The Honor able Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge f or the Southern District of * New Y ork, sitting by

designation. 09-0675-c v Ker cado- Cly

mer v. City

of Amsterda

m
U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT SUM M AR

Y O RD ER R U L I N G S B Y S U M M A R Y OR D E R D O N OT HA V E P RE CE DE N T I A L E F F E C T . C I T A T I ON T O A S UM M ARY O RDE R FI L E D ON OR AF T E R J ANUARY 1 , 2 0 0 7 , I S P E RM I T T E D AND I S GOVE RNE D BY FED ERA L R U LE O F A PPELLA TE PR O C EDU R E 32 . 1 AN D TH I S C O U R T’ S LO C A L RU LE 32 . 1. 1. W H EN C I TI N G A S U M M A R Y O R D E R IN A DO C U M ENT FI LED W I TH TH I S C O U R T, A PA R TY M U ST C I TE E I T HE R T HE F E D E R A L A P P E N D I X OR A N E L E C T R ON I C D A T A B A S E ( W I T H T HE N OTAT I ON “ S UM M ARY ORDE R” ) . A PA RT Y CI T I NG A S UM M ARY O RDE R M US T S E RVE A COP Y OF I T ON ANY PA R TY N O T REPR ESENTED BY CO U N SEL. At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of Ne w York, on the 25 day th of Mar ch, two thousand ten. Pr e se nt: RAL PH K. WI NTER ROBERT A. K

ATZ MANN, Circuit Judges , J ED S . RAKO FF,

District Judge
. *

________________________________________________ AN GE L I TAKE RCA DO -C LYM ER,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v. No. 09-0675-c v CI TYOF AM STE RD AM ,

Defendant , TH OM AS V . N . B RO WNE L L , a s Ch ie f o f t he Pol ic e of

the City of Am ste rd am and

in h is In d i v i d u a l C a p a c i ty,The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the off icial ca ption as set forth above
. ** -2- De fe nd an t- Ap pe lla nt. **

____________________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellee : J A M ES B. T U T T LE , The Tuttle L aw F irm, L atham, NY F or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt: C ARRI E M C L OUGHL I N N O LL , Pennock, B ree dlove & Noll,

L L P, Cl ifton Park, NY Appea l from the United States District Court for the Northe rn District of Ne w York (McCurn, J. ). ON CO NSI DE RA TIO N W HEREOF , i ti s h e r e b y OR DE RE D , AD JU DG ED , and DE CREED that th e de c isi on of the dis tr ic t c ourt

is RE VE RSE D in part and AF F IRM ED in pa rt . Def endant- Appellee Thomas B rowne ll appeals fr om a dec ision of the United States District Court for the Nor thern District of N ew Yor k (McCurn, J. ) deny

ing his motion for summary judgme nt based on qua lified immunity . Br ownell contends that even a ccepting Pla int if f- Ap pe lle e An g e lit a

Ke rc a do -C ly

me r’ s v e rs ion

of the fa c ts a

nd dr awi nga ll i nf

e re nc e s in her f avor, he is entitled to qualified immunit y as a matter of law

on Ker cado- Cly

mer’s dis c ri min atio n a

nd re ta liatio n c la ims . We a ssume the pa rt ie s’ fa mil iari ty wi th t he fa c ts, pr oc e dura l hi sto ry , a

nd sc op e of the iss ue s p re se nte d o n a pp e a l. This case is before us on interlocutory appea l from the district cour t’s Memorandum Dec ision and Order

denying B rowne ll’s motion for summary judgme nt based on qua lified immunit y . Be cause Br ownell ac cepts Ke rca do-Cly mer’s ve rsion of the fa cts for the purpose of this appeal, we have jur isdiction to hear this appea l. Se eMi tc he ll v . F or sy th , 472 U.S. 511, 526- 27 (1 98 5) ; Sa lim v . Pro ulx , 93 F.3d 86, 90 ( 2d Cir. 1996). Qu a lif ie d immun ity

sh ie lds pu

bli c-3-

of fi c ia ls “ fr om l ia

bil ity fo r c ivi l da

ma g e s in so fa

r a s th e ir c on du c t do e s n ot v iol ate c le arl y established statutory

or constitutional rig hts of which a r easona ble per son would have known.” Ha rlo w v . F

itz ge ra ld, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The district court denie d Br ownell’s motion for summary judgme nt based on qua lified immunity with respec t to Kerc ado-Cly mer’s c laims that he
c re ate d a ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt a

