If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

June 10, 2021

v No. 352858

Livingston Circuit Court

MICHAEL RYAN WEINSTEIN, LC No. 14-022342-FH

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and SAWYER and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, the People of the State of Michigan, appeals on leave granted1the order of the 

trial court granting the request of defendant, Michael Ryan Weinstein, to dismiss his felony 

conviction of assault by strangulation, MCL 750.84(1)(b), pursuant to a plea agreement between 

the parties. We reverse and remand. 

I. FACTS

The charges against defendant arose from a complaint of domestic violence by defendant’s 

wife, Amanda Weinstein. On the night of October 24, 2014, police were dispatched to the home 

of defendant’s brother-in-law, who had allowed defendant, Amanda, and their three children to 

move into his home temporarily because the family was homeless, Amanda was pregnant, and the 

couple and their children had been living in their van. Amanda reported to police that when 

defendant arrived home that evening, she and defendant quarreled. When she refused to give him 

the keys to their van, he broke a window of the van with a brick, searched the van, and took the 

money from her wallet. When she tried to stop him, he twisted her arm and pushed her, and she 

fell against a wooden post. He then grabbed her by the neck and began choking her. After 

defendant released her, the police were called, and defendant was arrested. 

 

1 People v Weinstein, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 29, 2020 (Docket 

No. 352858). 
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On February 6, 2015, defendant pleaded no contest to one count of assault by strangulation, 

MCL 750.84(1)(b), and one count of domestic violence, second offense, MCL 750.81(3). The 

Special Attachment to the guilty plea form stated, in relevant part:

The Defendant will plead no contest to both counts as charged in the 

Information, as well as all enhancements. Defendant will be granted 5 years[’] 

probation, with no early discharge or program time. The terms and conditions of 

the probation shall include:

- The Defendant shall successfully complete the LACASA Batterer’s 

Intervention Program.

- The Defendant shall undergo a mental health evaluation and comply 

with all treatment recommendations.

- Any other terms as set by the court.

If Defendant is in complete compliance with all terms and conditions, and 

successfully completes the probationary period, the People of the State of Michigan 

agree to dismiss the conviction for Count 1: Assault by Strangulation. The 

conviction for Count II: Domestic Violence Second Offense would remain, 

resulting in an effective reduction to a misdemeanor offense. 

This probation shall be zero tolerance, meaning any failure to comply with 

any of the above terms or conditions shall result in a loss of the opportunity to earn 

the reduction, as well as subject the defendant to further resentencing as may be 

appropriate. 

At the final settlement conference, the prosecution confirmed the parties’ agreement, 

stating the terms of the plea agreement consistent with the written agreement. The trial court then 

advised defendant:

The Court: . . . This probation shall be zero tolerance, meaning any failure to 

comply with any of the above terms or the terms I placed on this record, or the 

conditions that are contained in this record shall result in the loss of the opportunity 

to earn the reduction, as well as subject you to any further sentencing as may be 

appropriate, understood? 

The Defendant: Yes. 

The Order of Probation entered by the trial court stated the terms of probation imposed by 

the trial court, including the requirement that defendant immediately notify his probation officer 

of any change of address. At the request of Amanda Weinstein, the trial court permitted defendant 

to have contact with her and the children, but not at her apartment. The trial court ordered that 

defendant was not to be within 500 feet of Amanda Weinstein’s residence, and explained to 

defendant that “you may not have any physical contact with Amanda Weinstein at that apartment. 

I want to make sure that for the time being that she’s got a safe haven, which is her apartment with 
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the kids. You can see those kids somewhere else, but I want you staying out of there, as that’s the 

safest circumstance.”

