UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

Special Studies 

REARMING THE FRENCH 

by 

Marcel Vigneras 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STA TES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. , 1989 





Foreword

Every thoughtful American interested in the history of our present mutual

assistance program should find this a profitable and illuminating book. In

rearming the French the War Department and the U.S. Army became agents

of an Allied policy which not only enabled this country to further a friendship

for France that dated from the Revolution, but in addition served the military

interests of both nations. It equipped Frenchmen with the means to fight and

by so doing increased at minimum cost the forces available to the United Nations.

The Army can take pride in the success with which it administered a policy

involving both political and military matters. The policy of mutual aid has

since been extended throughout the world with the Army again designated

as the agency principally responsible for its administration. The present thorough

and objective study of an early large-scale American experiment with mutual

aid should therefore be highly instructive to all concerned.

JOHN H. STOKES

Washington, D.C. Maj. Gen., U.S.A. 30 August 1956 Chief of Military History

ix
Introductory Note

The original intent of the European Theater of Operations series was to

portray the history of ground combat as carried on by U.S. forces in western

and central Europe during World War II. Very early in the planning devoted

to this series it became apparent that two subjects were of such grand import

and interest as to require separate treatment. For this reason volumes were

prepared and published on the history of the supreme command and the logistical

support of the U.S. armies that fought in the European Theater of Operations.

Research for these two volumes unraveled one continuing but tangled thread

which did not quite fit into the fabric of the series as a whole. This was the

problem posed by the French national forces serving under U.S. command and

by the rearmament of these forces to permit their effective employment in the

fight for the liberation of their homeland. The problems of command and

decision involved in French rearmament and in the logistic support furnished

to the French forces reached outside of the European Theater of Operations.

It was decided, therefore, to devote a special study to the history of French

rearmament. This decision was supported by the fact that the United States

had once again embarked on the business of supplying weapons and other material

assistance to potential Allies, and that such military assistance appeared to have

become a continuing feature of U.S. policy.

An author was available who had exceptional qualifications for a task

recognized from the first as complex and delicate. A scholar who had studied

history at the Lycée of Limoges, France, and received his Ph.D. at Western

Reserve University, Marcel Vigneras had served in the French Army in both

World Wars, although in World War II seconded to duty as an American citizen

with the Office of Strategic Services in 1943. He was a member of the faculty

at Smith College before World War II. At the close of the war he joined the

Historical Division, European Theater of Operations, then in France. At present

Dr. Vigneras is continuing research on military problems as a member of the

Operations Research Office, from which he was granted leave to complete the

present volume.

HUGH M. COLE

Chief, European Section, 1947-1952
Preface

This volume tells how the French forces were rearmed from the time they

re-entered World War II after their temporary eclipse from the battlefields of

Europe. The text inescapably focuses attention on the part played by America

in the undertaking if for no other reason than that the undertaking itself, while

shared between the United States and the United Kingdom, was largely American.

The purpose of this volume is twofold. It is a historical account of a sizable

and laborious enterprise that enabled a friendly military establishment in dire

need of assistance to take its place among the forces aligned against the Axis.

It is intended also to serve as a guide for the solution of problems likely to arise

out of similar future enterprises. While this volume is not primarily concerned

with operational matters, it contains sufficient operational material to establish

the extent of the contribution made by the rearmed French forces toward the

final victory of the United Nations. The reader is warned that only such French

political developments that had a definite influence on the course of rearmament

are discussed, and the discussion is limited to that sufficient to place the evolution

of French rearmament in its proper perspective.

Rearming the French is the product of co-operative effort and it is a pleasure

to acknowledge indebtedness to the many individuals, too numerous to be listed

here, who offered advice and help. While I express my deep appreciation to

them, I wish to emphasize that they are in no way responsible for the handling

of the material used, or for errors of fact or presentation.

I am especially grateful to those French and U.S. officers who granted me

interviews which enabled me to clarify a number of points. Some provided me

with information from their private files. Others were kind enough to read

part or all of the manuscript. Their names have been listed in the Bibliographical

Note.

Several members of the Office of the Chief of Military History were particularly helpful in suggesting improvements. I should like to thank Dr. Gordon

A. Harrison for generous and skillful assistance in achieving better organization

and clarity of text; Col. Leo J. Meyer for valuable comments on the substance

of the preliminary draft; Dr. George F. Howe for guidance in interpreting

controversial points; finally Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield for his critical review

of the revised draft.

For assistance in exploring the tons of files held by the War Department,

I am indebted to Mr. Royce Thompson, of the European Section, OCMH,

xi
Mrs. Blanche Moore and Mr. Albert Whitt, of the Departmental Records Branch,

AGO, Mrs. Mary Greathouse, of the Historical Section, G-3, Mr. Israel Wice

and members of his Reference Branch staff in OCMH.

The task of extracting pertinent data was greatly facilitated by the diligent

help of Miss Katharine C. Jenkins. I am indebted to her for assembling and

analyzing the material now appearing in the section on French assistance to

the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I, and in the chapter on the

Joint Rearmament Committee.

Miss Ruth Stout edited the entire manuscript and her suggestions greatly

contributed to improving the narrative. The excellent map is the work of

Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff, Deputy Chief Historian for Cartography. Miss

Margaret E. Tackley selected and prepared the illustrative material. The copy

editors were Mrs. Marion P. Grimes and Mr. Arthur C. Henne.

Rearming the French was prepared at the suggestion and under the general

direction of Dr. Hugh M. Cole, Chief of the European Theater Section. It

was my good fortune to have his wise and learned counsel throughout the period

of research and writing.

30 August 1956 MARCEL VIGNERAS

Washington, D. C.

xii
Contents

Chapter Page

PROLOGUE ......................... . 1

French Assistance to the A.E.F. in World War I ............ . 1

The American Decision To Rearm the French in World War II ....... . 6

PART ONE

The North African Forces

I. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE A REARMAMENT

PROGRAM ..................... . 2 1

Procedures ....................... . 2 1

Initial Groping Toward a Policy ............... . 23

Setting Up the Joint Rearmament Committee .......... . 25

General Giraud Sends a Military Mission to Washington ...... . 26

Emergency Provision of Equipment .............. . 27

General Giraud Eyes the Larger Program ............ . 29

The Deadlock Over a Firm Plan ............... . 30

II. THE ANFA AGREEMENT ............... . 33

Franco-Anglo-American Conversations ............. . 3 3

President Roosevelt and General Giraud Negotiate an Agreement ... . 36

Clarification of the Agreement ................ . 38

III. PHASE I OF THE PROGRAM (JANUARY-JULY 1943). . . 45

Phase I Is Launched .................... . 45

The CCS Agree on a Rearmament Formula ........... . 48

Implementing Phase I ................... . 59

IV. EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS ........ . 62

AFHQ Spells Out Rearmament Policies ............ . 62

Allied Assistance in Handling Matériel ............. . 64

The French Organize an Expeditionary Corps .......... . 69

V. PHASE II OF THE PROGRAM (JULY-AUGUST 1943) ... 74

Negotiations ....................... . 7 4

Political Complications ................... . 7 8

Implementing Phase II .................. . 82

Fusion of the Giraud and de Gaulle Forces ........... . 86

Results of Phases I and II ................. . 89

xiii
Chapter Page

VI. PHASE III OF THE PROGRAM (MID-AUGUST-NOVEMBER

1943) ........................ . 9 1

The 15 August Plan ................... . 91

French Political Situation Threatens Program. .......... . 97

Implementing Phase III .................. . 99

VII. THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME (NOVEMBER 1943-FEBRUARY 1944): I .................... . 104

"La Bataille des Services". ................. . 104

The 1st DMI Incident ................... . 116

Cutback of the Program—The 23 January Plan ......... . 121

VIII. THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME (NOVEMBER 1943-FEBRUARY 1944): II .................... . 130

The French Reorganize Their Supply System ........... . 130

Supply and Maintenance of the Expeditionary Forces ........ . 138

Supply Situation—End of January 1944 . ............ . 146

IX. PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM (FEBRUARY-OCTOBER

1944)1: BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES ...... . 148

Rearmament Operations Resume ............... . 148

Control Over the French Forces ............... . 149

Reorganization of the French High Command .......... . 151

Franco-American Relations ................ . 15 3

The 23 January Plan Becomes the Basis of Phase IV ....... . 155

Secondary Programs ................... . 15 8

X. PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM (FEBRUARY-OCTOBER

1944) II: IMPLEMENTATION ........... . 163

Equipping the Units on the ANVIL Troop List .......... . 163

Service Troops and the Lack of Technicians ........... . 165

Shortages of Equipment ................... . 169

SCAMA's Role During Phase IV ............... . 174

Repossession of U.S. Equipment ............... . 176

Disposal of British Equipment ............... . 177

XI. THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ACTION ..... . 178

Italy and Other Battlegrounds in the Mediterranean ....... . 178

France ......................... . 18 2

Logistical Support of the French ANVIL Forces ....... . . . . 186

The North African Rearmament Program Ends .......... . 189

XII. REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE ......... . 195

XIII. REHABILITATING THE FRENCH NAVY ........ . 214

xiv
Chapter Page

XIV. LIAISON, LANGUAGE, AND TRAINING PROBLEMS ... 227

Liaison and the Language Barrier .............. . 227

Training ........................ . 23 0

XV. CONTROVERSY OVER SUBSTITUTE WEAPONS .... . 241

Artillery ........................ . 24 2

Tanks ......................... . 24 4

Small Infantry Weapons .................. . 246

XVI. OTHER MATERIAL PROBLEMS ............ . 254

Food ......................... . 25 4

Clothing ........................ . 25 8

Special Supplies ..................... . 260

Miscellaneous Equipment .................. . 264

Accounting. ....................... . 26 6

XVII. AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT ........ . 271

The Joint Rearmament Committee .............. . 271

The Joint Air Commission . . .............. . 285

SCAMA and Stock Control Section ............. . 288

French Training Section ................. . 293

PART TWO

The Metropolitan Forces

XVIII. INITIAL ASSISTANCE ................. . 299

Supply of the Resistance Forces ................ . 299

Employment of French Liberated Manpower ........... . 306

XIX. ARMING LIBERATED MANPOWER .......... . 319

Interim Organization and Equipping of Labor and Internal Security Units. 319

The Liberated Manpower and Metropolitan Programs ....... . 328

XX. THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN

PROGRAMS IN OPERATION ........... . 339

Implementing the Liberated Manpower Program ......... . 339

Implementing the Metropolitan Program ............ . 344

Revising the Metropolitan Program . ............. . 348

Carrying Out the Revised Program .............. . 354

XXI. THE REARMAMENT OPERATIONS END ........ . 361

Suspension of the Metropolitan Program ............ . 361

Political Developments Doom Rearmament ........... . 367
Chapter Page

XXII. RE-EQUIPPING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE AND FRENCH

NAVY. ....................... . 37 3

T he Air Force ...................... . 373

T h e Navy ....................... . 37 7

XXIII. REARMAMENT DIVISION, SHAEF MISSION TO FRANCE . . 381

Membership, Organization, and Operation ........... . 381

Training Under Inspection Group ............... . 388

XXIV. FRENCH PLANS FOR A FAR EAST EXPEDITIONARY

CORPS ........................ . 39 1

CONCLUSION ......................... . 40 0

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ................... . 40 5

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................... . 411

GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES ................. . 414

INDEX. ............................ . 41 7

Tables

No.

1. Equipment Furnished American Expeditionary Forces in World War I,

by Type and Supplying Country: 6 April 1917-11 November 1918 . . 4

2. Equipment, by Type, Available to the North African Forces: 1 October

1942 ........................... . 1 8

3. American and British-Equipped Squadrons of the FAF: December

1943). ........................... . 20 6

4. Quantities of Equipment Packaged by OSS in the United Kingdom and

Airdropped into France: January-October 1944 ......... . 307

5. Major Items of Equipment Furnished by the United States to the French

Forces ........................... . 40 2

Charts

1. Organization of the French High Command in North Africa: 1 April 1943. 66

2. Position of JRC and Related Agencies Within the Allied Command Structure: 1 April 1944 ...................... . 277

3. Internal Organization of the Joint Rearmament Committee: 1 April 1944 . 278

4. SCAMA: Internal Organization and Co-ordination With Other Agencies. 289

5. Position of Rearmament Division in SHAEF: 1 January 1945 .... . 383

6. The Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to France: March 1945 . . 384

xvi
Map

Page

Operations and Participating French Forces ......... . Inside back cover

Illustrations

Realization o f French Hopes ................. . Frontispiece

Victory Parade, Paris, 1918 .................... . 7

Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower .................. . 26

General George C. Marshall .................... . 2 7

Meeting at Casablanca, 24 January 1943 .............. . 37

U.S. Vehicles for North African Forces ............... . 46

General Eisenhower Delivering an Address ............. . 58

Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark Presenting Newly Arrived U.S. Equipment ... . 59

Inspecting U.S. Equipment .................... . 6 4

Vehicle Assembly Line ...................... . 6 7

Reviewing American Troops .................... . 6 8

Col. Ernest A. Suttles ....................... . 6 9

General Alphonse Juin ...................... . 9 3

Goumiers of the 9th Colonial Infantry Division ............ . 102

Goumiers of the 4th Group of Tabors ................ . 112

Spahis i n North Africa ...................... . 11 4

Conference i n Algiers ....................... . 12 0

Siena, Italy ........................... . 17 9

9 t h Colonial Infantry Division ................... . 18 0

Troops Entering Portoferraio, Elba ................. . 18 1

French 2 d Armored Division .................... . 18 4

Maj. Gen. Jacques Leclerc ..................... . 18 4

Street Fighting i n Marseille .................... . 18 5

Reviewing French Troops in Liberation Ceremony, Marseille ...... . 185

Victory Parade Through the Streets of Paris ............. . 192

P-40 Warhawks for the Lafayette Escadrille ............. . 197

Unloading P-38 Fighter Planes ................... . 199

French Submarine, Casablanca Harbor ............... . 21 5

Battleship Richelieu Passing Under Manhattan Bridge . ....... . 216

Battleship Jean Bart a t Casablanca ................. . 219

Firing a 105-mm. Howitzer .................... . 23 2

U.S. Instructor Demonstrating the Use of Signal Equipment ...... . 233

Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch .................. . 240

Tank Destroyer fo r th e French ................... . 24 2

French Tank Crew With U.S. Light Tank M5 ............ . 244

2d Moroccan Infantry Division Men Unloading American Rations ... . 256

French Wacs Assembling on the Beach ............... . 261

xvii
Page

Members of the Joint Rearmament Committee ............ . 273

Brig. Gen. Harold F. Loomis .................... . 276

French Forces of the Interior .................... . 305

Insignia of 1st French Army and Its Major Components ........ . 352

Battleship Strasbourg ........................ . 37 8

Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to France ........... . 382

The illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense except for those

from the following sources:

Service Cinématographique des Armées, Frontispiece.

National Archives, page 7.

Acme Photograph, page 216.

xviii
Prologue

In October 1942 Maj. Gen. Mark W.

Clark, representing the U.S. Army, and

Brig. Gen. Charles Mast, spokesman for

General Henri Giraud, met secretly in

Cherchel, seventy-five miles west of Algiers.

The subject of their conversations was a

momentous one—the imminent re-entry of

French North Africa into the war. General Clark, acting on instructions from

President Roosevelt, gave positive assurances to General Mast that the United

States would furnish the equipment necessary to outfit the North African forces.1

Clark's commitment was timely, for

Anglo-American forces were about to land

in northwest Africa. More important, it

heralded an event of great significance: the

forthcoming assumption, by the United

States, of direct responsibility for reequipping the French armed forces. The

British had been discharging this responsibility by maintaining the small band of

Frenchmen stubbornly fighting on their side

and under their control since mid-1940.

Before World War II had ended, the

Americans had fully equipped and trained

eight French divisions in North Africa,

partially outfitted and trained three more in

France, furnished equipment for nineteen

air squadrons, and carried out an extensive

rehabilitation program for the French Navy.

They had supplied some 1,400 aircraft,

160,000 rifles and carbines, 30,000 machine

guns, 3,000 artillery guns, 5,000 tanks and

1

 These instructions were relayed in Msg R-2080,

Gen George C. Marshall to Lt Gen Dwight D.

Eisenhower, 17 Oct 42, CM-OUT 5682. (See

Bibliographical Note.) "Clark . . . should state . . .

the U.S. will furnish equipment for French Forces

which will operate against the Axis."

self-propelled weapons, and 51,000,000

rounds of ammunition.

An occurrence of historic import was thus

re-enacted in reverse. Twice France had

similarly undertaken to assist an unprepared

America at war. In 1781, in addition to

sending an expeditionary corps to help the

young colonies in their fight for independence, France supplied weapons and matériel

to the infant Continental Army. Much

later, in World War I. France, herself at

war with Germany, again provided matériel

to the American Expeditionary Forces

(A.E.F.) sent to the European continent.

In that second episode, the nature and extent of the help rendered were vastly different from what they were to be in World

War II. Yet the parallel is striking enough

to warrant, for the sake of historical comparison, a brief account of the aid extended

by the French to the American forces in

1917-18.

French Assistance to the A.E.F. in World

War I

The entrance of the United States into

World War I, on 6 April 1917, found the

American forces totally unprepared for the

arduous tasks which they were later to carry

out on the battlefields of western Europe.

Initially, these forces, transported to the

Continent as fast as they were raised and

as shipping facilities would allow, lacked

the most essential weapons of the armies

then at war, namely, artillery, tanks, and

aircraft. Their plight was made worse by

the fact that, at home; most ordnance and

munitions plants were not prepared to go

1

 These instructions were relayed in Msg R-2080,

Gen George C. Marshall to Lt Gen Dwight D.

Eisenhower, 17 Oct 42, CM-OUT 5682. (See

Bibliographical Note.) "Clark . . . should state . . .

the U.S. will furnish equipment for French Forces

which will operate against the Axis."
2 REARMING THE FRENCH

into large-scale production for months to

come. In the case of airplanes, it was reported that American manufacturers could

not begin to furnish them before the summer of 1918.2

On reaching the Continent, in early June

1917, Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary

Forces, at once investigated the possibility

of obtaining from Allied sources the implements of war so urgently needed for his

forces. The depredations of enemy submarines on Atlantic shipping made such a

procedure even more advisable, and General Pershing began urging the War Department to make use to the fullest extent

possible of French and British factories,

already geared to wartime production, for

the manufacture of war matériel for the

A.E.F.

To the A.E.F. Commander-in-Chief,

speed was the essential consideration, for his

objective was to forge, as rapidly as possible,

a well-organized and adequately equipped

striking force to be employed as a separate

and autonomous component of the combined Allied armies. Without such a force,

he would have no other alternative than to

submit to the already strong pressure exerted by top Allied authorities for the use

of his troops as replacements for their own

armies.3

While Allied recognition of the principle

of a separate American task force was delayed for some months, the need of getting

equipment into the hands of U.S. troops for

training and combat purposes was at once

recognized. To this end, all available resources, it was agreed by everyone concerned, must be tapped immediately. General Pershing himself strongly supported

this view. "It matters little whether we

have a particular kind of artillery; if we

cannot get the French, we should get the

British. The same can be said of small arms

and personal equipment. If our ordnance

cannot furnish them, the French and British

have them. So in equipment and armament there should be no delay."

 4

Investigation convinced General Pershing that French industry was in a far better

position than its British counterpart to supply a large part of the needed war matériel.

Although not fully supplied themselves, the

French were said to be industrially so situated as to be capable of increasing their

production rapidly and substantially. With

this realization and the assumption that

American troops would operate in proximity

to the French armies, A.E.F. officials decided to adopt the French types of artillery

for the usual calibers and to seek French

assistance in obtaining the guns needed at

least for the first two years. "We secured

an agreement that our troops, as they came

along, would be provided with French guns

and ammunition, including not only the

75's and 155's, but 37-mm. guns and

58-mm. trench mortars as well."

 5

Although "France was responding generously," her resources were not inexhaustible.6

 Unless energetic measures were taken

to provide French factories with the necessary raw materials, their output could not

be expected to reach the required levels.

With this in view, War Department officials

enlisted the help of American industry and

business in establishing a vast supply program. Figures on the tonnage of raw ma2

 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World

War (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931),

I, 161. 3

 Ibid., I, 159.

4

 Ibid., II, 112. s

Ibid., I, 107. 6

 Ibid., I, 258.
PROLOGUE 3

terials supplied to the French up to the

Armistice for the production of munitions

of war are illuminating. For the artillery

pieces and ammunition of French manufacture fired by the A.E.F., the United States

supplied, in metals alone, over 700,000 tons

of steel, 30,000 tons of pig iron, 5,000 tons

of brass and zinc, 50,000 tons of copper, as

well as all the principal materials used in

loading the entire supply of shells. For the

finished airplanes used by the Air Service,

34,500,000 feet of spruce, fir, and cedar,

7,000,000 feet of mahogany and walnut,

4,000 tons of aluminum, and miscellaneous

aircraft materials and supplies were furnished by the United States. All together,

the French received from America, up to

November 1918, over 800,000 tons of raw

materials and semifinished products.7

On the other side of the ledger, available

figures on the weapons of war manufactured

by the French for use by the A.E.F. are no

less impressive. The forty-two divisions,

representing a total of 1,390,000 combatant

troops, which at the time of the Armistice

made up the A.E.F. in France, were

equipped almost exclusively with French

artillery, artillery ammunition, tanks, and

planes. It has even been said that, if given

the necessary raw materials, France could

have supplied all the artillery, ammunition,

tanks, and aircraft for an American army

of any size that could have been sent to

Europe.8

The French produced 3,532 of the 4,194

pieces of artillery used in combat by the

A.E.F. up to 11 November 1918, 227 of the

289 tanks, and all of the 240-mm. and 58-

mm. trench mortars. As General Pershing

observed: "It was most fortunate that we

were able to get these guns from the French,

as up to the end of the war no guns manufactured at home for our army, of the types

used, except twenty-four 8-inch mortars and

six 14-inch naval guns, were fired in battle.9

Almost all of the railroad artillery used by

the U.S. forces consisted of equipment

loaned by the French. The entire supply of

ammunition fired by American artillery up

until the last days of the war was of French

origin because practically none of U.S.

manufacture (other than shrapnel) had

reached the front. As for automatic weapons, reports show that the first twelve U.S.

divisions were completely equipped with

Hotchkiss heavy machine guns and

Chauchat rifles purchased from the French

Government.

Another striking figure is the number of

aircraft. By the time of the Armistice,

equipment in the hands of the Air Service

consisted of 3,210 combat and 3,154 training airplanes, or a total of 6,364, of which

4,874 had been supplied by French industry. Of the forty-three American squadrons engaged in operations on 31 October

1918, only ten were equipped with aircraft

manufactured in the United States and

three with planes of British manufacture,

as compared with thirty equipped with

French-made planes.

Besides manufacturing and supplying

munitions of war, the French also provided

troop s and facilities. The practice,

adopted by agreement between General

Pershing and the War Department, of

giving priority of shipment to infantry and

machine gun units left the A.E.F. woefully

short in supporting arms and services. This

condition never was corrected and General

Pershing was compelled to obtain from the

7

 Benedict Crowell, America's Munitions: 1917—

1918 (Washington, 1919), pp. 590-92. 8

 Grosvenor B. Clarkson, Industrial America in

the World War (Boston and New York: Houghton

Mifflin Co., 1923), pp. 236-38. 9

 Pershing, op. cit., I, 107. See Table 1, below.
4 REARMING THE FRENCH

TABLE 1—EQUIPMENT FURNISHED AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN WORLD WAR I, BY TYPE AND SUPPLYING COUNTRY: 6 APRIL 1917-11 NOVEMBER 1918
PROLOGUE 5

French a great part of the corps and army

artillery, aviation, and other services necessary to support his armies. For the movement of his supplies, the A.E.F. Commander-in-Chief likewise obtained from

the French the use of their facilities such

as harbors, railways, depots, warehouses,

and supply dumps. At the time of the

Armistice, American cargo was utilizing

98 berths in French ports of which 86 were

French-constructed and 12 American-built.

During the three-month period from September to November 1918, an average of

300 trains per day, representing a daily

haul of 22,000 miles, were operating at

the disposal of the American General

Headquarters.10

When plans were first discussed for setting up a supply system for the A.E.F., the

French strongly urged General Pershing to

adopt their own for the sake of simplification. The proposal was turned down for

a variety of reasons, not the least of which

was the firm American intent to preserve

the integrity of the U.S. forces as a separate military establishment. Yet, in superimposing the American supply system on

the existing French organization, efforts

were made, whenever possible, to harmonize with the latter so as to prevent needless

complications.11 As a concession to the

French plea for unification, U.S. administrative sections generally were made to conform to the boundaries of French military

regions. This resulted in simplification and

greater Franco-American co-operation.

One important feature was borrowed from

the French supply system—regulating stations. Located near advance depots, these

stations controlled the flow of supplies from

the zone of interior to the units at the front.

At the time of the Armistice, the A.E.F. had

constructed one such station, was in process of organizing another, and was making

use of French stations whenever necessary.12

Another major contribution to molding

the A.E.F. was the valuable assistance the

French rendered in the field of training.

The critical shortage of Allied manpower

had made it necessary to send untrained

troops to France immediately after the entrance of the United States into the war.13

Although General Pershing, President

Woodrow Wilson, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, and the American public

were insistent on the creation of a unified

American Army, trained and commanded

according to U.S. methods, the urgency of

the operational situation during the first

year of American participation in the war

required that every expedient be used to get

U.S. troops in battle as speedily as possible.14

 For lack of time and better practices,

Allied training methods were adopted, with

the result that no completely American

training organization was set up before hostilities came to an end.

10

 Col. Jacques de Chambrun and Capt. Charles

de Marenches, The American Army in the European Conflict (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919), p. 205; Lt. Col. Edouard Jean

Réquin, America's Race to Victory, with Introduction by General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff,

U.S. Army (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co.,

1919), p. 185. 11

 Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff, Organization of the Services of Supply,

American Expeditionary Forces, Monograph 7, WD

Doc 1009, (Washington, 1921), p. 14.

12

 Report of the Military Board of Allied Supply

(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924),

pp. 344-46. 13

 As an illustration, over 50 percent of the component elements of the first U.S. division to reach

the Continent were completely untrained. Historical Division, Department of the Army, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR: 1917-

1919, III, Training and Use of American Units

With British and French (Washington, 1948), 426. 14

 Ibid., p. 2.
6 REARMING THE FRENCH

Except for two divisions,15 U.S. units

abroad were trained by the French since

they were to fight alongside the latter at

least initially. This procedure was strongly

recommended by the chief of Liaison

Group, General Headquarters, who declared on 28 May 1917: "If the French

Army is to be our model and if the American is to fight beside the Frenchman according to the latter's methods, then the

training of the American troops should be

done in as close contact as possible with

the French troops, not only from the technical point of view but from that of mutual

acquaintance, mutual understanding, mutual respect."

 16

 After the proposed procedure was approved, an effective method

was adopted by which officers and enlisted

men of both armies were exchanged.

American troops were detailed to French

training camps as students, and the French

came to U.S. stations as instructors. Also,

the practice was established of billeting a

French division in proximity to a corresponding American organization for the

purpose of giving them both thorough instruction. The French division would stay

about a month, lending its officer and technician personnel to the American unit, and

would arrange for the parallel instruction

of the two divisions. After this initial

training period, American cadres would

spend tours of duty with the French in

quiet sectors of the front for additional experience in trench warfare.17

For the training of pilots, arrangements

were made for U.S. troops to enter flying

schools in France and in other Allied countries until such a time as American training

centers could be established.

From this brief summary, it can safely be

assumed that the services rendered by the

French, and to a lesser degree by the British,

both in supplying munitions of war and in

providing training and other facilities shortened by many months the time it took the

American Expeditionary Forces to become a

well-equipped and well-trained striking

force ready to take a decisive part in operations. Even so, a year elapsed before the

A.E.F. was in a position to undertake offensive action, and then with the strength of but

a single infantry regiment. It is probable

that without the generous assistance they received from the French, American troops,

except for a few individual units, might

well not have engaged in combat in 1917—

18. It is equally probable that the record of this assistance influenced the U.S.

decision in World War II to extend similar

help to the nation that had proved itself a

loyal provider in the earlier conflict.18

The American Decision To Rearm the

French in World War II

The American assurances given the

French at Cherchel in October 1942 auto15

 Which were among the American units to be

trained by the British for participation in combat

alongside British troops, in accordance with the

Six Division Plan agreed to by the United States

and the United Kingdom in January 1918 (and

revised later in June to include ten divisions).

Eight of the ten divisions were withdrawn before

the training program was completed, leaving only

two entirely British-trained. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 16

 Ibid., p. 238.

17 Serious consideration was given to the possibility of sending French and British officers to the

United States to give advanced courses in tactics.

General Pershing opposed this procedure which, he

felt, would tend to reduce the sense of responsibility and initiative of American officers. Furthermore, he was not entirely in agreement with the

military tactics taught by the French. Pershing,

op. cit., II, 237. 18

 See Bibliographical Note for list of World War

I source material used in this section.
PROLOGUE 7

VICTORY PARADE, PARIS, 1918. Leading Army troops is General John J. Pershing.

matically became a firm commitment the

moment the North African forces threw

their weight on the side of the Anglo-American allies barely a month later. The reentry of these forces into the war climaxed

a long period of painful uncertainty for the

Allies themselves, as well as for the French.

This period, which began at the close of the

ill-fated Campaign in the West of MayJune 1940, probably constitutes the most

crucial page of France's recent history.

French Political and Military Situation

June 1940-November 1942

By the time of the Franco-German

armistice of 22 June 1940, the German

forces had penetrated deep into French

territory. They proceeded at once to establish themselves in a zone of occupation comprising northern and western France, or

approximately one half of the country, and,

by a demarcation line, virtually severed it

from contact with the other half. A French

government headed by Marshal Henri

Pétain organized in the "free zone" and

from the small city of Vichy undertook to

repair the physical and moral havoc caused

by the blitzkrieg just ended. Fearful of

further German encroachments on what was

left of French sovereignty, Marshal Pétain

and his associates resolved to abide strictly

by the stiff armistice terms imposed by the

Germans. Under these terms the French

Army was being reduced to a skeleton police

force, or "Armistice Army," of some 100,-
8 REARMING THE FRENCH

000 men for Metropolitan France and a

like number for the overseas territories in

Northwest Africa. The fleet, still intact,

was to remain in French harbors on sufferance so long as the French respected the

armistice.

It has now been established that, during

the ensuing years, a number of officials in

the government and on the General Staff

in Vichy secretly endeavored to strengthen

the Army, at home as well as overseas, beyond the limitations imposed by the armistice clauses. These patriotic individuals,

undaunted by a defeat which they regarded

as only a temporary setback, were preparing

for the day when the Army would take up

arms once more against the Germans.

Their main effort was directed at building

up a cadre force and a reserve of weapons

and maintaining organizations and services

then unauthorized in anticipation of the

eventual mobilization of former combatants.19

At the end of June 1940, General

Maxime Weygand, Minister of National

Defense, issued a secret directive on the

hiding of weapons and requested military

region commanders in the free zone to conceal all antitank and antiaircraft guns in

their respective areas. These instructions

appear to have had the full support of both

the high military command and the heads

of services. The SR (Service de Renseignements, or Intelligence Service), ordered to

disband, managed to retain the framework

of its organization and continued to function

underground at the cost of many lives. New

civilian organizations sprang up which absorbed part of the General Staff and a number of Medical, Engineer, Ordnance, and

Quartermaster officers. Military transport

units reappeared under the guise of civilian

transport agencies. Even civilian organizations created by the Vichy regime for national rehabilitation purposes underwent

some unauthorized military instruction.

Students attending a training center for the

Chantiers de Jeunesse in 1941-42 were

taught guerrilla warfare, a subject for obvious reasons taboo in the regular schools of

the Armistice Army. On the basis of the

experience gained at that center, the commanding officer later prepared and distributed sub rosa a 200-page manual on the

organization and operational employment

of guerrillas.20

In addition to, and often at odds with,

these efforts on the part of regularly constituted authorities, other insurgent movements without official connection or backing developed after June 1940. Unwilling

19

 Général Revers, "L'O.R.A.," La France et son

Empire dans la Guerre, ed. Louis Mouilleseaux

(Paris: Editions Littéraires de France, 1947), II,

119-22; Maxime Weygand, Mémoires: Rappelé au

Service (Paris: Flammarion, 1950), pp. 303-21;

Intervs with Lt Gen Augustin Guillaume, Dec 48,

and with Brig Gen Marcel Pénette, Jul 50. (See

Bibliographical Note.)

20

 After the Franco-German armistice of June

1940, the Vichy Government created the Chantiers

de Jeunesse (youth work camps somewhat similar

to the CCC camps established in the United States

in the thirties) for the purpose of putting to work,

both in France and in North Africa, young men

who had not yet reached the age of military conscription. Dressed in a green uniform of semicivilian type, these men were primarily employed

in tasks of public utility. The training center referred to above was the Ecole des Cadres located at

Collonges, near Lyon, barely eighty-five miles from

Vichy. For the role played by Chantiers de Jeunesse

in North Africa, see p. 68, 68n, below.

The manual was Instruction Provisoire sur

I'Emploi des Corps Francs, prepared by Maj.

Charles de Virieu in 1943, clandestinely printed

and distributed under German occupation in early

1944. Copy found in file "Material zur Freischzerlerfrage" (Material on Partisan Problem), Military

Commander France, Oct 43 to Jul 44, GMDS No.

75486, located in German Military Documents Section, AGO.
PROLOGUE 9

to bow to the enemy, many citizens, especially in the German-occupied zone, began

to organize into Resistance movements.

These were generally sponsored and controlled by political parties. Their aim was

to resist by force the occupying power as

well as the Vichy Government, which they

regarded as a defeatist, or even a pro-German, regime. The dubious behavior of

some high officials, plus the increasingly

harsh measures—such as the conscription of

young men for forced labor in Germany

and the deportation of political enemies

of the "New Order"—taken by both the

occupant and the more collaborationist

element of the Vichy Government, forced

many of the "resisters" to take refuge in

remote areas. There they organized themselves into Maquis or guerrilla groups.

Eager to strengthen the spirit of resistance of the French in view of its potential

military value, the British undertook as

early as November 1940 to assist the underground forces morally and materially.

Later, in 1943, the Americans joined in the

task of supplying ammunition, equipment,

and even personnel such as leaders, radio

operators, and instructors in sabotage and

guerrilla warfare.21

On 18 June 1940, four days before the

signing of the Franco-German armistice,

Brig. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, who had just

made his way to London in a British plane,

issued his now historic appeal over the BBC

to the people of France urging them to continue the battle. Although on 23 June he

was stripped of his military rank by the

Vichy Government, the general rallied

around him all Frenchmen willing to remain in the fight on the side of the British

Commonwealth. In a letter dated 7 August, the British Prime Minister, Winston

Churchill, recognized him as "head of all

free Frenchmen, wherever located, who

rally around you to the support of the Allied

cause."

 22

 This recognition was followed,

on the same day, by a formal agreement between the British Government and General

de Gaulle which constituted the Charter

of Free France.

A year later, on 24 September 1941, the

Free France organization established in

London a French National Committee under the presidency of General de Gaulle.

To the world at large and more especially

to an increasing number of the French people then under German occupation, General de Gaulle was fast becoming the symbol

of the ultimate resurrection of France.

Meanwhile, a number of French overseas possessions had broken with the Vichy

Government and announced their shift of

allegiance to General de Gaulle. By the

end of 1942 de Gaulle had control over

French Equatorial Africa, the Cameroons,

Syria, Madagascar, Djibouti, and Reunion.

Military manpower available in these areas,

added to Frenchmen who had escaped to

the United Kingdom, produced a potential

army of about 100,000 men. In late 1940

General de Gaulle had begun converting

it to reality by creating staffs as well as

ground, naval, and air units. These organized groups, known as Forces Françaises

Libres or Free French Forces, grew to some

35,000 men by October 1942.23

2l

 A brief evaluation of this Anglo-American undertaking and of the American share in providing

material assistance to the Resistance forces is given in Chapter XVIII, below.

22

 Ltr, Churchill to de Gaulle, 7 Aug 40, quoted

in Philippe Barrès, Charles de Gaulle (New York:

Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1941), p. 147. 23

 Theoretically, they were renamed Forces

Françaises Combattantes (Fighting French Forces)

when, on 19 July 1942, the Free France organization changed its name to Fighting France in order
10 REARMING THE FRENCH

From the start, the Free French Forces

operated under the control of the British

who assumed the responsibility for feeding

and equipping them. In mid-November

1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared them eligible to receive American

lend-lease equipment, not directly, but

through the British.24 Soon after the entry

of the United States in the war, their status

was re-examined as British and Americans

studied the division of responsibility for

equipping members of the United Nations.

On 24 March 1942 the topmost AngloAmerican military body, the Combined

Chiefs of Staff, agreed on what amounted

to a system of adoption by which the members of the United Nations would look for

all their military supplies either to the

United Kingdom or the United States. By

this arrangement, the Free French Forces

remained under the tutelage of the British,

who would provide for the rearmament as

well as the training of these forces except

for the few stationed in the Pacific.25 Thus,

from the time they were organized in the

fall of 1940 to the end of the Tunisian campaign in May 1943, the Free French were

almost entirely British-equipped and British-trained. During those two and a half

years, they took an active part in military

operations.

Their ground forces consisted of two

main units. The first was the L Force, also

known as the Leclerc Column, from the

name of its commanding officer, Col.

Jacques Leclerc. After making a spectacular dash from Lake Chad across northeastern Africa, the column reached Tripolitania

where it fought gallantly under the operational control of the British Eighth Army.

It was subsequently engaged in southern

Tunisia. Later it was raised to the strength

of a division, operating as the 2d Free

French Division (2d DFL) under the command of Brig. Gen. Jacques Leclerc. The

second unit was initially composed of the

1st and 2d Free French Brigades, of which

the 1st, under the command of Brig. Gen.

Pierre Koenig, distinguished itself, also under the British Eighth Army, at the battles

of Bir Hacheim in Libya and El 'Alamein

in Egypt. The two brigades having been

reorganized, in February 1943, as the 1st

Free French Division (1st DFL), the unit

to include the members of the Resistance forces.

In practice, however, they generally retained their

former appellation throughout the war. They will

be referred to as Free French Forces or the Free

French throughout this volume. Most important

of the staffs created was the BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action), whose function was to carry out clandestine operations in

France. See p. 299-300, below. 24

 Ltr, Roosevelt to Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 11

Nov 41, DAD Authority File of President's Ltrs. 25

 Min, CCS 13th Mtg, 24 Mar 42. (See Bibliographical Note.)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, organized in

January 1942 with headquarters in Washington,

consisted of the British Chiefs of Staff or their

designated representatives in the United States

(British Joint Staff Mission) and the U.S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Their task was to formulate and

execute, under the direction of the heads of the

countries involved, policies and plans relating to

the strategic conduct of the war, broad war requirements, allocation of munitions, and transportation

requirements.

The British Chiefs of Staff were Field Marshal

Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General

Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound

(later replaced by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew

B. Cunningham), First Sea Lord, and Air Chief

Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were Admiral

William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief (President Roosevelt, later President Harry S. Truman), General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, Admiral Ernest J.

King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief

of Naval Operations, and General Henry H.

Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

See Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

(Washington, 1951), Ch. I.
PROLOGUE 11

was subsequently engaged, under the command of Maj. Gen. Pierre Koenig, in

southern Tunisia along with the Leclerc

Column. From their earliest commitment

to combat up to the end of operations in

that area the Free French Ground Forces

had suffered nearly 3,700 casualties, including 1,160 killed in action. Likewise participating in Allied operations were the Free

French Naval Forces and the Free French

Air Forces. By October 1942 the Air

Forces had grown to five squadrons. Two

were operating from the United Kingdom,

one in the Middle East, and one in Libya

in conjunction with the Free French

Ground Forces. Shortly afterward, the remaining squadron departed for the USSR,

there to participate in operations on the

Russian front under Russian control.26

Not all of the overseas possessions had

rallied to General de Gaulle. In French

North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and French

Morocco) and West Africa, military authorities had chosen the policy of "unity of

the French Union behind the Marshal."

The African Army had been greatly reduced in numbers and efficiency as a result

of its participation in the campaign in

France of May-June 1940 and subsequent

demobilization. Its chiefs—Generals Maxime Weygand, Alphonse Juin, Auguste

Nogues, and others—first undertook the task

of reorganizing, re-equipping, and training

such forces as were authorized under the

terms of the Franco-German armistice.27

The strength of these forces was set successively, with German agreement, at

100,000, 120,000, and finally 137,000 in

1942. By waging an active recruiting campaign especially among the native population, and by obtaining from the General

Staff in Vichy additional French cadres, the

North African military authorities gradually

built the army to its authorized strength.

Simultaneously they took steps to reorganize

the necessary services, find equipment, and

rekindle the morale of the troops.

As in the case of the Metropolitan Armistice Army, it appears that individual staff

officers or groups of officers exerted considerable effort to increase the African Army

over and above the authorized level.28

They put into effect a bold, secret program

which had a twofold objective: immediate

concealment of extra troops and equipment, and mobilization of additional men

in the event of hostilities. The program,

unlike that undertaken in continental

France, proceeded with relatively little interference from Axis armistice commissions.

It was particularly successful in mountainous French Morocco; the geographical

situation at the westernmost end of North

Africa encouraged and facilitated clandes26

 Figures on losses are taken from Lt. Col. P.

Santini, "Etude statistique sur les pertes au cours

de la guerre 1939-1945," Revue du Corps de Santé

Militaire, X, No. 1 (March, 1954).

Les Forces Aériennes Françaises de 1939 a 1945,

ed. Pierre Paquier (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949),

pp. 53-65, a semiofficial publication prepared by

a group of French Air Force officers. See also

pp. 195, 376, below. 27

 Although the avowed purpose of the rehabilitation of the North African Army was to provide

for the defense of that area against any invader,

recent written and oral statements from various

Army officials then in control leave little doubt

that their secret hope was that their forces would

take up arms once more against the Axis in conjunction with an eventual Allied intervention on

French territory. Evidence in this connection:

Weygand, op. cit.; Gen Noguès, Corres with

OCMH; Intervs with Gen Guillaume, Nov 48,

with Gen Juin, Dec 48, with Gen Pénette, Jul 50. 28

 Adm. Pierre Barjot, Le débarquement du

8 Novembre 1942 en Afrique du Nord (Paris:

J. de Gigord, 1948); René Richard and Alain

de Sérigny, L'Enigme d'Alger (Paris: Librairie

Arthème Fayard, 1947), pp. 203-14; Weygand,

op. cit., pp. 395-405; info provided by Gen Pénette,

Jul 50.
12 REARMING THE FRENCH

tine activities. The results were impressive: some 60,000 men, including shortterm volunteers, civilian workers, laborers,

auxiliary police, and goumiers (or Moroccan riflemen), were secretly maintained in

various mountain areas. A secret plan

was worked out to mobilize 109,000 men

and requisition transport vehicles, animals,

and supplies in the event of hostilities.29

As for equipment, 59,000 weapons and

22,000,000 rounds of ammunition above

the levels authorized under the armistice

were hidden away. Most of this matériel

had been concealed immediately after the

armistice on orders from local commanders.

Some weapons in time were manufactured

locally from odds and ends.

Finally steps were taken to increase the

capabilities and efficiency of important

services such as the radio communication

system and the medical corps, and to replenish quartermaster stocks. Additional

roads, trails, and rail lines were constructed

to improve the transportation network.30

In French West Africa armistice commissions had not determined the number

of men or the amount of equipment to be

authorized in that area. French military

authorities as a result had the opportunity

to play up their defenseless position in the

face of Allied threats to Dakar, and to convince the Germans of the need for strengthening West African garrisons. A force of

some 50,000 men was eventually raised.

But it received little equipment, no tanks,

and no antitank guns.31

Pre-TORCH Negotiations

on Supplying the French

By the spring of 1942, General de Gaulle

was confident that in the event of an Allied

landing in France, large numbers of Frenchmen would rally to the common cause and

assume under his leadership a substantial

share of the fighting. To implement the

ambitious rearmament program which he

had just completed, he decided to tap the

real source of equipment, the United States.

In May and again in June, he and members

of his National Committee asked American

officials in London whether or not the

United States would agree to allocate and

deliver equipment, under the Lend-Lease

Act, directly to the Free French Forces

instead of through the British as was the

practice.32 Before American authorities

could take action on the matter, Free French

headquarters submitted in July and again

in August and September of the same year

a series of concrete proposals. These called

for re-equipping with U.S. matériel not only

the existing Free French units but the much

larger forces expected to be raised once an

Allied assault on continental France had

been launched.33

29

 Info furnished by Gen Pénette, Jul 50. General Pénette, a captain assigned to General Weygand's staff in North Africa in early 1941, is credited

with having initiated the program. See also Wey- gand, op. cit., pp. 395-405.

Col. Augustin Guillaume, then on General

Noguès staff, was in charge of recruiting, equipping, and training the goumiers. With the connivance of officials in the Vichy Government, he

obtained substantial appropriations with which to

carry his work on and secured additional cadres

from France. In this manner, he was able to conceal several thousand goumiers. Interv with Gen

Guillaume, Nov 48. 30

 Info supplied by Gen Pénette, 1952.

31

 Maj Gen Emile Béthouart's statement at 6th

MRP Meeting, 7 Jan 43, CCS 334, Military Representatives of the Associated Pacific Powers

(5-26-42); see also Interv with Gen Pénette,

Jul 50. 32

 Memo, Adm Harold Stark, 2 Jun 42, in Comdr

U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, US-French Relations,

App. B, Pt. I, copy in OCMH. 33

 Notes 2 and 3, Gen de Gaulle's Special Staff,

21 Jul and 4 Aug 42, OPD 336 France, Sec 1;
PROLOGUE 13

The proposals were turned down for a

number of reasons. First, there were at the

time more pressing needs for armament and

matériel elsewhere. In the opinion of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of

the U.S. Army, the limited striking power of

the Free French Forces did not warrant such

increased allocations of matériel as those

requested by General de Gaulle. In addition, there was considerable reluctance on

the part of American authorities to have

dealings with the Free French military headquarters. Not that the integrity of General

de Gaulle himself was in the least questioned, but experience had convinced

Anglo-American planners that his organization was "extremely leaky" from the standpoint of security.34

 More important still

was the fact that at the very moment when

the Free French armament request was

being submitted, U.S. military authorities

in London and Washington were putting

the final touches to plans for an assault not

on France but on northwest Africa (Operation TORCH). In line with the policy of

avoiding all official exchange of information

with the Gaullists, the latter were being

excluded from planning for, and participation in, the contemplated operation. At the

same time, however, American planners

were negotiating with other French authorities for active French support.35

General Giraud, who had been in southern France since late April 1942 after his

daring and spectacular escape from internment in Germany, was regarded by American officials as the available military figure

most likely to be successful in leading French

North and West Africa back into the war on

the side of the Allies. A soldier first and

foremost, General Giraud cut a legendary

figure in the eyes of most Frenchmen. His

recent escape was the second such exploit in

his life, the first having taken place in World

War I. At the outbreak of hostilities in

September 1939, he was leading the French

Seventh Army. In mid-May 1940, soon

after the German break-through at Sedan,

he took command of a group of armies and

desperately attempted to stem the German

advance only to be taken prisoner. In early

1942, after his return to France, American

representatives approached him secretly and

obtained his promise of support. General

Giraud felt that the Allies should consider

a landing on the Mediterranean coast of

France simultaneous with the invasion of

North Africa. For the forces that he expected to assemble in the bridgehead from

available French manpower, he urged the

Allies on 27 October to include in their

logistical planning the provision of some

150,000 tons of war matériel to be brought

from Gibraltar to a port in southern

France.36 Such a proposal was out of the

question for, unknown to General Giraud,

TORCH had long passed the planning stage.

In fact, the assault troops were already at

sea. Finally persuaded that he must accept

Allied plans and expecting that they would

go into effect in an operation beginning

several months later, General Giraud signified his readiness to be brought to North

Africa at the opportune moment.

In North Africa, meanwhile, the heads

of a small band of determined French offiMemo, Col Emmanuel Lombard for Adm Stark,

26 Aug 42, OCS A-45-523 (France). 34

 Memo, Gen Marshall for Secy State, 20 Nov 42,

OPD 336 France, Sec 1. 35

 Memo, Marshall for Adm Ernest J. King, 1 Oct

42, OCS A-45-523 (France); Memo, Brig Gen

Albert C. Wedemeyer for Maj Gen George V.

Strong, 29 Oct 42, OPD 336 France, Sec 1; Memo,

Marshall for President, 3 Sep 42, WDCSA 381

TORCH (9-3-42).

36

 Général [Henri] Giraud, Un seul but, la Victoire

(Paris: R. Julliard, 1949), pp. 336-38.
14 REARMING THE FRENCH

cers and civilians who had long pledged

themselves to the Allied cause and had welcomed General Giraud's promise of leadership were preparing for the role they

expected to play at the time of the Allied

landings. In the course of the secret meeting held at Cherchel on 23 October, at

which General Clark relayed President

Roosevelt's pledge of assistance to the African forces in the event of their re-entry in

the war, he and General Mast, military

leader of the French "dissidents" and

spokesman for General Giraud, discussed

the nature and amount of armament that

would be required. A week later, in two

letters addressed to General Giraud, Robert

D. Murphy, the U.S. political representative in North Africa, confirmed the President's intent as disclosed at Cherchel:

"During [the period following the landings] the Government of the United States

will bend its efforts to furnish the French

forces with arms and modern equipment. . . . The United States Government will extend the benefits of the

Lend-Lease Act to the requisitions for matériel from the United States intended to

give the French Army the means to participate in the common struggle. The United

States Government will facilitate the negotiation and implementation of these

requisitions."

 37

On the strength of the assurances he had

been given, General Mast submitted at

once and in great secrecy an extensive

and detailed rearmament program, known

thereafter as the Mast Plan. The program

was based on the assumption that French

North Africa would be able to raise, by the

end of the first month after the landings,

eight infantry and two armored divisions,

together with a number of tank, artillery,

air, and service units. Actually the Mast

Plan was the third rearmament scheme to

be submitted before TORCH to American

representatives in North Africa. It was

drawn up by Lt. Col. Louis Jousse, a Resistance member on the staff of General

Mast, who had already proposed (in December 1941 and June 1942) the equipping of two armored and six infantry divisions. Neither the first Jousse program nor

the still earlier rearmament study submitted

in March 1941 by Capt. André Beaufre,

another Resistance member on the staff of

the Governor General of Algeria, was officially acted upon.38

 In point of fact the

possibility that the United States would

some day undertake a French armament

program had not yet been seriously considered by the War Department, and for

a number of reasons.

First, it was not until July 1942 that

British and American planners decided on

an invasion of northwest Africa as part of

the Anglo-American "Grand Strategy," a

strategy which involved operations on many

fronts. For some time before, they had

tossed back and forth a plan to land in

France itself, but had abandoned the

project in favor of the North African venture, thus removing for the time any consideration of an armament program for

Metropolitan France.39

Even after plans for TORCH began to

take shape, there could be no question of

an armament program for the North African forces. Allied planners were being

faced with crucial issues, in particular a

37

 Text of both letters, dated 2 November, in

French Records, File 221, OCMH.

38

 Intervs with Col. André Beaufre, 7 and 9 Sep

50; Barjot, op. cit., pp. 34-36, 54-55. 39

 See Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell,

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-

1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1953), Chs. XII and XIII.
PROLOGUE 15

shipping and equipment situation rendered

critical by the heavy demands from China

and the USSR for matériel. An ambitious

American armament program known as

the Victory Program had been initiated in

late 1941; it visualized a maximum U.S.

ground force of over 200 divisions as necessary to accomplish the defeat of America's

potential enemies.40 The program still was

in its early phase of implementation. Even

to equip the American divisions earmarked

for TORCH required that other divisions in

training in the United States be "scalped"

of their matériel.41 To provide arms for

forces such as the North African Army

would necessitate stripping more U.S.

units. At any rate the question was premature in view of the uncertainty regarding

North Africa's eventual reaction to TORCH

itself.

By September the encouraging results of

the secret negotiations carried out with the

dissidents gave hope that the North African

forces would join the Allies. The problem

of providing them with arms was now in the

foreground. In October the assurances

given at Cherchel forced the issue: the Mast

Plan would have to be taken into serious

consideration in Washington.

In transmitting to the War Department a

partial list of the Mast requirements, Lt.

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, commanding

general of the TORCH forces, urged that he

be informed as to the ability of the United

States to furnish the necessary items of

equipment and the rates at which they could

be made available. His intention was to

include the matériel in later shipments "in

accordance with the situation as it develops."

 42

After rapid examination of the Mast Plan,

War Department officials concluded that,

in general, the items on the partial list of

requirements could be made available for

shipment by 20 December 1942. To carry

out the entire plan, they warned, would

require stripping twelve American divisions.

They urged therefore that only such matériel

be provided as was necessary to supplement

existing French equipment.43 Their recommendation was submitted to General Marshall, who approved furnishing supplementary equipment when it could be determined

that the French would take an active part

in operations.44 Commenting on the French

request for aircraft, Lt. Gen. Henry H.

Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air

Forces, urged that caution be exercised in

the employment of French pilots. He recommended that as soon as practicable after

the initial phases qualified French pilots,

once their loyalty had been determined, be

incorporated in American combat and service units. When their ability had been

ascertained and as their numbers increased,

flights within American squadrons might

be formed, progressing gradually to allFrench combat and service units using U.S.

equipment. In his opinion, the factors of

importance to be considered included determination of loyalty, need for security,

language differences, ability to absorb training, and familiarization with American

equipment.45

The invasion of northwest Africa thus

40

 See Richard M. Leighton and Robert W.

Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940—

1943, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II (Washington, 1955). 41

 Matloff and Snell, op. cit., p. 318.

42

 Msg 4259, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 30 Oct 42,

ABC 400 (11-11-42), Sec 1. 43

 Memo, Chief, Logistics Gp OPD, for Lt Gen

John E. Hull, 31 Oct 42, OPD 400 France, Sec 1. 44

 Planning Div Diary, ASF File, 1 Nov 42. 45

 Msg R-2728, Arnold to Maj Gen Carl Spaatz,

3 Nov 42, ABC 400 (11-11-42), Sec 1.
16 REARMING THE FRENCH

brought suddenly to a head the question of

American large-scale and rapid rearmament

of the French. By November a plan was in

being and it had been tentatively approved.

Yet all the thorny problems of rearmament

still lay ahead as the Allied armada steamed

toward the coast of Africa to deliver the first

Anglo-American blow for the liberation of

Western Europe.

The French North and West African

Forces Throw Their Weight on the

Side of the Allies

Operation TORCH, directed by General

Eisenhower, was launched on the night of

7-8 November 1942.46 The assault troops

numbered some 83,000 Americans and

26,000 British, or a total of 109,000 men,

the British in addition furnishing almost all

the shipping and carrier air support. As

they landed, the invaders eagerly hoped

that the French would welcome them or

offer no more than token resistance. In the

Algiers area, the timely and effective intervention of the French dissidents circumscribed hostilities and rapidly brought them

to an end. At Oran and more particularly

in and around Casablanca, the Allies met

with strong, even bitter, resistance.47

When, on 9 November, General Giraud

reached North Africa after much unexpected delay, another French official, Admiral François Darlan, commander in chief

of all the armed forces of the Vichy Government, was already in control and had assumed the role of leader of the forces opposing the Allies. He had agreed on the

previous day to a local cease fire at Algiers

and was negotiating with the Allied authorities there for a broader understanding

while i n communication with Marshal Pe

order all resistance in French North Africa

to cease, and not until 13 November did

he succeed in arranging with other French

officials for a provisional French government in Algiers under his leadership which

would renew hostilities against the Axis

Powers. On 14 November he appointed

General Giraud commander in chief of all

French ground and air forces in the territory. An agreement signed by Admiral

Darlan and General Clark on 22 November

set forth the terms under which French

North Africa was joining the Allied camp.

The North African Army was back in the

war.48

The Germans, meanwhile, alarmed at

the turn of events across the Mediterra46 nean, had made two quick moves. On 9

 For a detailed account of TORCH, see George

F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative

in the West, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957). 47

 French authorities in control at the time have,

since then, ascribed this resistance to a lack of

understanding, before the operation, between the

Allied command and themselves. They were caught

off guard, they claim, and had no opportunity of

releasing officers under their respective command

from the loyalty pledge which the latter had been

required to give to their commander in chief,

Marshal Pétain. The dissident leaders, on the

contrary, have blamed it on faulty or insufficient

co-ordination between their own forces and the

Allies, and on the fact that General Giraud had not

reached Africa by D Day. Whatever the reasons,

a brief but bloody encounter ensued accompanied

by considerable political and military confusion on

the side of the French. 48

 For detailed information regarding the relations of Darlan with the Allied authorities, see

William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), and Howe, Northwest Africa. The English text of the ClarkDarlan Agreement may be found in Arthur Layton

Funk, "A Document Relating to the Second World

War: The Clark-Darlan Agreement, November 22,

1942," The Journal of Modern History, XXV No.

1 (March, 1953), 61-65; a French translation, in

René Richard and Alain de Sérigny, L'Enigme

d'Alger (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1947),

pp. 270-76.

tain. Not until 10 November did Darlan
PROLOGUE 17

November, taking advantage of the confusion prevailing among the French North

African authorities, they had gained a foothold on the eastern coast of Tunisia and

were hastily building up strength in that

area. On 11 November their occupation

forces in France had crossed the demarcation line, overrun the free zone, and ordered

the Armistice Army disarmed. Not only

would this German action cause the large

French fleet harbored in Toulon to scuttle

itself,49 on 27 November, rather than to fall

in enemy hands, but it would wipe out

many of the valuable gains laboriously

achieved in great secrecy by the French

General Staff. Resigning themselves to

the fact that the Allies had chosen not to

land in France proper at this time, a small

number of officers and personnel of the Armistice Army prepared to escape from

France in order to join French forces overseas. A larger number formed a secret organization known as Organisation de Résistance de l'Armée for the purpose of

continuing underground the activities they

had conducte d in semiclandestinity.

Working now in conjunction with other

existing underground forces, they resolved

to prepare for the day when they could

again fight in the open alongside the Allies

for the liberation of their country.

With French North Africa, except for

the eastern coast of Tunisia, securely on the

side of the Allies, the active participation

of France in the common struggle suddenly assumed considerably larger proportions. Until then it had been limited to

the relatively small force of General

de Gaulle. Now another much larger

French force was swelling the ranks of Allied military manpower by some 197,000

men, including the North African Armistice Army and the 60,000 troops heretofore

maintained in mountain hide-outs. By the

end of November, when the effects of the

secretly prepared mobilization had been

felt, another 68,000 men had answered the

call to the colors, bringing the total number

of effectives under arms in North Africa

to 265,000 men, or nearly twice the size of

the Armistice Army. Meanwhile the rallying of French West Africa, on 22 November, had provided a further increase of

50,000 men, thus raising the effectives

available to General Giraud in both North

and West Africa to over 300,000 men.50

Initially these effectives were distributed

as follows: one infantry division in Tunisia;

three infantry divisions and one light

mechanized brigade in Algeria; two infantry divisions, one light mechanized brigade,

and 5,000 goumiers in French Morocco.

In addition, scattered throughout the three

areas were several regiments of general

reserve troops, service units, Territorial and

Sovereignty troops and installations, some

naval and merchant ships for the most part

in need of much repair, and a few air

squadrons.

Figures on equipment and war matériel

in the hands of these forces as they were

re-entering the war cannot be accurately

49

 This fleet represented approximately one half

of the French Navy.

50

 Although the secret mobilization program contemplated the recall of 109,000 reservists, only

68,000, of whom half were natives, answered the

call to the colors. The partial response has been

attributed to three main factors:

1. inaccuracies in the mobilization program itself caused by the conditions of secrecy existing

at the time the program was drafted;

2. last-minute decision not to call up reservists

engaged in or needed for defense work;

3. near paralysis of the mobilization operations

because of the Allied requisition of most available

transportation and housing facilities.

Interv with Gen Pénette, Jul 50; notes and

statistics from Gen Pénette, Jul 50, Aug 52.
18 REARMING THE FRENCH

given. The only available statistics, as

shown in Table 2, are dated 1 October 1942

and therefore apply to the pre-TORCH

period. Of the equipment listed, an indeterminate percentage was used up or destroyed in the course of the brief period of

resistance, 8-11 November. Losses were

light in infantry weapons but particularly

heavy in tanks, light armored cars, and airplanes. Over 50 percent of the latter are

said to have been destroyed.51

As it passed under General Giraud's

command, the African Army, half-organized and ill-equipped, could be regarded

only as a "transition" force. Yet General

Eisenhower, now Commander in Chief,

Allied Forces in North Africa (hereafter

referred to as Allied Commander in Chief),

was already depending on it to cover the

continuous flow of incoming Allied units,

to maintain internal security in North

Africa, and to reinforce his own AngloAmerican troops then rushing to meet the

mounting threat in the east. By his first

directive of 15 November, General Giraud

committed this transition force to the pursuit of the German units established in

Tunisia.52 Four days later, French elements, now part of the combined Allied

armies, were firing their first shots at their

former enemy in the hills west of Tunis, a

prelude to a bitter campaign to come.

51 Ibid.

52

 Dir 1, in Fr Rcds File 220, Vol. I, Reorgn of

Fr Army, OCMH.

TABLE 2—EQUIPMENT, By TYPE, AVAILABLE TO THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES:

1 OCTOBER 1942
PART ONE

THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES

CHAPTER I

Early Attempts To Formulate

a Rearmament Program

The alignment of French North and

West Africa on the side of the Allies posed a

multitude of problems, political as well as

military. On the political scene, Admiral

Darlan's assumption of power, which the

Allies had accepted as a temporary expedient at a time when resistance to the landings was going on, had produced a situation

fraught with danger. The admiral's ties

with Marshal Pétain's government at Vichy

made impossible the merging of his following with General de Gaulle's and created

instead a condition highly conducive to

French factionalism rather than national

unity in prosecuting the war. The problem

was suddenly removed, on 24 December,

when Darlan was struck down by an assassin's bullet. On orders from the Imperial

Council which Darlan himself had created,

General Giraud replaced him as High Commissioner for North and West Africa while

remaining Commander in Chief of all

armed forces including naval units. The

political calm was to be short-lived. For

the ensuing sixteen months one crisis after

another would erupt on the French political

scene and create for Giraud increasingly difficult problems. The evolution of French internal politics during that

period will not be treated in detail. However, inasmuch as the situation did at times

affect, to the point of endangering them,

the good relations established at an early

date between the Anglo-American authorities and the French High Command, notice will be taken of at least those political

events that had a decisive influence on the

course of French rearmament.1

Procedures

On 13 November President Roosevelt

hailed North Africa's shift to the Allied

camp by extending to its forces the benefits

of the Lend-Lease Act, benefits heretofore

enjoyed by General de Gaulle's Free

French. The North African forces now

were eligible to receive munitions from the

Anglo-American pool of equipment. Because of the promises made at Cherchel,

which placed them squarely within the

American sphere of influence, equipping

them would be a responsibility to be assumed by the U.S. Government and the

matériel involved would be provided from

American production. The Free French,

on the other hand, would continue to receive armament through the British, who

still held operational control of their larger

units.

The procedure expected to be followed

for the assignment and delivery of matériel

to French North Africa would be that nor1

 For additional information on the French political situation from November 1942 to July 1943,

see Howe, Northwest Africa.
22 REARMING THE FRENCH

mally applicable in the case of the United

Nations whose re-equipment was similarly

charged against U.S. production. Each requirement submitted by any one of these

nations was transmitted to Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department.

If approved by OPD, it was forwarded to

the International Division of the Army

Service Forces (ASF).2 The various

branches and sections of the International

Division then screened the requirement,

broke it down according to technical service, determined production possibilities in

the light of other requirements, charged it

against U.S. production, and included it in

the over-all Army Supply Program. From

then on, ASF was responsible for the production and distribution of the items involved. In the case of airplanes and air

force items, the same procedure was followed except that the Army Air Forces instead of the International Division was

responsible for processing the requirement

and for including it in the Air Forces section of the Army Supply Program. In both

instances, however, the decision to accept

the requirement was one to be made by the

War Department alone.3

The decision to assign the equipment

involved bilateral action since it could be

effected only through the combined AngloAmerican Munitions Assignments Boards

established, one in Washington (MAB),

and one in London (LMAB), as part of

the Combined Chiefs of Staff machinery.

The United States having assumed the

burden of furnishing matériel to the French,

assignments to them became the responsibility of the MAB, the board charged with

allocating American munitions production.

The MAB operated through three subcommittees: the Munitions Assignments

Committee (Ground), MAC (G); the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air),

MAC (A); and the Munitions Assignments

Committee (Navy), MAC (N). The Air

and Navy committees assigned items peculiar to the Air Forces and Navy respectively. The Ground committee was

responsible for the assignment of all other

items. Since the membership of these committees was a combined one, unanimous

agreement was required before action could

be implemented.

The MAB and its subcommittees considered U.S. production of military items

as a pool production without regard to the

particular requirement for which production had been initiated. Assignments of

current production were made at weekly

meetings of the board and its subcommittees in the light of existing shipping and

matériel availability and of the over-all

strategic and operational requirements of

the United Nations including the United

States. Assignments normally followed accepted requirements. There were instances, however, where production of a

given item was initiated as a result of a

requirement stated on behalf of one member of the United Nations, while delivery

of the item so produced was made to another member nation because of changes

in circumstances and operational requirements between the time when production

was initiated and the time when the item

became available. Whether or not such

delivery would be authorized and when it

would be effected was left to the decision

of the MAB.

Since the MAB received its policy from

the CCS, it follows, therefore, that the

2

 Known as Services of Supply (SOS) before

March 1943. 3

 Tab D to Memo, Maj Gen Wilhelm D. Styer

for Eisenhower, 10 Feb 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item

5-a.
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE A REARMAMENT PROGRAM 23

latter held the final authority in the matter

of the granting or rejecting of munitions

requests from individual members of the

United Nations. In practice this CCS authority limited itself to laying down the

general policy to be followed with respect

to the member nation concerned. To arrive at their decision, the U.S. Joint Chiefs

of Staff (JCS) sought advice from the

various sections of their respective General

Staff agencies. Of these, Operations Division was largely responsible for influencing

or determining rearmament policies on the

basis of recommendations from theater

commanders and in the light of global U.S.

commitments.4

Initial Groping Toward a Policy

Armament negotiations, suspended at

the close of the Cherchel meeting pending

the outcome of TORCH, could now be resumed. As they got under way, it soon

became clear that the main protagonists,

General Giraud, General Eisenhower, the

War Department, and the Combined

Chiefs of Staff, were approaching the rearmament problem from different points of

view. The problem itself, moreover, was

complicated by the fact that it involved

two distinct yet closely related issues. One

was the emergency provision of minimum

matériel, chiefly arms, to the French units

being sent to the Tunisian front in increasing numbers; the other was the large-scale

rehabilitation of all African forces, such as

the Mast Plan advocated, for participation

in subsequent operations. From midNovember to late January 1943, divergence

of opinion regarding the immediate as well

as future employment of the North African

forces, anxiety over operational developments in Tunisia, and the still critical shipping and equipment situation facing the

Anglo-American allies all combined to impede attempts to formulate an armament

program.

In the judgment of the French Commander in Chief, emergency equipment of

the forces in action was urgent, of course,

but the main issue was the conversion of

his large yet poorly equipped transition

army into a striking force capable of intervening in Tunisia as well as on future battlefields. Only a reconstituted French

Army could restore French prestige. It

was essential, then, that a large-scale rearmament program be instituted at once.

General Giraud's estimate of French

capabilities was highly optimistic. From

the outset he took the position that he would

have no difficulty in putting into the field

an effective fighting force of 250,000, even

300,000 men. These figures included the

troops already available, several classes of

natives and Frenchmen, soon to be mobilized, Frenchmen who were expected to

escape from France in increasing numbers,

as well as French nationals residing in foreign countries who were likely to enlist.

If the question had been mere numbers,

General Giraud's planning would not have

been unduly optimistic. But a modern

army needs a high percentage of technicians. General Giraud had very few Europeans, and it soon became apparent that

Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian natives

either could not be used at all in specialized

combat and service units or needed a very

long period of training. The lack of white

manpower was to be the source of increasing difficulties for General Giraud. In the

beginning, however, the French com4

 For detailed information on acceptance of requirements and assignments of matériel, see Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy:

1940-1943.
24 REARMING THE FRENCH

mander, confident of his ability to raise a

sizable righting force, directed his headquarters to draft a large-scale rearmament program along the lines of the Mast Plan.

The CCS were still studying the Mast

Plan. On 13 November they directed the

MAB to review assignments for November

and December in order to determine what

matériel (except aircraft) could be made

available to the French before the end of the

year.5 Simultaneously they requested the

Allied Commander in Chief to submit his

views and recommendations on the plan,

warning him to keep in mind that shipments

of matériel for the French would necessarily

be at the expense of the build-up of his own

forces.6 General Eisenhower replied that

the extent to which the African forces should

be re-equipped by the United States depended on how they would be employed

ultimately—a matter still to be determined—and on the number of first-line

troops the French High Command would

produce. He felt that if General Giraud

could activate the number of units he

claimed he could raise, "which was doubtful," it would be possible to eliminate some

of the last U.S. divisions planned for shipment to the theater. He pointed out that

a detailed study of the matter would soon

be prepared by his headquarters and the

results forwarded to the CCS.7

General Eisenhower was not at first convinced of the value of arming the French in

view of the uncertainty regarding their combat effectiveness against the Axis. Reports

reaching him during the first week of

Franco-Allied collaboration seriously questioned the offensive spirit of the North African forces. He felt, then, he could expect

little of them for the present at least. He

would use them initially as garrison forces

in the theater. Later he might employ certain selected units in combat operations.

In the belief that an early token shipment of

equipment "as a political gesture" would

produce beneficial effects "in every way,"

he recommended to the CCS, on 18 November, that small arms, antitank, and antiaircraft armament, with spare parts and ammunition, be sent forthwith to the French.

As an initial shipment, he suggested 8,000

rifles, 36 37-mm. antitank guns, and 32

antiaircraft automatic guns of any type

available.8 The next day, French and German forces already were coming to blows.

Before long, reports from Tunisia indicated a marked stiffening of the French

fighting spirit. This in turn suggested that

the French had succeeded in solving the

complex morale problem which had faced

them in the second and third weeks of

November. They seemed to have recovered

from the successive psychological shocks of

that early period: the "token" resistance

directed against the Allies, the conflicting

orders to which they had been subjected,

the sudden breaking off with the mother

country, their shift of allegiance, finally

their being thrown into battle almost without equipment. Now they were reported to

be doing well in combat. Gradually General Eisenhower was acquiring the conviction that he could count on them.

For the Allied commander, then, the

immediate question was how to keep French

units in the line in Tunisia. In his opinion

the emergency issue of minimum equipment

to enable them to fight must be the primary

concern of any rearmament program. The 5

 Min, CCS 48th Mtg, 13 Nov 42. 6

 Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 13 Nov 42, FAN 18. 7

 Msg 866, Eisenhower to CCS, 18 Nov 42, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip. 8

 Ibid.
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE A REARMAMENT PROGRAM 25

wholesale rehabilitation of the entire North

African Army, a long-range issue related to

future, unpredictable campaigns in the

Mediterranean or in Europe, must be given

second priority.

Setting Up the Joint Rearmament

Committee

Providing equipment to the French already was posing serious problems for General Eisenhower and his headquarters, Allied

Force Headquarters (AFHQ), established

in Algiers shortly after the Allied landings.

As problems kept multiplying the Allied

Commander in Chief ordered, on 16 December, the organization at AFHQ of a

special agency to act both as a clearinghouse

and as the authority responsible for developing an armament program. He then placed

the agency, known as the Joint Rearmament

Committee (JRC), directly under the authority of his chief of staff.9

 The creation

of the JRC had been urged by the Chief,

Liaison Section, AFHQ, whom the French

had for some time queried with mounting

insistence regarding a variety of matters,

such as the procurement of token issues of

British and American equipment, probable

dates of delivery, specifications of American

matériel, establishment of schools of instruction, translation of technical manuals, and

other problems.10

The responsibilities and functions of the

JRC were as follows:

a. To centralize all equipment requests

from the French.

b. To develop a program for the rehabilitation of the French armed forces.

c. To ensure that the executive action

necessary to implement the approved program was placed with the responsible section of AFHQ.

d. To undertake all matters of co-ordination with the French authorities, the

Lend-Lease Administration, and others concerned with the rearmament of the French.

The committee, composed initially of

nine members—four American , four

French, and one British—met for the first

time on 23 December under the chairmanship of the senior U.S. member, Col. William Tudor Gardiner.11

 It operated for

approximately twenty-two months, its functions, responsibilities, membership, and

place in the staff structure varying from

time to time. Throughout the entire period

the committee played a major role in the

rehabilitation of the Frenc h African

forces.12

While the JRC and its parent organization, AFHQ, were charged with the overall problem of equipping the French from

Allied sources, the responsibility for handing over American matériel assigned in

Washington rested solely with the commander of the U.S. forces in the theater.

The responsibility was that of General

Eisenhower, who commanded not only

AFHQ but also Headquarters, European

Theater of Operations, U.S. Arm y

(ETOUSA), operating in London. The

responsibility continued to be his after 3

February 1943, when he took command of

the newly created Headquarters, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

(NATOUSA), established in Algiers as a

headquarters separate from ETOUSA.

9

 AFHQ Staff Memo 52, 16 Dec 42, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip. 10

 Memo, Col Julius C. Holmes for CofS AFHQ,

5 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC.

11

 Min, JRC Mtg, 23 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgn

of JRC. 12

 For information on organization, membership,

and activities of the JRC, see Ch. XVII, below.
26 REARMING THE FRENCH

LT. GEN. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, commanding general of the

TORCH forces.

General Giraud Sends a Military Mission

to Washington

Eager to obtain from the United States

an early decision on the provision of war

matériel, General Giraud, in the first week

of December, announced his intention of

sending to Washington a military mission

empowered to discuss with the War Department all questions of supply. General

Eisenhower greeted the proposal with some

skepticism. In a message to General Marshall, he pointed out that missions of this

kind were "usually only a source of annoyance to the CCS" and could accomplish

"little or nothing" in their dealings with

the MAB, and that recommendations from

his headquarters would be required in

any case. He suggested, however, that

the mission be allowed to proceed as

"it might be a good thing for these people

to realize at first hand the complications

involved in supplying a world conflict."

 13

The JCS having approved the proposal, the

mission, headed by Maj. Gen. Emile

Béthouart, departed from Algiers on 20 December. Its function, as defined by the

French Commander in Chief, was to negotiate and expedite the delivery of matériel

on the basis of the requirements set up by

the French High Command and within the

framework of agreements to be concluded

with the U.S. Government.14 Temporarily

assigned to the mission was Jacques

Lemaigre-Dubreuil, then chief of the Research Section of General Giraud's headquarters, whose duty was to obtain the

production and shipping priorities necessary for the speedy delivery of matériel

to the French forces and, incidentally,

to act as the French commander's civilian

representative in the United States. Both

General Béthouart and Mr. LemaigreDubreuil were stanch friends of the United

States. Members of the North African

"dissidence" of long standing, they had, a

month earlier, distinguished themselves in

their valiant attempt to prevent opposition

to the American landings.

The mission arrived in Washington on

24 December.15 Throughout the war, it

formed the principal link between the

French High Command and the War

Department. Liaison, however, remained

almost its sole function as General Eisenhower had foreseen. The entire responsibility for initiating and implementing the

rearmament programs subsequently estab13

 Msg 1812, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Dec 42,

ABC 334.8 (12-4-42). 14

 Memo, Giraud for Béthouart, 10 Dec 42, in

same file. 15

 AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Béthouart,

Nov 42-Jan 43.
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE A REARMAMENT PROGRAM 27

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

lished by decision of the CCS rested with

the Allied Commander in Chief in the

theater of operations.16

Emergency Provision of Equipment

On 20 November the CCS approved the

recommendation submitted two days before

by General Eisenhower, and directed the

MAB to assign the equipment. They

stipulated that the United Kingdom would

furnish the 8,000 rifles (from the stock of

Enfields sold to the British by the United

States after Dunkerque), in spite of some

objection on the part of the British Chiefs

of Staff since the transfer of these weapons

to the French was to be effected at the

expense of the Home Guard. In the eyes

of the CCS, approval of this first request

from the Allied Commander in Chief for

the re-equipping of the French was given

as an emergency measure. At the suggestion of the British members of the committee, they agreed that all further similar

requests from him would be referred to

the MAB for action.17 On 22 November

the MAB assigned the equipment. In a

sense this action marked the real start of

the International Division's responsibility

for French rearmament, a responsibility

which it was to carry through to the end of

the war.

Some equipment had been assigned, but

no date was yet set for its shipment. On

12 December General Eisenhower, in a

personal message to General Marshall,

stressed the urgency of sending this equipment. He pointed out that the French

had no antitank weapons at all, and that he

could do little to help them because of his

own pressing needs. "If we had available

at once antitank and light antiaircraft

weapons for just one French regiment, it

would have a tremendous moral and material advantage. It would even help if I

could inform Giraud that the equipment

for several AT and AA battalions, with

some motor transport, was being shipped

immediately."

 18

By then General Giraud had already

placed at the disposal of the Allied Commander in Chief for the battle of Tunisia a

16

 In September 1943, General Giraud's mission

and General de Gaulle's Free French Military Mission (established in Washington in 1941), until

then two separate agencies, merged into one single

organization under the name of French Military

Mission in the United States. OPD 336 France,

Sec III. 17

 Min, CCS 49th Mtg, 20 Nov 42; Msg R-3415,

AGWAR to USFOR, 21 Nov 42, JRC Cable Log.

18

 Msg 1825, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Dec

42, JRC Cable Log.
28 REARMING THE FRENCH

substantial task force commanded by General Juin. This force, then numbering approximately 7,000 men, would increase to

40,000 combat troops within the coming

months. For the moment, the units were

unable, because of their still meager and

for the most part obsolete matériel, to take

offensive action against an enemy equipped

with tanks and all the modern weapons of

war. It was clear that they could be used

only as a holding force until either adequate

equipment or Allied reinforcements arrived.19

 Even if they were to hold their

present positions, it was urgent that they be

issued weapons without delay. Pending

the arrival of the equipment ordered from

the United States, Eisenhower turned to

the theater for help.

On 13 December he authorized the Commanding General, Eastern Task Force, to

provide French units engaged in combat

under his command with such equipment,

supplies, and matériel as they needed to

conduct operations current or imminent.

The supply of this equipment was to be on

temporary loan without prejudice to any

arrangements likely to be concluded with

French authorities for the permanent reequipment of their forces. A few days later

the Allied Commander in Chief also appealed to the Commanding General, Western Task Force, with a request to send any

surplus equipment such as automatic rifles,

rifles, submachine guns, and light machine

guns for loan to French units in Tunisia.20

Cognizant of the fact that technical instruction on the proper use of matériel was

as important as the issue of the equipment itself, Eisenhower took a number of measures

in this connection. He requested U.S.

Fifth Army then stationed in French Morocco to assist in organizing, equipping, and

training French forces located within its

zone. Simultaneously, he directed AFHQ

to ensure that "all possible assistance" be

given by American troops to the French

African forces in their training with American arms and equipment. Pursuant to

these instructions, the various responsible

commands and agencies in the theater proceeded to establish technical training programs and arranged to get them under way

without delay.21

Finally, pending definite arrangements

on the provision of lend-lease supplies and

equipment to the French, the Allied Commander in Chief prescribed the manner in

which items currently being issued to them

on an emergency basis were to be transferred

and accounted for.22

By the third week of December, no word

had yet been received from Washington

regarding the equipment requested on 18

November. As the situation in Tunisia was

growing critical, Eisenhower appealed directly to the CCS for a decision that would

enable him to tell General Giraud precisely

how much equipment was being sent and

when it would arrive. The CCS promptly

replied, on 24 December, that the promised

rifles would be shipped from the United

Kingdom within forty-eight hours, and the

antitank and antiaircraft guns as well as

2,000 grenade launchers from the United

States on 6 January. Only a shortage of

19

 For detailed information on the part played by

the French in Tunisia, see Howe, Northwest Africa. 20

 Dir, Eisenhower to CG Eastern Task Force,

13 Dec 42, AFHQ AG 400/042-C; Msg 2481,

CinC to CG Western Task Force, 19 Dec 42,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.

21

 Ltr, CinC to CG Fifth Army, 30 Dec 42,

quoted in Fifth Army History, I, 2, DRB AGO;

Ltr AG 353/082 C-M, AFHQ, 31 Dec 42, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. II (3) ;

see pp. 230 ff., below. 22

 AFHQ Cir 5, 10 Jan 43, JRC 400.2/001 Admin

of Sup—-Gen.
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE A REARMAMENT PROGRAM 29

shipping, they pointed out, prevented the

inclusion of more matériel for the French in

the 6 January convoy. Some 3,400 additional weapons including machine guns,

mortars, and howitzers were available from

the United Kingdom and the United States

if required. They warned, however, that

these weapons, if shipped, would take the

cargo space allotted to organizational equipment for Anglo-American forces in North

Africa. They asked the Allied Commander

in Chief to make specific recommendations

as to the amounts and types of armament

required for the French.23

Reviewing the French operational situation as it stood at the close of the year 1942,

Eisenhower urged the U.S. Joint Chiefs of

Staff to give constant consideration to the

question of equipping and maintaining the

French forces engaged in Tunisia as it had

"a strong influence on morale." Their most

immediate need, he explained, was for light

antiaircraft and antitank equipment. Since

these items were not bulky, he recommended

that they be shipped to the full extent of

space available. A few days later, General

Eisenhower appealed once again directly to

the CCS. "If we can provide General

Giraud with only a few tanks and some

additional AA and AT equipment, he may

be able to help us when the more critical

phase of the battle arrives. It must be clear

to all that the enthusiastic and effective cooperation of the French forces is a vital

factor in all our calculations." Having

cabled anew for emergency deliveries of

clothing, tentage, and other matériel, he

felt he had done everything in his power to

assist the French. In his judgment, the

problem of their re-equipping was definitely

one for the governments of the United States

and the United Kingdom to solve.24

So far, only a small amount of matériel,

largely from U.S. sources in the theater,

had been or was in process of being transferred to the French, It consisted of equipment for approximately one light tank company, two tank destroyer companies, and

three to four antiaircraft batteries.25 A

number of miscellaneous weapons also had

been turned over directly by U.S. commanders in Tunisia to their French neighbors in the field.

General Giraud Eyes the Larger Program

While pleading for more weapons for

his hard-pressed troops in Tunisia, General

Giraud was giving increased attention to

the larger armament objective, the rehabilitation of all his forces. By mid-December

members of his staff had prepared a revised

and more detailed version of the Mast Plan,

based on their latest estimates of French

capabilities. They submitted it first to

AFHQ where it was subjected to the scrutiny of the Joint Rearmament Committee.

Later, General Béthouart handed another

copy of it to War Department officials.26

The new program was slightly larger than

the Mast Plan, the proposed number of

divisions being raised from ten to eleven.

Briefly it called for the delivery, in order of

priority, of:

23

 Msg 2392, Eisenhower to CCS, 18 Dec 42,

ABC (11-11-42), Sec 1; Msg, CCS to Eisenhower,

24 Dec 42, FAN 47; Memo, Maj Gen Thomas T.

Handy for Marshall, 26 Dec 42, OPD 400 France,

Sec I.

24

 Msg 3664, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Dec 42,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip; Msg

4141, Eisenhower to CCS, 4 Jan 43, NAF 84;

AFHQ Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch, The North

African Campaign: 1942-1943, pp. 29-30, copy in

OCMH. 25

 Memo, ACofS G-3 for Gen Clark, 21 Dec 42,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops. 26

 Ltr, Brig Gen Roger Leyer to AFHQ, 30

EMG/IM/S, 14 Dec 42, and Memo, Béthouart for

WD, 26 Dec 42, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab P.
30 REARMING THE FRENCH

a. The matériel necessary to maintain

the normal life of the North African forces,

such as medical supplies, railway equipment, coal, gasoline, motor transport, and

the like.

b. The entire equipment for one army

headquarters, two infantry corps headquarters, one armored corps headquarters, eight

infantry divisions, three armored divisions,

and miscellaneous tank destroyer, antiaircraft, and air units.

c. The matériel for the service units and

depots required for the support of the above

forces.

As the Mast Plan still had not been acted

upon by the CCS, General Marshall transmitted the new French proposal to ASF for

examination and again asked General

Eisenhower for comment. The Allied

Commander in Chief replied that the composition of the forces as indicated in the

revised program was agreeable to him.

However, since activation, equipping, and

training had to be governed by a long-term

policy and be influenced by United Nations

strategy, he felt that the last word was not

with him but with the CCS. As for the

suggested sequence of shipments, he

pointed out that the phasing of any approved program would be affected by

changes likely to occur in the military situation in North Africa. With regard to the

rehabilitation of the North African Air

Forces as proposed by the French, Eisenhower, after summing up the action already

taken in the theater, offered the following

comment: The French, he explained,

were reported to have sufficient personnel

for eight hundred aircraft of various types;

it was important for him to know if and

when he could expect this number of aircraft; in the meantime he was considering

sending selected French student pilots,

bombardiers, gunners, and radio operators

to training schools in the United States.27

The Deadlock Over a Firm Plan

The six-week debate on French rearmament at the end of 1942 had produced no

decisions, but it had served to define the

points of view of the various parties concerned. The French, now definitely in

the fight, were impatient to receive modern

weapons of war. To them speed was the

essential factor. As General Béthouart

pointed out on 7 January, in the course of a

meeting of Allied military representatives in

Washington, equipment must be furnished

to French troops rapidly so as to avoid their

"complete paralysis" and to prevent a "serious blow to morale."

 28

 The Allied Commander in Chief, while fully convinced of

the French desire to fight and ready to provide all possible material assistance, considered French rearmament in relation to

his over-all requirements. These, in turn,

were conditioned by the amount of shipping

allocated to his theater and more particularly by the current and probable operational developments. For the moment, the

failure of the Allied drive on Tunis and the

rapid westward movement of the German

forces had created an urgent need for the

earliest possible presence in southern Tunisia

of a strong Allied force. In General Eisen21

 Msg 3664, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Dec 42,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip; Msg

3503, Eisenhower to Arnold, 29 Dec 42, JRC Cable

Log. The North African Air Forces is discussed

in Ch. XII, below. 28

 Min, MRP 6th Mtg, 7 Jan 43, CCS 334, Military Representatives of Associated Pacific Powers

(5-26-42). This was the first meeting to which

France was invited to send representatives. (The

name of the committee was subsequently changed

to Military Representatives of Associated Powers.)

The last meeting of the committee was held on 18

June 1943.
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO FORMULATE A REARMAMENT PROGRAM 31

hower's judgment, therefore, the initiation,

at this juncture, of a full-scale, long-range

rearmament program was untimely. This

point was made clear in a message addressed

to General Marshall on 31 December. Excluding the needs of French troops engaged

in combat which "must receive constant

consideration," he set forth the shipping

priorities for his requirements as follows:

(1) the logistical build-up, still incomplete,

of the Anglo-American forces under his

command; (2) the rehabilitation of the

North African civil economy so as to prevent

unfavorable repercussions on the political

and military situation.29

War Department officials, on the other

hand, were weighing French rearmament

in relation to world-wide logistical commitments and in the light of its probable impact

on the U.S. war effort. Yet their conclusions regarding the practicability of a largescale French rearmament program were

almost identical, for reasons quite apart,

with those of the Allied Commander in

Chief. The report which the Logistics

Division of Army Service Forces issued on

9 January on the implications of Béthouart's

proposal pointed out that American production would probably make it possible to

equip the 272,000 troops required under the

French program, and to equip and maintain

the U.S. troops already overseas or planned

for shipment abroad in 1943. However,

equipping the French would interfere seriously with equipping units in the United

States. Furthermore, the shipping necessary to float equipment for the French had

to be provided principally by the United

States. This would defer the shipment of

approximately 250,000 to 270,000 American troops to the Mediterranean theater in

1943 and interfere considerably with the

equipping and maintaining of U.S. troops

already in the theater, unless convoy restrictions were relaxed and port capacities augmented. In the light of these considerations, the report recommended, in part, that

the equipping of American troops in North

Africa take priority over that of the French;

that only those French troops be activated

and equipped which could be utilized in

Allied operations; and that their initial

equipping be restricted to the minimum required for their maintenance and training.30

To the CCS, finally, French rearmament

was a matter to be viewed in relation to its

likely effect on global strategy. A program

of the size proposed by General Béthouart

was bound to cut across the lines of AngloAmerican logistical plans. The question,

to the CCS, boiled down to this: would the

commitment, if accepted, be feasible in view

of the world-wide shipping situation? If

so, what would its strategic advantage be?

Shipping, then, and not production—except in the case of some critical items of

equipment—would be the main factor to be

considered in drawing up any large-scale

French rearmament program. This was

made unmistakably clear to General

Béthouart and Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil

when, on 10 January, they called on Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy,

himself a stanch proponent of French rearmament. "Every American," Mr. McCloy declared, was "anxious that there

should be a strong French Army in North

Africa." But it was well not to lose sight

of the enormous difficulties involved. As

an illustration he pointed out that to float

the equipment necessary for eleven divisions,

exclusive of all other matériel listed in the

29

 Msg 3664, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Dec 42,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.

30

 Rpt, Logistics Div SOS, 9 Jan 43, ASF Planning

Div A-47-147.
32 REARMING THE FRENCH

Béthouart program, would require 325

cargo vessels. These, quite simply, were not

available.31

Increasingly alarmed over the severe

losses incurred by his ill-equipped forces in

Tunisia, General Giraud was prone to brush

aside the unfavorable logistics of the situation facing the Allied Commander in

Chief. In an effort to dispel his apparent

misconception of the facts, Maj. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff, AFHQ,

accompanied by the British and American

political representatives in the theater,

called on him on 12 January. General

Smith described the "extraordinary efforts"

made by the Allies to overcome the many obstacles hampering the delivery of armament. He referred to the inadequacy of

port and railroad facilities, the limitations

of shipping and other obstacles. General

Giraud then countered that all available

French merchant shipping was being

turned over to the Allied shipping pool.

Some of it, he insisted, ought to be used to

transport equipment for his forces.32

The next day, 13 January, Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil was leaving Washington for

Algiers, his mission completed. In the

course of his talks with State Department

officials, he had stressed the political aspect of French rearmament. General

Giraud, he had pointed out, was primarily

concerned with bringing Frenchmen back

into active participation in the war. To

succeed, he was dependent on the fulfillment of a number of conditions, moral as

well as material. Among the latter was the

speedy issue of U.S. equipment to his troops.

At a time when General Giraud and General de Gaulle were discussing the unification of their forces, it was imperative that

Giraud's hand be strengthened by all possible means. In Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil's

opinion, only then could the French Commander in Chief pursue the war with maximum efficiency, dispel French anxiety, and

establish himself as the leader of French

military resistance.33

That General Giraud was fully confident

of the intent and ability of the United States

to re-equip his forces cannot be doubted.

Answering a New Year's message from

President Roosevelt, he declared:

The responsibility which I assume is made

much lighter by the military support brought

by the United States and the Allied Nations

and by the promise of help which you were

kind enough to send me. Thanks to American matériel, the restored French Army will

be able to resume at the side of the United

Nations a strong and effective action for the

liberation of France and of Europe, and for

the achievement of a just peace.34

Still, by mid-January, approximately ten

weeks after the Allied landings, no decision

was yet in sight on "the subject closest to

Giraud's heart.35

31

 Min, Conf McCloy with Béthouart and

Lemaigre-Dubreuil, 10 Jan 43, JRC Misc Doc,

Item 5-a. 32

 Msg 3585, Eisenhower (from Murphy) to

CCS, 13 Jan 43, NAF 100.

33

 Msg 1049, Marshall to Eisenhower (State Dept

for Murphy), 13 Jan 43, JRC Cable Log. 34

 Msg 3731, AFHQ to AGWAR (Giraud for

President), 1 Jan 43, AFHQ AG Sec 336.91. 35

 Msg 3585 cited n. 32.
CHAPTER II

The ANFA Agreement

Franco-Anglo-American Conversations

The question of French rearmament,

both immediate and long range, drew considerable attention from the Combined

Chiefs of Staff when, having shifted the

scene of their next deliberations from Washington to French Morocco, they assembled

for the sessions of the Casablanca Conference. Presiding over the conference held

at Anfa, a suburb of Casablanca, from 14 to

26 January 1943, were President Roosevelt

and Prime Minister Churchill. Both Generals Giraud and de Gaulle were expected

to attend. In inviting them, the President

and the Prime Minister had intended to

bring them together in the hope that they

would conclude an agreement on the unification of their forces. General Giraud

reached Anfa on 17 January and immediately began a series of consultations with

the President, the Prime Minister, General

Marshall, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell,

Commanding General, Arm y Service

Forces, and others. The head of the Free

French at first declined to come to the

meeting. This rebuff angered Churchill,

who had given strong backing to the Gaullist group, and prompted both him and the

President to question "whether or not

de Gaulle was a leader who merited their

support."

 l The general finally relented

and, on 22 January, toward the end of the

conference, left London for Anfa where he

met briefly with Allied officials and with

General Giraud.

At their first meeting, held on 15 January,

the CCS heard General Eisenhower himself

stress the urgency of providing immediate

assistance to the North African units engaged in Tunisia. Called upon to report on

the latest developments in the campaign

there, the Allied Commander in Chief emphasized that a serious situation would develop if the French were unable, for lack of

equipment, to stand firmly on the line they

now held between the British in the north

and the Americans in the south.2

To the CCS the two issues of immediate

and long-range assistance to the French

could not be separated. In their judgment,

the question was simply this: how much

rearmament and how soon? To answer,

they had first to determine what use they

intended to make of the North African

forces, and this, in turn, depended on how

much they were prepared to trust these

forces. British and Americans were in

sharp disagreement over this particular

point. The British seemed hesitant to rely

on an army which until recent weeks had

remained obstinately loyal to Marshal

Pétain's government, in their eyes a defeatist, even pro-German, regime. The

Americans, although they had cause to be

resentful after the costly resistance put up by

1

 Min, ANFA 2d Mtg, 18 Jan 43, Casablanca

Conf. (See Bibliographical Note.)

2

 Min, CCS 57th Mtg, 15 Jan 43, Casablanca

Conf.
34 REARMING THE FRENCH

that same army in November 1942, nevertheless were willing to forget the distasteful

episode and accept the pledges of the new

ally at their face value. The U.S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff had discussed this matter of

trust in the North African forces. Admiral

Ernest J. King had urged his colleagues to

"insist" on making the "maximum use" of

these forces by giving them appropriate

tasks and relying on them to carry through

their assignments. He realized that there

would be "some British opposition," and he

considered it essential to convince the British

Chiefs of Staff of the "necessity of trusting

the French fully."

 3

Two subsequent CCS meetings underlined the reluctance of the British to place

full confidence in the North African forces

and as a result their disinclination to consider more than a limited rearmament. On

16 January, General Marshall, speaking for

the JCS, voiced the belief that the French

could be used effectively and economically.

He proposed therefore that selected divisions be re-equipped as soon as practicable.

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of

the Imperial General Staff, agreed on maximum employment of the North African

forces, but regarded their usefulness as confined largely to "garrison work." The possibility of wider employment, he thought,

would depend greatly on whether a satisfactory government could be established in

North Africa, for good leadership was required to "rekindle in the French the desire

to fight."

 4

At the next CCS meeting, held two days

later and attended by the President and the

Prime Minister, Roosevelt urged that every

effort be made to provide equipment for

the army of 250,000 men which General

Giraud expected to raise. Field Marshal

Brooke then observed that the British forces

in North Africa had offered to transfer to

the French some used tanks once they themselves had received their new American vehicles. The proposal elicited from General

Marshall the remark that the North African

units must be given "the best equipment

obtainable." This, he continued, he proposed to provide out of U.S. resources subject to shipping limitations. If the Allies

intended to equip the French, he pointed

out, they must make "good units" of them.5

Apparently concerned over the divergence between the British and American

attitudes toward General Giraud's forces,

Admiral King brought up the subject at a

meeting of the JCS on 19 January. He

again urged his colleagues to place full

confidence in these forces and to equip them

as rapidly as possible. General Marshall

agreed, saying that he thought it "impracticable to go halfway with the French."

