IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jaquise Thomas, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, : No. 935 C.D. 2018

Respondent : Submitted: January 4, 2019

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge 

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: June 27, 2019

Jaquise Thomas (Thomas) petitions for review from the June 21, 2018 

order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) denying Thomas’s 

request for administrative relief that challenged the Board’s May 9, 2018 Order to 

Recommit Thomas by alleging that the Board failed to credit to Thomas’s original 

sentence all the time to which he was entitled. David Crowley, Esquire (Counsel), 

Chief Public Defender of Centre County, who represents Thomas, asserts that the 

appeal is without merit and seeks permission to withdraw as counsel. For the 

foregoing reasons, we grant Counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw as counsel and 

affirm the order of the Board.

On January 9, 2014, Thomas pleaded guilty to manufacture, delivery, 

or possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (PWID) and related 
2

charges and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 3 to 6 years in prison. On 

June 28, 2016, the Board paroled Thomas1 with a maximum date of June 28, 2019. 

See Certified Record (C.R.) at 13-14. During the first approximately half year of his 

term of parole, Thomas received a number of warnings for technical violations of 

his parole terms, but managed to avoid recommitment. See C.R. at 73. However, 

on January 12, 2017, Harrisburg City Police charged Thomas with aggravated 

assault, strangulation, and false imprisonment related to an incident involving 

Thomas’s girlfriend (the domestic violence case), and a warrant issued for his arrest. 

See C.R. at 23-26. As a result, on January 18, 2017, the Board declared Thomas

delinquent effective January 12, 2017. See C.R. at 27.

Thomas remained at large until February 6, 2017, at which time police 

arrested and again charged him with a new case of PWID and related charges

stemming from an incident in a hotel room (the new drug case). See C.R. at 39-44. 

The Board issued a detainer at that time. See C.R. at 45. Thomas did not post bail 

on the new charges. See C.R. at 96 & 109.

On January 11, 2018, Thomas pleaded guilty in both the domestic 

violence case and the new drug case. See C.R. at 76-120. The trial court sentenced 

Thomas to 30 to 72 months for the new drug case and an additional 24 to 48 months 

for the domestic violence case, to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed 

in the new drug case. See C.R. at 97 & 110-11. The trial court applied the credit for 

the 340 days Thomas served from his February 6, 2017 arrest toward the 30 to 72 

month sentence in the new drug case. See N.T. 1/11/2018 at 13-16; C.R. at 88-91 & 

97.

 

1 The Board granted Thomas parole on March 11, 2016, effective June 28, 2016.
3

On May 9, 2018, the Board issued the Order to Recommit, in which the 

Board stated Thomas owed 1,095 days of backtime and thus recalculated his 

maximum date to April 10, 2021 based on his April 11, 2018 return to custody on 

the detainer. See Order to Recommit, C.R. 139-40. On June 1, 2018, Thomas filed 

an Administrative Remedies Form and a Notice of Appeal that alleged the Board

lacked the authority to alter his maximum sentence date and failed to credit his street

time in its calculation of his new maximum sentence date.2 See Administrative 

Remedies Form, C.R. at 177-92. On June 21, 2018, the Board issued its response to 

Thomas’s Administrative Remedies Form finding that the Board properly calculated 

Thomas’s maximum sentence date and denying Thomas’s appeal. C.R. at 193. 

On July 11, 2018, Thomas, through Counsel, petitioned this Court for 

review.3 After reviewing the certified record, on October 26, 2018, Counsel filed an 

Application to Withdraw Appearance (Application to Withdraw) stating that 

Thomas’s appeal lacks merit. In support of the Application to Withdraw, Counsel 

filed a letter to this Court explaining his conclusion that Thomas’s claims lack merit 

(No-Merit Letter).

4

 

 

2 Thomas signed his Proof of Service on June 1, 2018. The Administrative Remedies Form 

was time stamped June 18, 2018. See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 177 & 180.

3 Our scope of review of the Board’s decision denying administrative relief is limited to 

determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an 

error of law was committed or whether constitutional rights have been violated. Fisher v. Pa. Bd. 

of Prob. & Parole, 62 A.3d 1073, 1075 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).

