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S. Hrg. 114–691 

FRUSTRATED TRAVELERS: RETHINKING TSA 

OPERATIONS TO IMPROVE PASSENGER 

SCREENING AND ADDRESS THREATS TO AVIATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 7, 2016 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

JOSE J. BAUTISTA, Professional Staff Member 

SERVANDO H. GONZALES, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Detailee 

BROOKE N. ERICSON, Chief Counsel for Homeland Security 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

STEPHEN R. VIN ̃ A, Minority Chief Counsel for Homeland Security 

ABIGAIL A. SHENKLE, Minority Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

BENJAMIN C. GRAZDA, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 1 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 2 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 15 

Senator Enzi ..................................................................................................... 17 

Senator Ernst .................................................................................................... 18 

Senator Ayotte .................................................................................................. 20 

Senator Peters .................................................................................................. 22 

Senator Lankford .............................................................................................. 24 

Senator Portman .............................................................................................. 26 

Senator Heitkamp ............................................................................................ 28 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 32 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 39 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 41 

WITNESS 

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 2016 

Hon. Peter V. Neffenger, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .................................................... 4 

Hon. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ... 7 

Jennifer Grover, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 9 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Grover, Jennifer: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 68 

Neffenger, Hon. Peter V.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

Roth, Hon. John: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56 

APPENDIX 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record 

Mr. Neffenger .................................................................................................... 89 

Mr. Roth ............................................................................................................ 118 

Ms. Grover ......................................................................................................... 120 

(1) 

FRUSTRATED TRAVELERS: 

RETHINKING TSA OPERATIONS TO IMPROVE 

PASSENGER SCREENING AND ADDRESS 

THREATS TO AVIATION 

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 2016 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:14 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Johnson, Portman, Lankford, Enzi, Ayotte, 

Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp, Booker, and Peters. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON 

Chairman JOHNSON. Good morning. This hearing will come to 

order. I apologize for my tardiness. What should have taken 10 

minutes took an hour. But, I want to welcome the witnesses and 

try and catch my breath. I appreciate your testimonies. Obviously, 

there is a fair amount of interest in this hearing. 

I think, at the heart of what is currently ailing the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), is the fact that we really 

have two completely contradictory goals. On the one hand, we want 

efficient throughput, so we can get passengers to their flights on 

time. And, at the same time, we need to be 100 percent secure. 

All of this is being driven—we have to understand that the root 

cause of the problem here is Islamic terrorism. Since the inception 

of the TSA, we have spent about $95 billion just on TSA alone. The 

cost of Islamic terror to the world—to the civilized world—is enormous. So, if you really want to talk about addressing the root cause 

of the problem, we have to defeat Islamic terrorists where they reside. 

But, again, I appreciate all of the witnesses’ testimonies. The fact 

that we consciously made the decision to decrease the number of 

TSA workers—obviously, it did not work out very well. I appreciate 

the fact that we are beefing up training—a ‘‘Unity of Effort initiative.’’ All of these things are positive signs. I appreciate the fact 

that, Admiral Neffenger, you are working very cooperatively with 

both the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO). It comes through very clear in testimony. 
2 

1The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 39. 

So, again, I just apologize for being late. I do ask unanimous consent that my written statement be included in the record.1

With that, I will turn it over to Senator Carper and I will catch 

my breath. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Chairman, we are glad you are here. There 

were a couple of trains that were shot out from under me coming 

down from Delaware, so I know the feeling. 

Thank you all for joining us this morning. We are delighted that 

you are here. This is going to be a good hearing. This is going to 

be a really good hearing. It is a very timely hearing. 

As we all know, the Transportation Security Administration was 

created in the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11). 

And, we understand well the terrorist threat to our aviation system, which the Agency was created to combat. Having said that, 

though, we oftentimes fail to acknowledge an undeniable tension 

that exists—as alluded to by the Chairman—an undeniable tension 

that exists at the core of TSA’s mission. 

On the one hand, we ask TSA to screen millions of passengers 

and their luggage carefully every day to prevent explosives, weapons, and other dangerous items from finding their way on board 

our aircrafts. 

On the other hand, millions of passengers—we have been among 

them—we have all been there—want to get on board our airplanes 

on time and without the aggravation that security screening oftentimes can bring. 

Given the long wait times we have recently witnessed—at security checkpoints at a number of airports across America—we know 

that it can be difficult to strike the right balance between security 

and convenience. Some might even be tempted to say that we cannot have both—that effective security measures invariably bring 

with them inconvenience, lines, and even missed flights. I disagree. 

In fact, I believe that many of the problems we have witnessed at 

some of our airports are eminently solvable. But, first, we need to 

better understand the scope of the challenge and its genesis. 

After the DHS OIG produced a very troubling report last year, 

revealing vulnerabilities at TSA checkpoints, Admiral Neffenger 

took several steps to tighten security. And, while the steps that he 

and his team have taken have contributed to longer waits for some, 

there are other reasons why TSA has struggled lately. And, I want 

to talk about a couple of them. 

Resource constraints and increased air travel have played a significant role. TSA is being asked, literally, to do more with less. 

While inept management and ineffective leadership at some airports has been a major factor, the truth is that staffing at TSA has 

dropped by more than 10 percent since 2011. At the same time that 

staffing has gone down, passenger volume at our airports has increased by more than 10 percent. TSA must be nimble enough to 

handle this growth in air travelers, especially the surges that occur 

during the busy summer travel season—like we are seeing now— 

and at other times during the year. 
3 

The good news is that Admiral Neffenger and Homeland Security 

Secretary Jeh Johnson have moved quickly to reduce wait times 

and to do so without compromising security. Is there more that we 

can do? Sure there is—and I am going to talk about a couple of 

those things. 

But, based on the reports that we have seen, these efforts are already beginning to bear fruit. They helped to keep passengers moving during the busy Memorial Day weekend. But, let me just say 

this: Security on our airplanes and security in our airports—these 

are shared responsibilities. It cannot all be on TSA. It cannot all 

be on Admiral Neffenger and his leadership team. This is a shared 

responsibility. 

Congress must work with the Administration to ensure that the 

Agency has the resources it needs to effectively carry out their mission. Funding levels in appropriations bills awaiting action—we 

have some appropriators here. I just want to say that you folks are 

doing a good job, with respect to funding levels for TSA. And, the 

bills that are awaiting action in the Senate move us—and I think 

they move TSA—in the right direction. We need to enact those 

bills. 

But, airports and air carriers have an important responsibility to 

help reduce wait times as well. I have been very encouraged by the 

willingness of private sector stakeholders to step up and contribute 

their own resources and ideas to solving this problem. A longerterm solution is being demonstrated—we just talked about it back 

in the anteroom with Admiral Neffenger. It is being demonstrated, 

in real time, today, at London’s Heathrow Airport. In the spirit of 

my saying, ‘‘Find out what works and do more of that,’’ TSA 

launched a similar initiative last month. It is called an ‘‘Innovation 

Lane’’—there are a couple of them down in Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport—and I am sure we will hear more 

about them, today—and the partnership, between TSA and Delta 

Air Lines, to improve passenger throughput by, I am told, as much 

as 30 percent. 

While that concept shows great promise over the long haul, airlines have already taken a number of other steps that can make 

a difference, now, such as reassigning their own employees to help 

TSA in some places. Perhaps, the most important step we can take, 

though, is to continue to dramatically grow participation in trusted 

traveler programs, like TSA PreCheck, that speed screening for 

vetted passengers and shorten wait times for those not in TSA 

PreCheck lines, too. And, I am encouraged by the steps that TSA 

has taken so far to increase TSA PreCheck enrollments. We are 

told that enrollments have soared, from 3,500 people, per day, getting into TSA PreCheck a year ago, to, roughly, 16,000 a day at the 

end of last month. We look forward to learning more today about 

the additional ways that we can encourage enrollment in this program. 

In closing, it is important to keep in mind that there are still 

very real security threats to our aviation system. They are not 

going away. These guys are not stupid. They are trying to come up 

with new formularies in order to create bombs that are even harder 

for dogs to detect. 
4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Neffenger appears in the Appendix on page 43. 

Today’s solution may not work tomorrow. Those seeking to wreak 

havoc are always changing their tactics and these evolving threats 

require that we constantly adjust what we do at our airport security checkpoints and on our airplanes. 

Finally, we need to stay on top of the growth in air travel and 

the changing travel patterns, so that TSA and its partners are not 

caught, like they were, recently, dealing with logistical challenges 

that they are not prepared for. This is why strong leadership is so 

critical in order to see us through these very challenging times. 

Leadership is a lot like integrity. Senator Alan Simpson used to 

say, ‘‘Integrity—if you have it, nothing else matters. Integrity—if 

you do not have it, nothing else matters.’’ The same is true of leadership. And, I think we are blessed with enlightened leadership 

and we are grateful to you, Admiral Neffenger, for your willingness 

to serve. This burden is not just for you and your team to bear. 

This is a shared responsibility. Each of us needs to do our part and, 

if we do, we will be much safer as a Nation. Let us roll. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in witnesses, so if 

you will all rise and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the 

testimony you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the 

whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I do. 

Mr. ROTH. I do. 

Ms. GROVER. I do. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Please be seated. 

Our first witness is Admiral Peter Neffenger. Admiral Neffenger 

is the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration. 

Administrator Neffenger manages a workforce of nearly 60,000 employees and is responsible for security operations at, approximately, 440 airports throughout the United States. Prior to joining 

TSA, he served as the 29th Vice Commandant of the U.S. Coast 

Guard (USCG). Admiral Neffenger. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE PETER V. NEFFENGER,1 ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Thank you, Chairman. Good morning, 

Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and distinguished 

Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I sincerely appreciate the Committee’s oversight of and support for TSA and of our important counterterrorism 

mission. 

Since taking office on July 4 last year, I have traveled, extensively, to observe our operations and to meet with our employees— 

and they are truly impressive. Their patriotism, their sense of 

duty, and their commitment to our national security mission is exemplary. And, when I appeared before the Committee nearly one 

year ago, I committed to addressing the immediate challenges we 

faced in our security mission, while positioning TSA for the future. 

And, to that end, over the past 11 months, we have undertaken a 
5 

systematic and deliberate transformation of TSA. Our strategy has 

included three complementary elements: 

First, focusing on security effectiveness. In the wake of the Inspector General’s finding, that was our fundamental mission—and 

that is our most important mission. 

Second, resourcing to meet demand. 

And, third, transforming the system. 

We are holding ourselves accountable to high standards of effectiveness and we are supporting our front-line officers in their critical counterterrorism mission. 

We have renewed our focus on security. We have revised alarm 

resolution procedures. We have ceased engaging in risky practices. 

We have retrained the entire workforce. And, we have retooled our 

performance measures to ensure we stay focused on our critical security mission. 

With Congress’ help, we overhauled our approach to training at 

all levels of the Agency, including leadership training. And, we established the first ever TSA Academy on January 1 of this year, 

with initial course offerings focused on training front-line Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). This intensive training enables 

TSA to achieve consistency, develop a common culture, instill core 

values, and raise performance across the entire workforce. 

Second, we are resourcing to meet demand. With help from Congress, we halted the reduction of our screening workforce this past 

year. We are making investments in new technology, converting 

part-time officers to full-time, and shifting screeners and K–9 resources to high-volume airports. We have begun hiring into the 

Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) remaining consistent with our 

new concept of operations. And, we are conducting our operations 

more effectively. 