On May 13, 2015, less than three months after sentencing, defendant was charged with a 

probation violation, specifically, with failing to notify the probation department regarding his 

change of address and being with Amanda Weinstein within 500 feet of her home. He pleaded 

guilty to the violations, explaining that he left the address that he had given to his probation officer, 

and had been “staying in the woods and staying at friends[’] houses,” but had not reported this to 

his probation officer. He also admitted that he had been at Amanda’s home. Defense counsel 

explained at the hearing that defendant had joined Amanda at her home after their youngest child 

was born because the family had been in chaos, and defendant was assisting with the children. The 

prosecutor clarified that Child Protective Services (CPS) had become involved with the family and 

reported to the probation department that defendant was living in the home. The trial court 

determined that defendant had violated the terms of his probation and sentenced defendant to six 

months in jail, with credit for time served, and with his probation to continue thereafter. 

On May 24, 2018, defendant moved for early release from probation. The prosecutor 

opposed the motion because a term of the plea agreement was five years’ probation with no early 

release. During the hearing on the motion, defendant referred to the condition of the plea 

agreement that the felony be dismissed upon his completion of probation. The prosecutor 

responded to this comment by stating “[w]ell, the violation [of probation] would have dispensed 

with his ability to have the misdemeanor [sic] reduced.” The trial court denied the motion for early 

release, and explained to defendant that the parties were bound by the terms of the plea agreement. 

On January 21, 2020, defendant moved for dismissal of the felony assault conviction upon 

the anticipated completion of his probation. At the hearing on the motion, the prosecution argued

that defendant was not entitled to that benefit of the plea agreement because of his May 2015 

probation violation. The record indicates some confusion at the hearing regarding the extent of 

defendant’s 2015 probation violation. The following exchange occurred:

The Court: This is it on the violation? The failure to notify the agent of 

the change of address? 

The Defendant: I didn’t have an address at the time. 

* * * 

The Court: All right. What I’m gonna do is this. The ah – in looking at 

these papers, I am going to grant your request to have this reduced, because the 

violation is not for any assaultive bad conduct. It’s untruthful with the probation 

agent, in that he failed to notify the agent of a[n] address change. As for what was 

being charged, which was, you know what you were being punished for was the 

domestic violence and assault. Seems like your behavior has been good from that 

point. Did you complete all the counseling you were supposed to do?

The Defendant: Yes, your Honor. 
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The Court: All right. Um, so you completed the LACASA Batter[er’]s 

Intervention Program?

The Defendant: Yes. 

The Court: All right. Did you complete the – did you undergo and 

complete the mental health and comply with all treatment recommendations? 

The Defendant: Yes, I’m still in counseling.

The Court: All right. All right, well those are the specific terms that were set out 

there. You got that done and your behavior as far as what brought you here has 

been good. I respect if your wife had some issues that were unhealthy like that, I 

think ah, the sprit and the -- have been complied with. . . . 

The trial court entered an order granting defendant’s request to dismiss the felony assault 

conviction. This Court thereafter granted the prosecution leave to appeal the trial court’s order. 

II. DISCUSSION

The prosecution contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the felony assault 

conviction. The plea agreement between the parties permitted the dismissal of the felony 

conviction only if defendant completed his probation with no violation of the plea agreement, a 

term of which was total compliance with all terms of probation imposed by the trial court. Because 

defendant violated the terms of his probation, he failed to comply with the terms of the plea 

agreement and therefore was not entitled to dismissal of the felony conviction. We agree. 

“Plea agreements are an ‘essential component of the efficient administration of justice.’ ” 

People v Rydzewski, 331 Mich App 126, 138; 951 NW2d 356 (2020), quoting People v Martinez, 

307 Mich App 641, 651; 861 NW2d 905 (2014). The basis of plea bargaining is the broad 

discretion of the prosecutor in determining what charges to bring. Id. at 651. The prosecution has 

a “constitutional interest in being entrusted with the authority to charge defendants. If a court 

could ‘maintain its acceptance of the plea over the prosecution’s objection, it would effectively 

assume the prosecutor’s constitutional authority to determine the charge or charges a defendant 

will face.’ ” People v Smith, 502 Mich 624, 646; 918 NW2d 718 (2018) (opinion by VIVIANO, J.). 