nd re ta liate d a g a ins t he r f

or c omp la ini ngof

his discrimination, concludingthat disputed issues of materia l fac t prec luded summary judgme nt. We reviewthe district court’s de nial of a summar y judgme nt motion based on qualified i mmun i ty de novo
. Fi nig an v . M ar sh all , 574 F.3d 57, 61 ( 2d Cir. 2009). We conclude that the district court er red when it denied B rowne ll qualified immunity on Ke rc a do -C ly

me r’ s h os til e wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la ims . K e rc a do -C ly me r a lle g e s th at B ro wn e ll
c re ate d a ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt b a se d o n h e r g e nd e r b y makin gse ve ra l se xua lly

and ra c ia lly derog atory

statements and by

denying he r desk duty

duringthe wee k, disciplining her for driving the wr on gwa

y do wn a on e -w ay str e e t, a nd de nyinghe r o ve rt ime op po rt un iti e s. To make out a hostile work environme nt claim, Ker cado- Cly mer must show that her “ workplac e is perme ated wi th d isc ri min ator

y int imi datio n, ri dic ule , a

nd ins ult that is su ff

ic ie ntl y se ve re or pe rv a siv e to alter the conditions of [her] employ ment and cr eate an abusive workingenvironment.” See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (c itation and internal quotation marks
o mi tt e d )
. B e c a

u s e K e r c a d o - Cl y

me r ’ s h o s ti le w o r

k e nv ir o nme nt c laim

is a p r o d u c t o f b o th s e xspecific verba l abuse a

nd other a dverse treatment, her task in showingthat the conduc t at issue was discr imination becauseof sexis made more dif ficult. Raniola v. Bratton , 243 F.3d 610, 621 ( 2 d Ci r . 2 0 0 1 )
. “ T o d e mo n s tr ateth at a ll o f th e a ll e g e d

a b u s e w a s s u f

f e r e d o na c c o unt o f

s e x, [she] may either show that the sex-based ver bal abuse indicated that other adver se treatment wasTh e dis tr ic t c ourt c or re c tly dis mis se d K e rc a do -C ly

me r’ s T itl e VI Ic la ims a g a ins t 1 Br ownell in his indivi dual ca pacity beca use under Title VI Iindividual supervisors are not subject to liabilit y . Se eMa nd

e ll v . Co un ty

of S uff olk , 316 F.3d 368, 377 ( 2d Cir. 2003). Individual -4- also on ac count of sex, or resor t to circumstantial proof that the other a dverse treatment that was not expl icitly

sex-based wa s, never

theless, suffe red on a ccount of sex.” Id . at 621-22. Her e, while Ke rca do-Cly mer a rgues that she wa s subject to sexual harassment on a regular ba sis, she only

points to a few incide nts of fac ially sexual harassment over

a thirtee n year period—B rowne ll’s comment about ra ping his wife , his remar

ks about her ha ir and he r relationship wit h her husba nd, and the inappr opriate postca rd he se nt to the prec inct. The other incidents alleg ed by

Ker cado- Cly

mer a s contributing to the hostile wor k environment we re not fa c ia lly re late d to se x. Ev e n ta

ke n to g e the r, ho we ve r, wh ile c e rt a inl y highly of fe ns ive , th e se ins tanc e s are fa

r l e ss s e ve re or

pe rv a siv e tha

n th os e fo r whic h w e have c on c lud e d th at a
rea sonable trier

of fa ct could find a

hostile work environme nt. See, e .g. , Ra nio la , 243 F.3d at 61 8- 22 ; Ho wle

yv . To wn o

f St ra tfo rd, 217 F.3d 141, 148- 49 (2d Cir. 2000). To be denied summary judgme nt on qualified immunity , an off icial must violate clea

rly established law. Harlow , 4 57 U. S. at 81 8. We c on c lud e that B ro wn e ll’ s a c tio ns , whil e pate ntl y ina pp ro pr iate , d id not violate clea

rly established law. Wit h respe ct to Ker cado- Cly mer’s r etaliation claims, howe ver, w e conc lude that the district court prope rly

denied B rowne ll summ ary judgme nt. To establish a prima f acie case of Title VI Ireta liation, a plaintiff must show (1) “pa rticipation in a protec ted ac tivity known to the defe ndant,” ( 2) “a