They must be trusted "either completely or

not at all." Personally, he had "every

reason" to believe that certain divisions,

when equipped, would be excellent. He

felt that the objections to placing full confidence in the North African forces were

based on technical matters rather than on

anything else. True, he foresaw difficulties

as to control or command, but he was certain that such difficulties could be overcome

as they arose.6

Later that same morning, the CCS heard

General Marshall declare that he was in

favor of proceeding with a definite rearma3

Min, JCS 50th Mtg, 13 Jan 43, Casablanca

Conf. For a list of the British and U.S. Chiefs of

Staff, see page 10, above. 4

 Min, CCS 58th Mtg, 16 Jan 43, Casablanca

Conf.

5

 Min, ANFA 2d Mtg, 18 Jan 43, Casablanca

Conf. 6

 Min, JCS 55th Mtg, 19 Jan 43, Casablanca

Conf.
THE ANFA AGREEMENT 35

ment program for the North African forces.

Such an undertaking would of course imply

acceptance by the French of Allied organization and training methods and would

inevitably delay the progress of equipping

U.S. forces. He considered, however, that

the undertaking should be carried out

"wholeheartedly." He was prepared, subject to General Eisenhower's views, to modify the American logistical program in order

to equip French forces up to a strength of

250,000 men. The necessary matériel

would be provided at the expense of U.S.

units forming in America. He proposed to

ship it to North Africa in French bottoms.

General Somervell disclosed that General

Giraud had agreed to turn over to the Allied

shipping pool 160,000 tons of shipping of

which he expected about 75,000 tons

to be earmarked for transportation of

equipment to his forces. Somervell estimated that this would make it possible to

equip approximately one division per

month.7

The most important debate on French

rearmament took place on the afternoon

of the same day. Appearing before the

CCS at their invitation, General Giraud

outlined his plans for the rehabilitation of

his forces. He explained that with the

cadres then at his disposal he could form

an army of thirteen divisions, including

three armored and ten motorized infantry

divisions. In addition, he wished to raise

as "an indispensable accompaniment to a

modern army," an air force consisting of

50 fighter squadrons, 30 light bomber

squadrons, and a number of transport

squadrons—with a total of 1,000 airplanes.

He was fully aware, he admitted, of the

serious difficulties that his program would

involve, considering the shortage of shipping and the needs of other United Nations

forces. He felt confident, however, that

the French Army, if properly equipped,

could make a great contribution to the

European campaign.

Speaking for the U.S. Army, General

Marshall asserted that he had undertaken

to determine how quickly modern equipment could be provided for the North

African forces. He then proceeded to outline the steps already taken in this connection by various American authorities.

Admiral King had begun discussions with

French naval officers on the shipping question. General Arnold had conferred with

French aviation personnel on the provision

of air force equipment. General Somervell

had examined with General Giraud the

problem of delivery of matériel. Two

points still remained to be taken up with

the French Commander in Chief, namely,

the desired priority of items and the procedure for equipping his units. General

Marshall then emphasized that it was to

the interest of the United States to bring

the North African forces to a high state of

efficiency. It was "not a question of

whether to equip the French Army, but

rather of how to do it." Transport, he

pointed out in conclusion, and not availability of equipment was the limiting

factor.

Whether they were impressed by the determination evident in General Giraud's

statements or reluctant to appear unfriendly

to the French in his presence, the British

members of the CCS expressed great sympathy for his aims. While they made no

specific commitments, at least they raised no

objection to the principle of rearmament.

Speaking for the British Chiefs of Staff,

7

 Min, CCS 61st Mtg, 19 Jan 43, Casablanca

Conf.
36 REARMING THE FRENCH

Field Marshal Brooke assured the conferees

that he fully realized the important part

which General Giraud's forces would play

in bringing the war to a successful end.

The British, he asserted, would do what

they could within the more limited resources

at their disposal to provide modern equipment. Admiral Sir Dudley Pound then

declared that, in view of the growing

U-boat menace, the help of the French

naval forces would be most welcome. As

for the French air forces, Air Chief Marshal

Sir Charles Portal expressed the hope that

they would be equipped as soon as possible

to fight once more alongside the Allies. He

too felt sure that, within the limits of British

resources already considerably strained, the

United Kingdom would do everything possible to hasten the day of this collaboration.

Field Marshal Sir John Dill closed the discussion by declaring that it was "a matter

of great pleasure" to have General Giraud

back to lead France to victory.8

By this time, the Americans had made unmistakably clear their stand on the rearmament issue. Confident of the ability of the

North African forces to put up a good fight,

they were determined to see these forces

used to the maximum and, to this end,

rearmed fully and speedily. Eager to translate this determination into action, General

Marshall, on 23 January, proposed that the

JCS set forth a policy with respect to the

contemplated employment of the North

African forces, and the scale of equipment

to be provided.9

President Roosevelt and General Giraud

Negotiate an Agreement

The issue was settled on 24 January

when the President, having taken the matter in his own hands, reached an agreement

with General Giraud which, in principle

at least, committed the United States to a

program of rearmament. This unexpected

action on his part was the culmination of

exchanges of views between himself and

the French Commander in Chief regarding

the French situation in general and the

rearmament question in particular.10 These

informal meetings had proceeded in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. Apparently disregarding the adverse criticism of

General Giraud's ability as an administrator which had just reached him,11

 the

President had shown keen understanding of

the many difficult problems then facing the

French Commander in Chief and expressed

great interest in his plans for the reorganization and rearmament of the African forces.

On the basis of these and other discussions,

and in line with his statements before the

CCS, General Giraud had prepared a mem8

 Min, CCS 62d Mtg, 19 Jan 43, Casablanca

Conf. Field Marshal Dill was head of the British

Joint Staff Mission and senior British member of

the CCS organization. He took part in the CCS

meetings as a representative of the Minister of

Defence (Mr. Churchill). 9

 Memo, CofS for JCS, 23 Jan 43, JCS 206.

10

 President Roosevelt and General Giraud appear to have met three times during the Casablanca

Conference. The first meeting was on 17 January, 1630-1730 hours, and was attended by Captain Beaufre, then Giraud's military aide. After

this meeting, General Giraud had a short interview with the British Prime Minister. The second

meeting, on 19 January, about 1200 hours, was

attended by Harry L. Hopkins, Mr. Murphy, Lt.

Col. Elliott Roosevelt, Capt. John L. McCrea

(USN), and Captain Beaufre. The third, on 24

January, appears to have been a brief one with

no other participants present, before the meeting

at which Churchill and de Gaulle were also present.

It is to be noted that the Prime Minister did not

take part in these Giraud-Roosevelt meetings. Interv with Col Beaufre, Sep 50; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), Ch.

XXVII. 11

 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, Ch. XXVII.
THE ANFA AGREEMENT 37

MEETING AT CASABLANCA, 24 JANUARY 1943. From left: General Henri

Giraud, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, General Charles de Gaulle, and Prime Minister

Winston Churchill.

orandum embodying the substance of his

several conversations and submitted it for

the President's concurrence.12 The President, on 24 January, recorded his approval

on the margin of the memorandum.

The part of the memorandum pertaining

to rearmament, together with the Presi- 12

 Title of the memorandum: Resume of the

Agreements in Principle Resulting From the Conversations at Anfa. Complete text in English and

in French in OPD Exec 1, Item 13.

The exact time at which General Giraud submitted this memorandum has yet to be determined.

At any rate, this was one of two memorandums

submitted by the general to the President and

approved by the latter in the course of their meeting of 24 January. Both later became known as

the ANFA Agreements. The second memorandum,

the text of which had been prepared by Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil, was a resume and a synthesis of

the conversations just ended in Washington between the French representative and the Department of State regarding the political relationship

between General Giraud and the Anglo-American

authorities subsequent to the Allied intervention in

North Africa. In effect it officially sanctioned the

Murphy-Giraud agreements of 2 November and

officially recognized General Giraud as the sole

military "trustee" of French interests.

Copies in English of both memorandums were

sent to General Giraud on 24 January and to

General Eisenhower on 28 January.
38 REARMING THE FRENCH

dent's marginal comments, was known

thereafter as the ANFA Plan.13 It read as

follows:

It has been agreed between the President

of the United States and General Giraud

that the French forces will receive, by priority,

the equipment which is indispensable to them

and that this shall be made up of the most

modern matériel.

In subsequent talks with General Marshall

and General Somervell, it was agreed that the

delivery would amount to matériel for three

armored divisions and eight motorized divisions as well as for a first-line air force consisting of five hundred fighters, three hundred

bombers and two hundred transport planes,

and that of this equipment, there would be

delivered in the weeks to come four hundred

trucks and the equipment for two armored

regiments, three reconnaissance battalions,

three battalions of tank destroyers and three

motorized divisions, and such of the aviation

equipment as can come by air.

In regard to transport, it has been agreed

with General Somervell that the resupplying

of French Africa would be assured by the

monthly allocation of 65,000 tons (50,000

tons of wheat, 12,000 tons of sugar, and 3,000

tons of fabrics) and that the shipment of the

matériel would be effected before next summer. France would furnish to the interallied

pool 165,000 tons of shipping and the allies

would furnish the remainder necessary for

the delivery to be completed within the agreed

time. The aviation matériel [coal and fuel

excepted] would be sent, as far as possible, by

air.14

Basically the ANFA Plan did not differ

greatly from the pre-TORCH Mast Plan

which called for ten divisions. It was somewhat less ambitious than the thirteen-division program outlined by General Giraud

himself in the course of his appearance before the CCS.15

 In practice, it was a restatement of the eleven-division program

submitted by General Béthouart to the War

Department on 26 December, except that

the air portion of the new plan was substantially larger.

Well might General Giraud rejoice.

After weeks of anxious waiting, he had at

last a definite promise of American assistance. The Chief Executive of the United

States Government himself had sanctioned

the principle of French rearmament and

had agreed to a target of eleven divisions

plus a substantial air force. Greatly encouraged by the turn of events, the French

Commander in Chief returned to Algiers

eager to expedite the reorganization of his

forces in anticipation of the delivery of the

much-needed matériel.

Clarification of the Agreement

The ink was hardly dry on the ANFA Plan

when its far-reaching implications became

the subject of considerable speculation.

Some commitment had clearly been made

by the President, but precisely what?

Moreover, how would the British, who had

so conspicuously not been consulted, react?

There was no evidence that the Prime

Minister, who had not been invited to

attend the Roosevelt-Giraud conversations,

had even discussed the rearmament problem with the President. When on 5 Feb13

 The rest of the memorandum dealt with minor

financial and political problems. 14

 The phrase "coal and fuel excepted" was omitted in the official English translation. Incidentally,

this version (as distinguished from the one, correct

in all respects, prepared by General Béthouart's

staff) contained at least two errors in translation:

"étoffes" (fabrics) was incorrectly rendered as

"matériel," and the words "le transport du matériel" (the shipment of the matériel) was improperly translated as "the shipment of this

material," thereby giving the erroneous impression

that only the shipment of civilian supplies (wheat,

sugar and the like) would be effected before the

summer.

15

 It is most likely that, during his various consultations at Anfa, the general was made aware

of the impracticability of a thirteen-division program.
THE ANFA AGREEMENT 39

ruary, two weeks after the close of the Casablanca Conference, Mr. Churchill chanced

to be in Algiers, he did not fail to point out

to Mr. Murphy this and other political and

military implications of the ANFA Agreements. He emphasized in particular that

General de Gaulle, the then protege of the

British Government, had been practically

left out of the new Franco-Anglo-American

relationship. In an attempt to meet the

Prime Minister's objections, Mr. Murphy

revised the text of the agreements and submitted a single memorandum to General

Giraud. The French Commander in Chief

endorsed the new document, a copy of

which was cabled to the Foreign Office,

and to Washington where the President approved it on 22 April. The text of the

ANFA Plan reappeared as Part II of the

new memorandum and was worded as

follows:

1. On the military plane it has been agreed

between the President of the United States

and the British Prime Minister on the one

hand and General Giraud on the other that

the French forces will receive equipment

which is indispensable and with that priority

which their military situation demands and

as may be determined by the Combined

Chiefs of Staff, and this shall be made of the

most modern matériel.

2. [Same as in original agreement.]

 16

Although a belated party to the rearmament agreement, the British at any rate

were now fully informed as to the scope of

the commitment.

Another serious question arose as soon

as American officials responsible for implementing armament programs began examining the ANFA Plan in relation to worldwide strategy, other armament commitments, production, and shipping. How

binding was the agreement just concluded?

Was it really an agreement "in principle"

only? If so, emphasis could reasonably be

placed on the spirit rather than the letter

of the text, and a rearmament program

established in the light of, and in proper

relation with, the many aspects involved.

Or was it, as the French were already insisting, a firm commitment to a specific

program? There was of course the possibility that the President, although quite

conversant with the French language, had

not realized that the words "Oui en principe" as written by him in the margin of

the original document had a much stronger

meaning than the less binding translation

"yes in principle" subsequently used in the

official English text.

Ten days after the conclusion of the

agreement, General Béthouart, at the request of the French Commander in Chief,

called on General Marshall to discuss the

implementation of the ANFA Plan. The

conversation, from the outset, elicited considerable surprise on both sides. General

Marshall first informed his caller that he

had not yet been advised by the President

of any specific agreements with General

Giraud other than the confirmation of what

he himself had already assured the French

Commander in Chief during their conversations at Anfa, namely, that the United

States would proceed with the greatest

speed to equip his troops and that the mat16

 Title of the new memo: Memo of the Points

Agreed Upon at the Casablanca Conference Between the President of the U.S. and the British

Prime Minister on the One Hand, and General

Giraud on the Other. Text in Crusoë, Vicissitudes

d'une Victoire (Paris: Les Editions de l'Ame

Française [1946]), p. 147. The copy approved by

the President: Memo, Brig Gen John R. Deane

for JCS, 22 Apr 43, OPD 400 France, Sec 1.

The main difference between the original and

the new document was that the latter limited the

trusteeship of General Giraud to the territories of

North and West Africa, thus leaving General de

Gaulle in control of other areas, pending an ultimate fusion of the two administrations.
40 REARMING THE FRENCH

ter of cargo space, character of equipment

as to priorities of shipment, and the like

would be determined later.17 General

Marshall then assured General Béthouart

that he did not contest the principle of

French rearmament. Generals Eisenhower

and Clark and Maj. Gen. George S. Patton,

Jr., whom he had consulted, all agreed that

North African units could be made effective

for battle provided they received modern

equipment. It was a foregone conclusion,

he continued, that the Americans would

feel justified in delaying the organization

of U.S. divisions now on the War Department program in favor of equipping French

divisions overseas. However, he pointed

out, there were practical and technical

aspects of the problem to be taken into consideration. The rearmament of the French

would have to be undertaken in the light

of other similar commitments, as the war

was being fought on many fronts throughout the world. In addition, it was agreed

that the requirements of matériel for the

North African Army should be met, both

in quality and quantity, under the same

conditions as those of the U.S. Army.

Hence it was obvious that the provision of

such matériel must be made according to

an order of priority to be determined for

the whole of the United Nations forces.

Finally, there was shipping to be reckoned

with. At the present time, he explained, it

was not possible to determine delivery dates

with any exactness. But, since it was considered important that at least a part of

the French forces be re-equipped at once,

War Department officials were taking steps

to have matériel ready to fill available

cargo space.18

On 5 February, the Combined Chiefs

of Staff, meeting in Washington, examined

the status of the negotiations on French

rearmament. Lt. Gen. George N. Macready inquired, on behalf of the British

Chiefs of Staff, whether any agreement on

the matter had been reached at the Casablanca Conference. General Marshall explained that "a favorable view" had been

taken by Generals Eisenhower, Patton, and

Clark regarding the "potentialities" of the

North African forces but that no decision

had been reached with regard to what

equipment should be sent.19 Shipping, he

pointed out, would be the limiting factor.

One of the effects of providing equipment

to the French, concluded General Marshall,

would be to delay equipping U.S. units.

The CCS then agreed that they should, as

soon as possible, give guidance to the

Munitions Assignments Board with respect

to French rearmament.20

In the theater, officials of Allied Force

Headquarters also were discussing the implications of the ANFA Plan. On 6 February, pending further instructions from

Washington, the chief of staff, General

Smith, issued the following statement:

"The President's promises to General Giraud deal with matters which are beyond

General Eisenhower's scope because they

17

 General Marshall was absent from Casablanca

during the last days of the conference and had not

seen the President since his return to Washington.

The first knowledge he had of any agreement was

when General Béthouart handed him, in the course

of the above interview, a memo on the subject as

well as a copy of the ANFA Agreements.

18

 Min, Marshall Béthou

902/11 Rearmt Plan; Memo, Marshall for McCloy,

4 Feb 43, OCS A-45-523 (France). 19

 It is most likely that General Marshall, who

had been apprised only two days before by General

Béthouart of the Giraud-Roosevelt agreement in

principle, had not yet talked to the President to

ascertain the facts regarding that commitment.

General Macready was a member of the British

Joint Staff Mission in Washington. 20

 Min, CCS 70th Mtg, 5 Feb 43.
THE ANFA AGREEMENT 41

involve additional tonnage which has not

yet been allocated to him. General Giraud

must deal with these matters with Washington through the Béthouart Mission."

 21

In the opinion of the Allied Commander

in Chief, therefore, it was clearly up to the

CCS and the War Department to carry out

the ANFA Plan, and to arrange for the

necessary additional tonnage.

General Giraud, meanwhile, on his return from Casablanca had publicly proclaimed that he had been promised

"substantial equipment to arrive by the

summer." Subsequently his staff submitted a request for the immediate shipment

of the matériel constituting the first part

of the ANFA Plan. The Joint Rearmament

Committee was then working on a schedule

of shipments based on the allocation of

25,000 tons per convoy which General

Eisenhower had approved on 26 January as

being "the maximum tonnage which could

be spared for French military equipment."

The figure, incidentally, represented about

one sixteenth of the total maximum tonnage per convoy (approximately 400,000

tons). It was somewhat lower than the

figure of 30,000-35,000 tons allocated for

civilian consumer goods as a result of Eisenhower's decision to place the requirements

of the North African economy above

those of the French military. Considering

that convoys were contemplated at the

rate of about one per month, the 25,000

tons thus allocated monthly to French

military requirements would permit no

more than a start on the rearmament program before the summer.22

 On 10 February General Béthouart informed General

Giraud that, as now envisaged by the War

Department, the composition of the next

shipments under the 25,000-ton allocation

was to be limited to 400 vehicles and the

medical and training equipment requested

on 26 December. He added, however, that

War Department officials had undertaken

a study of the "possibility" of equipping a

first increment consisting of three divisions,

a few tank battalions, and corresponding

antitank and antiaircraft units. Delivery

dates had yet to be determined, as shipments were dependent on production and

shipping.23

These and other disclosures brought

General Giraud's rejoicing to a sudden end.

Greatly disturbed because the re-equipping

of his troops was not being pushed with

more vigor, the French Commander in

Chief called on General Eisenhower on 16

February and made "strong representations." Believing the ANFA Agreements to

be a firm commitment, Giraud expected at

least the first part of the plan to be accomplished without delay. Under the allocation of 25,000 tons per convoy, the

eleven-division target set at Anfa would

never be reached. The negligible material

assistance now offered by the Americans

was inconsistent with his recent understanding with the President and General

Marshall. Moreover, it gave credence to a

21

 Memo, DCofS AFHQ for Liaison Sec, 6 Feb

43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan. 22

 As an illustration, 25,000 tons (or less than

three cargo ships) represent no more than the

vehicles of the three infantry regiments and divisional artillery of a division. FM-101-10, Staff

Officers' Field Manual: Organization, Technical,

and Logistical Data, 1941.

Msgs 1453, Eisenhower to OPD and Marshall,

17 Feb 43, 7433, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26 Jan

43, and 1768, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Feb 43,

JRC Cable Log; Msg 3664, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Dec 42, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops

Fr Equip; Memo, International Div ASF for OCT,

26 Apr 43. ASF ID 400.318 France, Free Fr, Vol. 1. 23

 Ltr, Béthouart to Giraud, 10 Feb 43, and

Memo, Styer for Eisenhower, 10 Feb 43, JRC

902/11 Rearmt Plan.
42 REARMING THE FRENCH

rumor that had lately reached him, to the

effect that it was the policy of the American

government not to equip his forces in such

a manner as to permit them to take part

in overseas operations, but to furnish them

only matériel sufficient to defend North

Africa. If that was the American intent,

he would withdraw from his position as

French Commander in Chief.24

General Eisenhower, reporting Giraud's

stand, urged the War Department to set

forth a definite policy which would enable

him to deal with the French Commander

in Chief. He needed to know in particular

in how many monthly increments the commitment made at Anfa could be met. His

staff could then determine shipping priorities and proceed intelligently with the rearmament of forces available for immediate

combat as well as those later to be employed.

In the meantime, he was reassuring General Giraud, on his own authority, that the

Allied governments had "no disposition

other than to carry through their original

promises" and that it was "their intent and

desire" that the North African forces participate in the liberation of France. Stressing the urgent need for immediate action,

General Eisenhower added this grave

warning: "I have here to face the insinuation that we are not straight-forward, that

we are long on promises and short on

performances. . . . This impression must be

dispelled before the situation deteriorates."

 25

To make his position unmistakably

clear, General Eisenhower, on the same

day, sent a personal message to General

Marshall. He stressed his own and General Giraud's concern over the serious results likely to follow from American

failure to deliver equipment. He feared

a further lowering of morale among French

units and a corresponding weakening of

General Giraud's hold on his army. Discontent was already rampant among the

troops fighting in Tunisia. They contended

that, just as in 1940, they had been sent

to battle without proper equipment with

the result that they were suffering heavy

losses. It was difficult for them to reconcile

this situation with General Giraud's repeated optimistic statements following his

return from Casablanca. Prompt action,

asserted General Eisenhower, was imperative to fulfill in part the "obligation implied

at Anfa." The "immediate situation"

could be met, he suggested, if about 100,000

tons of military supplies and equipment

were earmarked for delivery from the

United States during the following two or

three months. If this action was supplemented by a definite schedule for future

deliveries, "the matter would be settled."

The necessary tonnage, he explained, would

have to be provided by General Somervell

from shipping at his disposal including

French tonnage. With a probable reference to those officials who might be objecting to French rearmament on the ground

that it was politically inopportune, Eisenhower concluded with this pointed observation: "The plan for equipping eleven

divisions has no relationship to the great

question of whether France shall be rearmed after the war. The latter would be

a gigantic undertaking covering many

years."

 26

24

 Msg 1453 cited n. 22. The rumor, allegedly

of American origin, had been picked up in Algiers

by French officers. Approached on the matter,

Mr. McCloy hastened to furnish formal assurance

to the French that the rumor was without foundation. Memo, Jacques Tarbé de Saint-Hardouin

for Béthouart, 26 Feb 43, OCS A-45-523 (France). 25

 Msg 1453 cited n. 22. 26

 Ibid.; Msg 1620, OPD Algiers to AGWAR,
THE ANFA AGREEMENT 43

In a subsequent message addressed to

the Secretary of State for transmittal to

President Roosevelt, Mr. Murphy corroborated General Eisenhower's disclosure of

the critical situation arising from the rearmament issue. The French, asserted Mr.

Murphy, were manifesting a growing feeling that they were being "hoodwinked."

They had listened with "respectful credence" to repeated announcements of U.S.

armament production. On the other hand

they realized fully the seriousness of the

shipping problem. But what they could

not understand was that three months after

the landings in North Africa, during which

time the Allies had of necessity depended

on them for many things, no evidence of a

substantial armament program was yet in

sight. Mr. Murphy then reviewed the military and political implications of the current fumbling on French rearmament. The

security of the North African base required

that the fighting spirit of the French be

stimulated. Instead there was a growing

fear among them that France would be "excluded from real participation in the peace

settlement." In addition, General Giraud's

forces, aware that the Gaullist troops had received modern equipment from the British,

were now looking more and more toward

the United Kingdom for practical encouragement. Finally the French Commander

in Chief felt that "somewhere along the line"

there was "opposition if not deception."

The American political adviser then urged

that "we lay at least some cards on the

table and enter into franker discussions as

to the future of French participation if this

is at all practicable. Our prestige and policy are being challenged." If possible, he

finally recommended, General Eisenhower

should have more support. Additional tonnage with necessary escort vessels should be

allocated to him for the purpose of rearming

the French.27

Impressed by the gravity of the situation

as described by General Eisenhower and

Mr. Murphy, General Marshall referred

the entire matter to President Roosevelt.28

The President's reaction was immediate.

Within a few hours after Murphy's message

had been communicated to him, Roosevelt

requested the American political representative in Algiers to tell the French that

"at no time did [he] or General Marshall

promise equipment for the French divisions

on any given date." What had been agreed

to, he asserted, was "the principle of rearming them." The rearmament itself was to

be carried out "as soon as practicable from

the shipping point of view." His agreement in principle, therefore, did not involve

detailed commitments. The President

then added this somewhat caustic advice:

"Tell your good friends in North Africa

that they ought not to act like children.

They must take prompt steps to deny the

silly rumors that they have been let down

in equipping an expeditionary force to go

into France or that slowness in supplying

armament is delaying political progress. . . .

They must remain calm and sensible."

 29

In a message of the same date addressed

to Eisenhower, Marshall first restated the

President's own interpretation of the ANFA

Agreement, then disclosed some rather

startling facts concerning the conversations

held immediately before the President's

Eisenhower to Marshall, 18 Feb 43, OPD Exec 1,

Item 13; Msg 1628, Eisenhower to OPD, 18 Feb

43, JRC Cable Log.

27

 Msg 252, Murphy to Secy State for President,

20 Feb 43, OPD Exec 1, Item 13. 28

 Memo, Marshall for President, 20 Feb 43, OCS

A-45-523 (France). 29

 Msg, President to Murphy, 20 Feb 43, OPD

Exec 1, Item 13.
44 REARMING THE FRENCH

approval of the Giraud memorandum.

Specifically, the Chief of Staff referred to

paragraph 2 of the document. As worded,

it implied that, after Giraud and the President had reached an understanding on the

general principle of French rearmament,

Generals Giraud, Marshall, and Somervell

had subsequently agreed on the details of

the program. The U.S. Chief of Staff now

wanted to have clearly understood that

neither he nor General Somervell had made

any detailed commitments such as were

specified in the paper submitted to the

President for his signature. In their conversation with General Giraud, they had

dealt "only in general terms," and agreed

solely to a rearmament program "as speedy

as could be managed." They had informed

the French Commander in Chief that, because of shipping limitations, his program

would be impossible of immediate attainment in view especially of American commitments with the USSR and China, and

requirements in the southwest Pacific.

General Marshall further disclosed that the

President had had no opportunity to see

him or General Somervell after his receipt

of General Giraud's memorandum. The

President's agreement in principle, therefore, was "based on General Giraud's statement of a detailed arrangement with

Generals Somervell and Marshall which

had not been reached." 30

Both American and French observers

were later to express the opinion that General Marshall's implication that Giraud had

knowingly misrepresented the facts and had

secured the President's approval on false

pretenses did not square with Giraud's character. It seemed to them far more likely

that the French Commander in Chief, carried away by his eagerness to see his forces

rearmed, was misled by the encouragement

he received and that he readily translated

preliminary agreements into firm commitments because he wanted so badly to have

such commitments.31 As for the President,

the haste with which he had approved the

document suggests the possibility that he

had not examined its terms and implications

with sufficient care. His endorsement was

ambiguous to say the least. Under the circumstances, it was bound to lead to misunderstandings.

In an effort to dissipate General Giraud's

misgivings, the MAB dispatched to Algiers, at the request of the French Commander in Chief and with the approval of

the President and of the British Government, Mr. Jean Monnet, the French financial expert then in Washington. The purpose of his mission was to acquaint Giraud

with the situation as seen from Washington,

to review with him and with General Eisenhower the entire matter of French rearmament in relation to over-all Allied requirements, and generally to "give through appropriate channels every assistance to the

solution of questions arising in connection

with the rearmament of the French

forces."

 32

 The details of the rearmament

program still had to be established.

30

 Msg 2641, Marshall to Eisenhower, 20 Feb 43,

JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan.

31

 Intervs with Col George L. Artamonoff, Dec

49, with Brig Gen Jean Regnault, Sep 50, and

with Lt Gen Paul Devinck, Jun 50. 32

 Ltr, Hopkins to Monnet, 22 Feb 43, JRC

902/11 Rearmt Plan.
CHAPTER III

Phase I of the Program

(January-July 1943)

Phase I Is Launched

General Giraud had been correct in

assuming, as he had in the course of his

conversation with General Dwight D.

Eisenhower on 16 February, that no definite

schedule had yet been established for giving

full effect to the ANFA Plan. Still it did

not follow that War Department officials

had detached themselves altogether from

the question of furnishing large-scale material assistance to his forces. On the contrary, they had already begun to make

available some of the matériel required

under the plan. In their opinion, such

provision represented the first increment in

a program still to be elaborated by the

Combined Chiefs in the light of the ANFA

Agreements.

At the request of the War Department,

the Munitions Assignments Committee

(Ground) had acted favorably on one

armament requisition for the French and

was about to act on a second, such action

being taken subject to the ultimate approval

of the CCS and pending final decision by

the latter regarding the over-all program.

On 1 February, the MAC (G) had recommended, and the MAB had subsequently

approved, the assignment of the matériel—

vehicles and medical and training equipment—requested for the North African

forces by the theater on 26 January.1 This

matériel, incidentally, was much the same

as that listed under Priority I of the Béthouart program. Two weeks later, on 16

February, the MAC (G) also approved

the immediate transfer to the French of

some 400 machine guns, 24 medium tanks

for training purposes, as well as the matériel

requested earlier by General Eisenhower for

re-equipping one infantry division, two

truck companies, one service company, and

one ordnance battalion.2 Army Service

Forces then made arrangements for the

shipment of the equipment as filler cargo

on the next convoys to North Africa.

These measures clearly indicated that

War Department officials were no less determined than General Eisenhower to begin

1

 Min, MAC (G) 74th Mtg, 1 Feb 43. (See

Bibliographical Note.) 2

 Msg 8496, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 2 Feb 43,

JRC Cable Log; Min, MAC (G) 78th Mtg, 16

Feb 43. MAC (G) withheld the 17,500 rifles

requested by General Eisenhower because there

existed at the time a shortage of 1,300,000 in the

United States. As rifles were available from British

sources, the London Munitions Assignments Board

was requested to release them to the French complete with bayonets and scabbards, accessories, and

maintenance spare parts. These rifles, all .30-

caliber, were from the old U.S. stock turned over

to the British after the battle of Dunkerque. Msg

5826, AFHQ to USFOR, 21 Apr 43, JRC Cable

Log. On the question of rifles and other infantry

weapons issued to the French during the war, see

pp. 246-53, below.
46 REARMING THE FRENCH

U.S. VEHICLES FOR NORTH AFRICAN FORCES, Casablanca, 22 February 1943.

rearming the French while awaiting a decision of the CCS on the extent of the program. They intended to proceed generally

within the framework of the Béthouart proposal of 26 December, and on the basis of

recommendations of the Allied Commander

in Chief as to armament and shipping priorities. They concurred fully in General

Eisenhower's position that matériel and

shipping priorities must be decided by him,

except when the CCS might have to intervene.3

 To avoid dual shipping procedures,

they recommended, and the theater agreed,

that shipments for the French, distinctively

marked, should continue as U.S. Army

shipments consigned to Commanding General, NATOUSA, and handled like any

other U.S. military shipments.4

On 16 February Marshall referred to

Eisenhower a request he had just received

from General Béthouart for the equipment

to complete the initial phase of the ANFA

Plan. Béthouart was asking for an allocation of 100,000 tons monthly, for the next

two months, over and above the 25,000-ton

allotment authorized by the theater. War

Department officials, explained General

Marshall, considered that the decision in

the matter was up to the theater, not them.5

The Allied Commander in Chief, on 18

February, confirmed General Giraud's

eagerness to complete the initial phase of

the ANFA Plan as speedily as possible. He

3

 In the course of a conference held at AFHQ,

it had been agreed that Eisenhower would be the

final authority on the matter of French requisitions.

Min, CofS Conf, 29 Jan 43, AFHQ AG Sec 337.2. 4

 Memo, Styer for Eisenhower, 10 Feb 43, JRC

902/11 Rearmt Plan. In accordance with an

earlier request from the theater, the following

distinctive markings were subsequently adopted:

all packages containing equipment for the French

bore the code symbol NAFUS (for North African

French-U.S.) and were stenciled with vertical red,

white, and blue stripes. Msg 8496 cited n. 2. 5

 Ltr, Béthouart to Marshall, 15 Feb 43, OCS

A-45-523; Msg 2399, Marshall to Eisenhower, 16

Feb 43, JRC Cable Log. The submission of

Béthouart's request to the War Department was

entirely consonant with General Smith's statement

of 6 February (see p. 41, above) that the French

must take up shipping problems directly with the

War Department.
PHASE I OF THE PROGRAM 47

then submitted a detailed request for the

necessary equipment. On the question of

shipping, he pointed out in a subsequent

message that for him to allocate more tonnage for the French forces from his present

shipping allotment would be to compete

directly with his other military requirements. He fully realized that the "apparent

commitment of Anfa as understood by the

French" might require an immediate increase in rearmament tonnage. Existing

demands, however, were "quite beyond"

his capacity to meet if future plans were to

be executed, as he hoped, within the period

of time currently contemplated.6

Without waiting for Eisenhower's reply,

Marshall had instructed ASF to explore at

once the possibility of allocating more tonnage for the shipment of military equipment

to the French. On 19 February General

Somervell had announced that a special

convoy of approximately 125,000 tons

could be arranged for this purpose.

The request submitted by the theater on

18 February called for the shipment of

matériel to equip two infantry divisions, two

armored regiments with Sherman tanks,

three tank destroyer battalions, three reconnaissance battalions of the type contained

in armored divisions, and twelve antiaircraft

battalions. Operations Division gave the

request a very high priority, so high in fact

that American ground units in the United

States were to be stripped of equipment, if

necessary, to meet the French requirements.7

So far, the organization of the special

convoy was an American project. The

precipitate American action prompted the

British to point out with perfect accuracy

that to date the Combined Chiefs had made

no basic policy decisions on French rearmament. To assign equipment without benefit

of direction from the CCS was, in their

judgment, "putting the cart before the ox."

Despite the British demurral and pending

final action by the MAB, arrangements

for the convoy proceeded. Arms and equipment, on order of ASF, were moved into

ports and the convoy was assembled. The

Combined Chiefs meanwhile continued the

debate on long-range policy.8

The convoy, known as UGS 61⁄2 9 and

consisting of fifteen cargo ships, was to

leave about 19 March and arrive in North

Africa around 11 April. It had been arranged with great difficulty for it represented a "terrifically stiff demand on a very,

very tight shipping situation." Not all the

equipment assigned on 20 February,

amounting to some 150,000 tons, could be

lifted in the fifteen ships. It was agreed

that items left behind would be shipped as

soon as practicable. Also to go later was a

substantial amount of the air equipment requested by the theater on 14 February.10

All together, the matériel to be shipped

on UGS 6/2 and on convoys immediately

following, for which assignment either had

been obtained or was then pending, ex6

 Msgs 1628, Eisenhower to OPD, 18 Feb 43,

and 1930, Eisenhower to Marshall, 20 Feb 43,

JRC Cable Log. 7

 Memo, Secy for Chairman MAC (G), 18 Feb

43, attached to Min, MAC (G) 80th Mtg, 20 Feb

43.

8

 Min, MAC (G) 80th Mtg, 20 Feb 43. It was

not until 24 March 1943 that the MAB, acting

in accordance with a decision taken by the CCS

twelve days earlier, approved the assignment recommended by the U.S. members of the MAC (G)

on 20 February. 9

 The conventional symbol UG was used to

identify a cargo convoy originating in U.S. ports

(whereas KM signified a convoy from the United

Kingdom). The added symbols "S" and "F"

meant "slow" and "fast" respectively. 10

 Quotation from Memo, Lewis Douglas for

Somervell, 19 Feb 43, Somervell File, Shipping;

Msg 2833, Somervell to Eisenhower, 25 Feb 43,

JRC Cable Log.
48 REARMING THE FRENCH

ceeded substantially the equipment listed by

General Béthouart on 15 February. With

it, General Giraud would be able to equip

3 infantry divisions, 2 armored regiments,

4 tank destroyer battalions, 5 reconnaissance battalions, 14 40-mm. antiaircraft

battalions, 12 truck companies, and air

units representing more than 200 airplanes.11

 In actuality, these shipments

would complete the first phase of the ANFA

Plan.

General Béthouart could well be pleased

with the arrangements just concluded.

Aware of the important part which General

Marshall had played in shaping them, the

French representative expressed to him his

personal appreciation in a letter of thanks.12

The announcement regarding the special

convoy could not have reached General

Eisenhower at a more appropriate time, for

he was about to convey to General Giraud

the President's interpretation of the ANFA

Agreement. In his letter General Eisenhower first stressed the United States Government's desire and policy to equip the

French forces properly as fast as shipping

could be allocated for that purpose. He

then broke the news about the special convoy. The decision of the War Department

to set it up, he pointed out in conclusion,

was "a further evidence of our desire to

share with you to the fullest extent possible

consistent with the means at our disposal."

 13

At the close of the six-week period just

ended, extending from the opening session

of the Casablanca Conference to 23 February, when Eisenhower wrote to Giraud, the

Americans as well as the French could point

with satisfaction to the great strides being

made toward the rehabilitation of the North

African forces. The principle of a rearmament had been recognized by the American government and made the subject of an

agreement. The implications of the agreement had been analyzed and subsequently

clarified. Finally, a substantial amount of

equipment was about to leave the United

States for North African ports, a tangible

proof of the American intent to carry

through the promises made at Anfa and

earlier at Cherchel.

The question now uppermost in the

minds of all was this: How soon and how

often could shipments be made? The divergence of views demonstrated by the British

and American members of the MAB on

20 February was clear proof that the board

was not in a position to make further assignments unless it received the necessary

guidance from the CCS. Obviously no

policy would be forthcoming until such time

as the CCS had considered the French rearmament problem in its entirety and agreed

to the establishment of a firm over-all program.

The CCS Agree on a Rearmament Formula

Eager to obtain the formalization of the

action taken by ASF as well as a definite

policy with regard to equipping the French,

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff brought the entire

rearmament question before the CCS. The

memorandum which they submitted on 23

February first pointed out that as a result

of discussions held at Anfa between President Roosevelt and Generals Marshall,

Somervell, Giraud, and Eisenhower, it had

been agreed that equipment would be

11

 Memo, Marshall for Béthouart, 24 Feb 43,

OSC A-45-523 (France). 12

 Ltr, Béthouart to Marshall, 25 Feb 43, OCS

A-45-523 (France). 13

 Msg 2641, Marshall to Eisenhower, 20 Feb 43,

JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan; Ltr, Eisenhower to

Giraud, 23 Feb 43, AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Fr Matters.
PHASE I OF THE PROGRAM 49

furnished "as expeditiously as practicable

in accordance with requests submitted from

time to time through and coordinated with

the CinC [Allied Forces in North Africa]."

The CCS, asserted the JCS, had been informed of this "policy,"

 14

 and had further

been advised that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

intended to "delay the organization of

combat units in the U.S. in approximate

proportion to French units to be rearmed."

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff now proposed that

the CCS approve the following directive

to the MAB for guidance in allocating

equipment to General Giraud: "Munitions

of war will be assigned to French land

and air forces in North Africa from the

common pool to the extent that these forces

can be organized as units around a nucleus

of trained officers and NCO's in accordance

with priorities to be established by the CinC,

Allied Forces in North Africa, and to the

extent that shipping can be made available

for the transport of these munitions."

Naval forces were specifically excluded as

they were to be the object of a separate

paper.15

The memorandum, it must be noted, was

strangely silent regarding the scope of the

proposed rearmament. It made no mention of the eleven-division target as agreed

to by President Roosevelt, an omission possibly due to the fact that the revised version

of the ANFA Agreements had yet to be approved by the President.

The reaction of the British Chiefs of Staff

was prompt and vigorous. On 25 February, they expressed their views on the proposal just offered by their American colleagues. The rearmament of the French

in the immediate future and on a large scale

would, they asserted, cut across the agreements reached at Casablanca regarding

future strategy. They pointed out that the

North African forces could not be reequipped in time to take part in current

operations in Tunisia and were "unlikely to

be required" for any of the subsequent operations decided upon at the conference.16

The British Chiefs considered further that

any shipping allocated to French rearmament above that actually required for operations then contemplated would be at the

direct expense of these operations, thereby

seriously prejudicing them. The directive

proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, they

pointed out, made no mention of the fact

that the commitment to rearm the French

was to be carried out at the expense of the

activation of U.S. units. They now understood this was "the policy agreed on at

Anfa." Since French rearmament involved

a problem of assignment which differed in

no way from similar problems in other

theaters, they considered that it should be

dealt with by the MAB in the light of other

global commitments and be accorded such

assignments as its strategic priority merited.

In conclusion, the British Chiefs of Staff

14

 Obviously a reference to the disclosures made

in this connection by General Marshall at the 61st

and 62d CCS Meetings on 19 January. 15

 Memo, JCS for CCS, 23 Feb 43, CCS 181.

The memorandum was approved by the JCS at

their 63d Meeting, 23 February 1943. It is interesting to note that before submitting the draft

of this paper to the JCS for their approval, Brig.

Gen. John R. Deane, secretary of the committee,

made this rather startling statement in a memorandum for General Marshall: "The President agreed

in principle with General Giraud that French

Forces would be re-equipped but did not specify

any particular number even though General Giraud

believes that he did." Memo, Deane for Marshall,

22 Feb 43, OPD 400 France, Sec 1.

16

 The contemplated operations were: ANAKIM,

consisting of a large land operation for the reopening of the Burma Road and an amphibious

operation for the recapture of Rangoon; and

BOLERO, a preliminary build-up of the forces required for an operation across the English Channel.
50 REARMING THE FRENCH

urged that the proposed directive to the

MAB be revised to indicate the priority to

be given to French rearmament "in its

proper relation to the requirements of other

military operations already agreed upon."

They recommended further that the MAB

be informed of the ultimate scale of rearmament and the speed at which it should be

accomplished.17

On 26 February, the CCS engaged in a

lively debate centering on the American

proposal and the British answer. Admiral

William D. Leahy prefaced the discussion

by emphasizing that a commitment had

been made "on a higher level than the CCS"

and that the question now confronting the

committee was "the manner" in which the

commitment should be implemented. In

his opinion the agreement reached at Anfa

could not be voided. General Marshall

then called attention to the "inconsistency"

of some statements in the British memorandum. If equipment was to be furnished the

North African forces at the expense of U.S.

units, "it was hardly a question about a

common pool." Speed of deliveries and

amount of equipment involved, he pointed

out, were matters still to be determined.

He felt, however, that it was important,

both politically and strategically, that "some

measure of the agreement be carried out in

the near future" so as to bolster Eisenhower's position, especially in French

Morocco where his strength had been depleted by preparations for future operations.

Asked whether the dispatch of equipment

to the French would prejudice other

planned operations, General Somervell expressed the belief that it would not. The

present major shortage, he explained, was

in troopships, not in cargo carriers. General Somervell then voiced his "great surprise" at learning that there was any question regarding the rearming of the French,

as it was his understanding that the matter

had been agreed on at Anfa. He urged

that the MAB be authorized to assign

the equipment then being loaded on the

special convoy.

Speaking for the British Chiefs of Staff,

General Macready first questioned the wisdom of leaving the decision as to the extent

of French rearmament to the theater commander, who, he felt, was not in a position

to judge all the rival claims of other planned

operations. While fully recognizing the

"political necessity" for delivery of a minimum amount of equipment, he feared that

the contemplated shipments to North Africa

would conflict with commitments in the

Indian Ocean where General Sir Archibald

P. Wavell was asking for an additional

126,000 tons monthly. However, added

General Macready, the British Chiefs of

Staff were prepared to authorize the MAB

to go ahead with the present proposed assignments, "provided any delay which

might thus be caused to British assignments

would be made good later in the year."

In an effort to reconcile the American and

British stands on the matter, General Marshall proposed that the directive to the

MAB be amended to read "without jeopardizing other commitments."

 18

The directive, thus amended, was referred

to the British Chiefs of Staff in London.

On 2 March they signified their willingness

to accept it provided it was amended further

as follows: "Munitions of war will be assigned to the French Forces up to the limits

and at a speed to be decided by the CCS . . .

without prejudicing other commitments."

Their own proposed amendment, they de- 17

 Memo, Representatives of COS for CCS, 25

Feb 43, CCS 181/1. 18

 Min, CCS 73d Mtg, 26 Feb 43.
PHASE I OF THE PROGRAM 51

clared, was prompted by their feeling that

assignments of vital items in short supply

should not be made to the French for operational use at the expense of assignments to

U.S. or British troops. Since, in addition,

existing shipping was insufficient to meet

all present combined commitments, they

considered it essential to leave it to the CCS

to decide, "on purely military grounds and

after due consideration of the situation in

all theaters," what was to be assigned.19 It

was now clear that one of the fears experienced by the British regarding French rearmament as proposed by the U.S. Chiefs

of Staff was that the commitment would

jeopardize the delivery of American equipment to their own forces.

At their next meeting, the JCS took up

the controversial directive to the MAB.

Admiral Leahy first informed his colleagues

that the President had directed that the

loading of the special convoy be continued.

He then called attention to the statement

contained in the British memorandum of

2 March that the Prime Minister had confirmed that he had not discussed the question of French rearmament with the President while at Anfa. The President,

declared Admiral Leahy, had just informed

him to the contrary. Admiral King then

pointed out that, since there was no agreement such as that reached with the USSR,

and since the JCS had not clearly defined

the extent of the proposed rearmament, the

British obviously were concerned lest the

matter be carried too far. He felt that

some definite statement should be made to

the British indicating that for the moment

not more than three divisions or their

equivalent were to be re-equipped.

In a less conciliatory mood, Admiral

Leahy urged that a definite program be

"made, held to, and the British so informed." This was important, he pointed

out, in view of a possible United Nations

manpower shortage. General Somervell,

chief of ASF, then explained that there

existed no shortage of equipment, not even

of tank destroyers for which the British had

also made a request. Shipping, he asserted,

was the only question that mattered. And

he believed that when French ships, once repaired, had been added to the Allied pool, it

would be possible to increase the current

25,000-ton allocation for French military

supplies by some 40,000 additional tons per

convoy. There was no intention, he added,

to continue shipments at a heavy rate,

but only at the rate provided by French

shipping plus the tonnage allocated by General Eisenhower. In the case of the special

convoy, he explained, ships had been taken

out of the U.S. shipping allocation and had

been made available by the War Shipping

Administration. Admiral Leahy then offered this advice: "The best attitude to

adopt is to inform the British that the US

JCS intend to ship the equipment." Asked

by Admiral King what stand the British

Chiefs of Staff had taken at the Casablanca

Conference, Brig. Gen. John R. Deane,

secretary of the committee, replied that at

no time had they acquiesced to the American plans to rearm the French; they had

listened without comment and had never

agreed or disagreed.20

In the opinion of General Somervell,

British objections to sanctioning the measures already taken by the War Department

to arm the French appeared groundless.

Only the matériel for three divisions had

been assigned to date, a commitment "apparently concurred in by the British Chiefs 19

 Memo, Representatives of COS for CCS, 2

Mar 43, CCS 181/3. 20 Min, JCS 64th Mtg, 2 Mar 43.
52 REARMING THE FRENCH

of Staff." In addition, very few of the

items involved could be considered in short

supply and even in their case the amounts

assigned represented but a small proportion

of the monthly production rate. Finally,

in allocating the necessary tonnage, the War

Shipping Administration had advised that

the allocation had been made "without

prejudice to the fulfillment of other operational shipping needs considered as

urgent."

 21

Operations Division officials had come to

the conclusion that the amendment to the

MAB directive as proposed by the British

would make action by the CCS mandatory

on every armament request for the French.

The CCS, they feared, would then be assuming the role of a munitions assignments

board. Brig. Gen. John E. Hull, Chief,

Theater Group, OPD, declared flatly that,

as written, the British proposal was not acceptable. He offered as a possible compromise the following counterproposal:

Munitions of war will be assigned to the

French forces . . . from the common pool to

the extent that these forces can be organized

as units ... in accordance with priorities to

be established by the Allied CinC in North

Africa and to the extent that shipping and

equipment can be made available without

jeopardizing other commitments. Equipment allotted by the MAB will not, without

prior reference to the CCS, exceed that necessary to equip eleven divisions, an air force of

450 planes, and appropriate supporting and

auxiliary troops.

General Hull considered that his proposal,

if adopted, would fulfill the President's

"agreement in principle" and would not

commit the British Chiefs of Staff to the

granting of blanket authority to the

MAB.22

On 5 March, the CCS resumed their discussion of the terms of the draft directive.

First, Admiral Leahy restated the American

position and reminded his British colleagues

that at Casablanca they had raised no objection to the U.S. proposal to arm the

French. It would now be "as impossible as

it would be inadvisable" to withdraw from

the commitment given General Giraud by

President Roosevelt. Speaking for the British Chiefs of Staff, General Macready stated

that the point of disagreement concerned

the details of the commitment. What the

MAB required were instructions as to the

amount of equipment to be furnished and

the approximate speed of delivery. Without such instructions, he explained, the

MAB would not be in a position to fit the

assignments to the French into the over-all

claims upon available munitions. The fact

was, he concluded, that "no document existed" which indicated what was to be supplied to the French.

Admiral King agreed with General

Macready. Referring to the minutes of the

Casablanca Conference, he asserted that, to

his knowledge, no definite decision had anywhere been recorded regarding equipment

for the North African forces.23 He felt that

some sort of protocol similar to that for the

USSR should be agreed on for the French.

It was quite right, he added, that a "brake"

be put on the French project so as "to insure

that other existing commitments would not

be prejudiced." Admiral Leahy, on the

other hand, considered that the U.S. Chiefs

of Staff could not subscribe to the amendment proposed by the British as it ran counter to their own commitment. For the benefit of the British representatives, General 21

 Memo, Somervell for Deane, 3 Mar 43, OPD

400 France, Sec I. 22

 Memo, Hull for CofS, 4 Mar 43, OPD Exec 1,

Item 13.

23

 The minutes of the Casablanca Conference did

not record the conversations between the President

and General Giraud.
PHASE I OF THE PROGRAM 53

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney,

then Deputy Chief of Staff, and Admiral

Leahy in turn outlined briefly the ANFA

Plan and explained how they proposed

to meet it. Field Marshal Dill observed

that the British Chiefs of Staff might

take the view that eleven French divisions

were more than could ever be made use of

in Tunisia, particularly as a large part of

this force would not become available until

long after the fighting in that area was expected to cease. However, in the light of

the commitment which had been made, he

recognized that equipment would have to be

delivered. He proposed to refer the matter

to the British Chiefs of Staff and inform

them of the suggested ceiling of 11 divisions

and 450 aircraft. He would explain to

them that "it was the impression of the U.S.

Chiefs of Staff that the matter had been

fully discussed at Casablanca and approved

in principle."

 24

In the belief that a clearer statement of

their aims might dispel British objections,

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, on 6 March, offered

a revised version of their draft directive to

the MAB which read as follows: "Equipment allotted to the French by MAB will

not, without prior reference to the CCS,

exceed that necessary to equip 11 divisions,

450 planes, and appropriate supporting and

auxiliary troops."

 25

The proposed amendment failed to win

over the British Chiefs of Staff. On 11

March, they flatly declared that a diversion

of shipping at the present critical stage, for

the rearmament of forces not required to

implement agreed strategy, "could not be

justified militarily." It was now clear, they

continued, that the CCS could carry the

matter no further in view of the commitment which the President was "understood

to have given" to General Giraud. The

President, they pointed out, had probably

not been aware of the gravity of the shipping situation or of the certainty that operations agreed to at Casablanca could not be

carried out if even a fraction of the United

Nations shipping resources was diverted to

other purposes. As they understood that

the Prime Minister would be taking the

whole matter up with Mr. Roosevelt, they

suggested that, in the meantime, the U.S.

Chiefs of Staff consider steps to obtain

French shipping then lying idle in Martinique and other French West Indies ports.

This shipping comprised several small vessels whose commander, Rear Adm. Georges

Robert, had refused to rally to the Allies.26

In the opinion of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff,

there was no question of diverting shipping

for the rearmament of forces not required to

implement agreed strategy. Their proposed directive in fact placed the responsibility for the allocation of shipping squarely

on the Allied Commander in Chief in North

Africa, and specifically stated that the allocation of munitions to the French was

contingent on the shipping that could be

made available without jeopardizing other

commitments. They considered further

that the British argument over the shipping

question was inconsistent. In papers submitted by them concerning projects of their

own in which shipping was involved, the

British had made no mention of the critical shipping situation.27

 As for their proposal regarding French shipping then lying

idle in Martinique, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

24

 Min, CCS 74th Mtg, 5 Mar 43. 25

 CCS 181/4, 6 Mar 43.

26

 Memo, Representatives of COS for CCS, 11

Mar 43, CCS 181/5. 27

 The projects were: AFLOC, a trans-Africa supply route for the supply of vehicles and equipment

to the Middle East and east Africa; and FREETOWN,

the development of the port of Freetown.
54 REARMING THE FRENCH

discussed it in curious language as "a good

but worthless suggestion." The use of such

shipping, they added, would not affect materially the issuance of a directive to the

MAB.28

At the next meeting of the CCS, held on

12 March, negotiations came to a complete

deadlock. The committee first discussed

a report (CCS 142/1) from the Combined

Staff Planners (CPS) concerning the allocation of aircraft to the French under the

ANFA Plan. The report showed that the

Staff Planners had been unable to agree on

the matter. The American members had

recommended an initial allocation of aircraft for one light bomber group and one

fighter group, and of fifty light transports.

While agreeing to the principle of an initial

allocation, the British members were unwilling to have specific numbers set at this

time. Commenting on the U.S. proposal,

Air Vice Marshal W. F. MacNeece Foster

asserted that the British Chiefs of Staff were

gravely concerned at the prospect that

French rearmament might prejudice the requirements for future operations. He

urged the CCS to ascertain, before reaching

any decision on the matter, whether or not

General Eisenhower and his Air deputy in

the theater, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur

Tedder, considered that any particular allocation of aircraft to the North African Air

Forces was "in the best interests of operations in Tunisia." The CCS then took up

the question of equipment for the North

African Ground Forces. The British Chiefs

of Staff, asserted General Macready, did

not object in principle to a rearmament

spread over a period when it could be

achieved without prejudicing other operations. Their feeling was that, with the

very serious shipping situation then existing,

operations such as HUSKY and ANAKIM

would suffer if equipment was shipped to

the French in large quantities at this time.29

In view of the imminence of these operations, "it might be right," he added, "to go

so far as to stop the ships now earmarked for

French equipment and to divert them to

other uses." General Macready reiterated

that the theater commander was not in a

position to weigh shipping priorities as between his own and other theaters. He

pointed out that General Eisenhower himself might hesitate to recommend the shipment of matériel to the French if he thought

that it might result in prejudicing Operation HUSKY. Thereupon General Somervell emphasized that there was no question

of HUSKY being prejudiced. Admiral

Leahy then flatly declared that there could

be no stoppage of the presently planned

shipments. Realizing that they were not

likely to get out of the impasse, the CCS

finally agreed to suspend further action

pending the result of the exchange of views

then taking place between the Prime Minister and the President. They "took note,"

however, that the initial ground and air

equipment set up with General Eisenhower's concurrence would be sent to North

Africa.30

From available evidence, it appears that

the high-level exchange of views referred to

by the CCS was not concerned with the issue at stake and as a result was not likely to

produce the expected clarification. In a

message to the President, Churchill had

broached not the question of French rearmament, which he regarded as merely

one of the conflicting demands on shipping,

but the broader problem of global shipping

28

 CCS 75th Mtg, Notes for the Mtg, 12 Mar 43.

29

 Operation HUSKY: an assault on Sicily; Operation ANAKIM: see note 16, above. 30

 Min and Suppl Min, CCS 75th Mtg, 12

Mar 43. Rpt, CPS to CCS, 142/1, 10 Mar 43.
PHASE I OF THE PROGRAM 55

requirements. That was the problem

which Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden discussed with American officials in the course

of his subsequent visit to Washington,

13-19 March.31

It will be recalled that, on 23 January,

General Marshall had urged the JCS to set

forth a policy with respect to the contemplated employment of the North African forces and the scale of equipment to be

provided. At the request of the JCS, the

U.S. Joint Staff Planners (JPS) had undertaken a study of the problem. Their

recommendations, submitted on 20 March

and subsequently endorsed by the Joint

Chiefs, constituted in effect the basic declaration of U.S. policy on French rearmament.

In full recognition of the important part

that French air and ground forces will play

not only in the forthcoming operations in the

Mediterranean region but also shoulder to

shoulder with American and British troops in

the ultimate liberation of continental France,

the CCS accept herewith the obligation to

equip with modern equipment and to maintain a French Army of approximately 250,000

officers and men, in accordance with the following which will be considered an integral

part of the agreement:

a) Munitions of war will be assigned for

French land and air forces from the common

pool to the extent that these forces can be

organized as units around a nucleus of

trained officers and noncommissioned officers

in accordance with priorities to be established

by the CinC, Allied Forces in North Africa,

and to the extent that shipping and equipment can be made available without jeopardizing other commitments.

b) Equipment allotted to the French by

the MAB will not, without prior reference

to the CCS, exceed that necessary to equip

the units listed below:

11 divisions

air force of 450 planes

appropriate supporting and auxiliary

troops

c) Equipment for French Forces, either

already sent to North Africa or now on the

way, shall be considered part of, and not in

addition to, the equipment referred to in

paragraphs (a) and (b) above.

d) The US and UK shall share equitably

in equipping the French African Air Force,

the ultimate strength of which shall be regarded as approximately 450 aircraft.

e) French forces will be employed to the

maximum practicable extent (1) in the forthcoming battle in Tunisia, (2) for garrison

duty in North Africa after the Axis is ejected

therefrom, and (3) in such other operations

as the Theater Commander may desire.

f) This agreement applies only to French

forces in North Africa, and nothing herein

shall be construed as binding the US and the

UK to equip the French continental Army,

either upon the liberation of France or after

total victory over the Axis is won.

g) Although the need therefor cannot

now be foreseen, in view of the speed with

which the strategic situation in a global war

can change, the US and the UK must reluctantly, but necessarily, reserve the right to

modify the specific provisions of this agreement, should future circumstances so demand.32

This declaration, laid before the CCS, reflected the official American view that the

United States and the United Kingdom

were fully committed to a program specifically established as to scope if not as to

time schedule. In line with this view, Maj.

Gen. Thomas T. Handy, chief of OPD, on

15 March informed Army Service Forces

that "it [had] been decided" to furnish sufficient matériel from the common pool of

31

 Memo, E. I. C. Jacob (LMAB) for Brig Gen

William F. Tompkins (MAB), 10 Apr 43, CCS

400.17 (7-6-42), Sec 4.

32

 Rpt, JPS to JCS, sub: Equip for Fr Forces in

North Africa, 20 Mar 43, JCS 206/1. A first draft

of the report, completed 8 March, was examined

at the 64th Meeting of the JPS on 10 March, and a

revised version subsequently sent to JCS on 15

March.
56 REARMING THE FRENCH

munitions manufactured in the United

States to equip eleven French divisions.

He then requested ASF to study the impact

which the provision of such matériel was

likely to have on the equipping of American

forces, and to examine in particular to what

extent it would be necessary to defer the

activation of U.S. units during 1943. ASF

replied that there was no serious conflict and

that the activation of U.S. units could proceed as scheduled. The 1943 Army Supply

Program as then established was adequate

to take care of existing units and those presently planned for activation. With a contemplated cushion of matériel for some sixteen divisions, French rearmament could

easily be carried out without dislocating the

100-division program scheduled for the U.S.

Army in 1943. At General Somervell's direction, ASF promptly incorporated the

French requirements in Section V-A and

V-B of the Army Supply Program.33

The inability of the CCS to arrive at a

decision could not but produce a climate

of uncertainty, even apprehension, in the

theater. As pointed out by Colonel Gardiner, chairman of the Joint Rearmament

Committee, the absence of a directive setting forth the aims of French rearmament

"left room for discussion of the merits of

the question and opened the way to the expression of diverse views on the subject."

The French, he insisted, needed encouragement as well as "an example of decisive

action" and should be given an objective as

soon as possible.34

Still the Combined Chiefs seemed in no

hurry. They did not even discuss the matter from mid-March until the middle of

May when they convened for the TRIDENT

Conference in Washington. Then the situation had changed. The ending of the Tunisian campaign had placed the French armament issue in an entirely new light.35

 In

addition, President Roosevelt, earlier in

April, had authorized the redrafting of the

ANFA Agreement leaving out the controversial paragraph which set forth the extent

of the program at eleven divisions.36 As

they met, on 18 May, the CCS were now free

to discuss the matter without having to feel

any longer that they were committed to a

specific program.

Even so, the argument at first picked up

about where it had left off in March. To

the Americans, it still seemed wise to speed

up the arming and training of the North

African forces in view of their potential

value for operations in France. Admiral

Leahy pointed out that, while somewhat

more than three divisions had been reequipped, eight others already activated

were almost without modern equipment.

The French had been promised the equipment at Anfa, recalled General Marshall.

Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith then explained that AFHQ had been guided by the

ANFA decisions. Since French units had "in

general fought excellently" in Tunisia, he

declared, General Eisenhower now wanted

to use them not only to defend French Morocco, guard lines of communications, and

man antiaircraft defenses in North Africa,

but possibly to assault Corsica and Sardinia.

General Giraud, he added, was especially

33

 Memo, Handy for CG SOS, 15 Mar 43, Memo,

Maj Gen Lucius Du B. Clay for ACofS, 27 Mar 43,

and Memo, Hull for CofS, 10 Apr 43, OPD 400

France, Sec 1 ; Control Div ASF, The Determination of Army Supply Requirements, Hist MS File,

OCMH. 34

 Memos, Gardiner for Brig J. F. M. Whiteley,

12 and 30 Apr 43, copies in Col Gardiner's Private

File.

35

 Hostilities ended on 13 May with the capture

of the remaining Axis forces in Tunisia. 36

 Memo, Deane for JCS, 22 Apr 43, OPD 400

France, Sec 1.
PHASE I OF THE PROGRAM 57

anxious to equip his forces "on an expeditionary basis." Unless the Combined Shipping and Adjustment Board arranged to

provide additional tonnage, General Giraud's requirements of 100,000 tons

monthly would not be met.

The British reiterated their earlier cautions. While agreeing to the importance

of rearming the French, Field Marshal Sir

Alan Brooke voiced once again the British

belief that it was a matter of timing and

availability of shipping. Shipping, he asserted, should not be diverted to re-equip

the North African units at the expense of a

build-up of Allied forces for important operations. He agreed that, in general, the

"correct policy" was initially to equip the

French for the static role of relieving Allied

forces for offensive operations. At a later

stage the French then could be equipped as

an expeditionary force.

Both sides having thus again affirmed

their separate points of view substantially

unchanged from the earlier debates, the

CCS settled suddenly on a compromise

formula: "The rearming and re-equipping

of the French Forces in North Africa should

be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipping will allow,

but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U.S. Forces in the

various Theaters." They agreed further

that the possibility of using captured German matériel to re-equip the French should

be explored.37

The wording represented a considerable

if not total surrender to the view of the

British Chiefs in providing the double safety

valve for which they had consistently

argued: that the commitment be not firm as

to the amount of equipment to be delivered

and that it be made contingent on the prior

claims of British and American forces. It

seems likely that the Americans conceded the

point for two main reasons—a sense first

that it had become critical to have some kind

of decision, and second that agreement in

principle would permit, even if it did not require, the carrying out of the original ANFA

commitment. The Americans were convinced that neither shortage of equipment

nor shortage of shipping would interfere

with the arming of the eleven divisions as

agreed. They were equally convinced that

the North African troops had proved their

usefulness and that therefore it would be

militarily justifiable, if necessary, to arm

them at the expense of American units.

In effect the TRIDENT decision simply

reaffirmed the primary responsibility of the

United States for rearming the French in

North Africa and gave the U.S. Joint Chiefs

of Staff a comparatively free hand in carrying out that responsibility. That point was

underlined in a meeting with the President

and the Prime Minister when Air Chief

Marshal Portal, after pointing out that the

British were supplying the North African

Air Forces with aircraft for patrol duties

off the West African coast, emphasized that

except for this contribution "the entire

project was in the hands of the United

States."

 38

While the TRIDENT decision for the time

being settled the rearmament policy to the

satisfaction of the British and Americans,

it left something to be desired from the

French point of view. The urgency of rearmament had been forcibly brought to

the French by their recent experience in

37

 Min, CCS 87th Mtg, 18 May 43, TRIDENT

Conf.

38

 Min, 4th Mtg with President and Prime Minister, 21 May 43, TRIDENT Conf.
58 REARMING THE FRENCH

GENERAL EISENHOWER DELIVERING AN ADDRESS at the ceremony, 8 May

1943, in Algiers in celebration of the fall of Tunisia and the arrival of U.S. matériel for the

French. General Giraud is at the right.

Tunisia. The 40,000 North African troops

thrown into the battle had suffered some

9,600 casualties (including 2,300 killed in

action) or 24 percent of the forces engaged.39

 For these heavy losses, the inadequacy of equipment had been in large

measure responsible. To General Giraud,

facing the prospect of perhaps again committing troops to such an ordeal, the compromise formula of TRIDENT, with its indefinite program of rearmament to be carried out only as it could be fitted into more

pressing obligations, offered little comfort.

"The French," one American observer had

warned, "are deadly serious about the matter."

 40

 For the moment, however, they had

no choice but to go along with the ad hoc

solutions permitted by the CCS decision.

39" Figures on losses are taken from Lt. Col. P.

Santini, "Etude statistique sur les pertes au cours

de la guerre 1939-1945," Revue du Corps de Santé

Militaire, X, No. 1 (March, 1954).

40

 Memo, Gen Tompkins for Maj Gen J. M.

Burns, 29 Mar 43, CGS 400 France (11-3-42),

Sec 2.
PHASE I OF THE PROGRAM 59

LT. GEN. MARK W. CLARK PRESENTING NEWLY ARRIVED U.S.

EQUIPMENT to the French Ground Forces in a ceremony held at Casablanca, 9 May 1943.

General Auguste Nogués is at the left.

Implementing Phase I

Ten days before the formula on French

rearmament was finally agreed to in Washington, a significant event had taken place

in North Africa. On that day, 8 May, an

imposing ceremony was held in Algiers in

the dual celebration of the fall of Tunisia,

just wrested from Axis control, and of the

formal handing over to General Giraud of

U.S. matériel recently unloaded in North

African ports. The speech that General Eisenhower made on this occasion included a special message from President

Roosevelt to the French. "American workers," said the message in part, "are proud

to deliver the goods and weapons to be used

by French soldiers."

 41

 In accepting the

armament in the name of the French Army,

General Giraud echoed the feelings of pride

and gratitude of his countrymen when he

declared:

Today the pledge that was made at Anfa

by the President of the U.S. and the British

41

 Memo for Rcd, SGS, 9 May 43, AFHQ 0100/4

SACS Politics.
60 REARMING THE FRENCH

Government has been fulfilled. The convoys

are arriving. The news is spreading through

the country and among the troops and brings

them comfort and hope. Today's ceremony,

simple and great, allows us to express our

gratitude to the workmen of America who

have wrought that precious matériel and

brought such a contribution to the restoration

of Liberty in the world.42

Later in the day several North African

contingents, formerly horse cavalry and now

re-equipped as armored units, paraded

through the flag-decked streets of the city

and exhibited their newly acquired tanks,

tractor-drawn artillery, jeeps, and combat cars to the enthusiastic populace. In

the eyes of the French, the occasion symbolized the rebirth of their armed forces.

The new French Army, proud of its modern

weapons, was "taking its first steps."

 43

This and other similar demonstrations

were vivid proof of the American determination to proceed with the re-equipping of

the French.44 In fact, even before the campaign in Tunisia had come to a close, the

first phase of rearmament was well on its

way to completion. No development could

have been more welcome at this time. For,

if a few units were proudly displaying their

newly acquired U.S. matériel, the remaining combat forces were still woefully lacking

in equipment. Early in the Tunisian campaign, the French High Command had

rushed to the units engaged there nearly all

the matériel of French origin painstakingly

accumulated before Operation TORCH.

This matériel was now considerably reduced

through damage, wear, and capture. What

was left of it might possibly serve to equip

part of the forces assigned to guard the lines

of communications. Even for this purpose

it would be necessary to obtain from other

sources a substantial number of additional

small arms. As for the British and American matériel loaned in the heat of battle,

which consisted of miscellaneous quantities

of Sten guns, British 2-pounder guns,

75-mm. guns, Valentine tanks, and approximately 500 assorted vehicles, it was understood that the items still serviceable at the

end of the campaign were to be returned

when the troops left the forward area. Considering in addition that only a small quantity of captured enemy matériel was likely

to become available for use by the French,

it was clear therefore that the only equipment on which the North African forces

could rely for participation in further operations would be that received from U.S.

sources.45

Of the 256,000 tons of equipment assigned by the MAB in February and

March for the French Ground and Air

Forces, approximately 193,000 tons (including the 126,151-ton special convoy)

had reached North African ports by the end

42

 Rpt, C. Phillips, Import Div North African

Economic Board, to L. L. Short, 14 May 43, AFHQ

0100/26 Liaison Sec, Rpts. 43

 Georges Marey, "Le Réarmement Français en

Afrique du Nord (1942-1944)," Revue Politique et

Parlementaire (October and November, 1947). 44

 A ceremony of similar character was held on

9 May at Casablanca, at which General Clark, on

behalf of the Allied Commander in Chief, presented

some newly arrived U.S. equipment to the commanding general of the French Ground Forces in

Morocco. There followed a parade of motorized

equipment before a large crowd which could not

fail to be impressed by this "tangible demonstration of the determination of the United Nations

to put the French Army in the field as an effective,

modern fighting organization." Rpt, Liaison Sec

Fifth Army to Liaison Sec AFHQ, 15 May 43,

AFHQ Liaison Sec 0100/12C Fr Rpts From Fifth

Army. Likewise, in the course of a ceremony held

in liberated Tunis on 10 May, a Spahis regiment,

hurriedly re-equipped with U.S. matériel for the

occasion, paraded through the city, a third tangible

demonstration of the rehabilitation now going on

in the North African Army.

45

 Memo, Artamonoff for Col Clement Blanc, 10

Jul 43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan.
PHASE I OF THE PROGRAM 61

of April. The backlog, amounting to about

63,000 tons, had been inventoried and was

to be shipped on the next available convoys

and at the 25,000-ton monthly rate authorized by the theater. Some 8,000 tons of

supplies, including 200 airplanes, ground

equipment, vehicles, and matériel for one

parachute regiment, were intended for the

air units. The remainder, or 248,000 tons,

would serve to equip the ground troops provided for in the initial phase of the ANFA

Plan. These, it will be recalled, included

3 infantry divisions, 2 armored regiments,

4 tank destroyer battalions, 5 reconnaissance battalions, 14 antiaircraft battalions,

12 truck companies, and 3 ordnance battalions. The distribution of equipment to

individual units had already started and in

some cases was completed, as the enthusiastic witnesses to the parade held on 8 May

could testify.46

46

 Msg 4688, Marshall to Eisenhower, 26 Mar 43,

JRC Cable Log; Memo, Artamonoff for Gardiner,

1 May 43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan. The 256,000

tons included the training equipment requested by

the theater on 26 January (Msg 7433), special

items and organizational equipment requested on

2 February (Msg 8496), equipment for the balance of the first phase requested on 18 February

(Msg 1628), and air equipment requested on 14

and 27 February (Msgs 776 and 3271). (All

msgs in JRC Cable Log.)
CHAPTER IV

Early Organizational Problems

The process by which American matériel

was being channeled into the hands of

French units, from the time it was requisitioned by the Joint Rearmament Committee to the time of its actual distribution, was

a complicated one. It involved a number

of important problems the solution of which

required much patient labor and close teamwork on the part of the staffs and services

concerned.

AFHQ Spells Out Rearmament Policies

The mission of the JRC consisted chiefly

of determining, in collaboration with the

French High Command, what units could be

activated from available manpower, when

they could be activated, what equipment

they would need first, and how they best

could be trained. In carrying out this mission, the JRC was guided by directives issued

from time to time by the Allied Commander

in Chief. General Eisenhower, on 31 January, had set forth the policy to govern the

first phase of rearmament:

a. The French authorities will submit their

requisitions periodically to this headquarters.

However, the Allied CinC remains the approving authority and may modify the requisitions to conform to the availability of

equipment and shipping, and to the terms of

the general policy.

b. The JRC will maintain an up-to-date

schedule showing:

1) How equipment issued by this Headquarters has been assigned by the French

authorities.

2) How the French authorities intend to

assign future issues of equipment.

He also stated that the initial rearmament

phase was designed to provide forces for the

defense of North and West Africa, as well as

a picked force to form part of an Allied overseas expedition. Generally, the objective

to be reached was "quality, not quantity."

Finally, he defined the policy with regard to

the rehabilitation of the naval and air forces

in the light of their probable employment.1

It will be recalled that General Eisenhower, on 30 December 1942, had instructed the U.S. Fifth Army to assist the

French in equipping and training their units.

It was imperative therefore that the Fifth

Army should familiarize itself with the rearmament problem. On 26 March, the

deputy theater commander recommended

that a procedure be arranged with the JRC

whereby Fifth Army would "definitely enter the rearmament picture," and "act as a

balance-wheel" to ensure that equipment

was turned over to the French at a rate commensurate with proper care and maintenance.2

Later, on 30 March, the Allied Commander in Chief restated Fifth Army's

obligation to assist the French military authorities with organizing and training the

1

Dir AG 400/322-A-M, AFHQ, 31 Jan 43,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol.

II (3). 2

 Memo, Maj Gen Everett S. Hughes for Gen

Clark, 26 Mar 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops

Fr Rearmt, Vol. II (Pt. I).
EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS 63

forces stationed in French Morocco.3 The

next day General Clark and his chief of

staff, Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, discussed ways and means to effect proper coordination between Fifth Army and AFHQ

on the rearmament question.4 Five days

later, representatives from various AFHQ

staff sections, including the JRC, met to determine the respective responsibilities of

AFHQ, Fifth Army, and other interested

headquarters. The basis for their discussion was a study prepared by G-3 Section,

AFHQ, in which, curiously enough, it was

stated that the rearmament policy "had

already been fixed by the CCS." Nothing

could have been further from the truth, for

in that first week of April the CCS debate

on French armament was in a state of complete deadlock. Except for this erroneous

assertion, the memorandum furnished valuable data on the status of rearmament

operations and made several important recommendations. It proposed in particular

that AFHQ alone be made responsible for

contact with the French High Command,

the drafting of a rearmament program, and

the control of requests for shipping, and that

Fifth Army be given the responsibility for

the "mechanical and tactical training" of

the French.5 On the basis of the decisions

reached at the meeting, the Allied Commander in Chief, on 13 April, set forth in

detail the policy to govern the entire rearmament process. His directive first described how the rate of provision of equipment was to be regulated; the role of U.S.

base sections in assisting the French with

the immediate reception, storage, assembly,

and issue of equipment; the assistance which

the U.S. land forces in North Africa were

to give in familiarizing French personnel

with the technical details of storing, assembly, care, and maintenance of U.S. equipment. He then defined the respective responsibilities of AFHQ, the Commanding

General, NATOUSA, and the Commanding General, Fifth Army, in the matter of

French rearmament. AFHQ was charged

with initiating programs and obtaining the

necessary equipment from the United States.

The Commanding General, NATOUSA,

was responsible for handling equipment

from the moment it reached North African

ports to the time of its transfer to the French.

The Commanding General, Fifth Army,

was charged with assisting in the re-equipment and technical training of French Army

units stationed throughout the U.S. Communications Zone.6

Eisenhower issued other directives at various intervals which set forth the manner in

which French requisitions were to be processed and transfers of matériel accounted for

so that proper charges could be made to the

French lend-lease account in the United

States. A separate directive was issued

which governed the accounting procedure

for transfers of matériel from British sources.

Subsequent administrative memorandums

established on the basis of directives from

the War Department regulated the procedure to be followed by the bases at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers for turning U.S.

equipment over to the French.7

3

 Dir, CinC AFHQ to CG Fifth Army, 30 Mar

43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab K. 4

 Note, Conf between Clark and Gruenther, 1

Apr 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab K. 5

 Note for Mtg, G-3 Sec AFHQ, 4 Apr 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt,Vol. II (Pt. I);

Min, Mtg, 5 Apr 43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan.

6

 Ltr, CinC to CG Fifth Army and Deputy Theater Comdr NATOUSA, 13 Apr 43, JRC 902/II

Rearmt Plan. 7

 See pp. 266-70, below.
64 REARMING THE FRENCH

INSPECTING U.S. EQUIPMENT to be used by the French Army. From left: Col.

Clement Blanc, General Henri Giraud, and Brig. Gen. Roger Leyer.

Allied Assistance in Handling Matériel

The arrival in North Africa of matériel

for the French posed physical and technical

problems of considerable importance.

From the outset AFHQ officials feared that

the French military authorities might not be

able, by themselves, to handle, assemble,

sort out, distribute, and maintain the vast

quantities of highly specialized equipment,

much of which was entirely new to them.

If units were to be equipped within the

briefest possible time and with the least possible confusion, if, in other words, the optimum use was to be made of American

matériel, it was indispensable that responsible Allied agencies come to the assistance of

the French High Command by providing

the skill and means to handle it.

In this initial phase of the rearmament

operations, the French were particularly

lacking in qualified administrative and technical personnel. The roster of the French

General Staff and services included many

very able officers, the foremost in the field

of rearmament being Brig. Gen. Roger

Leyer and Col. Clement Blanc, whose superior qualifications as organizers and technicians made of them then and thereafter

the artisans of the rehabilitation of the

French Army.8 But in the services espe8

 From December 1942 to May 1943, General

Leyer served under General René Prioux, then chief

of Administrative Services, as first assistant for organization. In May, he became chief of staff of the

General Staff War, a post which he occupied until

November 1944, first as a major general, later as a

lieutenant general. Colonel Blanc served under
EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS 65

cially, many of the officers, including some

of the chiefs themselves, were unqualified

and inefficient by American standards.

Officials of the JRC were distressed over the

slowness of action displayed by various headquarters. They quoted an instance when

equipment delivered to French authorities

in Algiers did not reach the front line in

Tunisia until one month later. Even urgent

inquiries, they complained, were "delayed

for days notwithstanding repeated followups." The situation had led General Eisenhower, earlier in the year, to suspect that

General Giraud had "no idea of Administration."

 9 It was clear that little improvement could be expected until the French

Commander in Chief had corrected the defects of his organization. Changes in administrative personnel and in methods of

work were urgently required. It should be

pointed out, however, that the difficult task

of setting up almost from scratch and on

short notice an entire command and service

organization, with limited and often untrained help, made some fumbling almost

inevitable. "II fallait faire vite et avec

presque rien."

 10

The shortage of material means was an

even greater obstacle to establishing an effective organization. Office equipment

was worn out or nonexistent. As late as

June 1943 few typewriters were available

and the JRC was urging the War Department to send adequate supplies of them to

the French.11 Most of the indispensable

facilities, such as covered space and depots,

transportation, communications, and the

like, had been requisitioned by the AngloAmerican forces for their own use.

As General Giraud undertook to set his

house in order, a task in which he gradually

achieved a substantial measure of success,

he found himself in need of friendly advice,

"encouragement as well as tactful help and

guidance."

 12

 The American and British

members of the JRC did not fail to respond

generously and loyally. He needed also

considerable material assistance. Again

the JRC spared no effort to have the necessary means placed at his disposal. No better illustration could be given of this determination on the part of the Allies to facilitate his task than a brief account of the

manner in which the large shipment that

reached North Africa in April was handled.

The magnitude of the organizational

problem facing the French High Command

upon the arrival of UGS 61⁄2 with its

126,151 tons of matériel can easily be appreciated. For some days before, American, British, and French staff officers sought

ways and means to supplement the limited

reception and sorting facilities available to

the French. At a G-3 meeting held at

AFHQ on 5 April, a detailed program was

laid out for the reception of the matériel.

It was decided that at Casablanca, where

four of the fifteen ships were to dock, the

U.S. base section in charge of the port would

unload, assemble, and deliver the equipment "complete and in running order." At

Algiers, the British who ran the port and

the base were to unload the eleven ships due

General Leyer first as assistant chief of staff, G-1

and G-4, later as deputy chief of staff, a post which

he occupied until September 1944. He was promoted to brigadier general in April 1944. For the

role played by Blanc in the rearmament operations,

see pp. 280, 285, below. 9

 Statement by Eisenhower at CCS 57th Mtg, 15

Jan 43, Casablanca Conf; JRC quotation from

Memo, Artamonoff for Delaney, 3 Mar 43, JRC

Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab I. 10

 "We had to work fast and with practically

nothing." Statement by General Giraud in the

course of an interview, December 1948.

11

 Msg W-2573, AFHQ to AGWAR, 12 Jun 43,

JRC Cable Log. 12

 Memo, Gardiner for Whiteley, 12 Apr 43, copy

in Gardiner's Private File. See Chart 1.

EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS 67

VEHICLE ASSEMBLY LINE, Algiers, April 1943.

to dock there and transport the matériel to

eight local French depots.13 At one of

these, the French were to have the use of a

vehicle assembly line operating under U.S.

management. Once they had assembled

the equipment, they would then distribute it.

Setting up and operating the assembly

line at Algiers constituted one of the most

remarkable instances of efficient planning

and teamwork. First, AFHQ requested the

War Department to ship if possible on convoy UGS 61⁄2 the necessary tools and gear to

assemble about 200 vehicles daily.14 Later,

at a meeting between French and American

staff officers, an understanding was reached

regarding the extent and nature of the assistance to be furnished by SOS, NATOUSA, in setting up the assembly line. It

was agreed that the Mediterranean Base

Section (MBS) at Oran would be responsible for organizing and operating the assembly facilities until such a time as the

13

 French headquarters had strongly urged that

five vessels only be unloaded at Algiers and the other

six at Oran. However, anticipated port conditions

necessitated the unloading of all eleven at Algiers.

Msg 7575, AFHQ to AGWAR, 19 Mar 43, JRC

Cable Log.

14

 Msg 6400, AFHQ to AGWAR, 13 Mar 43,

JRC Cable Log.
68 REARMING THE FRENCH

REVIEWING AMERICAN TROOPS

who placed the French vehicle assembly line

in operation. General Eisenhower and General Giraud are riding in the back of the

vehicle.

French were qualified to take over.15 On

10 April, barely four days before the arrival

of the first ship, the MBS supply officer, Col.

Ernest A. Suttles, together with some forty

U.S. officers and men, arrived in Algiers

and began organizing the line.16 They had

brought with them crane equipment, blacksmith, welding, machine, and carpenter

tools, and related items essential for the

operation of assembly plants. Within five

days, Colonel Suttles and his team had improvised five such plants: one twin-line

General Motors plant capable of assembling

one 21⁄2-ton truck every three minutes, one

Dodge-Chevrolet plant with a capacity of 70

vehicles a day, one jeep plant with a capacity

of over 200 1⁄4-ton vehicles daily, one

trailer plant with a capacity of over 150

vehicles per day, and one tank and armoredvehicle servicing and testing plant.

The ships arrived on 14 April. Unloading began immediately and was completed

by 21 April.17 The matériel was unpacked

and assembled as fast as boxes could be

brought to shore. A French team of some

75 officers and 2,300 men, mostly from the

Chantiers de Jeunesse, assisted by Colonel

Suttles' team, accomplished the work in record time.18

 In spite of language difficulties

and the fact that lack of proper tools and

equipment often necessitated improvisation,

1,900 vehicles were assembled in the first

week of operations, and 5,100 more during

the following two weeks, making a total of

7,000 in less than one month.19 French

15

 Memo, Artamonoff for CG SOS NATOUSA,

1 Apr 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab J. 16

 Notes extracted from A Photographic Story

of the Assembly of T. U. P. Motor Vehicles by the

New French Army in the North African Theater

of Operations. Text by Col. E. A. Suttles, Maintenance Div, MBS, Ord. Copy in OCMH.

17

 Unloading proceeded with such efficiency and

speed that the British port commander thanked all

personnel concerned, American, British, and French,

for what had been "a record for the port." JRC

Weekly Rpt 5, 24 Apr 43, JRC Rearmt Rpts. 18

 From the time of their creation in French North

Africa in 1941, the Chantiers de Jeunesse (see

above, pp. 8, 8n) quickly developed into a welldisciplined body of approximately 3,000 men.

Although they were officially organized for peacetime purposes, their leader, Lt. Col. Jean Van

Hecke, himself a member of the North African

Resistance, had prepared them secretly for the role

which they were to play in conjunction with an

eventual Allied operation in that area. They deserve an honorable mention not only for the valuable assistance they rendered the Allies at the time

of the landings in November 1942, but for the

work which they subsequently performed on important military and public projects. In late 1943 they

were incorporated in the North African Army as the

7th Chasseurs d'Afrique Regiment (a tank destroyer unit) under the command of Colonel Van

Hecke. 19

 The highest production rate reached 776 vehicles in a single day.
EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS 69

COL. ERNEST A. SUTTLES, MBS

Supply Officer, relinquishes control of the

assembly plant to Col. Jacques Simon, French

Army, at a ceremony in Algiers.

officials watched this mammoth operation

with keen interest. On one occasion General Giraud accompanied by General Eisenhower visited the assembly line and expressed to the American personnel his deep

appreciation of their valuable assistance.

Not all the equipment brought over by

UGS 61⁄2 could be assembled at the time.

For a number of vehicles, tanks, and antiaircraft guns, necessary parts were not due

to arrive until later with the shipment of

the backlog of equipment.20

On 5 May, with the work nearly completed, the U.S. officers and men officially

turned the whole assembly line over to their

French associates who continued to operate

it by themselves.

The French Organize an Expeditionary

Corps

Unless modifications had been ordered

and arranged beforehand, the equipment

shipped to French units was identical with

that authorized for corresponding U.S.

units under War Department tables of organization and equipment current at the

time. It included everything from uniforms and medical supplies to rifles, machine guns, and tanks. It included in addition two units of fire, a thirty-day replacement allowance of major items and major

assemblies, and a six-month supply of spare

parts. Once unloaded, the equipment was

turned over to the French military authorities for assembly, warehousing, if necessary,

and distribution through the French Supply Services according to priorities fixed by

the French General Staff. AFHQ had

agreed, on 7 April, that the French themselves would be responsible for designating

which units were to receive American equipment. This, it was recognized, was an organizational matter for the French High

Command alone to settle.21

As they prepared their distribution plan,

the French military authorities were urged

20

 JRC Rpt 4, 17 Apr 43, and JRC Progress Rpt

1, 4 May 43, JRC Rearmt Rpts.

21

 Memo for Rcd, JRC, sub: Responsibility for

Fr Rearmt, 5 Apr 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div

Ops Fr Rearmt; Ltr, Loomis to Brig Gen Willis

McD. Chapin, 12 Jul 44, JRC 400.2/002 Stock

Control System; Min, CofS Conf, 7 Apr 43,

AFHQ AG Sec 337.2. A unit of fire is a specified

number of rounds of ammunition for each weapon,

varying with each type and caliber of weapon. A

major assembly is a combination of several major

items. The 155-mm. howitzer is an example of a

major assembly as it includes three major items:

the howitzer, the recoil mechanism, and the

carriage.
70 REARMING THE FRENCH

by AFHQ not to mix new and old equipment within units. This was to prevent, in

particular, an undesirable demand for spare

parts and service in efforts to make unserviceable matériel serviceable. They were

also reminded that thereafter their headquarters must cease submitting requests for

equipment to Allied depots. All their requirements, they were told, must be met

from their own sources. This was essential

if U.S. reserves in the theater were to be

maintained at their normal level. As the

French kept on submitting direct requests

to British Ordnance for items of equipment,

AFHQ on 15 May reminded all concerned

of the established policy and pointed out in

addition that the British had no rearmament commitments to the French.22

The matériel issued on loan to units engaged in Tunisia was now to be returned

to Allied depots since the French were receiving new equipment from the United

States. The policy was confirmed on 14

May in the course of a conference between

representatives of various AFHQ sections.

It was agreed that the equipment in question would be regained as a result of showdown inspections upon departure of the

units from Tunisian area.23

The French had decided that the troops

engaged in Tunisia should be the first to be

rearmed. Accordingly, they had, early in

April, pulled out of the Tunisian front for

immediate re-equipping the equivalent of

one infantry division. By the beginning of

May they had rearmed one infantry division,

the 2d Moroccan Infantry (2d DIM), and

were in process of equipping two more, the

3d Algerian Infantry (3d DIA) and a division later to be known as the 4th Moroccan

Mountain (4th DMM). It was the French

Commander in Chief's belief that in general

his units would reach an efficiency of 100

percent in eight to ten weeks from the time

they had received their matériel. At least

six weeks, he thought, would be required for

technical training. This estimate appeared

reasonable to AFHQ officials although they

considered that an additional period of one

month would be needed to bring armored

units to a satisfactory state of readiness.24

In this initial rearmament phase, the

French military authorities organized units

according to tables of organization and

equipment substantially similar to those currently in use in corresponding U.S. units.

In the case of infantry divisions, however,

they requested, for tactical reasons of their

own, that the U.S. table of organization

and equipment be modified to provide one

reconnaissance battalion instead of troop,

four Quartermaster truck companies instead of one, and one 40-mm. antiaircraft

battalion.25 The modifications, which the

War Department approved at the urging

of the JRC, were designed to provide

stronger initial cover for deployment, facilitate the quick locating of hostile positions

and flanks, and hasten the deployment of

22

 Memo, Brig Gen Lowell W. Rooks for G-4, 15

Apr 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt,

Vol. II (2) ; Memo, Gardiner for Fr Sec JRC, 14

Mar 43, JRC 908 Policy and Plan—Misc; Memo,

DCofS AFHQ, 15 Apr 43, AFHQ 0100/4 SACS

Rcd Sec, Fr Matters; Memo, AFHQ To All Concerned, 15 May 43, JRC 908 Policy and Plan—

Misc. 23

 Memo, Rooks for Fr Liaison Sec AFHQ, 22

Apr 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt,

Vol. II (2) ; Diary of a Certain Plan, 14 May 43,

ASF File Planning Div, 433-a-5.

24

 JRC Progress Rpt 1, 4 May 43, JRC Misc

Rpts; Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 28 Apr 43, and

Memo, Rooks for CofS AFHQ, 4 May 43, JRC

902/11 Rearmt Plan. 25

 Memo, Handy for CG SOS, 15 Mar 43, OPD

400 France, Sec 1.
EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS 71

infantry elements. The same modified table

was adopted for all infantry divisions subsequently re-equipped.

The intentions of the French High Command were to group the units then receiving

American equipment under Phase I into a

task force or expeditionary corps. It will

be recalled that the creation of such a force

to become part of an Allied overseas expedition had been formally approved by the

Allied Commander in Chief as early as 31

January.26 In the opinion of the JRC, the

units currently receiving equipment did not

constitute a coherent force capable of operating overseas independently if required.

They did not include Engineer, Signal, and

Chemical Warfare units, for which equipment was still lacking. Unless another

special convoy brought additional matériel,

the JRC felt that by 1 July, when the backlog of equipment of the first phase had been

received from the United States, General

Giraud would have to reshuffle the composition of the task force and, if necessary, reduce the number of units either by combining them or eliminating some. This would

mean shifting personnel, reassigning matériel already distributed, slightly modifying

division tables of organization, and using

some salvaged French equipment. Only in

that way could the proposed corps become

an efficient task force.27

General Giraud was of course eager to

rearm more than a limited expeditionary

corps. With a total troop strength estimated

in mid-April at 16,000 officers and 317,000

men, he had already activated most of the

eleven divisions of the ANFA Plan, although

some in cadre only. To form these divisions

into a self-supporting and coherent force,

General Giraud needed 50,000 trained

drivers as well as large numbers of technical

troops for Ordnance, Signal, Engineer, and

Medical units. That meant a large proportion of Frenchmen. On the basis of one

Frenchman for two natives, a ratio considered "reasonable" by General Giraud

himself, no less than 100,000 Frenchmen

would have to be found for the proposed

army of 300,000 men. It was doubtful that

such a number could be raised. There lay

the real bottleneck in a larger rearmament

program. The JRC considered that, for the

present at least, General Giraud must concentrate on activating, equipping, and putting into the field a small independent task

force of the expeditionary-corps size now

envisaged, for which troops of all types were

available in Africa. Later it might be advisable to incorporate in American or British

Army corps such other infantry units up to

divisions as were raised and equipped over

and above the initial task force. Thus the

French would not have to furnish the specialized service troops. The extent to which

the North African Army could and should

reasonably be expanded beyond the first expeditionary corps soon became the subject

of much lively discussion between AFHQ

and the French High Command, and lingered as a source of considerable friction for

months to come.28

Convoys arriving in May, June, and July

brought in the backlog of equipment of

26

 Dir AG 400/322, AFHQ, 31 Jan 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. II (3). 27

 Memo, Artamonoff for Gardiner, 1 May 43,

JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan.

28

 Memo, JRC for Joint Intelligence Collecting

Agency, AFHQ, 26 Apr 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item

5-a, Tab K; Interv with Gen Giraud, Dec 48;

Memo, JRC for CofS AFHQ, 25 Apr 43, JRC Misc

Doc, Item 5-a, Tab M; Memo, Artamonoff for

Delaney, cited n. 9.
72 REARMING THE FRENCH

Phase I.29 With this matériel the French

military authorities completed the equipping

of the expeditionary corps as then set up.

They had to resort to some juggling to ensure

that all units were properly equipped. Thus

they were forced to dissolve several units not

part of the corps, but to which they had

issued some American equipment on the

assumption that more was to come from the

United States, and to redistribute the matériel so recovered among units on the troop

list, especially the 4th Moroccan Mountain

Division. At the same time they issued, with

the approval of the JRC, to several infantry units already equipped with British or

French matériel, a small complement of

U.S. equipment, largely infantry weapons

and vehicles, and added these units to the

troop list. These nonprogram units consisted of one separate brigade of 8,000 men

created out of the former Corps Franc

d'Afrique (organized in early December

1942), one group of tabors (the equivalent

of one regiment of goumiers), and one

Shock Battalion (Bataillon de Choc).

These troops were to constitute part of the

corps reserves.30 Finally, the French General Staff turned over to the Territorial

forces assigned the task of guarding lines of

communication and of maintaining internal

security all obsolete equipment available in

French stocks as well as some equipment

received from the United States.

In late April the U.S. Fifth Army had,

with the co-operation of the JRC, launched

a training program to instruct the rearmed

units in the technical use and care of their

new equipment. By June the program carried out under the direction of Brig. Gen.

Alien F. Kingman was in full swing.31

On 18 June General Giraud informed

AFHQ that he was appointing General Juin

to command the expeditionary forces designated for participation in forthcoming

operations.32 These operations were the

contemplated assault and conquest of Sicily

and Italy.

Throughout Phase I, as well as in subsequent phases, the American members of the

JRC devoted their efforts, in pursuance of

the recommendations of the Allied Commander in Chief himself, to making the

units being rearmed a picked force. Their

task was not an easy one for their position

of buffer between the French High Command and AFHQ made their dealings with

both often difficult. To reach the goal of

"quality," they had requested and obtained

from the War Department the assignment

of matériel for units not specifically mentioned in the ANFA Agreement but considered necessary in organizing a balanced

modern force. At a meeting held on 14

June, the Deputy Theater Commander,

29

 Tonnage of military equipment shipped from

the United States between January and July 1943

and turned over to the French as part of Phase I of

the program:

Measurement Month Tons

Total....................................... 256,621

January.......................................... 736

February ..................................................... 1,842

March.............................................

 a 135,335

April............................................. 55,263

May......................................... 38,359

June............................................. 19,086

July (estimated)................................... 6,000 a

 Includes 126,151 tons in convoy UGS 61⁄2.

Source: Tab D, Memo, International Div ASF for Gen Clay, 7

Jul 43. JRC 905.6/1 Corres on Statistics of Rearmt.

30

 JRC Rpt 5, 3 Jul 43, JRC Rearmt Rpts. On

the organization and equipment of nonprogram

units, see pp. 112-13, 158-60, below.

