3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 5

INTRODUCTION

A Brief History of Iran’s Naval Forces 7

CHAPTER 1

Organization, Leadership and Personnel 13

CHAPTER 2

Naval Strategy, Doctrine and Missions 21

CHAPTER 3

Naval Capabilities 27

CHAPTER 4

Training, Operations and Exercises 37

Outlook 42

Additional resources:

Posters of Leadership Structure and IRIN/IRGCN Recognition Guide enclosed in inside 

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Published by the 

Office of Naval Intelligence

February 2017

Cleared for public release by Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR Case 17-S-0836)

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5

A

t the time of our first publication in 2009, 

Iran’s two navies were only a few years 

into a major reorganization, and each 

service was navigating through a period of 

considerable change. Now, nearly a decade 

following the reorganization, we have a 

better understanding of Iran’s ultimate intentions for the 

reorganization and clearer insight into how its navies are 

progressing during this time of transition. This new insight 

and understanding have made it even more necessary 

to consider and address each of Iran’s navies as distinct 

organizations with independent strategies, doctrines and 

missions. It is, in fact, a tale of two navies. 

In 2009, we provided a brief history of Iran’s naval forces 

dating back to the period of the Shah. In the current 

publication, we have provided a more comprehensive 

history, including Iran’s Persian imperial past, the spread 

of Islam, and the Iran-Iraq War. We believe these three 

threads provide the best backdrop for appreciating Iran’s 

vision for its current and future naval forces. 

Iran’s defense strategists recognize the growing 

importance of the maritime environment and are shaping 

its naval forces to secure Tehran’s interests accordingly. 

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) 

emphasizes an asymmetric doctrine to ensure national 

security in the Persian Gulf against regional neighbors 

and foreign presence. The Islamic Republic of Iran Navy 

(IRIN), dubbed by the Supreme Leader as a strategic 

force, employs a more conventional doctrine and focuses 

on forward presence and naval diplomacy. Its mission 

areas include the Caspian Sea, the Gulf of Oman and 

out-of-area operations. Both navies have considerable 

equities and are well positioned to influence and leverage 

the Strait of Hormuz; a vital chokepoint for the flow of 

resources and international commerce. 

During the early stages of the naval reorganization, both 

navies implemented leadership and structural changes 

to improve command and control within their respective 

areas of responsibility (AOR). The basic elements of 

these changes were incorporated early in the transition, 

but significant elements have yet to be realized. This is 

especially true for the IRIN, which requires more substantive changes to infrastructure along the Makran coast to 

accommodate its larger ships and logistics needs. 

Since the naval reorganization of 2007, both navies 

have engaged in dynamic acquisition programs. The 

IRGCN has continued to pursue smaller, faster platforms 

equipped with sophisticated weaponry, ideally suited for 

its asymmetric doctrine. The IRIN, largely neglected since 

the end of the Iran-Iraq War (with the exception of submarines), has undertaken a major recapitalization program to 

replace its aging surface fleet and augment its submarine 

force. Additionally, Iran’s navies have been supplemented 

by its other military branches through acquisition of 

air-launched cruise missiles and antiship ballistic missiles. 

These developments are a clear indication that Iran 

understands the growing importance of controlling the 

maritime environment in its security calculus. 

Over the past several years, much of the world’s attention 

on Iran has been focused on the Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action (JCPOA), in relation to its nuclear program. 

During the same period of time, Iran staged a major naval 

exercise that blatantly featured attacks directed against 

a mock-up of a U.S. Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. Iran 

also employed its navies in an attempt to reinforce Huthi 

rebels in Yemen and to interdict the merchant vessel 

Maersk Tigris in the Strait of Hormuz. Each of these 

events serves as a reminder that Iran’s navies are capable 

of churning the waters of the Persian Gulf and beyond. As 

Iran continues to hone its naval strategy and modernize 

its respective fleets, this capability will only improve, 

creating greater challenges to security in an already 

security-challenged region. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

7

INTRODUCTION

A BRIEF HISTORY OF IRAN’S NAVAL FORCES

To understand Iran’s naval forces today, it is necessary 

to consider three distinct—but interwoven—threads from 

Iran’s past, which generally shape the nation’s self-identity and specifically influence its navies. The first and most 

distant thread is the Persian Empire. Once unrivaled in its 

geography and power, Iran’s imperial past continues to 

impact national policy and defense strategy, even if only 

in the deep recesses of the national psyche. The second 

is Shia Islam, which made its way to Iran in the seventh 

century, but it has been a dominant thread particularly 

since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The last, but most 

significant thread, in terms of shaping Iran’s navies, is the 

Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) and especially a subset of that 

conflict known as, the Tanker War. Let us briefly consider 

each of these threads before examining the specifics of 

Iran’s contemporary naval forces.

Distant Past (550 BCE to 1800s CE)

The Persian Empire originated under the rule of 

Cyrus the Great during the 

Achaemenid Dynasty from 

550–330 BCE. The Achaemenid 

Dynasty extended from modern 

day India to the east to Libya 

and Greek Anatolia to the west. 

Under Cyrus the Great and his 

son Cambyses, Persian naval 

forces developed considerably. 

However, the majority of the 

Persian fleet was made up 

of foreign ships, sailors, and 

admirals, which led to loyalty 

issues. Darius, Cambyses’ successor, attempted to 

remedy this by staging the fleet in the Persian Gulf and 

integrating more Persian leadership into the naval forces. 

During the reign of Xerxes (486–465 BCE), the fourth 

King of the Achaemenid Dynasty, the Persian fleet grew 

to 600–800 ships—the only time in Iran’s history when 

its navy was commensurate with its land forces. This 

was short lived, however, when Xerxes launched a major 

expeditionary campaign against the Greek homelands in 

480 BCE. Despite initial victories on land, a naval attack 

against a heavily outnumbered Greek force huddled in the 

tight waters off the island of Salamis led to a decisive rout 

of the Persian fleet and the Persian land forces in Greece 

were defeated within a year.

The Achaemenid Dynasty continued for another 150 years 

and was finally defeated by Alexander the Great in 330 

BCE, marking the end of the Persian Empire. Two later 

manifestations of the empire emerged in the Parthian and 

Sassanian Dynasties. The Parthians (163 BCE–224 CE) 

controlled a land mass roughly equivalent to modern day 

Iran and Iraq. They excelled in land warfare, but made no 

attempt to develop a naval force, despite having control 

over much of the Persian Gulf. The Sassanians (224–651 

CE) restored territorial control to boundaries similar to the 

Achaemenian Dynasty’s, minus those lands controlled 

Cyrus the Great, 

ruler of Persia

Ancient trireme of the Persian era
8

by the Eastern Roman Empire. Despite having a strong 

military force in general and territories with shores along 

both sides of the Persian Gulf, Northern Indian Ocean, 

portions of the Caspian, Red, and Eastern Mediterranean 

Seas, the Sassanians never developed a fleet capable of 

securing its territorial gains. 

For the next 11 centuries, none of the several dynasties 

that emerged maintained a naval force of note. Nader 

Shah (reign: 1736–1747) ended this trend in the 

mid–1700s. In determining the means by which he would 

build his fleet, he wavered between the lack of natural 

resources and unskilled labor for domestic ship construction and the high cost of foreign acquisition to assemble 

his fleet. He ultimately decided on foreign procurement 

from India, developing a fleet of 30 ships. His navy was 

plagued by poor leadership, general incompetency, and 

a lack of loyalty that led to numerous mutinies. It was 

not until the 20th century that geography, energy, and 

security solidified the need for Iran to field a professional, 

lasting naval force.

Islam Comes to Persia

Within months of the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 

632 CE, Islam had spread through all of Arabia. 

After only three years, it had spread as far west 

as Syria and was positioned to expand eastward, 

with Sassanian Persia in its sights. For a thousand 

years the Persians were major players in a struggle 

between the super powers of the east and the 

west; their defeat, however, would come not at the 

hands of a superior military power, but from a less 

sophisticated and organized opponent: one that was 

highly-motivated and driven by principles of faith 

and religious fervor. After 19 years of intermittent 

fighting, the Sassanian Dynasty finally fell to the 

advance of Arab Muslims in 651 CE. Compared to 

its Arab neighbors, Sassanian Persia proved to be a 

difficult foe for the rapidly expanding Muslim conquerors. This same tenacity, resilience, and sense 

of independence would lead Persia to follow its own 

path of Shia Islam, distinct from the Sunni majority, 

and independent of the caliphate. Today, Shia Islam 

comprises only ten percent of Muslims worldwide, 

with Iran being home to the largest Shia population. 

Imperial Iranian Navy (1921–1979)

In 1921, following World War I, Reza Shah emerged 

as Iran’s new imperial leader. Looking to modernize 

the nation, Reza Shah undermined the influence of the 

Islamic clerics, which he believed were an impediment 

to Iran’s progress. His focus was on the nation’s imperial 

past as he sought to improve national infrastructure, 

education and transportation. In an effort to secure his 

position as Iran’s monarch and to improve the nation’s 

strength, Reza Shah devoted significant resources to 

expanding Iran’s military capabilities. The discovery of 

petroleum deposits, around this same time, drove a 

new security requirement for Iran to obtain naval forces 

to protect maritime commerce, as well as reduce the 

Arab reliance on Great Britain for regional security in the 

Persian Gulf. 

At that time, Reza Shah’s fleet was comprised of two 

ships Iran acquired from Great Britain in the late 19th 

century. Between 1924 and 1927, Reza Shah added two 

new vessels from Germany 

and Great Britain. In 1932, he 

officially established the Imperial 

Iranian Navy (IIN) and shortly 

after procured an additional 

four Italian ships. These eight 

vessels comprised the Southern 

fleet in the Persian Gulf, while 

a four-ship flotilla of smaller 

vessels, and the Shah’s yacht, 

served as the Caspian fleet. 