 

4

 Counsel seeking to withdraw may file a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), typically called an “Anders Brief.” If Thomas has a constitutional right to counsel, 

counsel should file an Anders Brief. However, in cases that do not involve a constitutional right 

to counsel, i.e., an appeal from the Board’s decision to recalculate a parolee’s maximum sentence 

date, this Court only requires a no-merit letter explaining why the claim is meritless to support an 

application to withdraw. In a no-merit letter, the standard is “lack of merit,” and in an Anders

Brief, the standard is the “slightly more rigorous frivolousness standard,” which requires “a 
4

When court-appointed counsel concludes that a petitioner’s appeal is 

meritless, counsel may be permitted to withdraw if counsel: (i) notifies the petitioner 

of the request to withdraw; (ii) furnishes the petitioner with a copy of a no-merit 

letter; and (iii) advises the petitioner of his right to retain new counsel and to raise 

any new points he might deem worthy of consideration. Miskovitch v. Pa. Bd. of 

Prob. & Parole, 77 A.3d 66, 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); Hughes v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & 

Parole, 977 A.2d 19, 22 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). The no-merit letter must detail: (i) 

the nature and extent of the counsel’s review; (ii) each issue the petitioner wished to 

have raised; and (iii) counsel’s explanation as to why those issues are meritless. 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Zerby v. Shanon, 964 A.2d 956, 

961 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). A no-merit letter must include substantial reasons for 

concluding that a petitioner’s arguments are without merit. Zerby, 964 A.2d at 962. 

Once appointed counsel fully complies with these requirements to withdraw, the 

Court independently reviews the merits of the petitioner’s claims. Id. at 960. 

Here, Counsel complied with the requirements to withdraw. Counsel 

notified Thomas of his request to withdraw by serving a copy of the Application to 

Withdraw and the No-Merit Letter on Thomas as provided in Counsel’s Proof of 

Service. See Application to Withdraw at 2, ¶ 3 & Proof of Service; No-Merit Letter, 

Proof of Service. The Application to Withdraw avers that Counsel notified Thomas

of his right to retain new counsel and/or raise other points he deems worthy of 

consideration. See Application to Withdraw at 2, ¶ 3. In his No-Merit Letter, 

Counsel provided: (1) a summary of his review; (2) a summary of each issue raised 

by Thomas; (3) an analysis of each issue complete with citations to relevant case 

law, statutes, and regulations; and (4) his conclusion that Thomas’s issues lacked 

 

determination that the appeal lacks any basis in law or fact.” Miskovitch v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & 

Parole, 77 A.3d 66, 69-70 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Here, we apply the lack of merit standard.
5

merit. See generally No-Merit Letter. Additionally, on October 30, 2018, Counsel 

mailed Thomas this Court’s October 29, 2018 order informing Thomas of his rights 

to obtain substitute counsel or file a brief on his own behalf. See Counsel’s 

Certificate of Service dated October 30, 2018; Order dated October 29, 2018. 

Because Counsel complied with the withdrawal requirements, we now 

independently review the merits of Thomas’s claims.

Before this Court, Thomas argues that the Board violated his 

constitutional right to due process and protection against double jeopardy by 

changing the maximum date of his sentence because the Board lacks the authority 

to alter the maximum date, and also that the Board improperly calculated his 

maximum sentence date by failing to provide credit for the time Thomas spent at 

liberty on parole and failing to award a credit for time spent incarcerated while 

awaiting trial on his new charges. See No-Merit Letter at 2-6; see also Thomas’s 

Notice of Appeal, C.R. at 178-80. These claims lack merit.

Initially, in Pennsylvania, a trial court’s imposition of a total 

incarceration sentence does not impose a maximum sentence date. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9756. Instead, Pennsylvania employs an indeterminate sentencing scheme whereby 

the sentencing court imposes a sentence with a maximum term of incarceration and 

a minimum term of incarceration not to exceed one-half the maximum sentence 

imposed. Id. The minimum term of incarceration determines the period before 

which an individual may not be paroled. Id. “The Department [of Corrections], not 

the Board, is responsible for calculating the minimum and maximum terms of 

prisoners committed to its jurisdiction.” Gillespie v. Dep’t of Corr., 527 A.2d 1061, 

1065 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). The Department of Corrections must follow the 

intermediate sentence range and the credit for time served imposed by the trial court 
6

to calculate minimum and maximum incarceration terms. Oakman v. Dep’t of Corr., 

903 A.2d 106, 109 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

Parolees convicted of new criminal offenses committed while on parole 

are subject to recommitment as parole violators and may, in the Board’s discretion,

lose all credit for “time at liberty on parole,” also known as “street time,” upon 

recommitment. See 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(1)-(2.1). “When computing the time yet 

to be served on the original sentence, [a convicted parole violator’s] street time is 

added to the original maximum expiration date to create a new maximum expiry.”

Armbruster v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 919 A.2d 348, 351 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). 

The only limitation on the recalculation of a parole violator’s new maximum date 

where there has been a forfeiture of street time upon a new conviction is that the new 

maximum date may not exceed the total unserved balance of the original sentence. 