31

 See Ch. XIV, below. 32

 Acknowledging the announcement of this appointment, General Smith pointed out that "the

excellent relationship" established between General

Juin and his U.S. and British associates during the

Tunisian campaign was a "guarantee of effective

cooperation in the future." Ltr, Smith to Giraud,

28 Jun 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr

Corres.
EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS 73

NATOUSA, Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes,

objected to this procedure. He urged that

the ANFA Agreement be followed to the

letter and nothing supplied beyond the matériel required for the units listed in the

agreement. Should this procedure not be

acceptable to the French, he felt that it was

up to them to obtain an "interpretation of

the agreement on the same level as the agreement itself."

 33

 In the belief that a clarification of this important matter was required,

the JRC urged AFHQ to set forth a definite policy and to advise the French accordingly. On 31 July General Eisenhower directed that the ANFA Agreement be

"interpreted" as follows:

a. The object of the Agreement was to

create a French force capable of taking part,

in conjunction with the Allies, in the liberation of France.

b. Under the terms of the Agreement,

Corps and Army Troops and Service organizations will be required. The number of

headquarters and the number of service troops

will depend upon the use to be made of the

French force which is being rearmed and will

be a matter of negotiation between the proper

French military officials, the JRC, and G-3,

AFHQ.

c. Since U.S. T/O's do not exactly fit the

French organization and since U.S. TBA's

contain many items not suited to French

Forces, particularly those composed of native

troops, great care will be exercised in submitting requisitions in order that equipment

not suitable for the French forces will not be

requisitioned from the U.S.34

The policy fully upheld the stand already

taken by the JRC and gave the committee

the necessary authority to proceed with the

rehabilitation of the North African Army in

such a manner as to make of it a truly effective force.

33

 Memo, Artamonoff for CofS AFHQ, 28 Jun 43,

JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab O.

34

 Memo, CinC for Liaison Sec AFHQ, 31 Jul 43,

JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan.
CHAPTER V

Phase II of the Program

(July-August 1943)

Negotiations

In mid-March 1943, long before the matériel of Phase I had been received from the

United States, the French military authorities had submitted a proposal calling for a

second phase of rearmament to follow immediately on the completion of the first.1

AFHQ had taken no action on the proposal,

largely because the allocation of shipping

remained 25,000 tons monthly. The transportation of matériel to complete the first

expeditionary corps, of spare parts, of replacement and maintenance items, and of

supplies generally necessary for the normal

life of the French Military Establishment in

North Africa was expected to take up the

monthly allocation for the better part of the

year. Any equipping of units over and

above that of the first corps would therefore

require additional shipping, possibly special

convoys similar to UGS 61⁄2- As pointed

out by G-3, AFHQ, to the JRC on 30

March, no such convoys were contemplated

in the near future "although they could be

requested if found necessary."

 2

The possibility of using French merchant

ships to transport military matériel for the

North African forces had already been considered, especially by General Giraud, who

fully realized that shipping would determine

the tempo of future armament deliveries.

In writing to General Eisenhower on 22

February, the French Commander in Chief

had outlined the measures taken or contemplated by him to put French merchant shipping to the greatest possible use in the common war effort. He had placed all personnel and cargo ships in the Allied shipping

pool, arranged for the rehabilitation of Vessels in need of repair, and had slowed down

the movement of effectives from West to

North Africa so as to release additional tonnage to the Allied shipping pool.3

The tonnage promised by Giraud was

being turned over very slowly to the pool.

Most ships first had to be sent to the United

Kingdom for repairs. Refitting in North

Africa was almost impossible since dry docks

and repair facilities in the area were being

used by British and American vessels; the

French themselves could use them only at

the discretion of the U.S. and British authorities.4

 For some weeks French merchant shipping remained available only on

paper.

1 While General Eisenhower argued that Ltr, Prioux to JRC, 12 Mar 43, JRC Misc Doc,

Item 5-a, Tab N. 2

 Memo, Gardiner for CofS AFHQ, 16 Mar 43,

JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab K; Memo, Rooks

for JRC, 30 Mar 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a,

Tab M.

3

 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 22 Feb 43, JRC

902/II Rearmt Plan. 4

 Msg 6798, Eisenhower to Somervell, 15 Mar 43,

JRC Cable Log.
PHASE II OF THE PROGRAM 75

there should be no relation between French

shipping and the delivery of arms to the

North African forces, both General Marshall and the War Department, with an eye

on the global demands on limited cargo tonnage, took the contrary view. Any increase

beyond the 25,000-ton rate, Somervell told

Eisenhower, would have to depend on the

French shipping effectively made available

to the united pool.5

On 7 April General Béthouart informed

General Marshall that French merchant

ships representing over 246,000 tons had

now been incorporated in, and were operating as part of, the Allied pool.6

 He hoped,

therefore, that the War Department would

make "appropriate" tonnage available to

General Giraud to enable him to plan his

program accordingly.7 General Marshall

replied that, although some 163,000 deadweight tons of French cargo shipping allotted to the pool were on the high seas, none

of the ships allocated to the United States

had yet made an outbound voyage. It

would be several months before the ships

could make the initial outward trip as much

repair work would be necessary once the

vessels had reached the United States. As

this shipping became available, it might be

possible to increase the tonnage allotted for

the transportation of French armament.

"In this worldwide war," he concluded, "it

it necessary to allocate the material resources

of the Allies in such a manner that they will

be of the greatest benefit to the common

cause regardless of the effect produced on

any particular group or nation, and it will be

necessary to view the matter in this light at

the appropriate time."

 8

It was clear that for the moment at least

the French High Command and the JRC

would have to continue re-equipping units

within the limitations of the 25,000-ton

monthly allocation.

Near the end of April, General Leyer,

then chief of organization at French headquarters, submitted a new proposal to

AFHQ for a second phase of rearmament.

Simultaneously he broached the question of

a tonnage increase with which to transport

the additional equipment. General Giraud,

he explained, intended in the near future to

make an official request for further tonnage

allotments to the extent of 100,000 tons per

month for May and June. The object of

the proposed second phase, as pointed out

by General Leyer, was to increase the number of combat units in the expeditionary

corps in order "both to absorb some of the

available native manpower, and to make of

the Corps a well-balanced, coherent force."

The strength of the corps was to be raised

to five divisions (three infantry, one mountain, and one armored), elements of a second armored division, and other units.9

AFHQ turned down the proposal for a

number of reasons, the most important being that the shipping situation was still

critical and the additional tonnage could

5

 Msg 6798, Eisenhower to Somervell, 15 Mar 43,

JRC Cable Log; Msg 2641, Marshall to Eisenhower,

20 Feb 43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan; Msg 4050,

Somervell to Eisenhower, 17 Mar 43, JRC Cable

Log.

6

 These ships included 9 troopships, 2 tankers,

and 19 cargo vessels capable of transoceanic travel.

The French were also using 50 cargo vessels for

coastwise service representing 170,000 tons. Eventually they furnished a total of 420,000 tons of

shipping to the Allied pool. H. H. Dunham, U.S.

Army Transportation and the Conquest of North

Africa, 1942-43, OCT HB Monograph 9, Jan 45,

p. 118, OCT HB. 7

 Ltr, Béthouart to Marshall, 7 Apr 43, OPD

400 France, Sec 1.

8

 Ltr, Marshall to Béthouart, 18 Apr 43, OPD

400 France, Sec 1. 9

Ltr, Leyer to CofS AFHQ, 25 Apr 43, and

Memo, JRC for CofS, 25 Apr 43, JRC Misc Doc,

Item 5-a, Tab M.
76 REARMING THE FRENCH

not be made available. Simultaneously,

AFHQ offered a counterproposal with the

suggestion that immediate future shipments

under the 25,000-ton allocation be utilized

to equip, in order of priority, the service

units necessary for a corps of three infantry

divisions, the mountain division already

partly equipped, the balance of a first

armored division, as well as additional corps

and army troops, especially corps artillery.10

On 15 May General Leyer submitted a

third, more modest proposal. Its objective

was to increase the strength of the expeditionary corps, by 31 July, to four divisions,

miscellaneous corps troops, and air units

consisting of two pursuit and two dive

bomber groups. After pointing out that the

final organization and training of this force

depended on the nature of its future employment, General Leyer suggested that

Generals Eisenhower and Giraud meet

without delay to determine the role of the

corps "for the campaign of the summer of

1943."

 11

 AFHQ officials received the suggestion with little enthusiasm for they were

still without instructions from the Combined

Chiefs of Staff as to the future employment

of the French forces. Pending the results

of the conference (TRIDENT Conference,

11-27 May) then taking place in Washington, Maj. Gen. J. F. M. Whiteley,

Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, informed

General Leyer that nothing was to be gained

from a discussion between the two commanders in chief at this juncture. He intimated, however, that in the event of such a

meeting, it would be well for the French

High Command to begin revising further

the composition of the expeditionary corps.

He pointed out in particular that the corps

was completely lacking in heavy antiaircraft units.12

Two days before receiving AFHQ's

answer, General Leyer had submitted one

more proposal. It called for a second phase

of rearmament designed to achieve the

following objectives: ground forces—completion of a first armored division around

the two armored regiments already in process of re-equipment, nucleus of a second

armored division, one mountain division,

headquarters for one infantry, one armored,

and one expeditionary corps, corps artillery,

and additional service units; air forces—

additional units representing 300 planes of

all types; naval forces—18,000 tons of

equipment.13

The program being consonant with the

suggestions offered by AFHQ on 14 May,

the JRC immediately approved it with

minor exceptions and recommended its

adoption.14 Subsequently, General Leyer

urged that the backlog of Phase I then arriving in North African ports be followed by

the matériel of the proposed second phase

"without any break." It would be regrettable, he pointed out, if, because of the delay

in passing the requests on to the War Department, the small monthly tonnage allotted to the French forces should not be

entirely used up.15

On 8 June the JRC informed General

Leyer that AFHQ had approved with minor

modifications the naval and ground force

requirements of his proposal. The air part

10

 Memo, Whiteley for Leyer, 14 May 43, JRC

902/II Rearmt Plan. 11

 Memo, Leyer for CofS AFHQ, 15 May 43,

JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab M.

12

 Memo, Whiteley for Leyer, 22 May 43, JRC

Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab M. 13

 Ltr, Leyer to JRC, 20 May 43, JRC Misc Doc,

Item 5-a, Tab L. 14

 Memo, Gardiner for CofS AFHQ, 23 May 43,

JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab L. 15

 Ltr, Leyer to JRC, 29 May 43, JRC 902/II

Rearmt Plan.
PHASE II OF THE PROGRAM 77

of the program was being put off pending

certain major adjustments. General Leyer

accepted the proposed modifications and

urged that the necessary requisitions be

cabled to the War Department without

delay to make it possible for deliveries to

follow immediately upon the liquidation

of the first phase. As no action had yet been

taken by 11 June, General Leyer pleaded

with the JRC to urge AFHQ not to postpone

sending the cable any longer.16

Still it was to be nearly four weeks before

the requisitions were sent. The delay made

sense only in the light of the military and

strategic situation in the Mediterranean

theater at the time. Since the close of the

Tunisian campaign, AFHQ had been engaged in feverish preparations for Operation

HUSKY, the invasion and conquest of

Sicily.17 U.S. troops withdrawn from Tunisia had been regrouped in Algeria where

they were being re-equipped. Ports in

Tunisia were being cleared and restored.

The shipping situation had become more

critical than ever as more troops and supplies were being brought to the theater from

the United States and a large fleet was being

made ready for the forthcoming operation.

In addition, the CCS decision, reached on

18 May, to rearm the French had made

the commitment secondary to the equipping

of American and British units. It had moreover established no specific program.

French rearmament had become "a handto-mouth procedure in which the basic

directive was vague and its execution

unmanaged."

 18

 Not one piece of initial

equipment had been assigned since March.

The program had reached a state of "definite lethargy."

 19

It was not until 4 July that AFHQ finally

cabled the necessary requisitions to the War

Department with a request that the matériel

be shipped immediately after the liquidation

of the first phase and within the 25,000-ton

allocation per convoy. Of this allocation,

current maintenance needs were expected

to take up 4,000 tons and French Navy

needs 3,000 tons, leaving a balance of 18,000

tons monthly for the proposed second

phase.20

The cable reached Washington while

General Giraud himself was en route to the

American capital. The French Commander in Chief was accepting the invitation extended to him by President Roosevelt, at the time of their meeting at Anfa,

to come to the United States for a visit.

"Multiple reasons, not the least of which

was the stepping-up of French rearmament," had prompted him to undertake the

voyage at this juncture.21

Anticipating that General Giraud would

press for a substantial increase in tonnage

to implement a second phase of rearmament,

General Eisenhower warned the War Department of the impossibility of handling

additional tonnage in North African ports

under existing conditions. Limited port

capacity, he explained, was further complicated by the present use of berths for loading

troops and supplies for Operation HUSKY

and for the departure of large numbers of

16

 Memo, Artamonoff for Leyer, 8 Jun 43, JRC

Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab L; Memo, Leyer for JRC,

8 Jun 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab L; Memo,

Leyer for JRC, 11 Jun 43, JRC 902/II Rearmt

Plan. 17

 The assault on Sicily was launched on 10 July

1943.

18

 Memo, Col Magruder for Director of Opns

ASF, 26 Jun 43, ASF Planning Div File A-46-371,

Fr Military. 19

 ASF Diary, 23 Jun 43, ASF Planning Div Diary. 20

 Msg W-4078, AFHQ to AGWAR, 4 Jul 43,

JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-e. 21

 Giraud, Un seul but, la Victoire, p. 189.
78 REARMING THE FRENCH

service troops for Sicily. As a result, cargo

ships were being held at Gibraltar until inside berths became available in North Africa. Only when the proposed reduction

of shipping to Casablanca was effected

would an increase in shipments be recommended. The French would then be asked

to take over port operations in Casablanca

to receive and handle all equipment intended for them. Eisenhower estimated

that 1 November was the earliest date at

which such a change would be possible, subject of course to the results of HUSKY and

post-Husky operations.22

General Somervell immediately undertook to determine a shipment schedule consonant with General Eisenhower's latest

information on port capacity in North

Africa. On 6 July he informed General

Marshall that the equipment required

under the proposed second phase could be

made ready for shipment beginning in

September at the rate of from 50,000 to

100,000 tons monthly. Although General

Giraud might feel that this increase was too

conservative, General Somervell considered

that, in view of the present port conditions

in North Africa, "Eisenhower was correct

rather than Giraud." Still, he questioned

whether some of the 70,000 additional

troops now requested by the Allied Commander in Chief for his operations could

not be French. To equip such French

forces, he went on to explain, it would be

possible to increase shipments, within sixty

days, to the 50,000 to 100,000-ton figure

provided North African port facilities were

made available. The necessary shipping

itself was "in sight."

 23

The Army Service Forces had meanwhile

completed a thorough study of the French

rearmament situation and had drafted a

detailed memorandum, dealing in particular with the proposed second phase now on

the CCS agenda.24

Political Complications

General Giraud was coming to Washington primarily to press for a resumption of

armament deliveries. He was also coming

for stronger political aid. To understand

the full import of his visit and of his relations with the U.S. Army, it is necessary to

go back a little to pick up the tangled

threads of internal French politics.

It will be recalled that, since the death of

Admiral Darlan on 24 December 1942,

General Giraud exercised the supreme civil

and military authority in French North and

West Africa. In London, meanwhile, General de Gaulle continued as president of the

French National Committee and chief of

the Free French Forces. Some time before

the conference at Anfa in January, the two

leaders agreed in principle that a union of

their respective followers and armed forces

was highly desirable. At the close of the

Tunisian campaign they decided that the

time was ripe for such action. On 30 May

General de Gaulle and his associates flew to

North Africa with a view to establishing

there, in agreement with General Giraud, a

central executive body to govern all French

areas not under Axis control.

Both men were equally concerned with

the restoration of a free, independent

France. But they viewed the problem from

wholly different experiences, preconcep- 22

 Msg W-4173, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 6 Jul

43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-e. 23

 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 6 Jul 43,

Somervell Files, Fr 1943-44, A-46-257, Ser 1.

24

 Memo, International Div ASF for Gen

Clay, 7 Jul 43, JRC 905.6/1 Corres on Rearmt

Statistics.
PHASE II OF THE PROGRAM 79

tions, and temperaments. Briefly, General

de Gaulle and his followers believed that

they alone—who, since June 1940, had kept

the French flag flying high by refusing to

lay down their arms—were entitled to lead

the French forces to final victory. In the

political field, they envisaged the establishment, after the liberation of France, of a

new, more progressive government. General Giraud and his associates, on the other

hand, considered that the recognition their

leadership had received from the AngloAmerican allies in November 1942 conferred upon them the right and duty to control the renascent French forces. Politically

more conservative, they favored, after the

liberation of the motherland, a gradual return to political freedom. The divergence

between the views of the two leaders and the

clash between their personalities promised

from the beginning not harmony but a

political struggle to the death.

After three days of what appear to have

been violent discussions and bitter political

intrigues, there was established in Algiers,

on 3 June, a French Committee of National

Liberation (Comité Français de la Liberation Nationale—CFLN) composed of

members of both factions and with the two

generals as copresidents.

Recognition by the United Nations of the

CFLN as a de facto government of France

or, in the narrow field of rearmament, as

representing the agency of final jurisdiction

in respect to French armament requirements

was put off owing especially to President

Roosevelt's distrust of the political motives

of the Gaullist element in the committee.

The British, apparently less reluctant to deal

with the CFLN regarding military matters,

proposed to the Munitions Assignments

Board on 26 June that the existing procedure for assigning munitions to the French

armed forces be revised to include an endorsement by the CFLN of all rearmament

requests. This, they felt, was important for

both political and financial reasons. They

were prepared, however, to block any

French request for membership in the MAB

on the ground that the French were "customers for arms and not producers."

 25

 The

American members of the MAB, on the

other hand, considered that, barring a reversal of the policy regarding recognition of

the CFLN, the board had no authority to

concur in, or process, the changes in procedure proposed by the British. They felt

that, for the moment, existing CCS directives on the assignment of armament to the

French should continue to apply.26 No further action was taken then on the matter.

The Allied Commander in Chief kept submitting armament requests for the North

African forces since they operated in the

American sphere. Demands for other

French forces throughout the world followed

supply channels of the nation or forces with

which such troops were operating.

No sooner had the CFLN been established

than General Giraud's authority, already

greatly curtailed, was further questioned by

General de Gaulle and his followers. They

claimed that it was not practicable or advisable for one individual to hold the two

posts of Commander in Chief and copresident of the CFLN. The changes which

they proposed to effect in the structure of

French administration were such that General de Gaulle would in practice assume the

control of the armed forces. Apprised of

their plan, President Roosevelt, on 17 June,

directed General Eisenhower not to permit

25

 Memo, Wing Comdr T. E. H. Birley, Br JSM,

for Maj Gen J. H. Burns, Exec MAB, 26 Jun 43,

JRC 472 MAB. 26

 Memo, Gen Burns for Maj C. W. Garnett,

Br JSM, 9 Aug 43, JRC 472 MAB.
80 REARMING THE FRENCH

de Gaulle or any other agency not under the

complete control of the Allied Commander

in Chief to command the French armed

forces, and not to tolerate any military or

civil direction that might interfere with military operations. The Americans, added the

President, would not continue arming any

French force in whose co-operation in Allied military operations they did not have

complete confidence. Consequently, they

would not, at this juncture, allow de Gaulle

"personally or through his partisans" to control the French Army in Africa.27

 Complying with these instructions, General Eisenhower, on 18 June, called in the two French

leaders for a conference at which he declared

that General Giraud must remain as French

Commander in Chief as this was "no time

for radical changes endangering the

Rear."

 28

Four days later, on 22 June, the CFLN

reached a compromise solution which they

embodied in a Decree on the Organization

of the Armed Forces. Under the terms of

the decree there was established the Permanent Military Committee of which both

leaders and their respective chiefs of staff,

General Juin and Maj. Gen. Edgar de

Larminat (the latter representing the Free

French) were members. This committee,

which had full authority over the entire

military establishment, was charged primarily with the task of accomplishing the

fusion of the two groups of forces. Pending

such fusion, each of the two leaders was to

retain the command of his respective

forces.29 The arrangement was of little

comfort to General Giraud, whose views on

the organization of the High Command as

disclosed by him in early June were well

known. While agreeing to the principle

that the CFLN must control the military

establishment, he held to the belief that the

Commander in Chief must exercise the

command of all forces wherever stationed

and that one of his responsibilities must be

to allot equipment.30

The two-headed organization adopted on

22 June was bound to increase rather than

dissipate political friction. The month of

July in fact witnessed a rapid deterioration

of the situation. While the theater's policy

was not to intervene in purely French affairs,

the Allied Commander in Chief could not

remain indifferent to the potential danger

created by the numerous desertions of individuals, even units, of one faction to the

forces of the other, as well as by the reported

undisciplined behavior of troops currently

assigned to guard duty.31 Secretary of State

Cordell Hull became alarmed over the

CFLN's leanings toward the political aspirations of General de Gaulle and the lack of

sympathy then shown by the committee

27

 Message summarized in William D. Leahy, I

Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950),

p. 168. 28

 Msg 3472, Eisenhower to Sherwood, 22 Jun

43, AFHQ 0100/21 AG Sec. 29

 Decree, CFLN, 22 Jun 43, JRC 320/004 Orgn

of Fr Army.

30

 JRC, Note on Giraud's Formula on Organization of Command (circa 1 Jun 43), JRC 320/004

Orgn of Fr Army. 31

 "Our policy is not to intervene in squabbles between the Free French and the Giraud French."

Statement by DCofS in Memo for G-3, 29 Jul 43,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr. When,

earlier in the year, mass desertions from Giraudist

to Gaullist vessels docked in New York Harbor

threatened to cripple the battleship Richelieu and

other North African naval units, American officials

were compelled to intervene and put a stop to the

practice on the ground that it endangered the

successful conduct of the war. Ltr, Forrestal to

Secy Hull, 20 Feb 43, OPD 336.3 France, Sec 1.

Seventy-seven incidents involving Free French units

with the native population in Tripolitania were

reported by the British 10 Corps for the six months

ending 31 July. Msg 3D/94156, MIDEAST to

TROOPERS, 10 Aug 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3

Div Ops Free Fr.
PHASE II OF THE PROGRAM 81

toward the Allies. He even suggested that

it might be desirable for the U.S. Government to suspend deliveries of war matériel,

at least until the situation was clarified.32

No such drastic action was taken, for it was

only a few weeks since the CCS, on 18 May,

had finally reached an agreement on rearming the French. Furthermore, it was

hoped that General Giraud's visit in Washington might gain him such material and

moral advantages as to strengthen his own

authority.33

Not only did the 22 June arrangement

fail to establish military unity, but it tended

to complicate the relationship and channels

of communications between the French and

AFHQ. An illustration may be found in

the efforts of the Free French headquarters,

on 1 July, to establish contact with AFHQ

with a view to obtaining equipment and,

incidentally, representation on the JRC.

G-3, AFHQ, urged that these efforts be

given no encouragement until French political and military unity had been achieved,

and then not until a change of policy had

been approved by CCS. General Smith

endorsed the recommendation and advised

General de Larminat, chief of staff of the

Free French Forces, to contact the appropriate sections of General Giraud's headquarters which, he pointed out, had complete information on the organization of the

U.S. Army. He then closed the door on the

matter of Free French representation in the

JRC by explaining to de Larminat that all

appointments to the committee had in the

past been made by General Giraud and

would in all probability be made in the

future by the Permanent Military Committee.34

The issue was soon reopened by the Free

French. On 3 July General de Larminat

offered several units from a Free French

division for rear guard duty in Tunisia in

replacement of American troops about to be

relieved, on condition that the division itself

be re-equipped by AFHQ within the following two months. Again G-3, AFHQ, recommended that no consideration be given

to re-equipping more units except through

a unified French High Command. Maj.

Gen. Humfrey M. Gale, Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ, went even further. He

proposed that issues of British equipment to

the Free French Forces be discontinued inasmuch as "it was assumed" that these

would shortly be absorbed in the North

African Army. The purpose of his recommendation, he explained, was not to remove

a liability from the British, but to simplify

the supply and maintenance of the French

forces.35

In the opinion of Allied officials, therefore, it was essential that the French achieve

the fusion of their forces without delay.

Only such a step would put an end to the

inconsistent arrangement under which some

units (those controlled by General de

Gaulle) were equipped and maintained by

32

 Leahy, op. cit., p. 169. 33

 It was during General Giraud's absence from

Algiers that the CFLN, on 9 July, fixed by decree

the powers of the newly created Commissioner of

Armament, Provisioning, and Reconstruction.

Decree, CFLN, 9 Jul 43, JRC 320/004 Orgn of Fr

Army. Under the terms of the decree, the Commissioner (Monnet) was charged, inter alia, with

the task of ensuring—with the co-operation of military authorities—the implementation of rearmament programs as laid down by the Permanent

Military Committee.

34

 Ltr, de Larminat to CofS AFHQ, 1 Jul 43,

Memo, Rooks for CofS AFHQ, 3 Jul 43, and Ltr,

Smith to de Larminat, 4 Jul 43, AFHQ 0100/12C

G-3 Div Ops Free Fr. 35

 Ltr, de Larminat to Smith, 3 Jul 43, Memo,

Rooks for DCofS AFHQ, 4 Jul 43, and Memo, Gale

for ACofS G-3, 6 Jul 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3

Div Ops Free Fr.
82 REARMING THE FRENCH

the United Kingdom through the Middle

East Command, while the others were provisioned by the United States through

AFHQ. But as General Giraud sped toward the United States, fusion was still in

the planning stage.

Implementing Phase II

The French Commander in Chief reached

Washington on 7 July and began at once a

ten-day round of important conferences

with President Roosevelt, Generals Marshall

and Somervell, and other officials. On 8

July the CCS invited him to present an account of the French military situation.36

After describing briefly the part which his

forces had played in the battle of Tunisia

and the "tremendous moral effect" which

the first phase of rearmament had had on

them, General Giraud reported that the

expeditionary corps was now ready for

action. The corps, of a strength of from

70,000 to 75,000 men, included two infantry divisions, one mountain division, and

one half of an armored division. He intended to add to it approximately 13,000

goumiers (Moroccan riflemen), "who had

given a good account of themselves in

Tunisia." General Giraud then outlined his

plans regarding a second corps similar to

the first, this to be available by September.

The second corps, he explained, would serve

to relieve the first after the initial phase of

operations had ended. To prepare it, he

must receive by 1 August the equipment

necessary to complete the first armored division and to rearm a second, as well as two

additional infantry divisions and general

reserve and service troops. He needed also

an allotment of uniforms and shoes for

100,000 men, because his forces, which he

estimated then at 417,000 men, were "practically in rags, a factor naturally detrimental

to morale."

 37

 Finally he desired some light

escort vessels to be assigned to him for convoy duty between West and North Africa.

He was fully aware, he added, of the supply

and tonnage implications of his proposal.

He urged, nevertheless, that the utmost efforts be made to ensure that the additional

divisions and general reserve units would be

placed on a fully active footing by September. He felt certain that the CGS appreciated the importance of having a French

force "big and powerful enough to seize the

opportunity of waging war on French soil."

Giraud then spoke of the efficient overhauling and refitting of naval units being effected

in the United States "under conditions of

great pressure." He expected that a number of vessels such as the battleship Richelieu, the cruiser Montcalm, and several modern destroyers would shortly be ready to take

their place in battle wherever they were most

needed. Before concluding, General Giraud urged the CCS to place full trust in

the French Army and its command, and to

look upon it as a weapon capable of rendering the greatest service to the common

cause, especially when operations should

extend to the continent of Europe and to

French soil.

The CCS immediately took up General

Giraud's proposals. General Marshall first

pointed out that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

were "in full harmony" with General Giraud's plans and that the details of his requirements were being studied by the Com36

 General Giraud was accompanied by General

Béthouart, Vice Adm. Raymond Fenard, Lt. Col.

Albert Le Bel, and Maj. Andre Beaufre.

37

 This was in addition to a previous request for

100,000 sets of summer clothing from General Eisenhower (Msg 5746, AFHQ to AGWAR, 11 Mar

43, JRC Cable Log).
PHASE II OF THE PROGRAM 83

bined Staff Planners. He then disclosed

that War Department officials had decided

to suspend the activation of a number of

U.S. divisions previously planned for the

period between August and the end of the

year, in order to make certain that the matériel required by the French would be

available to them. All that needed to be

done, General Marshall declared, was to

implement the requests just submitted by

General Giraud. Heretofore, the limiting

factor in rearming the French had been a

shortage of tonnage and escort facilities.

Now the tonnage situation had improved,

although the problem of port capacity in

North Africa had become rather acute because of forthcoming operations. The

U-boat situation likewise had improved, said

Admiral King, who added that he was

"much in favor" of General Giraud's plan.

In his opinion it was clearly an economy of

effort to arm the French forces already present in North Africa. The American Navy,

he asserted, would continue to do its best

on behalf of the French Navy. His view

was fully supported by General Arnold who

considered it "expedient and economical"

to equip the French Air Forces already in

the theater. He explained that a recent

French request for 300 additional planes

was being studied and a proposal for the

allocation of this number of aircraft would

soon be submitted.38 On the whole, he

concluded, the French squadrons would be

equipped with the planes they needed to

accomplish their mission. As the meeting

broke up, General Giraud expressed his

gratitude for the assurances he had been

given and added that time was the essential

factor to be considered.39

The next day, General Giraud called on

General Somervell to discuss the details of

his proposal. After their conference, General Somervell expressed to General Marshall his confidence that the French request

could be implemented. The major items

of equipment, he explained, were available

for immediate shipment except for the necessary rifles which would have to be obtained

as before from the United Kingdom. Shipping could be provided to the extent of

200,000 tons representing approximately

twenty-eight ships. These ships would be

added to a number of convoys, for the current heavy drain on escort vessels precluded

the possibility of a special convoy. The

chief stumbling block, Somervell emphasized, remained the limited North African

port capacity. It would be well, therefore,

if General Giraud were required to obtain

Eisenhower's consent to the addition of any

shipping before any promises were made in

Washington to deliver the matériel before

1 November—the date at which General

Eisenhower expected the situation of port

capacity to ease up. The 100,000 uniforms,

on the other hand, could be shipped at once

in July and August as filler cargo. General

Somervell then reiterated an opinion he had

expressed on earlier occasions. Inasmuch

as a successful assault on Sicily would bring

increasing demands from General Eisenhower for additional troops to exploit the

initial gains, "it certainly would seem desirable to make use of French troops in

North Africa rather than to employ troops

from America and the additional shipping

which their use would entail." He suggested accordingly that the Allied Commander in Chief be asked to review the

North African port situation with Giraud

after HUSKY had progressed a little further,

and to advise the War Department of the

38

 The request was contained in General Leyer's

memorandum of 20 May. 39 Min, CCS Spec Mtg, 8 Jul 43.
84 REARMING THE FRENCH

date when port capacity would become

adequate.40

The French Commander in Chief then

reported to General Marshall the substance

of his conference with General Somervell.

He stressed the importance he attached to

the dispatch of a special convoy to arrive in

Africa the latter part of July, a matter

which, he declared, he had put before the

President.41 General Marshall informed

him that twenty-eight ships probably would

be found, although not at one time, but

warned him both of the difficulty of finding

escort vessels for a separate convoy or for

the enlargement of scheduled convoys, and

of the congestion in North African ports.

He also pointed out that priorities would

have to be determined by the Allied Commander in Chief. The War Department,

he explained, could not "from this distance"

deny General Eisenhower's requests for

certain shipments in favor of some others,

and at the same time hold him responsible

for the success of operations. No final decision therefore could be reached until

Giraud had discussed the entire problem

with Eisenhower. Turning to the question

of the employment of French troops, General Marshall repeated a statement he had

made at nearly every CCS meeting at which

the matter had come up for discussion: it

was the "urgent desire" of the U.S. Chiefs

of Staff to have General Eisenhower use

French troops wherever possible rather than

to import U.S. troops. Thus was highlighted the often-expressed American thesis

that the rearmament of the North African

forces constituted one of the most economical ways of providing additional troops for

future operations on the European continent. As he took leave of General Marshall,

the French Commander in Chief expressed

the hope that the promise of another large

shipment of supplies and the assurance that

his forces would be employed in future

operations would have a "tremendous

psychological effect" on the political situation in North Africa.42

The conversations with General Giraud

having come to an end, War Department

officials urged the MAB to take immediate

action on the latest French demands.

Simultaneously, General Marshall informed

AFHQ of the plans now under consideration in Washington for Phase II. The

President, he pointed out, was naturally

desirous of backing Giraud's hand as much

as possible and would like to tell him "something encouraging" before his departure

from the United States. Could the theater,

at this time, give any hint as to what might

be done beyond the pessimistic prospect

indicated in Eisenhower's earlier report on

North African port capacities?

 43

This appeal brought instant, heartening

news from the theater. General Smith explained that plans now in effect at Casablanca would free sufficient port capacity

to permit the proposed 200,000 tons of

additional French rearmament to be unloaded in that port. He recommended,

however, that shipments be made after

July and at a rate of not more than nine

ships a convoy. The monthly 25,000-ton

allocation could continue to be delivered in

Oran, Casablanca, and Algiers.44

40

 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 10 Jul 43, JRC

902/II Rearmt Plan. 41Memo, Giraud for Marshall, 10 Jul 43, JRC

902/II Rearmt Plan.

42

 Memo, Marshall for Arnold, Somervell, McNarney, Handy, and Brig Gen Raymond G. Moses,

12 Jul 43, OCS A-45-534 (France). 43

 Msg 2594, Marshall to Smith, 15 Jul 43, JRC

902/II Rearmt Plan. 44

 Msg W-4989, Smith to Marshall, 16 Jul 43,

JRC Cable Log.
PHASE II OF THE PROGRAM 85

General Giraud, then in Canada on a

four-day visit before his return to Algiers,

was apprised by General Marshall of the

good news and of the details of the final

arrangements just concluded: approximately twenty-seven ships would bring the

equipment of Phase II to Casablanca at the

rate of nine per convoy.45 In addition,

clothing and accoutrements for 200,000

men would be shipped as filler cargo on the

regular July and August convoys. Rifles

would be ordered from the United Kingdom. Ammunition would continue to be

shipped at the customary monthly rate.

Such action, General Marshall noted, represented an "immediate substantial compliance" with Giraud's requests. The War

Department also proposed, he added, to

place the French forces on the same status

as U. S. troops in regard to issue and maintenance of uniforms and personal equipment entailing usual replacements.46

In the theater, meanwhile, plans were

being made for the reception of the matériel

of Phase II. Since heavy demands for U.S.

service troops in other areas were forcing

the rapid closing down of all American base

activities at Casablanca, it soon would be

necessary to turn over to the French the

entire responsibility for handling matériel

and for operating the motor vehicle assembly in that port. In anticipation of such

a move, French authorities were urged to

take immediate steps, in agreement with Atlantic Base Section, to make sure that they

would become self-sufficient in handling

future shipments at Casablanca at the earliest possible date. They were also advised

that they, and not SOS, NATOUSA, would

be responsible for handling directly from

the ships the distribution of uniforms, personal equipment, and maintenance items

due to arrive as filler cargo on future

convoys.47

On 31 July AFHQ requested the War

Department to delete from the standard

tables of allowance certain corps and army

headquarters items which the French did

not require. Among the items listed were

regimental reference libraries, general-use

dictionaries, manual coin-counting machines, American flags, and the like. The

arrival of full complements of American

flags in earlier shipments had already caused

considerable surprise among the French

service troops assigned the task of opening

boxes containing rearmament. By then the

MAC (G) had approved the assignment of

200,000 sets of clothing and of the equipment requested by the theater on 4 July.

Phase II was now a reality. Still, no less

45

 While in Canada, General Giraud was offered,

under Canada's lend-lease program, some 200 artillery pieces, including 3.7-inch antiaircraft guns,

100,000 complete sets of clothing, and 1,000 trucks.

The guns were to be used for the defense of the

principal ports of embarkation, and the trucks

largely for the transportation of mobile reserves.

General Béthouart having requested the War Department's approval of this offer of assistance, the

views of General Eisenhower were sought regarding

the matter. The Allied Commander in Chief replied that he saw no objection to the acceptance

of the Canadian offer, provided the effect was to

reduce the U.S. assignment under the eleven-division program, which he considered of "highest

priority." He cautioned, however, against accepting the 3.7-inch antiaircraft guns, as he regarded

the introduction of a new caliber undesirable, especially in view of the present shortage of trained

French artillery personnel. The French eventually

received the 100,000 sets of clothing. Msg 4246,

Somervell to Eisenhower, 5 Aug 43, and Msg

W-6985, Eisenhower to Somervell, 10 Aug 43, JRC

Cable Log. 46Msg, Marshall to Giraud, 16 Jul 43, JRC

902/II Rearmt Plan.

47

 Memo, CofS NATOUSA for JRC, 17 Jun 43,

and Memo, JRC for Leyer, 19 Jul 43, JRC 902/II

Rearmt Plan; Msg L-436, SOS NATOUSA to CG

NATOUSA, 27 Jul 43, and Msg 5718, CG

NATOUSA to CG SOS NATOUSA, 29 Jul 43,

JRC Cable Log.
86 REARMING THE FRENCH

than two months had elapsed between the

submission of General Leyer's memorandum of 20 May and the action finally taken

by the MAB.48

When General Giraud landed in Algiers

on 25 July, after a brief stop in England, he

could be well pleased with the results of his

trip to the American continent. Not only

had he succeeded in reviving interest in the

rearmament program, but in addition he

had the promise that within a few days

another substantial shipment would be on

its way to North African ports. There was

a chance that these positive material gains

might help disperse the dark clouds hovering over his political horizon. At any rate,

when they became known, these gains acted

as a tonic on the morale of French troops.

The French, cabled General Eisenhower,

were most enthusiastic about the action

taken in Washington. They regretted only

that the assignment of additional aircraft

had been deferred until the next calendar

year. As the first ships bringing the equipment of Phase II reached Casablanca in

late August, General Giraud seized the

occasion to thank General Marshall for his

"comprehensive, warm, and effective support in making known to all in America the

needs of the French Army."

 49

Fusion of the Giraud and de Gaulle Forces

Fusion of all French armed forces still

remained the major problem facing both

the French and AFHQ. To expedite

fusion, General Eisenhower had, during

General Giraud's visit to the United States,

submitted to the CCS three important recommendations. He had proposed that

thereafter all French forces be controlled

through AFHQ; that, pending a final CCS

decision on the matter, no further issue of

British equipment be made to the Free

French; and that General Giraud be requested to include the Free French Forces

in the target of eleven divisions due to be

re-equipped under the ANFA Agreement.

The Combined Chiefs, on 30 July, endorsed

the recommendations.50

By this time the French themselves had

come to the realization that the two-staff

arrangement established on 22 June was

impracticable and must be done away with.

On 31 July, after several weeks of tension,

the CFLN finally promulgated two decrees

which brought unity of command and made

the fusion of forces a reality. All armed

forces were to be integrated under one single

military administration and placed under

the over-all command of General Giraud.

In addition, the existing arrangement under

which the two copresidents of the CFLN

presided alternately was modified: Giraud

was to preside over debates whenever they

dealt with purely military matters; de Gaulle

was to be in the chair when political or

economic matters or general policy was

to be discussed.51 The new organization,

incidentally, was consonant with the wishes

of the Resistance forces in France. Meeting

secretly in Paris on 27 May, the National

Council of the Resistance had formally rec48

 Ltr, CinC AFHQ to TAG, 31 Jul 43, JRC 904

Modification of Rearmt; Min, MAC (G) 102d

Mtg, 15 Jul 43; Min, MAC (G) 103d Mtg, 24

Jul 43. 49

 Msg W-6517, Eisenhower to Marshall for

Arnold, 4 Aug 43, JRC Cable Log; Ltr, Giraud to

Marshall, 27 Aug 43, OPD 400 France, Sec II.

50

 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 14 Jul 43, NAF 289;

Min, CCS 104th Mtg, 30 Jul 43; Msg 3825, CCS

to Eisenhower, 31 Jul 43, FAN 176. 51

 See The Kittredge (Capt. T. B., USN) Papers:

FRANCE: Political A-2 Aug 43, copy in OCMH;

see also, Marey, "Le Réarmement Français en

Afrique du Nord (1942-1944)," Revue Politique et

Parlementaire (October, 1947).
PHASE II OF THE PROGRAM 87

ognized General de Gaulle as the political

leader, and General Giraud as the Commander in Chief, of all elements, both within

and outside of France, aligned against the

Axis.52

In the ensuing reorganization of the

French High Command, officers from both

factions were appointed to key posts: Chief

of Army Staff, Maj. Gen. Roger Leyer;

Assistant Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Pierre

Koenig; Chief of Naval Staff, Rear Adm.

André Lemonnier; Assistant Chief of Staff,

Rear Adm. Philippe Auboyneau; Chief of

Air Staff, Lt. Gen. René Bouscat.53

A final step toward unification was taken

in September with the establishment of a

Commissariat of National Defense, a sort

of inner war cabinet which replaced the

Permanent Military Committee and whose

function was to co-ordinate the activities of

the three chiefs of staff.

The belated fusion of the armed forces

gave rise at once to a number of crucial

problems. One was the manner in which

the former Free French Forces were to receive further issues of war matériel.

A few days after his return to Algiers,

General Giraud was informed of the CCS

decision regarding the incorporation of the

Free French Forces in the eleven-division

program. He then learned "with stupefaction" that, not only would the Britishequipped Free French units cease to be a

British responsibility, but they were to return

to British depots without delay all the

matériel in their possession, including clothing, individual equipment, armament,

armored vehicles, and other organizational

equipment. In practice the French Commander in Chief was acquiring 13,000 additional combatants, that is to say, 3,000 from

the Leclerc Column, and 10,000 from the

1st Free French Division, also known as the

Koenig Division, without obtaining a corresponding increase in matériel. He protested, but in vain. Faced with the prospect

of having to "sacrifice" two of his own

divisions in order to make room for the

former Free French, General Giraud announced his intention to revise the composition of the ANFA Plan as follows: 4 armored

divisions of the proposed new triangular

type, instead of 3 of the old square type (in

this manner, the Leclerc Column, trained

in tank warfare and now in process of being

raised to the strength of a division [the 2d

DFL], would be re-equipped as a fourth

armored division, thus leaving intact the 3

already activated), and 7 infantry divisions,

with an eighth, the British-equipped 1st

DFL, remaining for the present at least a

British responsibility outside the ANFA

Plan.54

G-3, AFHQ, immediately objected that

the ratio of 7 infantry to 4 armored divisions

as proposed by General Giraud constituted

an unbalanced force. The deputy theater

commander, on the other hand, considered

that four armored divisions of the new type

would require fewer tanks,55 therefore less

tank maintenance and technical supervision

as well as less shipping.56 Overriding G-3's

objection, he urged that the proposed ratio 52

 MS #B-035, Role joué par les Forces Francaises de l'Intérieur pendant l'occupation de la

France avant et après le débarquement du 6 Juin

1944 (Commandant Rogé, Service Historique de

l'Armée, Section Etudes), OCMH. 53

 Memo, Lt Col John C. Knox for Col J. Terrence, 2 Aug 43, AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec Rpts

to G-3 on Political Situation.

54

 Interv with Gen Giraud, Dec 48; Memo, Brig

Gen Sidney P. Spalding for CofS, AFHQ, 5 Aug

43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab Q. 55

 980 as against 1,170 in three old-type divisions. 56

 Memo, Deputy Theater Comdr for CofS

AFHQ, 10 Aug 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a,

Tab Q.
88 REARMING THE FRENCH

be accepted. AFHQ approved Giraud's

proposal and the 2d DFL was incorporated

in the rearmament program as a fourth

armored division. It was then renamed the

2d Armored Division (2d DB), and the

former 2d DB, commanded by Brig. Gen.

Jacques de Vernejoul, was re-designated the

5th DB.

General Giraud's plan regarding the 1st

DFL posed a more delicate problem. As

reported by G-3, the further issue of British

equipment to that division could be made

only at the expense of British troops committed to battle, since shipping limitations

precluded for some time to come the shipment to the theater of sufficient British

equipment to take care of the unit.57 It was

considered inadvisable, therefore, to maintain the division any longer with British

equipment. On 29 August General Smith,

after warning General Giraud that the 1st

DFL could not begin to receive British issues

until after the end of the year (by which

time its equipment would be reduced as

a result of normal deterioration), urged

him to consider making such adjustments

in his program as might appear to him

expedient.58

While discouraging, the above statement

was, as later pointed out by G-3, "sufficiently indefinite as to lead the French to

live in hopes of finding a solution to the

problem within a month or two."

 59

 The

solution which General Giraud adopted was

simply the one he had proposed earlier,

namely, to keep the British-equipped 1st

DFL, now being raised to the strength of a

full division by the addition of a third brigade, as an eighth infantry division.60

 He

then announced that it would be employed

in Italy "alongside their old comrades of

the Eighth Army." To complete its equipment, the French Commander in Chief

ordered the other British-equipped unit

stripped of its matériel before leaving Tunisia for Morocco, there to receive its new

U.S. equipment. Such action had become

possible, for the British military authorities

had just reversed their earlier policy requiring the Free French Forces to return their

British equipment. They had now come to

regard this matériel as unserviceable.61

Soon, however, it became known that the

third brigade being added to the 1st DFL

was a U.S.-equipped unit. AFHQ authorities immediately pointed out that the idea

of having any division take part in active

operations with two different types of equipment was "verging on madness."

 62

 To dispel once and for all the uncertainty then

current in French circles, the Deputy Chief

of Staff, AFHQ, made it clear to General

Giraud that the Eighth Army "no longer

regarded the 1st DFL as theirs and would

not call it forward."

 63

 The French Commander in Chief had now no other recourse

but to incorporate the division in the rearmament program.

In a letter to General Eisenhower, dated

57

 Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS AFHQ, 25 Aug 43,

AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters, Vol. I. 58

 Ltr, CofS AFHQ to Giraud, 29 Aug 43, signed

and mailed 6 Sep 43, AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd

Sec, Fr Matters, Vol. I. 59

 Memo, ACofS G-3 for DCofS, 5 Oct 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr.

60

 The division, organized from the time of its

activation on the British model, retained the brigade

organization throughout the war. All other French

divisions adopted the American organization with

only minor modifications. 61

 Memo, CinC for G.O.C. Tunisia District, 9 Sep

43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr. 62

 Ltr, Whiteley to Gruenther, CofS Fifth Army,

17 Oct 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr. 63

 Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 6 Oct 43, JRC

370/002 Employment of Free Fr Divs; Handwritten comment, Whiteley to G-3, 18 Oct 43, on

Memo, Rooks for DCofS, 5 Oct 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr.
PHASE II OF THE PROGRAM 89

26 October, General Giraud proposed a

second revision of the ANFA Plan to include

the 1st DFL, now renamed 1st Motorized

Infantry Division (1st DMI), as an eighth

infantry division.64 The four armored divisions now on the program being practically equivalent to three of the type originally planned, he considered that the

number of infantry divisions could be raised

from 7 to 8 without increasing the over-all

figure of 11 divisions with regard to matériel. The revision, he concluded, would

be "within the spirit of the ANFA Agreement." G-3 officials voiced the opinion

that General Giraud's proposal was a step

in the right direction. The addition of one

infantry division, they pointed out, would

improve the ratio between infantry and

armor. The issue with respect to the 1st

DMI could not be settled then and there.

Suffice it to say that the division ultimately

was re-equipped with U.S. matériel and

included among the expeditionary forces

for operations overseas.65

Results of Phases I and II

By the time the last shipments of Phase II

equipment reached North Africa in late

September, the French had re-equipped or

were in process of re-equipping with American matériel an expeditionary force consisting of four infantry divisions (the 2d

Moroccan Infantry, 3d Algerian Infantry,

4th Moroccan Mountain, and 9th Colonial

Infantry), two armored divisions (the 1st

DB and 5th DB), as well as headquarters,

corps troops, and service units. The task

of arming these units was complicated by

the fact that there had been serious gaps

in deliveries of U.S. matériel. No automatic rifles had yet been received. There

were shortages in certain types of trucks,

signal and medical equipment, tentage, and

other items. Equipment for the four Ordnance companies requested in July had not

been assigned by the MAB. As a result

the French were forced to make substitutions for the missing items from existing

French stocks. Already, in August, the

JRC had called attention to these facts and

had pointed out that because of their expansion the expeditionary forces required a

considerable monthly tonnage of spare major items, major assemblies, and spare parts.

A plan to furnish them with D and C rations

(to which the French had nothing corresponding), as well as ammunition, was

under consideration.66

Training, meanwhile, was proceeding

satisfactorily. The task of General Kingman's French Training Section was made

easier by the fact that most of the units

being re-equipped consisted of old and

battle-tried regiments, a large part of whose

personnel had gone through both the

1939-40 and the Tunisian campaigns.67

In fact there were exceptionally few men

who had not had some military training.

Hence, the state of preparedness of the

expeditionary forces depended upon their

capability of becoming acquainted with the

new matériel, of learning equipment maintenance and repair techniques, and of

training additional drivers for generalpurpose vehicles. It was believed that a

64

 Throughout the remainder of the war the

personnel of the division continued, for sentimental reasons, to refer to their unit as the 1st DFL. 65

 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt; Memo, Brig

Gen William C. Crane, DACofS G-3 for G-3, 1

Nov 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Free Fr;

for final re-equipment of 1st DMI, see pp. 116-117,

below.

66

 Memo, Artamonoff for Brig Gen Clarence L.

Adcock, 2 Aug 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab T. 67

 See pp. 230 ff., below.
90 REARMING THE FRENCH

sufficient number of tank crews with previous experience in French tank units was

available for the regiments of the two

armored divisions. Most combat units of

the four infantry divisions had already

acquired a good knowledge of their new

matériel, and it was reported that they

would shortly be ready for action. The

armored divisions on the other hand would

not be ready for some months yet, largely

because of delays expected in the receipt

of signal and ordnance equipment, tools,

service trucks, and spare parts.68

The status of the rearmament of the air

units was less encouraging. The air program was said to have completely stalled.

So far squadrons had been issued only a few

planes with the result that their morale was

seriously impaired. As for naval units, they

had received only a small monthly allocation of supplies.69

The effort to rearm the French North

African forces was, it can be seen, almost

exclusively American, and rightly so since

the original commitment, by agreement

with the British, was an American one. By

way of comparison, it is interesting to note

that the contribution of the British to the

rearmament of the ground forces was then

estimated at 5 percent in terms of tonnage,

and of the air forces at 10 percent in terms

of aircraft and related equipment. As for

the naval forces, practically the entire fleet

was being overhauled and re-equipped in

the United States. It was also being supplied and maintained chiefly with American

matériel in the Mediterranean. The British for their part had made temporary repairs on vessels harbored in Alexandria, to

enable them to reach the United States for

complete overhauling.70 They had also repaired a number of small craft not capable

of crossing the Atlantic. It was estimated

that, when the naval program had been

completed, the United States would have

financed 95 percent and the British 5 percent of the cost.71

68

 Memo cited n. 66. 69

 Ibid.

70

 The French fleet harbored at Alexandria since

June 1940 had thrown its lot with the North

African Naval Forces at the end of April 1943. 71

 Memo, Spalding for Brig Gen A. R. Wilson,

14 Aug 43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan. The figures

were prepared in reply to a question raised by a

senatorial committee as to the relative amount of

rearmament furnished by the United States and

by the United Kingdom to the French in North

Africa.
CHAPTER VI

Phase III of the Program

(Mid-August-November 1943)

The 15 August Plan

The practicability of a third rearmament

phase had been examined in Washington

long before the ships carrying the equipment of the second had docked in Casablanca. In late June, while waiting for

the theater to send in the requisitions for

Phase II, War Department agencies were

already seeking ways and means to complete the eleven-division program in its

entirety. To proceed with intelligent planning, they needed to obtain an accurate

picture of the current status of equipment

from all sources in the hands of the French

or available to them in the theater. To this

end, Operations Division requested AFHQ

on 1 July to furnish information on (1) the

amount of enemy matériel captured in Tunisia likely to become available for French rearmament; (2) the amount of American

equipment turned over to the French from

American theater stocks over and above

that shipped from the United States; (3)

the number of units still to be completely

or partially equipped and, in the latter case,

the list of items already provided; and (4)

the amount of matériel required to complete the eleven-division program, with an

indication of the earliest dates on which

this equipment could be "profitably received and assimilated" by the French.

The warning was added, as it had been in

connection with Phase II, that rifles, some

signal equipment, and certain trucks were

not available from stocks in the United

States.1

The desirability of using captured enemy

equipment for French rearmament had

long been considered by AFHQ. Pursuant

to a CCS directive on the disposal of such

equipment, the Allied Commander in Chief

had, on 16 May, given French requirements

fourth priority in the allocation of usable

enemy matériel. He had instructed the

JRC to handle its issue to the French. In

the case of captured equipment and transport of French origin, he had directed the

Allied forces in Tunisia to hand over all

such items to the French. While enemy

equipment, much of which had been left

in woods, mountains, and isolated locations,

was being collected, removed, segregated,

and classified, advance reports indicated

that Axis troops had smashed and burned

the bulk of their matériel "with their usual

thoroughness." Just as Eisenhower had anticipated, when the count was completed, it

was found that the total serviceable equipment from this source was very small in1

 Msg 1453, AGWAR to Eisenhower, 1 Jul 43,

JRC Cable Log.
92 REARMING THE FRENCH

deed. It would not be sufficient to equip

even one division.2

The situation with regard to U.S. and

British equipment loaned to North African

troops during the Tunisian campaign was

not any brighter. The matériel was now

in such poor condition that AFHQ, revising its earlier decision, ruled that it was no

longer to be returned to U.S. and British

stocks but was to be turned over to Territorial units to supplement the French matériel in their possession.3

 As far as the rearmament program was concerned, this

equipment simply did not exist.

In order to answer the other questions

raised in the Operations Division query of

1 July, the JRC requested the French High

Command to furnish without delay a complete list of the units still to be re-equipped

after Phase II had been completed, together with a computation of the ground

and air force equipment required for the

purpose.4

While the French General Staff was preparing the necessary lists, General Giraud,

then in Washington primarily to obtain the

armament of Phase II, was also pressing for

a third phase. General Marshall agreed

with him in regarding as a commitment the

task of completing the eleven-division program, and so informed General Eisenhower.

The U.S. Chief of Staff then dispatched to

the theater Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding

for the purpose of working out with AFHQ

a progressive plan to bring the entire program to completion. At the same time, he

requested General Eisenhower to indicate

at an early date the rate of shipping and

priority of supplies desired for such a commitment.5

All together five divisions, several headquarters, and a number of supporting combat and service units remained to be

equipped. The task was substantial. To

enable the Joint Rearmament Committee

to carry it out with greater efficiency, theater officials decided that the committee

must undergo some changes. On 7 August

they transferred it from the control of Liaison Section, where it had been since 5 June,

to that of NATOUSA. The move was a

logical one considering that the commitment

to rearm the French was almost entirely

American. As technical training was inseparable from re-equipping, AFHQ also

decided to place General Kingman's Training Section, until then under the control of

Fifth Army, directly under the supervision

of the JRC. The section became known as

French Training Section, JRC. Thus all

activities in connection with the re-equipping and training of the North African

forces thereafter were co-ordinated and supervised by a single agency, the JRC.6

AFHQ then proceeded to give the committee more prestige and authority by appointing a general officer, General Spalding, as its chairman. Similarly impressed

by the need for higher-ranking representation, the French military authorities appointed a field-grade officer, Col. Jean

Regnault, to head the French Section of

the committee. This action on their part

indicated clearly that they had come to

regard the committee and not the Béthouart

2

 CCS 200/2/D, 23 Apr 43; Dir, Eisenhower To

All Concerned, 16 May 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item

5-a, Tab T; Quotation from Ltr, Eisenhower to

Giraud, 20 Jun 43, AFHQ 0100/12C Div Ops Fr

Rearmt, Vol. II. 3

 Msg W-4636, AFHQ to AGWAR, 11 Jul 43,

OPD 400 France, Sec II. 4

 Memo, JRC for Col Blanc, 10 Jul 43, JRC

902/II Rearmt Plan.

s

Ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 17 Jul 43, AFHQ

0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters. 6

 NATOUSA Staff Memo 74, 7 Aug 43, JRC

320/001 Orgn of JRC.
PHASE III OF THE PROGRAM 93

GENERAL ALPHONSE JUIN, acting

French commander in chief.

mission in Washington as the authoritative

agency in matters of rearmament. A few

weeks later AFHQ established a separate

Joint Air Commission (JAC) which it

placed under the control of the Mediterranean Air Command. This commission,

composed of U.S., British, and French

members, was made responsible for handling strictly air armament matters. Problems concerning equipment common to

both air and ground units remained the

responsibility of the JRC. The closest liaison was established between the two

agencies for the discussion of questions that

involved their joint attention.7

In Washington, meanwhile, the Joint

War Plans Committee (JWPC) had concluded a study of the rearmament problem.

Its final report, dated 26 July, pointed out

that the CCS decision of 18 May to arm the

French was merely the "reaffirmation of an

indefinite commitment" which avoided the

most important issues.8 In particular, the

decision had set no target date, and had

given no indication whatsoever as to when

the rearmed forces could or would be used

in combat. The committee felt that for

political as well as military reasons, these

issues could no longer be avoided. It was

urgent that the commitment to arm the

French be carried out and that United Nations strategy be "designed so as to permit

taking full advantage of the potential combat power of a re-equipped French army in

the Mediterranean."

 9

Endorsing the conclusions of the JWPC

report, General Marshall, at the next CCS

meeting on 30 July, urged that French rearmament be continued, especially now that

the shipping situation had improved. Resorting again to the familiar argument that

such rearmament would provide over-all

economy in the exploitation of Allied resources, he recommended that a more determined effort be made to bring the North

African forces into action. So far, he explained, nothing further had been done in

this connection than to plan for their employment in an operation against Corsica.10

The conquest of Corsica had, indeed,

been assigned to the French and was sched7

 NATOUSA GO 74, 7 Aug 43, JRC 320/001

Orgn of JRC; MAC Hq GO 9, 6 Sep 43, in The

History of MAAF: December 1943-1 September

1944, Vol. II, AAF Hist Office Archives; see Ch.

XVII, below. 8

 "The re-arming and re-equipping of the French

forces in North Africa should be proceeded with

as rapidly as the availability of shipping and

equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U.S. forces

in the various theaters." Min, CCS 87th Mtg, 18

May 43; see p. 57, above.

9

 JPS 231, 26 Jul 43, OPD CS 381 File 2. 10

 Min, CCS 104th Mtg, 30 Jul 43.
94 REARMING THE FRENCH

uled to take place at some later date when

the current operations in Sicily came to a

successful end.11 But on 21 July, G-3,

AFHQ, also had strongly urged that other

North African forces, possibly one or two

divisions if available, be employed in the

planned invasion of the Italian mainland.

G-3 stressed the advantageous psychological effect which the use of French troops

was likely to have on the Italians. Three

days later Eisenhower asked General Juin,

acting French Commander in Chief in the

absence of Giraud, then in Washington, to

consider the employment on the Italian

mainland, with the U.S. Fifth Army, of

French units available over and above those

scheduled to take part in the assault on

Corsica. On 29 July General Smith requested General Juin to indicate how many

such units could be embarked and when.

The further employment of the North

African expeditionary forces, therefore, was

actually under serious consideration, and

energetic plans were being made to bring

them into action as speedily as possible.12

General Eisenhower's recommendations

for the completion of the rearmament program reached Washington on 12 August.

They embodied a detailed plan—concurred

in by General Giraud himself—drawn on

the basis of an army of four corps (three

infantry and one armored) consisting of

seven infantry and four armored divisions,

the ratio just approved by AFHQ.13 Already a total of four infantry and two

armored divisions, as well as two corps

headquarters had been equipped. The object of the plan therefore was to obtain the

matériel for the rest of the program. Under

the plan, which became known as the 15

August Plan, this matériel was to be shipped

in four installments as follows: one infantry

division, one armored division (minus certain elements already outfitted), and one

army corps headquarters in September; one

infantry division in October; one infantry

division and one army corps headquarters

in November; one armored division in December. Each slice was to include the

matériel to equip all the necessary supporting combat and service units. Shipments

were to be made to Casablanca, now an

entirely French base. The total tonnage

required for initial equipment, plus maintenance of major items and assemblies, was

estimated at approximately 180,000 tons

for September, and 150,000 tons monthly

thereafter. Air and naval requirements, as

well as rations and ammunition, would not

come within this tonnage but would be

shipped under the 25,000-ton monthly

allocation.14

Anticipating early approval by the CCS,

the JRC promptly forwarded to the War

Department the priority lists of matériel for

the September slice.15 The lists differed

somewhat from those submitted earlier by

the French, especially as to service units.

After some discussion with various AFHQ

sections, the JRC had made some changes

which the French were now reluctant to

accept. The proposed distribution of

maintenance units, they objected, no longer

corresponded to theirs. Because of a critical

11

 Participating in the Sicilian campaign was one

battalion of goumiers (the 4th Moroccan Tabor),

the only French ground unit then engaged in battle

anywhere. Its equipment was largely of French

origin, with a sprinkling of U.S. matériel. 12

 Memo, Rooks for Smith, 21 Jul 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Opns in Italy, Pt. II;

Ltrs, Smith to Juin, 24, 29 Jul 43, AFHQ 0100/

12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres. 13

 See pp. 87-88. above.

14

 Msg W-7177, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Aug

43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan. 15

 Msg 7274, AFHQ to AGWAR, 13 Aug 43,

JRC Cable Log.
PHASE III OF THE PROGRAM 95

shortage of technical personnel, they could

not, they asserted, commit themselves to

follow the proportion as now set up by the

JRC for the various maintenance companies within the divisions. Perhaps at a

later date, if it proved possible to enlarge

the flow of selected men from the Continent,

the proposed adjustments might become

feasible.16

The reluctance of the French High

Command to accept the increase in service

units as proposed by the JRC raised an

important issue. Just who would support

the rearmed divisions in combat? The

French themselves, or the Allies? The matter had until then been given little attention.

Within a few short weeks, it would become

the subject of heated debate and a source

of considerable friction between the French

High Command and AFHQ.

On 16 August General Somervell announced from Washington that the 15 August Plan could in general be met. A large

part of the necessary equipment would soon

become available in the theater as a result

of the expected departure from North

Africa of four U.S. divisions. In pursuance

of a CCS decision taken in May, these units

were shortly to be moved to the United

Kingdom to provide a core of battle-tried

troops for the cross-Channel operation then

under consideration. Their organizational

equipment would be transferred and credited to the French program. This would

result in a corresponding reduction of the

allocation of matériel from the United

States and, by the same token, in a considerable reduction of shipping tonnage

requirements. Pending a CCS decision on

the plan, General Somervell requested his

services to compute at once the items required from the United States and make

preliminary arrangements for their shipment.17

General Eisenhower's recommendations

regarding the 15 August Plan had reached

Washington just as the Joint Staff Planners

were completing a report entitled Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces, and Friendly

Neutrals. Incorporating his proposal in

their paper, they recommended that supplies and equipment necessary to implement the plan be authorized for shipment

during the period 1 September to 31 December 1943. They urged, however, that

the over-all program itself be limited to the

obligations of the Casablanca Conference,

or seven infantry and four armored divisions

as now approved by AFHQ.18

To avoid any delay, the U.S. Joint Chiefs

of Staff on 18 August submitted the JPS

report directly to the CCS, then assembled

in Quebec for the QUADRANT Conference

(11-24 August). The British members of

the committee having expressed their fear,

as they had on similar occasions, that the

French program might run counter to other

commitments, the CCS, on 23 August,

amended the American proposal by adding

the following proviso: "in so far as this

does not interfere with operations scheduled

previous to QUADRANT Conference." They

then requested the War Department to take

appropriate measures to implement the program. Simultaneously the CCS agreed that

"such French forces as may be re-equipped

and fit for war" would be used in operations

in the Mediterranean. This decision, in

16

 Memo, Col Blanc for Chief Fr Sec JRC, 19

Aug 43, and Memo, Theater Comdr for AGWAR,

18 Aug 43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan.

17

 CCS 242/6, Final Report to the President and

Prime Minister, 25 May 43; Memo, Somervell for

Marshall, and Msg 2315, Somervell to Styer, 16

Aug 43, Somervell Files, Fr 1943-44, A-46-257,

Ser 1, Dr 3. 18

 CCS 317, 18 Aug 43, QUADRANT Conf.
96 REARMING THE FRENCH

effect, merely formalized the action already

taken in the theater to prepare a French

expeditionary corps for service in Italy with

the U.S. Fifth Army.19

Thus, nearly ten months after the landings

in northwest Africa, the first definite, AngloAmerican rearmament commitment, specific as to scope and time, was finally made.

Henceforth all interested Allied agencies as

well as the French High Command could

look to a clear-cut directive for guidance

in rearming the North African Forces.

The QUADRANT Conference, it must be

noted, had brought forth another important

decision with respect to the French. On

26 August the British, Canadian, and U.S.

Governments had agreed to extend limited

recognition to the French Committee of

National Liberation as representing all

Frenchmen fighting the Axis, pending the

establishment by the liberated people of

France of a government of their own choice.

The CFLN therefore was recognized not

as a government but as the body administering French Africa and all other territories under its control during the war, and

providing the official channels through

which all French contributions to the common war effort should be made under the

collective responsibility of all its members.20

The French in North Africa received the

announcement of this decision with "enthusiasm and gratification." By 3 September twenty-three other members of the

United Nations had taken similar action.21

Recognition of the CFLN did not, for the

moment at least, affect the existing relationship between Allied military authorities

in the theater and the French High Command. AFHQ continued to handle armament matters directly with the responsible

French Army, Air, and Navy staffs or,

when co-ordination between the latter was

required, with General Giraud or the chief

of his personal staff, Brig. Gen. Paul Devinck. These authorities in turn obtained

from the CFLN such sanction as was necessary. The procedure had worked well

in the past. As pointed out by the chairman of the JRC on 25 August, there was no

reason to change it whether or not CFLN

was recognized.22

Now that the CCS had approved the

15 August Plan, the War Department took

steps to put it in effect. General Somervell

informed his services on 23 August that the

organizational equipment expected to be left

behind by the four U.S. divisions when they

moved to the United Kingdom in November

would be diverted to French rearmament

within the limits of General Eisenhower's

stated requirements and would be deducted

from shipments to North Africa. As a result, October, November, and December

shipments to the French would include individual equipment only, such as would be

carried by the American divisions going to

England. To determine with accuracy the

nature and quantities of items remaining to

be shipped from the United States, General

Somervell requested AFHQ to furnish without delay a detailed list of all matériel likely

19

 Memo, COS for CCS, CCS 317/3, 23 Aug 43,

QUADRANT Conf; Min, CCS 115th Mtg, 23 Aug 43,

QUADRANT Conf; CPS Rpt, CCS 329/2, Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertaking and Specific

Operations for the Conduct of the War, 1943-44,

26 Aug 43, QUADRANT Conf. 20

 Memo, Col Knox, Liaison Sec, for G-3, 27

Aug 43, AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec, Rpts to G-3

on Political Situation; see also Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 746.

21

 Capt. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years With

Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster,

1946), p. 399; Charles de Gaulle, Discours et

Messages (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1946), p. 348. 22

 Personal Ltr, Spalding to Lt Col Roger Jones,

MAB, 25 Aug 43, JRC 472 MAB.
PHASE III OF THE PROGRAM 97

to be left behind by the four American

divisions.23

Meanwhile, the Munitions Assignments

Board had approved the transfer to the

Commanding General, NATOUSA, of the

weapons and materiel constituting the September slice. This would serve to equip a

fifth infantry division, the units necessary

to complete a third armored division of the

three-battalion type, and various service

troops.24

The French military authorities had long

since activated the entire eleven divisions of

the program, not counting the Britishequipped 1st Motorized Infantry Division

which they were retaining as a nonprogram

unit. It was now reported that, in addition, they were activating four other infantry divisions, the nucleus of what they hoped

would become a second army.25

On 26 August General Giraud listed for

AFHQ the divisions to be fully rearmed

under the 15 August Plan. For each he

indicated an approximate date of readiness.

The exact date, he pointed out, depended

on the reception of the necessary materiel.

He warned that in the case of many service

troops, such as the maintenance units requested by AFHQ, their activation was

bound to encounter great difficulties for

lack of trained personnel.26

By this time the first ships carrying the

equipment of Phase II were being unloaded

at Casablanca. When General Giraud

wrote to General Marshall on 27 August

to express his gratefulness for this new evidence of American intent to rearm his

forces, he urged that the effort be continued

and the ANFA Plan brought to speedy completion. The men of the remaining five divisions, he explained, were "eagerly

awaiting the materiel which had been

promised them." He hoped that the entire

program would be completed by the end

of the year and he counted on the U.S.

Chief of Staff to make the necessary arrangements to this effect. "America will

not regret it," he asserted in conclusion. In

his reply, General Marshall assured the

French Commander in Chief that "every

practicable effort" would continue to be

made to complete the program.27

It must be noted in passing that no less

than six weeks elapsed between Giraud's

letter and Marshall's answer. Records

show that at least three drafts were successively prepared by the Operations Division

for the Chief of Staff's signature. The

first stated that the present goal was to complete the eleven-division program "by the

end of the year." The second, somewhat

shorter, asserted that the program would be

completed "according to schedule." The

final draft contained no such assurances.

Only an examination of the turbulent

French political situation during these six

weeks can provide a clue to the delay and

the noncommittal wording of General Marshall's answer.

French Political Situation Threatens

Program

Just as the implementation of Phase III

was about to begin, a recurrence of French

political strife in North Africa created a

23

 Memo, Somervell for Styer, 23 Aug 43, Somervell Files, Fr 1943-44, A-46-257, Ser 1, Dr 3;

Msg 7783, AGWAR to AFHQ, 16 Sep 43, JRC

903 Requests for Units. 24

 Min, MAC (G) 108th Mtg, 26 Aug 43. 2 5Chart, JRC, Plan for Equipment, 26 Aug 43,

JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan. 26

 Memo, Giraud for AFHQ Planning Staff, 26

Aug 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.

27

 Ltrs, Giraud to Marshall, 27 Aug 43, Marshall

to Giraud, 8 Oct 43, OPD 400 France, Sec II.
98 REARMING THE FRENCH

situation which threatened to put an end

to the rearmament program.

Immediately after the limited recognition of the CFLN on 26 August, climaxing

a month of truce during which the fusion of

all French armed forces had become a

reality, General de Gaulle and his followers

raised a new issue: the committee's control

over French military affairs. In particular

they questioned once more General

Giraud's remaining authority. The French

Commander in Chief had seemingly resigned himself to the fact that he must soon

relinquish his post of copresident of CFLN

in view of the failure of the two-headed

arrangement. He insisted, however, that,

by virtue of his recognition by the Allies in

November 1942 as the supreme French military commander, he alone had the authority to speak for the French forces. It was

his firm belief that the armament furnished

by the United States had been given to him

in his personal capacity. General de Gaulle

and his supporters, on the other hand, were

equally insistent that the powers then exercised by General Giraud, except as they

confined themselves to the control of expeditionary forces, should revert to the

responsible civil authority, namely, the

CFLN. In the words of Mr. Murphy, the

American political representative in the

theater, the controversy had "reached a

point where it was threatening the prosecution of the war."

 28

Apprised of the situation, President

Roosevelt was tempted at first to order the

immediate stoppage of all shipments of

equipment and munitions to the French.

On second thought he realized it was not

necessary to force a showdown. It would

come anyway and probably soon. He directed General Marshall to keep in close

touch with the situation.29

In early October the CFLN reorganized

itself, eliminated the two-head arrangement,

and elected General de Gaulle as its sole

president. General Giraud was thus removed from the political sphere. That

accomplished, the CFLN established a

National Defense Committee, placed the

Commander in Chief directly under the

Commissioner of National Defense, and

assigned him command of such forces as

it made available to him for military operations. As a member ex officio of the National Defense Committee, the Commander

in Chief was to share with the president of

the CFLN and the Commissioner of National Defense the task of administering and

maintaining the armed forces.30 Although

these measures went a long way toward

stripping General Giraud of effective control over the French Army, he retained for

the moment the title of Commander in

Chief. AFHQ officials therefore decided

that they would continue to deal directly

and only with him regarding rearmament

and other military matters. Yet it was clear

that he no longer could make decisions that

were final and that agreements reached with

him would be subject to approval or rejection by other French authorities. General

Marshall's reluctance, as evidenced in his

letter of 8 October, to make a firm commitment on the completion of the program

clearly reflected the trend of the situation

28

 Msg, Murphy to State Dept, 3 Sep 43, OPD

400 France, Sec II.

29

 Memo, President for Marshall, 13 Oct 43, OPD

400 France, Sec II. 30

 Decree on Reorganization of CFLN and Decree

Establishing a National Defense Committee, text

of both documents in Giraud, Un seul but, la Victoire, pp. 262-64.
PHASE III OF THE PROGRAM 99

Implementing Phase III

Two problems of matériel faced the

French military authorities during Phase III

and, for that matter, long afterward. The

first, to which the JRC had briefly referred

in its report of 2 August, concerned shortages of items in the hands of units whose

re-equipping was supposed to have been

completed. The International Division,

ASF, had already made a study of it. The

MAB likewise had looked into it after

learning that the French were requisitioning

for supplies which had been assigned and

delivered to them.31

As explained by General Spalding, chairman of the JRC, on 25 August, shortages

existed largely because the French military

authorities had distributed among several

different units matériel originally assigned

for some particular organization. They had

done so because of training demands,

changes in priority of equipping, transportation difficulties, and various other emergencies. It was up to the French to reshuffle in due time the equipment available

to them and to turn it over to the units for

which assignments had been made. Where

shortages existed because matériel had not

been assigned or shipped from the United

States, it was urgent that the missing items

be sent to North Africa without delay.32

The JRC attempted with the help of its

French Training Section to determine the

extent of shortages by conducting showdown inspections of French units. Similarly, the International Divisio n in

Washington began making a check of all

shortages in shipments made against Phases

I and II. But this check did not take into

consideration losses at sea as well as losses,

breakage, or diversion on and after arrival

in North Africa.33

The second problem facing the French

was lack of spare parts. In mid-August

they reported that they were dangerously

short of such items, especially parts for

combat vehicles; a large proportion of these,

as a result, was reported to be currently

deadlined. In answer to repeated appeals

from AFHQ, the War Department arranged to have some 11,000 tons of spare

parts assigned as part of the September

slice of Phase III.34

On 19 September AFHQ officials informed the War Department that to maintain properly their American equipment the

French needed considerable numbers of

major assemblies for replacement and exchange purposes. They pointed out that

the one-month supply included in original

shipments of matériel was inadequate.

They requested that automatic monthly

shipments of major assemblies be made for

all shipments of organizational equipment,

beginning at once and continuing until such

time as the French themselves would be in

a position to make monthly requisitions.

 35

By then, Army Service Forces had made

available for shipment to North Africa practically all the equipment, including spare

parts, requested by the theater as part of

31

 Memo, International Div ASF, sub: Summary

of Status of Equip of Fr Rearmt by Units as of

1 Aug 43, JRC 475 MAB; Personal Ltr 4, Col

Jones, MAB, to Gen Spalding, 13 Aug 43, JRC

472 MAB. 32

 Personal Ltr, Spalding to Jones, MAB, 25

Aug 43, JRC 472 MAB.

33

 Memo, Spalding for ACofS G-4, 18 Aug 43,

JRC 400.0/009 Sup of Combat Units; Ltr 5, Col

Jones, MAB, to Spalding, 27 Aug 43, JRC 472

MAB. 34

 Msg W-7322, AFHQ to AGWAR, 14 Aug 43,

and Msg W-8081, 23 Aug 43, JRC Cable Log;

Msg 7177, Somervell to AFHQ, 7 Sep 43, JRC

903 Requests for Units. 35

 Msg W-465, AFHQ to AGWAR, 19 Sep 43,

JRC Cable Log.
100 REARMING THE FRENCH

the September slice, with the exception of

certain ordnance and signal items then unavailable in the United States.36

 The total

amounted to 143,000 tons. Of these, 120,-

000 tons were to be shipped in September,

5,000 tons in October, and the remainder

after October. Tools and equipment for

base maintenance shops requested by the

theater would be shipped to the extent of

4,000 tons per month under the 25,000-ton

monthly allocation.37

The sudden arrival, at the end of September, of the large shipment of maintenance

equipment created a new and unexpected

situation: the French were reported to be

unable to handle the avalanche of spare

parts presently reaching Casablanca. Cases

of equipment were being unloaded by the

thousands. Lacking adequate material

means, facilities, and personnel, the French

Supply Services simply could not segregate,

inventory, and make ready for issue the innumerable items of equipment reaching

them. Where indeed could they have found

the 60,000-odd storage bins necessary for

this huge operation? All they could do was

to remove wrappings in great haste and distribute sets of spare parts immediately, often

right out in the open. "To the great indignation of the Americans," the precious

matériel was sometimes lost or damaged.38

Aware of this serious situation, the chief

Ordnance officer in the theater, Col. David

J. Crawford, recommended on 29 September that prompt action be taken to hold up

further shipments of parts in all cases in

which a large portion of the first six-month

quota had been received. He also urged

that the JRC and the French Supply Services bend all efforts toward the speedy establishment of an organization responsible

for attending to the needs of the French

Army for spare parts. He urged further

that special attention be given to the development and prosecution of a plan for the

supply of the expeditionary forces due to

be sent to Italy. In this connection he

regarded as essential the "immediate mobilization" of the supplies necessary for these

forces by segregating and binning the items

at strategically located depots, and the

establishment of proper procedures of issue

and replenishment by requisitions. Finally,

he recommended that replenishment of

parts be effected, not by automatic supply

likely to result in wasteful accumulation,

but by requisition, and then only after the

establishment of an initial stockage at what

was considered to be a satisfactory level for

the troops involved. In line with these

recommendations, the JRC requested the

War Department to cancel the second

6-month automatic shipment of spare parts

but to continue the initial 6-month shipment. The committee then proposed the

establishment of a 45-day reserve and a

30-day operating level of Class II and IV

supplies. The French had been instructed,

and were already organizing, to requisition

each month all supplies by item.39

36

 M5A1 tanks could be sent to the French only

at the expense of U.S. troops overseas. Accordingly, M3A3 tanks were being substituted, pending

availability of M5A1, for French rearmament as

well as for some U.S. troops. Msg 5460, Somervell to Eisenhower, 20 Aug 43, JRC Cable Log. 37

 Msg 7177, Somervell to AFHQ, 7 Sep 43, JRC

903 Requests for Units; Msg 6005, Somervell to

Eisenhower, 26 Aug 43, JRC Cable Log. 38

 Marey, "Le Réarmement français en Afrique

du Nord (1942-1944)," Revue Politique et Parlementaire (October, 1947), p. 57.

39

 Memo, Col David J. Crawford for G-4 AFHQ,

29 Sep 43, JRC 402 Sup Policy; Msg 1852/3931,

JRC to AGWAR, 6 Oct 43, JRC Cable Log. Class

II covers supplies and equipment, such as clothing and weapons, for which allowances are established by tables of equipment or allowances; Class

IV covers supplies and equipment, such as con-
PHASE III OF THE PROGRAM 101

Before taking action on the matter, the

War Department reviewed for the benefit

of AFHQ the status of spare parts and major assemblies as seen from Washington in

the light of past shipments.40 AFHQ did

not concur in the facts as given by the War

Department. As a result a long exchange

of correspondence followed which lasted

several months and was marked with considerable confusion due largely, it seems, to

the different terminology used at both ends.

The ceaseless flow of U.S. equipment into

French hands and the readying of units for

service in Italy brought the question of

technical training to the fore as a preoccupation of theater officials. To increase the

scope and efficiency of the program offered

by General Kingman's French Training

Section, General Eisenhower in mid-August

had requested the War Department to send

to North Africa 385 additional highly qualified U.S. instructors, including 25 officers.

The request had been granted and the men

were to be dispatched to North Africa at

the end of September.41

Meanwhile, the first major engagement

of French forces in operations outside northwest Africa, one to which General Marshall

had briefly referred in his statement before

the CCS on 30 July, was taking place.

Operation VESUVIUS, the liberation of

Corsica, planned and directed by General

Giraud under the over-all supervision of

AFHQ, had begun on 13 September at a

time when Corsican patriots were already

battling the 10,000-odd German troops entrenched on the island. Except for one

U.S. Ranger unit and, during the last week

of operations, elements of an Italian Army

corps, the participating forces—naval, air,

and ground—were French. The ground

force, commanded by Lt. Gen. Henry Martin and numbering some 15,000 men, included units of the 4th Moroccan Mountain

Division, a regiment of goumiers (the 2d

Moroccan Tabor Group, or 2d GTM), the

Shock Battalion, plus antiaircraft artillery,

engineers, and other supporting troops.

The 2d GTM and Shock Battalion, not part

of the eleven-division program, were

equipped with a mixture of French, American, and other matériel.42

 The invading

troops, unopposed at first, soon met with

stiff resistance as the enemy, suddenly deciding to evacuate the island (as well as

neighboring Sardinia), fought a series of

rear guard actions to protect his movement

toward northeastern ports. Pressing hard

on the retreating columns, General Martin,

on 30 September, launched a general attack

which ended on 4 October with the complete liberation of the island.43

 His forces

had suffered some 500 casualties including

100 killed in action.

As the implementation of the first slice

of Phase III was coming to an end, Allied

military authorities turned their attention to

the second, or October, slice. On 7 October

the Munitions Assignments Committee

(Ground) approved the assignment of signal and individual equipment (less clothing

already assigned and rifles, carbines, and pistols to be obtained from the United Kingdom) for a sixth infantry division and

twenty-two supporting units, and of all the

struction and fortifications materials for which allowances are not prescribed. The others are: Class

I, rations; Class III, POL (petrol, oil, and lubricants) ; Class V, ammunition. 40

 Msg 831, AGWAR to AFHQ, 25 Oct 43, JRC

Cable Log. 4 1Msg W-7177, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Aug

43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan; Msg 8547, Marshall

to Eisenhower, 24 Sep 43, JRC Cable Log.

42

 Nonprogram units are treated in pp. 111-13,

158-60, below. 43

 J. Joubert, La Liberation de la France (Paris:

Payot, 1951) pp. 90-94.
GOUMIERS OF THE 9TH COLONIAL INFANTRY DIVISION boarding

landing craft at Corsica for the invasion of Elba.
PHASE III OF THE PROGRAM 103

matériel required to outfit units which were

not the same as, or comparable to, the U.S.

organizations scheduled to move from North

Africa to England. The rest of the matériel

necessary to equip fully the division and its

supporting arms and services was to be provided by the theater from the equipment to

be made surplus as a result of the departure

from North Africa of similar U.S. units.44

Another question came up for discussion

during the same period. It concerned the

manner in which French forces were to be

maintained. In answer to a query from

the JRC, the War Department replied on

26 October that NATOUSA was authorized to maintain garrison-trained units on

a zone of interior maintenance basis, and

units ready and designated for combat

service on a combat maintenance basis.

The maintenance of all other forces was of

course the responsibility of the French High

Command. Troops certified and designated for combat service in the theater were

authorized the theater level in all classes of

supply except Class I (rations).45 The

issue of maintenance items from U.S. theater stocks was to be made in accordance

with existing War Department regulations.

These stipulated that, except in case of an

emergency, the authority to transfer supplies

and equipment to foreign governments must

be obtained from the MAB. Lend-lease

requirements of foreign governments could

not be requisitioned through Army supply

channels but must be submitted through

normal lend-lease channels.46

Near the end of October War Department officials began planning for the third,

or November, slice of the 15 August Plan.

As they prepared to submit the necessary

requisitions to the MAC (G), they requested the theater to forward pertinent

information on the amount of equipment

expected to become available as a result of

the departure of further U.S. units from

North Africa.47 At this point, however, important developments in the theater, long

present but increasingly troublesome, had

created a situation which forced a suspension of the 15 August Plan and led to a

4 4Min complete re-examination of the program. , MAC (G) 114th Mtg, 7 Oct 43; see

also Memo, Col George Olmstead for Chmn MAC

(G), 4 Oct 43, JRC 472 MAB, Msg W-1282,

AFHQ to AGWAR, 29 Sep 43, JRC 903 Requests

for Units. 45

 Msg 859, Marshall to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 43,

JRC Cable Log. 46

 WD Cir 220, 20 Sep 43. 47

 Msg 1165, AGWAR to Eisenhower, 29 Oct 43,

JRC 903 Requests for Units.
CHAPTER VII

The Program Marks Time

(November 1943-February 1944)

I

"La Bataille des Services"

Nothing, it will be recalled, had been said

in agreements and CCS directives regarding

the manner in which support of the French

forces was to be provided. The ANFA

Agreement had been interpreted to mean

the rearmament of eleven divisions plus

auxiliary troops, without any clear definition of the number and nature of such

auxiliary troops. In equipping the first expeditionary corps, the Joint Rearmament

Committee had endeavored to make of it

a coherent force capable of operating independently. With the much larger ground

and air force being outfitted for combat, the

problem of support was assuming vast proportions. The 15 August Plan merely

aimed at equipping the three infantry and

two armored divisions remaining on the

ANFA program. It made no provision for

army and corps artillery, antiaircraft, and

service units; nor did it provide for base

units, depots, service installations, repair

shops, hospitals, and the like. How, then,

were the rearmed divisions and air squadrons to be supported in combat? Where

would the support come from?

Just before General Spalding's assumption of office as chairman of the JRC, his

predecessor, Lt. Col. George L. Artamonoff, warned that the French lacked the

technicians, even semitechnicians, necessary

to organize all the service troops required

for a modern eleven-division army. He

proposed, much as he had done several

months earlier, that if maximum use was

to be made of the "excellent source of fighting manpower" that was the French Army

it should be backed by U.S. Ordnance units.

The number of such units would depend

upon the number of similar units that the

French themselves could not activate from

their own resources.1

Colonel Artamonoff's proposal had no

chance of being translated into action. The

possibility of placing U.S. service troops in

support of the French had just been ruled

out by General Eisenhower himself for the

simple reason that his own American forces

were short of such troops. Already General

Marshall had explained to General Giraud,

during their July conversations in Washington, the dilemma then facing the War

Department in meeting General Eisenhower's requisitions for service units. He

had pointed out that the Allied Commander

in Chief had been urged to secure French

service troops as these would be required to

round out French army corps organization.

1

 Memos, Artamonoff for Delaney, 3 Mar 43,

and for Gen Adcock, 2 Aug 43, JRC Misc Doc,

Item 5-a, Tabs I, T.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 105

General Giraud had made no comment on

that point at the time.2

On 31 July Eisenhower made it clear that,

as he interpreted the ANFA Agreement,

French service organizations would be required. Their number, he indicated, was

to be decided by negotiation between the

proper French military authorities, the

JRC, and G-3, AFHQ. In line with this

decision, the deputy theater commander,

General Hughes, promptly informed General Spalding that in the build-up of the

French Army, adequate provision must be

made for complete service organizations

and installations. U.S. base sections, he

pointed out, were currently being taxed to

the maximum to provide mobile service

units for U.S. fighting forces; the remaining service troops still had the responsibility

of receiving shipments from the United

States as well as preparing, transporting,

and loading supplies from North African

ports to advance elements of American combat forces. It was imperative, then, that the

French be required to plan for the huge

task of supplying such of their forces as

would take part in overseas operations.3

There could no longer be any doubt that

the French were under obligation to provide, from their own manpower resources,

the units necessary to support adequately

their combat forces. Yet, in their eyes,

the issue was far from settled. A heated

debate soon arose between the French High

Command and AFHQ. The bitter contest was to last to the end of the war.

The feud began in earnest when General

Lever, on 16 September, informed the JRC

that the proposal to add supporting units

to the 15 August Plan was unacceptable.

French military authorities, he explained,

had been led, by "pressing considerations

of a moral, psychological, and political nature, more than military," to set a relatively

high figure for divisions at the expense of

nondivisional combat and service units.

The JRC proposal, he agreed, was a reasonable one, but the increase which it advocated simply was out of question. Even

as it stood, the 15 August Plan represented

a maximum which could be reached only

with considerable difficulties. As for modifying it by lowering the number of divisions

in order to activate more service units,

the French High Command "flatly rejected

the idea." The present program, concluded

General Leyer, should stand until the liberation of continental France, either in part

or in whole, provided additional manpower.

Until then, it was adequate to enable the

French Army to play the role likely to be

assigned to it "within the framework of the

Allied armies and with their assistance."

 4

The last part of General Leyer's letter

was a clear indication that the French military authorities still entertained hopes of

receiving outside assistance in the form of

U.S. or British service units. That they also

considered the August Plan in its original

form as thoroughly adequate was evidenced

by the content of a memorandum from the

National Defense Committee dated 18 September. Signed by both Generals de Gaulle

and Giraud, and addressed to General Marshall and to the heads of the American,

British, and Russian Governments, the communication stressed the committee's intention to carry out "in as complete a manner

2

 Memo, Marshall for Somervell, 12 Jul 43,

WDCSA 400 France. 3

 Memo, CinC for Chief Liaison Sec AFHQ, 31

Jul 43, JRC 902/II Rearmt Plan; Memo, Hughes

for Spalding, 5 Aug 43, JRC 370/003 Employment of Sv Units.

4

 Ltr, Leyer to Spalding, 16 Sep 43, JRC 902/II

Rearmt Plan.
106 REARMING THE FRENCH

as possible" the program as initially established. In support of this intention, the

committee pointed out that the total number of effectives soon to be available was

estimated at approximately 500,000 men.

Significantly, it was silent on the question

of service units.5

Just what "pressing moral, psychological, and political considerations" motivated

French resistance to Allied demands for a

self-sustaining French Military Establishment, General Leyer's letter had not stated.

But the reasons had long been clear to

AFHQ. The French wanted above all a

maximum of combat forces as a means of

redeeming French honor on the battlefield

and restoring France to its former position

as a great nation. The same desire had

prompted thousands of men, and was inducing still more, to escape from the mother

country, often at considerable personal risk,

for service with the overseas forces. To

them and to most white elements already in

North Africa, the idea of serving in administrative, labor, maintenance, or other service units was repugnant. Their reluctance

to pick up the shovel instead of the rifle

greatly hampered the organizing of service

troops. The white manpower reserve was

small to start with, and the native element,

although numerous, in general made poor

technical personnel. Faced with a dearth

of men capable of manning highly specialized units, the French High Command reasoned thus: the Allies had the know-how,

the technical skills, and a vast manpower

reserve; it was up to them, the Americans

in particular, to provide the necessary support and thus make it possible for eleven

good combat divisions to get into the firing

line as speedily as possible. The French

could cite as precedent for their position the

fact that the U.S. divisions engaged in combat in World War I were backed largely

by French supporting units.6 The procedure, adopted then as an expedient to hasten

the entry of American troops in battle, had

worked well. Why couldn't the practice be

repeated at least until such time as the liberation of France provided additional

technical manpower?

There were other reasons for the attitude

of the French High Command regarding

supporting troops. In the judgment of

Allied observers, a judgment corroborated

after the war by French officers, General

Giraud and much of his staff lacked technical knowledge and as a result failed to

appreciate the importance of adequate support. Their thinking had not progressed

beyond the prewar concept. They suffered

from the same incomprehension that had

been one of the causes of the French Army's

downfall in 1940. The JRC could point to

the fact that whenever the French General

Staff submitted requisitions they invariably

gave last priority to the equipping of service units. The same lack of understanding,

it must be noted, persisted long after General Giraud's disappearance from the military scene. The French, consequently, never became fully self-sufficient even when

fighting on French soil, and the U.S. Army,

in the long run, had no other choice but to

provide a large part of the necessary support.7

The publication in mid-September 1943

by the French military authorities of a chart

giving the contemplated dates of complete

activation of the principal service units

5

 Ltr and Memo, de Gaulle and Giraud to Marshall, 18 Sep 43, CCS 358/3.

6

 See pp. 3-5, above. 7

 Intervs with Col Artamonoff, Dec 49, Col Gardiner, Apr 50, Brig Gen Harold F. Loomis, Jun

and Jul 50, and Lt Gen Jean Valluy, Jun 55.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 107

clearly emphasized their inability, or reluctance, to fulfill their obligations in the matter. According to the chart, no more than

a nucleus of personnel for any Engineer unit

was to be organized before 1 January 1944.

The only Engineer depot company planned

for the entire French Army was not to be activated until December and then in cadre

only. Except for the three Ordnance depot

companies about to be equipped from U.S.

matériel already at hand, no other Ordnance

units were planned for the remaining

months of 1943. General Kingman feared

that, as a result, the entire load of heavier

maintenance and repair for all units of the

French Army—except the expeditionary

corps—would be thrown on U.S. Ordnance

troops. The same held true of transport,

gasoline supply, and base depot services,

for which few or no units were contemplated

in the near future.8

AFHQ officials decided to appeal directly

to General Giraud. On 9 October General

Whiteley, deputy chief of staff, pointed out

to the French Commander in Chief that,

while the strength and balance of the expeditionary forces in terms of combat units

appeared satisfactory, deficiencies in communications and service troops would constitute a grave weakness in a period of offensive operations. Certain adjustments

and additions, he asserted, were necessary

to provide a more balanced force and ultimately increase its effectiveness. Repeating

the warning that resources presently available to the American forces precluded the

possibility of filling existing gaps with U.S.

units, General Whiteley urged General

Giraud to make every effort to provide the

required units from French manpower.9

General Giraud did not reply for more

than two weeks. Meanwhile AFHQ put

forward a number of solutions. General

Smith, then in Washington, recommended

scaling down the rearmament program to

perhaps eight divisions.10 Brig. Gen. Harold F. Loomis, who on 10 October took over

the chairmanship of the JRC in replacement of General Spalding, called to other

duties, proposed holding up deliveries of

equipment for combat troops until the

French activated the required number of

service units. He believed that, despite admitted difficulties, the service units could be

formed without delay. If trained manpower was not available, then French

personnel could be attached to U.S. organizations for instruction. Plans had

already been discussed between the JRC,

NATOUSA Services of Supply, and the

French High Command for training a number of French service units by giving them

temporary employment with U.S. bases.11

General Loomis was convinced that the

time had come to force the French military

authorities to adopt "a sound program, not

just a program." NATOUSA, however,

considered that to hold up further deliveries,

as he recommended, was premature and, at

any rate, should be delayed until General

Giraud had replied to General Whiteley's

letter of 9 October.12

When General Giraud's letter came, on

26 October, it contained nothing at all on

the subject of service troops. Instead it suggested an expansion of the whole program

8

 Memo, Kingman for Spalding, 23 Sep 43, JRC

370/003 Employment of Sv Units. 9

 Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 9 Oct 43, JRC 370/003

Employment of Sv Units.

10

 Memo, Handy for CofS, 18 Oct 43, OPD 400

France, Sec II. 11

 Memos, Loomis for CofS AFHQ, 23 Oct 43,

and Maj Gen Thomas B. Larkin for CG

NATOUSA, 12 Sep 43, and Ltr, Lever to Loomis,

19 Oct 43, JRC 370/003 Employment of Sv Units. 12

 Interv with Loomis, Jun and Jul 50; Memo.

Brig Gen E. L. Ford for Loomis, 26 Oct 43, JRC

370/003 Employment of Sv Units.
108 REARMING THE FRENCH

from eleven to twelve divisions in order to

incorporate the 1st Motorized Infantry

Division in the North African forces. General Eisenhower's reaction was immediate

and blunt. In a strongly worded letter, he

first sought to shatter General Giraud's illusions that U.S. service units might be used

in support of French combat troops. He

ruled out such an arrangement as being

"obviously unacceptable." He explained

further that he would not commit French

forces "even in Metropolitan France" unless they could operate as self-sustaining

units—if necessary at the expense of some

of the combat units presently set up on the

eleven-division program. Immediate adjustments, he warned, must be made to the

extent necessary to ensure that each corps,

as it was prepared for active operations,

would have its full complement of corps

and army service elements on a scale comparable to that recommended for the first

expeditionary corps.13

Echoes of the feud over service units

had by this time reached War Department

officials and convinced them that the 15

August Plan was inadequate. Before initiating any further assignments to the

French, they sought General Eisenhower's

opinion. The Allied Commander in Chief

replied that a re-examination of the rearmament program was under way, which

had in view the establishment of a balanced

army "in increments of self-sustaining army

corps." Pending the result of this study,

the War Department decided to hold up

assignments on the third, or November,

slice of the 15 August Plan.14

General Eisenhower's reply was the first

intimation that AFHQ had reached a decision regarding the future tactical employment of the North African forces. G-3

on 3 November confirmed that French

Army corps were to be used in increments

as self-sustaining units operating with the

Allied forces as soon as these corps were

prepared to participate in operations. The

decision was important in many respects.