In August 1941, Iran’s military, 

including its nascent fleet, 

were defeated in a surprise attack by British and Russian 

forces, which moved to secure key lines of communication and critical oil fields in support of the Allied war 

effort. Less than a month later, Reza Shah abdicated his 

throne to his son Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The 

new Shah shared his father’s vision of rebuilding Iran in 

the likeness of the former Persian Empire, and almost 

immediately, he began to develop Iran’s military forces. 

Although the naval forces initially were not a priority after 

World War II, Iran acquired a handful of ships and patrol 

boats from the U.S. and Great Britain, and by 1965, the 

IIN had increased from one to 6,000 personnel. In 1968, 

when Great Britain announced its intention to withdraw 

its military forces east of the Suez within three years, 

Mohammad Reza 

Shah Pahlavi
9

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi resolved to replace the 

British as the guarantor of security in the Persian Gulf. 

By 1972, on the IIN’s 40th anniversary, the Shah revealed 

even greater ambitions: the expansion of naval operations 

to the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean. 

From 1966 to 1978, acquisitions mirrored the Shah’s 

ambitions. The IIN acquired two U.S. Sumner-class and 

one British Battle-class destroyers, four British Vosperclass missile corvettes, 12 French La Combattante-class 

patrol boats, 12 hovercrafts, and a large fleet of U.S. 

naval helicopters. Before the Islamic Revolution, Iran and 

the U.S. reached an agreement for four Spruance-class 

destroyers, and three Tang-class diesel submarines. Iran 

also negotiated with European countries for submarines 

and additional frigates. From 6,000 personnel in 1965, 

naval forces growth maintained a rapid pace, totaling 

28,000 personnel in 1978; making it the strongest navy 

of any Persian Gulf nation. Even so, it wouldn’t be long 

before Iran’s naval forces, and indeed the regime itself, 

would be challenged by its neighbor, in the wake of the 

Islamic Revolution.

Iran-Iraq War and the IRGCN 

As the new Islamic Republic worked to solidify its fragile 

new government against threats from within, the chief 

threat to the regime would come from neighboring Iraq. 

In 1980, Iraq attacked Iran, and the two nations fought 

a bloody war that lasted eight years. In the early stages 

of the war, from 1980-1984, naval engagements were 

limited. However, the Tanker War started in late 1984, 

when Iraq attacked Iranian oil shipping and maritime 

infrastructure in the gulf, in an attempt to undermine 

Tehran’s financial ability to wage war and to bait the 

Islamic Republic into escalating the conflict. Iran retaliated by attacking Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian tankers, since 

these nations were subsidizing Iraq’s war effort. 

In the beginning of the Tanker War, the IRIN conducted 

most of the Iranian attacks against tankers. However, 

the IRGCN, a naval element of the IRGC created in 

1983, established its legitimacy using lightly-armed 

patrol boats to harass merchant shipping. By 1986, the 

IRGCN established a headquarters on Farsi Island in 

the central Persian Gulf and had more personnel than 

the IRIN. In addition, the IRGCN was in charge of Iran’s 

newly acquired Chinese Silkworm coastal defense cruise 

missiles (CDCMs). 

In July 1987, the U.S. Navy was officially drawn into the 

conflict and began escorting Kuwaiti tankers that had 

been reflagged as U.S. vessels. The first such tanker, 

the Bridgeton, struck a mine 22 miles off of Farsi Island. 

U.S. Navy escorts noted significant small boat activity off 

of Farsi island hours before the mine strike, but failed to 

detect mine-laying. The Bridgeton attack represented the 

opening salvo between the U.S. and Iran. Two months 

later in September, the U.S. Navy detected an Iranian 

LSM, Iran Ajr, laying mines in a shipping channel near 

Bahrain. In response, the Iran Ajr was attacked by U.S. 

helicopters, boarded by Navy SEALs and scuttled in 

the Persian Gulf. In response, Iran temporarily halted 

mine-laying operations, but the Tanker War continued. In 

October of 1987, Iran conducted three Silkworm missile 

The Islamic Revolution 

of 1979

1978 marked a turning point in the 

Shah’s rule. Signs of revolt were 

manifest in rising tensions, protests, 

labor strikes, military defections, 

and increased violence throughout 

Iran. In January 1979, Mohammad 

Reza Shah Pahlavi fled the country 

and Ayatollah Khomeini, exiled since 1964, returned 

to Iran to assume political leadership of the country. 

By the end of 1979, the theocratic Islamic Republic 

of Iran was established. Following the capture of the 

U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, the West 

severed ties with the Islamic Republic, leaving multiple defense contracts for naval equipment unfulfilled. 

During the early stages of the Revolution, Khomeini 

developed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

(IRGC), an organized militant band of Revolution 

supporters and zealots, to protect the regime against 

internal threats from the remnants of the Shah’s 

military. Iran’s military leadership experienced a 

purge, and many fled the country. Although the navy 

fared better than other Iranian military services, the 

IIN, now called the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy 

(IRIN), faced a multitude of challenges ranging from 

internal suspicion to inter-service rivalries. 

Ayatollah Ruhollah 

Khomeini
10

attacks against two tankers and one oil terminal. From 

1987 to the end of the war in August 1988, Iran conducted 143 attacks against shipping in the Persian Gulf. 

Two Competing Navies (1989–2006)

At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran had one military 

and one nascent, but rapidly growing, security force. 

Following the war it would have two parallel militaries with 

indistinct missions, overlapping areas of responsibility, 

and considerable mistrust between the organizations. 

With the war with Iraq behind them, Iran’s leaders turned 

their focus to building up Iran’s parallel militaries on the 

principles of the revolution and the lessons learned from 

the war. Moving forward, the IRGC emphasized Islamic 

zeal, asymmetric warfare, technology, and self-sufficiency 

in weapons procurement. Although the Regular Forces 

(Artesh) benefited and demonstrated loyalty to the regime 

during the war, the IRGC, as the guardians of the revolution and favorite of the new Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 

Ali Hossein Khamenei, emerged as the politically favored 

service. 

The IRGCN had proved itself during the latter half of the 

war with Iraq, given its relative lack of experience in naval 

warfare and limited resources. It was rewarded in 1992 

with a new fleet of Chinese-produced Houdong-class 

missile boats armed with C802 ASCMs. The Houdongs 

provided the IRGCN with a legitimate naval fleet, but the 

vulnerabilities of these new platforms would become 

apparent before they were delivered. In Operation Desert 

Storm, Iraq’s 13 missile combatants, of similar size and 

capability to the Houdongs, would be destroyed by 

Coalition forces in the first two weeks of the conflict. This 

observation likely drove the IRGCN’s interest in developing smaller, faster platforms armed with heavier weapons, 

such as the C-14 missile patrol boat first acquired from 

China around 2000, followed by the acquisition of 30 

torpedo boats from North Korea shortly after. Another 

noteworthy IRGCN acquisition in the 1990s was Chinese 

C802 CDCM launchers, a significant improvement to 

Iran’s Silkworm units. 

In contrast, following the Iran-Iraq War, the IRIN received 

very little in the way of modern equipment. For the surface 

fleet, the IRIN focused on back-fitting its existing surface 

combatants with C802 ASCMs. Notably, the IRIN invested 

in submarines, the one capability that would set it apart 

from the IRGCN, acquiring three Kilo-class attack submarines from Russia between 1992 and1997. This would be 

followed by purchasing and domestically producing North 

Houdong WPTGs being shipped to Iran.

Operation Praying Mantis 

On April 14, 1988, while on patrol in the Central 

Persian Gulf, the U.S. frigate Samuel B. Roberts 

struck an Iranian mine, blowing a massive hole in its 

hull and breaking its keel. If it wasn’t for the heroic 

efforts of its crew, 

the ship would 

have been lost. 

In retaliation, the 

U.S. launched 

Operation Praying 

Mantis four days 

later, destroying 

two Iranian oil 

terminals, sinking 

the Iranian corvette Sahand, the missile patrol boat 

Joshan and severely damaging a second corvette 

Sabalan. It was a devastating loss for the IRIN 

and Iran as a whole. The battle clearly illuminated 

the IRIN’s deficiencies in conducting conventional 

warfare at sea against a capable opponent. The IranIraq War, including the Tanker War, would end only a 

few months following Operation Praying Mantis, but 

the engagement would leave an impression on Iran’s 

military leaders and shaped Iran’s naval forces in the 

decades that followed.

Iran’s Sahand FFL sunk by U.S. Navy 

during Operation Praying Mantis. Its 

sister ship, Sabalan, nearly suffered 

the same fate.
11

Korean Yono-class midget submarines (SSMs), beginning 

in 2004. The IRIN also constructed several domestic 

La Combattante-class patrol boats to comprise its first 

modern naval presence in the Caspian Sea.

Naval Reorganization (2007–2017)

Beginning in 2007, a major shift occurred in Iran’s military 

strategy which affected Iran’s two navies. Likely influenced by the two military conflicts on its borders (Iraq and 

Afghanistan) and by the IRGCN’s growth into a legitimate 

asymmetric naval force, Iran reorganized its naval forces 

and assigned them to geographic regions. The IRGCN 

would have sole responsibility for the Persian Gulf and the 

IRIN would have responsibility for the Gulf of Oman and 

the Caspian Sea. Both services would continue to share 

responsibility in the Strait of Hormuz. The reorganization 

also provided opportunities for opening new bases and 

the movement of assets to align with their respective 

responsibilities.

The naval reorganization represented a significant 

increase in responsibilities for the IRGCN, given its lack of 

the larger vessels needed to maintain a continual presence in the Persian Gulf, especially in higher sea states. 

To address these shortfalls, the IRGCN dispersed assets 

proportionally throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of 

Hormuz and created two new naval districts in the Central 

and Southern Persian Gulf: located at Asaluyeh and 

Bandar Lengeh, respectively. 

As challenging as the new IRGCN mission was in the 

Persian Gulf, the IRIN’s new assignment was even more 

daunting. This was not so much the result of having sole 

responsibility for its mission areas, but rather the complexity of conducting blue water operations and warfare 

farther from Iran’s coastline. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq 

War, the IRIN lived in the shadow of the IRGCN, but with 

the reorganization, it had a new vision and purpose, 

perhaps driven by the concurrent appointment of its new 

commander, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari. 

To achieve this new mission, the IRIN needed to 

make major improvements to its conventional warfare 

capabilities and greatly improve its blue water operational 

proficiency. The IRIN has a number of surface and 

subsurface construction programs currently underway, 

and it has emphasized out-of-area operations since 

mid–2009, including operations in the Gulf of Aden, and 

Red and Mediterranean Seas, as well as the Indian and 

Pacific Oceans. The IRIN has major construction plans 

for the Makran coast to support its growing fleet and blue 

water aspirations. 

Now, nearly ten years following the naval reorganization, 

there is a marked difference between the Regular Navy and 

the IRGC Navy in strategy, mission, and force composition. 

Let us take a closer look at this tale of two navies.

13

CHAPTER 1

Organization, Leadership & Personnel

The Supreme Leader

According to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s constitution, 

the Supreme Leader—currently, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 

who succeeded Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the father 

of the Iranian Revolution—is the pinnacle of Iran’s power 

structure. The Supreme Leader is responsible for the 

delineation and supervision of the general policies of Iran. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Leader sets the broad objectives and direction of Iran’s domestic and foreign policies. 

The power structure within Iran is unique from other 

sovereign nations in that its executive, the President, 

does not control the armed forces. While the President 

does have nominal control over the Supreme Council for 

National Security (SCNS) and the Ministry of Intelligence 

and Security (MOIS), only the Supreme Leader may 

declare war or peace, and he serves as the approval 

authority for military plans and operations.

The Supreme Leader is the Commander-in-Chief of the 

Armed Forces, which consist of three main components: 

the regular military (or Artesh); the IRGC (or Pasdaran), 

and the Law Enforcement Force (LEF). The Supreme 

Leader exercises his military command through the 

appointed chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS).

Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS)

The SCNS is charged with preserving the Islamic 

Revolution, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty 

of Iran. The membership of the SCNS includes: the 

President, Speaker of Parliament (Majles), the Judiciary 

Chief, the Chief of the AFGS, the Ministers of Foreign 

Affairs, the Interior, and Intelligence, and the Commanders 

of the IRGC and Regular military. The current Secretary 

of the SCNS is Vice Admiral Ali Shamkhani, former 

commander of both the IRGC and regular navies. 

Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)

The AFGS serves as the most senior military body in 

Iran, with an aim to implement policy, and monitor and 

coordinate activities within the armed forces. The AFGS 

was created in 1989 to enhance cooperation and counterbalance the inter-service rivalry between the armed forces.

Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

VADM Shamkhani and President Ruhani
14

C2 Relationship

Coordination

Direct, informal C2

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy

Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Forces

Islamic Republic of Iran Air Forces

Khatemolanbia Air Defense Force

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Regular Forces (Artesh)

Supreme Leader

IRGC-Ground Forces

IRGC-Aerospace Forces

IRGC-Qods Force

Organization of the Basij Opressed

IRGC-Intelligence Organization

IRGC-Navy

Armed Forces General Staff

Supreme Council for National Security

The first AFGS Chief, IRGC Major General Seyyed 

Hassan Firouzabadi - appointed in 1989, was relieved 

by IRGC Major General Mohammad Baqeri in June 

2016. MG Baqeri was previously in charge of the AFGS’s 

Intelligence and Operations Directorate. Prior to this 

appointment, he served as the Armed Forces Chief of 

Services and Joint Affairs.

A turnover at the head of the AFGS is a first since 

the organization’s inception 27 years ago. Having no 

precedent, it is difficult to determine its potential impact 

on Iranian military organization, planning and operations. 

There are no indications thus far that MG Baqeri will 

direct any major shift in Iran’s naval forces. MG Baqeri 

is reputed to be a solid strategist, and his intelligence 

background may increase the focus on intelligence-based 

operations throughout the armed forces. Additionally, a 

new emphasis might be expected in the areas of cyber 

threats, as well as joint operations. 

Each of the military service chiefs are represented on 

the AFGS. Besides service chief representation, the 

AFGS also includes the chiefs of core directorates 

determined by function, such as Operations, Intelligence, 

Manpower, Training, Plans and Programs, Logistics, and 

Coordination, to mention a few. Most, if not all, senior 

positions on the AFGS are currently filled by individuals 

who served as junior officers during the Iran-Iraq war. The 

significance of the Islamic Revolution and subsequent 

war with Iraq in Iranian society, and especially within military circles, has created a profound sense of camaraderie 

among Iran’s current senior officers. For these officers, 

both the bonds of friendship and strategic perspectives--shaped in the formative years of their careers--go 

back more than three decades. With each passing year, 

however, Iran’s military forces are comprised of more 

individuals who were not alive during the republic’s 

turbulent beginning. This fact represents both challenges 

and opportunities for the leaders of the AFGS.

IRAN: NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL
15

Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces 

Logistics (MODAFL)

Following the ascension of Ali Khamenei to the position 

of Supreme Leader in 1989, the MODAFL was formed to 

improve the proficiency and efficiency of Iran’s parallel 

militaries. The primary function of the MODAFL is to 

organize and manage Iran’s defense industries and to 

facilitate procurement programs in support of plans and 

objectives determined by the AFGS. Unlike the AFGS and 

service branches, the MODAFL aligns to the executive 

branch and is subordinate to the President. 

Artesh and Pasdaran Forces

Immediately subordinate to the AFGS are the Regular 

Military Forces (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps (Pasdaran). The Artesh forces are a legacy 

of the Shah’s military dating back prior to the revolution. 

The Pasdaran is a product of the revolution. Both military 

arms have their own distinct service branches. The Artesh 

and Pasdaran Commands generally mirror the organizational structure of the AFGS, as do their respective 

service components, including the IRIN and IRGCN. In 

addition to functional directorates, the IRIN and IRGCN 

include subordinate commands aligned according to geographic areas of responsibility known as naval districts. 

Each naval district likely includes subordinate squadrons 

according to warfare specialties such as surface, aviation, 

coastal defense, and for the IRIN, subsurface. 

IRGCN 

RADM Ali Fadavi is the IRGCN Commander and RADM 

Alireza Tangsiri is the IRGCN Deputy Commander. 

The IRGCN Headquarters is located in Bandar Abbas. 

Subordinate to the Commander and Deputy Commander 

are the five IRGCN Naval District commanders located in 

Shahid Bahonar, Bushehr, Bandar Mahshahr, Asaluyeh 

and Bandar Lengeh. The naval district commanders are 

responsible for day-to-day naval operations for their 

districts. The naval reorganization of 2007 left the IRGCN 

with sole responsibility for the Persian Gulf. The departure 

of the IRIN from the Persian Gulf left considerable gaps 

in IRGCN coverage, given the preponderance of smaller 

vessels that make up its naval order of battle (NOB). To 

address these gaps, the IRGCN created two new naval 

districts in the central and southern Persian Gulf. For 

the most part, the IRGCN has evenly distributed its NOB 

across all naval districts, with Shahid Bahonar, located in 

the Strait of Hormuz, basing a slightly larger number of 

platforms, due to the importance and tactical advantages 

associated with that district. 

IRIN

RADM Habibollah Sayyari is the commander of the IRIN 

and his deputy is RADM Gholamreza Khadem Bigham. 

The IRIN Headquarters is located in Tehran. Similar to the 

IRGCN, the IRIN is also divided into four geographically 

aligned naval districts located in, Bandar Abbas, Bushehr/

Jask, Chah Bahar, and Bandar Anzali in the Caspian. As 

with the IRGCN, following the naval reorganization of 

2007, the IRIN also made adjustments to its command 

and control, realigning its naval districts by adding a new 

district in Jask, located between the 1st Naval District in 

the Strait of Hormuz and the 3rd Naval District in Chah 

Bahar in the Gulf of Oman. Besides closing a geographic 

gap located where the western Gulf of Oman and eastern 

Strait of Hormuz merge, Jask will eventually replace the 

legacy IRIN 2nd Naval District in Bushehr. Given the 

larger size of the IRIN ships, considerable infrastructure 

is necessary before the IRIN can vacate Bushehr and 

permanently reapportion assets to Jask. In the meantime, 

IRIN 2nd Naval District ships periodically transit the 

Persian Gulf to deploy IRIN mission areas. To provide 

coordination across its three southern districts and 

forward presence for Headquarters elements, otherwise 

located in Tehran, the IRIN stood up the Southern 

Forward Naval Headquarters (SNFHQ), located in Bandar 

Abbas. The SNFHQ commander, RADM Abrahim Ashkan, 

is responsible for the IRIN’s deployed naval groups which 

conduct extended out-of-area operations. 

Ali Fadavi (current IRGCN Commander) and 

Qasem Soliemani (current IRGC Qods Force 

Commander) during Iran-Iraq war.
CURRENT AS OF: JAN 2017

MODAFL*

IRGC Commander 

Major General Ali Ja’fari

IRGC Major General 

Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, 

the Armed Forces Chief of Staff

IRGCN IRIN

IRIN 2nd 

Naval District 

Commander

Rear Admiral 

Reza Abbasi 

IRIN 3rd 

Naval District 

Commander 

Rear Admiral 

Mohammad 

Hadi Shafi’i

IRIN 4th Naval 

District Captain 

Ahmadreza 

Baqeri

IRGCN 4th 

Naval District 

Commander 

Rear Admiral 

Mansur 

Ravankar

IRGCN 5th 

Naval District 

Commander 

Rear Admiral 

Ali Ozma’i

IRGCN 3rd 

Naval District 

Commander 

Rear Admiral 

Yadollah Badin

IRGCN 2nd 

Naval District 

Commander 

Rear Admiral 

Ali Razmju

IRGCN 1st 

Naval District 

Commander 

Rear Admiral 

Mahmud Shiyari

IRGCN IRIN

IRGCN Deputy Commander 

Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri

IRIN Deputy Commander 

Rear Admiral Gholamreza Khadem Bigham

IRGCN Commander 

Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi

IRIN Commander 

Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari

AFGS

IRGC

Artesh Commander 

Major General Ataollah Salehi

Artesh

Minister of Defense and 

Armed Forces Logistics 

Brigadier General Hossein Dehqan

*Aligned to the Executive Branch

IRIN 1st 

Naval District 

Commander 

Rear Admiral 

Hossein Azad

IRAN: NATIONAL MILITARY/NAVY COMMAND AND CONTROL LEADERSHIP

Supreme Leader

Commander-in-Chief and 

Supreme Leader of the 

Islamic Revolution, 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
17

Bushehr

Lengeh

Asaluyeh

Bandar Abbas/Shahid Bahonar

Chahbahar

IRAN

Tehran

TURKMENISTAN

PAKISTAN

IRAQ

SAUDIA ARABIA

OMAN

UAE

Bandar Mashahr

Bandar Anzali

IRGCN 3ND

IRGCN 2ND

IRGCN 5ND

IRGCN HQs 

& 1ND

Gulf of Oman

Persian Gulf

IRGCN 4ND

AFGHANISTAN

Jask

IRIN 2ND*

IRIN SNFHQs 

& 1ND

IRIN HQs

* IRIN 2ND will eventually move from Bushehr to Jask.

IRIN 2ND*

IRIN 3ND

IRIN 4ND

IRGCN & IRIN NAVAL DISTRICT HQ LOCATIONS

Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi

Birth: 1961

Education: Master’s Degree in Strategic 

Management, Esfahan University; 

Bachelor’s Degree in Electronics, 

Esfahan University

Military Service: RADM Fadavi joined the IRGC 

in 1983, and saw combat during the Iran-Iraq war. 

RADM Fadavi served in both the IRGC-QF and the 

IRGCN. His career includes intelligence assignments 

as the Chief of Intelligence for the Najaf, Nooh, and 

Hamzeh Seyyed Ol-Shohada Headquarters respectively, Chief of Intelligence for the IRGCN, and Chief of 

Intelligence for Khatemolanbia HQ. RADM Fadavi also 

served as the IRGCN 1st Naval District Commander 

and as the IRGCN Deputy Commander for 13 years, 

before assuming the post of IRGCN Commander on 

May 3, 2010. 

Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari

Birth: 1956; Fasa, Iran 

Education: PhD, National Defense 

College; Graduate of Iranian Command 

Staff College; Ground Forces Officer’s 

Academy 

Military Service: RADM Sayyari was commissioned in 

the Artesh in 1974 and served in Imperial Iran Navy prior 

to the Revolution. RADM Sayyari saw combat during 

the Iran-Iraq war as a Naval Commando. He has served 

as the Commander of the 1st Marine Rifle Brigade; 

Commander of the Manjil Marine Commando Training 

Center, Deputy IRIN 1st Naval District Commander, IRIN 

4th Naval District Commander and he has also served 

staff tours as the Assistant Deputy Coordinator, Military 

Advisor, Deputy of Administrative Affairs for Combat 

Services Support, Artesh Joint Staff Headquarters; 

IRIN Deputy Commander from 2005 to 2007; IRIN 

Commander 2007-present. 

Of Note: RADM Sayyari fought and was wounded during 

the famed battle of Khorramshahr during the Iran-Iraq War. 
18

ENSIGN JUNIOR 

GRADE

ENSIGN LIEUTENANT 

JUNIOR GRADE

IRIN Ranks

IRIN Insignia

Artesh Insignia

Artesh General 

Officer/Flag Officer 

Collar Insignia

LIEUTENANT

LIEUTENANT

COMMANDER

COMMANDER CAPTAIN

VICE ADMIRAL ADMIRAL FLEET ADMIRAL

SEAMAN 

RECRUIT

SEAMAN 

APPRENTICE

SEAMAN THIRD CLASS

PETTY OFFICER

MASTER CHIEF 

PETTY OFFICER

SENIOR CHIEF 

PETTY OFFICER

SECOND CLASS

PETTY OFFICER

FIRST CLASS

PETTY OFFICER

CHIEF 

PETTY OFFICER

18

REAR ADMIRAL

(UPPER HALF)

REAR ADMIRAL

(LOWER HALF)
19

IRGCN Ranks

IRGCN Insignia

IRGC Confidant 

Collar Isignia 

(General Officer/

Flag Officer)

LIEUTENANT

REAR ADMIRAL

(LOWER HALF)

FLEET ADMIRAL

SECOND CLASS

PETTY OFFICER

SEAMAN 

RECRUIT

FIRST CLASS 

PETTY OFFICER

ENSIGN JUNIOR 

GRADE

LIEUTENANT

COMMANDER

SEAMAN 

APPRENTICE

REAR ADMIRAL

(UPPER HALF)

CHIEF 

PETTY OFFICER

ENSIGN

COMMANDER

SEAMAN

VICE ADMIRAL

SENIOR CHIEF 

PETTY OFFICER

LIEUTENANT 

JUNIOR GRADE

CAPTAIN

THIRD CLASS

PETTY OFFICER

ADMIRAL

MASTER CHIEF 

PETTY OFFICER

19

21

CHAPTER 2

Naval Strategy, Doctrine & Missions

National Defense Strategy

Iran’s national defense strategy is primarily shaped by its 

interest in maintaining territorial integrity, preserving the 

Islamic Revolution and clerical rule (Velayat-e Faqih), and 

influencing regional political, economic, religious, and 

security issues. The Iran-Iraq War remains the principal 

influence on Iran’s national defense strategy, but observations of coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have 

also factored heavily into Tehran’s approach. The result is 

a primarily defensive, deterrence-based military strategy, 

which makes use of asymmetric doctrine intended to 

exploit perceived enemy weaknesses, increases the 

cost of war for a potential adversary, and diminishes its 

enemies’ will to fight. 

The main components of Iran’s defense strategy are 

ballistic missiles, naval forces, and proxies in the region. 

Each of these potentially provides the means to target 

Iran’s regional neighbors, or military forces based or 

operating in the region. When specifically focused on 

the Strait of Hormuz or oil infrastructure in the region, 

they provide Iran with the means to impact the global 

economy, in general, as well as the economies of those 

countries reliant on oil or natural gas from the Middle 

East, in particular.

An important component of this strategy is avoiding 

rapid defeat by a surprise attack: a lesson Iran learned 

from Saddam Hussein’s surprise invasion in 1980. The 

concept of passive defense (which is essential to Iran’s 

defense strategy) is to employ a broad program of denial 

and deception tactics to both reduce the vulnerability and 

increase the survivability of Iran’s forces. Examples of this 

include, using camouflage and concealment, hiding and 

dispersing forces, building underground facilities, and 

developing highly mobile units.

The past several years have witnessed Iran’s military 

become more involved in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Lessons 

from military operations throughout the region will influence Tehran’s future defense strategy, as well as the force 

structure and military capabilities Iran develops to achieve 

its objectives. As Tehran eyes regional conflicts beyond 

its borders and considers opportunities to influence them 

using military forces, it is not likely to forget the strategic 

importance of the Strait of Hormuz, nor the role its navies 

play in both securing and leveraging this key water way. 

IRGCN Strategy, Doctrine and Missions

IRGCN Strategy

The IRGC naval strategy is an extension of Iran’s national 

defense strategy, which seeks to, deter a maritime 

attack if possible, rapidly escalate if deterrence fails, and 

wage a protracted war if necessary. Fundamental to this 

strategy is the exploitation of geography and the use of 

asymmetric doctrine to combat a technologically superior 

force. Specifically, the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf 

and narrow waters of the Strait of Hormuz afford the 

IRGCN several warfighting advantages in some of the 

world’s most important waterways. The IRGCN believes it 

can overcome enemy defenses in these confined waters, 

by using different types of small and mobile weapons systems together, or by using its capabilities in unexpected 

“The capabilities of the IRGC and Artesh navies 

are for establishing security within the region... 

We have a presence in the Northern, Eastern, and 

Western Strait of Hormuz; and we have it completely 

surrounded.”

RADM Fadavi, IRGCN Commander
22

ways to achieve tactical surprise. Additionally, IRGCN 

commanders believe the revolutionary and spiritual zeal 

of their sailors gives their force an advantage over other 

navies, whose personnel rely heavily on technology. 

The IRGCN aims to deter an attack by projecting an 

image of military strength and signaling that an attack on 

Iran could have serious global economic repercussions. 

IRGCN officers often allude to Iran’s ability to impede 

or attack commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz and 

the economic crisis that could ensue. The IRGCN has 

demonstrated its ability to harass and interdict shipping 

on several occasions, since 2012, by boarding or firing on 

merchant ships in the strait. Additionally, the IRGCN also 

holds highly publicized, large-scale, deterrent-themed 

exercises (called NOBLE PROPHET) as a show of force, 

and as another means to warn of the consequences of 

attacking the Islamic Republic. 

If deterrence fails, the IRGCN could use any, or all, of its 

five pillars to confront enemy warships or commercial 

ships. These five pillars provide the means for the 

IRGCN’s strategy and include naval mines, CDCMs, small 

boats armed with a variety of light and heavy weapons, 

special forces/naval infantry, and naval aviation. 

IRGCN commanders claim that in the event of a conflict, 

they will move swiftly to attack and destroy enemy 

warships present in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. 

They believe that sinking several enemy warships in the 

early stages of a conflict would break the political will of 

an adversary to continue with a military campaign against 

Iran. IRGC leaders claim that if this early effort fails to 

bring a halt to the conflict, they are prepared to wage a 

protracted war of attrition against an opposing force. The 

IRGCN’s actions could include restricting access to, or 

attempting altogether to close, the Strait of Hormuz.

IRGCN Doctrine

The IRGCN’s leaders believe an asymmetric warfighting 

concept will allow it to defeat a more advanced military. 