This Court has consistently held that a plea bargain, although analogous to a contract, is 

“not governed by the standards of commerce but must comport with the interests of justice in the 

administration of criminal laws.” Martinez, 307 Mich App at 651, citing People v Reagan, 395 

Mich 306, 314; 235 NW2d 581 (1975). Because a plea bargain is more than just a contract between 

two parties, the trial court’s interest is to see that justice is done. People v Siebert, 450 Mich 500, 

509; 537 NW2d 891 (1995) (opinion by BOYLE, J.). However, although a plea agreement must be 

reviewed within the context of serving the administration of justice, “it is one thing to review a 

plea deal in that context and another to refashion a plea deal to further what that court may think 

is the goal of criminal justice in a given case.” Smith, 502 Mich at 647 n 76. 

This Court has applied the clear error standard to a trial court’s decision to enforce a plea 

agreement. See People v Abrams, 204 Mich App 667, 672-673; 516 NW2d 80 (1994). Because 
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contract principles apply by analogy to plea agreements, People v Swirles (After Remand), 218 

Mich App 133, 135; 553 NW2d 357 (1996), the interpretation of a plea agreement is reviewed by 

this Court de novo. See Kloian v Domino’s Pizza LLC, 273 Mich App 449, 452; 733 NW2d 766 

(2006). We review any factual findings of the trial court for clear error. MCR 2.613(C); People 

v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). 

In this case, there is no dispute that a valid plea agreement existed between the parties and 

no dispute that defendant failed to comply with the terms of the plea agreement because he violated 

his probation. The only dispute is whether defendant is entitled to specific enforcement of a benefit 

of the plea agreement even though he failed to comply with the agreement’s terms. On appeal, the 

prosecution asserts that defendant is not entitled to specific enforcement of the plea agreement, 

and relies in part on this Court’s decision in People v Walton, 176 Mich App 821; 440 NW2d 114 

(1989).2 

In Walton, the prosecutor charged the defendant with burning of insured property. The 

parties entered into a plea agreement that allowed the defendant to plead to a misdemeanor if the 

defendant cooperated in an investigation being conducted by a police unit known as COMET. The 

prosecutor thereafter determined that the defendant had not fully complied with the agreement to 

cooperate, and the defendant filed a motion for specific performance of the plea agreement. The 

trial court granted the defendant’s motion to enforce the plea agreement, finding that although the 

defendant had not fully cooperated with the COMET investigation, he had cooperated with other 

investigative agencies and therefore had substantially complied with the plea agreement. Walton, 

176 Mich App at 824. 

This Court reversed the trial court’s decision in Walton, holding that a plea agreement 

“must be reviewed within the context of its function to serve the administration of criminal justice,” 

as well as contractual principles. Walton, 176 Mich App at 825. This Court did not specifically 

reach the issue whether the contractual principle of substantial compliance applied to plea 

agreements, holding that the record in that case did not support the trial court’s finding that the 

defendant had substantially complied with the agreement. Id. at 825-826. The prosecutor had not 

agreed that the defendant’s cooperation in investigations by other agencies would fulfill the 

defendant’s obligation under the plea agreement; accordingly, the defendant’s cooperation with 

other agencies could not support the trial court’s finding that the defendant fulfilled his obligation 

under the plea agreement. Id. at 825. This Court explained:

The circuit court specifically found that defendant did not cooperate with 

COMET. On the basis of this finding, the circuit court should have concluded that 

 

2 MCR 7.215(J)(1) requires this Court to follow a rule of law established by a prior published 

decision of this Court issued on or after November 1, 1990, that has not been reversed or modified. 