n employ ment action disadva

ntag ing the plaintiff,” a

nd (3) “ a ca

usal
connec tion between the protec ted ac tivity and the a dverse employ

ment action.” Richardson v. Comm’n on Human R ights &Opportunities , 532 F.3d 114, 123 ( 2d Cir. 2008). Any action that 1liability , howeve r, may lie under the New Y ork Human Rights L aw ( “NYH RL ”) where , as her e, the individual actually

participates in the conduc t givingrise to the discrimination claim. See Tomka v. Se iler Corp. , 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 ( 2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Bu rli ng ton In du s. , I

nc . v . Elle rth , 5 24 U. S. 7 42 (1 99 8) . We a pp ly fe de ra l st and ard s o f p ro of to discrimination claims brought under the N YHRL
. Ma nd e ll , 316 F.3d at 377. Furthe r, a se ction 1983 claim alleg ing disc rimination in viol ation of a pe rson’s right to equal protec tion may be brought ag ainst an individual, and Title VI Ilaw is utiliz ed to eva luate such c laims. Demore t v. Ze ga re lli , 4 51 F .3 d 1 40 , 1 49 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ). Thus , a lth ou gh K e rc a do -C ly me r’ s T itl e VI Ic la ims ag ainst Br ownell have been dismissed, Title VI Ilaw is used to eva luate her claims brought under the NYHRL

and sec tion 1983. -5- “could we ll dissuade a re asonable worke r fr om making or supporting a

charg e of discrimination” may constitute an adve rse e mploy ment action supportinga cla im for re taliation. Burlington N . & Sa nta FeRy . Co . v . W

hite , 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). Ac c e pti ngKe rc a do -C ly

me r’ s v e rs ion

of the fa c ts, sh e satis fi e s th e pr ima fa c ie require ments. First, she f iled a complaint with the Ne w York D ivision of Human Rights on Marc h 20, 2006, a prote cted a ctivity , and it is uncontested that B rowne ll knew of it. Second, a month after she filed the c omplaint, Browne ll caused K erc ado-Cly mer to re ceive a counse ling memorandum a

nd then seve ral months later he initiated disciplinary charg es ag ainst her f

or drivingthe wrongway

down a one -wa

y street lea ding to he r loss of ac crue d vacation tim e. He also banne d her f

rom desk duty

duringthe wee k. A re asonable trier of fac t could find that the
c ouns e lin gme mor and

um, dis c ipl ina

ry c ha rg e s, los s o f a c c ru e d v a c atio n, and ba n f ro m de sk duty could all dissuade a

rea sonable wor

ker f rom makingor supportinga cha rg e of discrimination. See W hite , 548 U.S. at 57. Third, a trie r of f act c ould find a ca

usal conne ction betwee n the complaint and the a dverse actions bec ause the y wer e close in time, and there was testimony that wh ile 99 pe rc e nt o f o ff

ic e rs ha d o n o c c a sio n d

ri ve n th e wr on gwa

y do wn a on e -w ay str e e t, o nly Ker cado- Cly

mer wa s disciplined for doingso. See Gordon v. N.Y . City Bd. of Educ. , 232 F.3d-6-

111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000) (“ [P ]roof of ca usation can be shown . . . indirectly , by showingthat the protec ted ac tivity

was followe d closely

by discriminatory

treatment, or through other circ umstantial evidence such as dispar ate tre atment of fe llow employ ees who eng ag ed in similar conduct.” ). This conc lusion is onl y bolstered by

Br ownell’s stateme nts to the press, such a s that Ke rc a do -C ly

me r i s “ a c hr on ic c omp la ine r, ” “ pr of e ssi on a l vi c tim ,” and

“ on e of [his ] wo rs t employees” who “blata

ntly lied,” “w as neve r qualified to be hired,” “has a lway s demande d specia l treatment,” “and c an’t be trusted,” f ollowing he r filingof this suit, and the testimony of a male off icer that Br ownell has a

reputation for beingvindictive. See id. (holdingthat causation may also be shown by