This doctrine has its roots in the Iran-Iraq War of the 

IRAN

OMAN

Bushehr

Jask

Chah Bahar

Bandar Abbas

Gulf of Oman

Persian Gulf

SAUDIA ARABIA

UNITED ARAB 

EMIRATES

BAHRAIN

QATAR

Caspian Sea

IRGCN AND IRIN AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

*According to Iranian 

TTW Claims.

IRGCN AOR

IRIN AOR

Shared AOR
23

1980s, but it has grown in capability and complexity over 

the past several decades. The IRGCN’s doctrine reflects 

classical irregular warfare principles historically used by 

revolutionary forces. These principles include the use of, 

surprise, deception, speed, flexibility and adaptability, 

decentralization, and highly mobile and maneuverable 

units. The doctrine manifests itself as hit-and-run style, 

surprise attacks, or the amassing of large numbers of 

unsophisticated weapons to overwhelm the enemies’ 

defenses. The amassing of naval forces is often described 

as a swarm of small boats, and is essentially similar to 

the human wave attacks Iran’s ground forces used in the 

Iran-Iraq War.

IRGCN Missions

The IRGCN focuses on three primary missions in 

peacetime. First, it enforces Iran’s territorial water claims 

and protects Iranian economic interests, including its 

The Strait of Hormuz is central to Iran’s naval strategy because of geographic advantages that it affords from a warfighting 

standpoint as well as the economic importance of commerce that flows through the Strait to the global economy. 

Gulf of Oman

Strait of Hormuz

Strait of Hormuz

90 miles long

21–35 miles wide

OMAN

IRAN

UNITED ARAB 

EMIRATES

Total 

Seaborne

Volume

~1.4 billion metric tons (annually)

(~15% of global seaborne volume)

Total 

Seaborne

Value

~$1.3 billion (annually)

(~12% of global seaborne value)

Oil

~20.5 million barrels per day 

(~34% of global crude exports)

Natural 

Gas

3.1 million barrels per day 

(33% of global LNG market and 

45% of global LPG market)

Container 

Trade

>10 million TEU worth roughly 

~$230B (~7% of containerized volume and ~5% of containerized value)

ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF STRAIT OF HORMUZ

IRGCN strategy depends on large numbers 

of small boats.
24

offshore energy infrastructure, as well as countering illegal 

smuggling into, or out of, the Islamic Republic. Second, 

the IRGCN monitors and tracks the movements of foreign 

warships and merchant ships operating in the Strait 

of Hormuz and Persian Gulf. It accomplishes this with 

coastal radars, small boat patrols, and unmanned aerial 

vehicle (UAV) flights, to maintain situational awareness. 

Third, IRGCN units regularly train and exercise to prepare 

for wartime contingencies.

IRIN Strategy, Doctrine and Missions

IRIN Strategy

The IRIN’s role in Iran’s national defense strategy is 

to defend the Islamic Republic’s territory and protect 

the nation’s economic interests in the Gulf of Oman, 

Caspian Sea, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Aden. The IRIN 

also assists with Tehran’s broader goals to establish a 

dominant regional position through naval diplomacy and 

cooperation with other regional navies. The IRIN is better 

positioned than the IRGCN to support some strategic 

objectives because it has larger ships and follows a more 

traditional naval culture. Over the past several years, 

the IRIN has sought to advance the national strategy 

by combatting piracy, and engaging with regional and 

international navies, through bilateral exercises, reciprocal 

port visits, and attending international symposiums. 

IRIN leaders tout the navy’s presence in the “Golden 

Triangle”—the area within the Strait of Malacca, Bab 

al-Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz, where substantial 

maritime commerce occurs—as evidence that it protects 

international shipping, while gaining experience in the 

operating area. 

Compared to the IRGCN, the IRIN plays a minor role 

in deterrence, yet it holds important responsibilities to 

defend the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz in the 

event of a conflict. The IRIN may fight similarly to other 

conventional, coastal navies. Specifically, the IRIN aims 

to use its surface ships, submarines, naval mines, coastal 

defense cruise missile units, and air assets, all together, 

in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. The IRIN 

would also play an important role if the decision was 

made to attack or detain commercial ships, or to restrict 

access to, or attempt to close, the Strait of Hormuz. 

However, it is insufficiently equipped and lacks proficiency to fight a navy farther from the Gulf of Oman coast.

IRIN Doctrine

Iran’s naval doctrine has evolved since the 1979 

Revolution, morphing the western military concepts that 

formed its foundation, with some ideological tenets. 

The doctrine also adopted some Russian and Chinese 

concepts as it acquired the weapons systems and 

training from them, over the past 20 years. In general, the 

IRIN’s doctrine seeks to establish a defense in depth and 

to integrate multiple sea, land, and air-based weapons 

simultaneously, to saturate an enemy’s defenses.

IRIN Missions

The IRIN is responsible for a number of key missions that 

support Iran’s strategic goals. It has long-term goals to 

become a regional power in the Gulf of Oman and Indian 

Ocean that mirror the ambitions of the Shah. Among 

other objectives, the IRIN seeks to use “soft power” to 

expand bilateral, regional, and military relations, and it 

has done so through deployed naval groups. Recent 

increases in high-level military exchanges and combined 

exercises with China, India, Oman, Pakistan, and Russia 

highlight the IRIN’s peacetime objectives to increase its 

prestige through naval diplomacy.

In addition to the previously detailed naval diplomacy and 

counter-piracy operations, the IRIN’s missions include:

• Becoming a superior military power for defense and 

security

• Guarding the territorial independence of Iran against 

military threats

• Responding swiftly and countering all threats

• Training and preparing for wartime contingencies. IRIN port visit in Jakarta, near the Strait of Malacca
25

The IRIN has defined its operational boundaries based on the 10th degree north latitude and the “Golden Triangle,” represented by the straits of Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el Mandeb. IRIN out-of-area port visits while at times falling outside of 

these boundaries largely reflect its sphere of operations since 2009.

Arabian Sea

EGYPT SAUDIA ARABIA

SUDAN

ETHIOPIA

SOMALIA

IRAN

PAKISTAN

INDIA

BURMA

THAILAND

CHINA

TURKMENISTAN

SINGAPORE

10th DEGREE N. LATITUDE

Muscat

Vishakhapatnam

Salah

Djibouti

Jeddah

Latakia

Port Sudan

Colombo

Mumbai

Cochin

Dar es Salaam Jakarta

Zhanjiang

Karachi

Indian Ocean

Mediterranean

Sea

Bay of 

Bengal

South China 

Sea

East 

China 

Sea

Golden Triangle choke points

 IRIN port visit locations

* Port visit to Durban, South Africa not shown on map.

RADM Sayyari explains IRIN strategy for 

out-of-area operations.

IRIN STRATEGIC VISION AND OUT-OF-AREA PORT VISITS

“The Golden Triangle of Malacca, Bab al-Mandeb, 

and the Strait of Hormuz is an important triangle that 

is the area of the Artesh Navy’s concentration based 

on the Leader’s recommendation since 93 percent 

of the country’s imports and exports are conducted 

through this route.”

RADM Sayyari, IRIN Commander

27

CHAPTER 3

Naval Capabilities

Prior to the Islamic Revolution, Iran built its military 

capability primarily through foreign acquisitions. After 

experiencing isolation during the Iran-Iraq War, which 

greatly inhibited its ability to procure foreign weapons, 

Tehran has since placed considerable emphasis on 

improving its defense industries and domestic production 

capabilities. More recently, sanctions have only reinforced 

this approach. While not entirely abandoning foreign 

acquisition of complete systems, Iran has taken a 

long-view perspective by sacrificing immediate gains to 

increase technological knowhow. 

Currently, Iran uses a dual-track approach to advance 

modernization, which leverages its foreign acquisitions to 

improve its domestic production capabilities. Using this 

approach, Iran acquires foreign technology, reverse-engineers it, and then incorporates it into its own production 

initiatives. Iran has assimilated this methodology to 

satisfy its requirements across the spectrum of naval 

warfare including platforms, weapons, and sensors. 

Consequently, Iran has significantly improved its defense 

industries, but it has also resulted in some downsides: 

prolonged delays, inferior quality, and less sophisticated 

capabilities, than if it had otherwise emphasized foreign 

acquisition to build its navies. In many respects, Iran 

is still in the nascent stages of building domestic 

capabilities, but with each new domestic initiative, it gains 

valuable knowledge and experience.

IRGCN Principal Naval Capabilities

Driven by an asymmetric doctrine--based on speed, 

numbers, stealth, survivability, and lethality-- the 

IRGCN focuses its naval acquisitions along four primary 

capabilities: fast attack craft, small boats, anti-ship 

cruise missiles, and mines. Considering it began as a 

fleet of lightly-armed small boats in the 1980s, IRGCN 

acquisitions in each of these four core areas have greatly 

improved its capabilities. Individually, these improvements 

cannot compete with western technology. However, 

taken together, they could create an overall capability 

that is greater than the sum of its parts, particularly when 

employed in tight operational spaces like the Persian Gulf 

and Strait of Hormuz. 

Ghader ASCM production

Iranian surface ship construction
28

Fast Attack Craft (FAC)

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the IRGCN 

has significantly upgraded its fleet in terms of size and 

lethality, but it has remained a force comprised of smaller 

platforms. Rather than acquire larger ships as might a 

more traditional navy, the IRGCN has instead chosen 

to pursue smaller, faster vessels, armed with capable 

weapons systems, such as cruise missiles and torpedoes. 

It believes acquiring these types of vessels in sufficient 

numbers will allow it to threaten foreign navies and 

overcome wartime attrition. The IRGCN still employs ten 

Chinese-built Houdong WPTGs, acquired in the mid-‘90s. 

Originally equipped with C802 missiles, these vessels 

have since been upgraded with Iranian derivatives known 

as, Ghader missiles. The Houdong WPTGs serve as the 

capital ships of the IRGCN fleet and are frequently used in 

Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz patrols.