See Savage v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 761 A.2d 643, 645 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (“It 

is well-settled that the Board is not permitted to impose backtime which exceeds the 

entire remaining balance of parolee’s unexpired term.”). Also, parole violators must 

serve the balance of their original state sentence before serving new sentences. 61 

Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(5)(i).

Here, Thomas’s argument that the Board lacked the authority to alter 

the maximum date of his original court-imposed sentence rests entirely on his belief 

that the maximum date of his sentence, rather than the maximum length of his 

sentence, controls for purposes of recalculating his parole violation maximum 

date. Thomas is mistaken. Following his June 28, 2016 parole date, Thomas

engaged in conduct for which he received multiple new criminal convictions. As a 

result, the Board recommitted Thomas as a convicted parole violator and, in the 

exercise of its discretion, denied Thomas credit for street time based on his poor 
7

supervision history and the fact that his new convictions involved drug offenses and 

domestic violence. See Revocation Hearing Report, C.R. at 122-29; see also 61 

Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(1-2.1); Armbruster. Thomas’s new maximum date was then 

recalculated by adding the unserved portion of his original sentence – the 1,095 days 

from his June 28, 2016 release on parole through his original maximum sentence 

date of June 28, 2019 – to April 11, 2018 – the date he was returned to custody on 

his original convictions – for a new maximum date of April 10, 2021. See Order to 

Recommit, C.R. at 139; see also Campbell v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 409 A.2d 

980, 981-82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980) (stating that service of backtime commences once 

parole is revoked). This imposition of Thomas’s backtime to his original sentence 

was not the imposition of a new sentence, but instead was simply the direction that 

Thomas complete his original, judicially mandated sentence. See Savage. 

Additionally, the trial court correctly applied the 340-day credit for the time Thomas 

spent in jail following his February 6, 2017 arrest toward his sentence in the new 

drug case. See N.T. 1/11/2018 at 13-16; C.R. at 88-91 & 97; see also Gaito v. Pa. 

Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 412 A.2d 568, 571 (Pa. 1980) (noting that, when a parole 

violator does not post bail on a new arrest, following conviction, the time 

incarcerated on both the new criminal charge and the Board’s detainer must be 

applied to the new sentence). Therefore, Thomas’s argument that the Board erred 

in extending his new maximum sentence date beyond the maximum date of his 

original sentence lacks merit.

Further, to the extent Thomas argues that the extension of the maximum 

date of his sentence violates double jeopardy, this claim likewise lacks merit. As 

this Court has explained:
8

It is now clear that the Board’s parole revocation 

proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution but 

rather basically administrative proceedings to which the 

principles of administrative due process and 

administrative law apply. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 

471 [] (1972). If the Fifth Amendment [of the United 

States Constitution] does not preclude the 

[Commonwealth] from imposing both criminal and noncriminal sanctions upon a defendant for the same conduct, 

we see no reason to extend the protection against double 

jeopardy to administrative proceedings of the Board as

petitioner would have us do. Petitioner has cited no case 

law which would support such an extension and indeed all 

available case law supports the Board’s position. See 

Hughes v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,

[] 473 A.2d 225 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1984).

We further note that the Board’s action in recommitting 

petitioner as a technical and convicted violator had no 

effect upon petitioner’s judicially imposed sentence. If 

petitioner was to present a valid double jeopardy claim, it 

is that sentence with which petitioner must contend. The 

Board’s imposition of backtime was not the imposition of 

a new sentence but merely the directed completion of the 

original judicially-imposed sentence. The sentence 

imposed for a criminal offense is the maximum sentence 

and the minimum sentence merely sets the date prior to 

which a prisoner may not be paroled. McClure [v. 

Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 461 A.2d 645 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1983)]. As that sentence was not altered by 

the Board’s action, petitioner’s double jeopardy based 

upon the Fifth Amendment must fail.

Gundy v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 478 A.2d 139, 141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984)

(emphasis in original and footnote omitted). Accordingly, Thomas’s argument that 

the Board’s recommitment and maximum sentence recalculation violated his 

constitutional or statutory rights lacks merit.
9

For the reasons stated, we agree with Counsel that Thomas’s claims 

regarding the denial of his request for administrative relief of the Board’s 

recommitment order lack merit. Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s petition for leave 

to withdraw as counsel, and we affirm the order of the Board dismissing Thomas’s 

request.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jaquise Thomas, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Board of :

Probation and Parole, : No. 935 C.D. 2018

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2019, the petition of David Crowley, 

Esquire, to withdraw as counsel is GRANTED, and the June 21, 2018 order of the 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole is AFFIRMED. 

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge