Filed 2/4/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRET STEPHEN LANDEN,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B286062

(Super. Ct. No. 15F-11592)

(San Luis Obispo County)

The victim of this crime is a local school district. The 

defendant is ordered to pay restitution to the school district. 

Some of the loss the school district suffered was reimbursed by 

the state. 

Because of the state’s inextricable relationship to the school 

district, the state is also a direct victim of the defendant’s crime 

and is entitled to restitution. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 

Cal.4th 668, 680.) The amount of restitution the defendant must 

pay does not change. Only the party to whom some of that 

restitution must be paid changes. However reprehensible a 

defendant’s conduct, restitution due the victim should not exceed 

the loss suffered.
2

Bret Stephen Landen appeals a judgment following his no 

contest plea to making threats to use a weapon of mass 

destruction (Pen. Code, § 11418.5, subd. (a))

1 and making 

criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)). The trial court placed him on 

five years of supervised probation. After a restitution hearing, it 

ordered him to pay the Atascadero Unified School District 

(District) $235,341.17 as restitution. We conclude, among other 

things, that the court should reduce the amount of restitution to 

the District by the amount of reimbursement the District 

received from the State of California (State) ($68,722.56) for 

average daily attendance (ADA) funds. We reverse. On remand,

the trial court shall order Landen to pay restitution to the State 

in the amount of $68,722.56. In all other respects, we affirm.

FACTS

During June or July 2015, Landen stole the keys to the San 

Gabriel Elementary School, a school which is part of the District. 

On September 11, 2015, Landen locked the entrances to 

that school and placed a jar containing a liquid mixture of 

“sodium and cyanide” three feet off the ground, near a play area 

where it was “easy for children to reach it.” He left black 

envelopes for the teachers of the school with the following note 

inside:

“I want to play a game. Inside the package before you hold 

[sic] a key to the classroom. However, there is a catch. Three of 

your colleagues have the unfortunate situation where their keys 

are switched. Furthermore, an additional four teachers will have 

to retrieve four keys that will unlock the corresponding pad locks 

that currently deny the children’s entrance to the school. In 

order to further the safety of your children, four of you need to 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

obtain the keys that are located in a jar, connected to the fence, 

adjacent to the play structure. If these tasks are not completed 

by 8:00 am, there will be consequences to follow, possibly 

affecting the children. Make your choice.” 

A “digital recorder” was near the glass jar containing the 

cyanide and sodium liquid. Landen left a note close to the jar,

which read, “Congratulations, you have found the jar that 

contains the keys. As you can see, there is a liquid that 

surrounds the keys. Be aware that the solution is a combination 

of liquids that release a very poisonous cyanide gas. Also, the 

liquid happens to be a relatively strong acid.” 

Landen left a note on the digital recorder stating, “Play 

me.” In a digital recording in a “disguised voice,” Landen said, 

“Hello there. Most of you are probably wondering about the 

invitation at your doors. This is a game to test your ability of 

how far each and every one of you is willing to go in order to 

secure the safety of your children. As you can see, there are not 

four keys, but five. There is an additional lock that must be 

unlatched before your time is up. Get to it. The clock is running 

out.” 

The police investigated and discovered that the items used 

in the crime were not purchased locally. Law enforcement was

eventually able to trace these items to purchases made by 

Landen on Amazon. 

Landen admitted he committed the offense. He said that

“he felt good carrying out his plot and that he experienced an 

overwhelming sense of excitement.” He said that “[h]e wanted 

the teachers to feel fear.”
4

The probation department recommended that as a result of 

Landen’s actions he should pay restitution to the District in the 

amount of $456,163.09.

The trial court held a restitution hearing. Tom Butler, the 

District’s superintendent, Jackie Martin, a District assistant 

superintendent, and Curt Eichberger, the District’s assistant 

superintendent for human resources, testified about the District’s 

financial expenses and losses incurred as a result of Landen’s 

actions. Butler said Landen’s acts caused a “direct impact on the 

financial solvency” of the District. The San Gabriel school had to 

be closed for two weeks. Students and staff were transported to 

other District schools. There was a “[l]oss of revenue for reduced 

[school] attendance district wide.” There were increased labor, 

overtime, construction and security costs because of the 

September 11, 2015, incident.

The trial court found the District was a direct victim and

Landen’s threats were directed at District staff and caused “a 

significant sense of terror” for “parents and community 

members.” It said restitution serves the “probationary goal of 

rehabilitating the defendant” and making him “confront . . . the 

harm his actions have caused.” As a result of his crime, the San 

Gabriel school had to be closed and “taken over” by law 

enforcement “as a crime scene.” The District incurred substantial 

costs for chemical testing and security costs. Students had to be 

“relocated to other elementary school campuses.” 