It would in particular govern all further rearmament operations. According to G-3's

instructions, the French program was

to be revised with a view to providing (1)

in the immediate future: increments of

self-sustaining army corps; (2) ultimately:

"a balanced army capable of independent

and sustained operations and composed of

these successive army corps increments plus

whatever additional units were necessary."

 15

 With this twofold objective in

mind, the JRC and other interested AFHQ

staff sections undertook, once again, to determine the number and types of units to

be added to the program.

Simultaneously, General Loomis decided

to have a frank talk with the French and

inform them of the plans under consideration. Meeting with General Leyer and

Colonel Regnault on 7 November, he outlined the reasons for the sudden "sharp

change" in the attitude of the U.S. authorities. With the program well under way, a

clearer concept was being developed as to

how the French Army was to be employed,

and the wide scope of the program was

being realized. If in recent days the French

13

 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt; Ltr, Eisenhower to Giraud, 27 Oct 43, JRC 370/003 Employment of Sv Units; also see pp 88-89, above. 14

 Memo, Col Robert A. Case, Director Stock

Control Div ASF, for Director Sup ASF, 3 Nov

43, OPD 400 France, Sec II; Msg 1464, Marshall

to Eisenhower, 2 Nov 43, JRC 904 Modification

of Rearmt; Msg W-4199/5981, Eisenhower to

Marshall, 3 Nov 43, JRC Cable Log; Msg 2702,

Marshall to Eisenhower, 17 Nov 43, JRC 903

Requests for Units. 15

 Memo, Rooks To All Concerned, 3 Nov 43,

JRC 370/001 Employment of Units.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 109

military authorities had been required to

"justify fully" their requirements from U.S.

resources, it was because such requirements

must be weighed and their need considered

in the light of other United Nations demands. For the French alone, there were,

in addition to the eleven-division program,

a number of other requirements such as

maintenance levels, maintenance of the Territorial forces, and POL (petrol, oil, and

lubricants) requirements. The size of the

Allies' global commitment was such that it

was imperative to keep French requests

"within minimum requirements."

 16

On 13 November General Eisenhower

rejected General Giraud's proposal for an

expansion of the ANFA program to twelve

divisions. He then seized the opportunity

to remind the French Commander in Chief

that previous American appeals for a revision of the 15 August Plan had been unheeded, and to reiterate his warning that

U.S. service troops would not be provided

to support French combat units. He

added:

I am now convinced that you should have

the program restudied and revised so that the

largest possible balanced force will be rearmed. It must be apparent to all that there

is nothing gained in raising divisions which,

for lack of adequate supporting arms and

services, we are unable to employ in combat.

... As the revised program will be the basis

for the supply of U.S. equipment, I naturally

wish to approve it before it is sent to the War

Department.

Voicing his belief that only by effecting a

cutback of the program would the personnel

be found for manning the necessary supporting arms and services, General Eisenhower then revealed his intentions in the

matter. He proposed to recommend to the

War Department that the equipment for

one infantry and two armored divisions be

eliminated from the program. It was his

hope that the French Commander in Chief

would signify his agreement to the proposal

or offer any alternative thereto without

delay.17

While AFHQ staff sections were revising

the program along the lines set forth by

G-3 on 3 November, General Eisenhower

informed the CCS of his proposal to reduce

the number of divisions. In anticipation of

Giraud's reply, he urged that he be authorized to determine the appropriateness of

any solution which General Giraud might

offer and, if necessary, to inform the latter

that three divisions would definitely be deleted from the program. Such a reduction,

he explained, would free qualified troops

for the organization of a balanced army

adequately supported by the necessary

troops and base units.18

The French military authorities, it was

then learned informally, were planning to

submit a counterproposal calling for the

elimination of two divisions only (one infantry and one armored), with the justification that they could properly support in

personnel the remaining nine. Hopes were

high that a satisfactory agreement could

be effected between AFHQ and General

Giraud in the near future.19

On 20 November the JRC submitted

to General Giraud a revised version (known

thereafter as the 20 November Plan) of

the 15 August Plan. Prepared with the

assistance of the general and special staff

sections of AFHQ, the new plan represented

16

 Notes of Conf, Loomis, Leyer, and Regnault,

7 Nov 43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan.

17

 Ltr, Eisenhower to Giraud, 13 Nov 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt. 18

 Ltr, Eisenhower to CCS, 23 Nov 43, in same

file.

19

 Memo, Loomis for G-4, 23 Nov 43, JRC 902

Modification of Rearmt.
110 REARMING THE FRENCH

a substantial increase in service troops and

base section units considered necessary for

an army of eleven divisions. It was to be

used by the French as a basis in deciding

how many increments of self-sustaining

army corps they could reasonably activate.20

General Giraud's long-awaited reply to

General Eisenhower's two communications

finally came on 29 November.21 Contrary

to all expectations, the French Commander

in Chief merely reaffirmed his determination to implement the 15 August Plan in

its original form, meanwhile retaining the

1st Motorized Infantry Division as a nonprogram unit. In support of his position,

he furnished statistics intended to show that

sufficient white effectives would be found to

provide the necessary technicians and specialists. Service units, he explained, would

be set up progressively as matériel and

troops became available, and in such a

manner that the last unit would be ready

by 15 July 1944. The 15 August Plan, he

asserted in conclusion, could be achieved

in its entirety "with a necessary time lag"

between the activation of combat units and

the setting up of the corresponding services.

As for the 20 November Plan, he had requested his staff to study it and he would

send his comments on it shortly. A postscript, penned by the general himself, contained this last plea: "At the present time,

the main consideration is to equip the divisions as originally contemplated, for which

cadre and fighting personnel are now complete. To delay their rearmament will be

an error likely to have grave consequences.22

AFHQ officials received General Giraud's

communication with considerable apprehension. In the opinion of G-3, the French

Commander in Chief either failed to understand the importance of providing an army

properly balanced in combat and essential

service units, or "purposely ignored" the

suggestion made to him by General Eisenhower on 13 November. Not only was the

proposal to retain the 1st Motorized Infantry Division as an eighth infantry division regarded as likely to aggravate an

already serious deficiency in service units,

but it was feared that it would result in

setting up a force better adapted to an occupational role than combat against a firstclass enemy.23

Reluctant to act in a manner that might

be construed as arbitrary, General Eisenhower agreed to call a conference with the

French, presided over by G-3, for the purpose of re-examining the entire rearmament

question. To provide the conference with

a working basis on which to draft a program commensurate with available qualified

manpower, AFHQ staff sections undertook

to prepare alternate tables of the minimum

essential supporting service and base units

for an expeditionary force of 7 infantry and

3 armored divisions, 7 infantry and 2 armored divisions, or 6 infantry and 2 armored

divisions. These tables were to serve as a

basis for scaling down, if found necessary,

the present 20 November Plan of 7 infantry

and 4 armored divisions to whichever of

the three combinations would be most practicable in the light of French capabilities.

20

 Chart, 20 Nov Plan, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3

Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. I. 21

 On that same day, incidentally, Allied representatives attending the EUREKA Conference (held

at Tehran on 28 November-1 December) heard

Marshal Joseph Stalin raise the question of French

rearmament. President Roosevelt outlined for his

benefit the progress achieved to date and disclosed

that "nine" divisions, re-equipped and trained by

the United States, would soon be ready.

22

 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 29 Nov 43, JRC

904 Modifications of Rearmt. 23

 Memo, Rooks for CofS AFHQ, 1 Dec 43,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. I.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 111

Copies of the tables, once completed, were

forwarded to the French for their consideration.24

As the month of December opened, the

rearmament operations were still bogged

down. No action beyond shipment of the

October slice of the 15 August Plan had

been taken to assign equipment. The prospect of an immediate resumption of shipments was dim. Yet the weeks just ended

had not been altogether fruitless. The

readying of the first French expeditionary

forces had gone on at an accelerated pace.

In fact it was about to reach its culmination

in an event of significant importance.

On 8 December, two days before the

scheduled rearmament conference, a U.S.-

equipped North African division was committed to combat in Italy. The action resulted from a decision reached at a meeting

of the Commanders in Chief held on 3

November, and in execution of plans drawn

in August by AFHQ and the French High

Command.25 The division, the 2d Moroccan Infantry (2d DIM), commanded by

Maj. Gen. André Dody and accompanied

by a regiment of Moroccan goumiers, the

4th Group of Tabors (4th GTM), constituted the advance party of the French

increment expected to be engaged in operations in the Italian theater. For the moment, it was to reinforce, and fight as part

of, the U.S. VI Corps, one of the component

corps of Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's Fifth

Army, itself part of the Eighth British Army,

commanded by General Sir Bernard L.

Montgomery. As General Marshall had

pointed out a week before in the course of

the Tehran Conference, the build-up of the

French increment was to be effected progressively on the basis of the performance

of the first division.26 Actually, however,

another division, the, 3d Algerian Infantry

(3d DIA), under the command of Maj.

Gen. Aimé de Goislard de Monsabert, was

already en route to join the 2d DIM in

battle. The dispatch of these units was

consonant with a decision reached by the

CCS themselves at the Cairo Conference on

the very eve of the engagement of the 2d

DIM. All French troops, they had then

agreed, would be given battle experience in

Italy before their ultimate employment in

operations in continental France.27

These and other developments were tangible proof that the rearmament operations, notwithstanding their setbacks, were

beginning to bear fruit. The entry of the

2d DIM into combat at this juncture was

an excellent case in point. The division

had been activated, equipped, schooled in

the technical use of its matériel, subjected

to extensive and intensive tactical training,

briefed, shipped, and brought to the front

line, all in just seven months. This was a

record that those responsible for French

rearmament could well be proud of. In

addition to the 2d DIM and the 3d DIA,

a third division, the 9th Colonial Infantry

(9th DIC), was being readied for shipment

overseas, and another, the 4th Moroccan

Mountain (4th DMM), was completing

its re-equipment in Corsica. Of the armored divisions, two (the 1st DB and 5th

DB) were ready; a third (the 2d DB), already trained, was waiting for the rest of

its equipment.

The 4th GTM entering the front line 24

 Memo, Rooks To All Concerned, 4 Dec 43, in

same file. 25

 Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander,

The Allied Armies in Italy From 3rd September

1943, to 12th December 1944 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950).

26

 Min, Plenary Sess, 29 Nov 43, EUREKA Conf. 27Min, CCS 138th Mtg, 7 Dec 43, SEXTANT

Conf.
112 REARMING THE FRENCH

GOUMIERS OF THE 4TH GROUP OF TABORS, Italy, December 1943. Men

around the fire have American C rations.

alongside the 2d DIM was one of several

smaller organizations which were not originally planned for under the rearmament

program, but which the French had activated and made ready largely at the urging

of AFHQ. These nonprogram units, most

of which were earmarked for service in Italy,

included 4 Moroccan tabor groups corresponding to 4 U.S. light infantry regiments, 8 mule pack companies corresponding to 16 U.S. mule pack companies, 1

brigade of spahis corresponding to 1 U.S.

horse cavalry regiment, 1 Commando Battalion and 1 Shock Battalion corresponding

to 2 U.S. infantry battalions of the Ranger

type, various headquarters, and divisional

training centers.

The four Moroccan tabor groups, each

consisting of three tabors, or battalions, represented a total of approximately 13,000

goumiers. The basic organization of these

robust, hardy, fearless mountaineers, most

of them Berbers from the Atlas region, was

the goum, or company, of a strength of

approximately 220 men including French

cadres of 2 officers and 12 noncommissioned

officers, and 16 native noncommissioned

officers. Because of its extreme mobility

and lightness, the goum was regarded by

the French military authorities as a sort
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 113

of "foot cavalry" unit able to accomplish,

over difficult terrain, some of the missions

ordinarily assigned to mounted cavalry.28

In view of the mountainous country in

which the U.S. Fifth Army was then operating, Allied and French commanders expected to gain substantial advantage from

the employment of goumiers. Already a

number of tabors had proved their worth

in the Tunisian campaign, in the conquest

of Sicily, and in the assault on Corsica.

All goumiers were, since 1 July 1943, under

the operational command of Brig. Gen.

Augustin Guillaume.

The mule pack companies were necessary

not only for the support of the French divisions being sent to Italy but, as General

Smith pointed out in a letter to General

Giraud, for the support of the U.S. Fifth

Army as a whole. Several such companies

were already in Italy.29

Operational developments in Italy had

prompted AFHQ, in October, to request

General Giraud to nominate a horse cavalry

regiment for service with the U.S. Fifth

Army. General Giraud had then offered a

brigade of spahis (native horsemen) consisting of two regiments, the 7th Algerian

Spahis and the 5th Moroccan Spahis, with

a total strength of approximately 2,200

men. To equip the brigade, the French

General Staff had drawn a substantial

amount of American equipment from program units, and obtained additional matériel (vehicles, armament, and technical

items) from U.S. theater stocks in answer

to an urgent appeal from General Giraud.

The brigade, incidentally, never reached

Italy; a subsequent change in the operational situation made its dispatch to that

theater no longer necessary.30

Both the Commando Battalion and the

Shock Battalion had been organized from

personnel released after the disbandment of

the Corps Franc at the close of the Tunisian campaign. The Shock Battalion, it

will be recalled, had participated in the

liberation of Corsica. The French General

Staff had issued both units some American

equipment to complete their French matériel. They were not required for service

with the Fifth Army, but were being held

in readiness for possible employment in the

Mediterranean.

All together the equipping of these various nonprogram units had consumed a substantial amount of American equipment

originally intended for program units. As

a result, program units were feeling more

than ever the pinch of shortages. It was

imperative, therefore, that some definite policy be established with regard to the present

and future equipping of nonprogram units.

The issue, in fact, was one of the many

questions on the agenda of the armament

conference scheduled for 10 December.

Attending the conference, held at AFHQ,

were some twenty U.S. officers representing

various AFHQ and NATOUSA staff sections and headed by General Smith. The

French delegation included General Devinck, chief of General Giraud's personal

staff, Colonel Regnault, chief of the French

Section, JRC, and other officers from the

French General Staff. Opening the meeting, Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks, Assistant

28 Chief of Staff G-3, AFHQ, reiterated the For information concerning the organization

and employment of Moroccan goums, see Memo

2453/EMGG/3/CEF, Gen Juin, 15 Jul 43, AFHQ

AG Sec 336.2 (Fr) Foreign Armies. 2 9Ltr, Smith to Giraud, 2 Dec 43, JRC 370/001

Employment of Units—Gen.

3 0Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 12 Oct 43, Ltrs,

Giraud to Eisenhower, 19 Oct, 4 Nov 43, and Ltr,

Hq NATOUSA to SOS, 8 Nov 43, JRC 400.1/003

Equip and Sups for Spahis.
114 REARMING THE FRENCH

SPAHIS IN NORTH AFRICA

need of creating a balanced French force

and asked the conference to determine and

agree upon a reasonable basis, fully consonant with French manpower availability,

on which to establish a final program. To

arrive at such a basis, he pointed out, it

might be necessary to reduce the number of

divisions from 11 to 10, 9, or even 8.

The conferees first examined the practicability of the larger program as revised on

20 November. Speaking for General

Giraud, General Devinck, while readily

agreeing to the elimination of a fourth corps

and of a twelfth division as proposed by the

French Commander in Chief in late October, made a strong plea for the retention of

the 15 August Plan. The current activation program as developed by the French

General Staff, he explained, was based on

the assumption that the August Plan was

firm and final. Implementation of the plan,

he pointed out in addition, was proceeding

satisfactorily, as evidenced by the arrival of

the first combat divisions in Italy. Turning

to the troublesome question of service units,

General Devinck declared that the activation of these units, although now behind

schedule, would be effected in due time

because the French General Staff was exerting every effort in that direction. Some

of the units, he added, were unnecessary

in any case. The French Army could do

with fewer service units than the U.S. Army;

furthermore, inasmuch as it was destined

ultimately to operate on home soil, it would

be in a position to use local resources.31

31

 The French were generally of the opinion that

the U.S. Army had an overabundance of services

some of which would be of little use to their own

frugal forces. As an example they pointed out
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 115

Apparently impressed by General Devinck's

arguments, the conferees attempted to reach

a compromise between the 20 November

and 15 August Plans by deleting a number

of unnecessary service units. Discussions

on the matter were to be resumed four days

later.32

General Devinck's strong assertion that

a program of eleven divisions was practicable must be weighed in relation to the

stand then taken by other members of the

French High Command. From available

evidence it appears that the earlier solidarity

of French thought on the subject, as reflected in the de Gaulle-Giraud memorandum of 18 September, had dissipated.33

 In

fact Giraud's personal staff, of which General Devinck was the chief, and the French

General Staff were in sharp disagreement

over the matter. Their divergence of views

resulted from a different approach to the

problem. General Staff officers felt that

it would be next to impossible to find the

necessary technicians and specialists for

seven infantry and four armored divisions

as provided under the 15 August Plan. They

reasoned as follows. To activate the entire

program would require 403,800 men,

147,500 of whom must be Frenchmen to

serve as cadres, technicians, and specialists.

The prospects of getting this large number

of white effectives were slim. Fewer men

than originally anticipated were escaping

from France to North Africa. The integration of the Gaullist forces had yielded

a relatively small number of Frenchmen.

Even with the application of the contemplated mobilization measures (such as the

recall of the 1919-35 classes of reservists,

that is, of men twenty-nine to forty-four

years of age), it was estimated that a total

of not more than 138,000 Frenchmen could

be found. The resulting deficit in white

effectives would amount to approximately

9,500 for the expeditionary forces alone.

To this number must be added the white

personnel required to maintain both an adequate reserve pool for the combat troops

and the military establishments in the zone

of interior. In the opinion of the General

Staff, therefore, the 15 August Plan could

not be implemented until such time as the

liberation of part of the Metropolitan territory had yielded additional French manpower.

General Giraud's personal staff, on the

other hand, considered the manpower

problem from the standpoint of quantity

rather than of quality. According to their

calculations, the reserve pool for the elevendivision program could reasonably be reduced from 20 percent as now set to 15

percent of the strength of the expeditionary

forces. This would lower the minimum of

effectives required to 350,750 men. Since

it was anticipated that total resources in

North Africa could reach 540,000 men,

there would be left 189,250 men for purposes other than the expeditionary forces

and the reserve pool. With the needs of

zone of interior establishments not exceeding 180,000 men, officers of Giraud's personal staff considere d that available

manpower would be more than sufficient

to permit the setting up of the entire program. It is interesting to note, incidentally,

that their divisions had no need for laundry companies since African natives, who formed the bulk

of their effectives, were used to washing their own

linen. See Marey, "Le Réarmement français en

Afrique du Nord (1942-1944)," Revue Politique et

Parlementaire (October, 1947), p. 56. 32Min, Fr Rearmt Conf, 10 Dec 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. I. 33

 See Résumé des Opérations de Réarmement,

undated and unsigned, original provided by Gen

Devinck, copy in Fr Reds File 218, OCMH; see

also Interv with Gen Regnault, Aug 50; de Gaulle

and Giraud Ltr and Memo cited n. 5, above.
116 REARMING THE FRENCH

that in spite of this claim the French military

authorities were already having difficulty in

sending to Italy the personnel needed to replace the heavy losses currently being sustained by the 2d Moroccan Infantry

Division.

At the end of the conference the delegates

agreed to reconvene four days later. It was

at this juncture, just when negotiations were

proceeding satisfactorily although at a slow

pace, that a flare-up in the political tug of

war between the French Committee of National Liberation and the French High

Command threatened, once again, the very

existence of the rearmament program.

The 1st DMI Incident

Having been requested by AFHQ several

weeks back to nominate a third infantry

division for service with the U.S. Fifth Army

in Italy, General Giraud had designated the

British-equipped 1st Motorized Infantry

Division. The reasons for this selection, as

he gave them to General Smith, were military as well as political. The 1st DMI was,

in his estimation, well trained and contained

a high percentage of Foreign Legion troops

of first-class fighting capacity. Moreover,

it was an ex-Free French unit. As such, its

inclusion among the forces being sent to

Italy was highly desirable if only to ward off

any possible criticism on the part of the

Gaullists.34

After much exchange of correspondence,

AFHQ informed General Giraud on 1 December that the Commanding General,

Allied Armies in Italy, General Sir Harold

R. L. G. Alexander, was not prepared to accept the 1st DMI as then equipped but

would welcome it if rearmed with U.S. matériel. This view was shared by General

Clark in whose Army the French divisions

were fighting.35

On 3 December, after restating that the

1st DMI could not be employed as currently equipped, AFHQ requested General Giraud, in view of the urgency of the

matter, to nominate at once another infantry division to be ready for embarkation

beginning 20 December. General Giraud

promptly announced that he was assigning

the American-equipped 9th Colonial Infantry Division (9th DIC) in lieu of the 1st

DMI.36

Apprised of this nomination, the National

Defense Committee, acting presumably

under authority of the decree of 2 October

1943, rejected General Giraud's decision

twenty-four hours after it had been announced.37

 Endorsing General de Gaulle's

views on the subject, the members of the

committee, excepting of course General

Giraud, ordered that the designation of the

1st DMI be maintained. Their action was

indicative that the French Commander in

Chief no longer held any influence with the

committee. To many an observer it seemed

but a matter of a short time before he would

be relegated to a back seat and possibly

forced to withdraw entirely from the military scene. Informal word of the committee's action, followed one day later by offi34Ltr, Smith to Giraud, 18 Nov 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres; Hq Fr High

Comd, GO 14, 18 Nov 43, quoted in Memo, G-3

Fr CinC's Personal Staff, n. d., copy in OCMH;

Msg 6357, Smith to CG 15th Army Gp, 27 Nov

43, JRC Cable Log.

35 Msg MA-792, Alexander to CinC AFHQ, 30

Nov 43, JRC Cable Log. 36

 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 9 Dec 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Authority for Control of

Fr Exp Forces. 37

 Article 6 of the decree: "Within the scope of

the directives of the CFLN, the National Defense

Committee shall decide upon the over-all plans concerning the organization, distribution, and employment of the French forces."
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 117

cial confirmation from General Giraud,

reached AFHQ just as General Devinck

was pleading for the retention of the elevendivision program.38

 Its effect could not be

anything but detrimental, especially at a

time when Franco-American relations were

already strained. AFHQ viewed the action

with considerable apprehension. G-3 officials in particular regarded it as a threat to

the successful prosecution of the war.

Complying with the National Defense

Committee's decision, General Giraud ordered the immediate integration of the 1st

DMI in the rearmament program as one of

the seven infantry divisions, a course of action which elicited a word of praise from

General Eisenhower.39 The length of time

required to re-equip and train the division

with American matériel was bound to delay

its departure for several months. The delay

in turn seriously threatened the success of

operations in Italy. Later events demonstrated that the threat was real. The 2d

DIM and 3d DIA, regrouped in early January 1944 as the nucleus of a separate corps,

known thereafter as the French Expeditionary Corps (Corps Expéditionnaire

Français—CEF), under the command of

General Juin, did not receive a third division until the end of February, instead of

mid-January as had been hoped. For lack

of reinforcements during the intervening six

weeks, General Juin was unable to exploit

the successes achieved by his forces north of

Cassino.40 The third division to join the

CEF, it must be noted, was the 4th Moroccan Mountain, commanded by Maj. Gen.

François Sevez, ready long before the 1st

DMI. The 1st DMI, under the command

of Brig. Gen. Charles Brosset, arrived finally in April as the fourth and last division

of the CEF.

The committee's action in reversing General Giraud's decision focused attention on

an important and delicate issue, present

since November 1942, but one that had

engaged only the sporadic attention of

Anglo-American authorities, namely, the

question of the control of French forces. No

firm understanding had yet been reached

regarding the matter other than the arrangement set forth in the Clark-Darlan Agreement of 22 November 1942. The agreement stipulated that the status, command,

functions, employment, rights, and privileges of the French land, sea, and air forces

were to remain "under French direction."

No basis, therefore, existed on which the

Allied Commander in Chief could claim authority to issue orders either to the French

Commander in Chief, to the French Committee of National Liberation, or to the latter's military representative, the National

Defense Committee, concerning the disposal

of French forces. Eisenhower was in fact

dependent on voluntary French acquiescence in his proposals. In the past, it had

been possible to deal directly with Giraud

with reasonable assurance that just demands

would be met. The committee's recent action constituted a reversal of the existing

arrangement and a dangerous precedent.

The time had come to obtain the CFLN's

agreement that in the future the troops in3 8Ltr 924/3.S, Giraud to AFHQ, 11 Dec 43,

quoted in Memo, G-3 for CofS, 11 Dec 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Authority for Control of

Fr Exp Forces. 39

 In a letter to General Giraud, General Eisenhower praised the French Commander in Chief

for "sacrificing" some of his own desires in order

"to promote the best interests of the French and

a better understanding among the Allies." Ltr,

Eisenhower to Giraud, 31 Dec 43, AFHQ SACS

Red Sec, Fr Matters, Gen Giraud.

40

 General Marcel Carpentier, Les Forces Alliées

en Italie; la Campagne d'Italie (Paris: BergerLevrault, 1949), p. 69.
118 REARMING THE FRENCH

eluded in the rearmament program would

be made available as and when requested,

for employment in areas and under commands designated by the Allied Commander in Chief. Divisions, corps, and armies,

when employed as such, would of course

be under French commanders. Convinced

that the practice of dealing directly with the

French Commander in Chief was desirable

and should be continued, General Rooks

suggested that "the onus of getting the required guarantee from the Committee

should be placed on him."

 41

In line with this recommendation, Eisenhower requested General Giraud, on 14 December, to transmit to the CFLN the following warning. In view of the National

Defense Committee's action, which from the

tactical standpoint entailed "grave consequences," the rearmament program would

not be continued unless the CFLN gave definite assurance that the use of the rearmed

forces would be "governed solely by military

considerations and subject to the decisions

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff through

their representative, the Allied CinC in this

Theater."

 42

 AFHQ immediately cabled a

copy of Eisenhower's letter to the CCS and

informed President Roosevelt and Prime

Minister Churchill of the incident. The

President requested General Marshall to

keep him abreast of subsequent developments.43

General Giraud was now placed in a

doubly embarrassing position, for the warning which he was to transmit to the CFLN

was the indirect result of one of his own decisions. The committee seized the opportunity to tighten further its grip on the control of French military affairs. By a new

decree on the Organization of the High

Command, issued on 16 December, the

CFLN transferred much of the power heretofore vested in the Commander in Chief

to the National Defense Committee.

Thereafter the National Defense Committee was to make all decisions concerning the

employment and distribution of forces as

well as the general armament and organization programs. The Commander in

Chief was "appointed by decree of the

CFLN." Placed on a level with both the

Commissioner of War and Air and the Commissioner of the Navy, he was to "take part"

in rearmament discussions and negotiations,

and countersign all rearmament requisitions

submitted by the individual Commissioners

in accordance with the general directives

of the National Defense Committee.44

To say that the 16 December decree had

curtailed General Giraud's functions would

be an understatement. By it, the only forces

left under his control were the expeditionary forces, and even his control over them

ceased the moment they were committed

to an overseas operation, for they then

passed under Allied command. All other

forces were under the direct control of the

Commissioners of War and Air and of the

Navy. Commenting on the implications

of this and other decrees,45 AFHQ officials

41Memo, Rooks for Smith, 12 Dec 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Authority for Control of

Fr Exp Forces. 42Ltr, Eisenhower to Giraud, 14 Dec 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Authority for Control of

Fr Exp Forces. 43

 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 15 Dec 43, NAF 548;

Msg W-8446, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Dec 43,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. I;

Msg WX-5492, Marshall to Eisenhower, 22 Dec 43,

OPD Cable Files.

44Decree of 16 Dec 43, CFLN, JRC 320/004

Orgn of Fr Army. 45

 Such as the decree concerning the Organization of the Expeditionary Ground Forces, dated

7 January 1943 and signed by General de Gaulle

and André Le Troquer, Commissioner of War and

Air.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 119

admitted that the authority of the French

Commander in Chief was on its way to becoming "negligible." They agreed, however, that since he was being held "responsible for liaison," the practice of dealing

with him should continue as before until

such time as it would prove ineffective.46

Meanwhile, General de Gaulle, as President of the CFLN, had asked for a conference with representatives of the Allied

Commander in Chief to discuss the terms of

the assurance required of the committee in

connection with the control of French forces.

The meeting, first planned for 24 December

but postponed pending the outcome of another serious French political crisis, was

held three days later in General de Gaulle's

office.47 It was attended by General Smith,

Edwin Wilson, Minister of the United

States, Harold Macmillan, Minister of the

United Kingdom, and René Massigli,

French Commissioner of Foreign Affairs.

Massigli handed to his American and British colleagues the text of a draft agreement

prepared by the CFLN setting forth the

conditions under which the Allied Commander in Chief could employ the land, sea,

and air forces placed at his disposal by the

committee. Smith then informed Massigli

that a recent CCS decision to undertake

an assault on continental France in the near

future envisaged the participation of all

French land and air forces, whether American- or British-equipped. The greater part

of the land forces, he added, would be employed as a French army in an operation

of which he gave the general outline and

the approximate location.48

The decision to which General Smith referred had been made a fortnight before in

the course of the Cairo Conference. The

Combined Chiefs had agreed that the crossChannel attack ( OVERLORD ), with a target

date of 1 May, would be supported by a

simultaneous assault on southern France

(ANVIL, later DRAGOON). They had decided further that the bulk of the French

forces would participate in ANVIL, and only

a token force in OVERLORD. The CCS

agreement that the rearmed forces would

ultimately be employed on French soil was

a momentous one. It would tend to reassure the French that their legitimate ambition to participate in the liberation of their

homeland would be fulfilled. It would

also serve to stimulate interest in French

rearmament, for it represented a definite

objective on which AFHQ and the War

Department could base the next phase.

Once the extent of French participation in

both OVERLORD and ANVIL had been determined, it would be relatively easy to develop and implement a final program.49

Two days after the conference in General

de Gaulle's office, Massigli informed the

British and American political representatives that General Smith's disclosures regarding the future employment of the

French forces had "removed the essential

anxieties" of the CFLN. As a result, the

46

 Memo, G-3 Opns for G-3 Sec AFHQ, 20 Jan

44, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Negotiations,

No. 1, Vol. II. 47

 Informed that the CFLN was planning to mete

out severe punishment in the case of several officials who in the past had shown strong pro-Vichy

tendencies, President Roosevelt requested General

Eisenhower on 22 December to "direct" the committee to take no action against these individuals

at the present time in view of the assistance given

by them to the Allied armies during the campaign

in Africa. The CFLN complied with the request.

Msg 5456, WAR to Algiers (secret and personal

from the President for Gen Eisenhower), 22 Dec

43, White House File.

48

 Ltr, Massigli to Wilson, 30 Dec 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Negotiations, No. 1,

Vol. II. 49

 Min, CCS 136th Mtg, 4 Dec 43, and CCS 138th

Mtg, 7 Dec 43, SEXTANT Conf.
120 REARMING THE FRENCH

CONFERENCE IN ALGIERS, November 1943. From left: René Massigli, Andrei Y.

Vishinsky, Maj. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Harold Macmillan, and Robert D. Murphy. The

27 December meeting was attended by Edwin Wilson, Minister of the United States, and those

shown in the photograph except for Mr. Vishinsky.

committee had decided to place these forces

at the disposal of the CCS to be used by the

Allied Commander in Chief, in consultation with the French High Command, for

the execution of the contemplated operations. While eager not to hinder the conduct of these operations, the committee reserved the right to appeal to the American

and British governments, and the right of

the French High Command to appeal to the

Allied Commander in Chief to ensure that

the use of the forces in question would take

French interests into account "as completely

as possible."

 50

The solution offered by the CFLN for

the control of French forces was received by

AFHQ with considerable satisfaction. As

General Eisenhower had been given to expect by his advisers, the committee had recognized the "reasonableness" of his demands, and in turn was making a reasonable

proposal.51 It now remained for the CCS

to settle the issue. For the moment the

danger of a serious crisis had subsided. The

tension brought about by the 1st DMI episode was rapidly abating. On 4 January

AFHQ informed the CCS of the details of

the CFLN proposals, adding these comfort50Ltr, Massigli to Wilson, 30 Dec 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Negotiations, No. 1,

Vol. II.

51

 Msg W-8446, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Dec

43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt,

Vol. I.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 121

ing words: "The equipping of the French

forces is continuing."

 52

Cutback of the Program—The 23 January

Plan

Staff discussions, meanwhile, had gone on

undisturbed. The problems raised in the

course of the 10 December conference were

taken up again at the second meeting held

as scheduled four days later. The conferees examined once more the 20 November Plan and proceeded to reduce it by

eliminating certain unnecessary engineer,

field artillery, and antiaircraft artillery units.

General Devinck then expressed his conviction that the French High Command had

the necessary personnel to fulfill the program

as now revised. Turning to the question of

nonprogram units, he urged that some provision be made for their equipment. These

units, he pointed out, had been requested

for employment by the Allies and a number

of them were already in Italy. After some

discussion, the conferees agreed, in part,

that (1) the JRC would, as a matter of

urgency, examine the revised program in

the light of available qualified French manpower, and determine whether or not it

could be effectively fulfilled; (2) the French

High Command would make available to

the JRC all pertinent information needed

for such an examination; (3) the schedule

for activating and equipping units in the

program would be phased so that the forces

could be made ready for employment in increments of self-sustaining army corps with

proportionate supporting combat and service units for the corps, army and base installations; and (4) some provision would

be made for the issue of equipment to nonprogram units.53

Immediately after the conference, the

French military authorities took steps to

force a decision with respect to the provision of equipment to nonprogram units. In

their opinion the matter was a serious one,

for the issue of U.S. matériel to these units

had produced critical shortages in the equipment of program units. To fill these shortages, they announced their intention to submit additional requisitions. Commenting

on the proposal, General Loomis declared

himself opposed to requisitioning complete

initial equipment for the nonprogram units

since they were basically French-equipped.

He considered that their inclusion on the

program for maintenance only would adequately take care of their needs. His recommendation was endorsed by G-3 and

G-4, AFHQ, and, for the moment at least,

made the basis of the theater's policy on the

matter.54

General Eisenhower had already informed the War Department that he would

soon forward, for submission to the CCS, the

final recommendations of the theater on the

auxiliary units to be added to the program.

He had also indicated that an entirely new

project, incidental to the rearmament program and under consideration at AFHQ for

some time, was being transmitted to Washington by separate cable, likewise for submission to the CCS.55

The new project concerned the provision

of matériel to French Communications

Zone establishments considered necessary to

52Msg W-9307/23731, Eisenhower to CCS, 4

Jan 44, NAF 579.

53

 Min, Fr Rearmt Conf, 14 Dec 43, AFHQ 0100/

12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. I. 54

 Memos, Regnault for Loomis, 15 Dec 43, and

Loomis for G-3 AFHQ, 15 Dec 43, JRC 904 Modification of Rearmt. 55

 Msg W-7569, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 14 Dec

43, in same file.
122 REARMING THE FRENCH

maintain the normal life of the expeditionary forces. The question was not a new

one. In fact, since February 1943, the War

Department had been shipping maintenance

materials for these establishments, such as

ammunition, petroleum, and subsistence, at

the rate of approximately 4,000 tons

monthly and on the basis of requisitions

submitted by the French Military Mission

in Washington.56 The French, however,

had come to regard this assistance as totally

inadequate and not commensurate with the

expansion of their expeditionary forces.

The question of increasing this assistance

came up in the fall of 1943 in connection

with a study of French maintenance requirements for the future months. In early October War Department officials requested

the French military authorities to prepare,

with the assistance of the JRC, and submit

without delay an estimate of their maintenance requirements for the calendar years

1944 and 1945. This estimate was to be incorporated in the Army Supply Program

then under preparation in Washington. It

was to include a computation of the maintenance requirements on all matériel, American, British, French, and enemy-captured,

other than that sent from the United States

under the rearmament program. The War

Department, lacking adequate information,

delegated the study to the theater. In midOctober General Leyer submitted to the

JRC a number of requisitions. At the same

time the National Defense Committee produced a long memorandum which the

French Military Mission in Washington

passed on to General Marshall.57

An analysis of these various documents revealed that they envisaged new projects extending far beyond the maintenance of the

forces being rearmed under the current program and the Communications Zone troops

assigned to the support of expeditionary

forces. The new projects included additional units to be activated from manpower

resources of the French Union not presently utilized for the build-up of the expeditionary forces, a task force for employment

in the Far East, and units to be activated in

continental France once OVERLORD and

ANVIL had been launched.

American officials promptly turned down

these proposals. They regarded them as

going "far beyond any possibility of early

consideration by the CCS" and, insofar as

the Army Supply Program was concerned,

as wholly irrelevant.58 In General Marshall's opinion, the projects, especially the

proposal to rearm Metropolitan forces, were

matters for decision by President Roosevelt

inasmuch as they involved far-reaching

questions of policy.59 On 4 November

General Loomis informed General Leyer

that the theater would retain, for consideration and processing, only that portion of

the requisitions which dealt with the

Communications Zone establishments. He

pointed out that the French High Command was at liberty to take up all other

projects, if it so wished, directly with the

War Department through the French Military Mission.60

The requisitions submitted by General

Leyer on behalf of the Communications

Zone troops were quite substantial. To 56

 Memo, Loomis for CG NATOUSA, 12 Mar 44,

JRC 400.4/002 Maintenance for Territorial Forces. 57Ltrs, Leyer to Loomis, 5 Oct, 18 Oct, 20 Oct

43, JRC 907 Rearmt Plan '44-45; Memo, National Defense Committee for Fr Military Mission

for Marshall, 16 Oct 43, ABC 091.711 France (6

Oct 43), Sec 1-A.

58

 Memo, Loomis for Deputy Theater Comdr, 4

Nov 43, JRC 907 Rearmt Plan '44-45. 59

 Memo, Marshall for JCS, 2 Nov 43, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 45), Sec 2-A. 60

 Memo. Loomis for Leyer, 4 Nov 43, JRC 907

Rearmt Plan '44-45.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 123

justify their validity as well as urgency, he

sent to General Loomis, on 10 November, a

detailed report. The forces in question, he

explained, fell into two categories, namely,

Sovereignty and Territorial forces.

Sovereignty forces were the Army units,

none larger than a regiment, and service

organizations whose functions General

Leyer described as follows: to ensure French

sovereignty over the North and West African territory after the departure of the expeditionary forces for overseas service, to

maintain internal order, and to assume the

coastal and antiaircraft defense of the territory as well as the guarding of airfields,

depots, and POW camps. These forces represented a total strength then estimated at

103,000 men for both North and West

Africa. Of these, 8,000 were already employed by U.S. military authorities as guards

in American POW camps.

Territorial forces were the forces responsible for the running of headquarters, training centers, schools, port bases, hospitals,

shops, Quartermaster depots, and other similar establishments. Representing a total

of some 100,000 men, these troops worked

almost exclusively for the support of expeditionary units.

The equipment then in the hands of both

Sovereignty and Territorial forces was, explained General Leyer, in deplorable condition. All of it was of old French stock and

was now worn out. It was urgent, he concluded, to provide these troops with initial

equipment in addition to maintenance materials, lest the expeditionary forces themselves be deprived of proper support in the

immediate future.61

General Loomis was fully aware of the

conditions described by the French Chief of

Staff and recognized the necessity of furnishing equipment at least to the forces and

establishments devoting their activities to

the support of expeditionary forces. He

urged General Smith to consider the preparation of a separate project for submission

to the CCS. With this in view, he proceeded to list the Territorial establishments

which he considered indispensable, and estimated the personnel necessary to run them

at 93,000 men. He then recommended

that maintenance only be issued to these

establishments, and that no consideration

be given, for the moment, to the requirements of Sovereignty forces.62

 Endorsing

these recommendations, General Eisenhower requested the CCS to authorize the

issue of specific materials, largely nonmilitary, to such Communications Zone establishments as the theater considered necessary. Prompt approval of the project,

he pointed out, would ensure the proper

support of the expeditionary forces expected

to be re-equipped under the rearmament

program as currently revised.63

The revision of the program was, of

course, the main issue still to be solved. The

two armament conferences had emphasized

the desire of the French High Command to

implement the eleven-division program in

its entirety. General Giraud had not replied to Eisenhower's proposal, made on 13

November, to reduce the number of divisions to be rearmed. The growing suspicion

that he was not prepared to change his views

on the subject gained weight when AFHQ

officials learned that he had appealed directly to General Marshall.

The American Chief of Staff had, by his

61

 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 10 Nov 43, JRC 400.4/

002 Maintenance for Territorial Forces.

62

 Memos, Loomis for CofS AFHQ, 13 Nov, 29

Nov, 4 Dec 43, and Memo, Loomis for G-4, 4 Dec

43, in same file. 63

 Msg W-7589/13853, Eisenhower to CCS, 14

Dec 43, NAF 546.
124 REARMING THE FRENCH

attitude and utterances in the course of the

preceding months, shown himself to be a

firm and constant advocate of French rearmament. General Giraud had not failed

to recognize this fact and to express to General Marshall, as he did again in a New

Year's greeting, his appreciation.64 It was to

be expected that in his final attempt to retain

the original program, Giraud would appeal

to the one American official whom he regarded as his staunchest supporter. In a letter submitted on his behalf, Lt. Gen. Paul

Beynet, the new chief of the French Military Mission in Washington, assured Marshall that the reluctance of the French military authorities to accept AFHQ's proposal

to eliminate three divisions from the program was not due to lack of good will on

their part.65 Rather it resulted from the impossibility of reaching a satisfactory solution

to the problem of service troops. To convert into service units, he explained, good

combat divisions now trained in the use of

U.S. weapons and presently awaiting their

final equipment would result in a lowering

of morale bound to affect the entire French

Army. The conversion, in any case, was

not likely to produce efficient service units

considering that the personnel so transferred,

mostly native, had none of the professional

aptitude or skill required to make good

mechanics or technicians. In short, to

adopt the proposal advocated by AFHQ

would merely result in breaking up excellent

fighting units and necessitate their replacement by American combat units. The help

of the American services, therefore, was a

primary necessity, if only to eliminate the

need for a greater number of U.S. divisions.66

The argument was one which General

Marshall could not dismiss lightly considering his often repeated statement that it was

more economical for the United States to

rearm available French manpower than to

ship both equipment and American manpower overseas. But the decision regarding

the composition of the French forces, while

subject to CCS approval, rested with General Eisenhower. It was not likely that he

and his staff would retreat from the firm

position they had taken regarding the necessity for the French forces to become selfsustaining. In his answer to General

Beynet, Marshall merely observed that "the

present position is that we are awaiting a

reply from General Giraud." The French

Commander in Chief had still to be heard

from regarding Eisenhower's proposal to reduce the program.67

The position of the theater had been

made unmistakably clear to the French only

a few days before by the Allied Commander

in Chief himself. About to leave North

Africa to take up in London his new post

of Supreme Commander for the cross-Channel operation, General Eisenhower had paid

an impromptu visit to General de Gaulle.

One of the subjects he brought up for discussion was the controversy over service

troops. First he offered this sound advice:

"We must not be mesmerized by the number of divisions to be rearmed." Professing not to know what this number was, he

stressed that it was better to have one division completely organized than several

64

 Msg 109 BT, Giraud to Marshall (signed Eisenhower), 31 Dec 43, OCS A-48-11 (091 France

Sec 1). 65

 General Beynet was appointed Chief, French

Military Mission in the United States, in November

1943, in replacement of General Bethouart, who

was recalled to North Africa to take command of

an Army corps.

66

 Ltr, Beynet to Marshall, 3 Jan 44, Somervell

Files, Fr 1943-44, A-46-257, Ser 1, Dr 3. 67

 Ltr, Marshall to Beynet, 5 Jan 44, in same

file.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 125

which were not. General de Gaulle immediately declared himself in agreement

with this view. The correct policy was, he

recognized, to complete the activation and

equipping of some units before trying to

form others. He agreed that they must be

"made complete above all from the standpoint of Services" even if this meant that

their number could not reach that which

was at first contemplated. Still, he hoped

that it would be possible to arm six infantry

and three armored divisions as well as three

army corps headquarters and have them

ready by 1 April 1944. General Jean de

Lattre de Tassigny, under whose command

it was intended to place these forces, was

to go into the details of their organization.

The matter, he agreed, was one to be handled "meticulously and thoroughly." Apparently pleased by these arrangements,

General Eisenhower then made clear to de

Gaulle that he intended to use a token

French force in the cross-Channel operation: "I will not enter Paris without the

French at my side."

 68

General de Gaulle's statements were an

indication that his concept of armament

problems was more realistic than General

Giraud's. Granted that he did not feel the

moral obligation, as Giraud did, of holding

firmly to the ANFA Agreement since he had

not been a party to it, his views nevertheless

were known to be more in line with those

held by AFHQ officials.69 At any rate,

Eisenhower's advice not to be mesmerized

by the number of divisions to be re-equipped

had accurately identified the chief weakness

in General Giraud's reasoning. The

French Commander in Chief's insistence

on adhering strictly to the original elevendivision program was understandable from

both the psychological and national points

of view. Yet it could hardly stand up

against the realities of the time. Primarily

it was irreconcilable with the firm American decision not to provide troops and services in support of the French expeditionary

forces.

Meeting on 31 December, the CCS rejected Eisenhower's proposal of 23 November that he be authorized to determine the

appropriateness of any solution of the rearmament problem which Giraud might

propose. They felt and agreed that, for the

sake of co-ordination on the part of the

agencies involved, matters pertaining to

French rearmament should continue to be

presented for their consideration with the

recommendation of the Allied Commander

in Chief in the theater.70 The decision was

communicated to General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, who was succeeding General

Eisenhower in the Mediterranean with the

new title of Supreme Allied Commander,

Mediterranean Theater.71

The Munitions Assignments Board had

made no assignments to the French since

October but was ready to resume them if

and when the theater so requested. For

some time now, the theater had delayed

taking final action on the proposed reduction of the program pending word from

General Giraud.72 AFHQ, however, could

wait no longer. The decision to use the

bulk of the French forces in the ANVIL operation on 1 May made it necessary to end

policy debates. On 1 January AFHQ set

the deadline for the readiness of participating French troops at 1 April. With only

68

 Min of Interv, Eisenhower with de Gaulle, 30

Dec 43, JRC 908 Policy and Plan—Misc. 69

 Interv with Loomis, Jun 50.

7 0Min, CCS 139th Mtg, 31 Dec 43. 71

 Msg 6133, CCS to AFHQ, 1 Jan 44, FAN 288. 7 2Rpt, MAB to CCS, 31 Dec 43, sub: Status

of Fr Rearmt Program, ABC 091.711 France (6

Oct 43), Sec 2-a.
126 REARMING THE FRENCH

three months left for preparations, there

could no longer be any question of devoting further effort to revising the 15 August

Plan. Instead it was imperative to determine what units were considered essential

for the contemplated operations and

whether or not they could be equipped and

made ready by 1 April.

Expecting that a firm French troop list

for ANVIL would soon be established, AFHQ

agreed to resume shipments from the

United States. On 1 January the JRC ordered the equipment for those units of the

November and December slices of the August Plan which it considered essential for

the contemplated operations, and which in

its estimation the French could be expected

to have trained and ready by 1 April. The

JRC eliminated all other units, such as one

army corps headquarters, one armored division, one tank destroyer battalion, four

shore battalions, and various supporting

units for which the French did not have

the necessary trained personnel. Furthermore, in anticipation of a reduction of the

over-all program, the committee requested

the War Department to place the remaining infantry division of the November slice

in last priority. On 2 January General

Loomis queried the War Department regarding the possibility of equipping eightythree other supporting combat and service

organizations whose addition to the August

Plan was considered necessary. No equipment was currently available for these units

in North Africa.73

On 9 January Lt. Gen. J. A. H. Gammell,

successor to General Smith as Chief of Staff,

AFHQ, informed General Giraud of the

measures being taken by AFHQ as a result

of the limited time available for preparations. He urged Giraud to bend all efforts

to provide units for which there was urgent

need, and to postpone the formation of those

not required in the immediate future. Appended to his communication was a list of

units on the 15 August Plan no longer considered essential and therefore being deferred, and of those urgently needed by 1

April or immediately after that date for

which equipment would be made available

if they could be trained and made ready in

due time.74

General Gammell's letter brought an immediate reply from General Giraud. While

signifying his agreement in principle, the

French Commander in Chief restated his

intention of retaining "as a basis" the 15

August Plan. He confirmed the news that

had already reached AFHQ informally that

the National Defense Committee had ordered the deactivation of two infantry divisions (the 8th Algerian Infantry and the

10th Colonial Infantry). The action, he

pointed out, was expected to make available

large numbers of personnel for the creation

of supporting units. Giraud then voiced

his belief that it would be possible at a later

date to set up the units deferred at this

time, in particular the fourth armored

division.75

AFHQ's proposal to eliminate the fourth

armored division from the program had

greatly distressed General Giraud. In a

moving appeal to General Marshall, he explained that he had consented to the elimination of two infantry divisions in order

to retain the fourth armored division. He

73 urged Marshall to demonstrate once again

Msg 22135/W-9044, Eisenhower to AGWAR,

1 Jan 44, JRC Cable Log; Memo, Loomis for

Lutes, 2 Jan 44, JRC 904 Modification of Rearmt:

Msg W-9934/27229, Wilson to CCS, 11 Jan 44,

NAF 586.

74

 Ltr, Gammell to Giraud, 9 Jan 44, JRC 903

Requests for Units. 75

 Ltr, Giraud to Wilson, 11 Jan 44, in same file.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 127

his "sympathy for France" by pressing for

the maintenance of a unit which, for tactical reasons, would be "indispensable" in the

forthcoming operations.76

The National Defense Committee's decision to abolish two infantry divisions, confirmed in General Giraud's Order 16 of 11

January, had been reached after the committee became convinced that no other step

could produce personnel for service units.

Even officers of General Giraud's personal

staff, who for several months had fought

tooth and nail for the retention of the entire

program, had finally come to the conclusion

that deficits in technical personnel were too

great to permit implementation of the program in its entirety. The elimination of

two infantry rather than one armored and

one infantry divisions had been decided

upon by the committee for two reasons.

First, it was expected to yield 3,500 more

men. Second, it would make it possible,

much as Giraud himself had indicated in

his last letter to General Marshall, to retain

the greatest possible number of armored divisions whose role in the forthcoming operations the committee considered important.

The French General Staff was planning to

use the 30,000-odd men now made available to fill deficits in two other divisions

(the 7th Algerian and 9th Colonial Infantry Divisions), to provide personnel for supporting combat and service units, and finally

to complete army corps headquarters and

base units.77

AFHQ officials did not share the French

view on the fourth armored division. In

their judgment, terrain in southern France

did not favor the employment of armor.

They had fixed the composition of the

French-U.S. invading force at two armored

to eight infantry divisions. The two armored divisions, they agreed, would be provided by the French, and a third French

armored division, if required, would be employed in the cross-Channel operation.

They saw no use, therefore, for the fourth

armored division (the 3d DB), which the

French had already organized and partly

equipped.78 Moreover, they suspected that

the French action in deactivating two infantry divisions would result, in practice, in

the elimination of only one from the program. Indeed the 1st DMI, heretofore retained as a twelfth nonprogram division,

was now being incorporated in the program. There would still be left, in effect,

six infantry and four armored divisions, or

a total of ten. Such an arrangement hardly

accorded with the recommendations of the

theater that the program be reduced to eight

divisions.

The need for a speedy decision in the

matter was becoming increasingly urgent if

only for psychological reasons. Uncertainty as to their future was causing a

marked lowering of morale among the officers and men of the two divisions whose fate

was still in the balance. These were the

3d Armored and the 7th Algerian Infantry.

The 3d DB was only partly equipped and

trained. The 7th DIA had at one time received most of its American equipment and

had done considerable training. In recent

weeks some of its matériel had been turned

over to the Spahis Brigade; now more of it

was being transferred to the 1st DMI.79

Once they had eliminated the 8th DIA

76

 Ltr, Giraud to Marshall, 10 Jan 44, OPD 336.2

France, Sec 2. 77

 Résumé des Opérations de Réarmement, Fr

Reds File 218, OCMH.

78

 Msg 578, Devers to Marshall, 28 Jan 44, CMIN 19255. 79

 Memo, Loomis for G-3 AFHQ, 30 Dec 43,

JRC 370/001 Employment of Units—Gen.
128 REARMING THE FRENCH

and 10th DIC, the French military authorities undertook to revise their activation program on the basis of manpower now available to them. On 17 January the National

Defense Committee submitted to the JRC a

copy of the revised program together with

appropriate requisitions for matériel with

which to equip new units. The program

represented an attempt to effect a compromise between the demands of AFHQ for

certain essential supporting units and the

French desire to retain units recently deferred by AFHQ. It still included a fourth

armored division, although in second priority, as well as a number of units which

AFHQ considered no longer necessary. Anticipating that AFHQ would raise objections to their proposal, the committee asked

that a conference be held without delay at

which representatives of the French General Staff would furnish all pertinent

information.80

While the French proposal was being

studied by the JRC, discouraging news was

received from Washington. The CCS, it

was learned, had approved only partially

the recommendations submitted by the theater in mid-December on behalf of French

Communications Zone establishments.81

They ruled out the provision of organizational equipment and authorized only the

issue of certain maintenance materials generally falling into the category of expendable supplies, and of such indispensable items

(tools, electrical machines, and so on) as

could not be obtained from other sources,

provided the French would present sufficient

military justification for each request.82 In

short, the Combined Chiefs were not approving the full amount of even the rather

limited quantities of matériel which the

theater had requested initially. In a subsequent meeting with Brig. Gen. Auguste

Brossin de Saint-Didier, the new chief of

the French Military Mission in the United

States, about to depart for Washington,

General Loomis urged his visitor to take

the matter up directly with the War Department. He expressed the hope that a personal approach would succeed where impersonal cables had failed in securing the

necessary supplies.83

The conference requested by the National

Defense Committee was held on 22 January.

It was attended by Brig. Gen. William C.

Crane, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-3, Generals Loomis and Leyer, Colonels

Blanc and Regnault, and other officers.

After much discussion, the conferees drafted

a list of the units considered necessary for

participation in ANVIL. The list represented in effect the basis of a final rearmament program. It was immediately submitted to the National Defense Committee,

which approved it formally on 23 January.

The committee agreed that the troops

needed to implement the plan, known

thereafter as the 23 January Plan, were to

be drawn from the 7th DIA and the 3d DB.

These two organizations were to be retained

in cadre only, in the hope that they would

be reactivated and equipped at some later

date.84 As Colonel Regnault pointed out to

General Loomis, the action constituted a

"painful sacrifice" for the divisions concerned. The French High Command 80

 Ltr, Regnault to Loomis, 17 Jan 44, JRC 903

Requests for Units. 81

 Msg NAF 546 cited n. 63, above. 82

 Msg 7468, CCS to Wilson, 18 Jan 44, FAN

321, as corrected by Msg 8743, AGWAR to Devers,

3 Feb 44; Msg 267, AGWAR to Devers, 20 Feb 44,

JRC Cable Log.

8 3Min, Conf Loomis with de Saint-Didier, 12

Feb 44, AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec 337 (Fr)

Mtgs and Confs, Vol. I. 84Decision, National Defense Committee, 23 Jan

44, Rearmament Plan for Ground Forces, JRC

902/I Rearmt Plan.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: I 129

would try not to disintegrate their component elements but use them as constituted

units within other organizations so as to

maintain coherence and efficiency. It was

imperative, then, that the necessary equipment be made available to them forthwith.

Any delay would result in further lowering

morale and reducing efficiency.85

Before replying to Giraud's appeal of 10

January for the retention of all four armored

divisions, General Marshall sought the views

of the theater on the question.86 Lt. Gen.

Jacob L. Devers, who had recently replaced

Eisenhower as Commanding General, NATOUSA, reviewed for Marshall's benefit the

status of the negotiations to date. He explained how AFHQ had finally established

a program aimed at equipping units which

the French had the manpower to organize

in full and which would be engaged in ANVIL. As for the fourth armored division,

General Devers expressed the opinion that it

might be advisable to agree to its retention

on the program with the understanding that

the furnishing of equipment would be deferred indefinitely and that no personnel

would be reserved for it. Such a procedure,

he explained, would "appease French ambitions and at the same time accomplish our

purposes."

 87

The long and irksome struggle over service units appeared over for the moment at

least. The victory won by AFHQ had

made possible the establishment of a new

armament plan, sound and reasonable and

therefore workable. When it had been approved by the CCS, an action which they

were certain to take, both the French and

the Americans would have before them a

definite objective: the readying of a specific

task force for operations in France. During the final implementation of the program,

as many of the units as operationally practicable would be battle-tested beforehand in

Italy in accordance with the desires of the

CCS. The others would train in North

Africa. Ultimately, all would take part in

OVERLORD and ANVIL.

The 23 January Plan included in theory

six infantry and four armored divisions, and

some 245 supporting organizations of which

approximately 210 were units of the former

15 August Plan and 35 were additions. Actually, since one infantry division was being

retained in cadre only, and one armored

division was deferred indefinitely, the program consisted of just five infantry and

three armored divisions, or a total of eight

divisions. That was the number which

General Smith had recommended as a reasonable target in the course of his conversations in Washington back in October 1943.

The French had so far received from U.S.

sources the equipment considered necessary

for eight divisions and 164 supporting combat and service organizations. To implement the 23 January Plan in full, the task of

supplying matériel for approximately 80

supporting organizations remained to be

accomplished.

85

 Memo, Regnault for Loomis, 25 Jan 44, in

same file. 86

 Msg 8180, Marshall to Devers, 26 Jan 44, JRC

Cable Log. 87

 Msg W-1489, Devers to Marshall, 30 Jan 44,

AFHQ Cable Log.
CHAPTER VIII

The Program Marks Time

(November 1943-February 1944)

II

The French Reorganize Their Supply

System

Efforts to induce the French High Command to establish a sound supply system

paralleled those which were exerted to prod

it into organizing service units. Almost

from the beginning of the rearmament operations, AFHQ attempted to push the

North African Army into a position where

it would ultimately be able to supply and

maintain itself properly. As early as 24

March 1943 the chairman of the JRC

pointed out informally to his French colleagues on the committee how desirable it

would be for the French military authorities

to reorganize their supply system along the

lines of the American Services of Supply in

the theater. Two weeks later, just before

the arrival of convoy UGS 61⁄2, the first

large-scale shipment of U.S. matériel, he

urged the French General Staff, this time

in writing, to centralize the control of supply services and to institute material status

reports similar to those used in the U.S.

Army.1

After UGS 61⁄2 was unloaded, reports

reached the JRC indicating that U.S.

equipment was piling up in ports because

the existing French supply system was unable to keep pace with the rate of deliveries.

By September the situation appeared to

have worsened considerably. General

Kingman, Chief, French Training Section,

was expressing deep concern over the apparent incapacity of the French to organize

their supply services on a good working

basis. On 3 September, General Kingman

warned the JRC at length that lack of supply organization was having a serious effect

on the efficiency of the entire French ordnance system. Even division ordnance

units, he reported, were accomplishing relatively little real maintenance work because

they could not obtain spare parts from the

responsible supply agencies. As a result,

the troops were getting insufficient training.

The number of deadlined vehicles in the

divisions was slowly increasing, and the

supply services were making little effective

effort to forward the required spare parts

from depot establishments. These and

other deficiencies were, in the opinion of

General Kingman, unfortunate from the

point of view of both morale and training.

Nor was the situation due to lack of matériel. The French were at the time receiving large amounts of spare parts, but

they were having extreme difficulty in identifying them and had little, if any, knowledge as to what echelon of maintenance

the parts should be assigned. Units ap1

 Memo, Col Ira A. Crump for Loomis, 18 Oct

43, JRC 400.2/002 Stock Control System.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: II 131

peared not to know what agency or authority they must look to for the satisfaction of

their needs. Division ordnance officers had

no definite idea where they should go to secure the required parts and no knowledge

as to the exact location of depots.2

Already War Department officials in

Washington had been receiving a "collection of informal reports, rumors, and gossip," tending to show that the French were

unable to absorb properly their U.S. matériel and were misusing some items.3

 In the

opinion of General Spalding, then chairman of the JRC, the facts as reported to

Washington were probably exaggerated.

True, there had been "certain accumulations," but the congestion was no more than

could be expected under the circumstances.

The French, he explained in a letter to a

MAB official, were still having considerable difficulty in obtaining space for their

depots as the British and U.S. Armies were

superimposed on the limited facilities available in North Africa.4

Briefly, the inadequacy of the existing

French supply system could be ascribed to

two causes. First the supply services were

handicapped by insufficient storage facilities,

a matter soon to be remedied, for the U.S.

Army was giving up considerable space

especially at Casablanca. Second, their organization, judged by American standards,

was totally inadequate. In French Morocco there was as yet no individual officer

responsible for over-all supply and maintenance activity in connection with service

installations, depots, and central stock control in the area. No stock record cards were

being kept of what was available in depots.

At the vehicle assembly plant in Casablanca,

personnel rotated so rapidly that the establishment of any efficient organization was

impossible. Practically no use was made of

the instruction literature sent along with the

items; it was often thrown away. Nor was

the lack of a supply authority peculiar to

French Morocco. JRC officials were convinced that no one in the French Army,

either in Algiers or elsewhere, knew what

matériel was available or where. They

were told that division commanders were

visiting depots for the purpose of helping

themselves.5

The situation called for immediate corrective measures. In the opinion of General

Kingman, the time had come for the Americans to undertake a detailed survey of

the entire French ordnance organization,

then to assign qualified U.S. personnel to

the French for the purpose of helping them

establish a sound supply system within the

shortest possible time.6

Endorsing General Kingman's views and

recommendations, General Spalding resolved to bring the whole matter up for the

consideration of the French. Preferring for

the moment not to approach the French

General Staff officially, he invited Colonel

Regnault to discuss informally with him and

his assistant, Colonel Artamonoff, the existing situation, as well as possible corrective

measures. AFHQ officials, he pointed out,

were eager to learn whether or not the

French High Command contemplated

adopting the U.S. ordnance system. There

was some doubt on their part as to the interest shown by many officers of the Service

du Matériel, or Ordnance Department, in

Algiers regarding their functions. On the

other hand, they were aware of the difficulty 2

 Memo, Kingman for Spalding, 3 Sep 43, JRC

333/001 Inspections—Misc. 3

Ltr 5, Lt Col Roger Jones, MAB, to Spalding, 27 Aug 43, JRC 472 MAB. 4

 Ltr, Spalding to Jones, 8 Oct 43, JRC 472 MAB.

5

 Interv with Loomis, Sep 51. 6

 Memo cited n. 2.
132 REARMING THE FRENCH

the French services faced in finding sufficient

qualified technicians to carry out their work

properly. General Spalding then voiced his

own and Colonel Artamonoff's belief that it

was highly desirable for the French High

Command to reorganize its supply system

or at least give it a shot in the arm by applying the U.S. system "in its spirit." There

was need, he observed, of building up the

morale of Ordnance Department officers at

all echelons. Theirs was an essential role.

It was possible, concluded General Spalding, that the issuance by the French High

Command of a general directive on the responsibilities of the Ordnance Department

could improve the situation if it were stringently enforced.7

Colonel Regnault immediately conveyed

to General Leyer the American desire to see

the French establish their own counterpart

of the U.S. stock control section then functioning in Oran. Maj. Gen. Thomas B.

Larkin, chief of SOS, NATOUSA, had for

some time urged the French to establish

such a unit in Oran close to the U.S. section.

The unit could serve a twofold purpose:

provide centralized control of supplies and

equipment, and prepare requisitions for the

initial equipping of units or their maintenance after departure from North Africa.

General Larkin recommended that the unit

be operated by the French themselves with

such assistance as might be necessary from

qualified U.S. Army personnel.8

Official French reaction to the American

proposal was mixed. The French welcomed the opportunity to establish a stock

control unit at Oran, but did not believe it

necessary to give up altogether the existing

organization in Algiers.9 In an effort to

prod them into quick action, General Spalding took the matter up directly with the

French General Staff. On 27 September

he informed General Leyer that both the

commanding general of SOS and the deputy theater commander considered the establishment in Oran of a central stock control unit for the French forces to be a necessity. He then outlined the desirable composition and responsibilities of such a unit

as envisaged by SOS on the basis of experience acquired through similar earlier undertakings. The unit should be composed

of French officers and enlisted men having

as much acquaintance as possible with U.S.

matériel and with problems connected with

requisitions, stock control, and related matters. It should also include a small group

of U.S. experts in questions of supply and

requisitions to assist in setting up and operating the unit. General Spalding suggested a tentative ratio of one American to

four French. He then recommended that

the unit be established preferably in a building adjacent to the office of SOS. In this

manner, constant, close contact would be

maintained with SOS in all matters pertaining to requisitioning of supplies and issue of items to expeditionary corps units.

By the same token, unnecessary delays in

the exchange of correspondence between

Oran and Algiers would be avoided. In

the past, such delays had often been the

source of considerable annoyance.10

General Spalding's recommendation

brought forth the desired result. The next

day, 28 September, the French High Command ordered the establishment in Oran of 7

 Min Mtg, Spalding, Artamonoff, and Regnault,

4 Sep 43, in Gen Regnault's private papers. 8

 Note 568, Regnault to Blanc, 13 Sep 43, in

Gen Regnault's private papers: Msg, Larkin to

Devers, 14 Sep 43, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops

Fr Rearmt.

9

 Msg 6314, Devers to Larkin, 18 Sep 43, JRC

400.2/002 Stock Control System. 10

 Memo, Spalding for Leyer, 27 Sep 43, JRC

400.2/002 Stock Control System.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: II 133

a central supply authority known as Service

Central des Approvisionnements et Matériels Américains (SCAMA). Its chief was

to be an officer of French G—4 responsible

directly to the Chief of Staff. Because of

limited personnel and material means, however, serious difficulties were anticipated in

setting up the unit. Nevertheless, French

G—4 was currently preparing a directive on

its functioning and mission.11

The speedy establishment of SCAMA

seemed essential at a time when the first

expeditionary units were getting ready to

leave for Italy. By the provisions of a plan

then under consideration by Allied and

French staffs, the French supply system and

SOS, NATOUSA, were to share in the responsibility for the supply and maintenance

of these units.12 Effective implementation

of the plan required that the French supply

agencies be in a position at all times to provide SOS with detailed information as to

the quantities available in their depots for

each type of supply. General Larkin was

insistent that, in addition to organizing a

central authority in Oran, the French establish at once in Casablanca a competent administrative agency vested with sufficient

authority to act with vigor and promptness

in consolidating all French Army supply activity in Morocco. Unless this was done,

he warned, the French supply headquarters would not have a stock provisioning

system "in any sense of the term."

 13

The first of a series of instructions on

stock control was issued by General Leyer

on 15 October. It dealt with the organization and functioning of the newly created

SCAMA. Initially, SCAMA was given the

following mission:

To keep the French High Command posted

on the exact status of U.S. supplies and equipment of all types, and their distribution at the

time, so that the Command can, with full

knowledge of the facts, place orders with a

view to satisfying, in the shortest possible time

and under the best conditions, the needs of the

units, and send to the U.S. authorities justifiable requisitions whenever necessary.

Later on, "at a date yet to be fixed,"

SCAMA was to centralize material and financial accounting operations for all U.S.

equipment.14

The instruction, although representing a

step in the right direction, was wholly inadequate. In the opinion of Col. Ira A.

Crump, chief Ordnance officer of the JRC,

its provisions were only half measures enacted with little or no conviction of the real

importance of the entire undertaking. Centralization, he pointed out, was needed at

once, not at a later date. He feared that

the French military authorities did not realize the magnitude of the problem with respect to both volume of supplies to be handled and necessity of a rigid stock control,

or else they were expecting the U.S. Army

to assume part or all of their supply functions. It was all the more urgent, therefore, to press them for a concrete supply plan

of their own so that a definite basis for future requirements and assistance could be

established. The current situation, he

warned, was critical and likely to result in

delaying the employment of French units.15

Colonel Crump's suspicion that the

French military authorities were counting

on assistance from U.S. Army supply and

11

 Memos, Leyer for Spalding, 30 Sep 43, and

Regnault for Spalding, 30 Sep 43, JRC 400.2/002

Stock Control System. 12See below, pp. 138-39. 13

 Msg L-6335, Larkin to Devers, 7 Oct 43, and

Memo, Larkin for Hughes, 21 Oct 43, JRC 400.2/

001 Admin of Sup—Gen.

14

 Instruction 3751/3/EMGG/4, 15 Oct 43, JRC

400.2/002 Stock Control System. 15

 Memo cited n. 1, above.
134 REARMING THE FRENCH

ordnance services merely confirmed the feeling that AFHQ had already gained as a

result of the feud over French service units.

The current lack of interest on the part of

the French in reforming their supply system could be construed as one more indication that they expected the U.S. Army to

supply, service, and maintain their forces.

Yet they had been repeatedly warned not

to depend on such assistance and urged to

work toward self-reliance by all possible

means. In the opinion of AFHQ officials,

the time had come to put them in a position

where they must take energetic action.

Writing to General Giraud on 20 October, General Whiteley, Acting Chief of

Staff, AFHQ, set forth in clear terms

AFHQ's position on the matter of supply

control. To make it possible for the Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, to

have accurate and timely information on

the status of supply in French installations,

the French Army was requested to establish in Oran a central stock control group.

This group was to maintain stock records

and a central provisioning control on all

classes of supply held by depots. Such control was to be based on U.S. Army property

accounting and supply control procedure.

In addition, the French Army was requested

to maintain at Headquarters, SOS, NATOUSA, a liaison group consisting of one

senior grade officer, well-qualified and experienced in supply matters and with sufficient authority to act for the French Commander in Chief on all supply problems, and

of qualified officers for liaison duty with

the various U.S. Army supply services.

Finally, the French Army was to make available upon the request of the Commanding

General, SOS, NATOUSA, any necessary

data to assure complete utilization of stocks

on hand for the maintenance of French

forces.16

This was no longer a suggestion but a

firm request calling for General Giraud's

early approval so as to enable AFHQ to

issue final directives to the responsible Allied agencies. Five days later, on 25 October, the French Commander in Chief signified his agreement on the various points

raised in General Whiteley's letter.17

Once again, as in the case of service units,

the American concept that the French forces

must achieve self-reliance had triumphed

over the reluctance of the French to undertake what seemed to them an unnecessary

and, in all likelihood, an almost impossible

task considering the lack of qualified personnel.

The French General Staff had now no

other alternative than to set up an ordnance

system patterned after the American SOS.

The success of such an undertaking required, first of all, that supply officers at all

echelons be fully convinced of the urgency

of the proposed reorganization. That they

were subsequently won over was largely because of the efforts of Colonel Blanc, then

Assistant Chief of Staff for both CM and

G-4. His energetic intervention succeeded

in allaying the reluctance, indeed the hostility, shown by various heads of services to

the projected reorganization. Colonel

Blanc's own rallying to the American point

of view had been the result of the convincing interpretation which the French representatives on the JRC had given him of

American views and procedures. Their efforts, coupled with the persistent yet tactful, and friendly guidance offered by the

16Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 20 Oct 43, AFHQ

0100/4 SACS Red Sec, Fr Matters, Vol. I. 17

 Memo, Giraud for CinC Allied Forces, 25 Oct

43, JRC 400.2/001 Admin of Sup—Gen.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: II 135

successive chairmen of the JRC from Colonel Gardiner down to General Loomis,

contributed much to bringing about the

final meeting of French and American

minds on the matter of supply organization.

To assist the French in establishing a

sound and efficient supply machinery and

more generally to effect liaison with them on

all supply matters, SOS, NATOUSA,

placed, beginning 4 October, trained personnel at the disposal of SCAMA. The officers and men so detailed soon formed a

detachment known as Stock Control Section,

JRC. Technically on duty with the JRC,

the section, headed by Col. Michael J.

Geraghty, acted as a link between SOS,

SCAMA, and the JRC.18

The early history of SCAMA was marked

by unparalleled confusion.19 For some

weeks nothing seemed to get done. But the

job was tremendous. SCAMA had to deal

with literally hundreds of depots, small warehouses, and storage annexes scattered

throughout French North Africa and individually responsible to one of several authorities. Among these was an organization known as Centre de Réception des Matériels Américains (CRMA), set up in the

spring of 1943 in Casablanca. It controlled

all supplies of American origin and was

largely responsible for their distribution.

However, it was not co-ordinated in any way

with the French Supply Services, which concerned themselves primarily with matériel

of French source, and it maintained warehouses separate from those of the services.

Controlled from Algiers, CRMA worked in

conjunction with a special branch of the

General Staff which had been established

in Casablanca for the purpose of getting

American equipment into the hands of units.

CRMA kept no stock record accounts. The

other agency at least kept a card for each

unit being rearmed. But the card listed

only the major items issued; no entry was

made of accessories, tools, spare parts, basic

loads, allowances of all categories, and

individual expendable equipment. Still

another branch of the General Staff, functioning in Oran and apparently working independently of the Casablanca branch, was

responsible for building up stocks of maintenance supplies for the units preparing to go

overseas.

The confusion created by two sets of depots was evident everywhere. Service depots, which frequently received supplies as

an overflow from CRMA depots, were actually issuing to units items of equipment

no one had any record of having received.

Little attempt was being made in either category of depots to account for supplies on

hand and very few records of stocks were

available anywhere. Such a chaotic situation emphasized the urgent need of setting

up SCAMA as the central authority in accounting, recording, and stock reporting.

The lack of qualified personnel served

only to aggravate the confusion. Scarcity

of personnel can best be appreciated when

it is realized that, as late as the end of November 1943, one officer with no assistance

whatsoever was handling the Casablanca

Pharmacy, a medical depot somewhat similar to the U.S. Medical Issue Warehouse.20

For several months the manpower problem

remained a serious one. Men assigned to

l8

 For details on the composition, evolution, and

technical operation of SCAMA and of Stock Control Section, see pp. 288-93, below. 19

 History of Stock Control Section, JRC, n. d.,

copy in JRC files: Memo, Geraghty for Loomis, sub:

Rpt of Stock Control Sec, 8 Jul 44, JRC 400.2/002

Stock Control System.

20

 Memo, Lt Col A. T. Maxwell, Atlantic Base

Sec, for Larkin, 27 Nov 43, JRC 400.2/002 Stock

Control System.
136 REARMING THE FRENCH

SCAMA by the French General Staff were

untrained and often untrainable, for they

included a substantial proportion of natives

unwanted elsewhere and generally ignorant

of the French language—in short, of a type

unsatisfactory even as common laborers.

Lack of physical means was equally

acute. Warehouse equipment, transportation, tools, and covered space were insufficient. Depots even lacked such office supplies as pencils, typewriters, carbon paper,

stationery, forms, and filing cabinets. They

were using school tablets and scraps of

paper on which to record stocks. Their reports to chiefs of services in Algiers or to

CRMA were made largely by telephone in

the absence of other means. Providing

them with a minimum of essential supplies

proved at first difficult because SOS was

forbidden by NATOUSA from issuing anything to the French without special authority in each case. In mid-October a special

initial authorization from NATOUSA enabled SOS to turn over to the depots such

stationery and office supplies as were in

excess of its own needs. On 4 November

NATOUSA approved issue to SCAMA of

200,000 U.S. stock record cards. Within

a short time, SCAMA was receiving American catalogues, standard nomenclature lists,

tables of organization, tables of equipment,

and many other useful publications. It was

also able to obtain on loan freight-handling

equipment.

Other difficulties hampered the setting up

of SCAMA, such as language differences

and the frequent impossibility of reconciling

French nomenclature as given by warehouses with that used in American catalogues or standard nomenclature lists.

And then there were differences in national

idiosyncrasies. The easygoing North

African natives were not always ready to

adopt the American practice of getting

things done in a hurry.

More disquieting, especially to Colonel

Geraghty who was determined to see the

reorganization project through, was the fact

that SCAMA, after two months of existence,

was still without anything but a very general statement of what it was to accomplish.

It had no official standing or place within

the French military organization. Three

successive directives had failed to vest in

SCAMA the authority needed to effect real

centralization. Its director, Col. Emile

Charpentier, although regarded by his

American colleagues as highly qualified for

the position he held, could not prevent individual supply services from frequently disregarding his orders.

With SCAMA unable to assert itself

speedily and effectively, the general French

supply situation was bound to deteriorate

further. First to suffer were the troops

about to depart or already en route for Italy

with incomplete equipment. Their predicament, General Larkin pointed out on 13

November, was indicative of a complete

failure of the supply system; the failure

precluded any substantial support of the expeditionary forces from French sources.

There was no solution but for the U.S. Army

to assume the entire maintenance responsibility until such time as the French themselves knew what they had and where it

was.21 Thereupon General Larkin requested and obtained from General Eisenhower the authorization to inspect depots

for the purpose of assisting French supply

officers in locating items needed by units

about to depart, and if necessary to remove

and ship any items so found to appropriate

2 1Msg L-9908, Larkin to NATOUSA, 13 Nov

43, JRC Cable Log.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: II 137

destinations.22 After he had inspected supply installations in Casablanca, General

Larkin reported that supplies were being

"dissipated through absence of centralized

control." He warned that maintenance by

the French of their forces would be extremely difficult under the present "loose"

organization. He urged once again that

SCAMA be given sufficient authority to enable it to carry out its mission.23

It was not until 9 January 1944 that the

French General Staff, rescinding all prior

instructions, issued a new one that greatly

extended SCAMA's authority in the supply field. Many of the administrative restrictions which in the past had proved

harmful were now removed. Thereafter

SCAMA was:

1. to furnish to the French High Command, whenever called upon to do so, the

exact status of all stocks of matériel and supply of all kinds; and to do this in such a manner as would permit the French High Command to arrange for the best use of available

stocks and to prepare requisitions for submission to the United States;

2. to ensure the proper execution of the

High Command's decisions relative to both

initial equipping of troops and their maintenance ;

3. to maintain close liaison with SOS

NATOUSA with a view to settling quickly

all questions of shipping or transfer of

supplies.24

To SCAMA's director, Colonel Charpentier, the instruction delegated specific authority over organization and function. Actually, organization was not designed by the

director, but was thrust upon him by the

manner in which activities, previously operating independently, were associated, one

by one, with his office. The higher command still seemed reluctant to grant the necessary absolute authority. SCAMA found

itself repeatedly hampered by official interference. A case in point was the Casablanca Base. The French High Command

had placed all military bases established in

the ports of embarkation and debarkation

under SCAMA control, either directly or

through representatives. Yet the same command did not hesitate to infringe on

SCAMA's authority by organizing the

Casablanca Base and naming its director.

As a result, the base became a source of constant confusion.

Another unsatisfactory feature of the 9

January instruction was that it contained

several ambiguous phrases and loose terms

which subsequently gave rise to a number

of misunderstandings. As late as March

1944 some French agencies were still trying

to bypass SCAMA in submitting requisitions. Greatly disturbed over this situation, Colonel Geraghty feared that, unless

corrective measures were applied without

delay, SCAMA's brave efforts would be

futile.

It is interesting to note that, whereas

SCAMA remained under the effective control of the French General Staff, at no time

was the American Stock Control Section,

JRC, the subject of a single order from

higher U.S. authority. In fact it had no official existence. Even its name was assumed, having merely been approved by the

chairman of the JRC. Colonel Geraghty

had been given free hand in running his

section as he deemed best. He determined

its internal organization, issued the neces22

 Msgs L-40, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 14 Nov

43, 1752, Eisenhower to Larkin, 16 Nov 43, and

L-773, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 22 Nov 43, JRC

Cable Log. 23

 Msgs L-2271, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 5

Dec 43, L-2459, Larkin to JRC, 6 Dec 43, and

L-2805, Larkin to JRC, 9 Dec 43, JRC 400.2/002

Stock Control System. 24

 Instruction 340, EMGG/4, 9 Jan 44, JRC

400.2/002 Stock Control System.
138 REARMING THE FRENCH

sary instructions, and detailed his personnel with a view to providing the French

with the maximum assistance. He succeeded in developing a highly efficient system by which French and American technicians were put to work together. This

collaboration ultimately made possible the

setting up of a sound supply system. To ensure its spread to French depots and installations in other areas, Stock Control Section later opened branch offices in Algiers

and Casablanca (February 1944) and in

Tunis (May 1944).

In spite of its many handicaps and shortcomings, SCAMA began to grow in stature

and efficiency, largely through the excellent

co-operation between its personnel and that

of Stock Control Section. Recognizing its

increasing importance in the supply system, the French General Staff gradually assigned to it additional qualified members,

both military and civilian. Numbering

some 20 officers and 20 civilians at the end

of October, SCAMA could boast, two

months later, a total strength of 320 persons, including 65 senior and junior officers,

70 enlisted men, and 185 civilian employees.

Issuance of the 9 January instruction definitely accelerated progress by providing the

necessary spur. Colonels Geraghty and

Charpentier prepared and issued a pamphlet for use by the services as a sort of textbook on all supply matters. By mid-January they had printed and were distributing

some three million forms which standardized procedures and made possible "a common language and a common meeting

ground for supply interests throughout the

Services." An instruction issued by Colonel

Charpentier on 26 January set forth the relations to be established between the various

echelons of SCAMA, and prescribed the

forms to be used throughout the entire supply system.25

 By this time some progress

could be noted in the preparation of stock

record accounts and in the reporting of

stocks to SCAMA. It was apparent that the

recasting of the French supply system had

passed the planning stage: the "house of

SCAMA" was about to enter the final

phase of its organization.

Supply and Maintenance of the

Expeditionary Forces

Efficient and timely re-equipping of units

was not the only benefit expected from the

reorganization of the French supply system. It was hoped in addition that the

French military authorities would be better

able to supply and maintain their forces in

combat, another responsibility which had

become theirs as a result of the broad application of the concept of self-reliance.

The development of a supply plan for

forces in the field began to receive considerable attention in August 1943 when the

decision was reached to use French units

in Italy. The basic policy as set forth by

Headquarters, NATOUSA, was that

French troops, from the moment they departed from North Africa, passed from the

supply control of the French General Staff

to that of Fifth Army.26 Fifth Army's responsibility in the matter was limited, however. It consisted merely in ensuring the

continuous flow of maintenance supplies

into the hands of the French units under its

control. The French military authorities

themselves were charged with providing

25

 Instruction 43/D, SCAMA, 26 Jan 44, in History of Stock Control Section, JRC, copy in JRC

files.

2 6Msg 390, CG NATOUSA to CG SOS

NATOUSA, 12 Aug 43, JRC 400.4/003 Maintenance for Forces Operating With Fifth Army.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: II 139

from their own sources, be they of French,

American, or other origin, a determined

number of equipment items. SOS, acting

as the supply agent for Fifth Army, was

responsible for making certain that all the

necessary items were made available from

French sources, or, if necessary, from U.S.

sources pending reimbursement by the

French, and for effecting their transportation to the theater of operations. Its role

was far from negligible and its position between provider and consumer a thankless

one. In the last analysis, however, it was

on the French General Staff that the chief

responsibility fell for furnishing the maintenance supplies for the expeditionary

forces.

There remained the task of determining

with accuracy the division of responsibility

among the three authorities concerned—

the French General Staff, SOS, and Fifth

Army—and of taking adequate steps to

make certain that each was carrying out its

respective share of the combined operation.

This led to a long series of discussions, conferences, and studies.

At a preliminary conference, held at

AFHQ on 29 September 1943, the entire question of the supply of French expeditionary forces was examined. The

conference, attended by representatives

from the JRC, SOS, the Fifth Army, and

the French Supply Services, emphasized

two important points. The first was the

need for the French authorities to submit, in

ample time, requisitions on the United

States, through the JRC, for the assignment

to them of items not currently available in

their stocks. Second, it was urgent for

them to accelerate the setting up of the proposed SCAMA system then under consideration in order to guarantee the speedy

and continuous flow of supplies to the expeditionary forces.27

Three weeks later, General Whiteley,

Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ, submitted to

General Giraud for his concurrence a plan

covering all aspects of the supply problem,

including completion of initial equipment,

transportation of troops and matériel, and

maintenance of forces in combat. The recommended policy with respect to maintenance envisaged the following division of responsibility: Fifth Army was to submit to

SOS separate requisitions for the maintenance of French units under its control;

SOS was to fill such requisitions by placing

calls upon the French military authorities;

the latter were to deliver the required items

from stocks available to them or made available to them through the JRC.28

The French Commander in Chief having

concurred in the proposal, AFHQ, on 29

October, issued a directive officially charging SOS, NATOUSA, with the responsibility for the mounting and maintenance of

the French forces operating with the Fifth

Army in accordance with the provisions submitted to General Giraud. AFHQ stipulated, in addition, that essential supplies

which definitely could not be furnished from

French resources would be provided from

U.S. stocks if available, such issues to be

reported and accounted for in accordance

with established procedures. The French

were, of course, to reimburse SOS for the

items so transferred as soon as practicable.29

The success of the supply plan was de27Min, Conf on Sup of CEF, 29 Sep 43, JRC

400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat. 2 8Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 20 Oct 43, AFHQ

0100/4 SACS Red Sec, Fr Matters, Vol. I. 29

 Ltrs, Giraud to CinC Allied Forces, 25 Oct 43,

and AG 381/399 D-O, Hq NATOUSA to CG SOS

NATOUSA, 29 Oct 43, JRC 400.2/001 Admin of

Sup—Gen.
140 REARMING THE FRENCH

pendent in a large measure on the extent

to which units would manage to complete

their initial equipment before embarking.

General Whiteley had made this point clear

to General Giraud when he requested that

departing troops be "completely equipped

to authorized allowances under current

tables for equivalent organizations of the

U.S. Army." Yet, a week later, it was

learned that the French military authorities

proposed to embark their first division, the

2d Moroccan Infantry, with what appeared

to be insufficient winter equipment, such as

one coat or one field jacket instead of both

items per man, one pair of trousers instead

of two, two blankets instead of three, and

so on. At the request of General Clark,

Commanding General, U.S. Fifth Army,

AFHQ impressed upon the French General

Staff the desirability of equipping units in

accordance with prescribed Fifth Army administrative instructions.30

In spite of the warning, it was reported a

few days later that the same division had

embarked almost completely lacking in

basic load requirements of maintenance

parts and accessories and short of major

items of equipment, including twenty-two

57-mm. guns. Furthermore, when the division reached Italy, an inspection revealed

serious shortages, by Fifth Army standards,

of winter clothing and equipment. This

prompted General Clark to request AFHQ

that he be authorized to issue to the division

additional blankets and warm clothing on

the same basis as for U.S. troops. In fact,

without waiting for an answer from Algiers,

he ordered the emergency issue of these

items.31

Investigation showed that the unit in

question had received its normal allowance

of winter equipment but not the additional

items which troops in Fifth Army had been

issued under special authorization from

NATOUSA. The French High Command, although urged to take similar steps,

had for reasons of its own deemed it unnecessary to issue winter equipment over

and above the rates prescribed under the

current AFHQ tables of allowances. As for

the shortages of major items, maintenance

parts, and accessories, it was discovered that

the division commander and the French

General Staff had been working on different

tables of organization. NATOUSA immediately brought the matter to the attention

of General Leyer with a view to preventing

a recurrence of the situation.32

The confusion surrounding the equipment of the 2d DIM underlined a grave

weakness in the Allied command structure.

From the time the French in North Africa

had joined the Allies in November 1942.

they had been in a peculiar position in which

their military establishment functioned parallel to the Anglo-American administrative

system, but was at no point, except in the

field, fully part of it. This being so, they

could be urged, or requested, to take certain measures, but the Allied command was

wholly dependent on voluntary acquiescence on their part. They considered themselves free, to a large degree, to decide

whether the equipment standards as established by non-French commands, such as

Fifth Army headquarters, were practicable

or desirable for their own troops. They

could, and they did, modify U.S. tables of

30

 Msg 4192, Fifth Army to CinC, 27 Oct 43, JRC

Cable Log. 31 Msgs L-9908, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 13

Nov 43, 5732, Fifth Army to CG AFHQ, 18 Dec

43, and 5753, Fifth Army to CG AFHQ, 20 Dec 43,

JRC Cable Log. 32

 Msgs 2733, CG NATOUSA to Larkin, 18 Nov

43, and 17842, CG NATOUSA to Fifth Army, 22

Dec 43, JRC Cable Log.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: II 141

equipment to fit what they considered the

particular needs of their forces.33

To make sure, therefore, that equipment

standards of French units operating under

American control approached the U.S.

counterparts as closely as possible, the utmost co-operation was required between all

responsible authorities before the embarkation of troops. Once the troops were in the

theater of operations, the issuance of initial

equipment to fill shortages or emergency

needs entailed a labyrinthine process of

requisitioning. If General Juin wished an

additional issue of initial equipment, such

as winter clothing items for the 2d DIM,

his corps G-4 submitted the prescribed

requisition to Fifth Army supply sections for

clearance and transmission to SOS, NATOUSA. There the French liaison officer,

Lt. Col. A. Dufourt, prepared appropriate

lists which he forwarded to the French General Staff for examination, first by G-4, then

by Rearmament Section. Once approved

by the French General Staff, the lists were

sent to the French Section of the JRC for

submission to the committee, then forwarded to NATOUSA for final decision.

Only in "dire emergency" cases was Colonel

Dufourt authorized to bypass the French

General Staff altogether and request SOS

to transmit requisitions to the JRC or to

G-4, NATOUSA, for action.34

In spite of French urgings that the existing channels of communications be simplified, NATOUSA maintained that these

channels were not unduly cumbersome and

that they must be adhered to. The position

taken by NATOUSA was in accordance

with War Department instructions, which

restricted to operational emergency cases

the authority of a theater to transfer supplies

to a foreign government without prior approval from the MAB.35

 As supplies so

transferred were later to be replaced in U.S.

stocks by the foreign government concerned,

the theater was under obligation to ensure

proper and accurate accounting of all transactions. Consequently, the procedure

adopted by NATOUSA whereby all requests from the French forces under U.S.

control had to be cleared and approved by

both the French General Staff and NATOUSA was a logical one. In addition

and equally important, such a procedure

would tend to prevent wastage in the form

of needless expenditures of matériel.

French supplies, largely of American origin,

were not expendable any more than stocks

available to U.S. troops. Sound utilization of resources mattered as much as speed

of delivery.

Yet complete observance of the established policy frequently proved impossible.

Many cases arose in which operational

needs required the issue of equipment to

French forces engaged in combat "without

regard to strict adherence to the finer points

of Lend-Lease bookkeeping."

 36

 Eager to

set the record straight on the matter, AFHQ,

on 14 January 1944, informed General

Clark that the action he had taken in December in issuing additional winter equipment to the 2d DIM was contrary to the

established policy.

It must be emphasized that the initial issue

of organizational and individual equipment

must occur in North Africa from stocks made 33Ltr available to the French under the rearma- , Giraud to Allied CinC, 25 Oct 43, JRC

400.4/003 Maintenance for Forces Operating With

Fifth Army. 34

 Memos, Regnault for Spalding, 10 Oct 43, and

Spalding for Leyer, 11 Oct 43, JRC 400.2/001

Admin of Sup—Gen.

35

 Msg 859, Marshall to Eisenhower, 26 Oct 43,

JRC Cable Log. 36

 Ltr, Loomis to Col George Olmstead, 11 Dec

43, JRC 908 Policy and Plan—Misc.
142 REARMING THE FRENCH

ment program prior to the embarkation of

French units for Italy. . . . Where Fifth

Army administrative instructions contain

prescriptions which can be met by supplies

available in North Africa to the French Army,

the French authorities will be advised to comply therewith.37

In the meantime, NATOUSA had taken

steps to effect closer co-operation between

the various Allied command and supply

echelons on the matter of initial equipment

loads. Such co-operation was indispensable

if confusion and discrepancies were to be

avoided in the future. When Fifth Army

instructions or tables of equipment were at

variance with those given earlier to the

French by the JRC, NATOUSA officials

undertook to bring the three interested parties together to solve the problems involved.

They also urged the French General Staff

once again to verify the completeness of

equipment in the hands of units before embarkation and requested General Kingman's

French Training Section to give full assistance in this connection. Finally, they

asked the JRC to expedite the preparation

of requisitions for shortages of equipment

as these were reported.38

The objective of the supply plan, as put in

force on 29 October 1943, could be reached

only if the French military authorities were

in a position to make available to SOS, on

call from the latter or in execution of agreed

schedules, the supplies required for the

maintenance of their expeditionary forces

in Italy. This, incidentally, was only one

of their maintenance commitments. They

were also responsible for maintaining all

troops while in training, forces employed

under operational control other than American (such as the units which the French

High Command itself had committed to the

liberation of Corsica in September 1943),

all Territorial and Sovereignty troops, and

zone of interior establishments. To carry

out these heavy and varied assignments,

which the concept of self-reliance as imposed on the French had forced them to

assume, required that they establish and

maintain considerable stocks of supplies of

all types, readily available on a moment's

notice, for the support of any of their forces.

AFHQ had long urged the French to accumulate adequate reserves of both American and locally procured supplies. By the

fall of 1943 the Americans had the distinct

feeling that their urgings had not been

heeded, possibly because the French were

placing undue dependence on U.S. theater

stocks as a reserve. On 7 September General Spalding, chairman of the JRC, warned

General Leyer that "such a source could

not be taken for granted in the future." He

then proposed a number of measures which,

if carried out by the French, would enable

them to make their Military Establishment

self-sufficient. With regard to foodstuffs,

he recommended that the responsible authorities exploit North African resources and

take energetic steps to increase production

to the maximum. He suggested that they

prepare a monthly food program and, in

case of shortages, make arrangements to

obtain the rest from U.S. sources. As for

ammunition and all authorized expendable

items of American equipment, he urged that

they maintain adequate reserves either under

their control or available to them in U.S.

theater stockages, these to be supported by

a flow of supplies from the United States.

This operation would require the early

establishment, after detailed study, of a

sound plan carefully co-ordinated with

37Msg 28417, CinC AFHQ to Fifth Army, 14

Jan 44, JRC Cable Log. 38Msgs 6765, Eisenhower to CG SOS NATOUSA, 5 Nov 43, and L-9158, Larkin to CG

NATOUSA, 5 Nov 43, JRC Cable Log.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: II 143

American and British programs and involve

the submission by the French of regular

monthly requisitions on the United States

for maintaining stocks at established levels.

In reply, General Leyer announced that a

food program of the sort recommended by

General Spalding was in preparation and

that the responsible military as well as

civilian authorities had already taken steps

to increase the production of certain food

items both in North Africa and in other

French territories. He announced further

that, beginning 1 October, the French General Staff would forward monthly requisitions for the procurement of U.S. supplies,

such as ammunition and other expendable

items. A fortnight later, in the course of

a meeting with General Leyer, General

Spalding again broached the food question

which, he reiterated, required very serious

consideration in view especially of heavy demands on U.S. foodstuffs for Soviet and

British troops.39

The French were to submit to the JRC

for necessary action requisitions for all purposes except emergency issues. The requisitions were designed to make possible the

establishment and operation of a 45-day

reserve of supplies for the maintenance of

units dispatched overseas. It soon became

evident that the paper work involved was

posing for the French insurmountable difficulties. SCAMA was making so little

progress that, even at the end of December,

it had no accurate information as to the

actual supplies on hand and was unable to

determine what items it should requisition.

To make matters worse, SOS reported, on

1 January, that the French military authorities had replaced in U.S. theater stocks less

than 50 percent of the maintenance items

advanced as an initial stockpile to their expeditionary forces in Italy. SOS blamed

their failure to do so on SCAMA's inability

to complete the required 45-day supply reserve, a fact which emphasized, once again,

the urgent need for a more efficient French

supply system. General Larkin feared that

the situation, if allowed to continue, would

result in a considerable drain upon U.S.

Army reserves since SOS was required to

make up for any deficiencies in the French

deliveries.40

By this time, experience gained from the

presence of French units in Italy had shown

that the existing system of channeling supplies from the United States to North African depots for reshipment to the combat

zone increased movement and accounting

operations unnecessarily. In an attempt to

simplify the procedure, SOS had recommended earlier in November that Peninsular

Base Section (PBS) in Naples be given the

responsibility for maintaining the French

Expeditionary Corps, and that the French

military authorities be required in turn to

effect replacements in American depots in

North Africa from a stockpile established by

them for this purpose. Thus no shipments,

except of rations and special items obtainable only from French sources, would be

made to Italy for the supply of the CEF,

nor would any lend-lease accounting be necessary in Italy.41

 The proposal, a sound

one, had been submitted to the various

NATOUSA staff sections then considering

39

 Memo, Spalding for Leyer, 7 Sep 43, Memo,

Leyer for Spalding, 17 Sep 43, and Aide Mémoire,

Spalding for Leyer, 2 Oct 43, JRC 908 Policy and

Plan—Misc.