Almost immediately following receipt of the Houdongs, 

the IRGCN shifted its focus to even smaller, faster 

vessels, obtained both through foreign acquisition 

and domestic production. Between 1996 and 2006, 

the IRGCN received approximately 46 FAC of various 

classes from China and North Korea. Depending 

upon the platform, they are equipped with torpedoes, 

short-range ASCMs, or both, and can reach speeds 

of 40-50 knots. The North Korean procurement effort 

included four distinct classes of torpedo boats; two of 

which are submersible / semisubmersible. Both Chinese 

classes include short-range ASCMs. Iran has copied the 

North Korean Peykaap-class boat and is domestically 

producing it as a missile boat with Nasr (C704) ASCMs. 

The IRGCN continues to look for the right combination of 

vessel performance characteristics and weaponry, with 

platform speed and missile range as critical elements to 

incorporate into its procurement efforts.

Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC)

FIAC are lightly armed small-boats that have been a 

mainstay of the IRGCN since its inception in the 1980s, 

and they are by far, the most numerous of all IRGCN 

vessels. Usually fitted with only machine guns and/or 

rockets, and used en masse, these vessels are capable 

Houdong-class WPTG

Siraj-1 (Bladerunner 35 copy) WPB 

Iranian-produced Peykaap II torpedo/missile boat

“So, we must strive in the next few months to have 

mass production of fastboat vessels with a speed of 

80 knots armed with missiles with a 100 kilometer 

range – vessels that no one can get.” 

RADM Ali Fadavi, IRGCN Commander
29

of harassing merchant shipping and conducting swarm 

tactics during a force-on-force naval engagement.

The IRGCN’s infatuation with speed has also influenced 

its FIAC acquisition efforts. One of the IRGCN’s 

most notable additions is a copy of the British built 

Bladerunner, designated “Siraj-1.” The IRGCN claims 

the Siraj-1 is the fastest military vessel in the world, in 

its current modification to carry crew-served weapons 

and rockets. In the future; however, the Siraj-1 will likely 

incorporate additional armament: either torpedoes or 

ASCMs.

Mines and Mine-layers

Naval mines are a critical component of the IRGCN’s 

strategy in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. 

It realized the impact mines made during the Tanker 

War and operation Desert Storm and invested in new 

mines and mine delivery vessels. The IRGCN has a large 

inventory of mines including contact and influence mines. 

Though it possesses a number of larger vessels that 

can be used to lay mines, the IRGCN has integrated 

its philosophy of using smaller, faster vessels into its 

mine-laying strategy. It has equipped a large number of 

standard Ashoora small boats with mine rails capable 

of holding at least one mine. Using numerous boats 

complicates laying mines in mass, it is better suited for 

rapidly laying small amounts of mines and improving 

force survivability, both key elements of IRGCN doctrine. 

IRIN Principal Naval Capabilities

Unlike the IRGCN, the IRIN’s fleet is comprised of mainly 

traditional surface ships and submarines. Most of the 

IRIN’s surface ships are old, dating back to the 1960s 

and 1970s. Despite its aging platforms, the IRIN has 

done fairly well in preserving materiel readiness, but it will 

likely need to reconstitute its fleet in the coming years, 

given its mission in the Gulf of Oman and its ambitions for 

extra-regional deployments. 

Iran is the only Persian Gulf nation with a submarine 

force. The IRIN’s submarine fleet originated after the 

Iran-Iraq War when it received three Kilo-class attack 

submarines from Russia. Although domestic submarine 

production and maintenance programs exist, they seem 

to be plagued by setbacks and delays.

Surface Combatants

Until 2007, the IRIN’s most capable surface combatants 

included only three 1960-era British built Vosper MK 5 

corvettes (FFLs), ten French La Combattante patrol boats 

(PTGs) and several domestically produced Combattantes. 

Each of these classes were originally fitted or upgraded 

with C802 ASCMs. Following the naval reorganization 

of 2007, the IRIN added 11 missile combatants. They 

achieved this by upgrading three Hendijan-class 

auxiliaries and two PF 103-class patrol ships with medium-range C802/Noor ASCMs, as well as upgrading three 

PGM 71 and three Cape patrol craft with short-range 

C704 / Nasr ASCMs. 

Ashoora mine-layer

Jamaran-class Jamaran FFLG

“Our naval mines had left such an impression upon 

the Americans during Sacred Defense that they still 

live in apparent fear of these mines.” 

RADM Ali Fadavi, IRGCN Commander
30

The IRIN presently has two domestic combatant construction programs underway. The first is the IRIN’s new 

capital ship, the Jamaran-class, which closely resembles 

Iran’s Vosper-class corvettes and is likely intended to 

replace those aging ships. The Jamaran’s armament 

differs slightly from Vosper MK 5. Jamarans incorporate 

a helicopter flight deck, a 76 mm main deck gun, two 20 

mm cannons and a 40 mm aft gun. Additionally, Jamarans 

carry up to four C-802 or Noor ASCMs, Standard Missile 

1 anti-air missiles (SAMs) and torpedoes. In December 

of 2015, RADM Sayyari announced IRIN destroyers were 

being upgraded to carry the domestically-produced 

Ghadir ASCMs, which would allegedly increase the strike 

range of the Jamaran to 300 km. Iran has commissioned 

two Jamaran-class ships, one in Bandar Anzali, in the 

Caspian Sea, and one in Bandar Abbas, where four more 

are under construction, or being fitted out.

The IRIN’s other major combatant construction program 

is known as project Sina, which is intended to replace 

its aging French La Combattante IIb-class patrol craft. 

Since 2003, Iran has completed seven ships in this class, 

which operate in the Caspian Sea and Southern Fleet. 

The Iranian built Combattantes are armed with four box 

launchers for either C-802, or Noor ASCMs, and a 76mm 

forward gun. 

Surface Auxiliaries 

Overall, the IRIN has nearly 20 auxiliaries in its order of 

battle, but most are of smaller classes, and all are older 

platforms. Only two, the Bushehr and Kharg oilers, are 

capable of conducting legitimate replenishment at sea 

(RAS) missions.

While the IRIN is looking to become a “strategic navy”, its 

aging and small auxiliary fleet has highlighted how critical 

logistics and infrastructure are, to continuous out-of-area 

deployments. In order for the IRIN to achieve the goal of 

conducting extended deployments at greater ranges from 

home, the IRIN requires a robust and capable auxiliary 

fleet. Since the IRIN began out-of-area deployments in 

2009, Iran has given no indication that it intends to invest 

in additional auxiliaries.

Subsurface Fleet

Submarines are a critical component of the IRIN, which 

has undertaken an ambitious construction program 

to increase its subsurface production capabilities and 

expand its fleet. Iran has three classes of operational 

submarines in its order of battle. First, Iran received three 

Kilo-class attack submarines from Russia in the 1990s. 

The Kilo is Iran’s most capable submarine and is presently equipped with torpedoes and mines. Unlike many other 

countries using the Kilo-class submarine, Iran chose to 

forego sending its Kilos to Russia for mid-life overhaul, 

and instead, complete it in-country. This decision came 

at a significant time and operational cost, taking more 

than seven years to complete. Iran claims to have begun 

overhaul of its second Kilo submarine. With so few attack 

Bandar Abbas-class Bushehr AOR, one of only two IRIN oiler replenishment ships.
31

submarines available, the emphasis on domestic maintenance of its Kilo submarines will significantly impact 

submarine operations for well more than a decade, from 

the time it began.

Second, the IRIN has 14 North Korean-designed Yonoclass midget submarines (SSM). Iran originally acquired at 

least one Yono submarine from North Korea in 2004 and 

began domestically producing them shortly thereafter. 

Displacing only 120 tons, the Yono has two torpedo tubes 

capable of carrying Iran’s 53 cm Valfajar heavy-weight 

torpedo. One of the Yono submarines reportedly sank 

during a patrol in April 2014, after a possible collision with 

rocks. Finally, Iran has a single domestically-designed 

and produced Nahang SSM. The Nahang does not have 

torpedo tubes and may serve as a special operations 

platform. 

In addition to the three classes of submarines that are 

currently operational in the IRIN, Iran is domestically 

producing two other classes of submarines. The first 

is the Fateh-class coastal submarine (SSC). The Fateh 

reportedly displaces 600 tons with an operational diving 

depth of 200 meters and a range of 5000 kilometers. 

RADM Sayyari stated up to 20 Fateh-class submarines 

would be constructed in the future. Reportedly, the Fateh 

submarines will be equipped with torpedoes, missiles, 

and mines. In April 2016, Fateh hull one was still undergoing sea trials with the goal to be certified operational by 

the end of 2016, but as of January 2017, the IRIN has yet 

to declare the Fateh submarine operational.

Iran is also building a 1300 ton attack submarine known 

as Besat. According to Iranian press reports, the Besat 

will be approximately 60 meters in length, capable 

of diving to 300 meters, and able to sustain 12 knots 

surfaced and 20 knots submerged. In terms of armament, 

the Besat will likely have six torpedo tubes, capable 

of employing torpedoes and mines, as well as submarine-launched ASCMs. 

Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles 

The tight water space in the Strait of Hormuz, as well 

as vast miles of coastline, both provide optimal firing 

positions for coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCMs). 

Yono-class midget submarines (SSM) Valfajar torpedo

Fateh-class coastal submarine (SSC)

Iranian Kilo-class attack submarine
32

IRAN

QATAR

OMAN

UNITED ARAB 

EMIRATES

SAUDIA ARABIA

BAHRAIN

Gulf of Oman

Persian Gulf

C802 (Noor) 120 km

Ghadir ASCM 300 km

Ghader ASCM 200 km

Accordingly, as one of the primary layers of defense for 

both the IRGCN and the IRIN, Iran has invested heavily 

in procurement, research, and production of multiple 

anti-ship missile systems, over the past several years.

Iran’s initial experience with CDCMs was gained with the 

Chinese-built Silkworm missiles during the Tanker War. 