We completed a review of personnel policies and practices, which 

led to a number of significant changes. And, we are designing a 

Human Capital Management (HCM) system to address recruitment, development, promotion, assignment, and retention. 

Third, we are transforming TSA in fundamental ways to ensure 

a mature, enterprise-wide approach needed to have an Agency prepared to address the very real and sustained terrorist threat. We 

have reinvigorated partnerships with the airlines, airport operators, and the trade and travel industries. We are working closely 

with Congress to address the ongoing demands of our security mission. 

We are overhauling management practices across the Agency. We 

conducted an independent review of our acquisition program. We 

are building a new planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process. We are modernizing. Among other initiatives, our innovation team is taking advantage of existing technology to establish automated lanes at selected checkpoints. And, as noted, 

through a public-private partnership with Delta Air Lines, we 

have, recently, installed two new automated lanes. These were 

done in just 9 weeks and they became operational last month, in 

Atlanta. Initial results show dramatic improvements. We have 

similar projects planned with other major airlines and airports in 

the coming months. 
6 

This year, TSA is projected to screen some 742 million people. By 

comparison, in 2013, TSA screened 643 million people. So, our approach to screening requires a similar transformation and we are 

meeting that challenge head on. With the support of Congress, for 

our recent reprogramming request, we have brought on board 768 

new TSA officers. Our Federal Security Directors (FSDs) have redeployed Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs), as needed, to screening 

functions. We placed additional K–9 teams at our highest-volume 

airports and activated our volunteer National Deployment Force to 

surge to airports of greatest need—and we are beginning to see 

positive results. 

For example, nationwide, over Memorial Day, 99 percent of passengers waited less than 30 minutes in standard security lines; 93 

percent of passengers waited less than 15 minutes; and, in TSA 

PreCheck lines, 93 percent of passengers waited less than 5 minutes. 

Over that 6-day period, over this last Memorial Day, we screened 

10.3 million passengers. That is a 3-percent increase over the same 

period last year—and we did so effectively—and we did so in a way 

that protected the system. 

Four factors, in my opinion, have contributed to our ability to 

move people more efficiently and effectively through checkpoints. 

First, the new resources that we received from Congress, through 

the reprogramming and other proactive efforts, have allowed us to 

effectively open more checkpoint lanes at peak periods to manage 

the volume. 

Second, we placed a strategic focus on the seven largest airports 

in the system, because, if you can prevent problems from happening there, then you do not have problems that cascade throughout the system. 

Third, we established a National Incident Command Center 

(NICC). This allows us to focus, daily, on screening operations, 

hour by hour, at the seven largest airports, to look to see what the 

challenges are, as they develop—and to move resources, in nearly 

real time, to address those challenges. We have now expanded that 

to the top 20 largest airports—and this is a full-time command center, which will stay in operation. 

And, finally, we are conducting daily operational calls from that 

command center, airport-by-airport, with the airports, the airlines, 

and the Federal Security Directors, in order to ensure collaboration, information sharing, and the real-time movement of necessary 

resources. 

None of this would have been possible without the tremendous 

efforts of our front-line officers. They have performed admirably 

and they always deserve our thanks. But, we are not celebrating 

and we are not letting up. Passenger volume will remain high 

throughout the summer and we will need to continue to manage resources aggressively. 

In the short term, TSA, airlines, airports, Congress, and travelers, working together, can improve the passenger experience 

while maintaining security. I would like to thank the airlines and 

the airports, in particular, for hiring staff to support non-security 

duties in the airports. But, longer term, we know we have to continue to right-size TSA to ensure we meet the demands being 
7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Roth appears in the Appendix on page 56. 

placed upon us. We look forward to working with Congress to get 

it right, both in terms of staffing and in developing new approaches 

to aviation security. 

Our front-line officers are focused on their security mission. It is 

up to us to ensure that they have what they need. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, thanks for the 

Committee’s support, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Admiral Neffenger. 

Our next witness is John Roth. Mr. Roth is the Inspector General 

of the Department of Homeland Security. Before joining the Office 

of the Inspector General, he served as the Director of the Office of 

Criminal Investigations (OCI) at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) . Mr. Roth. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOHN ROTH,1 INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ROTH. Thank you. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me 

here to testify this morning. 

About a year ago, I testified before this Committee at a hearing 

about TSA. During that hearing, I testified that we remain deeply 

concerned about TSA’s ability to execute its important mission. At 

the time, I testified that TSA’s reaction to the vulnerabilities that 

our audits uncovered reflected TSA’s failure to understand the 

gravity of the situation. 

Since that time, we have conducted more audits and released 

more reports that challenge TSA’s management of its programs 

and operations. 

However, I believe that we are in a different place than we were 

last June. As a result of our audit reports and a vigorous response 

by DHS, TSA is now, for the first time in memory, critically assessing its deficiencies in an honest and objective light. TSA’s leadership has embraced the OIG’s oversight role and appears to be addressing vulnerabilities. 

However, we should not minimize the significance of the challenges that TSA faces and the risk that failure brings. The stakes 

are enormous. Nowhere is the asymmetric threat of terrorism more 

evident than in the area of aviation security. TSA cannot afford to 

miss a single, genuine threat without catastrophic consequences— 

and yet, a terrorist only needs to get it right once. 

Fortunately, TSA’s response to our most recent testing has been 

significant. DHS and TSA instituted a series of changes well before 

our audit was even final. As part of that effort, TSA initiated a 

‘‘tiger team’’ program that resulted in a list of 22 major corrective 

actions that TSA either has taken or is planning to take. We are, 

generally, satisfied with the response we have seen at TSA. These 

efforts have resulted in significant changes to TSA leadership, operations, training, and policy. 

We will continue to monitor TSA’s efforts to increase the effectiveness of checkpoint operations and we will continue to conduct 

covert testing. In fact, we have a round of covert testing scheduled 

for this summer and are presently developing the testing protocols. 
8 

Consistent with our obligations under the Inspector General Act of 

1978, we will report our results to this Committee as well as to 

other Committees of jurisdiction. 

We applaud TSA’s efforts to use risk-based passenger screening, 

such as TSA PreCheck, because it allows TSA to focus on high-risk 

or unknown passengers, instead of known, vetted passengers, who 

pose less risk to aviation security. 

However, while reliance on intelligence is necessary, we believe 

that TSA, in the past, has overstated the effect of a reliance on intelligence and a risk-based approach. 

The hard truth is that, the vast majority of the time, the identities of those who commit terrorist acts are, simply, unknown to or 

misjudged by the intelligence community (IC). What this means is 

that there is no easy substitute for the checkpoint. The checkpoint 

must, necessarily, be intelligence driven, but the nature of terrorism, today, means that each and every passenger must be 

screened in some way. 

Unfortunately, TSA made incorrect budget assumptions in 2014 

and 2015 about the impact that risk-based security would have on 

its operations. For the Administration’s 2016 budget, for example, 

TSA believed that it could reduce the screener workforce by more 

than 1,600 screeners—full-time employees—stating that risk-based 

security requires fewer resources and would allow TSA to transition to a smaller workforce. 

Likewise, in the Administration’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 request, 

TSA asked for a reduction of over 1,400 full-time screeners, based 

on claimed deficiencies and risk-based security. 

However, our testing and audits found that TSA had been incurring unacceptable risks in its approach. And, TSA has now eliminated some of the more dangerous practices that we identified. 

Moreover, we believe that, even if TSA had not changed its approach to screening, the planned decline in the screener workforce 

was far too optimistic. As a result, the long lines that we are seeing 

this summer are not mysterious: TSA, because of the decisions it 

made in 2014, has fewer screeners, but is facing more passenger 

volume than ever before. 

We will continue to examine TSA’s programs and operations and 

to report our results. In addition to the new round of penetration 

testing, we are in the process of conducting a number of audits and 

inspections, including a look at the Federal Air Marshal Service, 

their use of Behavior Detection Officers, and TSA’s oversight of the 

badges that are used to get access to secure parts of the airport. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I welcome any questions that you or other Members of the Committee may have. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Inspector General Roth. 

Our next witness is Jennifer Grover. Ms. Grover is the Director 

of the Homeland Security and Justice (HSJ) team at the Government Accountability Office. In this position, she oversees GAO’s reviews of TSA programs and operations. Ms. Grover. 
9 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Grover appears in the Appendix on page 68. 

TESTIMONY OF JENNIFER GROVER,1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. GROVER. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, other Senators, and staff. In recent weeks, travelers, 

Members of Congress, and others have raised concerns about long 

airport security lines. As you have both noted this morning, one of 

the challenges inherent in TSA’s mission is the tension between 

taking the time to do the job right and moving passengers through 

as efficiently as possible. But, first and foremost, TSA is responsible for ensuring transportation security. 

My statement today will focus on two points. First, changes that 

TSA made to improve the security effectiveness of its expedited 

screening programs, which likely contribute to today’s long lines. 

And, second, new information showing that TSA should improve its 

oversight of screener performance to ensure that screeners are carrying out their tasks accurately. 

First, regarding expedited screening, as we have heard already 

this morning, TSA has made recent changes to tighten security, 

which likely contribute to the long screening lines. In November 

2015, TSA modified its risk assessment rules, which reduced the 

number of passengers that were automatically designated as low 

risk. At the same time, TSA cut back, significantly, on its use of 

‘‘Managed Inclusion,’’ which is used to divert non-TSA PreCheck 

passengers into the TSA PreCheck lanes when they would otherwise be underused. TSA still uses this program at airports where 

passenger screening canines are available, but has discontinued its 

use otherwise. 

According to TSA, these changes were necessary to improve the 

security of their expedited screening programs and resulted in a 

20-percent decrease in the number of passengers receiving expedited screening. Despite the changes that TSA has made, GAO continues to be concerned about the effectiveness of the remaining 

‘‘Managed Inclusion’’ program. We await the results of tests, which 

TSA is planning, to evaluate the security effectiveness of the program, as we recommended in December 2014. 

My second point is about TSA’s oversight of its screener performance. Our recent review of screener training and testing showed 

that TSA could improve its oversight of the screeners’ ability to 

identify prohibited items. TSA conducts tests to monitor screener 

performance. However, we found that much of the testing data was 

missing over multiple years. For example, screeners are regularly 

tested on their ability to identify images of threat items hidden in 

carry-on baggage and TSA policy requires FSDs, who are the local 

TSA officials, to submit the data to headquarters. 

In every year from 2009 through 2014, TSA headquarters did not 

receive any of this data from a substantial percentage of airports. 

We recommend that TSA ensures that FSDs submit complete 

image testing results to headquarters, as required, for airports 

across the country. This is needed to confirm that the screener 

image testing is being carried out as intended and to allow for a 
10 

future national analysis of the data for trends that could inform 

screener training. 

We also found that TSA’s covert test results are not reliable. 

FSDs conduct covert testing at airports on a regular basis. But, 

when TSA headquarters brought in a contractor last year to independently perform the same tests, the contractor obtained noticeably different results. Specifically, screeners performed more poorly 

on the tests conducted by the contractor. TSA is in the process of 

determining the root cause of the differences, but initial results 

suggest that FSDs may have trouble obtaining anonymous role 

players to keep the tests covert. TSA has briefed its FSDs on the 

results and continues to work with the contractor to examine this 

issue. 

In conclusion, TSA has taken positive steps to improve the security effectiveness of its expedited screening programs, though these 

changes likely contribute to today’s long screening lines. Yet, more 

work remains for TSA to ensure that screeners are carrying out 

their tasks accurately. TSA should improve its oversight of screener performance by more effectively collecting and monitoring 

screener testing data and by ensuring the reliability of its covert 

testing data. 

Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Carper, this concludes 

my statement. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Ms. Grover. 

By the way, I appreciate the attendance. But, because we have 

pretty strong attendance, we will limit questioning rounds to 5 

minutes. And, I will start. 

Admiral Neffenger, we are putting an awful lot of weight on the 

expedited screening procedures—TSA PreCheck—that type of 

thing. What metric do you use or what do we know about how— 

how much faster is the throughput of that program? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. So, the difference between an expedited 

lane and a standard lane, roughly—at peak, if you have an efficient 

team working it, you can move about 250 people, per hour, through 

a TSA PreCheck lane. It is about 150, per hour, through a standard 

screening lane. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, it is about 75 percent faster—and that 

is just off of the top of my head. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. It is a significant improvement. That is 

right. 

Chairman JOHNSON. What percent—because we know the number of people that signed up for TSA PreCheck, but I do not know 

how often they travel. What percent of passengers, currently, are 

in TSA PreCheck? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, on a daily basis, we move about 30 

percent of the traveling population through TSA PreCheck lanes. 

So, that is the combination of people who have signed up for TSA 

PreCheck, people who are in cleared populations, like Department 

of Defense (DOD) individuals, who hold security clearances and the 

like, and then, a very small piece, based upon rules. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, we are all concerned a little bit about 

that algorithm, correct? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. 
11 

Chairman JOHNSON. This is what the Inspector General and 

GAO were a little concerned about that, I guess, they call that 

‘‘Managed Inclusion.’’ 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I would not call that ‘‘Managed Inclusion.’’ ‘‘Managed Inclusion’’ was the practice of taking truly unknown people and randomly assigning—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. We do not do that anymore. So, these are 

people who are looked at—they are looked at through a rules-based 

calculation and assigned a risk value. Again, it is a very small population. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, you are looking at that because we are 

a little concerned about that, correct? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I do know that there are about 200 adjudicators that are waiting to be approved by TSA. I know, in Milwaukee, people cannot sign up and get their application—they cannot apply. There is, I think, about a 45-day waiting period. Where 

are you, in terms of approving those adjudicators, so more people 

can sign up for TSA PreCheck? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, we have been working very closely 

with the vendor. We, actually, have all of the capacity we need to 

approve it. As long as we get a completed application—they have 

to fill out the standard form that we all fill out for security clearances. If we get a completed application, then we can process that 

application inside of 7 days—and that is the turnaround that we 

have right now. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I do know they are waiting at the Milwaukee airport. That application office is clogged. So, if you would 

check on that—— 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I will check on that. 

Chairman JOHNSON. I would appreciate that. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Where are we, in terms of new technology? 

You talked about two new automated lanes in Atlanta. Can you describe those in greater detail? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I will. So, these are two lanes—this is existing equipment. This is equipment that I first saw when I visited 

London’s Heathrow Airport last year. Essentially, if you just think 

of the current system—it is a fully manual system. You have to 

push your bag along a table. You have to engage the conveyor belt 

at the X-radiation (X-ray) machine. Then, you have to pull your bag 

out on the other side. And, it is a single-file system. You are in line 

behind whoever is in front of you and until their stuff moves 

through. 

So, first, it is an automated conveyor belt—so it is an automated 

roller system—an automatic bin return. There are five stations 

where individuals can stand, so you can move five people at a time 

up to the checkpoint. 

As you put things in your bin and push it onto the conveyor belt, 

you can cycle right in. So, there is no waiting for the person in 

front of you. 

And then, on the other end, it has an automatic divert. The bins 

have radio frequency identification (RFID) technology on them, so 
12 

they are tracked to the individual. It makes it much easier to divert a bag if there is an image of concern. And, it pulls the person 

whose bag has been diverted out of the line. 

The bottom line is we are seeing, just in the initial phase of operating these two lanes, about a 30-percent increase in throughput— 

at the same level of effectiveness. It also allows us to be much more 

effective on our end. To GAO’s point, one of the problems that we 

have is giving real-time, right-now feedback to an officer on their 

performance. This does that. It allows us to do real-time performance monitoring. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Are you looking at just better detection 

technology—better than the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) 

machines? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Are you really exploring that? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. In fact, what we are looking at— 

the next phase would be to incorporate computer tomography (CT) 

technology at the checkpoint. So, we now have a couple of approved 

systems that we can put in. We are looking to pilot one of those 

this summer. That gives us a much more defined ability to see 

what we are looking—it is a system we use in checked baggage and 

it is a substantial improvement over the X-ray. 

Chairman JOHNSON. We held a hearing on the ‘‘Dogs of DHS.’’ 

From what I have learned, I am incredibly impressed by, again, the 

ability—the nose of a dog. There is no technology that can beat it. 

Where are you, in terms of trying to beef up the number of 

K–9 units we have? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, as you know, TSA, itself, operates a 

little over 300 K–9 teams—of which 148 have been trained to do 

passenger screening. My goal is to get the rest of those trained for 

passenger screening. That will take about another 8 or 9 months 

or so. But, I would like to see a total of about 500 dog teams. That 

would allow me to really address the highest-volume airports in a 

very efficient way. 

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. I want to be very supportive of those 

efforts. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Neffenger, I want to go back to a conversation you and 

I had several weeks ago. There had been long waits and a lot of 

frustration at Chicago O’Hare International Airport. I urged you to 

go there and to see for yourself what had happened—what had 

gone wrong. And, I want to thank you for going. Tell us what you 

found. Tell us what has been done and what lessons you learned 

that you have been able to take away and to spread to other airports—to other security stations across America. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, thank you for that—and thank you 

for the opportunity to talk about that, earlier. There are a couple 

of pieces to that answer. 

The first is: What happened in Chicago? That was truly—in my 

opinion—and in my investigation—just a failure to get enough 

lanes opened in advance of what was anticipated to be a significant 

increase in volume for that day. It was sort of the first day of the 

volume season. We saw about a 13-percent increase in volume from 
13 

the previous week and we did not have enough lanes open. And, 

once you are behind, it is very challenging to catch up. 

So, the first thing we did was to look at what caused that and 

to make some immediate operational changes—opening a checkpoint earlier and making sure that the lanes are fully staffed when 

you do. We put a new, temporary management team in place, 

which, I am pleased to say, within 24 hours had really turned that 

situation around—and we have not seen a repeat of that. 

What we learned from that, though, is that you really do need 

to pay attention to these large hub airports. And, out of that really 

came the development of a daily National Command Center focused, specifically, on screening operations. We have always focused on our daily operations, but you need to really look at screening, checkpoint by checkpoint, at the major airports across the 

country. And, in this case, we decided to focus, for the Memorial 

Day weekend, on the seven largest airports. These are the big, 

multi-hub airports where all of the traffic originates, essentially. 

And, if you start to have problems in one, you are going to cascade 

it across the system. And so, by doing that—by taking the resources that we were able to put into place as a result of the reprogramming—overtime hours, new hires, as well as converting 

people from part-time to full-time—we dramatically increased the 

staffing available. And then, we watch it very carefully, on a daily 

basis, to make sure it is applied to the right locations. 

So, the lesson we learned out of that was that you have to be 

laser-focused on the actual operations, airport by airport, at the 

largest airports. And, you cannot let yourself get behind, because, 

once you are behind, it is like a traffic jam. It is very challenging 

to clear it out. 

Senator CARPER. Alright. Thank you so much. I talked earlier 

about leadership—the importance of leadership. I think we are 

blessed with the leadership that you provide. Talk to us about your 

ability to put in place around you the kind of leadership team that 

you need in order to lead TSA. And, also talk about the flexibility 

you have to put in place, whether it is at Chicago O’Hare or at 

other airports—the kind of leadership teams that will better ensure 

that we do not see the kind of jam-ups and confusion that we witnessed at Chicago O’Hare. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I have made a number of leadership 

changes over the course of the past year—some just in the past few 

months. It is critical that you get the right leaders in the right 

places. For the first time ever, we now have a Chief of Operations 

for TSA. Before that, we had a series of operational programs that, 

in my opinion, were not fully integrated. And, as a result, you can 

have a problem that arises without a vision for how to deal with 

that. So, we have a Chief of Operations, now. I have a new Deputy 

Administrator, I have a new Chief of Staff, and I have a new head 

of my Screening Operations section. Those have made a substantial 

difference. And, we have made some field changes, where necessary, to ensure that you have the right people in the right place. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you. 

The Chairman asked about the issue of TSA PreCheck contractor 

and staffing backlogs. I have heard some reports that there was a 

backlog. And, the folks that, actually, vet the TSA PreCheck appli-
14 

cants, there were not enough of them. And, there was a delay—as 

much as 40 days—in doing that vetting process. And, I think I just 

heard you say earlier, in response to the Chairman’s question, that 

that is really a 7-day wait—and that is not extraordinary. Is that 

correct? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, I think we have fixed the problem, 

with respect to clearing the contractor’s employees, who do the vetting work. So, we have a process in place. We can handle anybody 

they give us—and we can turn it around very quickly. 

What we are now working with the contractor on, is expanding 

the number of mobile enrollment centers ensuring that we balance 

their staffing workload, so that they provide staffing to the highestvolume locations. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Very briefly, tell us, what do we need to 

do? We are all about doing our jobs. We want you to do your job. 

We want your folks to do their jobs. What do we need to do, in our 

jobs, to enable all of you to be more effective? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. That is a great open-ended question. Well, 

Congress has been extremely supportive this past year. You have 

helped us to grow back some of the staff that we needed. I do believe that TSA is smaller than it needs to be in order to meet the 

demands of the system. It was extremely helpful to get those 1,600 

people, who we were slated to lose, back on the books. The TSA 

Academy has been a cultural game changer for us. And, more importantly, this recent reprogramming—we have another reprogramming that is pending. It has been approved by the Senate. It is 

pending before the House right now, which would allow us to bring 

on additional staff and, more importantly, allow us to continue to 

convert more part-time workers to full-time. Those are very important, because that helps us to address the challenge of just getting 

lanes manned at peak periods. 

The second piece is this very real need to transform the system. 

I mentioned those two automated lanes. That is an example of the 

ways in which we need to modernize and bring TSA into the 21st 

Century. And, this is not technology that does not exist. This is just 

using existing technology. I have technology—information technology (IT) backbone systems that have to be upgraded. I need to 

connect my systems in a way that they are not currently connected. 

I cannot, currently, see the health of the system, because I have 

independently operating entities out there that cannot be 

networked together for cybersecurity reasons. And, I need to do a 

better job of getting real-time performance data on my workforce, 

which I currently cannot get. It is a very manual system right now. 

So, those are the kinds of things that I intend to bring forward 

to Congress, over the coming weeks, in order to show we have a 

good—I think we have a good plan moving forward and a good 

strategy for addressing that. It will help us to address a lot of the 

concerns that the Inspector General and GAO have raised, with respect to performance. Their work has been critical, in terms of informing how we go forward with this. 

Senator CARPER. In closing, continue to let us know how we can 

help. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 
15 

Chairman JOHNSON. We are going to do questioning in order of 

arrival. Senator Tester. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you for 

your service, Administrator Neffenger. And, I want to thank you 

for your employees, too. As I have told you before, I do a lot of flying and, maybe, with one exception, these folks have been very professional—and that is over the last 10 years. So, thank you very 

much—not only for what you do, but for what the people who serve 

under you do. 

I want to talk about advanced imaging technology for a second. 

We have talked about it before—and the need to get it deployed 

throughout the country. Could you talk about—and I know you are 

under budget constraints—and that might be something we can do, 

as it applies to full-body scanners. But, could you talk about your 

progress on getting full-body scanners to the airports that do not 

have them, currently? How is that progressing? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. Well, we have now identified the 

number that we need in order to do that—and let me preface it by 

saying that I agree with you. I think that it is important that we 

get that capability everywhere that we need it, because we know 

that the terrorist groups are focused on their ability to get into the 

system. 

Senator TESTER. The weakest link. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. So, we are working through the Administration, right now—the Department of Homeland Security and the 

Administration—to put forward what we hope will be a request 

that will allow us to purchase the additional equipment that we 

need. Not every place can actually accept one, but, wherever we 

can put one, that is the goal. 

Senator TESTER. OK. Good. Thank you. 

For GAO and the IG, have you guys done any research into the 

effectiveness of magnetometers as opposed to full-body scanners 

and whether we should be concerned, on this side of the dais, with 

airports that only have magnetometers? 

Mr. ROTH. During our covert testing, we sort of saw both types 

of machinery. Without getting into the details, there is cause for 

concern, in terms of not having an AIT in a specific facility. 

Senator TESTER. Did you find the same, Jennifer? 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, they do different jobs. They are also looking for 

different things and have different purposes. So, there is a cost 

when you do not have an AIT. 

Senator TESTER. OK. And, Administrator Neffenger, you talked 

about new scanners that you are working on now, which will be 

more effective—which is good for you. I always worry about scanners—to know if I am getting radiated or not. Do you guys have 

protections? Are there parameters that you work under for health 

situations? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. So, the scanners that I was referring to are really the ones that are checking the carry-on baggage. 

Senator TESTER. Yes, but you said there would be similar technology applied to us. 
16 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Oh, no. If I did, then I misspoke. No, the 

technology that we are currently using is non-penetrating. It is just 

radio waves bouncing off—— 

Senator TESTER. Super. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. We have no intention of using anything 

else. 

Senator TESTER. OK. When I get on an airplane, I look out and 

the passengers have gone through the magnetometer or the fullbody scanner, whichever it may be—but there are people that work 

for the airlines—there are people who work for the airport. Can 

you tell me—do they go through the same procedure as the passengers? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Very few go through the same procedures 

as passengers. So, this is a population that has already been vetted 

against criminal databases and terrorist databases—and they are 

recurrently vetted. Some airports do screening—in the form of 

magnetometers and what might be called a ‘‘stadium check’’ of the 

bags—and then, they are subject to random screening throughout 

the day. But, the passenger screening environment is unique to the 

passengers. 

Senator TESTER. It is more intense than the screening environment for the people who work there, would you say? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I think, for passengers—remember, we 

know something about these individuals that are badged—that 

have badged access—so, you are doing continuous vetting of those 

individuals against terrorist databases and recurrent vetting 

against criminal databases. 

Senator TESTER. So, Administrator, tell me what recurring vetting means. What does that mean? Are you vetting them monthly? 

Weekly? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Daily. 

Senator TESTER. Daily. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Every single day, if you hold a badge, you 

are continuously vetted against the terrorist screening database 

and the extended categories that feed that database. 

Senator TESTER. So, you are comfortable with it? I mean, as the 

Administrator of the TSA, you are comfortable with the state of our 

screening procedures for those employees and the folks who work 

for the airlines and the airports. That is all I want to know. If you 

are not comfortable, then—— 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I think there is more work to be done. 

I think we need to keep our eye on the insider population. If you 

have a trusted population, you need to continuously verify that 

trust—and you need to do it in a way that is designed to deter, detect, and, ideally, disrupt—— 

Senator TESTER. So, when you find contraband items with those 

employees, do you keep a record of that? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. We do. If we find it, we keep a record. And, 

for contraband items, we work with local law enforcement to deal 

with whatever consequences might result from that. 

Senator TESTER. OK. And so, do you have the ability—if you find 

somebody that has contraband items—to get them terminated? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir, we do. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you. 
17 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Enzi. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ENZI 

Senator ENZI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, I thank you all 

for the testimonies that you have provided. 

I go home pretty much every weekend—to Wyoming, which 

means flying—and I tried to get into some businesses there, but I 

found out that any business that I am not familiar with looks pretty simple until I take a look at it. So, that is probably what we are 

seeing as we go through airports, too. But, I am worried about the 

management at the security points, themselves—not about whether 

they are stopping the bad stuff or not—but about whether they are 

getting people through the lines. Several times, I have found a 

manager at one of these checkpoints and asked him some questions—like why they had three people training one person on how 

to look at a driver’s license, instead of having two of those people 

helping somewhere else. 

I also find two podiums for one line to be able to get through the 

screening. So, they are continually holding up the line, because, if 

they let more people through, they get stacked up and cannot get 

through the X-ray machine to begin with. And yet, there will be another line over there that is not being used with X-rays. So, I am 

always wondering why the management does not say, ‘‘Just open 

one podium if we can only open one line through there or, otherwise, take that second person from the podium and help to staff a 

second line over there.’’ I am just not seeing any—and I am seeing 

the lines growing and growing behind me—and my result, when I 

have called in about some of these things, has been a call later saying, ‘‘When you are coming through the airport, if you will just let 

us know in advance, we will make sure you get through security.’’ 

I want you to know that is not the point. The point is I want my 

constituents to be able to get through the line just as easily—and 

I want to be able to do that. 

I have also seen one screener who took three times as long to 

look at the screen for the item coming through and called for somebody to do a bag check on almost everything that came through. 

And, nobody checked to see if that person was just extra careful or 

if they were actually finding those kinds of things. 

Also, at Dulles, I really like the little sign that they have that 

says how many minutes you have to wait in the different lines. 

One of the things that fascinates me here, in D.C., is that almost 

everybody is TSA PreCheck. So, the regular line is usually one 

minute. The TSA PreCheck line is 20 minutes. 

Now, in Casper, Wyoming, when you go through, they do not 

have a TSA PreCheck line and a regular line. But, if you have TSA 

PreCheck on your ticket, they hand you this orange card that you 

can take through with you. And then, you have the same thing— 

except for having to remove your computer—you have the same 

thing as if you were in a regular TSA PreCheck line. And, it kind 

of expedites things. So, instead of taking regular people and putting them in TSA PreCheck lines, sometimes, maybe, we ought to 

be taking TSA PreCheck people and putting them in a regular 

line—giving them an orange card, so that they can be expedited. 
18 

Another thing that I hear frequently is, ‘‘Why are there so many 

people that do not appear to have anything to do at the checkpoint?’’ And, my suggestion on that is the same as—it is that, if 

they do not have anything to do, is there some kind of a collection 

point where they can be out of sight at the moment, so that people 

are not counting how many people are just standing around? And 

then, there is a pool to draw from when there is another use for 

them. 

So, I guess, my question is—besides the observations that I have 

made—is there some kind of an incentive system for people to suggest improvements—for people that work for TSA to suggest improvements? And, how does that incentive system work? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. There is. And, as to your observations, one 

of the things that I have found—that we have found—is that, by 

focusing, as I said, daily, on screening operations, you start to identify some of those challenges that, maybe, you have seen. 

I suspect that those are problems here and there, because we are 

not seeing that widely across the system, but, what we can do, is 

rapidly identify those kinds of problems and then get the best practices out there. 

So, it is about front-line leadership. It is about supervisory leadership. And, it is the—measuring performance and then moving 

those measures of good performance to other places. So, that has 

been very helpful. 

I happen to believe that front-line people are, probably, some of 

your best sources of information for how to improve a process, because they see it. They live with it every day. And, in fact, when 

the people who are now operating those new automated lanes, 

down in Atlanta, first took a look at it, our TSOs, immediately, 

found even more efficient ways to operate it, because they, instantly, saw how much they could do differently as a result of that. 

So, we do have a program. I am happy to give you, for the record, 

kind of the details on how it works, how we collect information, the 

kinds of information that have come in, and then, how we put it 

to use back through the system. 

Senator ENZI. I appreciate that. My time has expired, but I will 

be submitting some questions about rural airports, where they 

have very few passengers, and some things that could be done 

there. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Enzi. Senator Ernst. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to 

Senator Ayotte for allowing me to jump ahead here in the questioning. And, thank you to all of our witnesses. You all have very 

important jobs. We want to make sure that our constituents are 

not only traveling comfortably, but we also want to make sure that 

they are traveling safely. So, thank you for taking on the roles that 

you have. 

Administrator Neffenger, it seems as though a lot of the issues 

that we are seeing—a lot of the underlying problems at TSA—come 

from a simple mismanagement of resources. We have heard a number of them, today. And so, I do think that is something that we 
19 

need to really hone in on. In Inspector General Roth’s written testimony, he noted that recent audits reflect issues with TSA’s stewardship of taxpayer dollars. And, as a straightforward example— 

and this is pretty blatant—but recent media reports revealed that 

TSA spent tens of thousands of dollars on a mobile application— 

and, maybe, you know where I am going with the ‘‘Randomizer.’’ 

It is a mobile application called the ‘‘Randomizer.’’ And, it is an 

arrow on the screen of an iPad that, randomly, tells passengers to 

go to the left line or to the right line. And, this is government 

spending here. This is the epitome of wasteful Washington spending. 

What we would like to hear is how you will assure us—and the 

American people—that TSA will take those taxpayer dollars and be 

responsible stewards of those dollars. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, Senator, thank you for that question. 

I found that pretty outrageous, too. As you know, that application 

was purchased, I think, in the 2013 timeframe—and we do not use 

it anymore, because we have stopped that process of randomly including people. 

I am very concerned about that. One of the things I did, when 

I was in the Coast Guard, was work on reforming our entire acquisition process—really setting clear requirements for why we do 

what we do and ensuring that those requirements lead to capability as well as ensuring that you do not buy capability that you 

do not need at a higher price than you should be paying for it. 

And so, when I first got here—within the first month—I brought 

in the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), which, as you know, 

is a semi-independent arm of DOD that looks at how we execute 

government procurement. And, they conducted a pretty in-depth review, over about a 3-month period, of our acquisition program. 

They have made a number of substantive recommendations, which 

we are beginning to put into place now. And, we are working with 

the Department and our other overseers to do that. 

I do not want to see us spend that kind of money. The money 

that we have is so critically important to the mission of security 

that I do not want to see any of it wasted as we go forward. And, 

I have committed to being as open and transparent as I need to 

be with, not only our current expenditures, but also the things that 

we have carried forward from the past, to ensure that we do not 

do that—and have invited oversight entities in to take a hard look 

at that. 