“evide nce of

reta liatory

animus directe d ag ainst the plaintiff by the defe ndant”)
. Finally , the right at issue was c lear ly established at the time of the adve rse e mploy

ment action. See Galdiere-Am brosini v. Nat’l Realty &Dev . Corp. , 136 F.3d 276, 291- 92 (2d Cir. 19 98 ); see als o Te rry

v . A sh c ro ft , 336 F.3d 128, 144 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (“disc ipline can be reta liatory if do ne to p un ish

an in div idu a l f

or c omp la ini ng ” ); Lovejoy- W ilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc. , 263 F.3d 208, 223 ( 2d Cir. 2001) (holdingthat “neg ative eva luation letters, express ac cusations of lying, [and] assignme nt of [less desirable duties]” may be conside red a dverse employ ment
ac t i o n s (qu o t i n g Morris v. Lindau , 196 F.3d 102, 110 ( 2d Cir. 1999))). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a lso pr op e rl y

de nie d B ro wn e ll’ s mo tio n f or summa ry jud g me nt w ith respe ct to Ker cado- Cly

mer’s c laim of reta liation in viol ation of the F irst Amendment. To establish a F irst Amendment claim of r etaliation, a public e mploy ee must show that “( 1) [her] speec h addre ssed a matter of public conc ern, ( 2) [s] he suff ere d an adve rse e mploy

ment action, and (3) a ca

usal conne ction exis ted betwe en the spe ech a nd the adve rse e mploy

ment action.”-7-

Cob b v . Poz

zi , 3 6 3 F. 3 d

8 9 , 1 0 2 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Ma nd e ll v . Co un ty

of S uff olk , 316 F.3d 368, 382 (2d Cir. 2003)). F irst, Kerc ado-Cly mer pre sents evidenc e that in August 2005 she spoke with a City

attorney about her own and other s’ complaints as par t of an investig ation of B r o wn e l l i n s t i g at e d

b y th e C i ty. This speec h addre ssed a matter of public conc ern. See Konits v. Va lle yStre am Ce nt. Hi

gh Sc h. Di

st. , 3 94 F .3 d 1 21 , 1 25 (2 d Ci r. 20 05 ) ( “ [W]he n a pu bli c
e mpl oye e ’s sp e e c h r e g ard s th e e xiste nc e of dis c ri min atio n in

the wo rk pla c e , s uc h s pe e c h is a matter of public c oncer

n.”). Sec ond, as explained above , she suffe red a n adver se employ

ment action. Third, to esta

blish causation, Ker cado- Cly mer “ must show that the protecte d speec h was a substantial motivating f actor in the adver se employ

ment action.” Cio

ffiv . A v e ril l Par

k Ce nt. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 444 F.3d 158, 167 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Whil e c a us atio n is no t a s c le ar h e re a s in Ke rc a do -C ly

me r’ s e qu a l pr ote c tio n r e ta liatio n c la im be c a us e the a dv e rs e a c tio ns did no t a s c los e ly

fo llo w the pr ote c te d s pe e c h, B ro wn e ll’ s st ate me nts in the newspa

per, a nd the testimony

of a ma le police of

fice r that B rowne ll was “vindictive,” support an infe renc e that the a dverse employ ment actions we re at least in part ca used by Ker cado- Cly

mer’s pr otected spe ech. Finally , at the time of the a lleg ed eve nts, it was clearly established that a g overnme ntal entity “may not inflict an adve rse e mploy ment decision upon an e mploy ee in r etaliation for the employee’ s exercise of [her] First Ame ndment rights.” Skehan v . Village of Mamaronec k, 465 F.3d 96, 107 ( 2d Cir. 2006), overruled on othe r grounds by Appel v. Spiridon , 531 F.3d 138 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 8) ; Catlettiex re l. Estate of Cat letti v. Rampe , 334 F.3d 225, 231 ( 2d Cir. 2003); Mu na fo v. Me tro. Trans

p. Auth. , 285 F.3d 201, 211 ( 2d Cir. 2002) (“T he employee’ s right to be fre e fr om such re taliation has bee n clea rly established since at least 1968.” ).-8-

We have c onsidered the rema inder of B rowne ll’s arguments and conc lude that they lack
me ri t. A c c or din g ly , f

or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e de c isi on of the dis tr ic t c ourt

de nyingB ro wn e ll summary judgme nt based on qua lified immunity on Ker cado- Cly

mer’s hostile wor

k environment
c la ims br ou g ht u

nd e r s e c tio n 1 98 3 a

nd the NY HRLis RE VE RSE D . The de cision of the district court is otherw ise AF F IRM ED . T his c a se is RE M AN DE D for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with this opi nion.

FOR THECOURT: CA TH ERI

NE O’ HA GA

N WO L F E, CL ERK