Over the past decade, Iran has expanded its inventory 

by developing a domestic production capability for 

the Chinese C802 and C700 series cruise missiles. 

The C802 derivatives are known as Noor, Ghader, and 

Ghadir, with ranges reportedly of 120 km, 200 km and 

300 km, respectively. In addition to the development and 

deployment of these systems, Iranian CDCMs continue 

to evolve in all categories including, range, speed, flight 

profile, autonomy, seeker, and destructiveness.

Aviation / Missile Augmentation

Manned Aircraft 

The IRIN maintains a fleet of SH-3D, AB-212 and 

RH-53 helicopters, F-27 fixed-wing aircraft, and a small 

number of hovercrafts. Naval aviation serves primarily 

in reconnaissance and transport roles, but they are also 

used in limited warfare missions. The IRIN claims to be 

reconstituting the antisubmarine capability on its SH-3D 

helicopters, reportedly equipping them with new sonars 

and the ability to launch torpedoes. The RH-53 helicopters are the IRIN’s main counter mine capability. 

IRAN COASTAL DEFENSE CRUISE MISSLE (CDCM) RANGES

Iranian CDCM launcher
33

The IRGCN has a small number of Mi-171 helicopters, 

which are mainly used for transport, but according to 

Iranian claims, can also fire cruise missiles. The IRGCN is 

also equipping AB-206 helicopters with Nasr ASCMs.

The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) augments 

Iran’s naval aviation with aging P-3 Orion maritime patrol 

(MARPAT) aircraft. The P-3s, which are used for reconnaissance, date back to the Shah’s navy and are in major 

need of replacement. Iran has advertised the IRAN-140 

as a potential replacement, but this platform is not yet 

operational. The IRIAF also maintains a small maritime 

strike capability and intends to equip F-4 aircraft with 

Nasr/C704 and Ghader ASCMs.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

Both the IRGCN and the IRIN have incorporated UAVs 

into their respective operations and pla nning. Historically, 

UAVs have been reserved for reconnaissance missions, 

but as Iran improves its lethal and armed UAV technology, 

both navies are likely to employ these advancements in 

the maritime environment. 

Antiship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM)

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace 

Forces (IRGC ASF) controls Iran’s ballistic missile forces. 

The IRGC ASF has advertised several ballistic missile 

variants with the capability to target ships. The variants 

include the Khalij-e Fars, Hormuz-1 and Hormuz-2 

missiles, which reportedly have a range of 300 km and 

are equipped with terminal seekers, one of which is 

anti-radiation homing (ARH). 

With each new domestic program, Iran gains valuable 

technical experience, advancing its defense industries 

in support of its military objectives. While still lagging 

considerably behind leading nations, Iran’s defense 

industries have made recognizable strides in equipping 

its navies and other military services, with a broad range 

of capabilities for the maritime environment. As Iran 

incorporates these capabilities and develops proficiency 

in using them, the IRGCN and IRIN will be more capable 

of fulfilling their respective missions. For any navy, 

training, exercises, and operational proficiency are critical 

elements to achieve that objective. 

IRGCN AB-206 with ASCM on Harth WAG

Hormuz 1 & 2 antiship ballistic missiles

IRAN-140 maritime patrol aircraft

IRIN SH-3D helicopter equipped with torpedo
34

Class Role Order of Battle

THONDOR (HOUDONG) Fast Attack Craft, Missile 10

PEYKAAP I Patrol Craft, Coastal, Torpedo 15

PEYKAAP II Patrol Craft, Coastal, Missile 25

PEYKAAP III Patrol Craft, Coastal, Missile 5

MK 13 Patrol Craft, Coastal, Missile 10

C 14 Patrol Craft, Coastal, Missile 5

TIR Patrol Craft 10

TARLAN Patrol Craft, Inshore 15

KASHDOM II Patrol Craft, Inshore 15

ASHOORA Patrol Craft, Inshore Multiple - UNK

COUGAR Patrol Craft, Inshore Multiple - UNK

FB RIB-33 Patrol Craft, Inshore Multiple - UNK

GASHTI Patrol Craft, Inshore Multiple - UNK

KUCH Patrol Craft, Inshore Multiple - UNK

SIRAJ (BLADERUNNER) Patrol Craft, Inshore Multiple - UNK

BOGHAMMER Patrol Craft, Inshore 20

IRAN HORMUZ 21 Landing Ship 2

IRAN HORMUZ 24 Landing Ship 3

HARTH 55 Support Ship 1

SAFIR KISH Transport 3

NASER Transport 3

ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS NAVY

IRGCN IRGCN

Class Role Order of Battle

Kilo Fast Attack Submarine 3

Fateh Coastal Submarine 1

GHADIR (YONO) Midget Submarine 14

NAHANG Midget Submarine 1

MOWJ (Jamaran) Corvette 2

VOSPER MK 5 Corvette 3

BAYANDOR (PF 103) Corvette 2

KAMAN (COMBATTANTE II) Fast Attack Craft, Missile 13

HENDIJAN Patrol Craft, Missile 3

PARVIN (PGM-71) Patrol Craft, Missile 3

KAYVAN (CAPE) Patrol Craft, Missile 3

US MK III Patrol Craft, Coastal 10

US MK II Patrol Craft, Coastal 6

C 14 Patrol Craft, Coastal 9

FB 40 Patrol Craft, Inshore 6

HENGHAM Landing Ship, Tank 3

KARBALA Landing Ship, Logistic 6

WELLINGTON (MK 4) Hovercraft 2

WELLINGTON (MK 5) Hovercraft 4

KHARG Replenishment Ship 1

BANDAR ABBAS Fleet Supply Ship 2

DELVAR Support Ship 6

HENDIJAN Tender 7

SHAHSAVAR Training Ship 1

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN NAVY

IRIN IRIN

34

*Exact numbers are not known, but the IRGCN has 

hundreds of small boats throughout the Persian Gulf 

and Strait of Hormuz.
*Exact numbers are not 

has hundreds of small b

Persian Gulf and Strait o

*Not all IRGCN/IRIN shi

on graphic.

For greater detail of the graphics shown above, see the attached poster.

35

37

CHAPTER 4

Training, Operations & Exercises 

Both the IRIN and IRGCN recognize the important roles 

that training and naval exercises play in developing a 

stronger and more proficient naval force that is capable of 

carrying out a wide variety of operations, in both peacetime and during a conflict. The navies’ training programs 

include both classroom and practical, hands-on training. 

The vast majority of naval operations occur in the Persian 

Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. However, the 

IRIN also operates routinely in the Gulf of Aden and 

occasionally deploys to the Mediterranean Sea and South 

China Sea. 

IRGCN Development 

Naval Academy/Training

The IRGCN holds its formative training at the 

Imam Khamenei University of Marine Sciences and 

Technology—better known as the Imam Khamenei Naval 

Academy—located on the Caspian Sea, north of Tehran. 

This academy, formally opened in 2015, is a unified 

training center for five colleges: vessels, commandos, missiles, naval aviation, and UAVs. The academy’s curriculum 

presents coursework from entry level through advanced 

studies, and includes studies in asymmetric tactics. 

The IRGCN also has other facilities located in Rasht, 

Shiraz, and Esfahan for training on a range of naval 

operations, including fast attack craft operations and 

naval infantry. Besides classroom and practical training at 

sea, the IRGCN also makes use of simulators to improve 

crew proficiency.

IRGCN Exercises

Since 2006, the IRGC has held highly publicized, 

large-scale, deterrent-themed exercises (named NOBLE 

PROPHET) in an attempt to dissuade foreign political, 

economic, or military aggression. NOBLE PROPHET 

exercises typically showcase naval and/or ballistic missile 

capabilities and broadcast bellicose rhetoric. For example, 

in February 2015, the IRGC held NOBLE PROPHET 9 

in the Strait of Hormuz. During the exercise, the IRGC 

attacked a mockup of a U.S. Nimitz-class aircraft carrier 

with several types of weapons, including missiles and 

rockets. Political leaders, IRGC commanders, and officials 

of the AFGS Headquarters observed the demonstration. 

The event received extensive coverage in the press, 

prominently displaying Iranian weapons and capabilities. 

IRGCN small boat simulator strikes U.S. ship

IRGCN Imam Khamenei Naval Academy students
38

IRGCN NOBLE PROPHET exercise features attack on mock U.S. aircraft carrier.

The IRGCN also holds other exercises and training 

events beyond the NOBLE PROPHET series. These other 

exercises are not as widely publicized because they 

are focused on developing practical skills, rather than 

sending strategic messages.

IRGCN Operations

The IRGCN primarily operates in the Strait of Hormuz and 

Persian Gulf, and executes security patrols throughout 

these areas. Iran’s state media reports that, “the IRGCN 

relentlessly endeavors to protect the maritime borders of 

the Islamic Republic of Iran and to preserve security of 

the Persian Gulf,” through these operations. In addition 

to monitoring naval warships in the area, IRGCN vessels 

routinely stop and inspect vessels they suspect of 

smuggling drugs or other illicit materials. These patrols 

also aggressively enforce Iranian territorial water claims, 

especially in the southern Persian Gulf region, and near 

Iran’s offshore oil platforms. 

IRGCN patrols in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf 

regularly include surveillance and monitoring of U.S. Navy 

and Coalition ships. While the majority of these encounters are safe and routine, IRGCN operations do frequently 

include unprofessional or aggressive operations. Such 

operations increase the likelihood for a mishap at sea, 

potentially leading to strategic tension and insecurity in 

the region. 

IRGCN small boats conduct live rocket fire, sometimes near U.S. aircraft carriers.

“Today, more than 100 of our vessels are conducting 

patrols daily in the Persian Gulf to the extent that the 

Americans see us wherever they look...We shouldn’t 

play nice with the Americans. If we were to do that, 

there would be no end in sight; we would be going 

from “A to Z.”

RADM Fadavi, IRGCN Commander
39

IRIN Development

Naval Academy and Training Centers

The IRIN’s primary training center is the Imam Khomeini 

Naval Academy, located at Nowshahr. The University 

is the principal body for the development and training 

of both Iranian naval and merchant fleet officers. 