So, I am fully in your camp on that score. I cannot justify some 

of the actions that were taken in the past, but I can assure you 

that, at least under my watch, I will keep them from happening, 

again. 

Senator ERNST. Yes, we certainly cannot blame you for previous 

years’ Administration, but the thoughtful approach that you are 

taking is very much appreciated by many of us—and we hope that 

we can see that at all levels of TSA—and we hope to see continuous 

improvement. So, thank you very much. I appreciate it. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Thank you. 

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Ayotte. 
20 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank all of 

you for being here, today. 

I wanted to ask Admiral Neffenger—there were some pieces of 

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization bill 

that recently passed the Senate, including an amendment that I 

was a part of, addressing insider security threats, as well as an 

amendment focusing on the TSA PreCheck Enhancement Act—to 

ensure that you are able to expand that program. 

Are both of those pieces important to get passed? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. We are supportive of both of those pieces 

of legislation. They codify some things that we are already doing. 

I think that is important, because you want to ensure that you put 

good institutional practices in place for the future. So, both of those 

are positive for TSA. 

Senator AYOTTE. Good. Well, I hope that the House will take up 

the FAA reauthorization. 

I wanted to ask about—Admiral, as you state, they are concentrating on improving TSA protocols, retraining and refocusing the 

workforce, and driving technological improvements. One thing that 

you have not really mentioned, as an existing tool that could do 

that, is the Screening Partnership Program (SPP), where TSA acts 

as the oversight entity, but not the security operator—contracting 

with security companies. And so, what I have heard is that there 

are long waiting lines to get applications approved and that TSA 

does not seem to be that supportive of this program. 

Particularly, as we look at this program—just to use an example, 

in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, at Portsmouth International Airport at Pease—that is a SPP airport—and one of 22 airports, nationally, in the SPP. Unfortunately, what I have heard, from my 

local airport, is that TSA has imposed contracting limitations on 

Pease and the security contractor, which limit the flexibility of the 

staff at the airport to respond to dynamic needs. So, I guess I 

would like to know—it seems to me, when we have seen, for example, the implementation of the SPP partnership at San Francisco 

International Airport—are you interested in also looking at a vibrant Screening Partnership Program? And, does the Agency see 

SPP as a way to consider reducing lines? So, what is your view of 

this program? 

And, I do have a follow-up comment, because, having looked at 

what the Inspector General and also GAO has looked at, in this 

program, I know there is an outstanding issue, where TSA has not 

shared with the Congress—or with those who are conducting oversight—the cost estimates, so that we can, as policymakers, really 

compare the SPP programs to the fully TSA-run programs and decide what is the most efficient, effective way to operate security at 

the airports. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Thank you, Senator. When I came into this 

job, I was very interested in understanding the SPP program better. As you know, that is a program where an airport can request 

to bring in a private, contract screening workforce. That workforce 

is contracted to the Federal Government through TSA. 

Senator AYOTTE. Right. 
21 

Admiral NEFFENGER. But, they can choose to do so if they like. 

And, I have been committed to making that as straightforward a 

process as possible. In fact, we have streamlined, significantly, the 

application process over the course of this past year, so that they 

do not have long waits. It is governed, certainly, by the Federal Acquisition Rules (FAR), so there is a certain amount of waiting that 

is required just for the announcement, the bid process, and so 

forth. But, we have streamlined that significantly. 

I do not know the problem in Portsmouth and I will look into 

that for you, because I am not aware of the specifics of that case. 

Senator AYOTTE. OK. Well, I appreciate it. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. So, I will check into that. I would hope that 

it is not the case that there is anybody making it more difficult. 

We are officially neutral. If an airport wants to use a private 

screening contractor, we will work with them to ensure that 

they—— 

Senator AYOTTE. So, one thing I wanted to follow up with Ms. 

Grover on—as I understand, even though Congress has made this 

request, TSA has not yet reported cost comparisons, between the 

Federal and the private screening at SPP airports, to us, as policymakers. Is that true? 

Ms. GROVER. At the time of our report, which was in November 

2015, that is what we found. I do not know if TSA has taken actions over this past winter, but we did recommend that they should 

provide regular information to you about the relative costs. 

Senator AYOTTE. To my knowledge, it has not been produced. 

Has it been, Admiral? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, we have a deadline at the end of this 

month to provide to GAO those costs, so we have done that. It, 

now, includes the so-called ‘‘imputed costs.’’ The issue was that we 

were using just the costs to TSA, but it did not include retirement 

costs and so forth, which the rest of the Federal Government would 

pick up. So, now, the ‘‘imputed costs’’ are those things that are outside of the TSA budget, but that are still costs to the taxpayer for 

an employee at TSA. That is the piece that needed to be added in 

to give the full burden cost of—— 

Senator AYOTTE. Are we doing any comparisons on wait lines between the different programs and on this issue of management, in 

terms of efficiency, between the two programs? Are we going to get 

that information? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. We have, actually, done that. And, what we 

are seeing is comparable across the system, whether you are a private screening workforce or a Federal workforce. It has to do with 

making sure that the staffing is in place and that the staffing allocations are correct. But, right now, we are seeing, roughly, comparable wait times across the whole system—and, as I said, by 

really focusing on the biggest-volume airports, there has been a 

dramatic improvement in our ability to manage the lines effectively. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I hope that, with the information being 

transmitted to GAO, we will have an opportunity to see that analysis as well. Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. 
22 

I tell you, the one thing I love about this Committee is that the 

Members ask great questions. And, I want to quickly follow up on 

the SPP program. We talked about costs. We talked about the 

metrics. Is it the exact same process? Are those partners able to 

do it a different way or do they do it the exact same way that TSA 

does it? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. They train with TSA. They train at the 

TSA Academy. They are trained to the same standards. And, you 

have a Federal Security Director, a TSA employee, who manages 

the contract of that workforce or works with the contractor to manage the workforce. So, they should be performing to the same 

standards across the system. And, that is how—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, there would not be innovation on the 

part of those partners, in terms of screening. It is really done the 

exact same way. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, it currently is. 

Chairman JOHNSON. That process—I do not want to say ‘‘impose,’’ but, basically, they are required to do it the same way. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. There is, currently, a set of standards provided. You are right, yes, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Let us see here. Senator Peters? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 

thank our panelists for being here today and for your work. This 

is, obviously, tough work—the fact that you have to find a needle 

in a haystack, based on the numbers that are going through—but 

if that needle gets through, obviously, the impact could be catastrophic. So, we appreciate your efforts to keep us safe, but also to 

move us through very efficiently, as people are getting on those airplanes—and it is going to take the concerted effort of everybody to 

make that happen. 

We have, certainly, heard the horror story of what happened in 

Chicago—the delays that occurred there—and that have happened 

on, I think, a few occasions. But, I want to get a sense of what is 

happening around the country. Admiral, you talked about your 

focus on some of the major airports, but, obviously, we have many 

airports people are going through. Where are we, in terms of the 

overall system of airports? Are there a number of airports that you 

are concerned about? How would you break that down—the places 

where we have problems—as a percentage of the whole system? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I think that the positive side of this 

is that we are not seeing problems—if you take the top 20 airports, 

which represent about 58 percent of the daily travel volume—these 

are the big hub airports and then the lesser hub airports associated 

with them. The remaining 430 or so are really doing pretty well. 

It is a pretty healthy system. And, I look at this across—I see the 

results of every airport every day. And, we are, generally, moving 

people very effectively through the smaller airports. Every now and 

then you get a spot problem, because you will have an unexpected 

surge of people coming through, but, for the most part, they are 

moving very well. 

Where we have seen the problems, consistently, have been in 

those top 20 airports. When you get stories of long wait times, it 
23 

is there, which is why I really wanted to retool our approach to 

this, focusing, specifically, on those airports and making sure that 

you get the resources in there to get ahead of the expected surge 

of people coming. We get good data from reservation systems and 

the airlines on who to expect—make sure that you get your lanes 

manned at the time. So, I think that the positive side is, if you can 

work on those 20 airports, you can really, for the most part, solve 

the problems in the whole system. 

Senator PETERS. Well, speaking of one of those airports, the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, which is one that I hear about regularly—I travel through there as well. I will say, from my personal 

experience, when I have traveled—at least at the times that I have 

traveled—the volumes have been similar to what I have experienced over the last few years—although we still get complaints 

from my constituents, particularly, in the morning hours. Could 

you address a little bit of what is happening in Detroit—the good, 

the bad, and the lessons learned that would be helpful in Detroit 

as well as at other airports? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Actually, Detroit is a very good example. 

One, you have an exceptionally strong workforce there—a good 

workforce and a very stable workforce. We have been able to convert more of those employees to full-time positions. That is very 

helpful, because that immediately reduces attrition. A lot of people 

want full-time jobs. When they cannot get them, then they leave 

for a full-time job. You have a good management staff in place 

there and they have strong relations with the airport and the airlines that service it. I was, recently, in Detroit and had a chance 

to meet with the various partners in the airport environment. And, 

they all had—I believe, honestly so—good things to say about our 

folks there. 

What we have seen there is that it really is a matter of, first, 

ensuring that you get a checkpoint opened well in advance of the 

time that you expect the surge of passengers to come in. Second, 

that you work closely with the airlines and the airports to manage 

that surge, as it is moving from curb to ticket counter, to checkpoint. And then, more importantly, that you have fully staffed 

lanes. So, that is the absolute key to doing that. If you can do that, 

then you can, very efficiently, move those people through a line 

while doing the job the way we should—and moving them through. 

So, the lesson we learned from Detroit is, when they really got 

ahead of that—and, if you noticed, over Memorial Day weekend, 

they had exceptionally good numbers going through there. People 

moved through very efficiently. We did not have any extended wait 

times at all there. 

Senator PETERS. Great. And, in the remaining time here, Admiral, I appreciate your efforts on acquisition and procurement reform—and changing those systems. Certainly, it was very disturbing to Members of this Committee—and others—to see some of 

the media reports that occurred last year about equipment that 

was not performing the way it was advertised—and that people 

were able to get through items, in some of the tests, that were done 

for the IG and others. To what extent, going forward, are we going 

to hold the contractors that design and build these machines to 

much higher standards than they have been held to in the past? 
24 

And, they must be held accountable, because we simply cannot accept the types of failures that we have seen in the past. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I spent a lot of time with our major 

equipment contractors when I first came on board. And, we have 

had a lot of lengthy discussions about performance standards—performance of the equipment, maintenance of the equipment, and so 

forth—going forward. 

I am also very interested in seeing more participation by the private sector in the types of things that we are looking—the types 

of capabilities that we need. I think that we need more open architecture—we need the ability for some of the really talented, innovative minds out there to participate by increasing our ability to do 

the job more effectively. 

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Admiral. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Peters. 

By the way, when I am connecting in Detroit, it is really great 

for my FitBit challenges with my wife. A lot of long walks. 

Let us see here. Senator Lankford. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD 

Senator LANKFORD. Not as much as Charlotte Douglas International Airport is a help for that, but that is a whole different 

issue. 

Thank you all. I have been here for your testimony, today. I 

think everyone has reiterated the same thing and we want to make 

sure that you hear, loud and clear, from all of us: Safety is the primary consideration. We never want there to be a situation where 

you just say, ‘‘Let us speed everything up.’’ In fact, that was part 

of our conversation even, a year ago, when you were going through 

the confirmation process. And, the concern with the TSA PreCheck 

line is that TSA PreCheck had become a TSA PreCheck line plus 

another randomized—and we had so many people going through 

it—it was all about speed and there was a sense, from us, to say, 

‘‘We are losing a sense on safety.’’ And, obviously, from the IG’s report as well, to come back and say, ‘‘OK, we are also overly optimistic on staffing. So, we have a drop in staff and we have an increase in passengers and it is not rocket science to try to figure out 

why we have long lines to go through.’’ So, I just want to make 

sure everyone hears, loud and clear, we are still focused on safety. 

It is not just about speed, but there are also plenty of people, myself included, that, as we travel through airports, see TSA workers 

standing around or not in a hurry, when people are waiting in very 

long lines. And so, I think people understand the safety, but they 

also want to see some efficiency in the process. 

With that, let me just highlight a couple of things that I want 

to be able to bring up—one we have already briefly discussed. That 

is the innovation that happened in Atlanta. I would like to be able 

to talk more about how that could be multiplied. 

My understanding is that Delta Air Lines spent about $1 million 

researching a better way to do the TSA screening in their home 

airport, in Atlanta. They developed a system, partnered with TSA, 

and implemented the system. It has proven to be much faster. And, 

for $1 million, at that airport, their check-in is now much faster. 
25 

The concern I have is: Where can we have more opportunities for 

the private sector to be able to engage with TSA to help innovate 

in other areas and to be able to—not only put private sector folks 

in places that are non-security, but to allow for better innovation 

in the process as well? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, thank you for that question. This is 

where I see the greatest promise going forward. Originally, the 

whole idea came about as a result of seeing some of the work that 

had been done, in Europe, to create more efficient, more automated 

systems, as you move through. In discussions with a number of airports and airlines, shortly after I came in, I said that I was looking 

for opportunities to partner on some innovation pilots. Originally, 

it was just, ‘‘Hey, can we do a couple of pilot projects?’’ Delta Air 

Lines offered to jump in and purchase a couple of these automated 

systems. This happens to be one that is currently in use at 

Heathrow Airport—and they move very quickly. And, you are absolutely right. Just these first two lanes, alone, have shown tremendous promise, in terms of improving efficiency—about a 30-percent 

improvement, by their own count, in what we go through. So, I 

think that that is, certainly, a critical element of transforming the 

system. 

Other airlines and airports have come forward and said that they 

want to do the same thing. So, I put together an innovation project 

team, which is focused, specifically, on these public-private partnerships—managing it so you do not create a hodgepodge of systems 

out there. You really want to do something that makes sense and 

that takes advantage of existing technology—not just to automate 

the lane, but to look at the technology that can be added to that 

automation and that could, eventually, lead to electronic gates to 

let you into a checkpoint or that could move the identification (ID) 

check out to a kiosk—and then, you keep the person sterile as they 

come through—really building that true curb-to-gate security environment, as opposed to just focusing it all around the checkpoint. 

I am very excited we have a pretty good plan going forward. It 

is mapped out. We are building the architecture for that now with 

various airlines and airports that have expressed interest. We have 

about a dozen airports that have come forward—along with the airlines that service them—to talk about doing some of this transformation. And, this is happening over the course of the next 6 

months. 

So, I am happy to provide you with a more detailed brief on that, 

but I think you would find it promising. 

Senator LANKFORD. I think you would find plenty of people that 

are willing to help you innovate in the areas that are the pinch 

points—like the bags, which have been noted—to try to find ways 

to be able to evaluate how we, actually, move people faster through 

this spot and still get the innovation we have. 

With the innovation and the technology piece of it, that would 

still be the expectation, I think, of everyone on this dais as well. 

Early on in TSA’s history, there were a lot of overpromises made 

by some manufacturers. We overpurchased in some areas and 

ended up having, in warehouses, lots of equipment sitting there, 

unused. We, obviously, do not want to see that, nor do we want to 
26 

have equipment put in place that says one thing and actually cannot fulfill what it is stated to, actually, do. 

So, we want to make sure that that process stays in place and 

that all of our equipment—so, not only purchasing the right 

amount, but also having the equipment that, actually, can fulfill 

what it is being asked to do. So, thank you for that. And, I would 

ask for your continued attention on things like the TSA PreCheck. 

In Oklahoma, we had a computer glitch for a while, where, suddenly, you could not sign up for TSA PreCheck for a period of time. 

There are lots of other ways to be able to, not only show innovation 

in getting people through the line, but also in getting people registered for TSA PreCheck. And so, we can get that background, so 

TSA PreCheck is really TSA PreCheck and more people are able 

to actually go through that process and be able to be checked off. 

So, I would appreciate continued attention to that as well from 

all of those contractors, around the country, that are doing that. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. 

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Portman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Admiral, it 

is great to have you here before us. You are talking to a pretty 

tough audience here, because we are all frequent flyers. And, I go 

back and forth from Ohio, every week, a couple of times, I guess. 

We are also, though, all TSA PreCheck, I would think, and so, 

when I am in the TSA PreCheck line in airports in Cincinnati, Columbus, or Cleveland, it is a lot shorter. It is not like Dulles International Airport or Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, 

where a lot of people are in the TSA PreCheck program. And so, 

a lot of the questions we are asking you are not about TSA 

PreCheck, but about, how we can be sure and expedite everybody. 

And, by the way, the TSA folks who I deal with every week are 

courteous—they are professional—the vast majority of them. I remember being here at a hearing, recently, where Senator Carper 

said that he thanks them as he goes through—as I try to do. And, 

I say, ‘‘Thank you for keeping us safe.’’ They look at you kind of 

funny, like, ‘‘No one has ever said that to me before.’’ And, I think 

that was your experience, too. 

On the other hand, as taxpayers, they do all work for us. And, 

that customer service side of—— 

Senator CARPER. When I say that, people say to me, ‘‘Are you 

Rob Portman?’’ [Laughter.] 

Senator PORTMAN. I go incognito through there. 

But, you talked a little about the training and performance 

measurement—and, again, I appreciate your leadership and I am 

glad you are there. We talked a second ago about what you have 

done, with regard to Mr. Roth’s report that came out just before 

you were confirmed, in June of last year. But, in terms of the training, just quickly, on the customer service side, what are you doing, 

in terms of measuring performance and training? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, that was one of my big concerns when 

I came in. In fact, I extend it beyond customer service. This is what 

true public service is all about: providing an important service to 
27 

the public in a way that treats them with respect and dignity and 

that recognizes the inherent inconvenience of what you are doing. 

So, that is an important thing to do. 

So, we built that into our new TSA Academy training. So, for all 

of our new hires now, there is an entire component on what it 

means to be a public servant and who that public is that you serve. 

These are people who are your fellow citizens. And, there is a part 

of it where they say, ‘‘Think of these as your family members’’— 

assuming you like your family members. But, they say, ‘‘Think of 

these people as your family members, as they are coming through.’’ 

So, I hope people are seeing—and, anecdotally, we are getting reports that people are seeing a difference among the workforce, as 

they come through—and we have done that back through the entire workforce. It takes front-line leadership to make it work, so we 

are also working on that first-line supervisory leadership training. 

That is critical. We need to do more of that in TSA. It just had not 

been done consistently. 

Senator PORTMAN. I appreciate that attitude and that approach— 

and I know that is your personal approach. And, I do think, actually, it expedites the process as well. There is a safety aspect to 

this also—in addition to the fact that it is a matter of customer 

service for the taxpayers that are inconvenienced. 

This report from last June was incredibly troubling. Mr. Roth 

has not gotten to answer many questions—and I may not give you 

a chance here, either, but I am going to tell you about your report. 

Ninety-five percent of the time, TSA was not finding dangerous 

items. Security screeners failed to detect weapons, mock explosives, 

and other prohibited items 95 percent of the time. Shocking. This 

is before your time. 

We also found that there were 73 individuals employed by the 

aviation industry who were on terrorist ‘‘watchlists.’’ And, at the 

time, I asked some questions to you as a part of your confirmation. 

You indicated you were going to, immediately, put in place some 

things that Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson was talking 

about, to address both of those issues—and that you were going to 

look at the more systemic problems. 

Can you give us a quick report—where are we on that 95 percent? Mr. Roth said that you are continuing to do testing and audits, but you did not tell us what the percentage was. So, either 

of you, if you could answer that. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I cannot talk about the percentage of what 

we are finding in open session, but, what I will tell you is that, we 

are better. As you know, one of the biggest concerns I had was to, 

first of all, find out why we had a failure rate of that magnitude. 

And, as it turns out, it was really that we were asking the frontline workforce to do something directly in opposition to what their 

job was. If their job is to ensure something does not get past a 

checkpoint, well, then you cannot ride them about moving people 

faster through a checkpoint. And so, if I put myself in the shoes 

of the front-line officers, they are torn, thinking, ‘‘I am told I cannot hold things up, but I have something to look at.’’ 

So, we have gotten better at that. We retrained the whole workforce—and I think that we are significantly better. I am hoping 
28 

that the Inspector General’s testing bears that out, as we go forward. 

Senator PORTMAN. Mr. Roth, do you have anything to say on 

that? 

Mr. ROTH. As I indicated in my testimony, we are going to do 

some covert testing this summer. I will be candid in saying that 

we have taken a look at some of the red team testing that TSA has 

done. We think that our testing will be more objective and I think 

those results will be more accurate. So, we will wait and see what 

happens. 

Senator PORTMAN. This Committee will be very interested in the 

results of that test. And, in terms of the employees on terrorist 

‘‘watchlists,’’ I assume you are comfortable that that has been addressed? 

Mr. ROTH. Yes. Just so we understand, there are two lists. One 

is the ‘‘Terrorist Watchlist,’’ itself. And, the other is the Terrorist 

Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database, which is the 

larger list that supports the smaller list. They did not have access 

to the larger list. It was, largely, bureaucratic inertia—not on 

TSA’s part, but on DHS’s part—as well as on the intelligence community’s part. That has been fixed and we think that TSA now has 

all of the information it needs to be able to adjudicate those things. 

Senator PORTMAN. My time has expired, but I am going to ask 

a question for the record, with regards to Cuba. I am very concerned about the agreement the Administration has made with 

Cuba. I am concerned about reports I hear of TSA opening—not 

eight, but another additional two airports without any of the kind 

of screening that we would consider acceptable. And, these are all 

going to be, as I understand it, points of departure to the United 

States. I know there has been travel, for instance, from Afghanistan to Cuba, and so on. So, I will ask questions for the record 

(QFRs) on that issue. But, I want to express my concern, right now. 

We need to be sure that those airports are fully vetted and have 

the proper security screenings in place. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Heitkamp. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP 

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you 

for stepping up and serving your country once again, Admiral. We 

really appreciate this and we were very glad to confirm you. And, 

I can tell you, from this testimony and our dialogue, our trust has 

been well served. 

But, we have some business that needs to get taken care of. I tell 

people, occasionally, that, if you have ever been to a penitentiary 

and have the warden bring out a box, they have a box of handmade 

weapons—from toothbrushes that have been shaved off to just simply plastic knives that have been used to kill other people. And so, 

we have to be really careful that we do not overstate the risk that 

there is because, even though we are looking for traditional weapons, we let people on with knitting needles. So, we sometimes frustrate the public because they look at this through a lens of common 

sense. 

One of the things I want to ask is whether, when you look at the 

metrics—and it is for anybody here—and we look at this transition 
29 

now to bag fees that has resulted in more people taking carry-ons, 

I believe. Has that been a problem? And, is there a way to prescreen carry-on baggage that would help the line move quicker— 

and also would provide greater security, in terms of determining 

what is in the bags? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I will start the answers on that. The first 

thing is, we have been working really closely with the airlines—to 

the extent possible—to enforce the ‘‘one-plus-one’’ rule. It is the 

case that there is more stuff coming through a checkpoint—more 

carry-on baggage, by definition, is going to slow things down. 

The other thing is to encourage people to really double-check 

their bag—pack wisely. A prohibited item in a bag of any type 

causes something to stop for a moment while it is being checked. 

So, we encourage people to double-check their bags and make sure 

that they have not put anything in there that should not go. There 

is very clear information on the website now, explaining what 

should not go in there. If they have any question at all, they can 

always ask somebody as they come into the airport. 

So, I think, trying to keep the number of bags coming through 

to a minimum—so the ‘‘one-plus-one’’ rule is very important—and 

many of the airlines are working very hard to enforce that. And 

then, ensuring that passengers just double-check before they come 

through, because it will—one, it is an inconvenience to the individual that forgot that they left something in there. 

It is true that we find a lot of contraband items coming through. 

We had a phenomenal number of loaded weapons at checkpoints 

last year. It always astonishes me that people forget that they have 

a weapon in their bag when they come through. So, that, from my 

perspective, is one of the most important things we can do. 

We are looking at whether there are ways to do something different with carry-on baggage before you get to a checkpoint. But, 

again, that is a part of the technology improvements that we are 

considering. 

Senator HEITKAMP. I would really encourage you to think outside 

of the box on what could happen with carry-on luggage, because— 

more time to screen that—we are all standing in line with our 

carry-ons, right? Those carry-ons could, with a couple of extra lines, 

be screened ahead of time, as we are moving through the line. And, 

I think that would give you more time to actually check the carryon luggage. 

I can tell you, it is incredibly frustrating when you see someone 

bring something through that they should not have. Just a couple 

of weeks ago, I had a bottle of water in my backpack. How often 

do I fly? And, I have made that mistake. And so, you do not always 

know. 

I want to ask, finally, about the 2013 GAO report that noted that 

TSA could not provide evidence to justify its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) Program. GAO recommended that Congress should consider the absence of scientifically validated evidence for using behavioral indicators to identify 

threats to aviation security, while assessing the potential benefits 

and costs to making future funding decisions for aviation security. 

Obviously, DHS did not concur with GAO’s recommendation. 
30 

My question is: Have you reviewed that report? And, since you 

have been there, have you come to the same conclusion as DHS 

did, when they did the review initially? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I have reviewed that report and there 

are a couple of elements to this that I think are important. 

The first thing I did was figure out whether anybody else is 

doing behavioral detection of some sort. And so, quite a few law enforcement agencies around the world use it. There are other security agencies that do it. So, I think that there is some value in continuing to look at whether behavioral detection is a valid element 

to add in. It is never going to be a perfect system. 

That said, we are looking at how we can more effectively use the 

people that we have assigned as behavioral detection officers. As I 

said in my opening statement, we are pushing a lot of those people 

back into security screening duties this summer. We are having 

them work with K–9 teams, because I do think that there is some 

work to be done on the validation of the indicators—on the way in 

which we do behavioral detection. There may be some modifications 

that we will have to make in order to make it more scientifically 

valid. 

Senator HEITKAMP. I do not want to belabor the point, but it is— 

and can be—a very effective tool at checkpoints—at border crossings. There is a science to this. The question is: Are you applying 

the right science? 

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for the time. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Heitkamp. 

Just to pick up, that is really what Israel does, correct? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. They do. In fact, a lot of what the Israelis 

are doing has informed what we are doing—and we have trained 

with the Israelis on behavioral detection. 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, that is a far more intensive process, 

correct? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. It has more elements to it than we are currently using. That is correct. 

Chairman JOHNSON. There are a number of people proposing to 

force airlines to drop the baggage fees to allow more people to 

check bags. Do we really gain anything from that? We still have 

to run those bags through the detection system, correct? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. It is hard to know whether it would dramatically change the way things are. I think there is more to be 

gained by reminding people to minimize their carry-on baggage to 

the ‘‘one-plus-one’’ rule that the airlines require. That makes things 

a lot smoother at the checkpoint. I have concerns about the baggage system’s ability to handle checked bags without some modifications to the way we are currently doing it, in some airports. So, 

what I have committed to doing, with the airlines and airports, is 

to work on minimizing the amount of carry-ons, because a lot of 

that stuff gets gate-checked anyhow. I would just as soon prefer it 

does not come through the checkpoint if it going to be gate-checked 

on the plane—and then ensuring that we have the appropriate 

staff there to handle it. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, again, you are kind of confirming my 

suspicion that we do not gain a whole lot from that—and I, basically, agree with that. I think there is an awful lot to be said for 
31 

having the passenger stay with their bag, just in terms of security 

as well. 

Without getting into the details of the failure of the AIT machines, has there been any thought given to having an AIT machine followed by a metal detector? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. We have looked at that. And, in fact, as we 

look at what I call ‘‘transformation’’—but really changing the 

thinking behind screening—I want to get away from what is, essentially, a static system. We are looking at systems that integrate 

that technology. The challenge is that you have to be careful, because then metal detectors go off on people with artificial hips. So, 

there may be a way to do it. But, we are looking at ways to integrate more of the technology—and that is why I really want to activate the private sector more effectively than we have, because I 

think that there are ways to do this that are smarter. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Generally, the people who know they are 

going to set off a metal detector can talk about something, but that 

would really—— 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman JOHNSON [continuing]. Improve security, dramatically, 

would it not—if people went through both? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Go ahead. 

Chairman JOHNSON. General Roth. 

Mr. ROTH. Again, the two different machines look for two different kinds of things. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Correct. 

Mr. ROTH. And, my understanding, as far as the TSA’s protocols 

now, when there is an alarm on the AIT that is, for example, suspicious, they have the ability then to run people through—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. But, again, the failure—and I do not want 

to go into detail, but I have seen videos. There is a real problem, 

in terms of what one machine detects and what the other one does 

not. 

Mr. ROTH. Correct. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, if you would go through both, I would 

think that you would dramatically increase the level of security. 

Mr. ROTH. I will defer to TSA on that. Our testing has not shown 

that. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Admiral. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. What I would say is, it gets challenging to 

talk about this in open session. And, I would be happy to sit down 

with you, in closed session, to do so. But, we are looking at those 

kinds of capabilities. I am concerned about what one can do and 

what the other cannot do. I think the canines play a role, here and 

if I could sit down with you—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. So do I. OK. Well, we will talk about that 

in a closed session. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. OK. 

Chairman JOHNSON. And, again, listen, I truly appreciate reading the testimony. It came across very clear. As General Roth 

talked about, you are doing a great job at really looking at this 

honestly, admitting you have a problem and critically assessing 

what has happened in the Agency. So, I just want to ask the In-
32 

spector General, on a scale of 1 to 10, in terms of critical assessment, we have gone from what to what, in terms of improvement? 

Mr. ROTH. I mean, we have gone from night to day. I cannot put 

a number on it, but we went from a cultural situation, where we 

were fought at every turn, to one in which they now embrace oversight in a way that, I think, is a very sort of positive method. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, Admiral, that is to your credit and 

thank you for your service in doing that. 

Now, let me ask you the harder question. So, that is the first 

step in solving the problem. How about the actual implementation 

of the solutions? Where are we? Let us say we were at one. Where 

are we now, on a scale of 1 to 10? 

Mr. ROTH. I mean, we have a number of challenges—I will not 

underestimate it. With regard to the checkpoint and the covert 

testing, there is a 23-point plan that TSA has put into place. We 

are, generally, satisfied with the progress they are making. It is by 

no means complete. But, there are issues, not just at the checkpoint. There are issues with regard to TSA as a contract administrator, for example. There are issues as far as TSA as a regulator 

with local airports—how well they are regulating the local airports. 

We have considerable concerns about insider threat and the fact 

that there is a—while the Administrator talked about the recurrent 

vetting that occurs—the criminal vetting, it is a very static process. 

You are either convicted of certain offenses—enumerated offenses— 

or you are not. But, there is not a holistic look at an airport worker, who has unrestricted access to aircraft—unescorted and unrestricted access to aircraft. They are either sort of convicted or not 

convicted. And, if they are not convicted, there is no holistic vetting 

that would occur, for example, that I am familiar with—with Federal employees—where we look at a whole range of things before 

we determine whether they are trustworthy. 

Chairman JOHNSON. So, I hate putting words in people’s mouths, 

but, from the standpoint of taking the first step in solving a problem—it is admitting we have one. We have really taken that step. 

But, in terms of, actually, solving the problem, you would say 

that we have a long way to go? 

Mr. ROTH. That is correct. We did not get into this overnight and 

we are not going to—— 

Chairman JOHNSON. Admiral, you would probably agree with 

that, correct? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I would agree with that. I think that we 

have made some substantial progress in really enumerating what 

some of these issues are. But, these are issues that will take some 

time to correct. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Trust me. I do not envy your task. Again, 

God bless you for your service. Senator McCaskill. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to talk a little bit about the Senior Executive Service 

(SES). I understand, Mr. Neffenger, that the bonuses that were 

paid to the former Assistant Administrator happened before your 

time, but there was $90,000 in bonuses paid to the Assistant Administrator of the Office of Security Operations at the same time 
33 

that all of those tests were failing—where the IG was conducting 

the tests and showing that 67 out of 70 weapons got through. And, 

those bonuses were paid in a way to hide them. They were paid 

over time, obviously—clearly exceeding a 20-percent cap. 

I know that you have made changes to make sure that does not 

happen again, but this is really a symptom of this Senior Executive 

Service, I think, and the lack of reform that has occurred with the 

SES. 

I like to point out every time I get a chance, on the record, how 

the Senior Executive Service began. And, it began, frankly, as an 

idea that I think the Chairman would agree with—that you need 

to get talent in management and government. So, the idea is that 

you would hire competitively with the private sector and these 

managers would go from Agency to Aagency and gain expertise. 

Well, that has long since been abandoned. These are people who 

burrowed in one agency, that hang out long enough to figure out 

how to get an SES position, and then they get paid a lot more— 

and this is where we have seen a lot of abuse, in terms of bonuses. 

So, let me ask you this: With your reforms, is there any connection between bonuses paid and whether the Agency is succeeding? 

In the private sector, the bonus pool changes based on how the 

company did. And, it has not been that way in government. I do 

not think anybody, looking objectively at TSA over the last couple 

of years, would say that the bonus pool should be really big. 

So, are you now tying bonuses to the performance of the Agency 

and not just the performance of the individual? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. It is a combination of both, now—and I 

want to just also preface it—or add—that I have severely limited 

both the type and the number of bonuses that can be handed out 

in the Agency. And, I have put controls on it above me. My concern 

was that the Agency had the ability to independently assign bonuses. I now require Department oversight for that—and I have 

asked the Department to do that. 