That court rule does not state, however, that older cases of this Court are not precedentially 

binding. This Court has observed that published cases of this Court issued before November 1, 

1990, are regarded as retaining meaningful authority. Woodring v Phoenix Ins Co, 325 Mich App 

108, 114; 923 NW2d 607 (2018). In addition, MCR 7.215(C)(2) provides that a published opinion 

of this Court has precedential affect under the rule of stare decisis. People v Bensch, 328 Mich 

App 1, 7 n 6; 935 NW2d 382 (2019). 
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defendant did not live up to his part of the bargain and, hence, had no right to 

specific enforcement of the prosecutor’s obligation to amend the information so as 

to allow defendant to plead guilty to a misdemeanor offense. Compare People v 

Olsen, 155 Mich App 294; 399 NW2d 66 (1986); People v Acosta, 143 Mich App 

95, 98-99; 371 NW2d 484 (1985) (a defendant has no right to specific performance 

where he fails to meet an agreed-upon condition precedent). The circuit court’s 

failure to make this finding was clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C). [Walton, 176 

Mich App at 825-826.] 

Similarly, in Abrams, 204 Mich App at 672, this Court held that the trial court erred by 

dismissing a charge against the defendant when he failed to comply with the plea agreement. 

There, the defendant was charged with drug-related offenses, and entered into a plea agreement 

providing that he cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of others involved in drug 

trafficking. The agreement provided that if the defendant violated any part of the agreement the 

entire agreement would be void. Although the defendant assisted with the investigation and 

prosecutions, he violated other provisions of the agreement by engaging in criminal activity. As a 

result, the prosecutor charged the defendant with the offense underlying the plea agreement. The 

trial court granted the defendant’s motion to quash the information and dismiss the charges, finding 

essentially that the defendant had substantially complied with the plea agreement by cooperating 

extensively with law enforcement and concluding that “the administration of justice was well 

served by this agreement.” Id. at 671. 

On appeal, this Court held that the trial court erred by dismissing the charges against the 

defendant, concluding that “the administration of criminal justice was best served by allowing the 

prosecution to pursue its case against defendant for his breach of the agreement. . . . The trial court 

clearly erred in finding otherwise.” Abrams, 204 Mich App at 672-673. In accord, People v Kean, 

204 Mich App 533, 535-536; 516 NW2d 128 (1994) (because the defendant violated the terms of 

his plea agreement he was not entitled to the benefit of the bargain of the agreement). 

In this case, the trial court properly considered the interests of justice when resolving this 

issue, but failed to follow this Court’s decisions in Walton and Abrams, which held under similar 

circumstances that the interests of justice were not served by the defendant receiving the benefit 

of a plea bargain after the defendant failed to comply with a condition precedent to receiving the 

benefit. In doing so, the trial court overlooked the logical conclusion that it would not serve the 

ends of justice to allow defendants to receive the benefit of their plea agreements despite not having 

lived up to the terms of those agreements. Rather, allowing the benefit of the bargain under such 

circumstances might incentivize defendants to disregard certain conditions and would place courts 

in the unenviable position of attempting to determine which violations are “serious enough” to 

warrant enforcement of the agreement terms. 

Here, the plea agreement specifically provides that defendant is only entitled to the 

dismissal of the felony assault conviction if he completed five years’ probation with full 

compliance with the plea agreement, including full compliance with all court-imposed terms of 

probation. The Special Attachment to the guilty plea form described the agreement as “zero 

tolerance,” and it was referred to in this way by both the prosecution and the trial court. The parties 

do not dispute that defendant violated his probation; he moved into his wife’s home contrary to 

the probation terms the trial court ordered, and the trial court determined that this was a violation 
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of his probation.3 Nonetheless, the trial court found that defendant had complied with the “spirit” 

of the plea agreement because his probation violation was based not upon assaultive behavior but 

upon being untruthful to his probation officer about his address.4 As in Walton and Abrams, we 

conclude that the trial court in this case erred by ordering specific performance of the plea 

agreement when defendant did not qualify to receive that benefit because he had failed to comply 

with his obligations under the plea agreement. Defendant’s failure in this case to fully comply 

with the terms of the plea agreement was a failure to fulfill a condition precedent to receiving the 

benefit of that bargain. 