The trial court ordered Landen to pay restitution to the 

District in the total amount of $235,341.17. In reaching this 

amount, it found nine restitution categories were reasonable, 

which included: 1) $ 2,778.88 to rekey classrooms at San Gabriel;

2) $21,728.22 for security costs to supervise or monitor the school;
5

3) $11,933.87 for relocation expenses; 4) $23,810.23 for additional 

costs for ongoing construction due to security concerns; 5) 

$19,044.14 for administrative costs “to stabilize the work force 

over the weekend and engage in relocating a school within 48 

hours without having access to the school”; 6) $94,669 for losses 

in ADA revenue for San Gabriel and other District schools due to 

school children being relocated and parents fears about school 

safety; 7) $32,585.75 for chemical testing; 8) $8,245.16 for 

“classroom lockdown kits” distributed “across the school District”;

and 9) $20,545.92 for a “visitor software system.”

The trial court also found that the District had received 

“partial reimbursement” for the loss of ADA funding from the 

State in the amount of $68,722.56.

DISCUSSION

The Amount Ordered as Restitution to the District

Landen contends the trial court should not have ordered 

restitution to the District for expenses not directly related to the 

incident at the San Gabriel school as a condition of probation.

We review the trial court’s conditions of probation for abuse 

of discretion. (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403.) “[A] 

reviewing court will disturb the trial court’s decision to impose a 

particular condition of probation only if, under all the 

circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is 

wholly unreasonable.” (Ibid.)

“In granting probation, courts have broad discretion to 

impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public 

safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.” (People v.

Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) “Restitution has long 

been considered a valid condition of probation.” (Id. at p. 1121.) 

“[A]n order for restitution, which attempts to make a victim 
6

whole, ‘has generally been deemed a deterrent to future 

criminality’. . . .” (Id. at p. 1123.) “There is no requirement the 

restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in 

which the defendant is actually found culpable, nor is there any 

requirement the order reflect the amount of damages that might 

be recoverable in a civil action.” (Ibid.) 

The trial court’s discretion in ordering restitution is broad, 

but not unlimited. (People v. Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at 

p. 1121.) It may not order excessive restitution amounting to an 

unreasonable windfall for a victim. (In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 

Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.) It should compensate a victim for 

actual losses, but never overcompensate a victim. (People v. 

Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172.) 

Landen claims he did not cause “physical harm” to any 

“school property” or any “person present” and the District is not a 

“direct victim.” He targeted the San Gabriel school, not the 

District. He contends the District sought restitution for security 

and other costs unrelated to the San Gabriel school. 

But the San Gabriel school is part of the District and

Landen minimizes the impact of his actions on the District. He

made criminal threats and used a deadly substance – cyanide.

Law enforcement was not able to immediately identify a suspect.

A school had to be closed. Landen targeted District teachers and 

the District believed this was not an isolated incident. Keys and 

cyanide reflected careful planning. This was not a harmless 

prank. 

Landen terrorized District educators on September 11, the 

anniversary of the World Trade Center attack. District 

administrators believed the District had been targeted by an 

unknown terrorist. They incurred substantial costs by taking
7

steps consistent with their duty to protect the District’s students 

and faculty. (Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1970) 2 

Cal.3d 741, 747.) Butler said Landen’s actions caused a “direct”

impact on the District’s “financial solvency.” 

Lockdown Kits and the Visitor Software Program

Landen contends restitution for “lockdown kits for all 

[District] schools” and the “visitor software program” is not 

authorized. He claims restitution is only proper for the loss of 

ADA revenue at the San Gabriel school, not other District 

schools. He argues the order to pay $23,810.23 for increased 

construction costs at the San Gabriel school was improper.

Eichberger testified the District’s “Safety Committee” 

determined lockdown kits for students and a software system to 

identify and screen all school visitors were necessary for the 

District’s schools. Those measures had not been instituted before 

the September 11, 2015, incident. Butler said various security 

measures and costs “would not have been necessary if it were not 

for the horrific event at San Gabriel Elementary School.” 

Teachers whom Landen targeted at the San Gabriel school 

had to be transferred to other District schools when the San 

Gabriel school was closed for chemical testing and a police 

investigation. Butler said law enforcement had obtained 

evidence showing a threat “to other students in the District.” 

Landen had shown his ability and intent to enter a District 

school to target teachers. He had placed a dangerous substance 

within the reach of children. The District had a duty to protect 

its teachers and students. (Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School 

Dist., supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 747.) The trial court reasonably 

inferred these safety measures were the result of, and reasonably 

related to, Landen’s crimes. The restitution order was well 
8

within the trial court’s discretion. (People v. Tarris (2009) 180 

Cal.App.4th 612, 624-626.)

Increased Construction Costs 

The trial court found $23,810.23 in increased construction 

costs at the San Gabriel school was “reasonably related to Mr. 

Landen’s crimes.” It did not err. Butler testified there was an 

ongoing construction project at the school when it had to be 

closed because of Landen’s threats. The suspect had not been 

apprehended and there was a belief that a “trades person 

working on [that project]” may have been responsible for the 

September 11, 2015, incident. The District decided to have 

construction proceed at night “when students were not there.” It 

was concerned for the safety of its students. (Dailey v. Los 

Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 747.) It 

incurred “swing shift employment” costs for this reason. The 

court found that given “the trauma” Landen caused, the decision 

to incur this special labor expense was appropriate. 

The trial court also found this “would aid in the 

rehabilitation of Mr. Landen under the total circumstances of 

this case.” Landen has not shown error. The court’s concern that 

Landen needed to understand the consequences of his actions 

was well justified. After his arrest, Landen said that “he felt 

good carrying out his plot.” A defendant must “ ‘ “confront, in 

concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.” ’ ” (People v. 

Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 27.) This is a proper goal of 

probation restitution. (People v. Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at 

p. 1123.)

Loss of Revenue for District ADA Funds

The closing of the San Gabriel school and the transfer of its 

students and faculty to other District schools produced a climate 
9

of fear throughout the District. Many parents decided to keep 

their children out of District schools. Martin testified the District 

receives State money based on the ADA. Butler said there was “a 

dramatic decrease in attendance across [their] school district,”

causing a loss of ADA revenue in the amount of $94,669. He said 

this was a “direct cost associated with the incident on September 

11, 2015.” The District’s ADA loss of revenue was reasonably 

related to Landen’s crimes.

But as Landen correctly notes, the trial court also found the 

District received “partial reimbursement” from the State for the 

loss of ADA funding in the amount of $68,722.56. The court did 

not subtract this amount from its restitution order. 

Martin testified the District applied for an ADA “waiver,” 

the State granted it and recalculated ADA funding. The State

then sent $68,722.56 in ADA funds to the District. Landen notes 

the trial court incorrectly calculated the District’s ADA loss.

That loss was not $94,669; it was only $25,946.44 (the difference 

between $94,669 and the $68,722.56 ADA funds the District 

actually received). The court has broad discretion to determine 

restitution as a probation condition. (People v. Carbajal, supra, 

10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.) In the ordinary case, the court abuses its 

discretion if it orders restitution at an amount several times

higher than the victim’s actual loss. (People v. Whisenand (1995) 

37 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1391; People v. Baumann (1985) 176 

Cal.App.3d 67, 76.) But such an abuse will not occur here.

Restitution to the State

The trial court ordered restitution to the District in the

amount of $68,722.56 it received from the State to reimburse it 

for its loss of ADA funding. We asked for additional briefing on 

whether the trial court has authority to now order Landen to pay 
10

restitution to the State for that $68,722.56 amount. Counsel for 

the parties cited inapplicable authority, mostly involving victim 

restitution relating to insurance policies.

We conclude the trial court has authority to order 

restitution to the State. Why? Because the State is a direct 

victim of defendant’s crime. “Public education is an obligation 

which the State assumed by the adoption of the Constitution. 

(San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 

937, 951-952 [92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669]; Piper v. Big Pine 

School Dist. (1924) 193 Cal. 664, 669 [226 P. 926].) The system of 

public schools, although administered through local districts 

created by the Legislature, is ‘one system . . . applicable to all the 

common schools . . . .’ (Kennedy v. Miller (1893) 97 Cal. 429, 432 

[32 P. 558], italics in original.)" (Butt v. State of California, 

supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 680.) Under the broad provisions of section 

1203.1, the court may order the defendant to pay victim 

restitution.

The restitution statutes authorize trial courts to “retain 

jurisdiction” for the purpose of “imposing or modifying 

restitution” so that eligible victims will receive the restitution to 

which they are entitled. (People v. Bufford (2007) 146 

Cal.App.4th 966.) “The government may be the beneficiary of . . . 

reimbursement if it has incurred actual loss due to the crime.” 

(People v. Tarris, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 622.) 

Landen’s interruption of school attendance was a crime 

affecting the District and the State. The State is responsible for 

maintaining adequate educational funding based on student ADA 

figures. (Butt v. State of California, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 704; 

Fullerton Union High School District v. Riles (1983) 139 

Cal.App.3d 369, 373.) 
11

Where there is a drop in attendance due to a wrongdoer’s 

criminal act which creates a funding crisis, the State is a victim. 

The State is responsible for obtaining the funds necessary to 

address the crisis and support the educational process. It has the 

“plenary constitutional responsibility for operation of the common 

school system.” (Butt v. State of California, supra, 4 Cal.4th at 

p. 704.) Because the District was unable to financially meet its 

responsibility, the State paid these funds which reduced its State

ADA funding reserve. An order requiring Landen to pay 

restitution to the State falls within the trial court’s discretion to 

order restitution as a probation condition to require the 

defendant to face the consequences of his criminal acts.

DISPOSITION

The portion of the restitution order that ordered Landen to 

reimburse the District for $68,722.56 for partial ADA 

reimbursement it received from the State is reversed. On 

remand, the trial court shall order Landen to pay restitution to 

the State for that $68,722.56 amount. In all other respects, the 

order is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

PERREN, J.

TANGEMAN, J.
12

Jacquelyn H. Duffy, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Colleen M. Tiedemann, Viet H. 

Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.