4 0Msg W-8584/19360, Eisenhower to AGWAR,

26 Dec 43, CM-IN 16426; Msg L-5742, Larkin

to JRC, 1 Jan 44, and Memo, Larkin for Loomis,

13 Jan 44, JRC 400.4/003 Maintenance for Forces

Operating With Fifth Army. 41

 Memo, DCofS SOS for CG NATOUSA, 28

Nov 43, JRC 400.4/003, Maintenance for Forces

Operating With Fifth Army.
144 REARMING THE FRENCH

steps to improve conditions. The ills which

it sought to correct, however, were minor in

comparison with others. So damaging were

these that the entire supply plan as established on 29 October had become an unworkable arrangement.

In a long message to the War Department

on 26 December, NATOUSA outlined the

basic weaknesses of the plan in its current

form. The chaotic situation of the French

supply system made it impossible for the

French military authorities to make available to SOS the supplies which they were

expected to furnish for their expeditionary

forces. It would, in addition, prevent them

from preparing and submitting proper

requisitions in time to provide any assistance, from the supply standpoint, toward

the mounting of Operation ANVIL. NATOUSA then recommended a sweeping

change of policy: the responsibility for submitting requisitions for the procurement of

equipment and supplies necessary for the

maintenance of French units participating

in operations under U.S. control should be

assumed by SOS, no longer by the French.

Otherwise, the large French force designated for participation in ANVIL would not

be properly supplied.42

War Department officials immediately

endorsed NATOUSA's proposal with minor

modifications. On 16 January 1944, after

further discussions on the matter between

the War Department and the theater, SOS

issued a new directive on the maintenance

of French expeditionary forces.43 Drafted

after consultation with and approval by

General. Giraud, the directive was applicable to forces specifically operating under

U.S. control whether, as then, in Italy or

in future operations in continental France.

It set forth in detail the latest policy with

regard to the provision of both initial equipment and maintenance supplies.

Initial equipment was to be provided to

the greatest extent possible from stocks supplied the French through the rearmament

program. Only when items were unobtainable from such sources, was the Commanding General, NATOUSA, empowered to

authorize their issue from U.S. theater stocks

to the extent available and without jeopardy to the proper supply of U.S. forces.

All items so transferred to complete initial

equipment were charged against the French

lend-lease account in North Africa. As for

equipment and supplies required for maintenance of troops in operation, these were,

with some exceptions, provided by SOS

through the submission to the New York

Port of Embarkation of single consolidated

monthly requisitions for both French and

U.S. troops. Levels of supply furnished

were those authorized for the U.S. forces,

and combat maintenance provided was

computed on U.S. Army replacement factors. Food rations, ammunition, post exchange, and Special Services supplies were

excepted from these regulations.44

Rations were provided partly from U.S.

sources, partly from French sources, as in

the case of items peculiar to the French

menu, in accordance with agreements

reached between NATOUSA and the

French General Staff. Post exchange and

Special Services supplies were provided entirely by the French. Ammunition was supplied from U.S. stocks in North Africa to

42 the extent available, and the remainder Msg W-8584/19360 cited n. 40. 43

 Cir 7, SOS NATOUSA, sub: SOP on Sup and

Maintenance of Fr Forces, 16 Jan 44, JRC

400.4/003 Maintenance for Forces Operating With

Fifth Army.

44

 The question of rations, post exchange, and

Special Services supplies is treated at some length

in Chapter XVI, below.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: II 145

obtained from the United States through

consolidated requisitions for both French

and U.S. troops. The French Supply Services were required to replace in U.S. depots,

from stocks available to them, the supplies

(food, post exchange items, and other materials) which it was their responsibility to

provide for the maintenance of participating

French units. All items furnished by SOS

either by direct shipment from the United

States or from U.S. stocks in the theater, and

not replaced by the French Supply Services,

were charged against the lend-lease account.

The directive contained other important

provisions concerning the handling of matériel intended for the expeditionary forces.

Supplies furnished from French sources

were delivered by the French Army to shipside or to U.S. depots as requested by SOS,

and were loaded aboard ship and discharged

by the U.S. Army, with French assistance

if required. The French liaison group at

SOS headquarters was charged with ensuring that complete utilization was being

made of French stocks for the maintenance

of French forces. To this end, it obtained

from SCAMA periodic reports of supplies

on hand in French depots.

The advantages gained from the application of the new plan were many and substantial. Supplies were now reaching the

base serving the expeditionary forces by direct shipment from the United States or, in

the case of a relatively small percentage, by

shipment from North African ports, thus

saving much valuable time and shipping.

More important yet, it now was almost certain that the expeditionary forces would receive in due time all the supplies necessary

for their continued support. To make certain that French and Allied agencies responsible for the mounting of ANVIL clearly

understood the details of the new policy,

a letter on the subject, which AFHQ addressed to General Giraud on 11 February

in the name of the Supreme Allied Commander, was made the basis of an official

directive.45

In execution of the new policy, SOS,

NATO USA, immediately assumed the responsibility for preparing and submitting,

with French assistance, requisitions for the

supplies which had to be obtained from

U.S. sources for the maintenance of all

French forces then, or destined to be, part

of an American task force. The French

continued to be responsible for preparing

and submitting requisitions for the maintenance of all other forces, and for shortages of initial equipment. Subsequently

they were urged to consider the submission

of requisitions for the replenishment of

equipment in the hands of units engaged

in combat for some length of time. This

matter was expected to present a problem

of considerable scope in the not too distant future.46

A sound supply plan for the maintenance

of French expeditionary forces was now a

reality. Its establishment, incidentally,

was being effected at a time when the

drafting of a workable rearmament plan

(the 23 January Plan) was about to be

completed. In the last analysis, much of

the direction for the supply and maintenance of French troops was now to rest

in American hands. This was in line with

recommendations from War Department

officials who had come to the conclusion

and strongly urged that, in the theater,

"American management should follow

45

 Ltr, Wilson to Giraud, 11 Feb 44, JRC 400.4/

003 Maintenance for Forces Operating With Fifth

Army; Dir, AFHQ, AG 400-1 (Fr), 11 Feb 44, sub:

Sup and Maintenance of Fr Forces. 46

 Memos, Loomis for Leyer, 15, 22 Jan 44, JRC

400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat.
146 REARMING THE FRENCH

American equipment." Such a course of

action, they believed, was a sound development in the lend-lease program and the

time was opportune to put it into effect.47

Supplies reached the CEF in Italy

through Peninsular Base Section, set up in

Naples on 1 November 1943 for the support of the U.S. Fifth Army. Long before

the arrival of the first North African unit,

it had been agreed that the French military authorities would assume their share of

the responsibility for the operation of PBS.

As early as October, Generals Juin and

Clark decided that French Base 901, already

activated in North Africa, would join PBS

in Naples, there to serve as the supply organization for CEF. Accordingly, an advance detachment from that base was dispatched to Naples where, on 22 November,

it set up shop in the G-4 office of PBS.48

Just then the first division, the 2d DIM,

was on its way to the front line.

Headquarters, Fifth Army, having announced, on 23 November, that it was taking over the full responsibility for the supply of the CEF, SOS, NATOUSA, recommended that the French themselves be

urged to contribute to the fullest extent possible to the "housemaiding" of their own

forces. Since it was expected that three

eighths of Fifth Army combat troops would

ultimately be French, SOS considered that

French service units should be assigned for

duty with PBS in approximately the same

ratio. On this basis, a list of the required

signal, ordnance, quartermaster, transportation, and medical units was subsequently

drawn up and incorporated in the 23 January Plan. The list represented, it was

thought, a proper proportion of the total

number of base section units required for

the support of Fifth Army. AFHQ considered that their assignment would, in addition to helping relieve the acute shortage of

U.S. service personnel in PBS, provide them

with excellent practical training toward

their ultimate employment in ANVIL. General Loomis strongly urged the French General Staff to accelerate the activation of the

necessary units. Yet by the end of January,

no such troops had been made available.

When queried on the matter, General Leyer

could only give the assurance that he would

"try" to activate as many units as he possibly could and as quickly as practicable.49

Such was the situation as the next phase

of the rearmament program was about to

begin. The blueprint for a French base section to support the CEF had been completed. Running the section now hinged

on the ability of the French High Command

to assign to it the necessary personnel.

Supply Situation—End of January 1944

By the end of January the long and tedious period of re-examination, begun with

the suspension of the 15 August Plan, had

come to an end. It had given rise to extensive reorganization in every field of the

rearmament operations. A new equipment

47

 Ltrs, Col Olmstead, International Div ASF, to

Loomis, 6 Nov 43, and Loomis to Olmstead, 11

Dec 43, JRC 908 Policy and Plan—Misc. 48

 Hq, Peninsular Base Section, History of the

Peninsular Base Section, North African Theater of

Operations, United States Army, Vol. II, Covering

the Period 28 August 1943 to 31 January 1944

(Naples, 1944), Ch. IV, copy in OCMH.

49

 The three-eighths ratio was reached at the peak

of Fifth Army's strength in May 1944. Of a total

of some 13 divisions, 4 plus elements of a fifth

were French.

Hq Fifth Army, Admin Dir 12, 23 Nov 43, in

Opn Rpts, Fifth Army G-3, Sep 43-Jan 44, and

Msg L-4528, Larkin to JRC, 22 Dec 43, JRC Cable

Log; Memos, Loomis for Leyer, 29 Dec 43, 29 Jan

44, and Leyer for Loomis, 1 Feb 44, JRC 370/003

Employment of Sv Units.
THE PROGRAM MARKS TIME: II 147

program, the 23 January Plan, had been

drafted which, unlike its predecessors, was

considered reasonable, therefore capable of

accomplishment. The substantial reduction of the number of combat divisions as

agreed to by the French High Command

was expected to produce personnel for the

activation of supporting arms and services

and for the manning of supply installations.

A central supply authority similar to the

American SOS was attempting, with

American assistance, to set up an efficient

supply system. A sound plan for the maintenance of expeditionary forces had been

put into operation. A program of requisitions had been devised which, it was hoped,

would guarantee the continuous flow of supplies from U.S. sources. These and other

similar measures had one common purpose,

the building up, within the shortest possible

time, of a well-balanced French task force

adequately equipped and properly maintained in battle.

The need to apply these measures with

speed and vigor was emphasized by developments in Italy. Reports currently being

received from that theater indicated that

French troops were still arriving without

their full initial equipment. The two divisions already there, the 2d DIM and the

3d DIA, were said to be fighting extremely

well. It was all the more urgent therefore

that they and their corps commander, General Juin, be given all the necessary material

means with which to maintain their good

record. On 26 January General Kingman

voiced to General Loomis the fear that the

French had not learned ordnance supply

as yet. He then pointed to a curious difference between the respective attitudes of

French and American troops regarding supply matters: ''Americans howl for what they

want. The French anticipate that Higher

Command will send what they should

have."

 50

 Yet it was known that CEF authorities themselves had registered their concern over the shortage situation and taken

steps to correct it. The Chief of Staff, Brig.

Gen. Marcel Carpentier, had urged General

Giraud to intervene energetically with the

Commissioner of War to ensure that reinforcements reaching Italy would arrive fully

dressed and equipped. Unless this was

done, he had warned, maintenance stocks

available to the CEF would gradually disappear.51

Despite these disturbing reports, there

were signs that the supply situation would

rapidly improve, for the French, bent as

they were on assuming as large a share

as possible of the fighting, were equally determined to correct errors as they were detected. In addition, the experience being

gained as a result of their battle-testing in

Italy was expected to be a valuable guide

in implementing the next rearmament

phase.

50

 Memo, Kingman for Loomis, 26 Jan 44, JRC

333/002 Inspections by Gen Kingman. 51Msg 182-A, CofS CEF to Giraud, 7 Jan 44,

JRC Cable Log.
CHAPTER IX

Phase IV of the Program

(February—October 1944)

I: Background and Objectives

Rearmament Operations Resume

The 23 January Plan for rearming the

French forces was formally presented to

General Giraud by the Chief of Staff,

AFHQ, on 1 February 1944 for his approval of its details. General Gammell

reminded Giraud that the plan had been

developed after lengthy conversations between French and AFHQ staffs, on the

basis of available qualified manpower. The

objective, which General Gammell hoped

the French Commander in Chief would

concur in, was to provide a sound troop

list representing a balanced force suitable

for the type of combat anticipated in ANVIL.

 1

 Thus was set forth in precise terms

the final rearmament goal which AFHQ

was determined to reach.

Three days earlier, General Devers

had informed the War Department of

the proposed revisions. Pending the final

drafting of the plan, he had requested the

early shipment of the matériel necessary

to equip the remainder of such supporting

units on the 15 August Plan as were expected to become part of the new plan.

This matériel had already been assigned

by the MAB but had not yet been delivered. He had also requested the War

Department to fill as completely as possible

shortages in previous assignments and

shipments.2

AFHQ officials were confident that the

French part of the ANVIL troop list as represented by the 23 January Plan provided

as large and as well-balanced a force as

the French military authorities could organize and train within the limitations of

time and manpower.3 The National Defense Committee, it will be recalled, had

already approved the troop list. It only

remained to obtain General Giraud's final

decision. No word had been received from

the French Commander in Chief since 11

January, when he had approved in principle the revisions then under consideration

while reaffirming his intention of retaining

the 15 August Plan "as a basis."

Concern at AFHQ increased when it

was learned that Giraud had appealed directly to General Marshall for the retention

of a fourth armored division. The U.S

1

Ltr, Gammell to Giraud, 1 Feb 44, JRC Incl

to 320/001.

2

 Msg W-1313/44211, Devers to AGWAR, 28

Jan 44, AFHQ Cable Log; Memo, Loomis for

Leyer, 29 Jan 44, JRC 903 Requests for Units;

Msg 8524, Somervell to Devers, 30 Jan 44, OPD

Exec 1, Item 13-A; Msg W-1520, Devers to

AGWAR, 31 Jan 44, AFHQ Cable Log. 3

 Memo, Brig Gen Daniel Noce, ACofS AFHQ,

for CofS, 1 Feb 44, AFMQ 0100/12C G-3 Div

Ops Fr Rearmt 2.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: I 149

Chief of Staff seized this opportunity to

remind him that General Wilson was eagerly awaiting his views on the current restudy of the program, on which to base final

recommendations to the CCS.4

On 4 February, deciding to wait no

longer for a reply from General Giraud,

General Wilson cabled to the CCS the full

details of the 23 January Plan. His message listed the units of the 15 August Plan

to be deleted, those to be added, as well as

the nonprogram organizations (Moroccan

tabors, mule companies, and so on) for

which maintenance only was requested. In

a letter of the same date the Supreme

Allied Commander recommended that the

program be approved and assignments

made without delay so that priority of shipments could be established at an early date.5

By his action, General Wilson was setting

the wheels of the rearmament machinery

in motion once again. There was little

doubt that the CCS would endorse his recommendations without delay, for the proposed plan involved a relatively small outlay of equipment and its prospect of being

carried out successfully was greater than

that of any preceding plans. After a threemonth period of re-examination, during

which no assignments and only a few deliveries of equipment had been made to the

French, the rearmament operations were

entering a new phase, the fourth and last.

Control Over the French Forces

With the entire French forces expected

to be engaged in combat in the near future, the question of their operational control was taking on increased importance.

It will be recalled that at a conference held

on 27 December 1943, Mr. Massigli, the

French Commissioner of Foreign Affairs,

had submitted to the U.S. and British political representatives in the theater the draft

of a military agreement on the control and

employment of the French forces. Two

days later he had made known to his American and British colleagues the great interest

which the French Committee of National

Liberation attached to the speedy conclusion

of an agreement.

The entire question was subsequently referred to the CCS who, on 11 March 1944,

instructed General Wilson to present to the

CFLN a counterproposal they had just approved. Article III of their own draft

agreement stipulated that "the French

forces to be placed at the disposal of the

CCS is a matter for agreement between the

CCS and the CFLN, it being understood

that the forces placed at the disposal of the

CCS will include all French forces which

have been rearmed and re-equipped by the

U.S. or the U.K."

 6

On 3 April, the CFLN proposed some

modifications of the CCS document. The

committee held, in particular, that the agreement should be with the two Allied governments and not with the CCS.7

 It was

clear that the committee, which regarded itself as a de jure government in full possession of its sovereignty, desired that military

matters be dealt with at government level.

Already French civil authorities had attempted to take over the handling of rearmament negotiations with AFHQ. The

Commissioner of War and Air, André Le

4

 Ltrs, Marshall to Giraud, 2 Feu 44, and to

Devers, 3 Feb 44, OPD 336.2 France, Sec II. 5

Msg W-1847/47163, Wilson to AGWAR, 4

Feb 44, NAF 597; Ltr, Wilson to CCS, 4 Feb 44,

SHAEF 388.3/3 Fr Rearmt, 16 Mar 45, Dr 5418.

6

Msg 1913, CCS to Wilson, 11 Mar 44, FAN

343; Ltr, Wilson to de Gaulle, 14 Mar 44, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres. 7

 Ltr, CFLN to U.S. and Br Representatives, 3

Apr. 44, AFHQ 0100/12A G-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr.
150 REARMING THE FRENCH

Troquer, had requested on 12 January that

thereafter all correspondence on armament

questions be addressed to him. He had

done so in pursuance of the decree of 16

December 1943 which specifically charged

the Commissioner of War and Air with the

task of implementing the decisions of the

National Defense Committee regarding

armament matters. But AFHQ officials

considered that to deal with Le Troquer

through the American and British ministers would be a particularly cumbersome

method. Barring a CCS decision to the

contrary or new developments in the theater, they agreed to continue to regard the

French Commander in Chief as the official

link between themselves and the French

High Command on all rearmament questions.8

 Although informed of this decision,

the commissioner kept writing directly to

AFHQ. Replies to his queries were

forwarded to him through French

headquarters.

As the CFLN kept insisting that military matters be handled on a political level

as between governments, General Marshall

sought President Roosevelt's advice on the

matter. The President informed him on 28

April that it was his desire that military

questions which involved the French forces

continue to be discussed directly between the

Supreme Allied Commander and the

French military authorities, and "not as between one sovereign government in full possession of its sovereignty and another government which has no de facto sovereignty."

 9 This was a restatement of the

policy long advocated by the President, a

policy based on his firm conviction that no

French, government could exist until the

liberated people of France themselves established one of their choice. In December 1943 he had specifically informed the

Department of State that he wished all military matters to be treated directly between

General Eisenhower and the French military authorities and not on a government or

committee basis. Later, in March 1944,

when the question of establishing British

and U.S. military missions to the CFLN

was under discussion, the CCS showed, by

their action, that they held the same view.

They ruled that the proposed missions, if

established, should "in no way infringe on

the [Supreme Allied Commander's] position as the CCS representative in dealing

with the French on military matters, especially French rearmament."

 10

 Finally,

when, at about the same time, General

Eisenhower began negotiating with French

military authorities in London an arrangement to govern French-Allied relations in

the proposed cross-Channel operation, General Marshall restated for his benefit the

President's policy.11

In mid-May, after AFHQ had carefully

examined the French proposal of 3 April,

General Wilson cabled the views and recommendations of the theater on the control of

French forces. First he outlined the prac8

 Memo, Le Troquer for Gen Wilson, 12 Jan 44,

Memo, Whiteley for Minister Edwin Wilson, 14

Jan 44, AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Red Sec, Fr Matters,

Vol. IV; Ltr, Gammell to Le Troquer, 26 Jan 44,

AFHQ 400/1 Rearmt.

9

 Memo, President for Marshall, 28 Apr 44, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 1-A. 10Msg, CCS to Wilson, 28 Jan 44, FAN 329:

Msg 890, Wilson to CCS, 20 Feb 44, NAF 623:

Msg 197, JCS to Wilson, 29 Feb 44, SHAEF SGS

092 France, Vol. I, Fr Relations; Msg 2500, Marshall to Devers, 17 Mar 44, JRC Cable Log. 11

 Msgs 324, Marshall to Eisenhower, 17 Mar 44,

and S-50531, SCAF 15, Eisenhower to CCS, 21

Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 092 France, Vol. I, Fr

Relations.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: I 151

tices then current. Under the terms of a

naval agreement to which the French had

subscribed, the Allied naval area commander exercised the operational control of all

French naval units, rearmed and otherwise.

This was consonant with the general policies set forth by the CCS on 4 October

1943 on the subject of French naval vessels.12

 With respect to the air squadrons,

on the other hand, no formal agreement

existed, the current informal arrangement

being that when a squadron was ready, the

French Commander in Chief notified the

Allied air command in the Mediterranean,

which assigned the unit to duty and assumed

operational control of it. General Wilson

then strongly recommended that a written

agreement, similar to the naval agreement,

be concluded with the CFLN which would

ensure that all French land, air, and sea

forces that were rearmed by the United

States or the United Kingdom would automatically come under Allied operational

control.13

By the end of May the control question

had not been solved and no agreement was

yet in sight. The launching of OVERLORD

and ANVIL, in early June and mid-August

respectively, would take place without any

formal agreement having been reached

other than a temporary arrangement concluded by General Eisenhower pending

further negotiations with the French.

Reorganization of the French High

Command

Meanwhile the showdown between the

CFLN and General Giraud, which observers had long regarded as unavoidable,

had come to pass. In spite of continued

Allied support, the French Commander in

Chief had had his powers so reduced by

successive ordinances and decrees that by

February he was able to make few, if any,

decisions that were final.14 In early April,

a few days after his return to Algiers from

a tour of inspection of the French units engaged in Italy, General Giraud was suddenly confronted with a dramatic situation. An ordinance issued by the CFLN

on 4 April, apparently without prior consultation with him, announced a reshuffling

of the National Defense setup. Invoking

the law of 11 July 1938 bearing upon the

general organization of the nation in wartime, the ordinance made the president of

the CFLN titular Chief of the Armed

Forces.15 It established, in addition to the

existing National Defense Committee, a

General Staff of National Defense, a sort

of war department placed directly under the

president. Finally it abolished, although by

implication only, the post of Commander

in Chief. Feeling that his position was

untenable, General Giraud at first declared

his firm intention to resign. General Wilson, while concerned over the situation, did

not anticipate that immediate serious repercussions would result from the French

Commander in Chief's resignation. He was

convinced that he could depend upon

Giraud loyally to use his influence in favor

of continuing the existing Franco-Allied

collaboration.16

During the following three days, General

Giraud deliberated with General Juin,

12

 CCS 358 (Revised), 4 Oct 43, sub: Policies Regarding Fr Naval Vessels. 13

 Msg F-46812, Wilson to CCS, 16 May 44.

NAF 701 ; Memo, Col J. Terrence for Maj Gen

Daniel Noce, 30 Jun 44, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3

Div Ops Fr Comd and Liaison 2.

14

 Personal Ltr, Devers to Marshall, 13 Feb 44,

Somervell Files A-46-257, Ser 1, Dr 3. 15

 CFLN, Ordinance, 4 Apr 44, AFHQ 0100/12A

G-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr. 16

 Msg F-27715, Wilson to CCS, 4 Apr 44, NAF

661.
152 REARMING THE FRENCH

whom he had summoned to Algiers, and

with various AFHQ officials including the

U.S. and British political representatives in

the theater. He then decided not to resign. The crisis came to a head on 8 April

when General de Gaulle offered Giraud

the post of Inspector General whose duties

had been defined by a special decree promulgated the day before.17

The reasons for the committee's latest

action, as given by de Gaulle in a letter to

General Giraud, appear sound when examined in the light of the situation then prevailing.18

 The post of Commander in Chief

had lost much of its significance, considering that French expeditionary forces, when

engaged in operations, passed under Allied

command. It was not likely, moreover,

that present and future Allied operational

plans offered any chance for General Giraud to assume a field command commensurate with his rank. In addition, the

CFLN had come to regard the handling

of problems of organization and employment of forces its prerogative. In the opinion of the committee, therefore, the post

of Inspector General was a logical substitute, one which General Giraud could fill

with greatest advantage to French interests. Giraud, on the other hand, felt that

acceptance of the post would entail a lessening of authority which would "prevent

him from fully serving his country." Protesting against the decree which he considered arbitrary, General Giraud declined

de Gaulle's offer and expressed his intention of continuing to serve as Commander

in Chief.19

Announcement came on 12 April that Lt.

Gen. Emile Béthouart was being appointed

by decree Chief of Staff of National Defense. In effect, he was supplanting General Giraud. Thereafter, liaison with

AFHQ was to be divided between Béthouart

as Chief of Staff, National Defense, and

General Leyer as Chief of Staff, Ground

Forces. General Béthouart immediately

called first on General Gammell, Chief of

Staff, AFHQ, then on General Wilson, the

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to inform them of the latest

changes in command.20

Two days later, on 14 April, the CFLN,

on the ground that General Giraud was unwilling to accept the post to which he had

been assigned, decided to relieve him of all

command although retaining him on active

reserve.21 The next day, General Giraud

issued his last order, a pathetic farewell to

the French forces. In it he took occasion

to recall how he had obtained from America

the armament which now enabled the units

in Italy to show their worth.22

Whatever the merits or demerits of the

CFLN actions that led to General Giraud's

removal from the French High Command,

it cannot be denied that he played a decisive role in the North African rearmament program. He had been its ardent

champion even before his escape from

France in October 1942; at Anfa in January 1943 he extracted a promise for arms

from President Roosevelt; in July of the

same year he went to Washington, there to

17

 Msg F-29518, Wilson to CCS, 8 Apr 44, NAF

669.

18

 Text of letter in Giraud, Un seul but, la Victoire, p. 287. 19

 Ltr, Giraud to de Gaulle, 9 Apr 44, in Giraud,

Un seul but, la Victoire, p. 300.

20

 Min Mtgs, Béthouart with Gammell, and with

Wilson, 12 Apr. 44, AFHQ 0100/12A G-3 Div

Ops BIGOT Fr. 21

 Min Mtg, Béthouart with Wilson, 14 Apr 44,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Comd and

Liaison, Pt. I. 22

 Fr CinC, GO 19, 15 Apr 44, AFHQ 0100/12 A

G-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: I 153

plead for more arms and supplies; for

months afterward he relentlessly fought for

what he considered to be a major objective: the speedy rearming of a large striking force capable of taking a full share in

the common fight against the Axis. At the

time of his removal, the undertaking was

nearly complete.23

Command of the French forces was now

vested in the National Defense Committee,

with General de Gaulle as its President, and

the new General Staff headed by General

Béthouart as its executive organ. On 15

April an instruction issued by the committee

set forth the respective functions of the president of the CFLN and of the several Commissioners. The President, assisted by the

General Staff of National Defense, was responsible for the general organization and

distribution of forces as well as the general

plans for their employment and equipping.

The National Defense General Staff ensured

liaison with military and civilian departments and with Allied staffs. The functions of the National Defense Committee and of the Commissioners of War and

Air and of Navy remained as defined by the

earlier decree of 16 December 1943.24

On 4 May General Béthouart outlined

the internal organization and the functions

of the National Defense General Staff of

which he was the chief. One of its duties

was to establish and carry out rearmament

plans in pursuance of decisions reached by

the Commissioners.25

Franco-American Relations

The departure of General Eisenhower

and some members of his staff from North

Africa in early January had brought a reorganization of the Allied command in that

theater. As newly appointed officials were

assuming their posts, Liaison Section,

AFHQ, urged them to start a round of calls

on French military authorities. Pointing to

the hypersensitivity of which the French

had seemed to be the victims since 1940,

Liaison Section believed that these courtesy

calls would do much to strengthen FrancoAllied co-operation.26

 The first meeting

took place on 1 February when General Wilson, the Supreme Allied Commander, called

successively on General de Gaulle, Le

Troquer, and General Giraud. With the

latter, he discussed, in particular, French

participation in the Italian campaign. A

week later, General Wilson received General

de Lattre de Tassigny, commander designate of the French forces assigned to ANVIL,

and with him discussed, among other matters, the perennial question of service units.27

Since his appointment, on 8 January, to

the posts of deputy commander in chief and

commanding general of NATOUSA, General Devers likewise was giving close attention to French matters, especially rearmament. Writing personally to General Marshall on 13 February 1944, General Devers

outlined the French situation as he had

found it upon assuming his command. He

dealt largely with the question of FrancoAmerican relations. At a time when increasing numbers of French and American

troops were being or would soon be thrown

23

 General Giraud received the degree of Chief

Commander of the Legion of Merit on 23 October

1943. 24

 National Defense Committee General Instruction, signed by de Gaulle, 15 Apr 44, AFHQ 0100/

12C G-3 Div Ops Corres From the Fr. 25

 Memo, Béthouart for Col L. Higgins, Chief

Liaison Sec AFHQ, 4 May 44, AFHQ 0100/12C

G-3 Div Ops Corres From the Fr.

26

 Memo, Higgins for CofS AFHQ, 11 Jan 44,

AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec, Mtgs and Confs,

Vol. I. 27

 Min Mtg, Wilson with de Lattre, 7 Feb 44,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops, F-1, BIGOT Fr.
154 REARMING THE FRENCH

together in combat, the question was taking

on considerable importance.

General Marshall, it appears, had been

greatly disturbed by the tenor of a confidential report which had recently reached

him. Emanating from International Division, ASF, the report implied that FrancoAmerican relations, which had started off so

well, had seriously deteriorated, thereby

creating "a condition which augured ill for

the good of combined operations." The

French, explained the report, were ascribing

the present "unfortunate trend" to impatience, intolerance, lack of elementary courtesy, officiousness, and a belittling of French

effort on the part of U.S. Army officers in

the theater when dealing with their French

allies.28 While recognizing that misunderstanding did exist, Devers assured General

Marshall that conditions as reported by

ASF were grossly exaggerated. Discourtesy, even rudeness, had been present in isolated, instances, he admitted. There was

no evidence, however, that it was widespread. It would in no case be tolerated.29

There is sufficient reason to believe that

General Devers' statement reflected accurately the situation prevailing at the time

and, for that matter, during the two and one

half years of Franco-American collaboration. French and American officers formerly associated with the Joint Rearmament

Committee, when queried on the subject

since the war, loudly and unanimously discounted the assertions of the ASF report.

Several of the French officers so questioned

frankly admitted that there had been occasions when an American official, presumably exasperated at French incomprehension

of his own views or at French slowness by

American standards, had, under the impulse

of the moment, acted in a harsh, even scathing manner. But, they quickly admitted,

his behavior was generally quite justified,

and, at any rate, never unfair. In other

instances, they said, American incomprehension of the French viewpoint had caused

the French to misinterpret the American position and intentions. They quoted the

case of an American general officer who,

because he had frequently questioned the

validity or soundness of various armament

requests submitted by the French, had led

the latter generally to believe that he was

anti-French. On the whole, they emphasized, American officials had been sympathetic to the French cause.30

General Loomis, who for nearly two years

supervised French rearmament operations

and therefore can speak with authority on

the subject, could not, when queried on the

matter, recall a single instance of bad feelings other than the alleged anti-French case

reported above. He, too, emphasized that,

considering the basic difficulties encountered, such as the language barrier and

differences in national idiosyncrasies,

Franco-American relations were, at the time

of the ASF report and thereafter as well,

"remarkably good."31

Having reduced the allegations contained

in the ASF report to their true proportions,

General Devers in his letter to Marshall next

examined the causes of some of the grievances currently being voiced by the French.

Until recently, he pointed out, they had been

especially irritated by the very complex 28

 Memo, Col Eugene Villaret, International Div

ASF, for Director International Div ASF, 21 Jan

44. JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-d. 29

 Personal Ltr, Devers to Marshall, 13 Feb 44,

Somervell Files, Fr 1943-44, A-46-257, Ser 1,

Dr 3.

30

 Intervs with Lt Col Roland de Beaumont, Jul

50, Brig Gen Jean Regnault, Jul and Sep 50, Col

André L'Huillier, Sep 50, Gen Aimé de Goislard

de Monsabert, Nov 48, and others. 31

 Interv with Loomis, Jul 50.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: I 155

procedure through which their armament

requests had to pass. He hoped that this

particular grievance would soon be dispelled

as a result of steps which he had just taken.

He had authorized General Loomis to deal

directly with General Larkin in all armament matters arising within the framework

of established policies. He believed that

this change in procedure would be appreciated by the French and would have an immediate favorable effect on relations with

them.

Another grievance voiced by the French

was that Americans in Washington promised more than Americans in the theater

performed. They felt there was contradiction between the decisions announced by

the War Department and the restrictions

imposed by AFHQ and other Allied agencies. To clear up their misgivings in this

connection, General Devers had undertaken

to explain to them the existing relationship

between the CCS, the War Department, and

the theater.

The paucity of equipment available to

French communications zone establishments

necessary for the support of the expeditionary forces had been another source of friction. No provision had been made at Anfa

or since for the issue of supplies to these

establishments. It was hoped that the

measures recently taken on their behalf

would settle the issue to the satisfaction of

the French.

General Devers then turned to one final

French grievance. In the course of his recent visit to French troops fighting in Italy,

he had heard them make one complaint:

not enough food. This, he explained, was

not the fault of the Americans, but of insufficient planning on the part of the French

military authorities themselves.32 AFHQ,

he pointed out, had taken action to make

sure that, thereafter, French troops would

get the full U.S. ration.

The 23 January Plan Becomes the Basis of

Phase IV

All things considered, Phase IV got off to

an auspicious start. A sound over-all program had been drawn up and submitted to

Washington for approval. The French

were putting their supply system in order.

Closer relations with them were being

sought. More important, glowing accounts

were being received of their fine performance in action in Italy, a tangible proof that

American efforts to rearm them were being

wisely expended, and a decisive argument

in favor of the speedy completion of the

rearmament operations.

The general feeling of optimism was enhanced further by the announcement that

General Giraud was approving the revisions contained in the 23 January Plan.

Writing to General Marshall on 16 February, he declared himself in complete

agreement with the principle that "a balance should be brought about between combat forces and service and supply units."

In Washington, the Combined Staff Planners had already considered the plan favorably. On 2 March the CCS approved

it "insofar as availability of equipment

would permit." War Department officials

immediately informed General Wilson that

the necessary matériel, once assigned, would

be shipped in accordance with theater priority. They warned him, though, that

shortages were likely to occur in signal

equipment, trucks, and artillery.33

32

 See the discussion on the food and troop ration problem, pp. 254-58, below.

33 Ltr, Giraud to Marshall, 16 Feb 44, OPD

336.2 France, Sec II; Msg 1255, CCS to Wilson,

2 Mar 44, FAN 340.
156 REARMING THE FRENCH

On 13 March the MAB assigned all

available equipment for the eighty-odd supporting combat and service organizations

still to be equipped. Not all the matériel

was to be shipped from the United States.

Some of it had already been delivered as

part of Phase III toward the requirements

of the two divisions now deferred. For the

rest, as much as possible was to be transferred from stocks available in the theater.

At the request of the French, the JRC arranged with NATOUSA to have the locally available items of equipment issued to

them before the arrival of the more important shipments. In this manner there would

be no sudden congestion of their supply

facilities.34

Before long, AFHQ and French authorities came to recognize the necessity of subjecting the 23 January Plan to minor modifications. Initially they had drafted the

plan with a view to filling specific requirements for an operation, ANVIL, scheduled

to take place around 1 May. As time

passed, the target date was changed to early

June, then to late July, finally to midAugust. Operational requirements were

bound to fluctuate accordingly and with

them the composition of the French troop

list. Headquarters, Force 163, the Allied

command organized in early January for

the purpose of planning ANVIL, urged from

time to time the addition of new units and

the elimination of others no longer regarded

as essential.

By the end of May the JRC had drawn

up a tentative list of the units considered

necessary for addition to the plan. All

were supporting service organizations except for two antiaircraft operations detachments and one tank destroyer battalion

which American authorities urged the

French to include in their troop list. In

the case of some of these units, AFHQ felt

that maintenance equipment only need be

provided. To arrive at a final decision,

some thirty-five representatives from

AFHQ, NATOUSA, Force 163, and the

French General Staff met on 13 June. They

drew up a final list of revisions to be submitted first to the French High Command,

later to the theater commander. At a second conference, held a fortnight later, the

French proposed the further addition of

three replacement depots and sixty replacement companies. The proposed revisions

having been formally approved by all concerned, General Wilson recommended to

the CCS on 17 July their incorporation in

the 23 January Plan.35

The French, in the meantime, had requested and obtained inclusion in the program of an additional infantry regiment

(the 4th Zouaves) for use not in ANVIL

but in Corsica to reinforce the Sovereignty

forces charged with the defense of the island. General Devers had already authorized SOS to issue the necessary equipment

on loan, pending its assignment in Washington and replacement from future

shipments.36

In early July the French also had urged

the addition to the 23 January Plan of two

more infantry regiments of two battalions

34

 Min, MAC (G) 134th Mtg, 13 Mar 44; Msg

2099, AGWAR to Devers, 13 Mar 44, and Memos,

Leyer for Loomis, 29 Feb 44, Loomis for Leyer, 4

Mar 44, JRC 903 Requests for Units; Msg 223,

Somervell to Devers, 18 Feb 44, ASF International

Div Files, A-45-192.

35

 Min, Conf on Fr Rearmt, 13, 27 Jun 44, JRC

904 Modification of Rearmt; Msg, Wilson to CCS,

17 Jul 44, NAF 752; Memo, Loomis for Leyer,

7 Aug 44, JRC 904. 36

 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 21 May 44, Msg F58925, Devers to Larkin, 13 Jun 44, and Memo,

Loomis for Leyer, 21 Jul 44, JRC 903 Requests

for Units.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: I 157

each, to provide for a stronger infantry

reserve in the forthcoming operations in

southern France. They considered this increase necessary in view of the nature of

the terrain and to offset the numerical insufficiency of infantry as compared with

tanks in the existing composition of armored

divisions. The two regiments were the 9th

Zouaves and the 1st Algerian Tirailleurs

(1st RTA). Again, on 10 August, the

French recommended the addition of a

mobile salvage unit to be used in southern

France for the salvage and repair of matériel abandoned by the enemy within the

French sector of operations. While theater

officials were examining these two requests,

the CCS, on 13 August, approved the revisions recommended earlier by General

Wilson. They directed that the equipment

already in the hands of units deleted from

the troop list be repossessed and put into

U.S. stocks without delay.37

By the time of the launching of ANVIL

in mid-August, AFHQ officials had come to

regard the French troop list as it stood then

as quite satisfactory. This was evidenced

by the action they took on the French request for two infantry regiments and a salvage unit. In a letter to General Béthouart

dated 17 August, General Wilson declared

that AFHQ would give no consideration to

additional units or equipment until the current program had been completed. He

pointed out that the CCS had been "very

cooperative" and therefore should not be

asked to approve equipment or units unless

these were vitally necessary. In the case of

the salvage unit in particular, AFHQ considered that there was no need for it in

view of the existence of similar Allied

organizations.38

In spite of General Wilson's warning,

the French submitted, on 30 August and

again on 22 September, a request for matériel to equip one escort troop and one

headquarters company which General de

Gaulle considered necessary for his own security and "for reasons of prestige."

 39

 Deciding against making any further recommendations to the CCS, AFHQ officials informally advised the French to resubmit

their request to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), then

established in Paris.

At the end of August, General Leyer furnished pertinent information on the state of

activation of the units now approved for

addition to the program. The tank destroyer battalion, for which 3-inch M10

guns had been requested, was organized and

had been placed on the troop list. All other

units were or would be ready by 30 September at the latest.40 On 20 October the

War Department advised the theater that

no equipment for these units had yet been

assigned in the absence of information as to

the desired priority of shipment and ultimate destination. The theater had, in fact,

cabled this information some six weeks

earlier but its message had apparently been

lost in transit. AFHQ then repeated the

content of its first communication and stated

that it wished the entire equipment, less the

quantities reported earlier as being available

in theater stocks, shipped immediately to the

port of Oran from which French troops were

being embarked for service in southern

37

 Ltrs, Leyer to Loomis, 8 Jul 44, and Mr.

André Diethelm to Loomis, 10 and 18 Aug 44,

JRC 904; Msg, CCS to Wilson, 13 Aug 44, FAN

390.

38

 Memos, Noce for JRC, 23 Aug 44, and Loomis

for Leyer, 28 Aug 44, JRC 904. 39

 Ltrs, Leyer to Loomis, 30 Aug and 22 Sep 44,

in same file. 40

 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 28 Aug 44, in same file.
158 REARMING THE FRENCH

France.41 The War Department immediately submitted the necessary bids to the

MAB. Once assigned, the matériel was

shipped along with the rest of the equipment being furnished under the 23 January

Plan.

Secondary Programs

Approval by the Combined Chiefs of

the 23 January Plan, including the rider

having reference to nonprogram units, came

some five to six weeks after other important

decisions. On 18 January they had authorized the issue of maintenance materials to

a number of French Communications Zone

establishments. Ten days later they had

also approved an extensive rearmament

program for the French Air Force.42 These

various measures were proof that the AngloAmerican allies were determined to rehabilitate the North African forces to the fullest

extent possible. Moreover, they were evidence of a desire to establish programs consistent with both French manpower and

Allied production capabilities. But it soon

developed that the French considered the

provisions made with respect to nonprogram

units and Communications Zone establishments as wholly insufficient, and they reopened the issue.

Nonprogram Units

The letter that General Giraud had addressed to General Marshall on 16 February signifying his general agreement to the

terms of the 23 January Plan included an

appeal for a more generous provision of

matériel to nonprogram units. Under the

plan, they were to receive maintenance supplies only. It was indispensable, he urged,

to replace without delay the initial equipment now in the hands of these organizations, as it had been issued at the expense

of program units. In his answer, the U.S.

Chief of Staff explained that, since the theater itself had originally recommended that

only maintenance items be furnished, General Giraud should take the matter of further provision up directly with General

Wilson.43

AFHQ had, by this time, recognized the

necessity of granting the French request so

as to make it possible to reduce shortages in

program units from which equipment had

been diverted. At a conference held on

12 March with General Devinck, chief of

General Giraud's personal staff, General

Gammell, Chief of Staff, AFHQ, promised

that steps would be taken to obtain the necessary equipment. The French General

Staff immediately prepared the requisitions

and in early April submitted them along

with others to the JRC. In transmitting

them to the War Department, General

Loomis requested that NATOUSA be authorized to transfer at once to the French, as

partial fulfillment of the requirements, a

number of items then available in theater

stocks. Before reaching a decision, War

Department officials asked for a justification of the contemplated transfer. General Loomis explained that the transfer was

intended not to make up for shortages of

assignments or shipments but primarily to

replace equipment diverted for the benefit

of nonprogram units. These units, he carefully pointed out, had been organized at the 41

 Msgs FX-94554, AFHQ to AGWAR, 10 Sep

44 (repeated in FX-46207, 31 Oct 44), and WX54256, Somervell to SHAEF Mission to France, 29

Oct 44, in same file. 42

 See pp. 204-06, below.

43

 Ltrs, Giraud to Marshall, 16 Feb 44, and

Marshall to Giraud, 4 Mar 44, OPD 336.2 France,

Sec II; Msg 1372, Marshall to Devers, 4 Mar 44,

JRC Cable Log.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: I 159

request of the theater commander for service in Italy.44

By this time Lt. Gen. Roger Leyer had

submitted to the JRC new requisitions for

matériel urgently needed by the Shock Battalion and the Commando Battalion, two

nonprogram units not intended for service

in Italy. These units, each composed of one

headquarters company, three combat companies, and one demolition company, and

with a combined strength of 1,100 to 1,300

men, were then stationed in Corsica and

participating in raids on enemy territory.45

Their equipment was so inadequate that

any further training was considered inadvisable. Also the men were reported to be

suffering from such neglect in all spheres

(insufficient clothing and food rations in

particular) that they lacked energy and

showed apathy in their work.46 The JRC,

however, decided that most of the items requested on their behalf by General Leyer

had been included in the requisitions sent

to the War Department on 17 April and that

there was no need for further action.

On 5 May the War Department announced that the transfer of matériel proposed by General Loomis to fill shortages of

initial equipment was approved except in

cases where such shortages resulted from diversion of matériel to units not authorized

initial equipment by the CCS.47 With this

ruling, all hopes vanished, temporarily at

least, for the replacement of initial matériel

issued to nonprogram units.

It soon became obvious that the diversion of equipment to nonprogram units had

created such shortages as to make it impossible for the French military authorities

to complete the equipping of program units.

Gravely concerned over the situation, General Devers appealed once again to the War

Department on 14 June. First he proceeded to justify the operational necessity

for the activation and equipping of the

nonprogram units. The tabor groups and

mule companies, he explained, had been

organized by the French at the urgent request of General Clark and with NATOUSA's approval in order to meet unexpected

operational requirements presented by conditions of terrain that were unforeseen when

the Italian campaign was planned. They

had been engaged for several months and

had rendered "invaluable support" in the

successful operations of the U.S. Fifth

Army. The Shock and Commando Battalions were standing ready for the conquest

of the Island of Elba (Operation BRASSARD). Divisional instruction centers were

considered necessary in view of the French

replacement system. The Spahis Brigade

had been issued initial equipment as a result of a personal agreement between Generals Smith and Giraud. It was not possible, warned General Devers, to take

equipment away from these units nor could

the units themselves be withdrawn from

present operations or deleted from the

ANVIL and BRASSARD troop lists. The

promise had been made to the French that

the equipment issued these organizations at

the expense of program units would be replaced. Failure to fulfill this commitment

was bound to jeopardize ANVIL. The only

possible course of action, concluded General Devers, was to assign and float the

equipment in question without delay.48

44

 Msgs F-33327, Devers to AGWAR, 17 Apr 44,

WX-26296, Somervell to Devers, 22 Apr 44, and

F-36083, Loomis to AGWAR, 22 Apr 44, JRC

400.4/005. 45

 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 9 Apr 44, in same file. 46

 Memo, Capt J. McNeil, Officer Commanding

Commando Training Teams, for G-3 AFHQ, 27

Apr 44, in same file. 47

 Msg W-32523, Somervell to Devers, 6 May

44, in same file.

48

 Msg F-59425, Devers to AGWAR, 14 Jun

44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A.
160 REARMING THE FRENCH

Apparently impressed by the strength of

General Devers' arguments, War Department officials took immediate action. Four

days later they announced that initial

equipment for the Spahis Brigade and tabor groups had been assigned. They were,

however, referring the entire question to

the CCS, the latter being the sole authority

in the matter of the provision of initial

equipment. In case the CCS turned

down the proposal, the matériel already

assigned would be deducted from future

assignments to program units which had

received no equipment, such as the fourth

armored division and the remainder of the

sixth infantry division.49

It was not until 14 July that the CCS finally approved the issue of initial equipment to Moroccan tabors, pack companies,

and the Commando and Shock Battalions.

With respect to replacement training centers, they approved the issue of a minimum

amount of equipment to be used solely for

the training of replacements earmarked for

expeditionary units. The CCS then warned

General Devers to make no further commitments to rearm additional French organizations without their approval. To

keep the record straight, Devers replied

that, except for the equipment given nonprogram units for operational reasons and

that furnished for the purpose of filling

shortages in program units alerted for operations, the theater had transferred no

serviceable major items of initial equipment to the French without prior CCS

approval.50

Sovereignty Forces

In the fall of 1943 theater officials, it will

be recalled, had recommended against the

provision of equipment to Sovereignty

forces.51 This position they maintained for

some months but reconsidered it in May

1944 when the question of the responsibility

for the ground defense of French North

Africa came up for re-examination.

The Sovereignty forces had long taken

an important share of the antiaircraft defense of North Africa and, since October

1943, had gradually assumed the entire

coastal and air defense of Corsica. When

in April 1944 AFHQ suggested that they

take over the entire responsibility for the

ground defense of North Africa, the French

High Command accepted the commitment

provided the units charged with the task

received additional help in the way of

equipment. AFHQ had hoped that they

would take on the added responsibility with

the equipment already available to them.52

Asked to comment on the matter, General Loomis pointed out that the needs of

the Sovereignty forces must be assessed in

the light of their operational duties. The

units charged with the defense of the territory were, in his judgment, sufficiently

equipped. Only in the case of those charged

with the ground defense of Corsica was there

some justification for providing more equipment. Even then, the inclusion in the 23

January Plan of an additional infantry regiment (the 4th Zouaves) for use as reinforcement on the island would probably be sufficient.

49

 Msg 53405, AGWAR to Devers, .20 Jun 44,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A. 50

 Msg WX-64781, AGWAR to Devers and

SACMED, 14 Jul 44, ABC 091.711 France (6

Oct 43), Sec 2-A; Msg F-7307, Devers to CCS,

17 Jul 44, JRC Cable Log.

51

 See p. 123, above. 52

 Two Ltrs, Smith to Devinck, 26 Oct 43,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres; Ltr,

Béthouart to Gammell, 1 May 44, AFHQ 0100/12C

G-3 Div Ops Corres From Fr; Ltr, Gammell to

Béthouart, 14 May 44, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div

Ops Fr Rearmt.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: I 161

It was with respect to the units responsible for maintaining internal security that,

in the opinion of General Loomis, the provision of material assistance was wholly

justified. He urged that these troops, then

inadequately equipped, be furnished sufficient matériel to enable them, should the

need arise, to carry out their duties satisfactorily. The forthcoming departure from

North Africa of the bulk of the French expeditionary forces made this course of action all the more necessary. AFHQ immediately endorsed General Loomis' recommendation and requested the French military authorities to prepare and submit appropriate requisitions for consideration by

the CCS. The new project was intended

to provide generally for supplies of an expendable nature to be used for the maintenance of the clothing and equipment,

French as well as German and Italian, currently in the hands of the troops concerned

and for which U.S. maintenance materials

were available. When the French requisitions were received and screened by the

JRC, General Wilson cabled a request on

8 June for supplies consisting largely of raw

materials and representing a total estimated

at from 3,000 to 3,500 tons semiannually.53

The French felt that the internal security

units needed also more arms. At their request, General Wilson urged the British

Chiefs of Staff and the CCS to authorize

the transfer to them of 100 Crusader tanks

and 30 armored cars, all obsolescent, with

sufficient spare parts for six months. The

British Chiefs of Staff agreed to the proposed transfer provided the French clearly

understood that the British Army accepted

no continuing liability for the maintenance

of the vehicles once the initial provision of

spare parts had been exhausted.54

It was not until 1 July that the CCS finally approved the request for the provision

to internal security troops of 3,000-3,500

tons of materials semiannually. They made

it clear that their approval did not constitute authority for the issue of additional organizational and individual equipment. At

the end of the month they authorized the

proposed transfer of obsolescent British vehicles, such transfer to take place approximately ninety days before the departure

from North Africa of the last British, French,

or U.S. unit equipped with tanks and armored cars. As the last Allied unit of this

type was due to leave within ninety days,

General Wilson recommended and obtained

approval that the proposed transfer be effected forthwith.55

The French, in the meantime, had requested and General Wilson had subsequently agreed, that the CCS be asked to

approve the further transfer of American

half-tracks, forty M3's and twenty-four M2's

in all, with which to effect the motorization of the units due to receive the tanks.

Motorization, they had explained, would

enable the units to extend their radius of

action and increase their mobility. The

CCS approved the proposal on 11 August,

with the proviso that the transfer be made

concurrent with that of the British tanks and

armored cars.56

53 Memo, Loomis for Dever, 15 May 44, JRC

902/1 Rearmt Plan: Msg F-66424, Wilson to

TROOPERS, 30 Jun 44, JRC Cable Log; Msg,

Wilson to CCS, 8 Jun 44, NAF 691.

54

 Msg, Wilson to CCS and COS, 15 Jun 44,

NAF 714; Msg F-66424 cited in 53; Msg 3256,

AMSSO to AFHQ, 22 Jun 44, AFHQ 0100/12C

G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt. 55

 Msg, CCS to Wilson, 1 Jul 44, FAN 375; Msg,

CCS to Wilson, 31 Jul 44, FAN 714; Msg, Wilson

to CCS, 6 Aug 44, NAF 757. 56

 Msg, Wilson to CCS, 19 Jul 44, NAF 753; Msg,

CCS to Wilson, 11 Aug 44, FAN 388.
162 REARMING THE FRENCH

The delivery to the security units of the

tanks, armored cars, half-tracks, and maintenance materials followed close on the heels

of the CCS approval. With this matériel,

the units, within a short time, were in a

position considered favorable should they be

called upon to engage in operations for the

maintenance of internal security. It is well

to note here that throughout the ensuing

months their duties remained light. No development occurred significant enough to

warrant their employment, at least while

the war in Europe was in progress.57

57

 Just after the war ended, on 11 May 1945,

severe rioting broke out at Sétif, Algeria. Forty

Europeans were killed by natives. Rioting was followed by disturbances including the burning of

outlying European farms. The Sovereignty forces

quickly gained control of the situation. To reinforce them, the French authorities, with the approval of SHAEF, moved a few combat units from

France to North Africa. Msg 4237, Lewis to

SHAEF, FWD, 11 May 45, AFHQ 0100/12C G-3

Div Ops Fr Movements.
CHAPTER X

Phase IV of the Program

(February-October 1944)

II: Implementation

Equipping the Units on the ANVIL

Troop List

While revisions of the 23 January Plan

were being effected and secondary programs

initiated, implementation of Phase IV was

proceeding at a pace that quickened as the

launching of ANVIL drew near.

On 18 March AFHQ requested the

French High Command to nominate specific units for inclusion in the ANVIL troop

list, and to indicate for each the respective

U.S. or French table of organization and

equipment, its strength in personnel and

vehicles, present location, status of equipment, and date of readiness. Within a few

days the French General Staff submitted the

necessary information on the basis of which

AFHQ immediately established and subsequently published, on 1 April, the official

French troop list. The troop list actually

incorporated all of the units included in the

rearmament program. On 17 April the

French headquarters informed AFHQ that

General de Gaulle had officially appointed

General de Lattre de Tassigny to command

the French ANVIL forces.1

The American ANVIL forces comprised

the Seventh U.S. Army, commanded by

Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, also Commanding General, Force 163. General

Patch, under whose control the French

forces were to operate during the initial

phase of ANVIL, was watching the progress

of their equipping with considerable interest. At his direction, Headquarters, Force

163, on 5 April, instructed NATOUSA to

make sure that participating French units

would be equipped and maintained on exactly the same scale as corresponding U.S.

organizations. All logistical and other plans

were being prepared accordingly.2

Aware that some U.S. tables of organization and equipment were currently being

modified, G-3, AFHQ, voiced the opinion

that any attempt at this juncture to change

in a like manner the corresponding French

tables would result in confusion and delay

in readying units for combat. Instead, G-3

recommended that the JRC be asked to determine, with the assistance of all interested staff sections, the minimum requirements of equipment involved in each re1

 Memo, Gen Noce To All Concerned, 16 Mar

44, ASF Planning Div Files, A-47-192 Theater Br

15—Fr Military NA; Ltr, Gammell to Giraud, 18

Mar 44, JRC 320/004 Orgn of Fr Army (1 Jan

44); Memos, Noce for Liaison Sec AFHQ, 30 Mar

44, and G-3 AFHQ To All Concerned, 29 May 44,

AFHQ 0100/12D G-3 Div Ops, Vol. I; Ltr,

Béthouart to Wilson, 17 Apr 44, AFHQ 0100/12C

G-3 Div Ops Fr Forces in ANVIL, Vol. I. 2

 Memo, Hq Force 163 for CG NATOUSA, 5

Apr 44, AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups.
164 REARMING THE FRENCH

vised U.S. table, and to establish a method

of obtaining the necessary additional equipment for the French. G-4 opposed the proposal on the ground that changes in U.S.

tables would bring about a "continual deluge" of requests from the French for additional equipment without their turning in

the matériel made surplus also as a result of

changes. The JRC, on the contrary, agreed

with the recommendation of G-3, and informed the latter that a procedure had already been established by which the War

Department, upon the recommendation of

the theater commander, obtained from the

MAB the assignment of the minimum

equipment required.3

On 17 June Headquarters, Force 163, indicated the dates by which French units were

to be ready and requested NATOUSA to

ensure that they would be fully equipped

before their release to Force 163. SOS

being vitally interested in the matter, its

chief, Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin, recommended a number of measures. He suggested that SCAMA, the JRC, and French

headquarters be briefed sufficiently in the

operation to know what troops must be

equipped, in what order of priority, and

how soon; that French Training Section be

requested to perform thorough showdown

inspections of each unit on the troop list;

finally, that shortages of equipment be filled,

first from French stocks and then from U.S.

stocks.4

Representatives from G-4, the JRC,

NATOUSA, Force 163, and SOS immediately took up General Larkin's recommendations in the course of a series of conferences.

They agreed first to brief SCAMA and the

French General Staff. General Leyer was

handed, on 23 June, a priority list of the

units, program as well as nonprogram, to

be fully equipped, trained, and made ready.

Later General Loomis suggested to him that

each organization be asked to submit requisitions for shortages to SCAMA, and that

SCAMA be directed to issue all items available in French stocks and to forward consolidated requisitions to SOS for the remaining shortages. He promised that both the

French Training Section and the Stock Control Section of the JRC, which he supervised,

would furnish all possible assistance in this

connection.5

Meanwhile, a large part of the equipment

ordered from the United States under Phase

IV had been assigned and delivered to

North Africa. Only a small amount remained to be shipped. In a message dated

23 June, General Devers requested the War

Department to float "on highest priority"

all the rest of the equipment then awaiting

shipment at ports and depots in the United

States. The French units, he explained,

were to be used in scheduled operations; it

was urgent, therefore, that everything be

done to reduce their shortages, particularly

of critical items not available in theater

stocks. The War Department replied that

the necessary action was being taken and

announced that the MAB had just assigned

items omitted from previous assignments because of nonavailability at the time. Simultaneously, NATOUSA turned over to the

French, in pursuance of earlier agreements

with the War Department, substantial

amounts of equipment available in U.S.

3

 Memos, Noce for JRC, 3 Jun 44, G-4 for JRC,

6 Jun 44, and Loomis for G-3, 6 Jun 44, JRC

320/004 Orgn of Fr Army (1 Jan 44). 4

 Memo, Hq Force 163 for CG NATOUSA, 17

Jun 44, AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups; Memo, Hq SOS

NATOUSA for CG NATOUSA, 19 Jun 44, Hq

MTOUSA File, Fr Policy (Feb-Oct 44).

5

 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 23 Jun 55, Hq

MTOUSA File, Fr Policy; Memo, Loomis for Leyer,

6 Jul 44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated

for Combat.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: II 165

stocks in North Africa, especially items

required for the further training of troops.6

On 7 July General Béthouart, then on a

brief visit in Washington with General de

Gaulle, called on General Marshall to discuss with him the general situation of

French rearmament. He urged that the

rest of the matériel needed to complete the

equipment of the fourth armored and the

sixth infantry divisions be assigned without

delay. The U.S. Chief of Staff promptly

referred the matter to General Devers and

asked whether it was the theater's intention to order any additional equipment over

and above that delivered for the five infantry and three armored divisions. General Devers replied that all essential equipment required for pending operations had

been ordered and, in fact, should arrive on

time if action already initiated was completed as scheduled. It was true, he explained, that some matériel had not been

ordered, but only because of the decision

of the theater not to maintain organizations in the program for which the French

High Command did not seem to have

enough personnel. General Devers then

offered a word of caution in connection

with the presence in Washington of Generals de Gaulle and Béthouart. The French

had just submitted several requests, which

AFHQ had ignored, for equipping units

to be activated from personnel expected to

become available in continental France. It

would be well, General Devers recommended, if General Marshall refrained

from making any commitments based on

statements made by Béthouart or de Gaulle

without the theater's comments.7

By the beginning of August, no significant items of equipment for which the

theater had cabled requisitions to Washington remained unassigned. Moreover, all

items assigned had been shipped, received

in North Africa, and turned over to the

French along with the matériel available

locally. Yet, the various inspections conducted in the preceding weeks by French

Training Section had revealed some startling and disturbing deficiencies. At a time

when the launching of Operation ANVIL

was getting dangerously close, some units

were reported to be still short an appreciable amount of initial equipment, with

the result that much of their personnel had

not been trained. Worse yet, several units—

all supporting service organizations—had

not even been activated. These were indeed serious matters, creating a situation

likely to jeopardize the successful employment of the French in ANVIL. The problems involved were familiar ones: lack of

technicians and shortages of equipment.

Service Troops and the Lack of Technicians

Activation of the units necessary to implement the 23 January Plan in its entirety

was bound to create for the French military authorities insuperable difficulties

owing to the continued dearth of technicians and specialists. The elimination of

two divisions and the deferment of two

more had not produced the expected number of skilled troops. The inability of the

French High Command to organize in particular base units for the support of their

forces in Italy forced a re-examination of

the entire question of service troops.

6

 Msgs FX-63398, Devers to AGWAR, 23 Jun

44, and W-57516, AGWAR to Devers, 28 Jun 44,

JRC 903 Requests for Units; Msg W-57137, Somervell to Devers, 28 Jun 44, JRC Cable Log. 7

 Memo, Béthouart for Somervell, 6 Jul 44, OPD

400 France, Sec IV; Msg W-61762, Marshall to

Devers, 7 Jul 44, JRC 903 Requests for Units;

Msg FX-70274, Devers to Marshall, 8 Jul 44,

SHAEF Mission to France 475 Rearmt Plan and

Policy, Ground, 900-1.
166 REARMING THE FRENCH

It will be recalled that, by the end of January, the French still had not made available to Peninsular Base Section in Naples

any of the units necessary for the operation

of Base 901, the French subsection of PBS.8

On 3 February General Loomis requested

General Leyer to nominate at least some of

the required units as their presence in Italy

was urgently needed. On the same day he

complained to General Larkin of continued

hesitation on the part of the French in providing units for PBS in spite of several conferences with them on the subject. If his

latest communication to General Leyer did

not produce immediate results, he intended

to take the matter up with General Giraud

or General de Gaulle.9

General Leyer promptly promised that

some units would be made available by the

end of February and others activated at a

later date. What rendered their organization difficult, he explained, was the extensive reshuffling of personnel and equipment

then going on in the army as a result of the

application of the January Plan.10 The

Poste de Statistique, or Statistical Branch, of

the General Staff was working feverishly to

effect the necessary transfers.11 General

Leyer hoped that an accurate report on

readiness for combat could be prepared by

the end of February, when sufficient adjustments would have been effected.12

By this time the French military authorities were making frantic efforts to find qualified service troops for their many commitments. Most of the divisional and corps

service units were activated. General Leyer

also had succeeded in assigning approximately 8,000 additional effectives for duty

with the French bases at Oran and Casablanca. But he still was faced with the

problem of activating the army base and

other service units provided for under the

January Plan, and of assigning additional

technicians and specialists to SCAMA,

depots, and warehouses. Further aggravating his difficulties, AFHQ was urging him

to activate two ordnance maintenance battalions in addition to the ordnance units required under the January Plan. General

Loomis informed him that the need for these

battalions was urgent; without them,

French forces participating in ANVIL would

have inadequate fourth and fifth echelon

maintenance of artillery and armored vehicles. General Leyer flatly rejected the

proposal on the ground that he could not

undertake this additional commitment.

All present reserves of specialists as well as

troops in training and available at a later

date, he explained, would be absorbed by

service units already on the program.13

Intervening directly in the matter, General Giraud, on 3 March, informed General

Wilson that the current general lack of

service troops made it impossible for his

headquarters to assign to PBS as many units

as desirable for the support of the French

forces in Italy.14 A few days later, in the

course of a meeting with Generals Wilson

and Devers, Giraud warned that the same

8

 See p. 146, above. 9

 Memos, Loomis for Leyer, 3 Feb 44, and for

Larkin, 3 Feb 44, JRC 370/003 Employment of

Sv Units. 10

 Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 4 Feb 44, JRC 370/

003 Employment of Sv Units. 11

 It had been established in March 1943 for

the purpose of allotting U.S. matériel to the units

designated for activation in first priority. 12

 Memo, Lt Atlas Cheek, Jr., for Col Crump, 15

Feb 44, JRC 905.6/1 Corres on Statistics of Rearmt.

13

 Memo, Loomis for Larkin, 3 Feb 44, JRC

370/003 Employment of Sv Units; Memos, Loomis

for Leyer, 5 Feb 44, and Leyer for Loomis, 11 Feb

44, JRC 904 Modification of Rearmt. 14

 Ltr, Giraud to Wilson, 3 Mar 44, JRC 370/003

Employment of Sv Units.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: II 167

lack of service troops would prevent the organization of the army and base services required for ANVIL. Reiterating his oftenexpressed conviction that it was "a pity to

waste excellent combat troops by converting

them into service units in which duty they

were poor," he urged that the U.S. Army

make every effort to furnish men for the

services, thus permitting him to put more

men in combat units. General Devers replied that the U.S. Army itself was short

10,000 men to meet its own service requirements in the theater. He voiced the hope

that the French Army, after landing on the

Continent, would find competent personnel

to meet the requirements for service technicians. In the meantime he recognized that

the U.S. Army would have to provide troops

for the port and lines of communications,

but would provide none for corps services.15

In the apparent belief that General

Devers' statement left the door open for a

more generous provision of U.S. service

units, the French High Command, on 17

March, sounded out AFHQ on the matter,

only to be told that General Devers had

not meant that commitments made in January with respect to the ANVIL troop list

were to be modified. The January agreement constituted the basis of the current

program. The program itself had been formally acted upon by the CCS; it should

therefore be considered as "firm and still

binding."

 16

 The next day General Devers

himself clarified his statement in the course

of an interview with General Giraud. The

U.S. Army, he asserted, would assist to the

fullest possible extent in providing certain

port and base service units but it could not

do more.17

There were sound reasons why General

Devers' offer of limited assistance could not

be extended further. He had sought,

earlier in January, to obtain from the War

Department the assignment of some U.S.

service units to the French. General Marshall had informed him that the War Department "specifically decided and directed" that service units for support of

French troops as requested by him could

not and would not be provided.18

With the issue now closed, the French

High Command endeavored to fulfill its

commitments to the limit of available manpower. At the end of March a few service

units were ready for movement to Italy.

By special agreement between AFHQ and

General Giraud, they were being assigned

to General Juin's CEF for employment with

Base 901. On 23 April the base was placed

under the command of a general officer,

Brig. Gen. Jean Gross, himself under the

operational control of PBS. At the end

of May and during the first two weeks of

June, more service units were assigned to

the CEF for employment, at the discretion

of General Juin, with either the corps itself or Base 901.19

That the French military authorities did

not reopen the issue with respect to technical troops does not mean that they succeeded in activating all the required units.

Already at the end of March they had announced that they were unable, for the

moment, to organize a number of units,

15

 Min Mtg, Giraud and Devinck with Wilson

and Devers, 9 Mar 44, AFHQ CAO 1202 BIGOT

ANVIL, Pt. I. 16

 Min Mtg, Devinck with Rooks and Noce, 17

Mar 44, AFHQ 0100/12A G-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr.

17

 Min Mtg, Giraud with Devers, 18 Mar 44,

AFHQ 0100/12A G-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr. 18

 Msgs W-9779, Devers to Marshall, 10 Jan 44,

and 2704, Marshall to Devers, 17 Mar 44, OPD

Cable Files. 19

 Dir, Hq PBS, 1 Apr 44, JRC 370/003 Employment of Sv Units; CEF Rcds, File 88, OCMH.
168 REARMING THE FRENCH

among which were three general hospitals

then on the 23 January Plan. The order

of battle of the CEF as of 22 May 1944,

when the corps was at the peak of its

strength, shows that the U.S. Army had

been forced to place at its disposal a considerable number of supporting units both

combat and service. Practically all the

corps field artillery and antiaircraft units

were American.20

At the end of June, with preparations for

ANVIL in full swing and the launching of

the operation itself only a few weeks away,

a report on the equipment status of the

service units on the troop list revealed that

as many as forty such units had not yet

been activated. The French "division

slice" was currently being estimated at

32,500 men instead of the required 40,000.

On the basis of eight divisions it was feared

that the French would lack approximately

60,000 service personnel needed to permit

operation as an independent force. There

was little doubt that the American Army

would be compelled, as it had been in

Italy, to make available substantial service

troops of its own to the French expeditionary units if the latter were to be supported

adequately in operations. In recognition

of a situation which the French High Command was not likely to correct in time, the

earlier stringent policy as contained in General Marshall's message of 17 March to

General Devers was modified on 14 June.

The War Department agreed that until

French communications zone troops became available, U.S. Army service units

could be employed "in indirect support of

French combat organizations, but only when

such organizations were employed together

with U.S. combat troops in operations under U.S. command, and when such support

was incidental to the major mission of supporting U.S. combat units."

 21

Meanwhile, AFHQ officials were redoubling their efforts to induce the French

High Command to activate forthwith all

the remaining required service units. Their

patience was severely tried when they were

informed in early August that the French

were planning to delay the activation of a

number of organizations, mostly truck battalions and ordnance maintenance companies, while at the same time they were requesting equipment for infantry and other

units not on the troop list. General Gammell seized the opportunity to remind them

that any reduction of the number of service

units or any delay in their readiness would

have serious repercussions in the pursuit

of the war. For this reason no consideration could be given to new requests for

armament while such a situation existed.22

In mid-August, as ANVIL was about to

be launched, the situation with respect to

20

 Msg F-25964, Devers to AGWAR, 1 Apr 44,

ASF International Div Files A-45-192 Cables,

Vol. IX: Fifth Army History, Pt. V, pp. 251-56.

21

 Memo, Hq Force 163 for SACMED, 21 Jun

44, AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups; Memo, Col J.

Terrence for Gen Noce, 30 Jun 44, AFHQ 0100/

12C Div Ops Fr Comd Liaison 2; Quotation from

Msg W-50668, Marshall to Devers, 14 Jun 44,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.

The "division slice" consists of the total strength

of the division plus the number of troops involved

in maintaining the division in the field, that is to

say, corps, army, army group, and communications zone troops. It is determined by dividing

the theater strength (minus air forces) by the number of divisions in the theater. The normal division slice for the U.S. forces operating in Europe

in 1944 was estimated at 40,000, made up as

follows: 15,000 in the division itself; 15,000 corps

and army troops; 10,000 communications zone

troops. 22

 Ltr, Gammell to Juin, 15 Aug 44, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres; see p. 157,

above.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: II 169

service units was far from satisfactory.

Some units were insufficiently manned,

others were only partially equipped and

trained, others had not even been activated.

There was no alternative but for the U.S.

Seventh Army to direct its own service units

to assume such support of the French forces

as the French High Command was unable

to provide.

Shortages of Equipment

As Phase IV opened, the problem of

shortages, which had plagued the French

for many months, was facing them with undiminished gravity. Reports currently

being received from Italy indicated that

units were still arriving without essential

items of equipment. The reasons were

many.

Not all the equipment expected from the

United States had been or was being received in North Africa. Some items were

unobtainable; others were deleted by the

War Department because they were considered nonessential, or because their shipment would jeopardize other commitments.

Sometimes, initial equipment arrived without some of the required 30-day maintenance items or 6-month spare parts. At

other times, the French failed to submit

proper and timely requisitions, or the equipment was ordered by the JRC on the basis

of U.S. tables of organization and equipment for units activated on different tables.

Furthermore, of the matériel actually received, the French were diverting substantial amounts to equip nonprogram units,

run depots and training centers, or maintain

units during their period of training, a period extending not infrequently over several

months. Finally, and not the least important, the order of priority for the readying

of alerted units and the corresponding dates

of readiness were subject to sudden changes

by order of AFHQ.23

The French supply system, which still had

not progressed to a point where it could

handle even routine matters smoothly, was

seriously taxed by the unexpected. In spite

of considerable juggling of equipment, involving at times the complete and hasty

turnover of matériel from one unit to another, the French military authorities were

continually faced with the alternative of

calling on SOS to complete the initial equipment and basic loads of alerted units or of

embarking the units improperly equipped.

Greatly concerned over the situation, American officials in the theater undertook to survey its causes with a view to devising adequate remedial measures.

The submission by the French of requisitions for initial equipment still appeared

to be a source of considerable difficulty to

them. To clear up some of the technical

problems involved, a conference, called at

the suggestion of the French themselves, was

held on 17 February between members of

the JRC and French G-4 officers responsible for the submission of requisitions. The

conferees discussed and finally agreed on a

satisfactory procedure. They agreed further that the requisitions would serve to

complete the equipment of the units designated for combat. The matériel to be requisitioned was to replace that previously

drawn from program units and diverted for

23

 Memo, Charpentier To All Concerned, 21 Feb

44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for

Combat; Memo, Director International Div for

CG North African Theater, 25 May 44, JRC 903

Requests for Units; Memo, G-4 Sup Br for ACofS

G-4 SOS, 18 Jun 44, Hq MTOUSA File, Fr

Policy.
170 REARMING THE FRENCH

various purposes; it would also be used to

re-equip units after combat.24

Having been informed by General

Loomis on 19 February that the French

had not requisitioned any additional major ordnance items for replacements, General Larkin once again inferred that they

were depending on the United States for

maintenance of their units in North Africa

and elsewhere. The French, he pointed

out, still were not providing full initial equipment for departing units, as evidenced by

two new cases just reported. One artillery

regiment had reached Italy equipped with

only one pair of shoes per man, and with

three of its twelve 155-mm. guns not in

working condition; a training center had arrived short of tents and training equipment.

Warning that the Fifth Army stocks would

soon be depleted if emergency issues to inadequately equipped troops were allowed to

continue, General Larkin urged that the

JRC arrange to have every French organization about to depart from North Africa

inspected by U.S. officers to ensure completeness of equipment. General Loomis

objected that such a procedure was not practicable owing to lack of personnel. He

pointed out that the U.S. advisers with

French divisions were already submitting

weekly reports to the JRC indicating what

shortages existed. The attention of the

French had been drawn to the matter and

he felt certain that the situation would soon

improve.25

General Loomis immediately informed

General Leyer of the great concern currently

felt by Generals Larkin and Devers regarding the question of shortages. He reiterated

that responsibility for the completion of

equipment of units alerted for movement

rested solely with the French High Command.26

 Realizing that only energetic action taken without delay could solve the

problem, Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce, G-3,

AFHQ, called Generals Larkin (SOS),

Loomis (JRC), Kingman (French Training Section), and others for a conference

on 4 March. General Larkin repeated his

earlier recommendation that units be completely inspected before leaving North

Africa in order to determine shortages.

"Someone has to decide whether they are

battle-fit," he insisted. This, explained

Generals Loomis and Kingman, was being

done. Inspections, however, were in

French hands and the responsibility for

completeness of equipment, they believed,

should remain French. Once in the field,

the units reported shortages to the U.S.

teams attached to them by General Kingman. In some instances, they claimed to be

short certain items of equipment, when in

fact the French tables of organization and

equipment under which they were equipped

did not call for them. In other cases, the

responsible authorities had not received the

new French table in time. The conferees

agreed that efforts should be made to expedite the printing and distribution to all

units of the exact table under which each

was to operate. After the conference,

AFHQ informed General Clark, Commanding General, Fifth Army, that difficulties incidental to shortages appeared to

be due largely to lack of knowledge of the

24

 Memo, Regnault for Loomis, 7 Jan 44, JRC

402 Sup Policy; Min, Conf AFHQ, 17 Feb 44, JRC

400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat. 25

 Msg 53748, Loomis to Larkin, 19 Feb 44, JRC

402 Sup Policy; Msg L-1635, Larkin to Loomis, 20

Feb 44, JRC Cable Log; Msgs L-1603, Larkin to

JRC, 20 Feb 44, and 55172, Loomis to Larkin, 22

Feb 44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated

for Combat.

26

 Memos, Loomis for Leyer, 25, 26 Feb 44, JRC

400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: II 171

appropriate tables of organization and

equipment under which French units were

organized and equipped. Copies of these

tables were being prepared in sufficient

quantity and would be forwarded to his

headquarters without delay.27

On 8 March, the War Department issued

a directive on the replacement and maintenance of equipment for the French forces.

The directive embodied and formalized the

several actions taken earlier. It set forth

in detail the manner in which shortages of

initial equipment and of replacement and

maintenance items were to be requisitioned

for both combat and noncombat units, and

prescribed the accounting procedure to be

followed for each category of items. The

procedure remained in force until June

when it was revised to conform with new

War Department policies.28

In spite of vigorous action on the part of

French and Allied headquarters, the problem of shortages continued to be a thorny

one. In early April the U.S. Fifth Army informed General Devers that two pioneer

(labor) regiments had arrived in Italy

"with such large number of initial shortages

as to be impractical to list by cable." In

mid-April an inspection of the 1st Motorized Infantry Division about to depart for

Italy revealed important shortages of mortars, machine guns, radio sets, trucks, and

other items. The division, until recently

British-equipped, had been re-equipped

with U.S. matériel largely drawn from

"nonparticipating" units. These were the

units not designated by AFHQ for immediate participation in operations. Among

them were the 1st and 5th Armored Divisions, both program units and both on the

ANVIL troop list, but whose presence was not

required in Italy. The 1st DMI was still

holding some British equipment (such as

mortars, Brens, tents, wreckers) besides

French and Italian matériel. Fifth Army,

having no maintenance facilities, parts, and

ammunition for such non-U.S. equipment,

requested AFHQ to effect its immediate

replacement. It was not until the middle of

April that the division, then on its way to

Italy, was reported as having all its initial

U.S. equipment except antiaircraft weapons.29

Simultaneously with the 1st DMI's departure from North Africa, the 2d Armored

was being readied for shipment to the

United Kingdom, there to be included in

the forces designated for the cross-Channel

operation (OVERLORD). The CCS had

agreed at the TRIDENT Conference in May

1943 that a token French force would participate in OVERLORD.30

 In late January

1944 the Allied command had further decided that French elements would be included among the first troops to enter Paris.

The 2d DB had subsequently been chosen

for this honor by the French military authorities. This division, like the 1st DMI,

was once British-equipped and had now

been rearmed with U.S. matériel. It

moved to the United Kingdom in midApril with approximately 100 percent of

its initial equipment and basic loads, plus

27

 Msg 60678, CinC to Fifth Army, 6 Mar 44,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt; Msg

2345, Fifth Army to CinC AFHQ, 21 Mar 44, JRC

Cable Log. 28

 Ltr, WD AG 400 (8 Mar 44) to CG

NATOUSA and CG N.Y. Port of Embarkation, 14

Mar 44, amended by Ltr, WD AG 400 (7 Jul),

11 Jul 44, JRC 402 Sup Policy.

29

 Msgs 2245, Fifth Army to CG NATOUSA, 3

Apr 44, RFTS 101, Inspection Team to CG Fifth

Army, 19 Apr 44, 8321, Fifth Army to CG AFHQ,

10 Apr 44, and F-35027, CinC AFHQ to Allied

Armies in Italy, 20 Apr 44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup

of Forces Designated for Combat. 30

 Min, 5th Mtg with President and Prime Minister, 24 May 43, TRIDENT Conf.
172 REARMING THE FRENCH

a 30-day supply of tank replacements.31

While in the United Kingdom, the division

became the supply and training responsibility of the U.S. Third Army, under whose

control it was placed, and was maintained

in the same manner as U.S. divisions. Third

Army determined the exact status of its

equipment and submitted requisitions to

SOS, ETOUSA, operating in the United

Kingdom, for the few existing shortages.

These were filled from U.S. Army stocks

in the theater and all transfers of matériel

were reported by chiefs of services in accordance with current lend-lease directives.32

Another division about to depart for

overseas duty was the 9th Colonial Infantry. Its destination was Corsica, liberated

in September 1943 by French troops, where

it was to prepare for future operations in

the Mediterranean.

The final equipping of the 1st DMI, 2d

DB, and 9th DIC had necessitated the filling of numerous shortages. This had been

accomplished by securing the missing items

from one of the following sources, in order

of precedence: from French sources other

than nonparticipating units, that is, from all

stocks available to the French; from

excess U.S. theater stocks; from nonparticipating units; and from U.S. theater

stocks, provided it did not jeopardize the

support of U.S. forces. The procedure followed had been that established by NATOUSA on 7 April.33

 SCAMA, SOS, and

Stock Control Section, all had shared in

the task.

The procedure as set forth by NATOUSA, although simple in appearance, was,

when put into application, quite complex

because of the many channels of communication involved. As pointed out later by

one of the U.S. advisers to the French divisions, to fill a shortage of initial equipment

might require no less than twenty administrative steps.34

 Nevertheless, in spite of its

complexity, NATOUSA extended its application thereafter to all other units subsequently alerted.

In mid-April the French began submitting, at the request of the JRC, a large number of requisitions designed to complete as

fully as possible the initial equipment and

basic loads of all remaining units on the

troop list. These requisitions were also designed to provide, at least for the second

half of 1944, the minimum maintenance

requirements of the Territorial establishments necessary for the support of expeditionary forces. The requisitions were first

screened by the JRC, then checked against

the list of equipment currently available in

excess theater stocks, which SOS furnished

at frequent intervals. From these lists the

JRC extracted the items required and requested the War Department to authorize

their transfer. Granting this authorization

was a routine matter in itself but necessary

for proper co-ordination with supply agencies in the United States. NATOUSA

then arranged for the immediate turnover

of the equipment. The locally unavailable

items were requisitioned from the United

States.

Feeling that some French requisitions

31

 Msg F-34203, Devers to AGWAR, 18 Apr 44,

JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for

Combat. 32

 Memos, Hq ETOUSA for CG Third Army and

SOS ETOUSA, 10 May 44, and Hq ETOUSA

for CG Third Army, 24 Aug 44, SHAEF G-3

091 France, Vol. I. 33

 Ltr, NATOUSA AG 400/466 D-O, 7 Apr 44,

JRC 370/001 Employment of Units—Gen.

34

 Memo, Liaison Office Fr Training Sec for

JRC, 26 May 44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces

Designated for Combat.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: II 173

were excessive, General Larkin questioned

whether the French Supply Services were

exploiting their own resources to the maximum before calling on U.S. theater stocks

for equipment. He recommended that, except in cases of actual emergency, only

items listed as "excess" in theater stocks be

given to the French. The continued issue

of other items, he feared, would jeopardize

seriously the American supply situation and,

in addition, would encourage the French

to depend too heavily on the U.S. Army for

completion of initial equipment of both

alerted and nonparticipating units.35 General Loomis, likewise, was disturbed by the

size of some of the French requisitions, especially those submitted for medical items.

He could not help but feel that they were

indicative of a desire on the part of the

French to build up stocks for ultimate use

in continental France either by the civilian

population, or by units raised there.36

To ensure that the French requisitions

were fully justified, the JRC subjected them

to more stringent scrutiny and screening.

Simultaneously the JRC urged the French

once again to exploit their own resources to

the limit. In the case of the units which

had left North Africa incompletely

equipped, General Loomis arranged for the

U.S. base section nearest to them to honor

the French requisitions as rapidly as possible.

In late May General Leyer forwarded to

the JRC a list of requisitions for matériel

with which to re-equip the 2d DIM and 3d

DIA after their expected withdrawal from

the Italian front, in anticipation of their ultimate engagement in ANVIL. General

Leyer's action was consonant with a recommendation made several months earlier by

General Loomis. As the requisitions appeared to contain for the most part supplies

normally furnished through SOS as maintenance, General Loomis and SOS agreed

that they need not be acted upon. They

then informed General Leyer that SOS

would assume the responsibility for re-equipping all French units operating in Italy before their engagement in ANVIL.37

On 16 June Headquarters, NATOUSA,

issued a final directive on the readying of

French participating units. The directive

instructed SOS to see to it that the French

completed from their own stocks the initial

equipment and basic loads of each unit before it was alerted for movement overseas.

As the unit was alerted, SOS would issue to

it from U.S. stocks such supplies as were

unobtainable from French sources.38

The remaining task now was to make arrangements for the adequate and timely provision of the maintenance supplies expected

to be required in the course of the following twelve months by forces other than expeditionary units. It will be recalled that

on 18 January 1944 the CCS had approved

the issue of some maintenance materials to

Territorial units and establishments supporting the expeditionary forces and, on 1 July

of the same year, the provision of 3,000-

3,500 tons semiannually of maintenance

materials for the Sovereignty forces. In

fulfillment of these decisions, the French,

in mid-July, submitted requisitions covering

the second half of 1944 and, on 15 September, those for the first half of 1945. Once

the requisitions were screened and properly

37

 Ltr, Loomis to Leyer, 22 Jan 44, and Memos.

Loomis for McKay, 1 Jun 44, Loomis for Leyer, 21

Jun 44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated

for Combat. 38

 Ltr AG 400/466 D-0, Hq NATOUSA to CG

SOS, 16 Jun 44, JRC 370/001 Employment of

Units—Gen.

35

 Msg L-17212, Larkin to JRC, 26 Apr 44, JRC

400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat. 36

 Memo, Loomis for CofS NATOUSA, 17 Apr

44, JRC 902/1 Rearmt Plan.
174 REARMING THE FRENCH

cut down in the case of unnecessary items,

the matériel available in the theater was

turned over to the French and the rest ordered from the United States.39

By the time ANVIL was launched, the

situation with regard to shortages had substantially improved. In addition, since

some units, especially service organizations,

were not expected to land before D plus 25,

it was hoped that their shortages would be

filled by then. At any rate, General Loomis

was satisfied that the French military authorities were making a "real effort" to supply all available items from their stocks.

Their task, he recognized, was still greatly

handicapped by the dearth of competent

supply personnel and the fact that serious

shortages and delays in shipments from the

United States were placing "a tremendous

burden" on them.40

SCAMA's Role During Phase IV

Throughout Phase IV, SCAMA, ably assisted by the American Stock Control Section, continued its efforts to assert itself as

the supreme French supply authority.41 Its

difficulties, numerous enough from the start,

had increased as a result of the application

of the decree of 16 December 1943 which

divided military responsibility between the

Commissioner of War and Air and the Commander in Chief.42

 In January and early

February, this responsibility was split further by the delegation of some authority to

the General Staff, the heads of services, and

to a smaller extent to the commander-designate of the French ANVIL forces. General

Loomis greatly feared that the establishment

and continued operation of an effective supply organization were next to impossible.

In his judgment the time had come for the

French High Command to nominate a general officer armed with sufficient authority

to correct a situation likely to affect adversely current and future operations.43

The French took no such step, but the appointment, later in April, of General

Béthouart as Chief of Staff of National Defense did result in a centralization of responsibility.

As SCAMA and supply installations

struggled toward standardization, the

French General Staff authorized, about 1

February, certain depot and port units for

activation one month later. Even though

these units never materialized, their authorization served to call attention to the

need of reinforcing the personnel in depots

and ports. To fill this need, General Leyer

recruited additional civilian employees and

ordered service units of the expeditionary

corps placed on temporary duty with

SCAMA while they waited to be shipped

overseas. In general, the personnel situation began to improve in early February

even though no definite plan had been established.

On 15 February Maj. Gen. Arthur R.

Wilson, Commanding General, Mediterranean Base Section, informed General Larkin that all U.S. officers assigned to French

depots were reporting notable improvements. Progress was further evidenced by

the fact that the French were now replac39

 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 15 Jul 44, JRC 400.4/

006; Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 15 Sep 44, SHAEF

Mission to France Requisitions, 1st half of 1945;

see pp. 128, 161, above. 40

 Memo, Loomis for G-4 SOS, 12 Sep 44, JRC

400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat. 41

 Sources for this section: JRC 400.2/002 Stock

Control System; History of Stock Control Section,

JRC, copy in JRC Files. 42

 See p. 118, above.

43

 Memo for Rcd, Loomis, 2 Mar 44, JRC 320/

004 Orgn of Fr Army (1 Jan 44).
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: II 175

ing in U.S. depots, at an increased rate,

the items of equipment issued for the maintenance of their forces in Italy. By early

March, SCAMA's director, Colonel Charpentier, felt that "the worst was over." He

predicted that the sample inventory scheduled for the second week of March for

the purpose of checking the accuracy of

SCAMA's records would show a definite

improvement. Actually, the inventory did

reveal substantial errors, in extreme cases

running as high as 80 percent. The discovery shocked the French into realization

of the need for still more energetic action.

Meanwhile a publication depot at

SCAMA headquarters had been set up.

English-French technical dictionaries prepared especially for each service became

available. So did a second supply textbook

written in both languages. French and

American officers on duty with SCAMA

were given courses of instruction on the

new supply system and the correct use of

forms. Once thoroughly schooled, the

U.S. officers were posted in French offices

and warehouses throughout North Africa

to give on-the-spot assistance on all supply

matters. Still there were frequent cases

where French chiefs of services would issue to their depots directives at variance

with the SCAMA textbooks.

By 15 May, when the French were conducting a general inventory of stocks

throughout North Africa, it became apparent that rapid strides in warehousing

and recording had been made. SCAMA

had reached a turning point in its existence. For the first time it had a fairly

complete and accurate picture of all stocks

on hand, with the possible exception of

ordnance and engineer spare parts. In

June detailed inspections of all depots conducted by joint Franco-American teams revealed that the SCAMA system was in operation in all warehouses and offices. Establishment of SCAMA as the sole supply

authority in the French Army could at

last be considered an accomplished fact.

The system had become sufficiently entrenched to render almost impossible any

return to the haphazard practices of the

old days.

SCAMA extended its activities to the entire supply field. It was now responsible

for preparing and submitting requisitions

to the JRC; for receiving, sorting out, assembling, and stocking matériel in the various depots; for maintaining supply levels,

regulating the movement and transport of

supplies, and keeping proper accounting

of U.S. matériel according to lend-lease

regulations. It had full authority to distribute equipment in accordance with priority lists and tables of organization and

equipment established by the French High

Command. If a unit was called forward

before it was completely equipped, SCAMA

was empowered to issue to it a "cheque" or

bill of credit which enabled it to draw the

necessary items from the U.S. base in the

theater of its destination. In short, SCAMA had become the SOS of the French

Army.44

By early July Colonel Geraghty, chief of

Stock Control Section, considered that

SCAMA could be left to continue its development "along lines natural to the

French" and that the presence of his section

was no longer needed. On his recommendation, Stock Control Section was disbanded

near the end of the month. But SCAMA

continued to operate long after the launching of ANVIL, since much work remained to

44

 Notes from Col Maurice Labarbarie, Jan 52;

Rpt, Col Labarbarie, 18 Jul 44, sub: Functioning

and Role of G-1 SCAMA, copy in OCMH.
176 REARMING THE FRENCH

be done for the supply of the expeditionary

forces.

Repossession of U. S. Equipment

Repossession by the U.S. Army of American matériel in French hands took place

in a number of cases and for a variety of

reasons, all consonant with established policies governing French rearmament and

with the theater's responsibility for ensuring

the judicious and economical use of all

American equipment. Frequently the purpose was to recapture matériel issued in an

emergency on the understanding that it

would be returned out of subsequent shipments to the French. A case in point is the

return to SOS depots of the tools, spare

parts, and supplies which SOS had loaned

to the French in early April 1943 for setting

up and operating their motor vehicle assembly plant at Algiers. In this instance, repossession was effected simply by appropriating the same materials directly from subsequent convoys bringing equipment for the

French.45

In other cases, particularly numerous during Phase IV, repossession was ordered because the matériel in question was considered "excess" in French stocks for one of the

following reasons: it had been delivered by

error, it was now in the hands of units once

part of approved troop lists, or American officials considered its further use by the

French no longer justified. In such cases,

repossession involved considerable difficulty,

often making it impracticable. The problem became particularly acute in April 1944,

when a number of units, not likely to be

activated, were stricken off the troop list.

The theater requested from the War Department the authority to instruct the French

to return to U.S. depots all ordnance equipment which had then become excess, except

general-purpose vehicles of which the

French were still short. The authority was

immediately granted with the understanding that proper credit reports would be made

on all returns and a detailed list of items involved transmitted to the MAB in Washington for information. The French then

directed SCAMA to effect the necessary returns.46

The operation proved to be more complex

than had been anticipated. In the first

place, SOS had no knowledge of just what

the French were to return. NATOUSA

asked the War Department for a detailed

list of all equipment that had actually been

shipped for the units in question. To complicate matters, the French had used the

equipment received on a French table of

organization basis with the result that the

matériel currently in the hands of the units

did not correspond to what had been ordered initially. Finally the French felt that

they could not return certain items as they

had used them to fill shortages in other units

or had given them to training centers. As

a result a considerable exchange of correspondence took place during June, July, and

August between NATOUSA, SOS, the War

Department, and French headquarters.

Such items as the French were finally able

to return were held in SOS depots pending a

decision on their ultimate disposition.47

The confusion was further increased by

the addition, throughout the early summer

45

 Msgs L-2316, SOS to CG Atlantic Base Sec,

15 Apr 43, and L-2317, SOS to JRC, 15 Apr 43,

JRC Cable Log.

46

 Msgs F-34037, Devers to AGWAR, 18 Apr 44,

and W-26607, Somervell to Devers, 22 Apr 44,

JRC 909 Surplus Equip. 47

 Msg F-47011, Devers to AGWAR, 17 May 44,

JRC Cable Log; Memo, CG SOS for CG NATOUSA, 2 Jun 44, JRC 909 Surplus Equip.
PHASE IV OF THE PROGRAM: II 177

months, of new units to both the 23 January Plan and the Air Force program. To

simplify matters, General Loomis asked the

French to transfer to these units the greater

part of the items which had become excess

as a result of the elimination of others, and

to keep him informed of such transfers.48

Repossession of U.S. equipment was consonant with the basic principle under which

French rearmament had operated from the

beginning, namely, that only approved units

were entitled to receive and hold Allied

equipment. The CCS did not fail to remind the theater commander on 13 August

that the French were to return the matériel

in the hands of units no longer on approved

troop lists.49

Disposal of British Equipment

A minor issue raised at the beginning

of Phase IV and rapidly settled concerned

the ultimate disposal of British equipment

still in the possession of the French. On

8 February General Wilson, the Supreme

Allied Commander, requested the French

military authorities to hand over all such

equipment to the British Ordnance Services.

The National Defense Committee immediately instructed Le Troquer, the Commissioner of War and Air, to take the matter up

with AFHQ and settle it within the framework of the Protocol of Anglo-French Mutual Aid recently signed.50

 The protocol

had laid down that the government of the

United Kingdom could, after the cessation

of hostilities, ask for the return of "such matériel supplied by it that was not destroyed,

lost or worn out." The French military authorities interpreted this to mean that they

could continue to use the equipment for the

duration of the war. Although not intending to maintain any organizations equipped

with British equipment, Le Troquer explained to General Wilson that the French

High Command had "various needs closely

related to the common war effort" which

could not be satisfied from American

sources.51 This was true, he said, of general-purpose vehicles, tank transporters, and

spare parts for the maintenance of British

equipment. To arrive at a satisfactory solution, Le Troquer suggested that responsible French and British authorities meet to

determine what items urgently needed by

the British should be handed over. General Wilson having approved the proposal,

British and French staff officers drew up a

list of equipment to be replaced in British

depots and advised General Leyer to complete the agreed transfer at the earliest possible date.52

 With respect to the matériel

which the French were to keep, General

Wilson pointed out that the British Army

could not accept permanent liability for its

maintenance now that the French forces

were being re-equipped with U.S. matériel.

Whenever possible, however, the British

supply services would make every effort to

furnish spare parts or provide maintenance. 48

 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 5 Jul 44, JRC 909. 49

 Msg, CCS to Wilson, 13 Aug 44, FAN 390. 50

 Memo, Commissioner of War and Air for CinC,

3 Mar 44, AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups.

51

 Ibid.

52

 Memo, SACMED for EMGG, 18 Mar 44,

AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups.
CHAPTER XI

The North African Forces in Action

Italy and Other Battlegrounds in the

Mediterranean

Vindication of the decisions which had

led to the arming of the North African

forces came promptly after their commitment to battle. Units of the French Expeditionary Corps, dispatched to Italy as fast

as they could be equipped and trained, already were giving a good account of themselves. More would soon be put to the test

of combat in anticipation of their ultimate

employment in ANVIL.

From a two-division corps in January

1944, CEF had, by 1 May, grown to an

oversize corps of a strength equivalent to

nearly five divisions. Its component elements were then: the 2d Moroccan Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. André Dody;

the 3d Algerian Infantry Division, Maj.

Gen. Aimé de Goislard de Monsabert; the

4th Moroccan Mountain Division, Maj.

Gen. François Sevez; the 1st Motorized Infantry Division, Brig. Gen. Charles Brosset;

the 1st, 3d, and 4th Moroccan Tabor

Groups, Brig. Gen. Augustin Guillaume;

and general reserve units comprising two

regiments of tank destroyers, six battalions

of artillery, various services, and Base 901.

Total strength of the corps was approximately 105,000 officers and men.1

 This

figure represented a division slice only

slightly more than half the size recommended for the ANVIL force (40,000), an

indication that the French forces still lacked

supporting combat and service troops.