Undergraduates at the university first attend two months 

of military indoctrination training before commencing 

a four year program toward a Bachelor’s degree. Its 

five colleges offer five Bachelor’s degree programs 

and two Master’s degree programs. The five basic 

branches include: Naval Operations and Command of 

Ship, Marine Engineering, Naval Infantry/Marines, Naval 

Electronics and Telecommunications, and Naval/Marine 

Management, and Commissary Branch. 

The IRIN has several other training centers for specialized 

training. For example, the IRIN’s Baqer Ol-‘Oloom naval 

technical training command is located in Rasht, Gilan 

Province. This center trains 70 percent of all personnel 

of in the IRIN. Warfare-specific training centers include 

a naval pilot training center at Bushehr, a naval infantry 

training center at Manjil, and the Sirjan training center. The 

IRIN touts its naval infantry training program as being very 

selective, accepting only the most qualified individuals.

Cadet cruises

As part of its practical training, the IRIN conducts annual 

cadet cruises. These cruises provide young sailors the 

opportunity to embark on a naval vessel to gain hands-on 

experience in basic warfighting tactics, navigation and 

ship handling, and damage control while underway. The 

cadets often participate in out-of-area deployments to 

distant shores. Additionally, the deployments serve to 

instill, in new naval officers and enlisted personnel, the 

concept that the IRIN is a professional, international navy. 

By participating in the operations, cadets receive valuable 

real world training aimed at developing more proficient 

personnel. Cadets have deployed as far away as China 

and almost always participate in counter-piracy operations 

in the Gulf of Aden before returning to Bandar Abbas. 

IRIN Exercises

The IRIN typically holds several specialized exercises 

throughout the year in the Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz, 

and Caspian Sea to gain proficiency in the warfare areas 

of surface, submarine, air, special operations, intelligence, 

and electronic warfare. Stated goals of these exercises 

are to improve readiness and counter enemy threats.

The IRIN’s VELAYAT exercises are a large-scale, highly 

publicized annual event used to showcase its naval 

strength against a notional enemy, in the Gulf of Oman 

and Strait of Hormuz. Its objectives include transferring 

experience to new personnel, turning theoretical training 

into practical skills, testing new weapons and equipment, 

and practicing command, control and communications. 

The four phases of VELAYAT exercises are: dispersal, 

tactical, show-of-force, and a pass-in-review. The tactical 

phase typically involves the naval forces countering an 

enemy invasion with supporting units deployed to littoral 

areas. Forces participating in the tactical phase normally 

include coastal defense cruise missile launchers, rocket 

launchers, commandos, coastal artillery, mobile electronic 

warfare systems, warships, submarines, and mine warfare 

teams. The show-of-force phase typically involves submarines, warships, and/or land based launched weapons 

firings. The IRIN marks the end of its large-scale naval 

IRIN Imam Khomeini Naval Academy students IRIN deployed naval group pulls into Dar es Salaam, 

Tanzania.
40

drills with a maritime parade, viewed by high-ranking 

military officials and foreign military advisors. 

In December 2014, all four branches of the Artesh 

Regular forces conducted the “Mohammad Rasulollah” 

Joint exercise to showcase advanced tactics and new 

equipment. The exercise was conducted in lieu of the 

typical navy-centered VELAYAT exercise, and was closely 

supervised by officials of the AFGS. One of the goals 

of the exercise was to activate the Artesh’s “Zolfaqar” 

Headquarters to practice joint command, control, and 

communications.

The IRIN supports Iran’s diplomatic outreach by holding 

exercises with regional and extra-regional countries. Over 

the past several years, the IRIN has participated in naval 

exercises with Oman, India, and Pakistan in the Indian 

Ocean and Gulf of Oman and with Russia in the Caspian 

Sea. The stated goals for these exercises are often to 

“exchange technical intelligence” between navies and 

demonstrate “joint operations.” 

Simulators

The IRIN uses simulators to offer dynamic training and to 

further develop its forces in a more cost effective manner. 

IRIN simulators present realistic scenarios that improve 

proficiency. The IRIN likely has bridge, missile, naval gun, 

submarine, and helicopter simulators. 

IRIN Operations

One of the IRIN’s roles is to keep lanes of communication 

open and secure by maintaining a continuous presence 

in nearby seas. As such, the IRIN investigates maritime 

traffic approaching the Iranian coastline to promote 

Iranian naval power and demonstrate a resolve to defend 

the homeland. The IRIN uses various surface combatants 

and air assets, which include UAVs, for routine security 

patrols in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman.

As stated earlier, the IRIN places significant importance 

on out-of-area operations to support both diplomatic and 

military objectives through the presence of deployed naval 

groups in regional waters. The IRIN routinely touts naval 

diplomacy efforts in press and other official channels. 

Senior leaders assess these efforts to help alleviate Iran’s 

international isolation, support possible future state-tostate engagement, and to promote the IRIN’s narrative 

that it is a regional naval power. Militarily, these operations 

increase the IRIN’s routine naval presence along the “golden triangle” of the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al Mandeb Strait, 

and Strait of Malacca. This activity also familiarizes sailors 

to operating amongst commercial and navy traffic down to 

the 10th degree latitude in the northern Indian Ocean.

To date, the IRIN has deployed more than 44 groups on 

a near-continuous basis for two to three months at a 

time. Most deployed groups stay in the proximity of the 

Gulf of Oman and Gulf of Aden. However, some groups 

have expanded the IRIN’s operating range from Latakia, 

Syria to the west, Durban, South Africa to the south, and 

Zhanjiang, China to the East. According to the IRIN, these 

deployments are categorized as either “operational-intelligence groups” or “peace and friendship groups”. 

Operational-intelligence groups support Iran’s presence 

in the Gulf of Aden and northern Indian Ocean with a 

mission focus on security; including counterpiracy efforts 

and escorting commercial ships. These missions usually 

involve a port visit to Oman. Depending on the political 

climate, other regional port calls may include Djibouti, 

Djibouti, or Port Sudan, Sudan. Iran has touted these 

groups as having escorted 3,000 ships and foiling more 

than 300 piracy events. 

IRIN bridge simulator
41

The IRIN “peace and friendship groups” support Iran’s 

diplomatic outreach efforts. Although these groups may 

spend time in regional waters, including the Gulf of Aden, 

their main purpose is to visit foreign ports and show the 

Iranian flag. These groups have recorded visits to India, 

Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, China, Syria, Tanzania, 

and South Africa. The IRIN has yet to fulfill its stated 

objective of reaching the Atlantic Ocean.

IRIN Vosper-class corvette launches antiship cruise missle during Velayat-94 exercise.
42

O

ver the next five years, Iran will likely continue to develop its naval strategy and capabilities in a manner that is consistent with trends 

we have observed since the reorganization of 

2007. Given Iran’s dependency on sea-based 

trade, its vast coastline and strategic position 

adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran will continue 

to invest in both of its naval forces for the foreseeable 

future. Although Iran has come to appreciate the growing 

danger represented by ISIS forces in the Middle East, 

Iran’s leaders still perceive that threats to Iran will come 

primarily from the sea. As such, the IRGCN and IRIN will 

remain key components of Iran’s defense strategy.

Three factors that are likely to impact Iran’s naval strategy 

and acquisitions are: the status of JCPOA, the price of 

oil, and the influence of Chief of the AFGS, MG Mohamad 

Baqeri as well as other leadership turnover that could 

follow. JCPOA includes the expiration of United Nations 

Security Council Resolution 2231, which bans Iran from 

acquiring sophisticated offensive weaponry. The expiration of UNSCR 2231 in 2020 will allow Iran to pursue 

foreign acquisitions that have been inaccessible since 

sanctions were imposed on Iran’s nuclear program. Oil is 

a critical export and principal element of Iran’s economy. 

If oil prices rebound over the next five years it will provide 

Iran more resources to build its military. Lastly, while it 

is too early to assess the impact of the change in AFGS 

leadership, the intent in making the change may be 

seen as Khamenei’s desire for new direction or stronger 

leadership at the top. 

The IRGCN’s area of operations will remain in the Persian 

Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, although the flotilla sent to 

the Gulf of Aden in 2015 suggests it could engage in forward deployments in some circumstances. Acquisitions 

will continue along established trends with an emphasis 

on smaller, faster platforms, equipped with sophisticated 

weaponry, and acquired in large numbers. One exception 

to this trend could be the replacement of the Houdong 

WPTGs, which will be approaching thirty years in service 

at the end of this outlook period.

The IRIN will continue to be the principal operator in the 

Caspian Sea and Gulf of Oman, with shared responsibilities in the Strait of Hormuz. The IRIN will continue 

to emphasize deployed naval groups, and capitalizing 

on JCPOA, it will look for opportunities to achieve new 

milestones farther into the Pacific, Mediterranean Sea, 

and Atlantic. Its chief acquisition efforts will be to complete the production runs for both the Jamaran FFLGs 

and Fateh-class coastal submarines. 

Over the next five years, new weapons will likely include 

submarine-launched ASCMs, the Hoot supercavitating 

torpedo, and potentially a supersonic ASCM, which Iran 

claims is in development. After 2020, Iran may look to 

foreign acquisitions of ships and submarines with a wide 

array of weapons suites. Reportedly, Iran has entered into 

negotiations with Russia to acquire the SS-N-26 Yakhont 

coastal defense cruise missile, as well. 

Many variables will influence the specific path Iran 

pursues regarding its naval forces. Regional security 

issues, diplomatic agreements, military leadership, and 

economic vitality will factor into Iran’s calculus in shaping 

its naval strategy, force composition, and operations. 

Regardless of these factors, Iran’s naval forces will remain 

a key component of Tehran’s national defense strategy, 

and it will likely continue to develop new capabilities and 

proficiencies. As the future story of Iran’s naval forces 

unfolds, it is likely to remain a tale of two navies. 

OUTLOOK
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