So, I am a strong believer in controls. I believe that there is a 

need to have the ability to get bonuses when people have done good 

work. You want to keep good people in government. So, the notion 

and the practice of bonuses is not, necessarily, a bad one, but it has 

to be managed carefully—it has to be controlled and it has to be 

appropriate. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Because, if you look at the data, no one 

could, objectively, look at the data and say that TSA has high 

marks, in terms of the things you look at for management, in terms 

of morale and turnover—on all of the measurements out there. So, 

I think you are trying to do better, in that regard. I think we need 

to look at SES reform in a larger capacity—not just at TSA. But, 

I think there are just a lot of issues with the Senior Executive 

Service. 

I also have some serious concerns, related to this, about whistleblower retaliation. I read, with interest, the article that was published, in April, about the high level of whistleblower retaliation at 

TSA. The case that really struck me was the man who took his 

case all of the way to the Supreme Court and won on whistleblower 

retaliation—that had been wrongfully fired and he lost 10 years— 

it took him 10 years to win. He lost 10 years of promotions and 
34 

TSA said, ‘‘Well, we cannot speculate how much he would have 

been promoted in 10 years.’’ They put him back in his other job, 

and, frankly, he is still getting passed over to this day. 

I would ask you, Mr. Roth, how does TSA compare to other DHS 

components, as far as the number of whistleblower complaints and 

the number of whistleblower retaliation complaints? 

Mr. ROTH. We have not done a study on that. That is something, 

certainly, that would be interesting to know, so I can take that 

back. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. And, what can we do about the lost 

years of salary, compensation, and promotion for the time period 

that someone litigates them for being treated unfairly? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, the individual you are speaking of did 

get full back pay for that full 10-year period—along with all of the 

associated cost-of-living (COL) increases that would have occurred 

during that time—in addition to other things. So, he got a sizable 

payment for back pay—and it included the cost-of-living increases. 

I understand that he has ongoing litigation, so it would be inappropriate for me to comment any more on that, because I want to 

make sure that he gets the appropriate due process. I am committed to supporting people who bring forward complaints. I am 

committed to them being treated fairly and I absolutely will not 

stand for retaliation inside the Agency. 

I understand that there have been allegations of that and, in one 

case, proof of that, in the past. My position is, I do not want to inadvertently bias any action going forward, so if you have pending 

litigation, we will support that going forward. We will work with 

the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), as necessary and, more importantly, I will take swift action against people if they do something, 

on my watch, that indicates that they have retaliated. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would love to get a response to the people 

whose stories are laid out in the New York Times article, as to the 

Agency’s position on these people, what occurred, and how this has 

been made whole. The woman who was forced to leave her assignment after she complained—there are a number of them in here, 

as you know. It is pretty damning. And, it says it is much higher 

than, for example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which has 

many more employees, in terms of the rate of complaints. It went 

up significantly—the number of complaints. So, I want to take a 

look at that. 

My time is up. I would say, on the record, that I hope you are 

thinking about every airport—you have a group of frequent flyers 

up here. Everyone flies home every weekend. No one uses TSA 

more than all of us, because we are flying twice a week coming 

back and forth to work. And so, we see an awful lot in airports. 

I am bombarded with kiosks wanting to sell me everything from 

sunglasses and pillows to cases for my iPhone. I would love to see 

a kiosk for TSA PreCheck. I mean, how simple would it be to put 

up a kiosk, in the airport, for someone to sign up for TSA 

PreCheck. It would not be that expensive and, frankly, you could 

probably staff it, especially in the non-peak hours, with people who 

are waiting for surges of people coming for flights. I bet you could 

do it pretty cost-effectively at $85 a pop. That is a hell of a lot more 

than a lot of cell phone covers. 
35 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I think the vendor is looking at dramatically increasing the number of mobile sites just for that reason. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Kiosks. Not an office somewhere that you 

have to go—— 

Admiral NEFFENGER. No, no. These are—— 

Senator MCCASKILL [continuing]. Down into the bowels of the 

airport, back by the lost luggage, to find it. I am talking about 

right there, neon letters, with a big smiley face. Maybe we could 

even sell cell phone covers at the same place. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Just to follow up on that, E–ZPass is not the 

same. We have a much different vetting process with E–ZPass, as 

opposed to TSA PreCheck. But, when you come into Delaware, we 

collect tolls on I–95. There is a fairly easy place—very visible, right 

on the road—to stop off and, if you want to get an E–ZPass, you 

can. The same thing with our ‘‘north-south’’ highway that goes 

down to our beaches. It is easy to just pull off and get yourself an 

E–ZPass. So, I think that is a good idea. 

I am going to ask a series of questions and I will ask for very 

brief responses, if you will, Admiral. I apologize to General Roth 

and I apologize to Jennifer for not asking more questions, but my 

colleagues have asked several that I wanted to, so thank you very 

much for the good work that you and your teams are doing to make 

TSA better. Make them better. 

Admiral, I was struck by the apparent success of TSA’s efforts 

to reduce wait times ahead of the Memorial Day holiday. According 

to the news reports that we talked about here today, security 

checkpoint wait times were mostly average—I think 99 percent of 

passengers waited fewer than 30 minutes to pass through screening—with 93 percent waiting under 15 minutes. Just take a minute 

and tell us how you and your team were able to cut wait times in 

such short order. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Really, four things. 

First, we got new resources through the reprogramming: thousands of overtime hours, we were able to convert people from parttime to full-time, and we moved additional K–9 units into the largest airports. So, that was number one. 

Second, the standing up of a national—focusing on the top 7 airports, primarily—looking across at the top 20 in addition to that. 

That allows us to address problems at the places where they begin. 

Third, having the National Incident Command Center to manage 

that on a daily basis—to look specifically at the checkpoint screening operations. And then, the daily phone call with each airport, 

Federal security director, and the airline partners in that airport, 

airport by airport, across the top airports. 

Senator CARPER. Alright. I mentioned in my opening statement 

that we have included, in the appropriations legislation reported 

out of Committee, by the Senate Appropriations Committee, some 

additional monies for human resources, for personnel resources, for 

dogs—canines—and, maybe, for some infrastructure improvements 

and technology improvements. Do you still believe that is going to 

be needed? 
36 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Absolutely, yes, sir. 

Senator CARPER. That is all I need. Thank you very much. 

Talk to us about the role that your employees have played, in 

terms of—they are on the front lines. They see this stuff every day 

and talk to people every day. How do you ask them for their ideas 

and make sure that their input is gathered and actually acted on? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I think we still need to become better 

at that, but what I have tried to do is to—both anecdotally and 

more formally—solicit information on how best to do the job that 

we are doing. So, we bring them in on short-term details to our 

technology office. They work in our test facility. They give us ideas 

as to how to improve what we are doing. When we were looking 

at these automated lanes, for example, we brought some front-line 

TSOs up and said, ‘‘How would you run this thing? ’’ 

So, there is a lot of just great tactical knowledge that they have 

in their head on how to do this job better, from day to day. And, 

we are trying to capture that in a much more systematic way. 

Senator CARPER. One of the ways I have always found to improve 

employee morale—whether it is in the Federal Government, the 

State, or some other regard—is training. Folks on my staff, particularly, folks in Delaware, love to come to D.C., where we have specialized training for them, regardless of what their jobs might be. 

Not only does it allow for folks to do a better job, but their sense 

of self-worth is enhanced as well. So, I want to encourage you to 

continue to do the training that is going on down in Glynco, Georgia at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC). 

The other thing I want to ask is, you talked a little bit about the 

range of weapons that we find—that your folks find on passengers 

trying to get onto a plane. And, I think you actually have an 

Instagram feed to display some of those. Can you just take a 

minute and tell us, if you will—speak about some of the dangerous 

items that TSA screeners discover in carry-on baggage and at the 

checkpoint—and the importance of careful and effective security 

screening in order to identify some of the overt threats. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, we have seen a lot of loaded handguns come through checkpoints. Last year, I believe it was somewhere around 2,700 handguns were confiscated at checkpoints. 

Many of these are not just loaded, but they have rounds in the 

chambers—so these are weapons that are dangerous. 

Two weeks ago, we had two smoke grenades—live smoke grenades—found in carry-on luggage coming through. 

You get a lot of inert items coming through—things that look like 

grenades, but those are of concern, too, because, you cannot tell 

from a distance. Quite a few knives, concealed weapons, and canes 

with knives—with swords embedded in them. You name it. And, 

somebody is trying to bring it through a checkpoint. Throwing 

stars, brass knuckles, and all sorts of stuff that you just do not 

want on an aircraft—in an aircraft environment—given what we 

know to be the way some people have been acting lately. 

Senator CARPER. Good. The last thing I will say is that I was 

elected Governor in November 1992. Along with other newly elected Governors, in November 1992, we went to ‘‘New Governors 

School’’ 2 weeks after the election. It was hosted by Roy Romer, 

who was then the Chairman of the National Governors Association 
37 

(NGA), the Governor of Colorado. I learned a lot. It was like 3 days 

and the faculty was existing governors and their spouses—the 

‘‘grizzled veterans,’’ I called them. And then, there were the 

newbies—those who had just been elected—Governors-elect and 

their spouses. And, one of the best lessons I learned during those 

3 days was from one of the Governors, who said, ‘‘When you have 

a problem—when you face a problem in your State as Governor— 

do not make a 1-day problem a 1-week problem or a 1-month problem or a 1-year problem. Own the problem. Take responsibility for 

the problem.’’ Say, ‘‘This is what we are going to do. We are going 

to fix this problem. Apologize and then do it.’’ 

And, the way I watch you perform in your role as the head of 

TSA, I am reminded of that advice. And, I do not know that you 

will ever be a Governor, but you are, certainly, prepared with the 

training you have gone through as well. 

I am going to close with the Preamble to the Constitution. We 

are very proud of the Constitution. Delaware was the first State 

that ratified the Constitution. For 1 whole week, we were the entire United States of America—a pretty good week. And, the Preamble to the Constitution begins with these words: ‘‘We the people 

of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union . . .’’ 

It does not say to form a perfect union. We did not. We continued 

to amend the Constitution over time. And, the idea is to always get 

better. How do we get better? And, clearly, TSA is doing a better 

job. We are grateful for that. We are anxious to know how we can 

help to make that happen even more expeditiously. 

We want to thank our friends at GAO and the IG’s office for the 

good work that they are doing to help, if you will, the wind beneath 

your wings—and to say, ‘‘Let us keep up the good work.’’ 

The last thing is, we were in Africa about a year ago with our 

family on a family vacation. I heard this old African saying: ‘‘If you 

want to go fast, travel alone. If you want to go far, travel together.’’ 

And, in this instance, this is a team sport. We are going to travel 

together. And, I think, to the extent we do, we are going to go a 

long ways toward where we need to go. Thank you—so that other 

people can get where they need to go. 

Thank you. 

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

Again, I want to thank our witnesses. Admiral Neffenger, really, 

we do appreciate the enormity of your task—the significant challenge—but I think you have really shown that you have taken 

some pretty great strides. And, that first step is admitting we have 

the problem. And then, starting to work in a very methodical and 

very military fashion, quite honestly, which I think we all appreciate. 

Inspector General Roth and Ms. Grover, thank you for your contribution to this effort as well. Again, thank you for your time, your 

testimonies, and your answers to our questions. 

With that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days until 

June 22 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and questions 

for the record. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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