While no units of the French Air Force were

assigned to the direct support of the CEF,

some squadrons were actively engaged in

operations as part of the Allied air pool in

the Mediterranean theater.2

Such was the force which, led by General

Juin, bore the brunt of the offensive

launched in mid-May by General Clark's

U.S. Fifth Army for the purpose of breaking through the German troops then solidly

entrenched in the Gustav Line. In the

words of General Alexander, Commander

in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy, the French,

on 11 May, attacked with splended élan

and "drove like the wind" across the mountainous terrain between the Liri River and

the Tyrrhenian Sea. Showing themselves

quick to exploit each local success, "possibly

quicker than U.S. and British troops," they

succeeded, "to the surprise and elation of

the Allied Command," in overrunning the

enemy, forcing him to pay a heavy toll in

casualties and prisoners.3 Within three days

they had completed the break-through and

outflanked the German positions in the Liri 1

 For details on division and regimental organization, fire power, and weapon distribution, see

Col. Adolphe Goutard, Le Corps Expéditionnaire

François dans la Campagne d'ltalie (1943-1944)

(Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1947), pp. 5-9.

2

 See Ch. XII, below. 3

 Quotations are from statements made by Field

Marshal Alexander to Dr. Sidney T. Mathews during an interview in Ottawa, 10-15 January 1949.
THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ACTION 179

SIENA, ITALY. French troops moving through the streets of Siena, 3 July 1943.

valley. Their "sensational advance"4 had

been a major surprise also to the enemy.5

Greatly pleased with the French performance, General Devers, on 15 May, cabled to

General Marshall: "French forces have

achieved outstanding victory," a statement

followed two days later by a message from

General Clark himself, addressed also to the

U.S. Chief of Staff: "French troops are

fighting splendidly with our American

matériel."

 6

Having broken through the Gustav Line,

units of the CEF pursued the enemy relentlessly, disorganized German resistance, and

continued their rapid advance through the

mountains south of Rome. After the capture of that city by Allied units, on 4 June,

the French pushed forward to Siena, which

they seized on 3 July, and drove in the direction of the Arno River. Just as their first

elements were reaching a point only a few

miles from Florence, the order was issued

for their withdrawal. The rest of the

4

 General Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New

York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 348. On

the same page: "For this performance, which was

to be a key to the success of the entire drive on

Rome, I shall always be a grateful admirer of General Juin and his magnificent CEF." Again on

page 360: "A more gallant fighting organization

never existed." 5

 "The French," wrote Field Marshal Albert

Kesselring, commander in chief of the opposing

German forces, "fought with great elan, and exploited each local success by concentrating immediately all available forces at the weakened point."

Statement in First Evaluation by the CinC Southwest (Army Group C) of Enemy Tactics During

the Offensive Since 12 May 1944, dated 19 May

1944, in Fifth Army History, V, 203.

6

 Msg, Devers to Marshall, 15 May 44, CM-IN

11577; Msg, Clark to Marshall, 17 May 44, OPD

319.1, Sec V, Case 182.
180 REARMING THE FRENCH

9TH COLONIAL INFANTRY DIVISION disembarking from LCI's for the invasion

of Elba, 17 June 1944.

corps had already begun, on 20 June, to

regroup behind the front line and make

ready for the forthcoming assault on southern France. By 23 July the relief of the

CEF by Allied units had been completed.

From December 1943, when the first division had been committed, to the final withdrawal, the French had sustained a total of

approximately 30,000 combat casualties (of

which over a third had been incurred during

the three-week period of the May offensive),

including 5,900 killed and over 24,000

wounded in action. They had taken more

than 8,000 prisoners.7

Meanwhile other French units had been

committed to combat elsewhere in the Mediterranean, notably in an amphibious operation, known as BRASSARD, launched against

the island of Elba in mid-June 1944.

Conquest of the island had first been advocated by General Giraud in October 1943

but ruled out at the time by the Allied command as premature. Suggested a second

time by the French Commander in Chief, in

February 1944, it had then received the approval of AFHQ and planning had begun in

April. The operation was assigned to Gen7

 Figures on losses are taken from Lt. Col. P.

Santini, "Etude statistique sur les pertes au cours

de la guerre 1939-1945," Revue du Corps de Santé

Militaire, X, No. 1 (March, 1954). For a detailed

account of French participation in Italy for the

period March-July 1944, see Sidney Mathews, The

Drive on Rome, a volume in preparation for the

series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD

WAR II; see also Goutard, op. cit.
THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ACTION 181

TROOPS ENTERING PORTOFERRAIO, ELBA, 19 June 1944. Destruction was

caused by Allied bomb attacks.

eral Martin, then commanding general of

1st French Corps, with headquarters in

Corsica, and was carried out by him under

the general direction of General de Lattre

de Tassigny, commander-designate of the

French forces assigned for participation in

ANVIL. General Martin, it will be recalled,

had, under General Giraud's direction, commanded in September 1943 the all-French

operation for the liberation of Corsica (Operation VESUVIUS).8

The ground forces taking part in the assault of Elba were exclusively French.

With a strength of 12,000 men, they consisted of approximately two thirds of the

9th Colonial Infantry Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph Magnan, one

group of Moroccan tabors (2d GTM), two

units of Commandos (Groupe de Commandos d'Afrique and Bataillon de Choc),

and supporting antiaircraft and engineer

units. Assisting the ground elements were

Allied naval forces, largely British but including several French naval vessels, all

under the command of Rear Adm. Thomas

H. Troubridge (RN), and Allied air units

commanded by Col. Thomas C. Darcy

(U.S.), among which were two French

fighter squadrons. The operation,

launched on the night of 16-17 June, rapidly achieved its goal. After two days of

severe fighting against well-defended posi8

 See p. 101, above. tions, the French overcame the resistance
182 REARMING THE FRENCH

put up by the German garrison of some

2,700 men. By the evening of 19 June,

Elba as well as the neighboring island of

Pianosa had been entirely liberated. The

assaulting forces had killed several hundred

enemy troops, made about 2,000 prisoners,

and captured more than 60 pieces of artillery. They had suffered some 900 casualties including 258 killed in action.9

Committed to other operations in the

Mediterranean under Anglo-American control were French air units and naval vessels. Air squadrons were engaged in convoy and coast protection or in air missions

preparatory to ANVIL.10 Naval vessels, a

number of which had been repaired and

modernized by the Americans and the British, were carrying out various missions not

only in the Mediterranean but in other areas

as well. All were under the operational authority of the Allied commanders in the respective theaters of operations.11

Yet not all the units on the North African

rearmament program had been committed

to action. For some, no employment had

been found; they were undergoing additional training and were kept in readiness

pending their ultimate engagement in

OVERLORD and ANVIL.

France

OVERLORD

Of all the ground forces re-equipped

under the North African program, only one,

the 2d Armored Division, participated in

the cross-Channel operation. Since its

transfer to the United Kingdom in April

1944, the division had completed its equipping and training. On 31 July, or approximately two months after the launching of

OVERLORD, the division, still under the command of Maj. Gen. Jacques Leclerc, was

landed in Normandy as part of Third U.S.

Army, under Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.

Immediately engaged in battle, the division

subsequently took an active part in the pursuit to the Seine. On 23 August Lt. Gen.

Omar N. Bradley, commander of 12th

Army Group, directed it to push to Paris.

The division entered the French capital two

days later along with the 4th U.S. Infantry

Division. After the liberation of Paris, the

2d DB continued its drive eastward still as

a component of the Third Army.12

Also engaged in OVERLORD were the British-equipped and British-controlled squadrons of the French Air Force, a number of

French naval vessels operating as part of

the Allied naval pool, and two paratroop

units. These were the 2d RCP (Regiment

de Chasseurs Parachutistes) and the 3d

RCP. The two units, organized in early

1941 in the United Kingdom and equipped

by the British, actually were component battalions (the 4th and 3d) of the British Special Air Service (SAS) Brigade. They were

parachuted in June and July respectively to

assist the Resistance forces operating in conjunction with OVERLORD.

ANVIL

By early August all alerted French organizations on the ANVIL troop list, includ- 9

 Figures on losses are taken from the Santini

article cited note 7. For detailed account of Operation BRASSARD, see Rpts, Adm Troubridge to

Adm Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, 24 Jun 44, and

Gen de Lattre to Allied CinC, 2 Aug 44, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops BRASSARD; also General

[Jean] de Lattre de Tassigny, Histoire de la Première

Armée Française (Paris: Plon, 1949), pp. 16-30.

10

 For details on organization, re-equipping, and

employment of French air units, see Ch. XII, below. 11 For details on the refitting and employment of

the French naval forces, see Ch. XIII, below. 12

 See Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command,

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR

II (Washington, 1954), Ch. XIII.
THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ACTION 183

ing those that had been withdrawn from the

Italian front and those which had taken

part in the capture of Elba, were re-grouping in staging areas in southern Italy, Corsica, and North Africa. While waiting for

their respective D Days they completed their

initial equipment or, in the case of units

which had already seen action, drew replacement items from U.S. base sections in

the same manner as the American units

about to participate in ANVIL. Meanwhile,

organizations which remained to be

equipped under the 23 January Plan and its

subsequent revisions hastily procured equipment in the hope that they would be ready

in time for effective participation in the

forthcoming operation.

One question was causing considerable

concern to American officials in the theater.

The French were short, not only of auxiliary

troops to support their ANVIL forces adequately, but also of the necessary replacement personnel to maintain them at strength

in combat. General Devers estimated that

they had replacements for only two months

of fighting after landing in France. In a

message dated 2 July he had urged General

Marshall to impress on General de Gaulle,

upon his arrival in Washington where he

was expected shortly, the seriousness of the

situation and the necessity for planning the

recruitment of replacements in continental

France after the launching of ANVIL. 1 3

The long-awaited assault on the French

Mediterranean coast took place on 15 August. Directing the operation was Lt. Gen.

Alexander M. Patch, Commanding General, U.S. Seventh Army. Although in the

initial stages the attack was led by three

American divisions (VI Corps) experienced

in amphibious landings, assisted by some

French Commandos and armored elements,14

 the operation was largely backed up

by French troops. These formed a task

force known as Armée B, under the control

of General de Lattre de Tassigny. Within a

few days, six French divisions had landed

and one by one joined VI Corps in battle.

By 31 August, with Marseille and Toulon

securely in French hands, the bulk of the

French ground forces, then comprising approximately two thirds of the combat

strength of Seventh Army, had been committed to battle. Progressively General de

Lattre grouped his units into two Army

corps—1st Corps under the command of

General Béthouart, and 2d Corps under the

command of General de Monsabert.15 In

mid-September, when Armée B left the control of the Seventh Army to become a tactically independent organization, it renamed

itself Première Armée Française (1st

French Army). From this time on, 1st

French Army and U.S. Seventh Army were

to fight side by side as the two component

elements of the U.S. 6th Army Group commanded by General Devers.

At the end of September, after a 450-

mile dash northward from Provence

through Lyon and Dijon, up to Belfort, 1st

French Army had received most of the

units on the ANVIL French troop list. These

were: five infantry divisions—1st DMI, 2d

DIM, 3d DIA, 4th DMM, and 9th DIC;

three groups of Moroccan tabors—1st

13

 Msg 13244, Devers to Marshall (Eyes Only),

2 Jul 44, OPD Exec 10, Item 52-D.

14

 One combat command from the 1st Armored

Division. 15

 General Béthouart was Chief, General Staff

of National Defense, until 7 August 1944; he became Commanding General, 1st Corps, on 6 September 1944. General de Monsabert was Commanding General, 3d Algerian Infantry Division,

first in Italy, then in France until 2 September

1944, when he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and assumed command of 2d

Carps.
FRENCH 2D ARMORED DIVISION passing through a small town near Paris,

25 August 1944.

MAJ. GEN. JACQUES LECLERC (left foreground), commanding general of the French

2d Armored Division, is followed by liberated Frenchmen as he walks through the street of a

small town on the way to Paris, 23 August 1944.
STREET FIGHTING IN MARSEILLE, 28 August 1944. By 31 August the city was

in French hands.

REVIEWING FRENCH TROOPS IN LIBERATION CEREMONY, MARSEILLE. The French Minister of War, Mr. André Diethelm, is followed by General Jean de

Lattre de Tassigny (left) and Lt. Gen. Aimé de Goisland de Monsabert, 29 August 1944.
186 REARMING THE FRENCH

GTM, 2d GTM, and 3d GTM; two armored divisions—1st DB (commanded by

Maj. Gen. du Touzet du Vigier) and 5th

DB (commanded by General de Vernejoul); and general reserve elements, services,

and base units.

Within a short time, 1st French Army

reached a strength of some 200,000 men

representing nearly all the expeditionary

forces equipped and maintained, or maintained only, by the United States under the

North African rearmament program. Yet

this army, sizable as it was, could not operate as an entirely independent force. Because it still lacked sufficient service units,

it was relying heavily on the U.S. Seventh

Army for a considerable part of its support,

thus creating a situation similar to that

which had existed in Italy with respect to

the former CEF. In addition, few replacements were reported to be available in

North Africa to maintain the existing units

at strength. Progress toward self-sufficiency could be envisaged, however, for

during its advance through French territory 1st French Army had absorbed considerable numbers of liberated Frenchmen,

40,000 by 20 September, 20,000 more by

15 October. Still larger numbers were

waiting to be enrolled. Ultimately 137,000

men were mustered in as replacements or

as personnel for new units, thus boosting

the strength of 1st French Army to a peak

of 290,000 men.10

Meanwhile the larger part of the French

air squadrons and a substantial number of

French naval vessels had been committed to

action as part of the Allied air and naval

pools operating in support of ANVIL.

Remaining in North Africa were a handful of expeditionary forces soon to be

shipped to France for use as replacements

or as additional reserve elements of 1st

French Army. All other forces in the area,

that is, Territorial and Sovereignty troops,

were continuing their normal activities, such

as maintaining the expeditionary forces in

operation or ensuring the defense and internal security of North Africa and of Allied

communications lines.

Logistical Support of the French ANVIL

Forces

The same basic principles which had

governed the supply and maintenance of the

CEF in Italy were applied to the logistical

support of the French forces operating in

ANVIL. The over-all maintenance and

supply responsibility rested with the U.S.

Army. The U.S. supply services obtained

all maintenance items of American origin

required for the participating French and

U.S. forces by means of combined monthly

requisitions, consolidated these supplies in

U.S. stocks, and saw to their proper distribution. The French themselves furnished items peculiar to their troops, such

as wine, brandy, and oil, as well as post

exchange and Special Services supplies.

French service units and supply officers assisted in the entire operation.

In early July 1944 a U.S. base section

was organized to support the combined

French-American forces from the time of

their entry on the Continent. The base,

known as Coastal Base Section (COSBASE)

and commanded by Maj. Gen. Arthur R.

Wilson, was to operate in Marseille as soon

as practicable. On 27 July Headquarters,

16

 These additional effectives being of local recruitment, and consequently not part of the North

African rearmament program, the question of their

amalgamation and equipping is treated in Chapter

XVIII, below, which deals with the rearmament

of the French Metropolitan forces. For final

composition of 1st French Army, see p. 353, below.
THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ACTION 187

SOS, NATOUSA, set forth in detail the

policies to be followed by COSBASE with

respect to the issue of and accounting for

rations and replacement and maintenance

supplies to the French.17

The French had not yet been able to activate enough service units, especially truck

companies, to operate a base section of their

own to support their combat forces. In

early July they had hastily begun setting

up an organization to function side by side

with COSBASE. They assigned to it the

personnel formerly operating Base 901 in

Naples, elements from other French bases,

and officers recruited from training centers

and elsewhere for the purpose. The base,

bearing the old designation "901" and

commanded by General Gross, was officially

activated on 1 August. Not only was this

action belated since the launching of ANVIL

was only two weeks away, but the organization of the base itself was, from the start,

wholly inadequate. Its personnel was insufficient in number and poorly trained.

Few of the officers knew English, a most

serious deficiency considering that the base

was to work in conjunction with a U.S.

base. Material means were almost nonexistent. Consequently, no planning could be

done which would effectively guide the base

in its future work.

The situation was so serious that by common agreement it was decided to attach

Base 901 to COSBASE, thus making General Wilson responsible for the logistical

support of both the French and the U.S.

forces. As a result, Base 901 became, in

practice, a French section of COSBASE

and a liaison agency between the latter and

the French.

Landing on 16 August along with the

first French combat elements was a small

advance party from Base 901. The party

was so unprepared for the difficult task of

handling vast quantities of personnel and

men, and so hampered by lack of physical

means, that it could do little valuable work.

As a result, the combat elements were

forced, during this critical period, to rely

entirely on the U.S. Army for their support.

It was not until 31 August that the first

echelon of the base arrived in Marseille.

By this time French combat elements had

already reached Lyon, or a point some 200

miles away. The second echelon arrived

on 15 September just as 1st French Army

was being formed. Two weeks later, when

the third and fourth echelons finally reached

Marseille, the lines of communications had

stretched to such an extent that the base was

snowed under with tasks entirely out of proportion to its still meager means—1,200

men and 200 vehicles.

Its work was made even more difficult in

early October as a result of the reorganization of the American supply lines. With

the ANVIL forces continuing their rapid push

northward, the Americans decided to set up

an advance base in the liberated town of

Dijon, while maintaining the coastal base in

Marseille. To conform with this reorganization, Base 901, although still greatly understaffed and poorly equipped, was split

into two sections. On 12 October a detachment headed by the new base commander,

Brig. Gen. Georges Granier, was sent to

Dijon to work with Continental Advance

Section (CONAD) commanded by General

Wilson, while the remainder stayed with

Delta Base Section commanded by Brig.

Gen. John P. Ratay. A few days later, on 23

October, General de Lattre announced that

CONAD was taking over the direct re17

 Memo, Hq SOS NATOUSA for CG COSBASE,

27 Jul 44, MTOUSA File, Sup of Fr (Mar-Nov

44).
188 REARMING THE FRENCH

sponsibility for the supply of 1st French

Army, and authorized General Wilson to

appoint French officers from Base 901 to

the various staff sections and commands of

CONAD. These provisions were to apply

as long as 1st French Army was operating

as part of U.S. 6th Army Group and on

French soil.18

CONAD's responsibility was to supply

both component armies of the 6th Army

Group. Delta Base Section concerned itself with the operation of the port of Marseille, the base depots, and the maintenance

installations in that area. Both sections

remained under the control of SOS,

NATOUSA, until 20 November when a

new headquarters, Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), commanded by

General Larkin, took over the entire American supply system in southern France.19

The place of the French within the final

American organization was as follows: General Granier, as Commanding General,

Base 901, was deputy to General Larkin.

French officers were posted at the various

U.S. command headquarters, SOLOC,

CONAD, and Delta Base Section. At

SOLOC and CONAD they were fully integrated in the staffs of these commands,

and therefore under the control of the respective U S. commanding officers. At

Delta Base Section the French section was

attached to the U.S. organization. For

matters of discipline and administration, all

French personnel were responsible to General Granier.

Base 901 played a dual role. It was

charged with obtaining, largely from North

Africa, and distributing supplies drawn

from French stocks. In this task it worked

independently of U.S. supply agencies and

dealt solely with the French High Command. With respect to supplies of American origin, including rations, it assisted U.S.

supply organizations in effecting distribution to authorized units, that is, troop list

units and their replacements. No U.S.

Army responsibility existed for any other

French personnel.20

The missions assigned to Base 901 were

exacting enough considering the limited

personnel available. Their execution, however, was made even more difficult from

the start as unexpected major problems

suddenly arose, in particular, the absorption

by 1st French Army of considerable numbers of liberated Frenchmen. Even when

this army grew in size, Base 901, whose effectives, according to American estimates,

should have amounted to 112,000 for a corresponding eight-division army, never exceeded some 29,000 men. As a result,

much of the logistical support continued

to be provided throughout the war by

American supply lines.21

It had been agreed between AFHQ and

the French High Command in Algiers that

matériel ordered from the United States

to complete the equipping of certain units

whose presence was urgently needed in

southern France would be shipped directly

to Marseille. To ensure its proper distribution, SCAMA opened an office in that port

on 25 September, and established the necessary liaison between the units concerned

18

 GO, Hq 1st Fr Army, 23 Oct 44, in GO 27, Hq

CONAD, 27 Oct 44, MTOUSA File, Fr Policy

(Feb-Oct 44). 19

 Msg S-66620, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 13 Nov

44, SHAEF Mission to France, 091.711-1 (Fr).

20

 Msg BX-18007, Devers to de Lattre, 17 Oct

44, JRC Cable Log. 21

 For additional information on Base 901, see

1st French Army Report, Maj. Gen. Henri Coudraux, La Base d'Opérations 901 dans la Bataille

pour la Libération de la France, 1944-1945 (Paris:

Imprimerie Nationale, 1947).
THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ACTION 189

and COSBASE.22 In late October SCAMA's remaining staff in North Africa was

ordered to the Continent where it continued to supervise the supply of the French

forces.

The North African Rearmament Program

Ends

While the fighting was progressing in

southern and then in eastern France, rearmament operations were continuing in

North Africa. Their object was to complete the equipping and training of the remaining troop list units.

Reports reaching AFHQ immediately

after the entry of the first French troops

into action emphasized the need of dispatching to the Continent all available French

service and base units to ease the burden

now thrown on the U.S. Army. Some, it

was known, had not yet been activated;

others were only partly manned and

equipped. At a conference called on 21

August, Brig. Gen. Clement Blanc, of the

French General Staff, agreed that all required truck battalions would be activated

at once but with only half their personnel,

the remainder to be raised later in southern

France. With respect to the other units,

he insisted that they could not be made

ready before the beginning of December

for lack of troops.23

A week later representatives from SOS,

Mediterranean Base Section, the JRC, and

SCAMA met to examine the equipment

and training status of the units currently

alerted for movement to the Continent.

They agreed that, on the whole, the units

concerned had made substantial progress.

However, they were deeply concerned over

the fact that some units, mostly ordnance

maintenance organizations and quartermaster truck battalions designated for the

operation of Base 901, were so deficient in

equipment, personnel, and training that

they could not possibly be made ready in

time to meet the commitment dates as then

set up.24

It was not likely that deficiencies in personnel could be remedied in time, if at all,

for already there were reports that the

caliber of students, both white and native,

then attending the French Ordnance

Training School at Meknès (Morocco),

was far below that of the previous classes

as far as mechanical aptitude and experience were concerned.25

 Obviously, the

recruiting of technical personnel in North

Africa had reached the limit. No improvement could be expected until the liberation

of part of France produced additional

manpower.

Shortages of equipment were another

cause for grave concern both at Allied and

French headquarters. The most acute

shortage appeared to be that of generalpurpose vehicle (1⁄4-, 11⁄2-, and 21⁄2-ton

trucks especially), although all necessary

vehicles were known to have been assigned

in Washington. The shortage was ascribed

to unauthorized diversions to nonprogram

units and incomplete shipments from the

United States. Already SOS had been

compelled to draw upon U.S. theater

stocks, even to the extent of threatening the

22 maintenance of American units. By 8 Sep- Msg LX-43235, Larkin To All Concerned, 21

Sep 44, JRC Cable Log; Memo, SCAMA Hq, 29

Sep 44, MTOUSA File, Fr Policy (Feb-Oct 44). 23

 Memos, Knox for Loomis, 21 Aug 44, and

Leyer To All Concerned, 24 Aug 44, JRC 370/003

Employment of Sv Units.

24

 Rpt on Conf, SOS, 8 Sep 44, JRC 400.1/009

Sup of Forces Designated for Combat. 25

 Memo, Kingman for Loomis, 10 Sep 44, JRC

353/003 Training Fr Army Personnel.
190 REARMING THE FRENCH

tember the shortage was estimated at approximately 1,100 vehicles. Since these

could not be provided from U.S. stocks,

General Larkin recommended that

NATOUSA redouble its efforts to get the

French to withdraw all vehicles from units

not entitled to hold U.S. equipment. This

recommendation was followed a few days

later by a warning to the French that SOS

would stop issuing vehicles to them as long

as any remained in the hands of unauthorized units.26

The warning was accompanied by a request from General Loomis that he be informed by 1 October of the number of

vehicles being withdrawn from nonprogram

units for re-issue to alerted units. A month

later, still without an answer, General

Loomis again broached the question. He

pointed out to General Leyer that, according to a recent study of assignments and

shipments from the United States, French

stocks should have, not a shortage, rather

a surplus, of some 900 vehicles. It was difficult, he observed, to reconcile this fact

with the considerable shortage currently reported. General Leyer replied that figures

available to him indicated a "theoretical

deficit" of some 560 trucks. However, he

was able to report that approximately the

same number of vehicles had been returned

and would be transferred to troop list units;

more would soon be returned. He allowed only schools and training centers

to retain their vehicles.27

Meanwhile, other shortages, such as various ordnance items, including individual

weapons, and signal supplies, were being

filled as a result of action by SOS. On 19

September General Larkin explained to the

War Department that all possible steps had

been taken to complete the equipping of

French units from French and U.S. stocks

available in North Africa. It was urgent,

he concluded, that existing shortages be

filled by shipments from the United States

in order that the units concerned be made

fit for operations.28 Simultaneously, to

make sure that the French were complying

with earlier repeated warnings, SOS,

NATOUSA, on 21 September, made an important announcement: thereafter, the U.S.

Army would issue no major item of equipment as long as any similar or suitable substitute remained in the hands of French

organizations not on the troop list or not

authorized U.S. equipment by the theater

commander. Future requests were to be

accompanied by a certificate stating that the

equipment could not be supplied from any

French source.29

Efforts to repossess from the French all

items in their hands considered "excess"

continued unabated. The matter had become more urgent now that emergency issues of equipment to alerted French units

had considerably depleted some American

theater stocks. It was expected that as

shipments from the United States reached

the French, surpluses in their stocks would

approximately equal the amounts of emergency items turned over to them initially.

It was essential for SOS to repossess such

items as well as items in the hands of units

once in the program but no longer on the

26

 Ltr, Loomis to Leyer, 19 Sep 44, and Memo,

Loomis for Leyer, 3 Sep 44, JRC 451/001 Vehicles—Misc; Msg LX-41201, Larkin to

NATOUSA, 8 Sep 44, JRC 903 Requests for

Units; Msg LX-41818, SOS to JRC, 13 Sep 44,

JRC Cable Log. 27 Ltrs, Loomis to Leyer, 19 Sep 44 and 17 Oct

44, and Leyer to Loomis, 30 Oct 44, JRC 451/

001 Vehicles—Misc.

28

 Msg LX-42836, Larkin to CG Pembark, 19

Sep 44, JRC Cable Log. 29

 Msg LX-43288, SOS to MBS, 21 Sep 44, JRC

909 Surplus Equip.
THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ACTION 191

troop list. On 5 September General

Loomis requested General Leyer to submit

to SOS at frequent intervals an inventory

of all initial items of equipment on hand in

French depots. He pointed out that the

items of U.S. origin currently in training

centers had been issued on a loan basis to

complete the training of replacements; they

were subject to recall by SOS when and

if required.30

Attempts to repossess the equipment in

the hands of a combat unit that had fought

brilliantly in Italy, but had subsequently

been withdrawn from the ANVIL troop list

by the French High Command, precipitated

a minor crisis in early September. The unit

was the 4th Moroccan Tabor Group. Unlike the other three tabor groups then fighting in France, the 4th GTM had been returned to French Morocco, there to be

given some much needed rest. Since it reverted to the status of a Sovereignty unit, it

was no longer authorized to retain its American equipment. Repossession in this case

posed a delicate problem. Should a victorious unit returning to its native country

be stripped of its matériel? American officials finally agreed that, for morale reasons,

the regiment would retain its individual

equipment including arms. The rest was

ordered returned to U.S. depots.31 The

crisis soon came to a head when it became

known that the French military authorities

had turned over a substantial part of the

organizational equipment such as vehicles,

weapons, and radio sets to a Commando

unit not on the troop list.32 General Sir

Henry Maitland Wilson expressed to General Juin, then Chief of Staff of National

Defense, his dissatisfaction over the French

action which, by diverting without authorization equipment to a nonprogram unit,

had violated the directives of the CCS.33

As repossession frequently tended to interfere with the work of equipping the remaining program units, the JRC decided to try

a fresh approach to the problem. General

Loomis, on 8 September, recommended a

suspension of the repossession operations

until such a time as the French had received

all equipment due them from the United

States. Meanwhile, only critical items

would be repossessed as required.34 That

was the procedure adopted and followed for

some weeks, during which time the JRC

prepared a study on excess stocks in anticipation of the eventual resumption of the

recapture operations.

In early October a new situation arose

in the theater as a result of operational

developments on the Continent. With

Paris liberated, on 26 August, the French

armed services had already begun to move

from North Africa to the French capital on

the heels of General de Gaulle's Provisional

Government (Gouvernement Provisoire de

la République Française), the successor to

CFLN since 3 June. Before leaving, General Leyer had submitted plans for the

mobilization and equipping of manpower

then becoming available as a result of the

30

 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 5 Sep 44, JRC

320/001 Incl: Corres File B. 31

 Msgs LX-39978, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 1

Sep 44, JRC/176, CG NATOUSA to AFHQ, 3

Sep 44, and FX-91969, CG NATOUSA to Larkin,

4 Sep 44, JRC 370/001 Employment of Units—

Gen; Msg FX15252, CG NATOUSA to JRC, 14

Sep 44, JRC 400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated

for Combat.

32

 The Staouelli Commandos, organized at

Staouelli, a small town near Algiers; later known

as Commandos de France during the campaign of

France and Germany. 33

 Ltr, Gammell to Juin, 9 Sep 44, JRC 370/001

Employment of Units—Gen; Memo, Loomis for

CofS SHAEF, 13 Oct 44, SHAEF Mission to

France, 091.711-1 (Fr). 34

 Msg JRC/199, JRC to CG NATOUSA, 8 Sep

44, JRC Cable Log.
192 REARMING THE FRENCH

VICTORY PARADE THROUGH THE STREETS OF PARIS, 26 August 1944.

Leading the parade is General de Gaulle, left, and General Pierre Koenig, right; center, rear,

is General Leclerc.

advance of the Allied armies. These and

other developments, including the anticipated closing down of U.S. installations in

North Africa, prompted AFHQ to question

whether it was qualified to act as agent in

dealing with French authorities on military

matters not directly affecting the theater.

General Wilson proposed, on 8 October,

that thereafter such matters be dealt with by

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, in Paris. Already an advance

detachment from the JRC, headed by General Loomis, had reached the French capital

on 3 October, and was organizing at

SHAEF an agency to handle French armament problems arising within the European

Theater of Operations. Pending a decision

on the proposed transfer to SHAEF of the

over-all responsibility for future rearmament, the rear echelon of the JRC kept

functioning in North Africa. It supervised

the movement of French Training Section

to France where its presence was urgently

required, and screened the general supply

program requisitions submitted by the

French for their Sovereignty and Territorial
THE NORTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ACTION 193

forces. In these various tasks JRC Rear

was assisted by SCAMA and by Mediterranean Base Section (MBS), the Oran port

organization serving Delta Base Section in

Marseille.35

By the end of October the study which

the JRC had conducted of excess matériel

in French hands had been completed and

its findings embodied in a memorandum

prepared for the benefit of MBS by Colonel

Crump, acting chairman of the committee

since General Loomis' departure. Colonel

Crump listed the four sources known to

possess such matériel: SCAMA stocks,

training centers and schools, program units

not on current troop lists, and nonprogram

units. He pointed out that a portion of the

excess items should be repossessed for use

in France with the remainder reverting

to MBS stocks.36 Pursuant to Colonel

Crump's recommendation, SCAMA proceeded to prepare and submit inventories

of items excess in French stocks. These were

carefully screened by appropriate theater

supply services to determine what items

were to be recaptured from the French. Except where large excesses already existed in

U.S. theater stocks, most of the items reported by French inventories were finally

repossessed by MBS and placed in U.S. depots, and due credit was given the French

on theater lend-lease reports.37

Throughout the month of November the

question of the responsibility for French

armament matters continued to be a lively

issue. SHAEF was handling entirely new

problems arising from the liberation of

French manpower in vast numbers and,

through ETOUSA, had assumed the support of the French expeditionary forces

operating in France. Meanwhile the American command in the Mediterranean,

MTOUSA, was supplying the forces,

largely Sovereignty and Territorial, operating in that theater. In view of the

presence in Paris of the heads of French

services, and of the approaching closing

down of all U.S. military installations in

North Africa, MTOUSA recommended to

the War Department that SHAEF be asked

to assume the responsibility for the continued support of Territorial and Sovereignty forces in addition to its present commitments. The War Department endorsed the

proposal, which fitted with its desire to see

a single agency dealing with all French rearmament problems, particularly since the

general supply situation had become critical

as a result of heavy demands from U.S.

troops. SHAEF finally agreed, on 3

December, and from that date on assumed

all supply responsibility for the French forces

including Sovereignty and Territorial

troops, as well as replacements for the expeditionary forces.38

By this time most armament activities in

North Africa had ceased. On 8 November,

JRC Rear had been officially disbanded.39

So had the remaining echelon of French

Training Section whose presence in the

theater had become superfluous as a result

35

 Msg FX-35102, Wilson to AGWAR, 8 Oct

44, AFHQ Cable Log; Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 16

Aug 44, Msgs MF-12547, Lewis to JRC, 5 Oct 44,

and JRC/295, Larkin to Loomis, 24 Oct 44, JRC

320/001 Orgn of JRC. 36

 Memo, Crump for MBS, drafted 20 Oct 44,

sent 8 Nov 44, in same file. 37Logistical History of NATOUSA—MTOUSA:

11 August 1942 to 30 November 1945, ed. Col.

Creswell G. Blakeney (Naples, Italy: G. Montanino,

1946), p. 372.

38

 Msgs FX-52426, MTOUSA to SHAEF, 14

Nov 44, WX-63198, AGWAR to SHAEF, 15 Nov

44, FX-60290, MTOUSA to SHAEF, 29 Nov 44,

and S-69284, SHAEF to MTOUSA, 3 Dec 44,

SHAEF Rearmt Div File 900-1. 39

 Memo, Crump for CofS, Fr Ground Forces,

8 Nov 44, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC.
194 REARMING THE FRENCH

of the transfer to southern France of the

division and army training centers operating as part of the ANVIL troop list. Such

officers and enlisted men of JRC Rear and

French Training Section as were needed

to reinforce General Loomis' new section

at SHAEF had been dispatched to the Continent. SCAMA's rear echelon was on its

way to France.

With all equipment problems henceforth

the responsibility of SHAEF, the North

African rearmament program could be regarded as having come to an end.

All together the contribution to the war

effort of French North and West Africa

and other French territories then aligned

on the side of the Allies had been substantial both in quantity and in quality. Total

effectives under arms, as of 1 September

1944, had reached the impressive figure

of 560,000 men. Of this number, North

and West Africa had furnished approximately 295,000 natives and 215,000

Frenchmen (of whom some 20,000 had

escaped from France), or a total of 510,000.

The effort had been greatest in North

Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and French Morocco) where 16.4 percent of the French

population had been mobilized (20.5 percent in French Morocco). Natives under

arms represented 1.58 percent of the Moslem population, a figure kept necessarily

low for lack of sufficient white cadres. Yet,

in French Morocco, where natives were

not subject to compulsory service and therefore could enter military service only as

volunteers, it had been possible to raise two

infantry divisions (2d DIM and 4th

DMM), four tabor groups, and various

cavalry, artillery, and service units.

The operational distribution of effectives, again as of 1 September, was reported

to be as follows: in the expeditionary forces,

260,000 men of whom approximately one

half were whites; in the Territorial and

Sovereignty forces, 250,000; in the Colonial forces—that is to say, the forces, largely

native troops, maintaining the security of

the numerous French colonies throughout

the world—50,000.40

Equally impressive had been, as already

related, the contribution of these forces on

the field of battle, a contribution which

could only increase as the critical operational situation in the last months of 1944

became more demanding. When, on 1

November, all French forces passed from

the control of AFHQ to that of SHAEF,

General Wilson, under whose supreme command they had been for approximately ten

months, seized the opportunity to express to

General Juin his admiration for the "heroic

performance" of those French troops who

had shared in the campaigns of Italy and

southern France. "Their courage in combat, their devotion to duty, their excellent

leadership, their sacrifices and successes in

battle have brought us to an overwhelming

common victory and given mute testimony

to the rebirth of French arms."

 41

 In a

similar message to General de Gaulle, also

dated 1 November, General Wilson concluded: "Thus it is with certainty that I

look forward to new and glorious victories

of French arms, in the final crushing of the

common enemy. The gallant traditions of

French arms live on in safe hands."

 42

40

 Memo with statistics, Poydenot To All Concerned, 21 Sep 44, SHAEF Misc Fr 320-2NA,

Orgn Fr Army: Colonel Spillman, "L'Armée

d'Afrique," Revue Historique de l'Armée (December, 1948), p. 40-41. 41

 Ltr, Wilson to Juin, 1 Nov 44, SHAEF SGS

092 France, Vol. III. 42

 Ltr, Wilson to de Gaulle, 1 Nov 44, in same file.
CHAPTER XII

Rearming the French Air Force

Shortly after the November 1942 landings in North Africa, the French air units

then aligned with the Allies began a long

period of reorganization and re-equipping.1

At the time, they fell into two groups: the

Free French Air Forces of General de

Gaulle, the first elements of which had been

organized and engaged in operations as

early as August 1940, and the French North

African Air Forces then under General

Giraud's authority. Both groups of forces

continued to operate separately until the

summer of 1943, when, with the fusion of

the de Gaulle and Giraud forces, all French

squadrons became an integral part of a

single air force.

The five squadrons of the Free French

Air Forces, commanded by Lt. Gen. Martial Valin, had been equipped, maintained,

and controlled by the Royal Air Force

(RAF). Two were operating from bases

in the United Kingdom, one in the Middle

East, and one in Africa in conjunction with

the Leclerc Column. In October, just before the landings in North Africa, the fifth

unit, the Normandie Fighter Squadron, had

left for the USSR to be re-equipped with

Soviet matériel and engaged under Soviet

operational control.2 In January 1943 two

additional fighter squadrons, coming from

North Africa, would join the two units already in the United Kingdom.

The North African Air Forces, commanded initially by General Jean Mendigal,

included some 20 fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, and transport squadrons scattered throughout Tunisia, Algeria, and

French Morocco, and 10 more stationed in

French West Africa. Total strength of

these units amounted to approximately

12,000-15,000 men, including some 1,500

fully trained pilots and corresponding crews,

all of them with wide experience. Most of

the pilots had seen action in the 1939-40

campaign of France and had served since

then in North and West Africa. Their

equipment, largely of French origin with

some American planes purchased in 1939,

was highly inadequate both in quantity and

in efficiency. Of the 700-odd aircraft available on 8 November 1942, a large proportion, approximately two thirds, had been

destroyed in action or damaged by sabotage

in the course of the brief resistance to the

1

 Except as otherwise noted, the sources for this

chapter are: JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan

and Policy; JRC 360/005 Status and Employment

of Units; Hq MAAF, The French Air Force in

MAAF, A Preliminary History, 1945, copy in AAF

Hist Office Archives; Les Forces Aériennes Françaises de 1939 à 1945, Col. Pierre Paquier, ed.

(Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949).

2

 On reaching the USSR in December 1942, the

squadron was equipped with the YAK-1, later

(July 1943) with the YAK-9, a third time (summer 1944) with the YAK-3, all fighter aircraft

of the Red Air Force. The unit, reorganized in

early 1944 as a regiment (known after October

1944 as the Normandie-Niemen Regiment) on the

model of similar Soviet units, participated in operations around Smolensk, Vitebsk, in eastern

Prussia, and finally over Germany.
196 REARMING THE FRENCH

assaulting American forces, leaving from

225 to 250 planes—some fit for combat,

others in various degrees of air worthiness.

Most were Dewoitine-520's from which the

guns had been removed for use elsewhere.

The rest included some Bloch, Lioré, and

Potez aircraft and a few American Glenn

Martins. The immediate problem now

facing General Giraud was to find sufficient

equipment to rehabilitate his air units.

Eager to assist the French Commander

in Chief was the Joint Rearmament Committee, whose responsibility at the time extended to French air matters. The chairman, Colonel Gardiner, himself a U.S. Air

Forces pilot, represented AFHQ, U.S. Army

Air Forces (USAAF), as well as G-3 on the

committee. Representing French headquarters was Capt. Fernand Rébillon.

Little effective assistance, however, could be

rendered by the JRC, at least until an overall air rearmament program could be established. For the moment the committee

acted as a clearinghouse for French requests

and as a liaison agency between French and

Allied air force commands and establishments.

During the months of December 1942

and January 1943, most pilots of the North

African Air Forces remained idle for lack

of flying equipment, and their morale began

to sag.3 Four squadrons were hastily engaged in the battle of Tunisia under various

Allied commands. Three were flying their

old French equipment. Two of these would

be moved to the United Kingdom at the

end of the campaign to be re-equipped with

British Halifaxes. The fourth unit, known

as the Lafayette Squadron, was flying its

newly acquired American P-40 Warhawks;

it owed the honor of being the first North

African squadron to be re-equipped to the

memory of the American pilots who, in

1914-18, had distinguished themselves in

the celebrated Lafayette Escadrille. Its reequipping, effected independently of the

JRC, had been arranged by the Allied Air

Commander in Chief in Northwest Africa,

Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz.

Meanwhile, in Algeria and French

Morocco, other pilots and crews were being

trained in U.S. squadrons. In addition,

plans were under consideration for sending

to the United States a number of selected

student pilots for a complete course of instruction, as well as sending transport and

bomber crews for a refresher course.4 Conversely, local USAAF commanders were

taking advantage of the presence of experienced French pilots by having them detailed to help train younger American pilots

in actual fighting.

Obviously, what the North African air

units needed, and quickly, was sufficient

modern equipment. It will be recalled that

the ANFA Plan of January 1943 envisaged

delivery from the United States of 500

fighters, 300 bombers, and 200 transport

planes. It was on this basis that General

Béthouart, then chief of the French Military Mission in the United States, submitted

the first air rearmament program.5 After

a detailed study of the Béthouart proposal,

General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the

U.S. Army Air Forces, recommended that

the CCS determine without delay the extent, composition, utilization, training, and

equipment of the North African Air Forces.

His report outlined the advantages, politi3

 Memo, Maj Paul Chemidlin for Asst Secy of

War for Air, 14 Jan 43, ABC 091.711 France (6

Oct 43), Sec 1-A.

4

 Msg 5142, Eisenhower to Arnold, 11 Jan 43,

JRC Cable Log. 5

 Memo, Béthouart for Marshall, 3 Feb 43, JRC

902/11 Rearmt Plan.
REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORGE 197

P-40 WARHAWKS FOR THE LAFAYETTE ESCADRILLE, January 1943.

Note the squadron's emblem, the head of a Sioux Indian.

cal, psychological, and military, which the

re-equipping of these forces would offer. It

also listed the disadvantages, such as the

diversion of aircraft at the expense of U.S.

and British air units, and the likely strain

on the command system due, in part, to

language difficulties. The report was then

submitted to the Combined Staff Planners

for study and recommendation to the CCS.6

Only when the latter had reached a decision could the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) assign any equipment.

On 14 and again on 27 February 1943,

General Eisenhower advised the War Department that the situation of the North

African Air Forces was becoming critical.

He urged that equipment for at least one

light bomber group and one fighter group

be shipped without delay, as recommended

by General Spaatz and agreed to by General Arnold in the course of his recent visit

to the theater.7 In answer to these appeals,

the War Department informed Eisenhower

and Spaatz of the steps presently contemplated for furnishing immediate assistance

to the French. The training of their pilots

in the United States could be arranged to

start in June, and an initial shipment of 90

P-39 fighters, 67 A-35 dive bombers, and

6

 Msg 2143, Marshall to Eisenhower, 11 Feb 43,

JRC Cable Log.

7

 Msgs 776, Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 Feb 43,

and 3271, to Marshall and Arnold, 27 Feb 43,

JRC Cable Log.
198 REARMING THE FRENCH

60 C-78 transport planes would be made

beginning late March or early April.8 Allocation of these aircraft, it must be noted,

was being made at the sole initiative of

American officials. It represented unilateral action on their part, since the CCS had

reached no decision. They felt quite justified in taking such action, pending CCS

approval, as the request had come from

General Eisenhower, himself the official

representative of the Combined Chiefs in

the theater.

The responsibility for supplying the necessary aircraft and air force items of equipment rested with the U.S. Army Air Forces.

International Division, Army Servic e

Forces, on the other hand, was to handle all

items common to air and ground forces.

The procedure for the assignment, shipment, and accounting of all items was

similar to that used in connection with

the French ground force program.

In late February Colonel Gardiner undertook a tour of inspection of North African

air units. Favorably impressed by their

resourcefulness, he reported, on his return

to Algiers, that they were doing the best

they could with the equipment at their

disposal. He pointed out that their

Dewoitines, which had proved to be good

fighter planes in 1939, were still serviceable

but were wearing out fast and needed parts

urgently. To assist the French in making

maximum use of their equipment, Colonel

Gardiner made arrangements with one air

service command to issue some spare parts

to them.9

The month of March 1943 marked the

beginning of the gradual integration of the

French air forces of North Africa into the

Allied air organization then established in

that area, known as Northwest African Air

Forces (NAAF) and commanded by Lt.

Gen. Carl Spaatz. It marked also the beginning of real assistance on the part of

NAAF and its component units toward the

rehabilitation of the French squadrons. On

13 March, at the request of General Mendigal, authorization was granted by General

Spaatz for a first increment of three French

squadrons to be placed under the operational control of Northwest African Tactical

Air Force (NATAF). A week later, General Spaatz announced that French air units

assigned to NAAF were to be supplied by

Northwest African Air Service Command

(NAASC) in the same manner as any

American unit, and that another component of NAAF, the XII Air Force Training and Replacement Command, was to

assume the responsibility for the training

of French combat crews. Thus were established the basic policies which were to

govern thereafter the relationship between

the Allied and the French air forces in

northwest Africa. In a further effort to

achieve close co-operation on matters of

supply and service requirements, a first increment of two French junior officers was

assigned in April to XII Air Force Service

Command (AFSC) as a technical detachment.

In spite of these and other measures

taken by the theater, the rehabilitation of

the French squadrons was proceeding at an

extremely slow pace. Allied deliveries of air

equipment were still very small. By the end

of March only thirty P-39's had been

shipped from the United States, enough to

equip one squadron, while the British had,

8

 Msg 2985, Marshall and Arnold to Eisenhower

and Spaatz, 27 Feb 43, JRC Cable Log. 9

 Memos, Gardiner for CofS AFHQ, 4 Mar 43,

and 5 Mar 43, JRC Misc Doc, "Annexes to

History."
REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE 199

UNLOADING P-38 FIGHTER PLANES for the French, Casablanca, 13 April 1943.

from local resources, furnished Spitfires for

another.10

No real progress could be expected until

a high-level decision had been reached on

the extent and rate of expansion of the air

program. Such a decision was not in sight.

At the time, it will be recalled, Anglo-American policy makers were in sharp disagreement over the scope of French rearmament,

the British expressing the fear that the commitment would jeopardize the interests of

both the U.S. and British forces. In their

report (CCS 142/1) dated 10 March 1943,

the Combined Staff Planners merely recommended that matériel assigned at General

Eisenhower's request should not exceed that

necessary to equip an air force of 450 planes.

At their meeting of 12 March, the CCS, deciding against action for the moment, simply

took note of the deliveries then being made

with Eisenhower's concurrence.11

By the end of April the French had received approximately 100 planes from the

United States. In addition the Lafayette

Squadron was undergoing a second reequipment, this time with P-47 Thunderbolts. On the basis of the fine performance

of that unit in the course of the preceding

five months, AFHQ officials estimated that

combat efficiency of future French air

squadrons would approximate that of Allied

units, particularly in piloting ability. For

this reason they agreed that new combat

10

 Msg 4939, Marshall to Eisenhower, 24 Mar 43,

OPD Cable Files.

11

 Rpt, CPS to CCS, 142/1, 10 Mar 43. Min and

Supplementary Min, CCS 75th Mtg, 12 Mar 43.

See p. 54, above.
200 REARMING THE FRENCH

squadrons should receive only the best

matériel, and that old equipment should be

used exclusively for training and for transport and liaison duties.12

A directive issued on 9 May by Maj. Gen.

Delmar Dunton, Commanding General,

Northwest African Air Service Command,

set forth in detail NAASC's responsibility

with respect to the supply and maintenance

of French air units. Such combat units as

were assigned to NAAF, or attached to the

latter for operational control, were, as directed earlier by General Spaatz, to be supplied as were other NAAF units. Squadrons

not yet assigned or attached were to obtain supplies by means of requisitions submitted by Headquarters, French Air Service

Command, to the JRC.13

The 9 May directive, although explicit as

far as NAASC was concerned, was insufficient to deal adequately with the entire

problem of French supply and maintenance

—a problem seriously complicated by the

fact that some units had British and some

U.S. equipment. In addition, the issue of

air items, and of items common to ground

and air forces, was to be effected according

to widely different procedures. It soon became apparent that proper co-ordination

between the various supply agencies had not

been established. As late as 7 July base

sections had not received orders to honor

requisitions submitted by French air units.

To clarify the matter, MAC (Air) set forth,

on 22 July, the policy to be put into effect

at once. Briefly, the new directive stipulated that squadrons not equipped with

British or American aircraft were ineligible

to receive supplies of British or U.S. origin

unless special authorization was granted by

MAC (Air). All other squadrons were to

conform to British or U.S. tables of equipment. Such items, other than aircraft and

special air force equipment, as were issued

to them by NAASC from USAAF or RAF

local sources were to be replaced from shipments from the United States effected under

the 25,000-ton monthly allocation to the

French.14

Meanwhile French military authorities

had continued to press for an expansion of

their air forces. In May General Leyer requested an additional assignment of 300

planes of various types.15 His proposal,

similar to the one submitted on 19 April by

General Mendigal to General Spaatz, was

held up pending a complete restudy, by the

French themselves, of the entire French air

position. A reorganization of their air and

naval forces was then taking place.16

By mid-June the French had received

from the United States 126 planes—including 90 P-39's, or enough for four fighter

squadrons, 21 A-35's originally intended to

form a dive-bomber squadron but later

diverted for training and use in police and

security squadrons, and 15 C-78's subsequently used for training and communications—as well as most of the necessary

ground equipment requested in February.17

12

 Memo, Chief Air Unit IG for OPD, 22 Apr 43,

OPD 336.2 France, Sec 1. 13

 Memos, Spaatz for CG NAASC, 5 May 43, and

65-62, Hq NAASC, 9 May 43, JRC 360/001 Air

Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

14

 Quoted in History of FAF in MAAF, p. 5. 15

 Memos, Leyer for CofS AFHQ, 12 May 43,

and SGS for DCofS, 17 May 43, JRC 360/001 Air

Force Rearmt Plan and Policy; Ltr, Leyer to JRC,

20 May 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab L. 16

 Memo, Deputy Air CinC for DCofS Mediterranean Air Comd, 10 Jun 43, JRC 360/001 Air

Force Rearmt Plan and Policy. 17

 The A-35 was so constructed that it required

a major overhaul after fifteen to thirty hours of

flight. This proved too great a burden on the

meager mechanical resources then available to the

French. As a result, deliveries of this type of

plane were discontinued. Statement in Corres from

Col Gardiner, OCMH.
REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE 201

In addition, General Spaatz had given

them, from available theater stocks, some

50 P-40's. All deliveries from the United

States had been based upon the recommendations of the theater commander.

The MAB had assigned to date a total of

217 planes of which 100 still remained to be

shipped. No further assignments would

be made without a new request from the

theater.

With the fusion of the Free French and

North African armed forces in July 1943

and the resulting reorganization of the

French High Command, General Bouscat

was appointed Chief of Staff of the Combined Armée de l'Air (French Air Force—

FAF). In a memorandum to Air Chief

Marshal Tedder, who, as Commanding

General, Mediterranean Air Command,

controlled all Allied air forces in the

Mediterranean. General Bouscat outlined

the steps he was taking to bring the organization of the FAF in line with that of the

Allied air force in the theater, and to

effect the closest co-operation possible between the two. He then reviewed FAF's

position and capabilities and urged that the

JRC be instructed to undertake without

delay a detailed study of the air rearmament problem. His staff, he pointed out,

was preparing a new program which would

supersede all previous ones.18

Meanwhile the British had made available enough additional Spitfires to equip 2

more squadrons. Allocation of these aircraft had been made entirely on local

initiative, as the United Kingdom made

bulk allotments to the British air officer

commander in chief for redistribution.

Only those French squadrons which were

stationed in West Africa or in the United

Kingdom were included in the War Office

program.

By August, excluding the squadrons operating with the Royal Air Force in the United

Kingdom, no more than 8 French squadrons had been re-equipped: 3 with Spitfires, 4 with P-39's, and 1 with P-47's.

The rehabilitation of the FAF was still

painfully slow. To make matters worse, the

action taken by the MAB in July, while

favorable with respect to the ground forces,

did not contemplate any extension of the

air part before January 1944. The reasons

ascribed for the postponement were the

acute needs for aircraft of the Americans

and British themselves and shipping difficulties. In the opinion of the chairman of

the JRC, the "stalling" was regrettable.

The FAF had received only a few planes

and its morale was deteriorating.19 This

view was shared by General Eisenhower

who, on 4 August, cabled the following

warning to the War Department: "The

French are much disappointed. . . . The

morale of their air units is low. This is

unfortunate, for an air force with high

morale, even though small, would be of real

assistance from a military standpoint.

They have many excellent pilots, and personnel skilled in maintenance. General

Bouscat has the confidence of both political

factions and should make an able leader."

The Allied Commander in Chief then recommended, as an emergency measure, that

three groups of the Twelfth U.S. Air Force

be converted from medium bomber to heavy

bomber groups, and the medium bombers

thus made available transferred to the

French. "The result will be a material increase in our effective strength."

 20

18

 Memo, Bouscat for Tedder, 13 Jul 43, JRC

360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

19

 Memo, Artamonoff for Adcock, 2 Aug 43, JRC

Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab T. 20

 Msg W-6517, Eisenhower to Arnold, 4 Aug 43,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.
202 REARMING THE FRENCH

On 8 August a conference on the reequipping of the French Air Force took

place at AFHQ. It was attended by

Tedder and his chief of staff, Brig. Gen.

Gordon P. Saville, both representing Mediterranean Air Command, General Bouscat

representing the FAF, Brig. Gens. Edward

P. Curtis and Harold A. Bartron of the

NAAF, General Spalding and Colonel Artamonoff of the JRC, and a number of other

officials. Opening the meeting, Tedder announced that an Anglo-American committee was being formed for the purpose of

handling the rearmament of the FAF. Its

first aim would be to make certain that all

present French squadrons equipped with

British or American equipment, whether operating in the Mediterranean or in the

United Kingdom, had sufficient supplies

and adequate reserves of airmen and

ground crews. In the opinion of Tedder,

this objective should be reached before the

rearming of other squadrons was contemplated. Speaking for the FAF, General

Bouscat disclosed that he had just drawn

up a rearmament plan, already approved by

Generals Giraud and de Gaulle, based precisely on availability of both airmen and

ground personnel. Since June, he continued, French pilots were being trained in

the United States at the rate of one hundred

monthly. The rest of the training was effected either in the French training center

established in Morocco, or under the supervision of the U.S. Air Forces in North

Africa. Once ready the French squadrons

would be assigned to the Allied air pool for

employment, preferably in groups of two

or more, under the control of the Air Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean and

according to operational requirements.21

This was in line with the tacit agreement

reached in the earlier days of Franco-Allied

collaboration and under which the French

placed their squadrons at the disposal of the

CCS for employment by the appropriate

Allied commanders.

By mid-August, some 230 planes had

been shipped from the United States, with

30 more to follow before the end of 1943.

Plans as then made by the War Department for the first half of 1944, subject of

course to CCS approval, contemplated the

shipment of some 700 additional aircraft.22

In terms of squadrons, total deliveries from

the United States for the years 1943 and

1944, if approved and carried out, would

provide equipment for 27 squadrons by the

end of 1944.23

On 29 August General Spaatz informed

General Arnold that he was equipping one

French squadron with B-26's and would

maintain the squadron through 1943 from

aircraft assigned to the Twelfth Air Force.

He was also giving the French additional

B-26's for training to prepare for a second

squadron in January. Furthermore, he announced that the rearmament program,

then in preparation, would soon be forwarded to Washington for action and that

both Eisenhower and Tedder concurred in

the steps being taken in the theater to rearm the FAF. To support the squadrons

already equipped, AFHQ requested the

War Department to provide equipment for

eight service units. These were to be in

addition to the three for which matériel

had been ordered earlier in April.24

21

 Min, Conf on FAF Rearmt, 8 Aug 43, JRC

360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

22

 Msgs, AGWAR to Spalding, 5163, 16 Aug 43,

5237, 17 Aug 43, and 5448, 19 Aug 43, JRC Cable

Log. 23

 Msg 4752, Arnold to Eisenhower, 11 Aug 43,

JRC Cable Log. 24

 Msg W-8617, Spaatz to Arnold, 29 Aug 43,

JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy;
REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE 203

On 6 September the Allied committee

whose impending creation had been announced by Air Chief Marshal Tedder at

the recent AFHQ conference on French air

rearmament was formally established in

Algiers. The new agency, known thereafter as the Joint Air Commission (JAC),

with General Saville as its first chairman,

was placed under the control of Mediterranean Air Command. It took over from

the JRC, heretofore responsible for all

French armament matters, the handling of

problems peculiar to the French Air Force.

To ensure proper and effective liaison between the two bodies, JAC's chairman was

made a member ex officio of the JRC. FAF

officers, selected by the French air command

and approved by the Allied Air Commander

in Chief, were assigned to the JAC.25

The Joint Air Commission immediately

undertook to work out, in co-operation with

General Bouscat, a comprehensive program,

taking into account the matériel which had

already been ordered and delivered and

covering aircraft, crews, and ground units.

Functions assigned to the JAC included not

only the supervision of the program but

the training of units and the upkeep of

French air bases, repair depots, training

schools, and meteorological stations. The

commission, in effect, paralleled for the FAF

the functions of the JRC with respect to the

ground forces. In it was vested the responsibility for overseeing the administrative

preparation of the French air and service

units for combat, and making certain that

they were adequately trained and equipped

before being turned over to Mediterranean

Air Command to take part in operations.26

Thereafter the War Department would

refer to the JAC, for appraisal, co-ordination, and recommendation, all air requests

submitted by French military authorities in

Washington.

Concerned over the slowness of the air

program, Generals de Gaulle and Giraud,

on 18 September, appealed directly to General Marshall. It was most regrettable, they

stressed, that the 30,000 men constituting

the FAF, which contained elements with

excellent technical training, were not being

utilized to the maximum of their capacity.

"In view of the high production capacity of

the United States and the United Kingdom," they urged that the program be

accelerated.27 Their communication was

immediately referred to the Joint Strategic

Survey Committee for study.

Meanwhile, one of the main objectives of

both the French and the Allied commands

had been to push the training of French air

personnel as thoroughly and speedily as possible. Already substantial numbers of

pilots, crews, and mechanics had attended

Allied air training centers in Africa. In

addition the French had opened, mostly in

French Morocco, a number of schools of

their own, operating largely with American

and British assistance in matériel and personnel, the British limiting such assistance to

the British-equipped squadrons. Training

was reported to be highly effective, students

responding readily and well to Allied instruction. Only with respect to technical

questions, such as electronics and the assimilation of the U.S. supply system, did they

Msg W-7723, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 20 Aug

43, OPD 400 France, Sec II. 25

 Msg W-8409, Spaatz to Arnold, 27 Aug 43,

JRC Cable Log; GO 9, Hq Mediterranean Air

Comd, 6 Sep 43, JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt

Plan and Policy. For detailed information on the

organization, membership functions, and command

of the JAC, see Chapter XVII, below.

26

 MAAF, French Air Force Rearmament Plan, 7

Mar 44, JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and

Policy. 27

 Ltr 796, de Gaulle and Giraud to Marshall, 18

Sep 43, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 1-A.
204 REARMING THE FRENCH

seem weak, possibly because of their reluctance to be used as technicians instead of

as combatants.28

Such squadrons as had completed their

training did not remain idle. As fast as

they became operational they passed under

Allied control and were assigned for duty

with the Northwest African Air Forces.

The arrangement gave the squadrons

exactly the same status in the Allied organization as the British and the Americans:

unity of command over all, but separate

administration. Allied control over the

French squadrons was questioned only once

indirectly and briefly in June 1944 when

the French were contemplating an operation (CAIMAN) in support of Resistance

forces in central France. Debate over

whether or not they might use FAF squadrons for the purpose was cut short by Allied

rejection of the whole operation as impracticable.29

By agreement with the French High

Command, a procedure was established in

September 1943 to formalize the assignment

of squadrons to Allied control. Thereafter

when a unit was ready for operations, General Bouscat notified Mediterranean Air

Command, which in time would publish a

general order assigning the unit to the appropriate command. The procedure was

not always followed to the letter and in January 1944 it proved necessary to trace the

assignments of several units far back and

make them a matter of record.30

Once assigned for operations, units were

broken in gradually. Initially they were

given relatively easy patrol and convoy

duties under Northwest African Coastal Air

Force; later, when their flying proficiency

had reached a point where they could profitably undertake offensive operations, they

were transferred to Northwest African Tactical Air Force. By September 1943 the

three Spitfire squadrons had taken part in

the support of operations in Sicily, south

Italy, and Corsica. Five U.S.-equipped

units were employed in convoy and coast

protection in the western Mediterranean.

On 29 September the final draft of the

air rearmament program was completed.

It had been worked out after considerable

research and study in the JAC by representatives of USAAF, RAF, and FAF, and

under the guidance and supervision of the

Air Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean. The program, known thereafter

as Plan VII, was designed to provide a

small, well-balanced force within the limitations imposed by the scarcity of French

technical personnel and by other U.S. and

British commitments. Such a force would

constitute the nucleus around which the

renovated air establishment would subsequently be built. All essential elements of

a tactical force were present in the plan.31

Plan VII contemplated no expansion of

French naval aviation, the matter being

still under discussion between French and

Allied naval authorities.

Under Plan VII the total number of

squadrons, including those based in the

United Kingdom, was scheduled to be increased from 16 to 21 by the end of 1943,

and to 31 (of which 18 would be U.S.-

equipped) by July 1944. The plan also

28 contemplated the delivery of matériel neces- Intervs with Col Gardiner, Apr 50, Col Ervin,

Jul 51, and Gen Saville, Jul 51. 29

 History of FAF in MAAF, p. 13. 30

 GO 11, Hq Mediterranean Air Comd, 26 Sep

43, JRC 360/003 Status and Employment of Units;

History of FAF in MAAF, p. 12.

31

 Memo, Smith for CCS, 29 Sep 43, AFHQ

0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters; Memo, AFHQ

for Sec CCS, 29 Sep 43, SHAEF Mission to France

091.711 Rearmt (Fr) Air Force. 900.2.
REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE 205

sary to equip 1 parachute regiment, 37 service organizations, as well as a number of

training centers, depots, and other installations. Priority of build-up for both operational and service units was established on

the same level as for the first four Army

divisions. Touching upon the question of

control, Plan VII merely restated the existing practice, namely, that all FAF tactical

units, both combat and service, formed and

equipped in North Africa would be assigned

to NAAF and be employed as elements of

the Allied air force pool of tactical units.

Army Air Forces headquarters in Washington approved Plan VII on 1 October and,

three weeks later, informed General Eisenhower that it was prepared to include the

plan, once it had been approved by the

CCS, in the Army Supply Program then

under consideration.32

Meanwhile the FAF supply situation, far

from improving, had become increasingly

chaotic. In an attempt to formulate proper

remedial action, General Saville, chairman

of the JAC, held a lengthy series of conferences with representatives of Mediterranean Air Command, XII Air Force

Service Command, AFHQ, NATOUSA,

the JRC, and SOS, NATOUSA. Finally

he was able to announce, on 2 November,

the supply policy and procedure as now

agreed to by all agencies concerned.33

Henceforth priority for distribution of supplies and equipment common to air and

ground forces was set as follows: (1) one

expeditionary corps of four divisions, (2)

air force units already activated and formed,

(3) air force units to be activated and

formed in accordance with the program

recently approved by AFHQ, (4) balance

of ground forces. Headquarters, French

Air Force, was to requisition from French

Ground Forces the matériel needed for Air

Force units (initial items and 30-day

supplies) and at the same time submit

requisitions on the United States for identical supplies for repayment to French

Ground Forces. Pursuant to this policy,

General Saville submitted to General

Loomis, for approval by the JRC and transmittal to the War Department, a first set

of requisitions needed to get the supply system working. Thereafter, he thought, it

would be a matter of automatic supply.

The problem of automatic supply had

already been raised in connection with the

maintenance of French ground troops.

Queried on the matter, the War Department listed the categories of items for which

automatic supply was provided and those

for which requisitions were to be submitted.

After a further exchange of communications between the theater and the War Department, General Loomis, on 24 January

1944, informed the French of the procedure

to be followed by them for the submission

of requisitions in cases where no automatic

supply was provided. General Bouscat was

invited "in the interests of economy" to

arrange without delay that items common to

the air and ground forces be stocked under

the authority and control of the French

Army.34

So that there would be no doubt as to

which FAF organizations were entitled to

obtain supplies from U.S. sources, NATOUSA headquarters, on 31 December

1943, listed the Air projects which had been 32

 Msgs 8262, Arnold to Spaatz, 1 Oct 43, 830,

Styer to Eisenhower, 25 Oct 43, and W-4465, Eisenhower to AGWAR for CCS, 6 Nov 43, JRC Cable

Log.

33

 Memo, Saville for Loomis, 2 Nov 43, JRC 360/

001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

34

 Msg W-3378, AGWAR to Eisenhower, 25 Nov

43, JRC Cable Log; Memo, Loomis for Bouscat,

24 Jan 44, JRC 360/002 Items Common to Air and

Ground; see pp. 99-101, above.
206 REARMING THE FRENCH

approved by the Allied Commander in

Chief. These included the rearmament

plan (Plan VII) of 29 September and the

maintenance of such establishments

(schools, depots, meteorological stations,

bases, and airfields) as were considered necessary. NATOUSA stipulated that all requisitions for the projects were to be submitted to the JAC for review, revision, and

approval. JAC would then forward the

requisitions to the XII Air Force Service

Command in the case of supplies and

equipment peculiar to the Army air forces,

and to the JRC in the case of supplies and

equipment common to air and ground

forces. It was further directed that XII

AFSC and the JRC would forward the

approved requisitions, through their respective lend-lease channels, to agencies in

the United States for appropriate action.35

About the same time (26 December), a

directive issued by XII AFSC and effective

1 January 1944 changed the Detachment

of Technical Liaison (French), assigned to

NAASC since April, into French Section,

NAASC. The section was charged with,

among other duties, the command and inspection of all French air units.36

By the end of December, approximately

twenty-two squadrons had been re-equipped

from U.S. and British sources. (Table 3)

So had a number of squadrons of the French

Naval Air Arm.37 Finally, the French

themselves had equipped and were maintaining, largely with old equipment, four

air "security squadrons" for colonial gendarmerie purposes.

It was not until 28 January that the CCS

finally approved Plan VII, subject to the

condition that modifications might be made

when required by the military situation.

Approval of the plan marked the beginning

of a new phase in the rehabilitation of the

FAF. Until then "at the end of the queue

for Allied attention," FAF could now feel

reasonably certain that, within a short time,

it would become an effective fighting

weapon.38

TABLE 3—AMERICAN - AND BRITISH -

EQUIPPED SQUADRONS OF THE FAF:

DECEMBER 1943

Location and Type Number

Total______________________________ _ a 2 2

North Africa

 b _ __.__.___--.-..-__________- _ 16

Bomber. _____________________________ _ 3

Light, A-35_-_________-___--____- _ 2

Medium, B-26. __.__--.-__-------- _ 1

Fighter--..-.-...--.--_-_-_--_-------- _ 10

Hurricane. -____.__..-..____--.___ . 2

P-39____._______ _ _________________ _ 4

P-47____.__ _ _____________________ _ 1

Spitfire.. --_---.--..-.-----__.-.-- _ 3

Transport, C-78_.__--..._-_._.-___---- - 3

United Kingdom c-_____--...---____--_-_-- - 6

Bomber _____,-..-_--____._.__-__-_--- _ 3

Heavy.__._____.___-__.__-_--_--- - 2

Light-..---.------.--.--.--------- 1

Fighter- ___________..______-_--____--_ - 3

a

 Plus 1 flight of photographic reconnaissance equipped in North

Africa. b

 American-equipped. c

 British-equipped.

Source: Memo, Fr Liaison Sec NAAF for A-4 Hq NAAF, 29

Jul 43, and GO 11, Mediterranean Air Comd, 26 Sep 43, JRC

360/003 Status and Employment of Units; Fr Air Force Rearmt

Plan, 7 Mar 44, JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

Just before the CCS action, a reorganization of the Allied air forces in Northwest

Africa had been effected coincidental with

that of the over-all Allied command in the

theater. In mid-January Lt. Gen. Ira C.

Eaker replaced Air Chief Marshal Tedder 35

 Ltr, NATOUSA to SOS and JRC, 31 Dec 43,

JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy. 36

 History of FAF in MAAF, p. 10. 37

 See Ch. XIII, below.

38

 Min, CCS 143d Mtg, 28 Jan 44; Msg, CCS to

Allied CinC Mediterranean, 29 Jan 44, FAN 330;

quotation from History of FAF in MAAF, p. 4.
REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE 207

as Air Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean and assumed command of the

newly created Mediterranean Allied Air

Forces (MAAF) now consolidating and

superseding both NAAF and Mediterranean Air Command. One of General

Eaker's first steps was to centralize the air

service responsibility for all U.S. components of MAAF in a single agency known

as Army Air Forces Service Command

(AAFSC), Mediterranean Theater of Operations. The latter, commanded by General Bartron, was charged, among other

duties, with supervising the supply of the

FAF. On 11 February General Bartron

issued, on orders from General Eaker,

a directive setting forth the basic policy

with respect to FAF supply: thereafter all

requests for supplies not available in French

stocks and needed for immediate consumption (except rations, post exchange

and Special Services supplies which were

the responsibility of the French themselves)

were to be submitted to AAFSC, on the

basis of the tables of basic allowances in

force for equivalent U.S. units. Appropriate charges were to be made by AAFSC

in the monthly lend-lease reports to SOS,

NATOUSA. Within AAFSC the unit

charged with co-ordinating FAF matters

was the French Section which had been

taken over from NAASC upon the latter's

deactivation.39

Immediately after the command reorganization in the theater, the French Chief

of Air Staff, General Bouscat, sought and

obtained from the Supreme Allied Commander, General Wilson, the definite assurance that French air units would ultimately

participate in operations for the liberation

of France. Presently the number of squadrons actively engaged in combat had slightly

increased. In addition to those operating

from bases in the United Kingdom or employed under Mediterranean Allied Coastal

Command, in early November an initial increment of two fighter squadrons and one

reconnaissance flight had joined the combined Allied air forces in Italy. Six more

units were on their way to that theater.

Others would follow as soon as they could

be made operational.

Meeting with General Wilson on 7 February, General Bouscat reviewed the situation of the FAF at the time. The training

of crews and replacements was completed

and the necessary maintenance and other

supporting services were organized. What

was needed to guarantee that units would

be ready on time was to speed up the delivery of planes and equipment. "We only

await the matériel." The FAF, he assured

the Supreme Allied Commander, was eager

to carry on the fight against the enemy.

General Wilson cautiously replied that the

question of equipment deliveries was one for

the decision of the CCS who, he reminded

General Bouscat, were the final authorities.40

It now remained generally to implement

that part of Plan VII which applied to the

year 1944, the October-December 1943

slice being almost completed. Under the

terms of the plan, the United States was

to assume the greater share of the task. Of

the eleven additional combat squadrons to

be re-equipped by 1 July 1944, ten were

to receive some 320 American planes of

various types. All together, the United

States was scheduled to furnish for the

entire years of 1943 and 1944, 615 single39

 Ltrs 65-5, Hq AAFSC MTO, 11 Feb 44, and

65-2, Hq AAF MTO, 3 Jun 44, JRC 360/001 Air

Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

40

 Min Mtg, Bouscat with Wilson, 7 Feb 44,

AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Confs—Gen (Fr), Feb 44-

Aug 44.
208 REARMING THE FRENCH

engine and 216 twin-engine planes, or a

total of 831 combat and transport aircraft.41

Deliveries of British aircraft would be limited to equipping, with Spitfires, one additional squadron in the United Kingdom,

and maintaining the existing Britishequipped squadrons in the Mediterranean,

less, however, the two Hurricane units now

being converted to P-47's.

Very shortly, shipments of American aircraft and equipment reached North African

ports at an increased tempo. Yet between

February and August, when Plan VII was

to end, deliveries of airplanes fell considerably behind schedule. Shortages of

B-26's and P-47's in particular resulted in

delaying as much as three months the final

re-equipping of several French squadrons.

The JAC, headed by Colonel Gardiner

(since 9 February), later by Col. R. Gilpin

Ervin (after 4 May), grappled with the

aircraft shortage problem as best it could,

often by obtaining loans from theater

stocks pending the arrival of allocations for

the French.42

In early February a request from General

Bouscat, approved by the JAC, for the delivery of. 100 additional A-24's for use in

training schools and in police and security

squadrons was turned down by the MAB

because the craft were not available.43 A

second request, this time submitted to the

War Department by the French Military

Mission in Washington, for 100 primary

and 100 basic training aircraft likewise was

disapproved "for failure to submit through

the JAC and lack of a definite training

plan." American authorities in Washington felt that there was no necessity for

sending training aircraft to North Africa as

long as a training program was continued in

the United States. This training program,

incidentally, called for a monthly production of some 80 pilots. But the French were

reported to be having difficulty in finding

the necessary candidates.44

Having been informed by the War Department that the B-26's being delivered to

the French were not to be equipped with

the Norden bombsight, General Eaker, in

a letter to Maj. Gen. Barney McK. Giles,

chief of the Air Staff in Washington, voiced

the opinion that this was a mistake. There

was little point in delivering an aircraft that

was not fully equipped to do a good military job. Moreover, there could be no

question of security since more than a thousand of these bombsights had been left in

bombers that had gone down over enemy

territory. Two weeks later War Department officials reversed their stand and

authorized General Eaker to leave the

bombsight on the B-26's allocated to the

French.45

Apparently feeling that more energetic

action should be taken in Washington toward the implementation of Plan VII, now

the "accepted guide" in the theater, General Eaker urged General Giles to organize

a staff agency which would take prompt

action on requests from his command for

materiel to equip the FAF.46 A visit to the

French squadron then training in Sardinia

with B-26's had convinced General Eaker

44

 Msg AFHQ-604, Arnold to Eaker and JAC, 24

Feb 44, JRC Cable Log. 45

 Ltrs, Eaker to Giles, 29 Feb 44, and Giles to

Eaker, 25 Mar 44, History of MAAF, Vol. II. 46

 Ltr, Eaker to Giles, 6 Mar 44, History of MAAF,

Vol. II.

41

 Memo, Bouscat for Ervin, 13 May 44, JRC

360/002 Items Common to Air and Ground. 42

 Both Colonels Gardiner and Ervin were Air

Corps officers. Colonel Gardiner, it will be recalled,

had already served as the first chairman of the Joint

Rearmament Committee (16 December 1942 to 5

June 1943). 4]

 Msg W-2124, Eaker to Arnold, 7 Feb 44, JRC

Cable Log.
REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE 209

that French pilots were "tops." In his

opinion, it was essential that the American

agreement to rearm French air units be

fully carried out. "This program should

be pressed to the limit," he asserted in a

personal letter to General Arnold. "We

ought to give the French the equipment

since they have such a fine offensive spirit."

General Eaker then praised their willingness

to serve as subordinates. "They fit right

into our organization willingly and cheerfully and there is never any question about

who is in command." All the French

wanted, he concluded, was an airplane and

a bomb.47

By April the number of units available

for combat had not increased as substantially as the French had hoped. Yet in

May, during the great Allied offensive leading to the fall of Rome, no less than 11

squadrons were operating within the combined Allied air forces. Three more soon

were to reach Italy, making a total of 14

divided in 4 groups. From the fall of Rome

on 5 June up to 15 August, date of the assault on the southern coast of France (ANVIL), several of the 14 squadrons would be

engaged in various pre-ANVIL activities: 3

in coastal protection, 7 in bombing action

on German airfields, fortifications, and lines

of communication, and 2 flights of 1 squadron in reconnaissance missions.48

 Nearly

all crews of the B-26, P-47, and P-38

squadrons had undergone their training at

the "transition school" specially set up for

the French by MAAF in early May. The

school, located near Tunis and run under

the control of the JAC, offered a modified

instructional program as the students all had

previously received some training.49

To enable the squadrons contemplated

under Plan VII to maintain their war effort

through the second half of 1944, it was indispensable that the needs of French auxiliary organizations in North Africa, such as

schools, replacement centers, airfields, and

medical and quartermaster services, be

properly assessed and filled. To this end,

General Bouscat submitted to the JAC, on

14 May, a list of requisitions. He reviewed

the composition, purpose, and activities of

the various organizations concerned. Their

total strength was estimated at 20,250 military and 6,500 civilian personnel. The

number of aircraft in use in the training

centers was given as 819, of which 322 were

of old French design, 181 of U.S. pre-1939

manufacture, 274 of recent American types,

and 42 of British design which had been

turned over to the French by the RAF since

1942. General Bouscat's requisitions were

promptly reviewed by the JAC and transmitted to the JRC for study and approval.50

In anticipation of the disbandment of

XII Air Force Training and Replacement

Command, which had been giving combat

training to French bomber crews and fighter pilots, the JAC, JRC, and other theater

agencies arranged for the transfer to the

French of sufficient equipment to enable

them to continue their own training. As

no advance trainers were available from

U.S. sources, the French, at the suggestion

of the JAC, attempted to obtain 25 Harvard

47

 Ltr, Eaker to Arnold, 21 Mar 44, History of

MAAF, Vol. II. 48

 It was in the course of a reconnaissance mission that the celebrated writer, Maj. Antoine de

Saint Exupéry, met with a fatal accident over the

Mediterranean on 31 July 1944.

For details on organization, control, and operations of FAF units in the various theaters of operations, see "Les Forces Aériennes Françaises"; General René Bouscat, "L'Armée de l'Air française

dans la Campagne d'ltalie," Revue de la Defense

Nationale (February, 1946), pp. 233-37; History

of FAF in MAAF.

49

 Interv with Ervin, Jul 51. 50

 Memos, Bouscat for JAC, 13 May 44, and Ervin

for Loomis, 5 Jun 44, JRC 360/002 Items Common

to Air and Ground.
210 REARMING THE FRENCH

planes from the Canadians. The MAB,

having no authority to assign Canadian aircraft, advised the French to refer their request to the Canadian Government through

British channels. The project was subsequently abandoned. The MAB, however,

authorized the transfer of 26 aircraft

(including 21 B-26's) used in the French

training program and no longer needed by

the American air forces in the theater. This

was in addition to earlier similar transfers

(13 aircraft in October 1943 and 8 more

in February 1944) by XII Air Force Training and Replacement Command. Later, in

July, the theater would approve one more

transfer, also for training purposes, of 90

P-40's which the RAF no longer needed in

North Africa.51

On 6 June 1944 the powerful Allied

armada, which for many months had patiently organized and trained in the United

Kingdom, was off on its initial assault of

western France. Among the air units engaged in the gigantic undertaking, a small

but determined French air force, integrated

into the RAF, was playing its part. It was

composed of the seven squadrons (4

fighter, 1 light bomber, and 2 heavy bomber

squadrons) which had already participated

in air operations over western Europe before D Day.

Meanwhile, in the Mediterranean theater, the squadrons engaged in Italy were

pursuing their combat and reconnaissance

activities, and three others, then in training in North Africa, were making ready to

join their comrades at a later date. However, French air participation in operations

in that theater would soon cease. In accordance with earlier agreements, all French

air squadrons were pulled from Italy along

with the units of the French Expeditionary

Corps and sent to join the pool of forces

being readied for ANVIL.

Headquarters, Force 163, the headquarters charged with the planning and execution of ANVIL, on 28 June published the

list of FAF organizations designated for the

operation. The list included twelve squadrons and several service units. To ensure

that the units would be thoroughly equipped

before their release to Force 163, General

Eaker requested and obtained from the

MAB the authorization to transfer to

them such items as were necessary to complete their equipment. Transfers were made

on the basis of requests submitted by the

French directly to NATOUSA. Meanwhile, the JAC inspected the units to ascertain whether or not they had their full

load of equipment.52

It soon became evident that, as in the

case of the ground forces, the French military authorities had activated too few

service units to make the combat squadrons

self-supporting. For lack of personnel, they

were not organizing all the maintenance

units required under Plan VII. The squadrons, as a result, were operating "on a shoestring." To keep them going, MAAF had

been compelled to provide, by mid-July,

more than 450 American maintenance

men.53

51

 Memo, Ervin for Loomis, 23 Jun 44, JRC 360/

002 Items Common to Air and Ground; Msgs W45370, Arnold to Eaker, 3 Jun 44, and Eaker to

Arnold, F-52950, 31 May 44, MX-24412, 13 Jul

44, 25045, 18 Jul 44, and M-25071, 18 Jul 44,

JRC Cable Log.

52

 Memo, Hq Force 163 for CG NATOUSA, 28

Jun 44, AFHQ AG 400-1 Fr Sups; Msgs, Eaker

to Arnold, M-25502, 21 Jul 44, and M-28515, 18

Aug 44, JRC 360/002 Items Common to Air and

Ground; Msg W-86188, Arnold to Devers, 26 Aug

44, JRC Cable Log. 53

 Msg M-23957, Eaker to Arnold, 8 Jul 44, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A; Msg

M-24150, Eaker to Arnold, 10 Jul 44, History of

MAAF, Vol. XXII.
REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE 211

Participating in ANVIL operation, on 15

August, were twelve French squadrons operating from bases in Corsica, Sardinia, and

Italy and representing approximately one

twentieth of the combined Allied air

armada. They were joined later by other

French squadrons operating elsewhere in

the Mediterranean. Tactically they were

employed, at least during the initial phase

of the operation, in exactly the same manner as the U.S. and British units engaged

in support of ANVIL. They operated

directly under the control of XII Tactical

Air Command (TAC), commanded by

General Saville who, it will be recalled, had

served as the first chairman of the JAC. On

the recommendation of General Wilson,

who felt that for psychological and political

reasons French units should be employed in

support of French Resistance forces, General Eaker directed XII TAC to put French

squadrons, whenever operationally practicable, to such use. While so employed, the

units, nevertheless, remained firmly under

Allied control.54

Also taking part in ANVIL was 1er Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes (1st

RCP), a parachute regiment equipped under Plan VII as one of the auxiliary units

of the FAF. The regiment was to function

independently of the other parachute units

(2d RCP and 3d RCP) activated and

equipped in the United Kingdom and

destined to operate as part of the SAS

Brigade.55 Organization and equipping of

the 1st RCP were the subject of much discussion and the source of considerable difficulties for many months.

In March, and again in early May 1943,

General Giraud had requested, and AFHQ

had subsequently approved, the equipping

of a parachute regiment composed of one

headquarters company, one service company, and two combat battalions. On 18

May the War Department authorized the

delivery of the ground items, the air equipment not being available at the time.56

Twice in August and September AFHQ

requested that the air items be shipped. Not

until the end of September did the War

Department announce that most of the

necessary equipment had been assigned and

would reach North Africa shortly. Meanwhile, the unit which until then had been

issued only vehicles and clothing had been

training with its old French rifles. By October the regiment, with a strength of approximately 1,600 men, had reorganized on a

U.S. table of organization and received on

loan from SOS some weapons, including

M1 rifles, to permit immediate training

with U.S. equipment. In November the

unit learned the American parachute-jump

technique at the Fifth Army Airborne

Training Center. It was still expecting its

equipment, most of which was said to have

already left the United States. Yet by the

end of November it had received no parachutes.

The situation of the regiment at the beginning of the year 1944 was not a happy

one and held little hope for early employment in combat. The regiment had not

completed its training (half of the men had

not even fired their M1 rifles). Of the

parachute boots issued, 30 percent had been

found to be too large. Worse yet, reports

indicated that insufficient personnel replacements were available to maintain the unit at 54

 History of FAF in MAAF, pp. 20-21. 55

 The following brief outline draws upon JRC

360/006 Fr Parachute Regt. On 2d RCP and 3d

RCP, see p. 182, above.

56

 Msgs W-3, AFHQ to AGWAR, 7 May 43, and

8258, AGWAR to AFHQ, 18 May 43, JRC Cable

Log.
212 REARMING THE FRENCH

strength in case it was engaged in operations.

These and other considerations prompted

AFHQ officials to decide, on 14 January,

that the regiment was unfit for combat and

would not be sent to Italy as originally contemplated. Instead it would be held in

North Africa for future operations. In

April it underwent further training at Fifth

Army Airborne Training Center. As

the unit was still short of equipment,

NATOUSA authorized SOS to issue to it

some of the missing items subject to their

ultimate replacement by SCAMA. In late

May, at the request of the French High

Command, the regiment was designated for

participation in the conquest of Elba (Operation BRASSARD). On 13 June, four days

before the attack, AFHQ announced that,

owing to heavy demands for air transport in

Italy, no aircraft would be available for the

airlift of the regiment.57 The regiment was

finally included in the ANVIL troop list and

subsequently transported to southern

France, not, however, as a parachute unit,

much to the disappointment of its personnel, but as a general reserve infantry organization assigned to 1st French Army.

Activated some eighteen months earlier, 1st

Parachute Regiment had yet to fire its first

shot in combat.

Near the end of August, with the ANVIL

forces in fast pursuit of the enemy, Allied

commanders agreed that the French air increment operating in France under XII

Tactical Air Command should be granted

a measure of tactical autonomy. As a first

step, there was established, on 1 September,

a "French Section, XII Tactical Air Command," the nucleus of what was to become

a month later the "1st French Air Corps"

commanded by Brig. Gen. Paul Gérardot.

On 13 November 1st French Air Corps,

now a full-fledged tactical air command,

left the control of XII TAC, and the two

organizations were consolidated under the

First Tactical Air Force (U.S.). The

French component included two B-26

bomber groups and three fighter groups,

each consisting of three combat squadrons

and one tactical reconnaissance squadron.

In order adequately to supply, maintain,

and support these units, a French Air

Depot group was created with the approval of the CCS, its equipment being

provided from matériel available in American stocks in North Africa.58

 Thereafter,

1st French Air Corps was to enjoy, under

First Tactical Air Force, a degree of autonomy similar to that enjoyed by 1st French

Army within the U.S. 6th Army Group.

Its essential mission was generally to act in

direct support of 1st French Army.

By November most of the FAF had left

North Africa and MAAF's control. Moreover, the JRC and the JAC whose presence

was no longer needed in that theater had

been disbanded and their key personnel

transferred, at General Devers' suggestion

and with the concurrence of Generals Eisenhower and Marshall, to the control of

SHAEF. Already General Bouscat had

moved his staff to Paris.59

All twenty-five operational squadrons reequipped under Plan VII were then actively

engaged in combat, seven in northern

France with the RAF as part of the 2d

Tactical Air Force (British), and approximately sixteen, constituting 1st French Air

Corps, as part of the First Tactical Air

Force (U.S.). Two others were still operating in northern Italy.

57

 De Lattre de Tassigny, Histoire de la Premiere

Armée Française, p. 22.

58

 Msg, CCS to Wilson, 23 Oct 44, FAN 441. 59

 Msgs FX-24575, Devers to Marshall, 13 Sep

44, and WX-32283, Marshall to Devers, 17 Sep 44,

JRC Cable Log.
REARMING THE FRENCH AIR FORCE 213

After nearly two years of Allied teamwork in the Mediterranean, the rebirth of

French military aviation had become an accomplished fact. The North African air

rearmament program could now be considered as having come to an end. It had

produced a "small but damned good" air

force whose performance, "second to none"

in the Italian campaign, would for the ANVIL period be remembered "with pride."

 60

Operationally, the undertaking had been

highly successful. Morally—and to use the

words of one chairman of the JAC—"it

would have been a cruel thing, harmful to

our international relations, to have neglected the French Air Force. ... The

psychological effect of re-equipping such

splendid personnel was most far reaching.

... It helped greatly the cause of the Allies and played an essential part in the development of the winning team."

 61

60

 Intervs with Saville and Ervin, Jul 51. These

and other equally favorable statements by Allied

field commanders—Generals Alexander and Clark

in particular (see pp. 178-79, 179n, above)—are

greatly at variance with the curt and disparaging

remarks about the French in General H. H. Arnold's

Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers,

1949). His implication that they were playing politics when submitting a particular air equipment request (p. 541) and his statement that, by January

1945, the French Army and Air Force "had not won

a battle," although vast quantities of equipment and

supplies had been given to them (p. 543), do not

appear consonant with the facts. 61

 Statement in Corres from Gardiner, OCMH.
CHAPTER XIII

Rehabilitating the French Navy

When the members of the Joint Rearmament Committee assembled for their first

meeting on 23 December 1942, they were

to consider plans for the rehabilitation of

the naval as well as the other French armed

forces. The committee confronted a situation unique in the annals of naval history.

A month earlier, on 27 November, nearly

one half of the entire French Navy, immobilized in the port of Toulon since June 1940,

had chosen to scuttle itself, when threatened

with German seizure, rather than join the

Allies in North Africa. Of the four vessels,

all submarines, which had escaped the holocaust by putting to sea, three successfully

reached North African ports. Another

group of vessels under the command of Admiral René Godfroy, demilitarized and kept

under British surveillance in the port of

Alexandria since July 1940 as a result of the

admiral's unwillingness to join the Royal

Navy, was still refusing to rally to the Allies.

A third, smaller group, consisting of Admiral Robert's vessels anchored in French

West Indies ports, was likewise rejecting

Allied appeals to join North Africa.

There was a brighter side. Two French

fleets were now at war with the Axis—the

Free French Naval Forces of General de

Gaulle, which had been in operation since

the fall of 1940, and the North African

Naval Forces of General Giraud. Both

were under Anglo-American operational

control, but were acting independently of

each other and would continue to do so until the fusion of all French armed forces in

late July 1943.

The Free French fleet, commanded first

by Vice Adm. Emile Muselier, later, after

February 1942, by Admiral Auboyneau,

had, from modest beginnings, grown to a

well-equipped and seasoned force composed

of 5 destroyers, 4 submarines, 13 corvettes

and sloops, 1 training ship, and various

miscellaneous auxiliary ships.1 The vessels, some British, the others French or

enemy captured, had been operating largely as convoy escorts under the control of

the Royal Navy which provided them with

equipment and maintenance.

The North African fleet, then commanded by Vice Adm. François Michelier,

represented a considerable potential force

consisting of some forty-five combat vessels

and a number of auxiliary craft. The ships

generally were in such poor condition, however, that the question of their employment

posed a serious problem. Many had been

stripped of armament and equipment during the 1940-42 armistice period; others

had been severely damaged in the brief but

bloody encounter with Allied naval forces.

The French North African authorities had

insufficient means and materials at their

disposal to make the ships fit for further

operation. The few weapons, tools, and

parts which they had concealed at great

1

 App. 2 to Ltr, Fénard to Leahy, 15 Oct 43,

SHAEF Mission to France 900-4 Rearmt Plan

and Policy.
REHABILITATING THE FRENCH NAVY 215

FRENCH SUBMARINE, CASABLANCA HARBOR, joins Allied forces in North

Africa, 12 November 1942.

risk from Italo-German armistice commissions represented only a minor proportion

of the matériel required.2

The work of rehabilitating the North

African Naval Forces began in December

1942. The Anglo-American Allies then

agreed to assist them by furnishing materials to carry out relatively minor repairs in

French shipyards, by placing Allied shipyards and naval facilities in North Africa

at their disposal in the case of more important overhauling, or by sending vessels requiring considerable repairs or refitting, but

able to make the journey, to naval establishments in the United States. The responsibility for co-ordinating these activities was assigned to the JRC upon its

creation in mid-December.

At the end of December Admiral Michelier submitted to the JRC a general program of repairs and alterations which he

considered necessary for the rehabilitation

of the forces and establishments under his

command. His proposal involved fitting

8 escort vessels and 6 destroyers with modern antiaircraft armament, asdic (antisubmarine direction indicator) and radar

equipment, sending the battleship Richelieu

to the United States for repairs, and fitting

13 submarines with asdic. It also called

for the delivery from Allied sources of a

2

 One French naval official is said to have succeeded in assembling and hiding seventy-five

75-mm. guns, and forty-five 37-mm. guns. Admiral Pierre Barjot, "Le Débarquement," La France

et son Empire dans la Guerre (Paris: Editions

Littéraires de France, 1947), I, 207-34.
BATTLESHIP RICHELIEU PASSING UNDER MANHATTAN BRIDGE

heading for dry dock at a New Jersey port.
REHABILITATING THE FRENCH NAVY 217

considerable amount of stores and supplies

for naval shore establishments, dockyards,

and naval aviation.

In forwarding Admiral Michelier's program to the CCS, General Eisenhower

pointed out that the provision of secret

matériel such as modern radar and fire

control equipment would require an early

policy decision between Washington and

London. He saw no objection to the issue

of some form of asdic since several French

vessels already had Allied equipment of this

type. In his opinion and that of Allied

naval officials in the theater, the most urgent problem was to have French convoy

escort ships properly furnished with asdic

and close-range antiaircraft. The rearmament of the Richelieu, reputedly one of the

finest battleships in existence at the time,

was largely a matter of French prestige;

but the vessel, if put into operation, would

serve usefully in releasing an Allied battleship from the Atlantic. The French were

ready and willing to start immediately on

this general program in which Admiral Sir

Andrew B. Cunningham, commander of all

Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean,

concurred.3

Pending approval of the program, General Giraud proposed to send to Washington

a naval mission, headed by Vice Adm. Raymond Fénard, to cooperate with Allied

officials on such matters as the eventual

completion of the Richelieu, the repair and

refitting of other units, and similar questions. The proposal having been endorsed

by the Allied Commander in Chief and

through him by the CCS, Admiral Fénard

left for Washington in late January 1943.4

The Naval Mission, though separate from

General Béthouart's Military Mission,

worked in close collaboration with it.

It was then that a curious and somewhat

befuddled situation arose in connection with

the payment of French naval personnel.

The confusion originated as a result of the

dispatch, on 29 December, of a message

from Navy Secretary Frank Knox to Rear

Adm. John L. Hall, commander of Sea

Frontier Forces, Western Task Force. The

message authorized and directed the payment by U.S. naval disbursing officers of

all personnel of the French North and West

African naval units operating with and for

the United Nations. Greatly surprised at

this offer, which was described to him as

emanating from President Roosevelt, Admiral Michelier consulted General Giraud,

who in turn registered considerable astonishment since he had already taken the

necessary financial measures for the payment from funds available to him of all

ground, sea, and air forces under his command. At the direction of the French Commander in Chief, Admiral Michelier explained to Admiral Hall why the offer could

not be accepted, and expressed his personal

gratitude "for the generosity which had inspired this gesture."5

 Apprised of these

negotiations and of the initial offer made

without his knowledge, General Eisenhower

informed the CCS on 18 January that it

would continue to be his policy to respect

the apparent desire of the French to maintain their forces in North Africa without recourse to direct financial assistance from the

United States.6 The issue was now closed.

The French North African authorities, who

had already begun paying their personnel

from funds available to them, continued to

3

 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 2 Jan 43, NAF 78. 4

 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 7 Jan 43, NAF 91.

5

 AFHQ Msg (no ref), I Armed Corps (signed

Patton) to FREEDOM, 16 Jan 43, JRC Cable Log. 6

 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 18 Jan 43, NAF 108.
218 REARMING THE FRENCH

do so. In the case of crews and other personnel temporarily stationed in the United

States, arrangements were made for advances from the Treasury Department subject to repayment from French resources.7

Meanwhile, a program of rehabilitation

had been worked out after consultation with

the French and a conference with Admiral

Cunningham and Rear Adm. William A.

Glassford, commander in chief of Amphibious Forces, Northwest African Waters.