Defendant argues, however, that the prosecutor waived his right to raise defendant’s 

noncompliance with the plea agreement because the prosecutor did not raise this argument in 2015 

when the trial court sentenced defendant for violating his probation. Waiver is “the intentional 

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” People v Buie, 491 Mich 294, 305; 817 NW2d 

33 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “One who waives his rights under a rule may 

not then seek appellate review of a claimed deprivation of those rights, for his waiver has 

extinguished any error.” Id. at 306 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In this case, at the time the trial court sentenced defendant to six months in jail for violating 

the terms of his probation, the trial court stated that after the jail term the probation would continue 

“with all original conditions.” Defendant argues that the trial court’s statement was a 

determination by the trial court that the plea agreement was still in effect, specifically the provision 

regarding potential dismissal of the felony assault conviction upon completion of the five years’ 

probation. This argument conflates the terms of probation imposed upon defendant by the trial 

court with the terms of the plea agreement established by the parties. The trial court’s order that 

probation would continue “with all original conditions” appears to refer to the conditions of 

probation, not the terms of the plea agreement. 

Defendant argues, however, that by not specifically challenging the trial court’s statement 

in 2015 that probation would continue with “all original conditions,” the prosecutor was waiving 

the zero-tolerance provision of the plea agreement. We disagree. The plea agreement provided 

that defendant would plead no contest to the two charges and would be sentenced to five years’ 

probation. The agreement provided the additional benefit to defendant that he also could earn 

 

3 We observe that when sentencing defendant for his probation violation, the trial court did not 

find that defendant had complied with the “spirit” of the probation terms imposed by the trial court, 

nor did the trial court deem defendant’s violation insignificant. Rather, the trial court rightly found 

that even though defendant’s conduct had not been assaultive, he nonetheless had violated the trial 

court’s order of probation, earning the consequence of jail time. 

4 The record in this case does not support the trial court’s finding that defendant’s only probation 

violation was a failure to report his change of address. Defendant was arrested and charged after 

he violently attacked his pregnant wife. He received probation under the terms of the plea 

agreement, and the trial court specifically cautioned defendant that a term of his probation was that 

he not come within 500 feet of his wife’s home. Less than three months after sentencing, CPS 

reported that defendant was living in his wife’s home. 
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dismissal of the felony assault conviction upon completion of the five years’ probation if he fully 

complied with the terms of the agreement with no violations. At the time defendant was sentenced 

in 2015 for his probation violation, the defendant’s 2020 request to enforce the additional provision 

of the plea agreement was not before the trial court; in 2015, defendant had not completed his 

probation and was not attempting to enforce the plea agreement, and the trial court did not rule on 

the enforceability of the plea agreement. The prosecutor therefore did not waive the challenge to 

enforcement of the plea agreement by failing to raise it in 2015.5

The trial court erred by dismissing the felony assault conviction. The record demonstrates 

that defendant violated his probation and thereby violated the plea agreement. Although the trial 

court could consider the interests of justice as well as contractual principles when enforcing the 

plea agreement, the interests of justice are not served by permitting defendant to receive the benefit 

of a plea agreement with which he has not complied. 

Reversed and remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We 

do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

 

5 Although not determinative here, we note that the prosecutor raised this challenge in 2018 during 

the hearing on defendant’s motion for early release from probation. During the hearing, defendant 

referred to the condition of the plea agreement that the felony assault charge would be dismissed 

upon his completion of probation. The prosecutor responded to this comment, asserting that 

defendant’s 2015 probation violation would preclude defendant from obtaining that benefit. Thus, 

although it was not required that the prosecutor challenge the enforcement of the plea agreement 

before defendant attempted to enforce the agreement, the prosecutor advised defendant and the 

trial court as early as 2018 that he considered defendant’s 2015 probation violation to have violated 

the plea agreement.