The latter, who had just returned from

Casablanca where he had had an opportunity to inspect French naval vessels in that

area, submitted to the CCS, on 17 January,

the final recommendations of the theater

regarding action and priorities for the rehabilitation program. The recommendations were made with a view to putting

French ships in operation at the earliest

possible date.8

The CCS, already assembled for the

Casablanca Conference (14-26 January)

examined the problem of reconditioning the

French fleet in general and the specific program proposed by Admiral Glassford. At

one of the meetings attended by General

Giraud, Admiral King pointed out that

arrangements were well in hand for the

refitting in rotation of the French warships.

Resources, he explained, would not permit

of their being dealt with all at once. Admiral Pound then seized the occasion to

welcome the entry of the North African

fleet on the side of Allied naval forces.

From his experience at the beginning of the

war, he was confident that the French Navy

would render, once again, substantial and

valuable assistance especially in fighting the

U-boat menace.9 Two days later, on 21

January, the Combined Chiefs informed

Admiral Glassford that they approved certain of his recommendations. They also

informed him of the respective parts which

the United States and the United Kingdom

were prepared to play in arming, equipping,

and overhauling French naval vessels and

installations in North and West Africa.

All vessels to be overhauled, such as escorts,

submarines, cruisers, and destroyers, were

to be sent to shipyards in the United States;

none would be sent to the United Kingdom

for the moment as it would be impracticable.10

 When, a few weeks later, the first

vessels reached U.S. shipyards, the reconditioning program got fully under way. Its

progress was not affected by the temporary

desertion of crews to Gaullist vessels then

anchored in U.S. harbors.11

On 27 January, AFHQ formulated a

policy to govern the rehabilitation of the

North African Naval Forces. The undertaking was to aim at providing forces capable of carrying out the following roles:

local defense of ports, escort for coastal convoys, ocean escort, submarine operations.

Rehabilitation of course meant repair and

refitting of existing vessels. In the eyes of

the French it also meant the acquisition of

new units. At their request, General Eisenhower urged the CCS, on 1 March, to approve the transfer to them of a number of

ships including destroyers, escorts, and tugs,

planes and equipment for their Naval Air

Arm, clothing and foodstuffs for their personnel, as well as ship repair and construction materials and machine tools for their

naval installations. He also recommended

7

 Ltr, D. W. Bell to Hull, 26 Feb 43, OPD 336.2

France, Sec I. 8

 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 17 Jan 43, NAF 105.

9

 Min, CCS 62d Mtg, 19 Jan 42, Casablanca

Conf. 10

 Msg 2226/22, CCS to Glassford, 21 Jan 43,

OPD 336.3 France, Sec 1. 11

 See p. 80n, above.
REHABILITATING THE FRENCH NAVY 219

BATTLESHIP JEAN BART AT CASABLANCA after receiving three direct bomb hits

from a carrier-based dive bomber.

that the Fénard mission in Washington be

asked to designate the equipment to be delivered under the shipping allotment reserved by General Giraud for naval units

out of the total 25,000-ton monthly allocation. Shipments would be made as agreed

upon by Admiral Fénard and Overseas

Supply Division of New York Port of Embarkation (and not International Division),

the agency responsible for handling naval

materials.12

12

 Memo, AFHQ (signed Whiteley), 27 Jan 43,

AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters; Msgs

3729, Eisenhower to CCS, 1 Mar 43, and 4498,

Eisenhower to AGWAR, 5 Mar 43, JRC Cable

Log; Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 8 Mar 43, ASF

File 124 Task Force Chronology, 18 Oct 43.

On 17 April the CCS examined the

various piecemeal recommendations submitted by the theater, then drafted and

approved a supply policy for North African

naval vessels and bases. The policy determined the extent of the rehabilitation

program, the procedure to be followed for

the issue of materials, and the respective

participation of the United States and the

United Kingdom in the commitment. With

regard to vessels in operation, the policy stipulated that the United States and the United

Kingdom each would supply the necessary

ammunition, fuel, and other items to the

vessels operating under their control.13

13

 Note, CCS Secretaries to CCS, 16 Apr 43, OPD

400 France, Sec II; Min, CCS 80th Mtg, 17 Apr 43.
220 REARMING THE FRENCH

By this time a number of ships were being

overhauled in various dockyards. In New

York, the Richelieu was having main armament completed, radar equipment installed,

and antiaircraft armament improved. In

Casablanca, the battleship Jean Bart, badly

damaged in November 1942, was undergoing repairs sufficient to enable her to

steam to the United States later in the year

for final refitting. In Philadelphia, Boston,

Hampton Roads, and other American ports,

cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and various

miscellaneous vessels were undergoing repair, with many more to follow in the near

future. Repairs and refitting were also

being effected in Casablanca, Algiers,

Dakar, Oran, and even Bermuda. Twenty

French merchant ships were being issued

defensive armament and ammunition. The

British were about to furnish twenty Walrus

patrol planes for use by the French Naval

Air Arm. At all Allied ports in North

Africa, French officers were being trained

in British and American methods of harbor

defense. A French antisubmarine warfare

school was functioning at Casablanca.

Gunnery schools were in operation at Algiers and Oran. Selected French personnel

were being sent to sea in British destroyers

escorting convoys to study the latest methods

in antisubmarine warfare.14

On 30 April, pursuant to the CCS directive issued a fortnight before, the theater

forwarded to Washington a revised list of

naval items of munitions and warships

stores for the French. Two months later

General Eisenhower proposed to the CCS

that thereafter new requests for ships, proposals for major overhauls, and requests for

increases in armament be referred by General Giraud's headquarters to AFHQ for

recommendation, leaving matters of detail

relating to requests for naval supplies for

direct handling between the Fénard mission

and appropriate agencies in Washington.

Endorsing the proposal, the CCS directed

that the French submit their requests for

ships and major items of matériel to AFHQ,

for recommendation, simultaneously with

their requisitions to the MAB in Washington. They stipulated further that no consideration would be given in Washington

to items disapproved by AFHQ.15

In early July the theater cabled a request

for the issue to the French of gun and machinery spare parts and maintenance replacements on a scale comparable to that

authorized similar American naval vessels.16

The request was approved by the CCS a

month later.

While the overhauling operations were

proceeding, the question of employment of

the North African naval vessels and personnel was made the subject of a detailed study

by the Combined Staff Planners in full consultation with Admiral Fénard. Until then

the operational assignment of vessels had

been effected upon a basis of "cooperation"

in accordance with the terms of the still valid

Clark-Darlan Agreement: "French warships shall operate in close cooperation with

the CG, US Army, or Allied representatives

acting with his approval."

 17

 Feeling that

there was need for a more precise and

orderly arrangement, the CPS recommended that thereafter French naval units,

when ready for duty, be assigned to operations areas by the CCS, initially according

14

 Memo, Naval Members JRC for Gardiner, 7

May 43: Memo, Gardiner for DCofS, 14 May 43,

JRC 905.6/VIII Naval Rearmt.

15

 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 25 Jun 43, NAF 245;

Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 10 Jul 43, FAN 156. 16

 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 5 Jul 43, NAF 276;

Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 13 Aug 43, FAN 190. 17

 Article VII, Clark-Darlan Agreement, 22 Nov

42, AFHQ 0100/5 CAO/302/1 MAEB.
REHABILITATING THE FRENCH NAVY 221

to a specific detailed plan, later, if changes

were required, at the direction of the CCS

themselves. On 30 July the CCS approved

the recommendations of the CPS but postponed the issuance of a statement on the

question of control pending further discussion of the matter.18

In late July the long-awaited fusion of

the Free French and North African Forces

brought into being a single Marine

Nationale (referred to hereafter as French

Navy) under the supreme command of

General Giraud. Admiral Lemonnier was

appointed Chief of Staff of the integrated

force, and Admiral Auboyneau the Deputy

Chief of Staff. The new Navy included

also the forces which earlier had refused to

join the Allies. In May Admiral Godfrey

had finally agreed to rally to General Giraud

and arrived in Dakar, via the Suez Canal

and the Cape of Good Hope, with his eight

ships of which one was the battleship Lorraine. In July the seven vessels immobilized in the French West Indies had likewise joined the common struggle after the

resignation of Admiral Robert, then High

Commissioner for that territory. As a result of these successive additions, the French

Navy now represented a large force of some

80 ships including 3 operational battleships,19

 1 aircraft-carrier, 9 cruisers, 21 destroyers, 22 submarines, and 20 smaller vessels. Besides these, there were about 60

auxiliary craft. Available naval personnel

numbered some 45,000 men.

By this time the work of rehabilitation

had made substantial progress. Refitting

of the Richelieu was nearly completed and

the vessel was about to be subjected to a

period of trials and practice runs in the

United States. At Casablanca, temporary

hull repairs to the Jean Bart were continuing. A number of ships had left U.S.

ports upon completion of their refitting and

had joined others already operating under

the control of the Naval Commander in

Chief, Mediterranean. Others were on

their way to the United States. The British,

for their part, had made sufficient temporary repairs to the ships of Admiral Godfrey's fleet to enable them to sail from

Alexandria to Dakar, and eventually to the

United States. They also had repaired and

refitted in North African ports a number of

trawlers, escort vessels, and miscellaneous

small craft unable to cross the Atlantic for

modernization in American yards. It was

estimated that when the program was completed, the United States would have

financed approximately 95 percent of the

cost of French naval rearmament.20

The memorandum on the status of the

French armed forces which Generals Giraud and de Gaulle jointly addressed to

General Marshall on 18 September contained a plea that the naval rehabilitation

program be implemented speedily. Many

of the 45,000 sailors constituting the naval

forces otherwise would remain unused or

poorly used. The two generals also requested new ships: 12 destroyers and 30

escort vessels from the United States, and 3

destroyers, 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier, and

3 submarines from the United Kingdom.21

In late September, the CCS consolidated

all existing policies with respect to the

French Navy into one single memorandum

18

 Rpt, CPS to CCS (CCS 207/10), 19 Jul 43, OPD 336.3 France, Sec 1; Min, CCS 104th Mtg,

30 Jun 43. 19

 Two more could not be repaired.

20

 Rpt, JRC Naval Members to Chairman JRC,

1 Aug 43, JRC 905.6/VIII Naval Rearmt; Memo,

Spalding for Brig Gen Arthur R. Wilson, 14 Aug

43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan. 21

 Ltr and Memo, de Gaulle and Giraud to Marshall, 18 Sep 43, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43),

Sec 1-A; see also pp. 105-06, above.
222 REARMING THE FRENCH

(CCS 358). The memorandum covered

all aspects of administration and operational control, such as overhauling, refitting,

assignment, and employment; it also proposed a detailed supply policy in connection with repairs and the issue of matériel.

The memorandum was subsequently

amended on 4 October. The amended

version (CCS 358/Revised) became the

official policy governing the rehabilitation

and employment of the French naval and

naval air forces and the basis on which all

subsequent programs or revisions thereof

were shaped.22 The provision relating to

the assignment of vessels was a restatement

of the policy advocated earlier by the Combined Staff Planners in their report of 19

July. With respect to operational control,

the directive contained a clause which

merely formalized the practice then current: "French ships assigned to any operational area will operate under the operational command of the Allied naval area

commander. They will be utilized to the

extent of their capabilities and in the same

manner as other similar Allied ships in the

area, operating normally under subordinate French commanders." Internal administration was to remain, of course, the

concern of appropriate French naval authorities. The French immediately endorsed the provisions of the directive and

signified unqualified approval.23

Now that the French Admiralty in Algiers

controlled vessels operating world-wide,

many outside of his own theater, the Allied

Commander in Chief requested the CCS, on

17 October, to review the procedure with

respect to French naval rearmament. He

recommended that British and American

naval missions operating under the control

of the Naval Commander in Chief in the

Mediterranean be accredited to the French

Admiralty as representatives of the British

Admiralty and the Commander in Chief

of the U.S. Fleet respectively.24 The Combined Chiefs replied that they had no objection to the proposal provided the French

Admiralty, in compliance with CCS 358

(Revised), took up all policy matters

with the CCS through the executive agent

of that body, namely, the Commander in

Chief of the U.S. Fleet acting in concurrence with the British Admiralty delegation

in Washington.25

In late November Admiral Lemonnier

submitted to the Joint Rearmament Committee a list of requisitions for the year 1944

superseding all previous similar requests

most of which had been nullified as a result

of the change in supply policy effected by

the CCS. The list included a request for

ships, aircraft, clothing, medical supplies,

and the normal maintenance of vessels.

The requisition for clothing was based on

a personnel strength of 49,000 men.26 The

request for additional ships had little chance

of being granted because the CCS had just

decided that it would not be beneficial to

the war effort to make further assignments

of vessels to the French in the near future.27

Another request submitted almost simultaneously by Admiral Lemonnier on behalf

of the French Naval Air Arm (Aéronautique Navale) brought the question of the

rearmament and maintenance of that force

into focus. Four naval air squadrons were

22

 Min, CCS 121st Mtg, 1 Oct 43; CCS 358 (Revised), 4 Oct 43. 23

 Memo, Fénard for Leahy, 15 Oct 43, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711 Rearmt Plan and Policy

900-4.

24

 Msg, Eisenhower to CCS, 17 Oct 43, NAF 472. 25

 Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 6 Nov 43, FAN 272. 26

 Ltr, Lemonnier to Loomis, 30 Nov 43, JRC

045/001 Plan, Policy, Progress of Rearmt of Fr

Navy. 27

 CCS 358/3, approved by CCS 4 Nov 43.
REHABILITATING THE FRENCH NAVY 223

operating under Mediterranean Air Command. Two had been equipped with

Sunderlands and Wellingtons by the RAF,

one with Walruses by the Fleet Air Arm of

the Royal Navy, and one with Catalinas

by the U.S. Navy.28 These units had been

rearmed at the initiative of individual Allied

commanders without any definite over-all

plan and, as a result, the question of their

maintenance was presenting serious difficulties.

The advisability of expanding the Naval

Air Arm had been the subject of long negotiations in the course of 1943. As early as

July the French High Command had requested the War Department to deliver 255

planes to be used for the defense of bases

and ports and for the protection of French

naval units. The request, although favorably received by General Eisenhower, later

was disapproved by the War Department

on the ground that it had not been considered by the theater in relation to French

Air Force requirements.29 As the proposed

Air program (Plan VII) contemplated no

expansion of the Naval Air Arm, the

French, in mid-December, made a second

attempt to obtain equipment for their naval

air units. This time the request, largely a

repetition of the first one, was submitted by

Admiral Fénard to the U.S. Navy Department.30

 It called for 250 aircraft to equip

naval squadrons "for combat duty under

Allied control as may be prescribed by the

CCS." The request was referred to General Wilson for advice and recommendation

in accordance with the recent CCS decision

that all French rearmament matters be

cleared by the Allied Commander in Chief

in the theater before their submission to the

CCS.31

On 24 January 1944 General Wilson informed the War Department that no plan

had been submitted to him by the French

for the rearmament of their naval air

squadrons. He urged that no consideration

be given to arming such units at the expense

of Allied air forces, and added the information that the French were reported to have

insufficient trained crews and maintenance

personnel either for the activation of new

naval air units or for their continued support.32

 In addition, he warned, the theater

was having considerable difficulty in solving

the supply problem of the four existing

squadrons because of the diversity of the responsibilities involved.33

Endorsing General Wilson's advice and

recommendation, the CCS, on 25 February,

disapproved the French request and Admiral Leahy so informed Admiral Fénard.34

Meanwhile, President Roosevelt, consulted

on the matter by General Arnold, had directed that French naval air personnel be

employed in the Mediterranean in French 28

 Memos, Saville for Loomis, 30 Nov 43, and

Loomis for Saville, 16 Dec 43, JRC 045/009 Naval

Aviation. 29

 Msgs 3062, Arnold to Eisenhower, 22 Jul 43,

W-6872, Eisenhower to Arnold, 8 Aug 43, and

4752, Arnold to Eisenhower, 11 Aug 43, JRC

Cable Log. 30

 Admiral Fénard's initial request was submitted

to the U.S. Navy and not to the Army Air Forces

as indicated by General Arnold in his Global Mission, p. 541. Subsequently, however, a second

request from Admiral Fénard, dated 7 January 1944

and addressed to Admiral Leahy as Chief of Staff to

the Commander in Chief, was forwarded by the

latter to the Army Air Forces for action. Ltrs,

Fénard to Navy Dept, 18 Dec 43, and to Leahy,

7 Jan 44, ABC 091.711 France (12 Oct 43). 31

 Msg to AFHQ, 1 Jan 44, FAN 288; Msg 7165,

Arnold to Wilson, 14 Jan 44, JRC Cable Log. 32

 Msg W-919, Wilson to AGWAR, 24 Jan 44,

JRC Cable Log. 33

 Memos, Saville for Loomis, 30 Nov 43, Timberlake for Loomis, 13 Dec 43, and Loomis for Saville,

16 Dec 43, JRC 045/009 Naval Aviation. 34

 Min, CCS 147th Mtg, 25 Feb 44; Ltr, Leahy

to Fénard, 25 Feb 44, ABC 091.711 France (12

Oct 43).
224 REARMING THE FRENCH

Air Force units equipped and supplied from

U.S. sources.35

Obviously the matter of expanding the

Naval Air Arm was, for the present at least,

a closed one, considering in addition that

the CCS had just reached an important decision with respect to French military aviation. Indeed, on 28 January, they had

finally approved Plan VII, which, in their

opinion, represented the maximum objective likely to be reached by the French in

the field of aviation during the current

war.36

In mid-February 1944, the French Admiralty once again attempted to obtain an

extension of the naval program. Appearing before the CCS, Admiral Fénard discussed the request for additional vessels

submitted by Admiral Lemonnier in November. He explained that some 10,000

naval personnel, including specialists, were

currently unemployed for lack of sufficient

naval units. A month later the CCS informed Admiral Fénard that existing construction programs for combatant ships, although absorbing all available resources of

the United Kingdom and the United States,

would be short of the requirements for

planned operations during the current year.

As a result it was not possible to meet the

French request except for some escorts, submarine chasers, mine sweepers and other

miscellaneous ships which the Commander

in Chief of the U.S. Fleet proposed to transfer to the French Navy as soon as possible.37

So far the French had received or were

about to receive from U.S. sources 6 destroyer escorts, 6 patrol craft, and 6 submarine chasers,38

 and from British sources 4

frigates. During the following months, the

transfer of additional Allied vessels, mostly

American, such as mine sweepers, sloops,

and patrol boats, as well as the refloating

and refitting of salvaged French or captured

Italian ships, resulted in a substantial increase of the French Navy. By May it was

estimated that nearly 100 ships had been

added, bringing the total of units to approximately 240.39

Meanwhile, such ships as had been overhauled or acquired had not remained idle.

For over a year they had been carrying out

missions in various theaters of operations

under British or U.S. command, as part

of the Allied naval pool. In September

1943 a number of submarines, destroyers,

and cruisers had temporarily been released

from Allied control and placed by Admiral

Cunningham at General Giraud's disposal

for use in transporting the French ground

forces engaged in the assault of Corsica

(VESUVIUS ) .

40

 In November the Richelieu

had joined the Home Fleet and four months

later had been sent to the Indian Ocean

as part of the British Far Eastern Fleet.

Other vessels were operating in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, as well as in the

Mediterranean. Several were escorting

convoys to Murmansk.

During the coming months of June, July,

and August 1944, the reborn French Navy

was to furnish its greatest contribution to

the Allied war effort and to regain the place

of honor it had long occupied. Participating in the cross-Channel operation (OVERLORD) as elements of the Allied supporting

naval pool, commanded by Admiral Sir

35

 Memo, Arnold for JCS, 9 Feb 44, ABC 091.711

France (12 Oct 43). 36

 For details of Plan VII, see pp. 204-05, above. 37

 Ltr, Leahy to Fénard, 13 Mar 44, OPD 336.3

France, Sec 1.

38

 Rpt, MAB to CCS, 31 Dec 43, ABC 091.711

France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A. 39

 André Truffert, "La Marine Nationale," La

France et son Empire dans la Guerre, II, 188-96. 40

 See p. 101, above.
REHABILITATING THE FRENCH NAVY 225

Bertram H. Ramsay, were a number of

cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, torpedo boats, submarine chasers, and other

smaller craft. These vessels, under the command of Rear Adm. Robert Jaujard, were

attached to Rear Adm. Alan G. Kirk's

U.S. naval force.41 A week later, on 16

June, several units commanded by Rear

Adm. Robert Battet, operating alongside

British vessels under the over-all command

of Admiral Troubridge (RN), participated

in the assault on the island of Elba

(BRASSARD). 4 2

The most substantial contribution of the

French Navy was that given in connection

with the landings in southern France (ANVIL). The Allied naval task force, commanded by Vice Adm. Henry Kent Hewitt,

included a French increment under Admiral Lemonnier which comprised the

battleship Lorraine, eight cruisers, a number of destroyers, and many other smaller

craft. Like the British and American ships

engaged in the operation, the French vessels

were given the task of protecting the invading forces and neutralizing enemy coastal

defenses. In their after-action reports, Admiral Hewitt and other U.S. naval commanders highly praised the French crews

for their excellent seamanship and gunnery, their intrepidity under fire, as well as

the fine sportsmanship of their commanding officers.43

A word must be said here of the units of

fusiliers marins (marines) which the French

High Command activated and put to excellent use in operations. Two such units

accompanied the French Expeditionary

Corps in Italy, the 1st Fusiliers Marins Regiment as the reconnaissance regiment of the

1st Motorized Infantry Division (1st

DMI), and the Groupe de Canonniers

Marins (Naval Gunners Group) as a general reserve artillery unit of the CEF. Later,

in June 1944, the 1st Battalion of Fusiliers

Marins Commandos (Marine Commandos) operated as part of the French naval

forces engaged in OVERLORD, and the Regiment Blindé de Fusiliers Marins (Armored Marine Regiment) landed in France

as the tank destroyer regiment of the 2d

Armored Division. All these units,

equipped and trained under the North

African rearmament program, gave an excellent account of themselves.

Shortly before the launching of ANVIL,

General Wilson had recommended to the

CCS that the policy contained in CGS 358

(Revised) with respect to the supply of

French ships and ports under immediate

control of the United States and United

Kingdom be extended to the ports expected

to be captured in the forthcoming operation

and to the French warships and naval personnel likely to be operating outside direct

U.S. and British control.44 In mid-September, a month after the operation had

been launched, the CCS approved the proposal provided that the supply of repair

equipment and materials, ships, and stores

to the French Navy in its home ports and

to the ports themselves for their rehabilitation be limited to the extent required for

the support of operations.45

Soon after, the responsibility for the

41

 The old battleship Courbet and other ships no

longer seaworthy and anchored in U.K. ports since

1940 were brought close to shore, sunk, and used

as breakwaters for the protection of artificial harbors.

42

 See pp. 180-81, above. 43

 Ltrs, Vice Adm Lyal A. Davidson, Comdr

Task Force 86, 29 Aug and 5 Sep 44, and Hewitt,

3 and 15 Sep 44, to CinC U.S. Fleet, AFHQ Royal

Navy Op file, Op DRAGOON, Fr Ships, Rpts.

44

 Msg, Wilson to CCS, 15 Jul 44, NAF 719. 45

 Msg, CCS to Wilson, 21 Sep 44, FAN 424.
226 REARMING THE FRENCH

supply and maintenance of the French Navy

passed, along with that of all other French

armed forces, from AFHQ to SHAEF.

The rehabilitation of the French Navy,

within the limits set forth by the CCS, was

nearly completed. The question of further expansion would, thereafter, be a

matter for discussion between SHAEF authorities and the French officials in Paris

before consultation with the CCS.
CHAPTER XIV

Liaison, Language, and Training Problems

In implementing the North African rearmament program, AFHQ was confronted

with a variety of problems affecting, not

any one phase in particular, but rather the

entire period of operations. Some resulted

from human or personal considerations,

others involved purely material matters.

All resulted from a situation in which the

army of one nation was committed to the

rehabilitation of another nation's forces

having needs peculiar to them, therefore

requiring special attention. In general the

problems stemmed from lack of sufficient

planning or because of unforeseen developments. Their solution depended entirely

on the action or arrangements initiated by

AFHQ or NATOUSA subject to final approval by the CCS or the War Department.

Liaison and the Language Barrier

Foremost among the factors vitally influencing Franco-Allied relations, particularly in the field of rearmament, were the

language barrier and a dearth of qualified

liaison officers on both sides.

American as well as French officers agree

that, to be successful, a rearmament officer

must have certain qualifications. Next to a

thorough knowledge of his subject, he must

possess a keen understanding of the other

fellow's approach to the problem, his

personal and national idiosyncrasies, his

working habits, and his probable reactions.

In short, the rearmament officer must display a sympathetic attitude. Fluency in the

foreign language, although highly desirable,

is not the prime qualification required for

the position.1 Judged by such exacting

standards, few on either side possessed all

the skills required to perform their task

adequately. Among the Americans, excepting those officials directly supervising the

rearmament and training operations whose

sympathetic attitude was fully recognized

and appreciated by the French, many were

unable to understand the French, usually

from lack of preparation for the positions

they occupied. Similarly, French officers

other than those appointed to key posts

frequently lacked technical knowledge,

understanding of American organization

and methods, and fluency in the English

language. Notable among the exceptions

were a number of officers recruited in early

1943 among French residents abroad, especially in the United States and Canada.

After a period of training in U.S. schools in

the use of American equipment, some fifty

of these highly qualified bilingual officers

were assigned by the French High Command to the JRC, SCAMA, and French

depots and supply installations where they

rendered valuable assistance.

Fluency in the foreign language, while

it may be a secondary qualification for re1

 Intervs with Col Artamonoff, Dec 49, Col

Gardiner, Apr 50, Gen Loomis, Jun and Jul 50, Col

de Beaumont, Jul 50, and Gen Regnault, Jul and

Sep 50.
228 REARMING THE FRENCH

armament officers, is obviously of primary

importance for liaison officers. When these

officers were unable to cope with the finer

linguistic problems and, in addition, were

not thoroughly familiar with the technical

problems involved, their inadequacy led to

mistranslations or misinterpretations that

often strained inter-Allied relations. A case

in point is the serious misunderstanding between AFHQ and French Headquarters

brought about by a letter addressed in October 1943 by General Whiteley, then Deputy

Chief of Staff, AFHQ, to General Giraud.

In his communication, General Whiteley

requested that, "whenever necessary, equipment will be drawn from non-participating

units" in order to complete the re-equipment of units designated for combat. When

it became clear, from subsequent French

requisitions, that General Whiteley's instructions had not been complied with, the

French were accused of willfully disregarding orders received. Resentment on both

sides increased until an investigation revealed, nearly three weeks later, that the

English text of the paragraph in question

had erroneously been translated at French

Headquarters as: "equipment will be

drawn from stocks available to non-participating units."

 2 The very point which

General Whiteley had wished to stress,

namely, that nonparticipating units should

be stripped of their equipment if necessary

(a matter of considerable dispute at the

time), had been entirely missed. In other

instances, misunderstanding resulted from

faulty translation by Americans. The following sentence contained in a French directive, "Des forces françaises opérant dans

un cadre américain" (French forces operating within the framework of an American

command), was given by a translator at

AFHQ as, "French forces operating with

American cadres."3 War Department

translators, as well, occasionally missed the

particular meaning of a French word. In

a letter to General Marshall, General

Giraud spoke of a certain armament program "which we have drawn up" (le programme que nous avons arrêté). The

sentence was rendered, first, as "the program which we have held up," later in a

second translation, intended no doubt to

improve on the first, as "which we have

postponed."

 4 The resulting inference that

the French Commander in Chief was postponing his rearmament program, when in

reality he was fighting for its retention, must

have been somewhat of a surprise to those

who read the letter. Not all linguistic errors, fortunately, were serious in consequence. Some, by their humorous implications, probably contributed to the relief

of tension between Allied and French

staffs. In this category can be classed the

unexpected statement appearing in the

minutes of the 30 December 1943 meeting

between Generals Eisenhower and de

Gaulle, as drawn up by the French recording officer present. According to the

French text, the Allied Commander in

Chief is reported to have assured his visitor

that he would not fail to include a French

"talking force" in the cross-Channel operation.5

In addition to being the source of occasional misunderstandings, the language bar2

 Ltr, Whiteley to Giraud, 20 Oct 43, AFHQ

0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec. Italics supplied.

3

 Dir 6014, Fr Hq, 8 Dec 43, JRC 400.2/002

Stock Control (SCAMA). 4

 Ltr, Giraud to Marshall, 27 Aug 43, OPD 400

France, Sec. II. 5

 The two words appear in English and in quotations in the French text. Min Mtg, Eisenhower

with de Gaulle, 30 Dec 43, AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison

Sec, Mtgs and Confs, Vol. I.
LIAISON, LANGUAGE, AND TRAINING PROBLEMS 229

rier raised considerable technical difficulties. These might have been greatly reduced had it been possible in the early

stages of the rearmament operations to provide the French with translations in their

language of U.S. technical manuals and

publications, none of which were available

at the time. Recognizing the urgency of

the matter, the War Department promptly

undertook a vast program of translation and

began furnishing French texts as fast as

they could be prepared and printed. As

early as March 1943 thousands of copies

of various manuals were sent along with

the first large shipments of matériel. Psychological warfare booklets and numerous

technical bulletins were subsequently delivered, first through the JRC and French

Training Section, later through the French

base at Oran, for distribution to troops, depots, and shops. In September of the same

year the War Department announced that

the translation had been undertaken in the

United States of all American technical

publications needed for the current rearmament program. Yet, by the beginning

of Phase IV in February 1944, much still

remained to be done in connection with

the translation program.

Even publications in English were not

always available to the French when most

needed. In the course of the summer of

1943, when the first divisions were being

issued their U.S. equipment, the French

High Command complained of not having

complete sets of standard nomenclature

lists as well as the bulletins, circulars, and

other publications distributed by the various American services. It was not until

October that the first lists were delivered

to them.

To ensure that French units would obtain all the necessary technical literature,

whether in English or in French, General

Larkin recommended in November that the

French High Command organize a central

publications depot.6 The French approved

the suggestion and on 1 January 1944 established such a depot (Dépot français de

Publications américaines) at Oran to serve

as a clearinghouse for all requests for, and

issues of, American publications. These

were of two types: War Department publications—such as technical manuals, field

manuals, and tables of organization and

equipment—and Ordnance technical publications.

By the end of January the French still

had not been issued base shop data manuals

or lists of maintenance factors. In addition

they had received only half of the publications in French promised earlier by the War

Department. Without waiting for the rest

of the documents to arrive, they had undertaken the translation of a number of U.S.

publications. Already in November they

had published an English-French lexicon, a

most useful manual in view of the scarcity

of English-French dictionaries in the theater.

Technical dictionaries were and continued

to be in great demand. In April 1944 the

French General Staff tried unsuccessfully

to obtain from U.S. sources in the theater

such dictionaries, for use in particular at the

Casablanca Vehicle Assembly Line to which

women interpreters with no technical

knowledge had been assigned. Dictionaries

of this sort were not available in U.S. theater

stocks and the French were advised to obtain them from the United States through

their Military Mission in Washington.

Efforts of War Department and AFHQ

officials to provide adequate material both

in French and in English continued through6

 Msg L-1076, Larkin to CG NATOUSA, 24

Nov 43, JRC 461/001 Publications (1943).
230 REARMING THE FRENCH

out the spring of 1944. That they were

ultimately successful is best illustrated by

the comments of General Juin, Commanding General, CEF, at the end of French

participation in the Italian campaign. On

10 July 1944 General Juin requested the

chief of the French Military Mission in the

United States to express to the responsible

War Department authorities his appreciation of the "great care, accuracy and excellent taste" with which translations of U.S,

publications had been prepared.7

Training

U.S. assistance in the French training

program was limited to technical instruction in the use of American matériel. At

no time was tactical training, except in

minor infantry tactics and amphibious landings, ever given. By the time that rearmament operations were fully under way, in

May 1943, the bulk of the French units consisted of old and tried regiments, a large

part of whose personnel had gone through

both the 1939-40 and the Tunisian campaigns. Few were the men who had not

had some military training. It was felt that

French cadres were sufficiently experienced

to assume the burden of tactical training.

In fact, American commanders frequently

sought qualified French officers, especially

Air Force officers, to assist in the tactical

training of comparatively green American

troops.8

In the initial phase of Franco-American

collaboration, American technical training

assistance was extended by local U.S. commanders acting on their own initiative. As

early as mid-November 1942 General Patton arranged to have some French technicians as well as fighter pilots trained in

handling American equipment.9 In December, at the request of the French High

Command, training materials and instructors were placed at the disposal of the

Chantiers de Jeunesse school near Algiers.10

Schools for instructing French Ordnance

and Quartermaster personnel in the use of

U.S. weapons and matériel were being organized in various parts of North Africa.

As there appeared to be some hesitancy

about how far this assistance was to be extended, General Eisenhower, on 30 and 31

December, directed the U.S. Fifth Army

and AFHQ to make sure that U.S. troops

were giving all possible assistance to the

North African forces in their training with

U.S. arms and equipment.11 AFHQ

promptly issued an instruction setting forth

the purpose and general scope of the training to be given the French and outlining a

training plan.12 Already many French

cadres, officers as well as noncommissioned

officers, were receiving instruction within

American divisions for periods of approximately two weeks in armament, vehicle

driving and maintenance, and signal communications.

By mid-March G-3 Training Section,

AFHQ, found that the training program

was proceeding satisfactorily. The French

were reported to have a "keen appreciation

of problems, both mechanical and person7

 Ltr, Juin to Chief Military Mission in Washington, 10 Jul 44, JRC 461/001 Publications (1 Jan

44).

8

 Memo, Artamonoff for G-4 AFHQ, 2 Aug 43,

JRC Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab T.

9

 Memo, Patton for Eisenhower, 21 Nov 42,

AFHQ SAC 000.2-2 NA Political. 10

 On Chantiers de Jeunesse, see pp. 8n, 68n,

above. 11

 Ltr, CinC to CG Fifth Army, 30 Dec 42,

quoted in Fifth Army History, I, 2; Ltr, AG

353/082 C-M, AFHQ, 31 Dec 42, AFHQ 0100

12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. II (3). 12

 AFHQ Training Memo 1, 1 Jan 43, JRC

353/003 Training Fr Army Personnel.
LIAISON, LANGUAGE, AND TRAINING PROBLEMS 231

nel," and to be making great strides. They

were supplying personnel for liaison and

for instruction, and were expected to take

over the brunt of the burden of instruction

within a short time.13 Training equipment

had been requisitioned by the theater, assigned in Washington, and would soon be

on its way to North African ports.

General Eisenhower on 30 March restated Fifth Army's responsibility in organizing and training the French forces then

stationed within its area in French Morocco.

In a subsequent directive setting forth the

general policies that would govern the process of French rearmament, AFHQ prescribed the manner in which training assistance was to be provided. Basically, the

U.S. Army was to assist the French Army

in familiarizing its personnel with the technical details of storing, assembly, care, and

maintenance of all U.S. types of equipment.

To this end, the practice already established

of attaching French technical personnel to

U.S. service units handling equipment for

delivery to the French was to continue. In

addition, teams of instructors from U.S.

combat and service units were to be attached to French units while they were

being re-equipped and for as long afterward

as would be necessary. Responsibility in

the matter was to be divided. The Commanding General, Fifth Army, was to assist

combat and supporting service units being

re-equipped in the care and maintenance

of their equipment, during both basic training in unit stations and field training, until

such time as the French authorities considered assistance no longer necessary. The

Commanding General, NATOUSA, on the

other hand, was responsible for instructing

supply service units in the technical aspects

of handling and maintaining matériel.14

In Washington, meanwhile, War Department officials were eager to know how

efficiently the French were going to use their

newly acquired equipment. On 18 April

General Marshall asked approximately how

long a time should be allowed after receipt

of material for complete training of units;

also what degree of combat efficiency could

be expected of these units after the expiration of the training period. After consultation with General Giraud, the Allied Commander in Chief replied that training would

take two months for existing infantry divisions, three months for existing armored

regiments and reconnaissance and tank destroyer battalions, and six months for technical units.15

To co-ordinate its activities with respect

to the French training program, Fifth Army

organized, on 23 April, a Rearmament Advisory Section, redesignated on 15 May as

the French Training Section (FTS).16

FTS was charged with the over-all direction and supervision of the training of the

French divisions stationed in Fifth Army

area. The section, headed at first by Col.

Harry A. Flint, consisted of "advisers," assigned one to each of the divisions being rearmed, instructors detailed to teach French

instructors in the use and care of U.S. equipment, and staff co-ordination teams whose

main function was to observe the training

13

 Memo, AFHQ G-3 (Training) for Col Ross,

17 Mar 43, JRC 353/002 Training of Fr Army

Personnel.

14

 Dir AG 322.1/060 CS-M, Eisenhower for CG

Fifth Army, 30 Mar 43, JRC Misc Doc, Item

5-a, Tab K; Ltr, Eisenhower to CG Fifth Army

and Deputy Theater Comdr NATOUSA, 13 Apr

43, JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan. 15

 Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, 28 Apr 43, JRC

902/11 Rearmt Plan; Msgs 6213, Marshall to Eisenhower, 18 Apr 43, and 8565, Eisenhower to Marshall, 1 May 43, JRC Cable Log. 16

 For details on composition, organization, and

working methods of FTS, see pp. 293-96, below.
232 REARMING THE FRENCH

FIRING A 105-MM. HOWITZER, part of the program to train French soldiers in the

use of U.S. equipment, North Africa, March 1943.

and maintenance activities of the units.17

Three weeks later, on 13 May, General

Kingman replaced Colonel Flint (who had

been transferred at his own request to combat duty) as chief of the FTS. Thereafter

FTS rapidly grew in size and efficiency.

Its essential mission became twofold—to

give maximum training assistance to the

French and to make sure, by means of inspections, that units were adequately trained

and properly equipped. In this latter connection, FTS was in a position to render invaluable service to the JRC.

A visit made at the end of May to the

units stationed in French Morocco convinced Colonel Artamonoff of the JRC

that U.S. instructors should be placed within

the units to teach, in particular, preventive

maintenance of equipment.18 At his suggestion, General Kingman immediately

spread his personnel among the divisions,

but the number of available instructors was

too small (150 officers and men by July) to

fill the needs of a rapidly expanding army.

By August the chief of FTS recognized that

the procedure was not satisfactory since it

was teaching every soldier only a little about

a certain subject and dissipating American

instructor personnel through the division.

General Kingman then recommended that

17

 Memo, Clark for U.S. Advisers, 23 Apr 43,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.

18

 Memo for Rcd (Artamonoff), 31 May 43, JRC

Misc Doc, Item 5-a, Tab V.
LIAISON, LANGUAGE, AND TRAINING PROBLEMS 233

U.S. INSTRUCTOR DEMONSTRATING THE USE OF SIGNAL EQUIPMENT to French personnel, North Africa, February 1943.

division schools be established to which

could be sent students selected from all individual units of the divisions. This

method, he felt, would make it possible to

co-ordinate training within each division.19

The recommendation was warmly endorsed

by General Giraud, who agreed that it

would provide better instruction. Pursuant

to an order dated 25 August, the French

General Staff immediately established divisional technical schools, one for each of the

divisions to be rearmed. Each school had

the benefit of the collaboration of all the

U.S. instructors assigned to the technical instruction of its division. It trained simultaneously instructors for the division directly

concerned as well as instructors for the division of the same type next to be rearmed.20

The system proved highly successful and

made it possible for U.S. assistance to reach

maximum efficiency.

As those divisions that by then had received their equipment in French Morocco

and eastern Algeria were being moved to

the general vicinity of Oran in order to

utilize areas better suited for training, General Kingman, his French deputy, Lt. Col.

André L'Huillier, and staff, moved to Oran.

Once there, FTS was placed under the con19

 Memo, Kingman for Spalding, 9 Aug 43, JRC

353/002 Training Fr Army Units (1943).

20

 Ltr, Giraud To All Concerned, 25 Aug 43,

JRC 353/002 Training Fr Army Units (1943).
234 REARMING THE FRENCH

trol of the JRC and instructed by the latter

to prepare to conduct a series of inspection

tours.

Meanwhile, a number of small problems

had come up in connection with training.

Most important had been the establishment

of a program in the use of radar equipment.

The CCS, on 13 May, had approved the

release of such equipment to the French and

the disclosure to them, "where cooperation

was necessary," of information on any radar

equipment in operational use, but none on

equipment in research or developmental

stages.21 Meeting on 11 June, the Combined Signal Board, AFHQ, appointed a

subcommittee to study and present a definite training plan for the consideration of

the board.22 On the basis of the plan subsequently recommended by the subcommittee, some twenty French officers were sent

to the United States in July to receive radar

instruction.

By the end of August the various training programs instituted in the United States

for French personnel were well under way.

Training of pilots at the rate of 100 monthly had begun in June under the direction

of Southeast Training Command. A plan

had been approved but was not yet in

operation for the training of 200 Air Force

mechanics at Army Air Forces Technical

Training Command installations. At Fort

Benning, Georgia, some 200 liaison officers

were taking a course in infantry weapons

and minor tactics. At Camp Hood, Texas,

a number of officers were being given tank

and antitank training. Other officers were

attending the Quartermaster School at

Camp Lee, Virginia. A battalion of 2,000

men from Martinique was undergoing infantry training at Fort Dix, New Jersey.

Plans were under consideration for the

training of other officers at artillery, armored force, antiaircraft, and engineer

schools in the United States. The necessary

co-ordination for the assignment of students

to these various schools and centers was

effected by the French members of FTS.

One drawback in the implementation of

some of these programs was the fact that a

number of officers sent to the United States

were not proficient enough in English and,

as a result, were having difficulty in absorbing the instruction offered.23

Beginning in September and continuing

throughout the fall and winter of 1943 and

the spring of 1944, FTS, at the request of

the JRC, inspected the divisions being reequipped. Inspections were conducted by

General Kingman assisted by mixed teams

organized by him for the purpose, each

team consisting of U.S. members of FTS

reinforced, one for one, by French technical officer counterparts. These inspections, it must be emphasized, were not

showdown inspections as official memorandums seemed often to imply. They were

primarily designed to determine the status

of technical training of the inspected units.

Only indirectly did they help to complete

the action of the JRC whose responsibility

it was to make sure that the units were fully

activated and fully equipped. After each

inspection, General Kingman prepared a

detailed report which he forwarded to the

JRC.24

To expedite the training of service units,

21

 Msg, CCS to Eisenhower, 13 May 43, FAN 97. 22

 Min, CSB AFHQ 15th Mtg, 11 Jun 43, AFHQ

0100/4 SACS 337 (SGS) Conf, Military, Naval,

and Other.

23

 Memo, G-2 MIS WD for ACofS OPD, 28

Aug 43, OPD 226.2 France, Sec 1; Interv with Lt

Claude Tiers, Jul 50; Msg 6934, Marshall to

FREEDOM, 12 Jan 44, JRC Cable Log. 24

 Memo, Spalding for Kingman, 15 Aug 43, JRC

333/002 Inspections by Gen Kingman; Intervs

with Kingman, Jul 50, L'Huillier, Sep 50, and

Tiers, Jul 50.
LIAISON, LANGUAGE, AND TRAINING PROBLEMS 235

especially those designated for the support

of the expeditionary forces, the French General Staff and the JRC arranged, in early

September 1943, to place a number of such

units side by side with similar U.S. service

units to permit their working together. At

the end of the same month NATOUSA

directed that five divisions be given amphibious training at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center located at Port-auxPoules, near Oran, with the understanding

that the French themselves would take over

most of the instruction duties as soon as

practicable.25

By October, General Kingman was able

to report that the technical training of the

French had reached a satisfactory level. He

pointed out that more progress could have

been achieved but for shortages of spare

parts, cleaning and preserving materials,

and the frequent lack of adequate officer

supervision. To increase the efficiency of

the program, he recommended the following

measures: the immediate activation of all

French nondivisional units, at reduced

strength owing to personnel limitations, and

the prompt attachment of the cadres thus

assembled to appropriate U.S. service units

for training. The French authorities had

already been approached on the matter.

They were urged to adopt the plan forthwith.26

All together, seven divisions were undergoing instruction from U.S. personnel, with

one more (the 1st DMI) to be added

shortly. Moreover, some 720 officers and

3,500 enlisted men from smaller units were

receiving or about to receive individual

training. To expand its program, FTS

needed more personnel. Although additional instructors were due to arrive shortly

from the United States, General Kingman

recommended that the training personnel

of his section be increased still further.27

Reviewing the progress in instruction of

units designated for service in Italy, General Carpentier, Chief of Staff, CEF, voiced

the belief that the technical preparation and

group instruction of the units concerned

appeared generally satisfactory, a situation

which, he underlined, had been made possible by the assistance of U.S. authorities.

He warned, however, that in some instances,

training was being hindered or even made

impossible by lack of equipment, such as

training ammunition, gasoline, mine detectors, and chemical warfare matériel.28

By the end of October training of service

units still lagged behind schedule. The

French had not fully taken advantage of the

opportunities offered by AFHQ, such as

placing the units alongside similar U.S. organizations. Meeting with a French General Staff representative on 30 October, Lt.

Col. John C. Knox, the FTS liaison officer

with the JRC, pointed out that "American

Service Chiefs would have a better feeling

in the matter if the constant pressing and

needling for training of services, whether

units, cadres or nuclei of future organizations, originated from the French High

Command." He then emphasized that

American officials were only too ready to

examine any reasonable French counterproposals on the matter.29

25

 Memo, Leyer for JRC, 8 Sep 43, JRC 370/003

Employment of Sv Units; Memo, CG NATOUSA

for Comdr U.S. Naval Forces North African Waters,

24 Sep 43, JRC 353/002 Training Fr Army Units

(1943). 26

 Memo, Kingman for JRC, 6 Oct 43, JRC

353/002 Training Fr Army Units (1943).

27

 Memo, Kingman for CG NATOUSA, 12 Oct

43, in same file. 28

 Memo, Carpentier for Leyer, 21 Oct 43, in

same file. 29

 Memo, Knox for Kingman, 30 Oct 43, in same

file.
236 REARMING THE FRENCH

By November 1943 the French had organized two types of training centers of

their own. At the recruit training center

(centre d'instruction), only basic training

was given, lasting approximately three

months. Recruits were then sent to the

nearest replacement training center (centre

d'organisation). The replacement training

centers prepared replacement battalions to

be fed into the regiments of the expeditionary forces. Obviously, instruction in

these centers could not go beyond training

of the battalion as a unit, and seldom went

farther than that of the company. All together, the French organized some forty

replacement training centers, as well as a

number of miscellaneous replacement depots. They also opened several schools, including one military preparatory school for

sons of officers (known as the Prytanée),

one officers' training school for sons of titled

natives, one officer candidate school for

French personnel, and a General Staff

School.30 Whenever the French military

authorities so requested, General Kingman

and members of his staff visited the training

centers and schools. At the end of these

visits, if individual school commanders desired, General Kingman placed available

American officers at their disposal. In this

manner complete co-ordination was effected between training conducted by the

French themselves and instruction carried

out under the FTS program.

Simultaneously, an increasing number of

schools or courses of instruction had been

or were being opened by the Americans to

French personnel. Parachutists were being

trained at the Airborne Training Center

run by Fifth Army. At L'Arba (Algeria),

Air Force personnel were being instructed in

the installation, operation, and maintenance of equipment and facilities required

for fighter control and fighter defense. At

Meknès (French Morocco), the Americans

had established a school to train ordnance

personnel. Numerous courses in chemical

warfare were being offered. Generally the

students attending these various courses

were reported to be capable, industrious,

and eager to learn.31

Throughout January, February, and

March 1944, the reports which General

Kingman submitted to the JRC at the end

of inspections of French divisions had in

common one major feature: training was

still being impeded by important shortages.32

The lack of training ammunition being particularly acute, the theater requested and

obtained from the War Department, in

early January, the shipment of 4,275,000

rounds of .22-caliber long ammunition for

the 7,000-odd rifles and 900 machine guns

of that caliber in the possession of the

French.33 Other much needed items, such

as spare parts, cleaning materials, and training manuals in French, were obtained

either from French stocks at the urging of

the JRC or through requisitions submitted

by the JRC to the War Department.

In early March AFHQ requested the

French High Command to forward, each

month, a report on the state of training of

units likely to be employed at a later date as

part of an Allied force. Such information

would enable the Supreme Allied Commander to know what units would be avail30

 Memo for Rcd, JRC, 25 Nov 43, and Office

Memo 4, JRC, 26 Nov 43, JRC 320/004 Orgn of

Fr Army.

31

 JRC 353/002 Training Fr Army Units (1943). 32

 Rpts, Kingman to Loomis, 26 Jan, 23 Feb, 1

Mar, 7 Mar, and 30 Mar 44, JRC 333/002 Inspections by Gen Kingman. 33

 Memo, Loomis for G-4 NATOUSA, 6 Jan 44,

and Msg 7280, Somervell to Eisenhower, 15 Jan

44, JRC 471/002 Ammunition for Training.
LIAISON, LANGUAGE, AND TRAINING PROBLEMS 237

able for employment.34 By the end of the

month General Kingman and his mixed

teams had inspected all major units. General Leyer expressed to General Loomis his

deep appreciation of the assistance rendered

thus far by FTS and requested that the section inspect other organizations such as

corps and army supporting units, units then

in combat, and training centers.35 General

Kingman immediately arranged for the

necessary inspections.

French Air Force training schools, meanwhile, were receiving assistance from

American and British air commanders. A

close inspection of these schools by General

Eaker in April revealed that they were doing

excellent work. To assist them further,

Eaker requested and obtained the assignment in May, June, and July of additional

training planes and equipment.36

In late April General Kingman accompanied by his French deputy, Colonel

L'Huillier, visited the French Expeditionary Corps in Italy to determine on the spot

how the units were doing and what further

assistance they needed. By agreement with

their commanders, he detached to the divisions a number of single instructors or

teams no longer required for the training

program in North Africa. The teams, at

reduced strength, usually accompanied the

divisions in combat, at least during the early

phase of their engagement in operations.

The valuable information which General

Kingman collected during his visit enabled

him, upon his return to North Africa, to

improve further the training of the units

still in that area.37

In May and June, at the request of the

French General Staff, practically all French

training establishments were inspected by

FTS. Meanwhile, more personnel were

being detailed for short periods of instruction to American training schools located in

the United States or in the theater, such as

the Floating Bailey Bridge School which in

June was transferred to French control.

Eight officers were attending a special course

in sound ranging for artillery at Fort Sill.38

A tire repair company consisting of approximately 200 officers and enlisted men from

Martinique was completing its training in

ordnance schools in the United States.39

Training, although generally satisfactory,

was lagging in some fields. Instruction in

signal communications at regiment level

was rendered ineffective by lack of co-ordination. To effect the unification of the

various programs, General Leyer, on 14

June, ordered a centralization of all training facilities.40

 With respect to chemical

warfare, the program had completely

bogged down. This was due to lack of interest on the part of the French military authorities who assumed that chemicals would

not be used. An inspection tour conducted

between 12 May and 28 June revealed that

practically no chemical warfare instruction

was given in the replacement training

centers.41

An important development took place in

mid-May with the establishment in Italy of

three training centers to serve the CEF.

These centers, one Algerian-Tunisian, one

34

 Ltr, Gammell to Devinck, 8 Mar 44, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres. 35

 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 3 Apr 44, JRC 353/002

Training Fr Army Units (1944). 36

 See p. 210, above. 37

 Interv with Kingman, Jul 50.

38

 Msg W-49831, Maj Gen James A. Ulio to

Devers, 13 Jun 44, JRC Cable Log. 39

 Msg W-45342, Ulio to Devers, 3 Jun 44, JRC

Cable Log. 40

 Instruction 835 EMGG/3-T, Leyer, 14 Jun 44,

JRC 353/002 Training Fr Army Units (1944). 41

 Memos, CWS for G-3 Training Sec AFHQ,

22 Apr 44, and CWS for Kingman, 4 Jul 44, in

same file.
238 REARMING THE FRENCH

Moroccan, and one Colonial, were constituted by utilizing the personnel from the

former divisional technical schools, now discontinued, of the divisions engaged in Italy.

Their function was threefold: to supply

cadres and enlisted personnel to the CEF by

using replacements coming from North

Africa and men released from hospitals in

Italy; to take charge of replacements coming from rear areas and medical patients released from forward areas until such time

as they were reassigned to a unit of the

CEF; finally, to train personnel designated

for combat units.42

With an expeditionary force of nearly

five divisions and corps troops engaged in

operations, one of the main concerns of the

French military authorities was to recruit

and train, in North Africa, sufficient personnel replacements. To assist them in this

task, and to effect a saving in the amount of

training equipment required, General Devers suggested, in late June, that a U.S.

camp, preferably situated near Oran and

with a capacity of 8,000 to 10,000 men, be

turned over to the French complete with

housing and utilities. General Larkin having approved the proposal, the American

camp located at Chanzy was officially transferred to the French on 30 June.43

By this time training activities were being

directed more and more toward the readying of the units designated for ANVIL. On

7 July, as these units passed under the control of Force 163, General Patch, Commanding General, U.S. Seventh Army, who

was to command them in the initial phase

of the operation, assumed the general direction of their training. During the following three weeks Seventh Army inspected the

units to determine their state of readiness.

On 14 July the War Department informed General Wilson that the CCS had

authorized the issue of a minimum amount

of equipment to French replacement centers to be used solely for instructing replacements for the expeditionary forces.44

 In

notifying the French of this action, General

Wilson requested them to give assurances

that the housekeeping and training equipment thus authorized would be used for the

purpose for which it was intended. He also

urged them to take steps to put into effect,

immediately after the landing in France, a

sound replacement program to sustain the

expeditionary forces in combat.45 The

French had already considered the matter

as evidenced by their request, submitted

only a few days before, that the permanent

cadres of the three infantry training centers

then operating in Italy and the Armored

Force Training Center still in North Africa

be made officially part of the ANVIL troop

list.46

On 4 August, with the launching of ANVIL only ten days away, Headquarters, Seventh Army, reported to General Wilson on

the status of training of the French participating units. Inspections had revealed insufficient technical training owing to shortages of equipment. The remaining basic

problem, therefore, was to make sure that

such shortages would be filled in time to permit training before the units were engaged

in operations. The report then recommended that Seventh Army be relieved of

42

 Admin Memo 5997 EMGG/1, Leyer, 9 Jun

44, in same file. 43

 Msgs F-64566, Devers to Larkin, 26 Jun 44,

and LX-29481, Larkin to CG MBS, 30 Jun 44,

JRC Cable Log.

44

 Msg WX-64781, AGWAR to Devers, 14 Jul

44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A. 45

 Ltr, Gammell (for Wilson) to Béthouart, 30

Jul 44, AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters,

Vol. IV, Jan-Jul 44. 46

 Ltr. Béthouart to Wilson, 26 Jul 44, JRC

400.1/009 Sup of Forces Designated for Combat.
LIAISON, LANGUAGE, AND TRAINING PROBLEMS 239

all further responsibility in connection with

inspections of French units still in North

Africa.47 The question was examined at a

conference on 8 August between General

Noce, G-3, AFHQ, and General Loomis.

The two conferees agreed to stand fast on

the established policy under which Seventh

Army was responsible for determining, by

means of inspections, the condition of training of the French ANVIL units, and FTS for

providing the necessary assistance.48

As ANVIL was launched, on 15 August,

training operations were going ahead at an

increased tempo. In the case of service

units instruction still lagged considerably

behind schedule. Unable to form all the

units in North Africa, the French military

authorities were already contemplating their

activation from personnel expected to become available in France. As the inspection tour conducted by FTS was coming to

an end, General Leyer, with an eye on the

future, seized the opportunity to express his

gratitude for the valuable assistance General Kingman and his section had been rendering for several months.49

On 10 September General Patch

broached the question of the responsibility

for the training of French replacements.

He pointed out to General Wilson that the

supervision of this training was not considered the proper function of Seventh Army

as personnel was not available and in any

case such control would be "resented" by

the French. He recommended that the responsibility be turned over to the French

themselves with some measure of supervision

effected by General Kingman's section.

General Wilson approved the recommendation and advised the French that, thereafter,

they were fully responsible for carrying out

the training of replacements with the assistance of FTS. Three training centers

having already moved with their equipment

to southern France in late September, and

the fourth being about to follow, personnel

from FTS was dispatched to the Continent

to assist them in their work. A forward

echelon of FTS began operating at Delta

Base Section in Marseille on 12 October.

The rear echelon continued to function at

MBS until about 15 November when all remaining FTS activities were transferred to

France.50

On 22 October NATOUSA learned with

considerable surprise that SHAEF was contemplating recruiting French personnel in

France and moving them to North Africa

to be equipped and trained as replacements for the 1st French Army. NATOUSA objected that it could not undertake such a commitment inasmuch as

instructors, facilities, and equipment would

not be available, and pointed out that plans

had been made for the resumption, in continental France, of all training activities.

Such activities, in fact, were already well

under way.

The training of French troops in North

Africa under American guidance was now

over. Like the rearmament operations, it

had been effected on the basis of a program

established piecemeal as the situation demanded. On the whole it had been most

effective. Collaboration between the

French and the Americans had been par47

 Memo, CG Seventh Army for SACMED, 4

Aug 44, AFHQ AG 400-1 (Fr) Sups. 48

 Memo, Foster for G-3 (Orgn), 8 Aug 44,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip. 49

 Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 27 Aug 44, JRC

320/005 Replacement Troops.

50 Ltr, Gammell to Béthouart, 20 Sep 44, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Corres; Msgs CP13330, Patch to Wilson, 10 Sep 44, FX-24103,

SACMED to Seventh Army, 12 Sep 44, JRC/235,

CG NATOUSA to G-3 AFHQ, 20 Sep 44, JRC

Cable Log.
240 REARMING THE FRENCH

MAJ. GEN. ALEXANDER M. PATCH, Commanding General, U.S. Seventh Army,

inspecting men of the French Forces of the Interior, August 1944.

ticularly fruitful. French cadres and personnel had almost without exception appeared to be genuinely eager to receive the

assistance of their American comrades of

FTS. Relations with French commanders

had been most cordial.51 All signs now

pointed to continued mutual respect and understanding during the next phase of rearmament and training activities about to

open in continental France.

51

 Intervs with Kingman, Jul 50, Tiers, Jul 50,

and L'Huillier, Sep 50.
CHAPTER XV

Controversy Over Substitute Weapons

The ANFA Agreement had stipulated that

the French were to receive equipment

made up of the most modern matériel.

When, in the course of the ensuing months,

AFHQ officials undertook to effect certain

substitutions, a serious controversy arose between French and AFHQ staffs concerning

the legitimacy and desirability of such a

course of action. The French, whose attitude in the matter was only human, tended

to consider substitutions as meaning inferior

equipment and, when applied to weapons,

a lowering of fire power. As late as May

1944 they warned that the substitutions imposed on them were "adversely affecting

combat efficiency."1

In cases where American industrial production was insufficient to fill the needs of

both French and U.S. troops, the French

resigned themselves, although reluctantly,

to receiving substitutes. On the other hand,

they reacted strongly when, in the fall of

1943, AFHQ proposed that certain equipment items no longer standard but still serviceable be assigned, because of their availability in theater stocks, against French

rearmament requirements in lieu of the

standard items. The proposal was made at

a time when large stocks had become excess

owing to the departure for the United Kingdom of a number of U.S. troops. The

Munitions Assignments Board had ruled

that some of these stocks would be utilized

toward the partial implementation of the

French program. The measure, which

General Larkin, Commanding General,

SOS, NATOUSA, had strongly urged,

was primarily intended to economize shipping.

As the French were showing signs that

they would not readily agree to the provision

of substitutes for standard issue items, General Loomis sought from the War Department a definite expression of policy. Selecting one standard ordnance item as a test

case, the chairman of the JRC, on 4 November, requested Washington officials to

indicate whether or not they would authorize the issue to the French of a weapon

then available in theater stocks as a substitute for the standard item concerned.2

Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, Chief of Staff,

Army Service Forces, replied that since the

phrase "equipment of the most modern

kind" was interpreted by the War Department as meaning "equipment that had been

standard issue in the current war," the substitution proposed was authorized. This

and similar substitutions, explained General

Styer, could be effected in the case of equipment either still to be assigned from the

United States or already assigned but as yet

unshipped.3

1

 Ltr, de Saint-Didier to Marshall, 6 May 44,

OPD 400 France, Sec IV; Ltr, Marshall to de

Saint-Didier, 24 May 44, OCS A-48-11 France

091, Sec I.

2

 Msg W-4267, Loomis to AGWAR, 4 Nov 43,

JRC 400.1/007 Substituting From Theater Stocks. 3

 Msg 2627, Styer to Eisenhower, 16 Nov 43, in

same file.
242 REARMING THE FRENCH

TANK DESTROYER FOR THE FRENCH. This 3-in. gun motor carnage M10 bears

the marking of red, white, and blue stripes stenciled on all equipment for the French.

Guided by this clarification, General

Larkin prepared a report of all equipment

in the theater suitable for transfer under the

rearmament program. In the case of items

not currently standard for U.S. troops, the

report included recommendations as to the

standard items they might replace.4 On the

basis of these recommendations, substitutions considered desirable by AFHQ were

suggested to the War Department, which,

in turn, invariably gave its approval. Most

important among substitutions effected

either as a result of production shortages or

because of surplus stocks in the theater were

certain types of artillery guns, tanks, and

infantry weapons.

Artillery

The test case selected by General Loomis

concerned a proposal to substitute 75-mm.

gun motor carriages M3 for the 3-inch M10

guns authorized under the rearmament program for three French tank destroyer battalions. The M3 guns were readily available in theater stocks, whereas the M10's

were obtainable only by shipment from the

United States.

Apprised of the proposed substitution

some weeks before, the French had already

4

 Memo, Hq NATOUSA for CG SOS, 22 Nov

43, in same file.
CONTROVERSY OVER SUBSTITUTE WEAPONS 243

ruled it out as unacceptable "in view of the

inferior quality of the M3 gun." In the

face of their strong opposition, the various

AFHQ sections concerned debated for several months on the advisability of carrying

out the proposal. In March 1944, still

without information as to the intentions of

AFHQ regarding the matter, the French

asked that a re-examination of the question

be undertaken and a decision reached forthwith. Intervening personally in the matter,

General Giraud, in a letter to General Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander in the

Mediterranean, restated the French position, namely, that the proposed substitution

was not acceptable "as much because of the

inferior quality of the M3 as because of the

complications resulting from the disparity

of the matériel placed in the hands of French

units."5

Although AFHQ officials regarded the

M3 gun as only slightly inferior in combat

efficiency to the M10 and, therefore, quite

acceptable as a modern weapon, they finally

gave in to General Giraud's plea, for they

had just learned that M10 guns would soon

be available in sufficient quantity to take

care of both French and American needs.

After five months of debate, French tenacity

and American production had settled the

case. By 13 May, SOS, NATOUSA, had

delivered all 115 M10 guns authorized for

the three tank destroyer battalions.6

In another instance, a substitution was

effected over French objection. On 18

March 1944 General Leyer informed the

JRC that he could not agree to the replacement of eight 75-mm. howitzer motor carriages M8 by eight 75-mm. howitzer motor

carriages T30 as then proposed by AFHQ

for the last of the ten armored reconnaissance battalions to be re-equipped under the

program. The substitution had just been

authorized by the War Department. General Leyer warned that the replacement

would only result in decreasing the combat

efficiency of the unit involved. General

Loomis replied that AFHQ regarded the

T30 as a satisfactory substitute for the M8

and that, in view of the necessity of saving

critical shipping space, it did not consider it

advisable to recommend that the War Department change its decision.7

Once again General Giraud intervened

personally in the controversy. He pressed

General Wilson for a reversal of the position taken by AFHQ. In addition to lowering the effectiveness of the unit involved,

he declared, the proposed substitution

would have the serious disadvantage of

multiplying needlessly the types of matériel

in the hands of the reconnaissance battalions.8

 This last point was a telling one in

the eyes of the French who were already

plagued with serious maintenance and supply problems. However, their efforts to

bring about a reversal of the decision proved

futile. On 20 April the theater commander

closed the issue by informing General

Béthouart, then Chief of Staff of National

Defense, that the French request was disapproved. He explained that the T30 was

regarded as a "strictly modern weapon . . .

superior, in some respects, to the M8."

Since, moreover, the T30 was available in 5

 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 28 Oct 43, and Regnault for Loomis, 13 Mar 44, and Ltr, Giraud to

Wilson, 22 Mar 44, JRC 470/002 Substituting 75-

mm. for TD's. 6

 Ltrs, Devers to Giraud, 30 Mar, 5 Apr 44, and

Memos, Loomis for Leyer, 10 Apr, 13 May 44,

JRC 470/002.

7

 Msg 1039, AGWAR to NATOUSA, 29 Feb 44,

JRC 400.1/007 Excess Stocks (Mar 44) ; Ltr, Leyer

to Loomis, 18 Mar 44, JRC 472/003 Self-propelled

Artillery; Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 27 Mar 44, JRC

472/003. 8

 Ltr, Giraud to Wilson, 5 Apr 44, JRC 472/003.
244 REARMING THE FRENCH

FRENCH TANK CREW WITH U.S. LIGHT TANK M5, one of the vehicles issued

for training purposes, July 1943.

North Africa in ample quantity, the theater

considered it inadvisable to add to the shipping burden by ordering from the United

States a large tonnage of M8 carriages.9

Tanks

During the Tunisian campaign the British First Army had turned over to the

French as an emergency measure sixty

surplus Valentine tanks.10 These vehicles,

the first to be issued to the North African

forces, subsequently were transferred by

the French High Command to Sovereignty

troops charged with the defense of the

territory. In April 1943, as rearmament

operations got under way, the French began receiving American tanks of the same

models as those then currently issued U.S.

troops—M4A2 and M4A4 medium, and

M3A3 light tanks. In the course of the

following months, while U.S. forces in

the theater were drawing the newer M5A1

light tank, the French continued to receive

the M3A3.11 The M3A3 and M5A1 were

quite similar in design. Although the

M5A1 provided more armor protection,

both had practically the same turret, armament, and hull. The principal difference 9

 Memo, Theater Comdr for Béthouart, 20 Apr

44, in same file. 10

 Background material for this section is located

in JRC 470/003 Tanks and Tank Transporters.

11

 Msg 6162, Somervell to Eisenhower, 27 Aug

43, in same file.
CONTROVERSY OVER SUBSTITUTE WEAPONS 245

between them was in their engines and

power trains. Yet operation and maintenance were sufficiently different to require

special training.12 Anticipating that the

French would eventually be issued M5A1's,

the Americans gave them a few of these vehicles for training purposes. Later, as production .of the M5A1 increased, the War

Department authorized its issue to the

French not in replacement of, but in addition to, the M3A3 toward the fulfillment of

the over-all light tank requirements of the

rearmament program. As a result the

French received tanks of both designs and,

incidentally, in approximately the same proportion.

By June 1944 the French had been issued 368 M4A2 and 268 M4A4 medium

tanks, and 273 M3A3 and 230 M5A1 light

tanks, or a total of 1,139 vehicles.13 AFHQ

regarded this number as sufficient, not only

to equip the units on the approved troop

list (3 armored divisions, 5 infantry division reconnaissance battalions, and 2 nondivisional reconnaissance battalions), but in

addition to provide for combat replacements. In fact some 200 vehicles were

considered excess. A number of these were

currently being used for training replacement personnel. Others were still in the

hands of the 3d Armored Division, an organization in nucleus only which the French

High Command still hoped to raise to the

status of a fourth armored division. To

constitute an adequate replacement reserve

for the three authorized divisions, the

French in August were requested to release

approximately 120 vehicles to Mediterranean Base Section.14

 It was not until

mid-October, after considerable prodding

on the part of AFHQ officials, that the

French completed the release of all 120

vehicles. The tanks in the hands of the

3d DB had by then all been withdrawn

for this purpose.

The French had distributed tanks as the

vehicles themselves had become available;

as a result, units were not equipped in a

uniform manner. The 2d DB enjoyed

complete homogeneity of matériel as it

had been issued tanks from the earliest

shipments, all M3A3's, and M4A2's. In

the case of the 1st DB and 5th DB, on the

other hand, uniformity had been achieved

within individual component units, but not

within the divisions as a whole. AFHQ

had strongly urged the French military

authorities to regroup equipment within

the two organizations. Judging that such

a step would involve a substantial movement of matériel, an additional period of

training for crews, and a readaptation of

radio equipment, the French chose not to

modify the existing distribution. In their

opinion, the advantages offered by a regrouping, such as the simplification of spare

parts and maintenance problems, would not

offset the considerable difficulties involved.15

Thus, because of the tank substitution

imposed on them, when the 1st and 5th

Armored Divisions landed in southern

France they were equipped with light vehicles which differed in type from one component unit to another.16

 Yet there is no

evidence to indicate that the combat efficiency of these organizations was in any

way jeopardized. Nor does it appear that

units which received no M5's, such as the 12

 Memo, Maj Conrad L. Christensen for Regnault, 21 Aug 43, in same file. 13

 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 29 Jul 44, in same file. 14

 Memos, Loomis for Leyer, 5, 9 Aug 44, and

Msg JRC-73, Loomis to AGWAR, 8 Aug 44, in

same file.

15

 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 16 Apr, 29 Jul 44,

in same file. 16

 See ibid., for exact distribution of tanks in the

hands of all French armored units.
246 REARMING THE FRENCH

2d DB and four reconnaissance battalions,

were put to a disadvantage for lack of such

vehicles.17 It must be noted that tanks issued later in the campaign to French armored units included vehicles of newer designs such as were furnished to U.S. units.

Small Infantry Weapons

It was with respect to small infantry

weapons, such as rifles, carbines, and automatic arms, that the question of the use of

substitutes became an issue of particular

seriousness.18 The French who, by tradition, attached the utmost importance to infantry action were eager to ensure that their

infantry units would be provided with adequate fire power.

Rifles and Carbines

The first small arms which the French

obtained from Allied sources consisted, it

will be recalled, of the 8,000 rifles assigned

in November 1942 and delivered to them

from the United Kingdom in mid-January

1943.19 These were .30-caliber M1917

(Enfield) rifles. At the time, French units

engaged in Tunisia were equipped with

small arms of all descriptions and calibers,

particularly of French manufacture, such

as the 8-mm. level spring loading rifle

(Lebel), and the 8-mm. model 1912-16

mousqueton or carbine. One unit, the 1st

Free French Division (later renamed the 1st

DMI), was using .303-inch rifles of British

manufacture. Meanwhile, training centers

and Sovereignty forces charged with the defense of the territory were using, in addition

to arms of French manufacture, some

19,000 German rifles of the Mauser and

Herstal models, both 7.92-mm., and a number of Italian rifles generally in poor condition, all of which had been collected on

battlefields in Tunisia. In May 1943, with

more American rifles reaching North African ports, French authorities turned the remaining stocks of French manufacture over

to nonprogram units (Moroccan tabors,

Commandos, Spahis, and the like).20

In addition to the M1917 rifle, which

they received throughout the year 1943, the

French were also given large quantities of

the M1903 (Springfield), likewise .30 caliber. The continued issue to them of these

two weapons was being made at a time when

the M1903 rifles in the hands of U.S. troops

were gradually being replaced by newer and

more efficient arms, the .30-caliber M1 rifle

and M1 carbine. The French who were

not being issued these weapons feared that

their units would be less fit than the U.S.

troops fighting along with them. American officials, on the other hand, acted on

the principle that the M1 rifles and carbines,

being scarce at the time, could be made

available only at the expense of U.S. troops.

They felt justified, as a result, in prescribing

acceptable substitute weapons of standard

issue during the current war. As both the

M1903 and M1917 fell in that category,

the former being still used by U.S. troops

and the latter by the British, the two weapons became standard issue for the North

African program units.

Deliveries were made at a slow and irregular pace because of the over-all shortTwo of the five infantry division reconnaissance

battalions, as well as the two nondivisional reconnaissance battalions (the 1st and 2d Algerian Spahis

Regiments) were equipped with M3A3's exclusively. Ibid. 18

 This section draws upon these files: JRC

474/001 Small Arms—Misc, JRC 474/002 .30-cal

Rifles, JRC 474/003 Automatic Weapons, and JRC

474/004 Spare Parts for Small Arms. 10

 See pp. 27, 28, above.

20

 Msg 1926, FLAMBO to 15th Army Gp, 19 Dec

43, JRC 474/001 Small Arms—Misc.
CONTROVERSY OVER SUBSTITUTE WEAPONS 247

age of rifles and in a somewhat erratic fashion as to type depending on availability in

the United Kingdom, from where they

were shipped to the French. As a result

many combat units received both magazinetype rifles. This fact seriously increased

spare-part and maintenance difficulties, for

although the Enfield and Springfield used

the same ammunition their parts were not

interchangeable. The French would have

preferred to equip all of their combat units

with the M1903. This was not possible

since the larger part of the rifles issued to

them, approximately two thirds, consisted

of M1917's. At any rate, they attempted,

in the interests of economy and simplicity in

the distribution of spare parts and maintenance, to standardize the type of rifle used

in each unit. This they were not able to

do until January 1944 because they had not

been issued grenade launchers for the

M1917 rifle and therefore had been forced

to retain a number of M1903's in units

equipped with the other rifle.21

Further aggravating maintenance problems was the fact that a considerable proportion of the rifles (estimated by the French

as 10 percent, especially the M1917's)

were found to be of a low order of serviceability. This was not surprising for the

weapons involved were old. In fact they

were part of the stocks shipped by the

United States to the British after the evacuation of Dunkerque in 1940 and had served

the Home Guard for over two years before

being turned over to the French. The

latter were forced to effect repairs made

possible only by the receipt, in July 1943,

of a substantial allocation of spare parts

and maintenance materials.22

By the end of January 1944 program

units engaged on the Italian front were

equipped with pistols in lieu of carbines,

and with M1903 and M1917 magazine

rifles in lieu of semiautomatic rifles such as

the M1. The Moroccan tabors and other

nonprogram units, on the other hand, were

firing their French weapons, thus adding to

the complexity of the supply problem and

in some instances causing undue hardship

on personnel. A U.S. adviser told of the

losses sustained by a Moroccan goum

when, having exhausted the ammunition

for their French weapons, the men were

unable to borrow any from adjoining

units.23

Throughout 1943 American authorities

in the theater had recognized the desirability of providing French infantry units

with additional arms to compensate for the

reduced fire power resulting from the rifle

substitutions imposed on them. With this

in view they took a number of steps, most

important of which consisted in raising the

allowance of automatic weapons per infantry regiment.24

 In addition, General

Devers recommended, in March 1944, that

a portion of the M1 carbines then being

earmarked for U.S. service troops in the

theater be diverted to French combat units.

His proposal was approved and the MAB

authorized the lend-lease transfer to the

French from U.S. theater stocks of 13,000

carbines.25 These were to be issued to seven

divisions at the rate of 2,000 per infantry

21

 Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 30 Oct 43, JRC

474/002 .30-cal Rifles. 22

 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 16 Jun 44, and Col

Villaret for International Div ASF, 31 Mar 44,

JRC 474/002 .30-cal Rifles; Memo, Loomis for

Leyer, 28 Oct 43, JRC 474/004 Spare Parts for

Small Arms. 23

 Memo, Kingman for Loomis, 26 Jan 44, JRC

333/002 Inspections by Gen Kingman. 24

 See pp. 250-51, below. 25

 Msgs W-4323, Devers to AGWAR, 5 Mar 44,

and 1971, Somervell to Devers, 12 Mar 44, JRC

474/002 .30-cal Rifles.
248 REARMING THE FRENCH

division and 1,500 per armored division.26

Priority of issue was to be "above U.S. service troops but below U.S. combat units."

 27

It was then that the publication of a pessimistic report on the fire power of the

French infantry, drafted at the end of

March 1944 by an ASF officer sent on an

inspection tour in the theater, aroused considerable speculation both in Washington

and in Algiers and forced a re-examination

of the French rifle situation. The report

implied that, since the French had been

denied M1 carbines and semiautomatic

rifles and were using magazine rifles in poor

condition, the fire power of their infantry

was inferior to that of the enemy and to

that of the adjoining U.S. infantry. In

consequence, the personnel casualty rate was

"prohibitively high" and the functions of

the U.S. command were "unnecessarily

complicated."

Subsequent investigation revealed that

the serious implications contained in the

ASF report were grossly exaggerated.

G-3, AFHQ, definitely established, on the

basis of information furnished by General

Juin himself, that the French advances in

Italy had been accomplished without undue

losses. It was more likely—and the fact

has been confirmed since the war—that

whatever difficulties French infantry units

were, and would later be, experiencing with

regard to rifles were not the result of inferior equipment but rather of diversity of

equipment. Standardization could have

been achieved only by providing all the

units concerned with M1 rifles and carbines.

Since the rate of production of these weapons made this impossible, AFHQ decided

not to pursue the matter any further.28

In July 1944, answering a query from

the War Department, General Loomis reviewed the French rifle situation as it stood

on the eve of ANVIL. He estimated that the

French had received a total of approximately 215,000 rifles including 167,000

M1917's, 47,000 M1903's, 740 M1's, and

13,400 M1 carbines. Of the total, 4,000

rifles and carbines had gone to the French

Air Force, and all the M1 rifles to the 1st

Parachute Regiment (1st RCP). The

over-all figure was considered adequate to

cover the needs of the expeditionary forces

as well as those of replacements and training centers. To ensure adequacy of fire

power during the subsequent months, General Loomis obtained from the War Department the additional supply of 8,000 M1

carbines monthly for the last five months of

1944. This measure was considered all the

more necessary since the United Kingdom

had just requested that the British obligation

to furnish an additional 20,000 M1917 rifles

be canceled. The carbines, once assigned,

were shipped to Coastal Base Section

in Marseille for issue as maintenance to

French units operating with U.S. forces.29

Subsequent efforts by the French to obtain additional M1 carbines in exchange

for M1917 rifles proved unsuccessful.

26

 Instead of 6,500 per infantry division and

6,000 per armored division according to the U.S.

tables of organization. Memo, Artamonoff for

ACofS G-4 AFHQ, 9 Jul 43, JRC 474/003 Automatic Weapons. 27

 Msg 64439, Devers to Larkin, 14 Mar 44, JRC

474/002 .30-cal Rifles.

28

 Memo, Col Villaret for ACofS G-3 WD,

31 Mar 44, JRC 474/002 .30-cal. Rifles. Another

report by the same officer concerning Franco-American relations also was regarded as largely unfounded. See p. 154, above.

Memo, Noce for JRC, 22 May 44, JRC 474/002

.30-cal Rifles; Interv with Brig Gen Jean Piatte,

former CO 5th Moroccan Tirailleurs Regt, Sep 51. 29

 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 20 Jul 44, Msgs JRC/

72, Loomis to AGWAR, 7 Aug 44, and W-51930,

Somervell to Devers, 17 Jun 44, and Memo, Loomis

for CofS Fr Ground Forces, 18 Sep 44, JRC 474/002

.30-cal. Rifles.
CONTROVERSY OVER SUBSTITUTE WEAPONS 249

NATOUSA maintained that French requests to exchange major substitute items

of ordnance equipment previously allocated to them by the War Department for

standard equipment available in U.S.

stocks could be approved only when the

items involved were "clearly surplus" to the

needs of U.S. troops in the theater. No

such surplus stocks existed in the case of the

M1 carbine.30

The rifle issue was raised again in late

August 1944 in connection with battle-loss

replacements for the troops engaged in

ANVIL. As U.S. stocks of M1917's were

rapidly becoming negligible, it was urgent

to determine some policy in anticipation of

French demands for replacement rifles.

NATOUSA ruled, as it had a month earlier,

that M1903 rifles would be used as battleloss replacements for either M1903 or

M1917 rifles, but that there would be no

wholesale exchange of M1903 with M1917

rifles.31

The last discussion concerning rifles took

place in mid-September. French military

authorities having estimated their over-all

requirements at 17,500 rifles and carbines

more than the figure established by the

JRC, General Loomis asked them to furnish detailed justification for their estimate.

He seized this opportunity to request them

to withdraw all M1903 and M1917 rifles

from units not on the approved troop list.

Finally, he informed them that recent

requisitions submitted by them for M1 rifles

were disapproved, adding a reminder that

it was the War Department policy to supply the M1903 and M1917 rifles as substitutes for M1 rifles. He then enjoined them

to make no further demands on U.S. supply agencies for M1 rifles, a request which

was duly acknowledged, on 27 October,

by Brig. Gen. Antoine Poydenot.32

To sum up, the French North African

forces engaged in the campaign of Italy and

later in the campaign of France fought with

the M1917 rifle and to a lesser extent with

the M1903 rifle and the M1 carbine, in

addition to some old rifles of French manufacture. Except for the carbine, they were

forced to use substitute weapons as a result of production shortages of the standard items.

Automatic Weapons

As in the case of rifles and carbines, the

French used in the Tunisian campaign and

for some time afterward the automatic and

semiautomatic weapons of French manufacture originally available to them in North

Africa.38 Among these were the 7.5-mm.

model 1924-29 (Chauchat) fusil-mitrailleur, or automatic rifle,34

 to which they

were particularly attached as they considered it far superior to any similar weapon of

foreign manufacture, the 7.65-mm. automatic pistol, and the 8-mm. revolver. The

British-equipped 1st DFL, meanwhile, continued to use its .303-caliber Bren guns.

As the rearmament operations got under

way, program units began receiving American automatic and semiautomatic arms.

30

 Msg FX-83584, CG NATOUSA to Larkin,

16 Aug 44, JRC 474/002 .30-cal Rifles. 31

 Msgs L-39826, JRC to NATOUSA, 31 Aug

44, and F-79431, CG NATOUSA to SOS

NATOUSA, 5 Aug 44, quoted in Msg F-91987,

CG NATOUSA to SOS NATOUSA, 4 Sep 44,

JRC 474/002 .30-cal Rifles.

32

 Memo, Loomis for CofS Fr Ground Forces,

18 Sep 44, JRC 474/002 .30-cal Rifles.

General Poydenot was the successor to General

Blanc as Assistant Chief of Staff, French Ground

Forces in North Africa. Memo, Poydenot for

JRC, 27 Oct 44, JRC 474/002 .30-cal Rifles. 33

 Background material for this section is in the

file JRC 474/003 Automatic Weapons. 34

 More exactly, machine rifle.
250 REARMING THE FRENCH

However, deliveries in some cases being considerably delayed by production shortages,

a few units retained their French or British

weapons with the result that their final

equipment included a mixture of armament. In general, program units used, in

Italy as well as later in France, American

automatic arms, while nonprogram and

Sovereignty units used the remaining stocks

of French weapons.

In principle, the issue of American automatic rifles and pistols as well as of light

and heavy machine guns was to be made in

the same ratio as to corresponding U.S.

troops. As already pointed out, to compensate for the rifle substitutions additional automatic weapons were added to the French

tables of equipment. Thus an allocation of

some 900 Thompson .45-caliber submachine guns was authorized in early 1943.

In July of the same year, feeling that this

allocation was insufficient, the French requested a further issue of 3,500 Thompsons

as substitutes for a like number of M1 rifles

and carbines. The request was disapproved by Ordnance, AFHQ, on the

ground that the proper substitute for these

weapons, as used by U.S. troops themselves,

was the M1903 rifle.35

By August of the same year AFHQ officials themselves became aware of the critical

situation of the three divisions already rearmed with respect to automatic weapons.

As they explained to the War Department,

of the 1,769 Browning automatic rifles

(BAR's) authorized for these divisions

under the approved French Table of Organization of 18 January 1943, only 253 had

been made available for shipment due to

shortages of that weapon in the United

States.30 This was a serious matter for, in

the opinion of the French, no weapon could

adequately take the place of an automatic

rifle, much less of their own version of that

weapon, the fusil-mitrailleur. Their whole

conception of minor tactics was predicated

on the use of the automatic rifle as the basic

weapon of the combat group. To deprive

a combat group of such a weapon was tantamount to destroying its effectiveness in action. The substitution previously offered

by the War Department, namely, the

provision of 724 light machine guns

M1919A4, was termed inadequate, the

weapon being considered unsatisfactory because of weight. Theater officials feared

that divisions, if equipped with M1903 and

M1917 rifles instead of M1 rifles and carbines, and largely with M1919A4 machine

guns instead of BAR's, would have considerably reduced combat efficiency. They

urged, on 29 August 1943, the early assignment of additional automatic rifles or satisfactory substitutes to bring the units up to

authorized table of organization.37 Three

days later they also requested the immediate

allocation of 200 additional submachine

guns, preferably Thompsons, per infantry

regiment, the request being based on the fact

that in each regiment 2,728 M1903 rifles

had been substituted for 1,128 M1 carbines

and 1,600 M1 rifles. They also asked for

a further allocation of submachine guns, 972

for the Moroccan goumiers, then num35

 Ltr, Blanc to Artamonoff, 4 Jul 43, Memo from

Ordnance Office appended to draft cable from JRC

to AGWAR, 9 Jul 43, and Memo, Artamonoff for

Blanc, 9 Jul 43, JRC 474/003 Automatic Weapons.

36

 The French Table of Organization referred to

was T.E.G. (Tableau d'Effectifs de Guerre) 48,

established on the basis of the old U.S. Table of

Organization of 1 August 1942. On 21 November

1943 the French adopted a new table, T.E.G.

5465, based on the U.S. Table of Organization

7-11 of 1 March 1943. 37

 Msg W-8568, Spalding to AGWAR, 29 Aug 43,

JRC 474/003 Automatic Weapons.
CONTROVERSY OVER SUBSTITUTE WEAPONS 251

bering 12,000 men, and 125 for the 1,100

commandos.38

On 8 September the War Department

informed AFHQ that the Thompson submachine guns could be made available without delay as requested. A subsequent

message advised that since BAR's were still

in short supply only 1,000 could be furnished. To compensate for this deficiency,

additional Thompsons were being offered

"in some ratio greater than one for one" if

desired. To this, the theater replied that

the deficiency could be best met tentatively

by additional Thompsons in a ratio of one

to one, with the supply of BAR's to be completed as rapidly as production would allow.

Such was the line of action taken. In

November, the French military authorities

having reduced the allowance of BAR's per

infantry regiment from 189 to 81 to conform with the new U.S. table of organization,

 39

 it was expected that sufficient BAR's

could soon be made available to them under

the reduced ratio.40

In December 1943, as the first division

(the 2d Moroccan Infantry) reached the

Italian front, each of its infantry regiments

was equipped with the following automatic

weapons: 81 BAR's, 150 Thompson submachine guns, 31 light and 24 heavy

.30-caliber machine guns, and 34 .50-caliber

machine guns.41

 Except for the Thompsons, which were intended to make up for

rifle deficiencies, the number and types of

automatic weapons in the hands of the division corresponded almost exactly to those

furnished similar U.S. organizations. Incidentally, the division had received its BAR's

only five days before leaving North Africa

with the result that instruction in the use of

that weapon had been practically nil. The

BAR being much more complicated than

the fusil-mitrailleur, the natives were reported to be experiencing considerable technical difficulties in handling and maintaining the rifle; in particular they were said to

be consistently mislaying the bipod.42

Later divisions to reach Italy were similarly equipped, although their armament

still included some non-U.S. automatic

weapons. Thus the 3d Algerian and the

4th Moroccan Mountain arrived with 335

and 686 French automatic rifles, respectively, and the 1st Motorized Infantry Division with its full load of Brens. Ammunition for the latter was provided entirely by

the British forces in Italy. As for Moroccan tabors, they, like other nonprogram

units then in process of organization, were

using their 7.5-mm. fusils-mitrailleurs, 8-

mm. carbines and revolvers, and 7.65-mm.

automatic pistols. In March 1944 the

French General Staff undertook the gradual

replacement of these weapons with U.S.

arms, since the supply of spare parts and

ammunition for the French calibers was

rapidly diminishing. An earlier French

proposal that the United States undertake

the manufacture of 115 million rounds of

7.5-mm. ammunition for the 1,600-odd

fusils-mitrailleurs still in active service had

been turned down, in December, as impracticable. In the opinion of the French

General Staff, therefore, it was urgent to receive as speedily as possible the number of

38

 Msg W-8954, Spalding to AGWAR, 2 Sep 43,

in same file. 39

 Table of Organization 7-11, Mar 43. 40

 Msgs, Somervell to Eisenhower, 7149, 8 Sep 43,

and 7258, 9 Sep 43, and W-681, Spalding to

AGWAR, 22 Sep 43, JRC 474/003 Automatic

Weapons. 41

 Memo, Leyer for Rearmament Sec Fr Gen

Staff, 13 Jan 44, in same file.

42

 Memo, Kingman for Loomis, 26 Jan 44, JRC

333/002 Inspections by Gen Kingman.
252 REARMING THE FRENCH

BAR's assigned under the rearmament program as well as the repayment of U.S. arms

loaned to equip nonprogram units.43

In April the War Department offered for

use by the French some 10,500 Johnson

semiautomatic rifles, and 1,500 Johnson

light machine guns, both .30 caliber, remaining undelivered from old Netherlands

contracts taken over by the United States

Government in 1942. The French requested the rifles for the Sovereignty troops.

No favorable action appears to have been

taken by the MAB in this connection.44

Throughout the spring of 1944 and right

up to the time of the launching of ANVIL,

the French concentrated their efforts on

trying to obtain an increase in the allocation

of BAR's for their combat units. On 19

June General Leyer informed the JRC that

he wished to effect the replacement of 1,155

fusils-mitrailleurs still in use by an equal

number of BAR's. In the absence of a decision on the matter, he submitted, four

weeks later, a request for the immediate allocation of 117 additional BAR's for the

4th Moroccan Mountain Division, this in

spite of the fact that, by this time, the

French had received enough BAR's to raise

the allowance of that weapon per infantry

regiment from 81 to 93 and in some cases

to 110. The request, General Leyer

pointed out, was motivated by tactical considerations and the fact that the 4th DMM

possessed characteristics of a special nature.

NATOUSA turned down the proposal and

advised General Leyer to redistribute the

BAR's already in the hands of the other

divisions if he wished to carry out his intentions with regard to the 4th DMM.45

Another attempt made later by the

French met with a similar fate. On 18 July

they offered 200 fusils-mitrailleurs for use by

the Resistance forces in France, in exchange

for a like number of BAR's for issue to expeditionary units. After a lengthy examination of the various problems involved, the

JRC advised them that no BAR's would be

made available for such an exchange.46

By this time it was obvious that AFHQ

would not consent to an increase of BAR's,

the opinion being that the total number of

these weapons furnished both as initial

equipment and as maintenance was sufficient to fill all needs including those of nonprogram units.47

 The matter could now be

considered closed.

In September the French General Staff

requested that nonprogram units be issued

1,500 .45-caliber Colt automatic pistols in

exchange for a like number of 7.65-mm.

automatic pistols and 8-mm. revolvers in

their possession, for which the supply of ammunition was now nearly exhausted. Once

again their request was denied because of

the current shortage of Colt pistols, but the

JRC submitted a requisition to the London

Munitions Assignments Board for the allocation of 8-mm. and 7.65-mm. ammunition then available in the Middle East. In

view of the more limited supply of 7.65-mm.

ammunition, however, the French were

urged to replace the 7.65-mm. pistols in the

hands of combat units with 8-mm. revolvers

for which ammunition was available in suf43

 Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 10 Mar 44, JRC

474/004 Ammunition for 1st Exp Corps; Memos,

Leyer for Loomis, 16 Nov, 7 Dec 43, JRC 471/001

Ammunition—Misc. 44

 Msg W-21454, Somervell to Devers, 11 Apr

44, and Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 7 Jun 44, JRC

474/003 Automatic Weapons.

45

 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 19 Jun 44, Loomis

for Devers, 20 May 44, and Loomis for Leyer, 24

Jul 44, JRC 474/003 Automatic Weapons. 46

 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 18 Jul 44, and

Loomis for Leyer, 31 Aug 44, in same file. 47

 Memo, Loomis for G-4 AFHQ, 21 Jun 44, in

same file.
CONTROVERSY OVER SUBSTITUTE WEAPONS 253

ficient quantity. The French chose to

withdraw from stocks reserved for Sovereignty forces the 7.65-mm. pistol ammunition needed by expeditionary troops.48

Considering that French infantry regiments received the normal complement of

other standard U.S. weapons,49 the few substitutions imposed on them, while increasing

their supply and maintenance problems, did

not impair in any appreciable manner their

fire power. It can reasonably be said that

they were really at no disadvantage when

compared with corresponding U.S. units.50

48

 Memos, Poydenot for Loomis, 2 Sep 44, Loomis

for Poydenot, 30 Sep 44, and Crump for JRC Advance, 20 Oct 44, in same file. 49

 Such as hand and rifle grenades, 27 60-mm.

mortars, 18 81-mm. mortars, 18 57-mm. antitank

guns, and 6 105-mm. howitzers. 50

 Intervs with Loomis, Jun and Jul 50, and

Piatte, Sep 51.
CHAPTER XVI

Other Material Problems

Food

It will be recalled that General Devers,

in a letter of 13 February 1944 to General

Marshall discussing Franco-American relations, referred to the inadequacy of the rations served to the troops righting in Italy as

an important French grievance.1

The food problem had long been a major

preoccupation of both Allied and French

military authorities. From November

1942 to the fall of 1943, the French had assumed the entire responsibility for feeding

their own forces; with the exception of some

minor food items procured from U.S.

sources, French troops had subsisted on locally produced foodstuffs. With the forthcoming departure of the first expeditionary

units for overseas operations, the question of

the responsibility for their subsistence was

re-examined.

It was then agreed that the French military authorities would make available to

SOS, NATOUSA, as in the case of other

supplies, all food items needed for such of

their forces as would operate under U.S.

command. SOS would then issue, through

the appropriate U.S. command, to the units

in operation rations based on a predetermined menu. Since a large percentage of

the troops was made up of Moslems (50

percent by March 1944),2 two types of rations were established, the Moslem ration

differing from the French menu largely in

that it included no pork products.3

French authorities then promised to

furnish the items peculiar to the French

diet, such as brandy, wine, and cooking

oil, as well as all items produced in North

and West Africa: dried vegetables, dried

fruit, lentils, sardines, flour, macaroni, and

coffee. To build up a large reserve of these

foodstuffs, the JRC, it will be recalled, had

urged General Leyer in September and

October 1943 to proceed at once with the

establishment of a comprehensive food

program. It was agreed that what the

French could not procure from local sources

they were to obtain by requisitioning on the

United States through the JRC.4

In anticipation of the huge demand for

nonperishable foods likely to result from the

expected increase in the size of the expeditionary forces, the French submitted in

September an initial requisition for such

types of food since these were not available

from local sources. This led to a re-examination of French capabilities and to a restatement by AFHQ of the policy with

regard to the division of responsibility between the Americans and the French. On

12 October NATOUSA reiterated that the

French were to furnish an agreed list of

items, the U.S. Army being responsible for

1

 See pp. 153-55, above. 2

 32 percent in armored units; 54 percent in other

units. Msg F-24631, Devers to AGWAR, 29 Mar

44, JRC Cable Log.

3

 Memo 493, Leyer for Spalding, 19 Aug 43, and

Memo, Hq NATOUSA for SOS NATOUSA, 15

Sep 43, JRC 400.1/061 Subsistence for Fr Army. 4

 Memo, Hq NATOUSA for SOS NATOUSA,

12 Oct 43, in same file. See pp. 142-43, above.
OTHER MATERIAL PROBLEMS 255

providing all other components necessary

to complete the agreed ration scale. In

addition, the U.S. Army was to supply all

emergency rations.5

Such were the arrangements made in

October with respect to the subsistence of

French troops. Barely two or three months

later, at a time when the first units of the

CEF were reaching the battle line in Italy,

the JRC reported that the French military

authorities were submitting requisitions for

flour, macaroni, fruit juice, and canned

fruit, all items which they previously had

agreed to furnish in full. Their inability

to keep to their agreement was ascribed to

a variety of reasons. With respect to some

items, the food-raising and -collecting program had not been pursued with sufficient

energy. In other cases, physical causes

beyond their control had prevented the

French from accumulating the required

reserves. Some harvests had not yielded

the expected returns. Materials needed

for canning, storing, packaging, and transporting perishable foodstuffs had been unobtainable. A request submitted by General Leyer on 13 October for an allocation

of 10,000 sacks was expected to relieve the

situation with respect to the packing of

flour.6

The French, meanwhile, had given serious consideration to the shipment to North

African ports of the foodstuffs reported to

be available in substantial quantities in

other French territories, especially in Madagascar. Quartermaster, NATOUSA, had

supported their attempts in this direction

on the ground that such shipments would

save like amounts of tonnage from the

United States. But the North African

Shipping Board declined to make the necessary shipping available and the French

were advised to requisition, through the

North African Economic Board, the items

which they would otherwise have obtained

from Madagascar. General Giraud's personal appeal to General Eisenhower in December was likewise fruitless. Nor did the

special conference called on 5 February

1944 produce any satisfactory arrangement.

The necessary shipping was not available.

Furthermore, the bulk of the food production of Madagascar was being absorbed by

the Allies for the supply of other theaters

of operations.7

These and other factors had, by the end

of 1943, precipitated a serious food crisis

with the result that a larger share of the

responsibility for feeding French combat

troops was now being thrown in the lap of

American supply agencies. On 16 January

1944 General Devers advised both SOS,

NATOUSA, and the Commanding General, Fifth Army, that the U.S. Army

would not furnish any of the ration items

which the French had agreed to provide

wholly from their own sources. Only in

the case of items listed for partial supply

from French sources would deficiencies be

met from U.S. stocks. The French Army

would then be required to replace the items

so furnished.8

In addition to the difficulties encountered

by the French in fulfilling their part of the

subsistence program, it soon developed that

the rations as currently fed the units of the

5

 Memos, Hq NATOUSA for SOS NATOUSA,

12 Oct 43, and for Gen Leyer, 28 Oct 43, in same

file.

6

 JRC 400.1/051 S.A.A. of QM Items—GenMisc.

7

 Memos, QM for M and Tn NATOUSA, 6 Oct

43, Loomis for Leyer, 6 Nov 43, and Ltrs, Giraud to

Eisenhower, 9 Dec 43, Leyer to Loomis, 4 Mar 44,

JRC 400.1/062 Food From Madagascar and West

Africa. 8

 Msg 29668, CG NATOUSA to CG SOS

NATOUSA, 16 Jan 44, JRC 400.1/061 Subsistence

for Fr Army.
256 REARMING THE FRENCH

2D MOROCCAN INFANTRY DIVISION MEN UNLOADING AMERICAN

RATIONS from a mule train on the slopes of Mount Pantano, Italy, December 1943.

CEF were not only insufficient in quantity

but seriously deficient in nutritive elements,

sugar and fats especially. The French

High Command strongly suspected that ration deficiencies were partly responsible for

the abnormal number of cases of frozen

feet (440 in the 2d Moroccan Division alone

in December). In a memorandum to General Clark, General Juin pointed out that

the present ration inadequacy was prejudicial to the physical condition of his troops.

It was necessary, he urged, to provide CEF

units with a diet similar to the U.S. ration

because of the severe climate conditions.

The double standard was also affecting

their morale. They felt "less well treated

than their American comrades-in-arms."

Simultaneously, General Giraud appealed

to General Wilson with a request that CEF

troops be issued rations similar to the American B ration with some minor differences,

such as French bread instead of U.S. bread

and French tinned meat for natives instead

of U.S. tinned foods containing pork.9

That the French and Moslem rations

were low by American standards was made

apparent in a study conducted by Headquarters, Fifth Army. Comparative figures

indicating the number of pounds of daily

ration per man were given as follows:

American______________ 4. 89

French_____________ 3. 61

Moslem______________ 3.09

The modification requested by the French

was designed to increase the French ration

9

 Ltr, Devinck to CG AFHQ, 12 Jan 44, Memo,

Juin for Clark, 12 Jan 44, and Ltr, Devinck to

Wilson, 12 Jan 44, AFHQ Liaison Sec 420 France.
OTHER MATERIAL PROBLEMS 257

to 4.77 pounds and the Moslem ration to

3.68 pounds. Fifth Army recognized that

CEF troops were not getting enough food

and urged AFHQ to take immediate action

to bring about an adjustment which would

be satisfactory to them.10

The food crisis came to a head when, on

22 January, General Leyer disclosed that

supplying foodstuffs to the French armed

forces was now encountering insurmountable difficulties. These had been aggravated by a recent SOS decision whereby the

French Quartermaster was to stock up in

Italy a 90-day reserve of foodstuffs for the

CEF. Considering that, in addition, the

French Quartermaster had been directed

to constitute stocks for the units designated

for participation in ANVIL, the huge amount

of supplies thus to be assembled within a

three-month period was much more than

available resources permitted. General

Leyer flatly stated that, thereafter, the subsistence of the CEF could be assured only

on condition that the Allied command

would undertake the responsibility "either

without compensation in kind from the

French or with repayment in kind within

the limitations of French stocks under

Reciprocal Aid procedure."

 11

The serious implications contained in

General Leyer's announcement were made

the object of a detailed study by the JRC.

In a memorandum to G-4, AFHQ, General Loomis described the unsatisfactory

features of the existing arrangement governing the supply of rations to French units

operating as part of a U.S. force. He recommended, in the interests of simplicity

and of assuring proper subsistence for the

troops involved, a modification of the arrangement closely akin to General Leyer's

own proposal. He suggested that SOS requisition the entire ration, substituting additional flour for certain components deemed

unnecessary; that the French furnish the additional components which they required

but which were not part of the U.S. ration;

finally, that the French replace in U.S.

stocks such food items as SOS would make

available to their forces.12

While General Loomis' recommendations were being studied, General Giraud,

on 9 March, pointed out to General Wilson

that the diet as then served to the CEF was

so monotonous as to result in a marked

lack of appetite among the troops. He

urged that French units be "admitted to

the benefits of the substitution of fresh or

frozen meat," such as were enjoyed by

American troops of the Fifth Army. Four

days later General Leyer also referred to the

monotony factor, which he blamed on the

fact that the French and Moslem diets were

based primarily on canned foods. He

warned that the reduction of the cooking

oil rations as then contemplated by SOS

would be most unfortunate since French

units were receiving neither butter nor margarine, and oil was the only fat component

of their diet. At the time, cooking oil was

scarce in the United States. Since olive oil

was available in North Africa, the War Department asked the theater to provide salvage containers in sufficient quantity for

transporting this oil to Italy. Subsequently, the theater made available to the

French 25,000 five-gallon water cans for use

as cooking oil containers.13

10

 Memo, Hq Fifth Army for CinC AFHQ, 26

Feb 44, JRC 400.1/061 Subsistence for Fr Army. 11

 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 22 Jan 44, in same file.

12 Memos, Loomis for G-4 AFHQ, 7 Feb 44, and

for Leyer, 7 Mar 44, in same file. 13

 Ltr, Giraud to Wilson, 9 Mar 44, and Memo,

Leyer for Loomis, 13 Mar 44, in same file; Msgs

2653, Somervell to Devers, 19 Mar 44, and

L-27933, Larkin to Devers, 22 Jun 44, JRC Cable

Log.
258 REARMING THE FRENCH

General Giraud's proposal concerning

fresh meat, of which troops of the CEF received none, was taken up by NATOUSA.

Quartermaster officials reported that no

such meat could be furnished the French,

as the only source of supply was the United

States, and the number of available reefer

ships was limited. However, in April the

French authorities and NATOUSA were

able to arrange for the shipment to Italy of

5,000 live sheep from local sources, or

enough for one month's supply of fresh

meat. Soon after, General Leyer informed

the JRC that shipments of this nature could

not be continued without disrupting the

supply for civilians and for Territorial

troops. Quartermaster, NATOUSA, then

pointed out that General Leyer's statement

was greatly at variance with the definite assurance given earlier by French civil authorities that sufficient sheep could be found

in North Africa to fulfill all French commitments. Incidentally, the same authorities were reported to have informally offered

to sell fresh meat from North Africa to the

U.S. Army. In addition, they were said to

have requested the return of cold-storage facilities then used by Allied forces, thus indicating a desire to provide a greater supply

of fresh-frozen meat. The question of the

further provision of fresh meat to the CEF

was finally dropped, especially when it became known that the French command in

Italy had made arrangements to purchase

fresh meat locally and no longer needed live

sheep from North Africa.14

On 19 April General Devers informed

General Clark that to improve French rations authority had been secured from the

CCS to furnish the entire French and

Moslem rations with the exception of wine

and brandy. Yet it was not until 1 June,

after final agreement between AFHQ, the

War Department, and the CFLN, that the

SOS assumed full responsibility for feeding the French forces fighting with the

Fifth Army. The change-over did not

affect the composition of the French and

Moslem rations, which remained the same.

Simultaneously, the MAB in Washington allocated to the French Army 4,800 tons

of canned corned beef, and 12,000 tons of

frozen meat then available in Madagascar.15

From the time the new subsistence policy

became effective, food ceased to be a problem. Thereafter, the units of the French

Expeditionary Corps in Italy received adequate rations. The policy was subsequently

extended to the French forces participating

in ANVIL.

Clothing

Soon after the start of the rearmament

operations, it became known that the

French were unable to use a considerable

proportion, in some instances as high as

25 percent, of the clothing items of U.S.

manufacture delivered to them. This was

because of size differences, the average stature of the French soldier being smaller than

that of the American soldier. The differences were particularly notable in the case

of overcoats, coats, trousers, shirts, coveralls, and service shoes.16

 In order to clothe

14

 Memos, QM for JRC, 26 Mar, 27 Apr 44,

Leyer for Loomis, 23 Apr 44, and G-4 for QM,

26 Apr 44, JRC 400.1/061 Subsistence for Fr

Army; Msgs F-57630, Devers to Clark, 10 Jun 44,

and 4904, Clark to Devers, 22 Jun 44, JRC Cable

Log.

15

 Memos, Devers for CG Fifth Army, 19 Apr

44, Hq NATOUSA for CG Fifth Army, 12 May

44, and Msg F-48500, Devers to Fifth Army, 20

May 44, JRC 400.1/061 Subsistence for Fr Army;

Memo for Rcd, Office of CofS, 28 Apr 44, and

Memo, QM AFHQ for AG OPS, 16 May 44,

AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters, Vol IV. 16

 Size differences were not limited to items of
OTHER MATERIAL PROBLEMS 259

their men properly, French unit commanders were compelled to arrange locally

with U.S. supply organizations or with the

French Quartermaster for the exchange of

unusable items. The seriousness of the situation can be best appreciated when it is

realized that in the case of one unit of 1,600

men (the 1st Parachute Regiment), no

fewer than 600 pairs of service shoes, 110

parachute boots, 1,250 coveralls, and 1,200

pairs of woolen trousers had to be exchanged. In November 1943 the French

Military Mission in Washington requested

the War Department to lower the U.S. tariff

by one size when assigning clothing to

French troops. Later, in June 1944, the

French military authorities supplied the

War Department with their own size tariff

to be used in the case of all subsequent shipments of clothing.17

Something should be said of the many

problems raised in connection with the provision of clothing for the women serving in

the French armed forces.18

By the end of 1943 the African Army included 3,100 women in uniform, all volunteers. A few of these were employed as

technicians in the Signal Corps or as nurses

in the Medical Corps. The rest were serving as secretaries, social workers, interpreters, drivers, and the like. Mobilization of

women having been decreed, another 1,700

women were in process of induction. Expecting that more would be recruited within

the first few months of 1944, the French

High Command set the goal at approximately 11,000. This number never was

reached, partly because AFHQ urged that

conscription of the numerous women already employed in Allied services throughout North Africa be deferred. SOS,

NATOUSA, in particular, was eager to retain its civilian female employees so as not

to disturb the progress of its activities. The

French High Command agreed to place all

such personnel on special assignment to the

Allied agencies concerned.

So far the French Supply Services had

received 5,800 sets of women's clothing or

enough for the effectives then in active service. The uniforms and clothing items

were of the type issued members of the U.S.

Women's Army Corps (WAC). It was

understood that uniforms were to be worn

with French buttons and insignia. When

it was reported that a number of French

nurses were wearing WAC uniforms with

U.S. buttons and insignia, the theater commander directed the JRC to inform the

French that the practice must be stopped at

once.19

The wearing by French Army women of

the WAC cap with visor, an item which had

been issued to them along with the rest of

the uniform, precipitated a minor crisis.

American officials in the theater decided

that, because of its style, the cap was a distinctive article of the U.S. uniform, and

that its wearing even with French insignia

would result in confusion. Whereupon

NATOUSA requested the War Department to discontinue further shipments of the

item to the French, and at the same time

clothing for troops. In the case of animals, differences in shoe size caused considerable difficulty.

In June 1944 AFHQ requested the War Department to discontinue all further shipments of horse

and mule shoes to the French Army as the conversion of U.S. shoes to conform to French requirements resulted in excessive waste. Thereafter,

metal only would be requested, if needed, for fabrication of shoes locally. Msg F-54092, AFHQ to

AGWAR, 2 Jun 44, ASF International Div Files,

A-45-192 Cables, Vol. X. 17

 Memo, Bouscat for Loomis, 18 Nov 43, JRC

360/002 Items Common to Ground and Air; Memo,

NATOUSA for WD, 21 Jun 44, OPD 400 France,

Sec IV. 18

 JRC 400.1/076 Women's Clothing. 19

 Memo, Loomis to Leyer, 30 Nov 43, in same file.
260 REARMING THE FRENCH

asked the French to return to U.S. stocks

the caps already delivered to them.20 Soon

French Army women were observed in the

streets of Algiers without any hat at all, no

provision having been made for a substitute.

The JRC then hurriedly submitted a requisition for 5,000 garrison caps which SOS subsequently was authorized to deliver from

stocks in the theater. Much to their

chagrin, the French women returned the

cap with visor and donned the less elegant

garrison headgear.

On the assumption that mobilization

would achieve the expected goal, the French

Military Mission in Washington, in February 1944, obtained the assignment of

another 6,500 sets of women's clothing. By

this time the French had received all together 11,500 sets (8,000 U.S. WAC uniforms and 3,500 U.S. Army Nurse Corps

obsolete blue uniforms). This was over

twice as many as they needed, for even by

August 1944 no more than 4,815 women

had actually been recruited (3,465 in the

Army and 1,350 in the Air Force). Of

these, 1,745 were serving with the expeditionary forces. Out of an expected total of

1,335 nurses, only 635 had been recruited.

The French, as a result, lacked 100 nurses

for their expeditionary forces, and 500 for

the Territorial forces.

On 26 April 1944 the French Army

women were reorganized as the Auxiliaires

Féminines de l'Armée de Terre, or AFAT.

Shortly after, their Director, Maj. H. Terré,

submitted to AFHQ a request for 3,000 sets

of British clothing "on sentimental as well as

practical grounds." She explained that the

first women to be recruited had been organized in the United Kingdom where they

had been issued the uniform worn by the

women of the British Army (Auxiliary Territorial Service). She now wished to have

all AFAT units dressed in that fashion. In

her opinion the British uniform was more

suitable for the heavy duties which the

French women were performing as drivers

and mechanics. Moreover, the British allotment included "under-garments unobtainable in North Africa and not included in

the American equipment."

 21

 The request

was rejected on the general principle that

the provision of clothing to the AFAT was

just as much an American responsibility as

was the equipping of other French personnel. Throughout the war, except for the

few women still stationed in the United

Kingdom, the AFAT continued to be supplied from American sources.

Special Supplies

One problem closely related to the food

ration question caused considerable difficulties and endless confusion, particularly

throughout Phase IV of the rearmament

program. It concerned the distribution to

French troops of special supplies considered

essential from the standpoint of health,

morale, and combat efficiency.

These supplies fell into three categories:

(1) "gratuitous components," items such

as candy, cigarettes, and the like, which in

the U.S. Army are normally issued free to

the troops in the forward zone; (2) "post

exchange" supplies, also called "resale articles," such as candy, toilet articles, smoking components, clothing, and other items

handled by Army Exchange Service and

sold in post exchange stores to military

personnel for cash usually on a ration schedule; and (3) "Special Services" supplies,

20 Msg W-6706, JRC to AGWAR, 1 Dec 43, in

same file.

21

 Ltr, Maj Terré to Maj Gen Beaumont-Nesbitt,

Liaison Sec AFHQ, 8 Jun 44, in same file.
OTHER MATERIAL PROBLEMS 261

FRENCH WACS ASSEMBLING ON THE BEACH after landing at St. Tropez,

France, 17 August 1944.

such as athletic kits, libraries, and other

recreational items, distributed to units by

Special Services Division, ASF.

In the summer of 1943, as the first expeditionary units were getting ready for

combat duty outside of northwest Africa,

the French military authorities gave serious

consideration to the question of special

supplies. AFHQ urged them to stockpile

the necessary items, first by drawing to the

maximum extent possible on local French

sources, then by lend-lease cash purchases

effected on the basis of requisitions submitted to, and screened by, the JRC, and

finally, when necessary, by direct cash purchases in the United States through the

French Military Mission in Washington.

The last procedure was to be followed particularly in the case of Special Services supplies." When, in mid-October, the French

requested for their expeditionary units an

allocation of boxing gloves, rugby balls, and

basketballs, all items then unavailable in

North Africa, they were advised to buy

them in the United States on a cash basis.

Later, on 21 October, the theater approved an initial global requisition covering post exchange supplies for 125,000

French Army and Air Force troops, plus

90 days' maintenance. Distribution of the

resale items was to be effected by the French

High Command through military co-operatives set up on the pattern of the American post exchange stores. In a subsequent

22

 Memos, Spalding for Leyer, 20 Aug 43, and

Loomis for Leyer, 23 Oct 43, and Msg 2034,

Somervell to Eisenhower, 9 Nov 43, JRC 400.1/051

PX Sups.
262 REARMING THE FRENCH

message to the War Department dated 24

December, AFHQ recommended that the

French be required to make cash payment

in the United States for the supplies involved, and that shipment of the items be

included in the 25,000 tons allocated

monthly to the French military. The War

Department approved the recommendation

with the proviso that the French Military

Mission would arrange for the shipment of

supplies through the War Shipping Administration.23

Such was the situation at the opening of

Phase IV in February 1944. The French

were still eagerly awaiting the supplies ordered in October. Anticipating that their

needs would increase as their expeditionary

forces grew, they submitted new requisitions. These, although approved at first by

the JRC, were rejected as excessive by the

North African Economic Board. The

French were then asked to scale down their

demands and resubmit requisitions, this

time with appropriate justification and the

assurance that the items involved could not

be obtained locally.24

In an effort to ward off any possible misunderstanding on the part of the French

with respect to the transfer to them of post

exchange supplies shipped from the United

States, General Loomis, on 10 February

1944, reiterated the policy as determined

earlier by the War Department, namely,

that the transaction was to be "on a cash

basis outside of Lend-Lease procedure" and

that payment was to be effected in the

United States. To establish a definite procurement procedure, General Loomis then

asked General Leyer to agree that French

requests for post exchange supplies would

be submitted by French representatives in

the United States directly to the appropriate U.S. agency.25

Pending arrival of the first supplies ordered from the United States in the fall

of 1943, AFHQ authorized and later completed several cash transactions in the

theater. These concerned items then considered theater excess stocks, such as pipe

tobacco available in large quantities in

British depots and substantial amounts of

American "off-brand" cigarettes not desired

by U.S. troops. These sporadic transactions were not sufficient to improve the situation greatly. By April the French military authorities were still forced to ration

stringently the post exchange type of supplies which they were distributing to their

troops.

In a memorandum to the Joint Air Commission dated 14 April, General Bouscat,

Commanding General, French Air Force,

described the plight of the air squadrons

then stationed in Sardinia and operating

under U.S. command. Personnel of the

units were limited to the following rations:

10 ounces monthly of soap of poor quality,

one package of cigarettes daily, and some

shoe polish at irregular intervals. No other

items were provided. Considering that the

men of these units were forbidden by the

Allied command to buy from the local shops

and were not allowed the use of American post exchange stores, they had no way

of supplementing their meager rations.

This, General Bouscat stressed, was bad

from the standpoint of morale as it created

23

 Memo, Hq NATOUSA for CG SOS

NATOUSA, 21 Oct 43, in same file; Msgs

W-8440, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 24 Dec 43, and

6188, Somervell to Eisenhower, 2 Jan 44, JRC

Cable Log. 24

 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 3 Feb 44, JRC

400.1/051 PX Sups.

25

 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 10 Feb 44, in same

file.
OTHER MATERIAL PROBLEMS 263

among the men the regrettable feeling that

they were less well treated than their American comrades. Couldn't access to the U.S.

post exchange stores be extended to the

troops concerned? General Bouscat's request, opposed at first by G-4, NATOUSA,

on the ground that the responsibility for

providing post exchange supplies rested entirely with the French High Command, was

subsequently granted by order of General

Devers. This action was not to be taken

as a policy but as an emergency measure.

Meanwhile, the supplies ordered in November were still under procurement in the

United States. It was not until 30 April

1944 that they were finally shipped. They

began reaching North African ports in

June.26

The entire question of special supplies

came up again for discussion apropos of

the gratuitous components then turned over

to the units in Italy. On 23 May the War

Department reminded AFHQ that such

supplies were to be paid for in cash by the

French. A month later the French advised

the theater that they were unable to pay

cash and requested that the issue to them of

the items be made under the Lend-Lease

Act as in the case of all other supplies of

U.S. source. Queried on the matter by

AFHQ, the War Department replied that

it was up to the State Department and the

Foreign Economic Administration to determine whether supplies furnished the French

by the War Department were for cash or on

credit. Pending final arrangements on the

matter, the issue of gratuitous components

as currently made to CEF units in Italy was

approved.27

It was not until 20 July that the French

finally answered General Loomis' letter of

10 February concerning the question of

post exchange "resale items." General

Leyer's reply disclosed that, as in the case

of the gratuitous components, the Finance

Commissioner was now unable to provide

the necessary funds in dollars for cash payment in the United States of the resale

items. Nor, he added, could the Commissioner pay in French francs each time such

supplies were procured. This was because

receipts from post exchange sales remained

in unit treasuries and did not return to any

general post exchange fund, as was the

practice in the U.S. Army, thus making it

impossible to purchase additional resale

articles. He then proposed that the supply of such items to the forces whose maintenance was a U.S. responsibility be authorized as a lend-lease transaction. All items

so obtained would be sold on a cash basis

to the troops concerned.28 NATOUSA

endorsed the proposal and, with the

agreement of the International Division,

established, on 12 August, a policy to govern

the provision of post exchange resale items

and gratuitous components to the French.

Thereafter SOS issued gratuitous components to such Army and Air Force troops

as were serving with the U.S. forces outside the continental limits of Africa, and

reported the transfers to International

Division for financial accounting. SOS

also made available to the same troops,

26

 Memos, Gardiner for Loomis, 20 Apr 44,

Adcock for CofS NATOUSA, 10 May 44, and

Loomis for G-4 AFHQ, 7 May 44, and Msgs

F-46396, CG NATOUSA to Brig Gen Robert M.

Webster, 16 May 44, and WX-43037, Somervell

to Devers, 29 May 44, in same file.

27

 Msgs WX-40295, Somervell to Devers, 23

May 44, and FX-62567, Devers to AGWAR,

21 Jun 44, JRC Cable Log; Msg WX-57756,

Somervell to Devers, 29 Jun 44, JRC 140

Accounting. 28

 Memo, Leyer for Loomis, 20 Jul 44, JRC

400.1/051 PX Sups.
264 REARMING THE FRENCH

stocks permitting, a limited number of

post exchange resale items to be sold for

cash only. The War Department and

NATOUSA determined together, on the

basis of availability, what quantities of the

approved items could be delivered without

jeopardizing the welfare of American

troops.29

In mid-August, SOS turned over to the

French approximately 40,000,000 books or

boxes of matches and 6,500,000 packages

of pipe tobacco then available in theater

stocks. In the case of cigarettes, War Department officials informed NATOUSA

that because of the current severe shortage

of tobacco in the United States, cigarettes

could be supplied up to 50 percent of the

U.S. allowance and only if off-brands were

acceptable to the French.30

On 8 October SOS urged the War Department to secure the items requisitioned

in August as most were necessary to maintain the health and morale of the French

troops serving with the U.S. Army. Fiftypercent of the normal allowance was considered a minimum requirement. In the

case of cigarettes, General Larkin suggested that off-brand cigarettes be supplied

to the French before being offered for sale

to prisoners of war.31

As the equipment responsibility for the

French forces passed from NATOUSA to

ETOUSA in the fall of 1944, the same

general policy continued to apply with

respect to special supplies. French troops

on the Continent kept receiving, as they

had in the Mediterranean theater, a minimum of items which could not be increased

because of U.S. production limitations.

Miscellaneous Equipment

The French in North Africa also were

almost destitute with respect to a number

of articles of common use, especially manufactured goods, generally available in

healthy national economies and indispensable for the efficient running of a large

military establishment. The critical situation which French military authorities had

faced in this connection during the year

1943 became more acute as their troops

were being committed to combat in Italy

at the close of that year.

In late December 1943 the Surgeon,

AFHQ, reported that a large percentage of

the CEF troops engaged on the Italian

front were infested with lice, apparently

because they lacked the necessary sanitary

facilities and supplies. Since it was essential that troops be kept free from lice if

epidemics of typhus fever were to be prevented, AFHQ requested the War Department to provide the French armed

forces with 11⁄2 million cans of body insect

powder, 750,000 ampoules of methyl

bromide, and 6,000 ethocel fumigation bags.

The requisition was established on the basis

of 300,000 troops. The methyl bromide

being available in U.S. stocks in the theater,

SOS delivered 750,000 ampoules at the

end of January 1944. At the urging of

the War Department, the requisition for

insect powder was reduced to 645,000

cans. These were subsequently assigned

and their shipment arranged at the rate of

215,000 monthly for the three months of

March, April, and May 1944. To assist

further the French High Command in taking proper sanitary measures, various cir29

 Msg FX-82228, Devers to International Div,

12 Aug 44, JRC Cable Log. 30

 Msg 41292, AGWAR to NATOUSA, 16 Sep

44, in same file. 31

 Msg LX-45177, Larkin to Pembark, 2 Oct

44, in same file.
OTHER MATERIAL PROBLEMS 265

culars and pamphlets issued by the Surgeon's Office, NATOUSA, were translated

into French, and in February 1944 lectures

and demonstrations on typhus control were

given to French personnel under the direction of American medical officers.

From 1944 on, miscellaneous French requests increased sharply in number. In

February, General Leyer asked for 200 barber kits. The requisition, at first rejected

by MAC (G), was finally granted in March.

A first shipment of 100 kits was authorized,

with the rest to follow at a later date. Also

approved during the same month were requests for 6,000 canteen covers to be used

by combat troops as grenade carriers, and

for needles for the shoe-stitching machines

which had been delivered earlier with an insufficient number of replacement needles.

In April the French asked for a special

allocation of 6,000 to 9,000 canteens to be

used by the Senegalese troops of the 9th Colonial Infantry Division. The request was

based on the fact that such troops required

approximately four liters of water per day,

or double the normal ration, to maintain

their efficiency. On 28 April SOS,

NATOUSA, effected the lend-lease transfer

of 7,000 canteens.

Again in April the French requested,

through their Military Mission in Washington, the issue of 60,000 packages of dried

blood plasma for use by their expeditionary

forces engaged in Italy. This quantity was

to tide them over until the opening of a

blood collection center in North Africa

which they then had under consideration.32

On 29 April the War Department authorized the issue of blood plasma to all French

troops operating as part of a U.S.

force outside of North Africa with the understanding that U.S. Army stocks in the

theater would be replenished by the French

themselves through purchases in the United

States of commercially procured plasma.

This procedure was intended to prevent a

conflict with the American Red Cross blood

donor program.33

The question of the issue of penicillin to

French hospitals in North Africa came up

for discussion at about the same time.

French troops operating with and supplied

by the U.S. Army were issued penicillin on

the same basis as U.S. personnel. However, many casualties were evacuated to

French hospitals in North Africa where penicillin was not available. For the benefit of

these hospitals, the theater requested the

shipment without delay of a first allocation

of 1,000 ampoules. The War Department promptly granted the request and directed the theater to prepare thereafter

monthly requisitions for submission to the

War Production Board.34

For the printing of identification tags furnished to them under the rearmament program, the French had been authorized, in

March 1944, to use an electric embossing

machine then available at Peninsular Base

Section. When it was realized that this procedure overtaxed the limited U.S. facilities,

General Devers, in July, requested the War

Department to furnish the French with two

such machines. The War Department replied that no electric equipment could be

made available at the time, but offered to

deliver a hand-operated machine instead.

This machine was shipped in October 1944

32

 Msg W-20933, Somervell to Devers, 9 Apr 44,

JRC 400.1/033 Plasma, Human Normal, Dried.

33

 Msgs, Somervell to Devers, 2667, 20 Mar 44,

and W-29823, 29 Apr 44, and Ltr, Loomis to

Leyer, 1 2 May 44, in same file. 34

 Msgs WX-47401, Somervell to Devers, 7 Jun

44, F-64807, Devers to AGWAR, 26 June 44, and

W-59483, Somervell to Devers, 3 Jul 44, JRC

400.1/030 Medical Sups and Equip.
266 REARMING THE FRENCH

to Base 901 in Marseille, the base then

serving 1st French Army.

The problem of the protection of clothing in storage was one which the French had

difficulty in solving for they lacked antimoth

products. In the fall of 1944 they requested

an allocation of twenty tons of naphthalene.

The War Department promptly arranged

to have 42,200 pounds of naphthalene delivered through the Foreign Economic Administration.

Throughout the year 1943, some equipment had been turned over piecemeal to the

French Army Geographic Service in North

Africa for which no provision was made

under the rearmament program. This

equipment was wholly inadequate and the

service was unable to perform any valuable

work. On its behalf, General Leyer submitted, from February 1944 on, a series of

requisitions for materials and machinery of

all types, such as overlay paper, maps, paper

and equipment for printing maps, presses,

photographic supplies, and even commonuse items such as glue. In practically all

cases, NATOUSA authorized the lend-lease

transfer, from U.S. Army theater stocks, of

the materials requested. As a result the

Geographic Service gradually improved its

efficiency and in the pre-ANVIL period succeeded in doing much valuable work.

One last problem of some importance

should be mentioned. It concerns the inability of the North African authorities to

secure from local sources the chemicals

needed for the treatment of malaria, a disease prevalent in many areas of French

North and West Africa and the source of

considerable annoyance to the troops stationed in these territories. Atabrine, the

medication used by the U.S. Army for this

purpose, was then in great demand for Allied troops operating in the various theaters

of operations. In 1943 the French had already requisitioned and obtained from the

United States an adequate supply of the

precious curative, or approximately 12 million tablets, on the basis of a troop strength

of 270,000 men. This had enabled them

to control the disease during and until the

end of the malarial season (November).

In January 1944 they estimated their requirements for the coming year at about 25

million tablets, a figure which U.S. theater

authorities reduced to 20 million. A first

shipment of 15 million tablets was made in

June and the rest shipped soon after. Contending that their West African forces had

not been included in the over-all 1944 requisition, the French requested an additional

allocation of 4 million tablets which

NATOUSA reduced to 1,250,000. This

latter quantity was subsequently approved

in Washington and assigned for shipment

in July. Thanks to the substantial shipments of atabrine from the United States

and the energetic prophylactic measures

taken by all theater medical agencies concerned, malaria failed to cause any undue

hardship on the North African forces.

Accounting

No attempt is made in this volume to

examine the many legal and financial aspects of the North African lend-lease operations owing, in part, to the fact that the

important matter of the supply of the civilian population has been entirely left out as

being irrelevant. Nor is a study made of

the problems peculiar to "reverse" lendlease, such as the procurement by the U.S.

forces of goods and services available in

North Africa (a matter involving, incidentally, the thorny tax issue) and the signing of an agreement with the French on re-
OTHER MATERIAL PROBLEMS 267

ciprocal aid. These and other similar problems are matters for lend-lease historians.35

One question, however, requires some treatment at this juncture, not only because of

its close connection with the rearmament

operations, but also because the issue involved was the source of a serious controversy lasting some two and one half years,

as a result of which insuperable difficulties

were added to the already heavy burden of

supplying the French with munitions of war.

It concerns the manner in which transfers

of American equipment were recorded and

charged against the French for payment under the Lend-Lease Act.

Under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act

of 11 March 1941, the War Department

was required to maintain complete records

of all defense articles, facilities, information,

or services transferred to foreign governments. In the case of the French, materials were transferred to them either in the

United States or in the theater.

Transfers effected in the United States

involved largely the issue of initial equipment under the approved rearmament programs. They were reported and charged

against the French lend-lease account in the

United States. Such accounting, in itself a

simple procedure, should have been wholly

adequate had it not been for the fact that

shipments to the French were made, not directly to them, but to the American commanding general in the theater for subsequent transfer, hence their designation of

Commanding General Shipments. Thus

was the responsibility of the commander involved since he was given control over

French matériel to the extent that he could,

if he so wished, divert part or all of it for

purposes other than French rearmament.

As a result the theater was placed in a position where it had to keep strict accounting

of the deliveries it made to the French of

initial equipment obtained through Commanding General Shipments.36

Responsibility for the accounting of

theater transfers, that is, transfers effected

at the direction of the U.S. commanding

general in the theater or at the order of

U.S. commanders in the field, obviously

was that of the theater itself. Such accounting was effected in accordance with

directives issued from time to time by the

theater on the basis of policies established

by the War Department. Transfers were

recorded at the time of issue on shipping

tickets signed by duly authorized French

officers. The tickets were then priced in

terms of dollars and, until September 1944,

consolidated by the base section or Air

Forces service command concerned. After

30 September 1944 they were consolidated

by the Special Staff section concerned in

Headquarters, MTOUSA, for ground force

items, and the Air Forces service command

for air force technical items. In this manner more uniformity in pricing and reporting could be achieved. Finally, the reports,

once consolidated, were forwarded to the

theater fiscal director for inclusion in the

bimonthly report to the War Department.37

To lessen the burden of lend-lease accounting which it was required to assume

and for which it had insufficient personnel,

NATOUSA sought to obtain at least a

35

 See, for example, Leighton and Coakley, Global

Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943.

36

 Msgs 7162, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 17 Mar 43,

and 4663, Somervell to Eisenhower, 26 Mar 43,

JRC Cable Log. 37

 Admin Memo 12, Hq NATOUSA, 19 Sep 43,

MTOUSA 400.114 Misc Aug-Nov 43; Cir 5,

AFHQ, 10 Jan 43, JRC 400.2/001 Admin of

Sup—Gen; Logistical History of NATOUSAMTOUSA, p. 369.
268 REARMING THE FRENCH

simplification of the procedure with respect

to Commanding General Shipments. In

a message to the War Department dated

30 March 1943, NATOUSA strongly

urged that receipts be signed by the French

in Washington and not in North Africa,

with the understanding that any diversion

of equipment subsequently made in the

theater would promptly be reported.38

War Department officials having turned

down the proposal, the theater then sought

ways and means to lighten the task of SOS,

NATOUSA. To make it unnecessary, in

particular, to open thousands of packages

in order to inventory their contents, the

French military authorities in Algiers were

asked if they would be willing to sign receipts based on ships' manifests. This they

agreed to do. Thereupon, those American

base sections expecting large shipments of

French lend-lease equipment issued a standing operating procedure setting forth the

manner in which shipping tickets were to

be prepared and receipted.39

The issue was reopened in late August

1943 in connection with a new directive

from the War Department redefining the

policy with regard to lend-lease transfers.

The directive stipulated that all transfers

were to be recorded and reported, except

in the case of Commanding General Shipments when only diversions from the latter

needed to be reported.40

In the belief that this provision at last

exempted the theater from receipting shipments which were definitely consigned for

transfer to the French, NATOUSA announced its intention of discontinuing the

practice. Whereupon the War Department directed that the theater was to continue to obtain signed receipts from the

French upon transfer of matériel either

from theater stocks or from Commanding

General Shipments.41

Meanwhile, accounting of theater transfers was running into considerable difficulties for a number of reasons. The theater

was unable to obtain complete price catalogues to cover the wide variety of parts and

supplies released to the French. Shipping,

handling, and other miscellaneous costs accruing to supplies furnished could not always be computed with accuracy. Soon

after the entry of French troops on the Italian front, many of the large number of

transactions made necessary for their maintenance were taking place in forward areas

thus often precluding the possibility of obtaining and pricing itemized signed receipts

for all transfers. In addition, it was frequently impossible to distinguish between

initial and maintenance issues.42 From December 1943 on to July 1944 new difficulties were experienced. The accounting

policies established by the War Department

for each category of transfers, such as subsistence, battle-loss replacements, petroleum,

ammunition, were frequently changed.

Piecemeal emergency transfers from theater

stocks to fill large shortages of initial equipment, as well as attempts to recapture U.S.

equipment from French stocks, complicated

the situation further.

38

 Msg 173. Eisenhower to AGWAR, 30 Mar

43. JRC Spalding Cable Log. 39

 Msg 5032, Somervell to Eisenhower (Eyes

Only), 31 Mar 43, JRC Spalding Cable Log;

Msgs L-1595, MBS to Gardiner, 3 Apr 43, and

1548, Eisenhower to MBS, 4 Apr 43, JRC Cable

Log: Admin Memo 47, Atlantic Base Sec, 8 Apr

43, JRC 402 Sup Policy. 40

 Memo W5-12-43, WD, 30 Aug 43, JRC 140

Accounting.

41

 Msgs W-944, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 25

Sep 43, and 8890, AGWAR to Eisenhower, 29

Sep 43, JRC 140 Accounting. 42 Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA.

pp. 373-76.
OTHER MATERIAL PROBLEMS 269

By July 1944 accounting of theater transfers had reached such a state of confusion

that SOS officials recommended a radical

change in procedure for the sake of simplification "even at the sacrifice of a certain

degree of accuracy." They proposed that

the French be charged for all supplies and

services furnished by the theater on a "per

man per diem" basis, with the charge made

effective at a date to be agreed upon between the French and SOS. General Devers endorsed the proposal and strongly

urged the War Department to approve its

immediate adoption. Meanwhile, SOS

proceeded to determine the amount to be

charged per man per diem, on the basis of

the average cost of maintaining one U.S.

soldier for one day in the North African

theater. To this average cost, 25 percent

would be added for overhead, transportation, and accessorial charges, the percentage

having been tentatively set, on 29 August,

by War Department authorities themselves.

On 11 September 1944 ASF accepted the

principle of the per man per diem accounting procedure, but directed that, pending

the approval of a definite rate, accounting

be continued in accordance with existing

policies. A month later, SOS, NATOUSA,

forwarded to Washington all pertinent data

likely to assist the War Department in establishing a final rate and, on 16 November,

recommended a charge of $8.54 per man

per day.43

As the supply responsibility for the

French forces passed from NATOUSA to

ETOUSA, the War Department, on 18 November, informed ETOUSA of the accounting policy to be followed thereafter.

The policy resembled closely the one established earlier under War Department

Memorandum 35-44 of 22 September

1944. and made no reference to the per

man per diem proposal. Throughout the

months of December 1944 and January

1945. the War Department kept insisting

that the existing policy be strictly adhered

to. But the policy was not workable; it had

not produced records "even approaching

reasonable accuracy" on which future

charges could be made. On 15 January

General Somervell, then on a visit on the

Continent, was made aware of the difficulties in complying with the complicated system prescribed by the War Department,

especially in view of the lack of qualified

personnel in the theater. Recognizing the

desirability of adopting a simpler method,

he urged the War Department by cable to

put into effect the per man per diem

method.44

Discussions on the per man per diem procedure continued for several months. In

April 1945 the War Department dispatched

a special committee to study the status of

lend-lease accounting in both the Mediterranean and European theaters. It was not

until the end of May, after the cessation of

hostilities in Europe and, incidentally, after

ten months of correspondence between the

two theaters and the War Department, that

the latter, acting on the recommendations

of the special committee, established a firm 43

 Ltr, SOS NATOUSA to AG WD, 29 Jul 44,

and Msgs FX 85245, Devers to AGWAR, 20 Aug

44, and LX-47559, Larkin to AGWAR, 16 Oct 44,

JRC 140 Accounting: Ltr, Hq ASF, APLIC CO8

Accounting (3 Aug 44), 11 Sep 44, and 3d Ind,

Hq MTOUSA. AG 400.3295/414 D-O, 16 Nov 44,

quoted in Logistical History of NATOUSAMTOUSA, p. 379.

44

 Msg WX-66076, Somervell to Eisenhower, 18

Nov 44, ASF International Div A-45-192 Cable

Log, France-Out: Msgs E-90834, Lee to AGWAR,

26 Jan 45. and E-86634, Somervell to AGWAR,

15 Jan 45, SS and P Planning Div Files.
270 REARMING THE FRENCH

accounting policy.45 All prior charges and

credits were to be canceled and, in their

place, the French were to be charged: (1)

for the complete equipment of all units included in the approved rearmament programs on the basis of tables of organization

and equipment for similar U.S. units; (2)

for the supply and maintenance of their

expeditionary units at the per man per diem

rates of $6.56 (for MTOUSA) and $6.67

(for ETOUSA), retroactive to the date

when such units had become part of a

U.S. force and terminating on 31 May

1945; and (3) for ammunition, petroleum

and lubricants, and other special items not

covered in the above per man per diem

rates.46

Thus a simple accounting procedure had

finally been adopted, a method not as accurate, to be sure, as the item per item

system which the War Department had

vainly tried to enforce, but one considered

fair enough to all concerned. Such was

the basis on which the cost of equipping and

maintaining the French was estimated at

the time of the final settlement of lendlease obligations.

45

 Msgs WX-88427, AGWAR to MTOUSA, 26

May 45, and WX-38215, AGWAR to ETOUSA,

26 Jul 45, quoted in Logistical History of

NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 380-81.

46

 International Div, Lend-Lease as of September 30, 1945, II, 1212-14, MS copy in

OCMH; Logistical History of NATOUSAMTOUSA, pp. 379-81.
CHAPTER XVII

Agencies Handling Rearmament

The various wheels of the machinery set

up to initiate, implement, and supervise the

rearming and training of the French North

African forces have been introduced in the

preceding chapters. The justification for

the creation of the JRC, JAC, SCAMA,

Stock Control Section, and French Training

Section, the directives responsible for their

establishment, the functions assigned to

each, their successes or failures — all

these matters have been related at some

length as they arose. It remains to outline briefly the composition and internal

organization of these agencies, their respective position in the theater staff structure, their operational practices, the tools

at their disposal as well as those which they

forged.

The Joint Rearmament Committee

Composition and Position in the

Theater Staff Structure

When, in early December 1942, creation

of an agency to supervise the rearmament

of the French North African forces was first

envisaged, the most directly concerned

AFHQ staff sections—namely, the G-4

and Liaison Sections—made the following

recommendations. The contemplated

agency should be established as a special

staff section of AFHQ; it should be composed of American representatives from

G-1, G-3, G-4, the Air and Naval Sections

of AFHQ, and of representatives from the

French General Staff; finally, its functions

should be so set forth as to require it to

refer matters of policy to the Chief of Staff,

AFHQ, for instructions, and other matters

to the particular staff sections concerned for

both discussion and action.1

These and other recommendations were

embodied in AFHQ Staff Memorandum

52, issued on 16 December 1942, instituting

officially the Joint Rearmament Committee.

The memorandum set forth in detail the responsibilities and functions of the new

agency. In addition it made the JRC directly responsible to the Chief of Staff,

AFHQ. This arrangement was of fundamental importance to the committee for it

determined the nature of its internal organization, of its activities, and of its dealings

with other agencies.2

That the committee had not been placed

under the control of Liaison Section, the

agency previously set up to serve as an intermediary between AFHQ and the French,

is not surprising. The technical nature as

well as the scope of the assignment required

the establishment of a separate agency with

a permanent membership responsible for its

1

 Memo, Col Julius C. Holmes for CofS AFHQ,

5 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC; Memo,

Holmes for CofS AFHQ, 11 Dec 42, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip. 2

 AFHQ Staff Memo 52, 16 Dec 42, AFHQ

0100/12 G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip; see p. 25, above.
272 REARMING THE FRENCH

own internal organization. As such, it fell

definitely into the special staff category.3

The JRC having no power of decision, its

authority was limited. It managed, however, to circumvent this intrinsic handicap

by establishing personal friendly relations

with outside officials and agencies most interested in its activities such as the deputy

chief of staff, G-3, G-4, Ordnance, and

other technical and administrative services,

both American and British.4

The eight original appointees to the committee assembled for their first meeting on

23 December 1942 at the Hotel St. Georges

in Algiers. The four U.S. members and

the AFHQ sections they represented were

Col. William Tudor Gardiner (G-3 and

Air), Col. John Morrow (G-4), Capt. Jerauld Wright (Naval Staff), and Maj.

George L. Artamonoff (Ordnance). The

four French delegates were Maj. Jean

Morel (Army), Capt. Fernand Rébillon

(Air), Capt. Roland de Beaumont (Army),

and Lt. Comdr. R. Poincelet (Navy) .

5

In accordance with the 16 December

memorandum, the senior officer representing AFHQ, in this case Colonel Gardiner,

took over the chairmanship of the committee. The posts of vice chairman, executive

secretary, and vice secretary went to Major

Morel, Major Artamonoff, and Captain de

Beaumont, respectively, thus giving the appearance of a truly "joint" (in the sense of

inter-Allied) agency.

Of the four U.S. members, two, Colonel

Gardiner and Major Artamonoff, were

destined to play a major role in the subsequent activities of the committee. Colonel

Gardiner, a pilot on loan from the Air

Forces, was highly qualified for his new assignment. His experience with military

matters accrued from two years' service

in World War I, during which he had

served as interpreter because of his excellent knowledge of French. During the

years 1929 to 1933, he had been governor

of the State of Maine. He was to remain

with the committee as chairman until 2

June 1943.6 Major Artamonoff, also a

veteran of World War I, served first as executive secretary, later as chairman, replacing Colonel Gardiner. His fluency in the

French language and an excellent background in organization and supply problems

qualified him admirably for the discharge

of his important functions.7

Membership in the JRC varied from time

to time. Already by mid-February 1943

there had been a number of changes.

Colonel Morrow had been replaced by Lt.

Col. Douglas N. Lawley. Comdr. André

Stourm of the French Navy had replaced

Commander Poincelet, who had been transferred to other duties. Earlier, in late

December, the advisability of appointing to

the committee a British ordnance representative had been given serious consid3

 Memo, R. G. Lewis for Director of Ordnance

Svs (Br), 22 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC;

Gen Crane and Col William S. Biddle, discussion of

CofS Mtg, 24 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC;

Memo, Gen Rooks for Col Gardiner, 30 Dec 42,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops, Ser 623. 4

 Notes from Col Artamonoff, Dec 51 ; Interv

with Gen Loomis, Jun 50. 5

 Min, JRC Conf, 23 Dec 42, JRC 320/001 Orgn

of JRC; AFHQ SO 86, 26 Dec 42, copy in

Gardiner's private files.

6

 For his contribution to the success of the North

African rearmament operations, the French awarded

him, in July 1943, the Order of the Legion of

Honor (Chevalier), a singularly fine gesture toward

the United States considering that, a few months

earlier, the American Army had awarded him the

Silver Star for meritorious service in the course of

the 8-10 November 1942 operations against the

opposing French forces. 7

 Order of the Legion of Honor (Chevalier) and

Croix de Guerre (with Palm and Gold Star),

June 1945.
AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT 273

MEMBERS OF THE JOINT REARMAMENT COMMITTEE, Algiers, April

1943. Left to right: Maj. Jean Morel, Col. Clement Blanc, Capt. Roland de Beaumont, partially visible behind Col. William Tudor Gardiner, Lt. Col. George L. Artamonoff, Capt.

François Rébillon, Capt. Jerauld Wright, Comdr. André Stourm. The officer behind Captain

Rébillon is not identified.

eration, since French troops then fighting in

Tunisia were receiving equipment from

British as well as U.S. sources. However,

after the Casablanca Conference in January

1943, when it became clear that the rearmament of the French Ground Forces was to be

a wholly American commitment, the presence of a British Army representative hardly

seemed necessary. It became even less so

as time went on for, with the fusion of the

de Gaulle and Giraud forces in late July

1943, the two British-equipped divisions

(the 1st and 2d DFL) were re-equipped

with American matériel. The Royal Navy,

on the other hand, had been represented on

the committee since January by Capt.

Geoffrey Barnard. In practice, neither he

nor the U.S. naval representative was a fulltime member. They were called in only

when naval matters had to be discussed and

acted upon. For all practical purposes,

therefore, the JRC could be regarded as a

Franco-American committee with only occasional British participation.

The position of the JRC in the theater

staff structure was altered three times. The
274 REARMING THE FRENCH

first change, which occurred on 5 June

1943, was brought about by a number of

important considerations. With the battle

of Tunisia ended and the considerable

amount of equipment brought over on the

April convoy sorted out and distributed, the

various Allied agencies responsible for rearming the French were turning their attention to the task of developing the North

African Army into an efficient fighting force.

As it was anticipated that AFHQ would

some day move from northwest Africa,

leaving the rearmament operations the exclusive responsibility of NATOUSA, it appeared necessary to review the relationship

of these two agencies with the French. Liaison Section, AFHQ-NATOUSA, voiced

the opinion that the time was opportune for

centralizing under a single authority the

handling of all French problems arising both

within the lines of communications and in

the forward zone. Its chief, Col. Julius C.

Holmes, recommended that a special

French section be set up within Liaison

Section to handle, for both AFHQ and

NATOUSA, all policy, organizational, and

technical questions concerning the French

armed forces, including rearmament. On

the assumption (an erroneous one, as demonstrated by later developments) that the

work of the JRC was becoming "more and

more a routine G-4 problem," Colonel

Holmes further recommended that the committee be consolidated, at least for the present, into this proposed French section.8

Only part of his proposals was accepted;

no separate section was constituted, but, on

5 June 1943, the JRC passed under the

control of Liaison Section.9

Concurrently with the transfer of JRC

from the control of the Chief of Staff,

AFHQ, to that of Liaison Section, Colonel

Gardiner was replaced by Lt. Col. George

L. Artamonoff as chairman.10 A few weeks

later, on 19 July, General Spalding, who

had recently arrived in the theater to undertake a survey of the French supply situation,

was appointed both chief of Liaison Section

and chairman of the JRC, with Colonel

Artamonoff reverting to the post of executive secretary of the committee.11

JRC's position in the staff structure underwent a second change in August 1943.

By that time supervision by Liaison Section

had proved inadequate. The various tasks

performed by the committee had turned out,

after all, to be more than G-4 routine work.

The technical aspects of the problems involved were unfamiliar to the members of

Liaison Section who, in addition, were too

busy with matters of their own. Considering, furthermore, that the rearmament of

the French had become an almost exclusive

American responsibility, it appeared logical

to transfer the committee to the jurisdiction

of NATOUSA. Action to this effect was

taken on 7 August 1943.12 JRC was made

responsible to the Deputy Theater Commander, NATOUSA, then General

Hughes.

The added responsibility which the JRC

began assuming with respect to the training and supply of the French expeditionary

forces quickly brought about changes as

well as increases in personnel. Chairmanship changed hands once again when General Loomis replaced General Spalding on

10 October. As of 15 October, member8

 Memo, Holmes for CofS AFHQ, 24 May 43,

JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC. 9

 AFHQ Staff Memo 45, 5 Jun 43, in same file.

10

 Colonel Gardiner was recalled to duty with the

Air Forces. 11

 AFHQ GO 42, 19 Jul 43, in same file. 12

 NATOUSA Staff Memo 74, 7 Aug 43, in same

file.
AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT 275

ship of the committee was approximately

as follows:

JOINT REARMAMENT COMMITTEE

(Asterisk denotes officers who remained with the

JRC until the end of rearmament operations in

North Africa)

Chairman: Brig. Gen. Harold F. Loomis*

Executive Officer: Lt. Col. George L.

Artamonoff (1)

Policy Section

U.S. Army member: Col. Ira A. Crump* (2)

U.S. Air member: Brig. Gen. Gordon P.

Saville (3)

U.S. Navy member: Capt. Francis P. Old

(4)

Royal Navy member: Capt. Geoffrey Barnard

(5)

Executive Section

(all U.S. officers)

Lt. Col. John C. Knox* (representing FTS),

Training

Maj. E. S. De Long,* Quartermaster and

Medical

Maj. Conrad L. Christensen,* Ordnance,

Engineer, and Chemical Warfare Service

Maj. J. R. Quails, Ordnance

Lt. John L. Dexter,* Engineer and Ordnance

Lt. Atlas L. Cheek, Jr.,* Statistics

Lt. John W. Buckley,* Training

Lt. John S. Edmonston,* Engineer

Lt. Gordon H. Buter,* Office Administration

Maj. John W. Ames,* Liaison with French

for Air

Lt. (jg) J. Lodge, Liaison with French for Navy

French Section

Chief: Col. Jean Regnault*

Army member: Capt. Roland de Beaumont

(6)

Air member: Maj. Gilbert Mondin

Naval member: Comdr. André Stourm*

Two interpreters

(1) Left the committee on 5 November 1943.

Shortly after, he was transferred to the U.S. Fifth

Army in Italy where he took over the command of

the 53d Ordnance Group which included one

French ordnance battalion supporting the CEF.

(2) Replaced Colonel Artamonoff as executive

officer on 5 November 1943.

(3) Also chairman of the Joint Air Commission.

See pp. 203, above, 285-86, below.

(4) Replaced Captain Wright on 7 October

1943. Was replaced by Capt. D. D. Dupre, USN,

in June 1944.

(5) Replaced by Capt. M. B. Laing, RN, in

January 1944.

(6) Left for Italy on 1 January 1944.

NOTE.—Other officers were subsequently assigned to the committee. Among the French members so assigned, three (Maj. Plat, Lt. René Lehman and Lt. Guy de Biran) remained to the end

of the JRC's existence.

The committee had now under its jurisdiction both the French Training Section

since the end of August and Stock Control

Section since the beginning of October. It

had become a sizable organization with a

total strength of approximately 600 officers

and men.

The third and last change in the committee's position in the staff structure came

about in February 1944. (Charts 2 and 3)

Simultaneously with the command reorganization then effected in the theater, the JRC

was transferred from the jurisdiction of the

Deputy Theater Commander, NATOUSA,

an office which had just been abolished,

to that of the Commanding General,

NATOUSA, now General Devers.13

In July, with the arrival in North Africa

of the first elements of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, NATOUSA directed the

JRC to provide assistance in the training of

these troops before their departure for Italy.

The committee set up a Brazilian Training

Section similar to the section organized for

the French and placed it under the command of Lt. Col. Robert J. Shaw, himself

13

 History of Allied Force Headquarters and

Headquarters NATOUSA: Part Three, December 1943-July 1944, Sec. 1, pp. 697-99, copy in

OCMH.
276 REARMING THE FRENCH

BRIG. GEN. HAROLD F. LOOMIS,

center, and two of his associates of the JRC,

Brig. Gen. Alien F. Kingman, left, chief of

French Training Section, and Brig. Gen. Jean

Regnault (then a Colonel), chief of French

Section.

an officer from French Training Section

who had served more than a year with the

3d DIA as its senior instructor. Such was

the extent of the responsibility assumed by

the JRC with regard to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force.34

At the end of the same month, with the

departure, of NATOUSA headquarters

from North Africa and the gradual closing

down of U.S. installations, the chairman of

the JRC, General Loomis, was designated

representative of the theater commander in

the Algiers area, as well as Commanding

General, Headquarters, North African District, the successor to NATOUSA. As this

meant a broadening of the committee's responsibilities and functions, these were redefined by Headquarters, NATOUSA, on

14 August.15

Meanwhile, a field echelon of the committee (JRC Advance) had gone to Italy to

assist in the last-minute preparations of the

French units designated for ANVIL and to

keep the committee informed of the latest

developments in this connection.

After the launching of ANVIL on 15 August 1944, the JRC continued to operate

but its strength gradually decreased as its

various activities diminished in importance.

In late August, with Paris and a large

part of France liberated, the French proposed and Allied authorities agreed that an

agency to supervise the rearmament of the

Metropolitan forces should be set up in the

French capital. By agreement between

Generals Eisenhower and Devers, it was decided to use for the purpose selected members of the personnel heretofore assigned to

the JRC. On 9 September orders were issued directing the transfer to Supreme

Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force,

of General Loomis and four or five officers of

his choosing, requests for the remaining personnel to be made after General Loomis had

reached Paris. Leaving a rear echelon in

North Africa, General Loomis and his party

arrived at SHAEF on 3 October and were

assigned for duty with Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to France, the

successor to the JRC on the Continent.16

With some of its members now in Italy

14

 Interv with Loomis, Sep 51.

15

 Headquarters, NATOUSA, AFHQ, and other

Allied Headquarters moved to Caserta, Italy, on 20

July 1944. Ltr AG-370.5 A-0, Hq NATOUSA,

7 Jul 44, and Memo, NATOUSA for CG

SOS NATOUSA, 28 Jul 44, and Staff Memo 32,

Hq NATOUSA, 14 Aug 44, JRC 320/001 Orgn of

JRC. 19

 Msg 12547, Loomis to JRC, 5 Oct 44, in same

file.

278 REARMING THE FRENCH

CHART 3—INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT REARMAMENT COMMITTEE: 1 APRIL 1944

or France as part of JRC Advance and

some transferred to other duties, the JRC

had, by this time, been reduced to a skeleton organization. The responsibility for

the remaining rearmament activities having

been assigned, on 10 October, to Headquarters, Communications Zone,

NATOUSA, JRC Rear was officially disbanded on 1 November, although it continued to operate one week longer.17

French Participation

All available organizational charts give

an erroneous impression that the French

enjoyed equal representation on the JRC.

They did not, either in authority or in

numbers.

That the French representatives were

never considered as copartners in the fullest sense of the term is not surprising.

Their position reflected the fact that the

North African army was not integrated

with the Anglo-American military establishment. Having neither the right to cast

a vote nor the power to exercise control

over U.S. or British personnel, French

representatives could act only as liaison officers. In addition, it seems certain that,

had equal participation been originally

possible, it would have been ruled out as

inopportune on the ground that the French

were customers for, not producers of, war

matériel. For this reason possibly more

than any other, American supremacy in the

committee was firmly established from the

17

 Hq NATOUSA, GO 104, 11 Oct 44, in same

file; Memo, Capt Graham for Loomis, 14 Nov 44,

SHAEF Mission to France, Rearmt Div 320-1

Orgn and Function of Rearmt Div.
AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT 279

outset with the provision of the 16 December 1942 directive that the senior U.S.

member of the committee was to be the

chairman.

Surprisingly, the French military authorities themselves did not seem eager to obtain equal participation in the JRC, at

least during the first year of its existence.

Possibly that was because, discounting the

value of the JRC, they were content that

their representatives should remain without real authority. General Giraud, it will

be recalled, had banked heavily on the

Béthouart Military Mission, which he had

dispatched to the United States in late

December 1942. In the apparent belief

that the mission would adequately represent him in Washington, the fountain of

all supply, and from there expedite the

flow of rearmament matériel, he had

tended to attach little importance to negotiations at theater level. It was his opinion,

not an unreasonable one considering the

limitations placed on the JRC, that it

was little more than a liaison agency. In

detailing officers to represent him on the

committee, he expected them simply to interpret for the benefit of the American and

French commands the views of each regarding rearmament matters. It must be

noted here in passing that the Military

Mission in Washington established and subsequently maintained close relations with

the French members of the JRC, through

the channel of the Rearmament and Technical Studies Section of the French General Staff.

Unequal representation on the JRC was

made more apparent by the fact that the

French members were, particularly during

the first eight months, of a rank not commensurate with their responsibilities and

duties and inferior to that of their American colleagues. Possibly because of their

aloofness toward the committee, French

authorities were content to let the situation

continue for some time, any change being

made difficult by the fact that promotions

were more or less frozen. In spite of their

lower status, however, at no time did the

French members feel subjected to undue

inconvenience and embarrassment except

possibly in their dealings with other Allied

agencies. Within the committee, they

were treated on the basis of function, not

of rank. The feeling of inferiority which

they suffered occasionally was due solely to

the limited authority vested in them by their

own superiors.18

The French Section remained small

largely because qualified men were hard to

find. The demands for officers with linguistic skill and technical knowledge were

so pressing from the field and from the

services that the section never had a chance

to expand. Even such officers as were appointed from time to time were subject to

instant recall for duty elsewhere.

Their American colleagues have spoken

highly of Major Morel and Captain de

Beaumont, emphasizing that, in the early

period of the rearmament operations, these

two officers were among the few Frenchmen

who appeared to understand thoroughly

the problems involved. Before the North

African landings, Major Morel had gained

considerable ordnance experience by serving as assistant to General R. Poupinel then

in charge of matériel; in particular he had

played an important part in the French

efforts to hide equipment from the Axis.

Although technically he ceased to be a member of the committee in August 1943, he

18

 Intervs with de Beaumont, Jul 50, Artamonoff, Dec 49, Gardiner, Apr 50, and Loomis,

Sep 51 ; Notes from Gardiner.
280 REARMING THE FRENCH

continued to handle rearmament problems

at G-4, French Headquarters.

Before his appointment to the JRC,

Captain de Beaumont had been called to

Algiers on 20 November 1942 by General

Leyer to serve as assistant in charge of rearmament. Considering that he remained

at JRC's headquarters, whereas his colleague Morel operated largely from G-4,

French Headquarters, it can be said of Captain de Beaumont that he assumed the

greater part of the burden of representing

the French High Command at JRC, a task

which he appears to have filled with complete satisfaction. He was relieved of this

responsibility at the time of the appointment

of his successor in August 1943, but he continued to serve on the committee in a different capacity until January 1944 when, at

his request, he was transferred to active

service with the CEF in Italy.

The work of both Major Morel and Captain de Beaumont was immensely facilitated

by the cordial relations established early between the JRC and members of the French

General Staff, Col. Clement Blanc in particular. The latter, then serving as both

G-1 and G-4, although not a member de

jure of the committee, kept in constant

touch with it. His frequent ex officio presence at JRC meetings, which he attended at

the invitation of the American members,

and his informal, almost daily contacts with

the various members of the committee, made

it possible for much constructive action to be

taken which otherwise would have been delayed because of the lack of authority vested

in the French members. At one time a

classmate of General Loomis at the Ecole de

Guerre, Colonel Blanc was highly esteemed

by American rearmament officers who regarded him as the top French authority in

the field of equipment and training. He

was promoted to the rank of brigadier general in April 1944. By then his superior,

General Leyer, Chief of General Staff, had

delegated much of his authority to him in

dealing with Allied staffs.

The arrangement by which the chairman

of the JRC or his representative directly

approached Colonel Blanc or General Leyer

worked admirably. It was maintained

even after the CFLN vainly attempted to

vest in the Commissioner of War the responsibility for handling rearmament problems.

Both General Leyer and Colonel Blanc continued to work closely with the JRC to the

very end of the North African rearmament

operations. Another French official, Mr.

Jean Monnet, contributed much to the good

relations between the French and the JRC.

The MAB, it will be recalled, had arranged for his dispatch from Washington to

North Africa in early 1943 to assist General

Giraud on financial and armament matters.

By the summer of 1943 the French military authorities had come to recognize in

the JRC the only effective machinery

through which their demands could be met.

Feeling the need for more substantial representation on the committee, they appointed on 13 August a higher-ranking officer, Col. Jean Regnault, to the post of chief

of the French Section, held until then by

Major Morel.

Colonel Regnault's appointment proved

to be a most fortunate one. A combat officer who, a few months before, was leading

an infantry regiment in Tunisia, he had had

no prior training in armament matters.

Yet, thanks to his qualities of adaptability

and open-mindedness, his thoroughness in

handling technical details, an excellent

knowledge of English, and a genuine friendship for Americans, he soon succeeded in

strengthening further the co-operation be-
AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT 281

tween the French and American elements of

the JRC, and between the latter and the

French General Staff.19

It must be noted that the amount of authority vested in Colonel Regnault other

than the power which his rank carried did

not exceed that enjoyed by his predecessors.

Officers of the French High Command continued to feel that, as long as the aim and

scope of the rearmament program were

still to be determined, they alone could effectively deal with such matters. Meanwhile, the American position with respect

to French participation in the committee remained unchanged.

Together with the French officers subsequently appointed to assist him, such as Lt.

René Lehman who displayed an especially

keen understanding of rearmament problems, Colonel Regnault carried out the

duties assigned to the French Section with

the utmost efficiency. He remained with

the JRC until its disbandment in September

1944. He was then transferred to Paris to

occupy a similar post in the newly created

Rearmament Division of SHAEF Mission

to France.20

Internal Organization

From the moment it was activated, the

JRC was left free to develop its own structure.21

 During the initial phase, little internal organization was needed. The committee was then devoting its entire attention

to the emergency provision of equipment to

the units engaged in Tunisia. Not that the

16 December directive establishing the committee restricted the latter's functions to

such duty. On the contrary, the directive

specifically empowered the JRC, in addition, to develop an over-all rearmament

program. The French members had

brought with them such a program based on

the Mast Plan. Their American colleagues,

however, had come with "no plan at all,

merely an idea of rearmament."

 22

 In the

absence of clear instructions from AFHQ

as to what a program should consist of and

as to how far the Allied command was prepared to go, the U.S. members strongly felt

that the committee's most immediate task

was to assist the units in Tunisia in getting

the equipment they needed so urgently.

They maintained this position even after the

Casablanca Conference, pending the receipt

of definite instructions regarding the longrange program. During this entire stopgap

period the members worked as a group, each

specializing in one particular field and the

executive secretary keeping the necessary

records and statistics.

It was when the French submitted their

first requisitions, in the spring of 1943, that

the question of the division of responsibility

arose which soon led to a functional organization of the committee. The requisitions,

before being transmitted to the responsible

AFHQ staff sections, required considerable

processing and redrafting, for the French,

unfamiliar with the U.S. classification system and tables of organization and equipment, or with technical nomenclature in

English, were submitting them according to

their own classification system and in their

own language. To present these requests in

proper form, the JRC obtained the assignment of several assistants qualified in armament matters. The requests were screened

19

 Interv with Loomis, Sep 51. 20

 Just before his transfer to Paris, Colonel Regnault was awarded the Legion of Merit with the

rank of Officer. 21

 Memo for Rcd, JRC, 27 Dec 42, JRC 320/001

Orgn of JRC.

22

 Intervs with Artamonoff, Dec 49, and Gardiner,

Apr 50.
282 REARMING THE FRENCH

and broken down according to service and

type of item, then translated into English.

As the scope of its activities increased, the

JRC secured other assistants whose duty it

became to disseminate technical information to the French, supervise the delivery to

them of equipment, and establish liaison

with the several AFHQ staff sections involved in the rearmament operations.

Soon the JRC began grouping these assistants into sections. The Statistics Section collected and assimilated information

on the amount of matériel furnished. The

Administration Section handled reports and

correspondence passing through the U.S.

members of the committee. The Operations Liaison Section controlled all liaison

matters with the French.

The successive transfers of the JRC, first

to the control of Liaison Section, AFHQ, in

June 1943 and later to that of NATOUSA

in August of the same year, brought no substantial changes in internal organization.

In the fall of 1943, however, as the committee became involved with the supply,

maintenance, and training of the first expeditionary units about to depart for combat overseas, the number of sections had to

be increased. The Supply Section was created to handle technical matters pertaining

to all services and to act as liaison with the

Stock Control Section when the latter

passed under the control of the committee.

Similarly, when the JRC extended its jurisdiction over the French Training Section, a

special Training Section was set up to act

as intermediary.

By February 1944, the beginning of the

fourth and last phase of the North African rearmament program, the Joint Rearmament Committee had reached its full

growth. Its internal organization, established piecemeal as conditions had warranted, was now completed. It must be

noted that, with the creation of the Joint

Air Commission in September 1943, the

committee was no longer concerned with

air matters except in the case of items of

equipment common to both air and ground

forces. It was, on the other hand, still

handling a number of problems arising in

connection with the rehabilitation of the

French Navy. The three naval representatives were responsible for initiating

plans for miscellaneous projects, and for

screening requests for new ships, major

overhaul of ships, and increases in armament. Other naval matters were handled

through other theater channels.

Operating Procedures

In order to achieve maximum efficiency

and to keep abreast of the changing situation, JRC, from the outset, adopted,

flexible methods of work. Most of the

business at hand was handled through

individual action, and only a few formal

plenary meetings were held.

During the stopgap period, no system

existed that would provide the committee

with accurate information on what equipment the French needed most and on what

could be made available to them from Allied sources. For lack of such a system,

the committee as a whole agreed that individual members should, whenever possible,

go after this information, using their own

devices and means.

A few isolated examples, gleaned at random, are given of this individual effort to

"go and get things done." Early in January 1943, two members, Major Artamonoff and Captain de Beaumont, visited

the units engaged on the Tunisian front to

determine for themselves what items of
AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT 283

equipment were most urgently needed.

Meanwhile, the chairman discussed with

U.S., British, and French officials the possible emergency release of equipment.

During the winter months, various members toured Allied agencies and establishments throughout northwest Africa with a

view to locating matériel likely to be of use

to the French. Some of these trips were

made by air, the necessary aircraft being

borrowed for the purpose from American

or even French sources.

In April, when arrangements were being made with Colonel Suttles for the setting

up of the vehicle assembly line at Algiers,

the chairman again borrowed an airplane

from the Northwest African Troop Carrier

Command and flew to Rabat to pick up an

advance party of twenty mechanics from

the U.S. 2d Armored Division for employment on the new project.23

Later, after the fall of Tunis in May, the

chairman rushed to Tunisia to survey the

availability of captured enemy equipment.

The venture, incidentally, proved unprofitable, for what little matériel the Germans had not destroyed the theater planned

to distribute not only to the French but to

other Allied forces as well. It was also

through individual action that the necessary

technical troops were gradually secured and

assigned for duty with the JRC. When he

learned of a surplus of French-speaking

G-2 officers at General Patton's headquarters in Casablanca, Colonel Gardiner immediately approached the responsible

authorities and obtained the assignment of

two.24

After the cessation of hostilities in

Tunisia, the committee faced a multitude

of new problems arising from the implementation of the long-range rearmament

program. It was then that Colonel Artamonoff conducted a survey of French ordnance units to determine how they were

handling their newly acquired equipment.

Without such information no sound rehabilitation program could be pursued.

Later, in August, when the French Training Section passed under the operational

control of the committee, its chief, General

Kingman, undertook at JRC's request to

inspect certain units and report on the completeness of their equipment and training.

Thus the committee was able to inform with

accuracy both French and Allied commands

on the state of readiness and the degree of

efficiency of these units.

Again, when in the late summer of 1943

it became obvious that the French supply

system was totally inadequate, the JRC instructed a special party headed by Colonel

Geraghty to make a thorough investigation

of the situation. Colonel Geraghty's report, it will be remembered, led to the establishment of Stock Control Section, the

agency which so successfully assisted the

French in overhauling their supply system.

Although the committee was not empowered to make decisions affecting policy, its

members, especially the chairman and the

executive secretary, frequently participated

in conferences, some called at their own initiative, with representatives from the policymaking echelons. It was at such a conference held at the end of March 1943 in the

office of the Deputy Theater Commander,

NATOUSA, that the chairman discussed

with General Clark the advisability of bringing the Fifth Army into the rearmament

picture, as well as the procedure to be followed in case this was done. Conferences

were also held with staff sections or indi23

 Statement in Notes on Fr Rearmt by Gardiner, 10 Apr 50, copy in OCMH files. 24

 Ibid.
284 REARMING THE FRENCH

viduals of the French High Command. On

31 March Colonel Artamonoff discussed

with General Leyer and Colonel Blanc plans

for the forthcoming reception of the first

large-scale shipment. Two days earlier

Colonel Gardiner, together with other Allied

officials including Brig. Gen. William F.

Tompkins from Operations Division, had

examined the problem with General Giraud,

General Leyer, and Mr. Monnet. Meetings

with the French were for the most part

informal and, as already stated, held as

often as necessary.25

To deal effectively with the more technical problems, the JRC frequently borrowed

civilian and military experts from other

headquarters. One of the first experts to

be called in was Lt. Col. Howard J. Lowry.

Because of his thorough knowledge of enemy equipment, he was assigned to the JRC

from May to October 1943 for the purpose

of handling the various problems connected

with the transfer of such equipment to the

French.26 Civilian technicians on loan

from American industrial plants gave the

JRC the benefit of their firsthand knowledge of U.S. equipment. They conducted

inspections of French base shops and maintenance and combat units, and reported to

the JRC the degree of technical efficiency

of these units. In addition, they organized

classes for the benefit of French personnel

in which they taught the correct use and

maintenance of American equipment, especially vehicles. Among the civilian technical observers called upon to assist the JRC

were William E. Burnett and Charles F.

Dye, Jr., representing respectively the Cadillac Motor Car and the Fisher Tank Divisions of General Motors, and Thomas A.

Demetry of the Chrysler Tank Corporation.27

A word should be said about the reports

issued by the JRC. When the initial allocations of matériel arrived in North Africa

at the end of January 1943, AFHQ directed

the JRC to maintain an up-to-date schedule

showing how the French authorities were

assigning the items received and how they

intended to make future assignments.28

The committee then began issuing a semimonthly report to keep the Chief of Staff,

AFHQ, informed of the quantity of matériel turned over to the French in response to

emergency and training requirements. Simultaneously the JRC issued a weekly record of its day-to-day activities. With the

arrival of the first large-scale convoy in

April, the semimonthly report was replaced

by a progress report designed especially to

give accurate information regarding the distribution of equipment among units. This

information was obtained largely through

personal contact with the French General

Staff, through visits to units by either regular JRC members or temporarily attached

personnel, and through the exchange of

communications between the JRC and

Colonel Blanc. It included valuable data

on the equipment status of units, reasons for

delaying their rearmament, changes in tables of organization and equipment as effected by the French, exact tonnage of

equipment arriving on the various convoys,

and so forth. Copies of the progress report

were sent to the responsible AFHQ staff sections including the chief of staff himself,

25

 Memo, Hughes for Clark, 26 Mar 43, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt; Memo,

Artamonoff for CofS SOS NATOUSA, 1 Apr 43,

JRC 902/11 Rearmt Plan; Weekly Rpt No. 1,

JRC, 27 Mar 43, AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec

319.1/1 (Fr-B) Ser 93. 26

 SO 99, Hq NATOUSA, 15 May 43, JRC 210.3

Assignment and Transfer of Officers.

27

 JRC 353/001 Training Rpts, Tech Observers. 28

 AFHQ Ltr AG 400/322 A. M., 31 Jan 43,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt.
AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT 285

NATOUSA headquarters, American and

British Ordnance Sections, the U.S. Fifth

Army, and the lend-lease representatives in

the theater. The last of such reports was

issued in September 1943.

There is no question of attributing to the

JRC the entire credit for the success of the

rehabilitation of the French North African

forces. The role played by other Allied

agencies cannot be minimized, nor can the

impressive achievements on the part of the

French themselves in setting up an armament machinery of their own be underestimated. In addition to establishing

SCAMA, the French High Command organized two special staff sections to deal

with rearmament problems. The first of

these was the Rearmament and Technical

Studies Section, headed by Lt. Col. Charles

Chanson. This section, with the assistance

of 1st and 2d Bureaux (G-1 and G-2) and

under the general direction of Colonel

Blanc, prepared the over-all rearmament

programs and determined the composition

of the successive phases, as well as the general plans of distribution of equipment.

The other section was the Poste de Statistique, created in March 1943 for the purpose of working out the details for the distribution of U.S. equipment to the units

designated for activation in first priority.29

Yet there is little doubt that the JRC did

represent the driving force which rallied

and co-ordinated all individual efforts and

guided them to a sound and fruitful accomplishment. It is likely that when they first

met in December 1942 the original members of the committee did not grasp the full

significance of the undertaking they were

embarking upon, or foresee the scope of the

task that lay ahead. Neither could they

visualize the ultimate, impressive results

of the rearmament operations. From a

stopgap committee with no plan but only

an idea, the JRC, in spite of its limitations,

had become in early 1944 a real power extending its arm into many fields of endeavor. Together with the other related

rearmament agencies, it had built up an

efficient and indispensable machinery ready

to undertake and, as later events amply

proved, quite able to effect the final forging of the North African forces. Both the

French and the Americans would long be

grateful to the JRC for the major role it had

played in making it possible for these forces

to assume their rightful share of the struggle against the common foe and, incidentally, in strengthening Franco-American friendship. They would also, in the

fall of 1944, draw from the record of its

experience valuable lessons on which to

base their plans for the second chapter,

then opening, in the rehabilitation of the

French forces in World War II: the rearmament of the Metropolitan forces.

The Joint Air Commission

Shortly after he was appointed Air member of the Joint Rearmament Committee on

24 August 1943, General Saville, Chief of

Staff, Mediterranean Air Command, came

to recognize two important points. First,

the establishment of a separate committee

to handle French air matters independently

of the JRC must be expedited. Such a

committee, in fact, was already in process

of organization.30 Second, sufficient authority must be vested in the air committee

to enable it to function from the start with

29 the maximum efficiency. To ensure that Marey, "Le Réarmement français en Afrique

du Nord (1942-1944)," Revue Politique et Parlementaire (November, 1947), pp. 139-40. 30

 See p. 202, above.
286 REARMING THE FRENCH

the agency when established would enjoy

such authority, General Eaker, Commanding General, Mediterranean Air Command,

decided to make its relationship with his

own command the closest possible one.

Consequently, he delegated his chief of staff,

General Saville, to represent Mediterranean Air Command on the Joint Air Commission when the latter was officially established on 6 September 1943.31

 No better

kinship between the two organizations could

have been devised. The assignment of a

key staff officer to a staff section would, as

later events amply proved, make for efficiency and speed in the carrying out of

important business.

JAC's position in the staff structure remained unchanged throughout the commission's existence. When, in mid-January

1944, Mediterranean Air Command and

Northwest African Air Forces were jointly

replaced by Mediterranean Allied Air

Forces, the JAC merely passed under the

control of the latter.

The orders establishing the JAC had stipulated that it was to be composed of three

air officers: one American, as chairman,

one British, and one French. Initially, the

three members were General Saville, chairman, Col. André Hartemann, representing

the French Air Force, and Group Capt. J.

Rock de Besombes, representing the Royal

Air Force. The French and British membership remained unchanged throughout

the commission's existence. Genera l

Saville left the JAC on 3 January 1944, to

assume the command of XII Tactical Air

Command, and turned the chairmanship

over to Brig. Gen. Patrick W. Timberlake

who incidentally had already succeeded him

as Chief of Staff, Mediterranean Air Command, three months earlier. General Timberlake remained on the commission only

one month, until 9 February when he was

replaced by Colonel Gardiner.32 After two

requests for Colonel Gardiner's services

with G-5, SHAEF, in London, Generals

Eaker and Devers consented in mid-April

1944 to relieve him but only after he had

indoctrinated Colonel Ervin, who had

come from the United Kingdom with General Eaker and was to become the fourth

and last chairman of the JAC. Colonel

Ervin officially replaced Colonel Gardiner

on 4 May 1944 and remained on the commission up to its disbandment in September

1944.33

Assisting the JAC was, initially, one secretary whose duty it was to prepare action

on the basis of agreements reached by the

three members. The first officer to serve in

that capacity was Flight Lt. A. L. W. R.

Henry (RAF), himself a staff officer of the

Establishment Section of the Mediterranean

Air Command. He was replaced, in November 1943, by Lt. Paul C. Sheeline

(U.S.) who remained on the commission to

the end of its operations. For several

months it was felt that nothing more than

the one-man executive staff was required.

When in need of assistance, the chairman

merely drew from personnel resources available to Mediterranean Air Command.

Thus American and British instructors,

liaison officers, and technicians were assigned, from time to time, to the French Air

Force. As JAC's activities increased, especially in the spring of 1944, it was deemed

necessary to enlarge the executive staff. At

the time of the dissolution of the commis31

 GO 9, Hq Mediterranean Air Comd, 6 Sep

43, JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt.

32

 Since his departure from the JRC, Colonel

Gardiner had been serving as A-2 with the 51st

Troop Carrier Wing in Sicily. 33

 Statements in Notes on Rearmt of FAF by

Gardiner, 6 Jul 51, copy in OCMH.
AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT 287

sion, the staff had reached a strength of

eleven officers and enlisted men, Americans

for the most part. Meanwhile the practice

of using personnel from MAAF as instructors and technicians had continued.

The wide scope of the activities carried

out by the JAC can be best estimated by

examining the journal kept by one of the

chairmen.34 In the field of training, they

covered such problems as the allocation of

training planes, material assistance and

visits to training centers, the sending of

pilots and mechanics to schools in the

United States. In the field of supply, JAC

handled such questions as the issue of post

exchange items, the issue of the Norden

bombsight, the inadequacy of the food ration, at one time reported to be a factor in

the high rate of accidents, the supply of

equipment to the Naval Air Arm.

Among the administrative problems handled by the JAC were the operational assignment of squadrons, the assignment of

U.S. liaison officers to FAF units and of

French staff officers to Allied air commands, finally, the advisability of making

available to the French the air intelligence

weekly summaries.35

In the course of their meetings which they

held at regular intervals, the three members

of the commission, having obtained beforehand the views of their respective commands, discussed the plans to be established

or the measures to be taken. As each member enjoyed the double advantage of having

the full confidence of his two colleagues and

sufficient authority from his own superiors,

the JAC as a whole could reach decisions

promptly and take proper action without

having to refer constantly to higher command echelons. In this connection, the

American member was in a most enviable

position. General Saville, as well as his

successor General Timberlake, could, by

virtue of the fact that they served in the dual

capacity of Chief of Staff, Mediterranean

Air Command, and chairman of the JAC,

obtain the speedy implementation of the decisions reached by the commission. For

them it was merely a matter of "picking

up one's hat in one place and putting it

down in another."36 The pattern was somewhat altered with the arrival of Colonel

Gardiner. But the latter immediately established the policy, in agreement with Brig.

Gen. Charles C. Chauncey, the new Chief

of Staff, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,

that the JAC would have authority to make

all minor decisions, submitting for approval

matters of importance or affecting policy.37

With the last chairman, Colonel Ervin, who

directly represented General Eaker on the

commission and therefore enjoyed fuller authority than his predecessor, the original

pattern was re-established.

In contrast with his compatriots on the

JRC, the French member of the JAC was

in a most favorable position. He enjoyed

a considerable degree of authority, for General Bouscat, Chief of Staff, FAF, had made

him his personal representative on the JAC

with full power to speak for him. As a

result, his American and British colleagues

regarded him as a partner member of equal

standing. Yet it would be inaccurate to

describe the commission as being entirely

tripartite in character, for policy matters

remained an exclusive Anglo-American

responsibility. When such matters needed

34

 Gardiner, Journal, 9 Feb-4 May 44, in Gardiner's private files. 35

 The British appear to have objected strongly

to making these reports available to the French.

At the insistence of the Americans, they finally

relented.

36

 Interv with Saville, Jul 51. 37

 Statement in Corres from Col Gardiner, 1951.
288 REARMING THE FRENCH

to be cleared with higher French authorities, they were brought directly to the

attention of General Bouscat who, frequently, was invited to come and present his

views in person before the commission.

The bonds of friendship established early

between him and the members of the JAC

made possible the speedy conclusion of

agreements. The co-operation which the

French Chief of Air Staff extended so willingly proved especially useful in the initial

period. After three days of frank and

thorough discussions regarding the capabilities and needs of the FAF, Generals

Saville and Bouscat came to a complete

understanding as to the goal to be achieved:

"not a lot of squadrons but an efficient air

force."38 This meeting of minds between

the two Chiefs of Staff, each stating freely

what his respective command was in a position to contribute, got the JAC off to an

excellent start.

Relations between General Bouscat and

General Saville's successors continued on

the same cordial and fruitful plane. By

the time of Colonel Ervin's chairmanship,

collaboration between French air command

and JAC was so firmly established that the

commission could reach most decisions on

Colonel Hartemann's sole recommendations without further reference to General

Bouscat. The several American members

consulted since the war on the matter have

highly commended the manner in which

Colonel Hartemann acquitted himself of

his functions. Likewise they have been

unanimous in their praise of the co-operative

spirit displayed by all responsible French

air authorities.39 Within the commission

itself, perfect teamwork on the part of men

naturally endowed with widely divergent

national idiosyncrasies and representing

three different air forces resulted in greater

efficiency and prevented dissipation of effort.

Co-operation with the JRC was established from the outset. This was essential

considering the role which the JRC

was expected to play in relation to the

JAC. With the JRC rested the responsibility for ensuring the shipment from the

United States of the air equipment ordered

by the JAC, and for requisitioning all

items common to air and ground forces

requested by the commission. The necessary co-operation was achieved simply by

making the chairman of the JAC the ex

officio air member of the JRC. Co-operation was further strengthened by the fact

that the JRC liaison officer with the French

Air Force, Maj. John W. Ames—who, incidentally, had a desk at General Bouscat's

headquarters—also worked closely with the

JAC.

SCAMA and Stock Control Section

Both SCAMA and Stock Control Section, JRC, worked toward the same goal,

the establishment of a French central supply authority similar to the American SOS.

It is fitting therefore that, after a brief

study of the organization and evolution of

each, an account be given of their common

operating procedures.40

Organization of SCAMA

In establishing SCAMA the directive of

15 October 1943 made the agency directly

38

 Interv with Saville, Jul 51. 39

 Intervs with Saville and Ervin, Jul 51; Corres

from Gardiner, 1951.

40

 For the background of their establishment

and an account of their achievements, see pp.

132-38, 174-76, above.

290 REARMING THE FRENCH

responsible to 4e Bureau (G-4) of the

French General Staff. In this manner

SCAMA was to enjoy a status equal to that

of the services. Its high position in the

chain of command was expected to enable

it to deal authoritatively with other agencies. Such would have been the case had

the services extended their full co-operation. As pointed out earlier, it was not

until SCAMA's authority had been

redefined in stronger terms, especially by

the 9 January 1944 directive, that the

necessary co-operation was gradually

effected.41

The 9 January 1944 directive also prescribed the internal organization of

SCAMA, although, by a curious contradiction, it empowered the director to set

forth its composition, internal co-ordination, and functioning.42

 The director,

Col. Emile Charpentier, himself appointed by General Leyer, had no alternative but to follow the pattern established

in the directive.

When its organization was completed,

SCAMA included a central agency and

field echelons. (Chart 4) At the head

of the entire system was the director, stationed in the headquarters of the central

agency set up in Oran in proximity with

SOS, NATOUSA. The central agency

was composed of a clerical staff, a coordinating group, four bureaus whose

functions corresponded approximately to

those of a general staff in the American

Army, and five sections each representing

one of the French services, namely, Ordnance, Engineers, Medical, Signal, and

Quartermaster. A sixth section was

eventually added to handle air matters.

Also considered operationally part of the

central agency was the Stock Control

Section.

The field echelons comprised the military bases in the ports of embarkation and

debarkation, a liaison detachment with

SOS, a mobile group for technical liaison

with depots and warehouses, and various

representatives with the services and the

General Staff. Over all of these echelons

SCAMA had exclusive authority. In

addition its jurisdiction extended, but only

insofar as the movement of matériel and

supplies and the keeping of records were

concerned, to all service establishments.

Thanks to this intricate but necessary

organization, SCAMA was able to keep

a finger on the pulse of the entire French

supply system.

Organization of Stock

Control Section

Stock Control Section, JRC, was organized on 5 November 1943 under the command of Colonel Geraghty.43

 As SOS,

NATOUSA, had given him no instructions

as to what specific duties his section was to

fulfill, Colonel Geraghty merely set out

to meet problems as they were presented

by the French and to "assume responsibilities growing out of these problems as a

matter of course."44

When he had recruited enough specialists to begin operations, Colonel Geraghty

organized them into five branches corresponding to the five sections of SCAMA—

41

 See p. 137, above. 42

 Dir 3751-3 EMGG/4, 15 Oct 43; Dir 5499-3

EMGG/4, 25 Nov 43; Dir 340 EMGG/9, 9 Jan

44, JRC 400.2/002 Stock Control Section.

43

 Unless otherwise indicated, this section is

based upon Col Michael Geraghty, The History

of the Stock Control Section, JRC, copy in JRC

Files. 44

 Memo, Geraghty for Larkin, 8 Jul 44,

JRC 400.2/002 Stock Control System, SCAMA.
AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT 291

Engineer, Ordnance, Medical, Signal, and

Quartermaster. Each branch was then

subdivided into four groups—requisition,

stock control, technical, and warehousing.

Assisting the commanding officer was an

executive officer and the Administrative

Branch. Close liaison with the JRC was

maintained through Colonel Crump, a

member of the committee.

Finding sufficient trained personnel

constituted one of the major problems facing Colonel Geraghty. During the first

four months his section hardly increased in

numerical strength because U.S. Army replacement depots could furnish few officers

and enlisted men with adequate supply

experience. It was not until February

1944, with the arrival from the United

States of a substantial number of personnel

dispatched at the request of Colonel Geraghty, that the situation began to improve.

Eventually the section grew to a strength

of some 50 officers and 100 enlisted men.45

Another major difficulty confronting the

section was its inability, in spite of repeated

efforts, to secure official status and to obtain

a table of organization. For this reason

the officers and men employed by the section were "loaned" from replacement centers and placed on detached service with,

or assigned as overstrength to, French

Training Section, or more accurately,

2674th Headquarters Company, JRC

(Provisional). They were attached to the

service company of Mediterranean Base

Section for rations and quarters, with the

understanding, however, that they were to

be employed by Stock Control Section.

Lack of official recognition made each administrative detail a major problem for the

solution of which various commands had to

be approached. The section found it particularly difficult to obtain the vehicles

which it needed to carry out its duties.

Thus efficiency and progress were frequently

retarded.

The function of the officers and men of

each of the five technical branches was to

assist their French counterparts in SCAMA

by imparting to them their knowledge of

supply. This method of placing U.S. personnel side by side with corresponding

French personnel proved to be the most advantageous way of giving maximum onthe-spot assistance and advice to the French.

In spite of its inherent limitations, Stock

Control Section succeeded in reaching its

goal. There is little doubt that without its

fine performance, the "SCAMA system"

might well never have been firmly established.

Stock Control Section ceased to function

in late July 1944.

Operating Procedures

SCAMA and Stock Control Section followed three basic principles in carrying out

their operations. These principles, which

corresponded to three major goals to be

reached, were embodied in Colonel Charpentier's operational instruction dated 26

January 1944.46

First, and to quote from the instruction,

all records maintained by SCAMA were to

be based on the actual existence of stocks in

warehouses. To apply this principle required that a complete physical inventory

be conducted of all matériel and supplies

in French hands. As already stated, such

an inventory proved impracticable for many

months owing especially to lack of sufficient

45

 Ibid.

46

 Gen Instruction on Functioning of SCAMA,

26 Jan 44, in Geraghty, History of Stock Control

Section, App B, JRC Files.
292 REARMING THE FRENCH

trained personnel in French establishments.

In fact it did not take place until 15 May

1944. Only then did SCAMA have, for the

first time, a fairly complete and accurate

picture of stocks on hand throughout North

Africa.

Second, a "common language" had to

be established. The 26 January instruction itself provided a number of definitions

for words currently used in French and

American services. This was a welcome

step, for misunderstandings had frequently

resulted from differences in French and

American definitions of the same words. In

using the term requisition, for instance, the

French meant a delivery order given to a

depot by a qualified authority, or an approved requisition. The Americans, on the

other hand, were using it to mean a request

submitted by a unit within the limits of its

rights of allowances. For this and other

similar terms, definitions in simple and clear

language were established once and for all.

Thus a common technical vocabulary, including such English words as tally-in,

tally-out, bin cards and French terms such

as gestion, demande de réquisition, réserve

d'entretien, was compiled for compulsory

use by all personnel concerned, French as

well as American. Much later, in 1944,

SCAMA published a complete French-English technical dictionary which was made

available throughout the various interested

agencies and armies.

Third, information as collected within

the SCAMA system was to be given on convenient, thoroughly understood, standard

forms for use by all concerned. To achieve

this objective, Colonels Geraghty and

Charpentier first proceeded to eliminate

some of the thirty-odd forms and cards then

in use throughout the French services.

They finally adopted six standard forms,

three stock cards, and one stock identification tag, or ten in all.

Obviously the common aim of these

principles was to achieve standardization.

To make it as nearly 100-percent complete

as possible, Colonels Geraghty and Charpentier took other steps. They agreed that

every article, whether it be a unit containing minor items, an assembly of various

parts, or a part detached and considered

separately, was to be designated by the

American stock number and nomenclature.47

 They also prescribed a method for

tagging and identifying U.S. equipment at

all echelons and made its application compulsory. Finally, they issued definite instructions illustrated by charts on the

procedure for the reception and handling

of American matériel from debarkation

base to warehouses and on to units in process

of re-equipping. Briefly the procedure was

as follows. Upon the arrival of the cargo

ship, the base commandant checked the

French shipment against the ship's manifest,

separated the matériel according to service,

and forwarded it to the designated place of

storage. He then sent a detailed report of

this phase of his activities to SCAMA. At

the storage plant, boxes and bales were

turned over to the services where they were

classified and inventoried. The entry of

every item into magasins (warehouses) was

recorded on a tally-in card. A bin card

describing the item, its location, and stock

number was then made and filed in the

warehouse office, and a bin tag giving the

description as well as the English and

French name of the item was prepared for

identification in the warehouse. A tallyout card was filled after an item had left

a warehouse. All officers in charge were

warned that periodic inspections by French

47

 Ibid.
AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT 293

and U.S. officers would be made to determine the accuracy of all information so

recorded.

As a result of the application of these various measures and procedures, SCAMA, in

due time, was placed in a position where it

had an accurate record of (1) arrivals of

equipment at the port, (2) actual receipts

of items in warehouses, (3) actual issues of

items from warehouses, and (4) physical

inventories. Thus could SCAMA fulfill

one of its main missions, that of keeping

the French High Command informed at all

times of the exact status of American matériel available in French hands.

French Training Section

The formal activation of French Training Section as an agency of the U.S. Fifth

Army occurred on 13 May 1943, concurrently with the appointment of General

Kingman as its chief.48 The section was

the successor to the Rearmament Advisory

Section established earlier in April. Stationed at first at Oudjda, French Morocco,

FTS moved in August to Oran, Algeria,

where General Kingman set up headquarters and remained for the following fourteen

months.49

FTS retained close contact with the various agencies which, before its own activation, had taken part in the French training

program, such as G-3 and G-4, AFHQ,

SOS, NATOUSA, and to a limited extent,

the JRC. As these agencies continued to

maintain an interest in certain aspects of

the program, General Kingman reported

frequently to them on the progress of his

own activities. The JRC, however, gradually assumed a more extensive role of coordination and, within a short time, gave

more attention to the activities of the FTS

than the other agencies. General Kingman and the JRC began working in closer

association. They exchanged information

on their day-to-day activities, and together

planned the over-all training program, JRC

often acting as intermediary between FTS

and the French High Command.

Soon after the distribution of the first

substantial allocations of American equipment in May-June 1943, the JRC recognized the need of giving units immediate

instruction in the proper use and maintenance of their newly acquired matériel. As

the official clearinghouse for all rearmament matters, the committee felt that its

own activities and those of FTS must be

integrated to provide maximum assistance.

By August, with the equipment ordered as

part of Phase II then on its way, integration

of JRC and FTS seemed so logical to General Kingman himself that he suggested the

transfer of his section from the control of

Fifth Army to that of NATOUSA, and

recommended that his personnel be made

available for use under the general supervision of the JRC.50

 General Kingman's

proposal was accepted, and on or about 14

August his section passed under the control

of the JRC. Thereafter it was known officially as the French Training Section, JRC.

A few days later, on 25 August 1943, by

NATOUSA order, the personnel of FTS

was organized into the 2674th Headquarters Company, JRC (Provisional). The

48

 This section draws upon the JRC Files: 330/

001 Inspections—Misc, 330/002 Inspections by

Gen Kingman, 330/003 Rpts of FTS, 350/001

Training Rpts of Observers, 350/002 Training Fr

Army Units, 350/003 (Continuation of 350/002);

and SHAEF Mission to France, Rearmt Div Files:

320-1 Orgn and Function, 353-1 Training. 49

 See pp. 231 ff., above.

50

 Ltr, Kingman to Spalding, 9 Aug 43, JRC

353/003 Training Fr Army Personnel.
294 REARMING THE FRENCH

company, which enjoyed the unique distinction of being commanded by a brigadier

general, was placed under the administrative control of Headquarters, Mediterranean Base Section, and assigned for operational duty with the JRC. Shortly after,

in September, the personnel of Armored

Force Detachment, which had been

brought over in June from the Middle

East to instruct French armored units, was

organized into the 6704th Armored Force

Training Company and placed under the

administrative control first of MBS and in

May 1944 of SOS, NATOUSA. The two

units merged, later in the year, as the 2674th

Regiment, JRC, the administrative unit for

the FTS. By this time, FTS had reached a

strength of some 50 officers and 400 enlisted men. Because of the highly technical

nature of the armored force training program, and the fact that a large number of

armored units were still to be trained, FTS

underwent another change in organization

just before the end of training operations

in North Africa. It was split into the two

original component organizations, namely,

the 2674th Company, JRC, and the 6704th

Armored Force Training Company. In

October 1944 the two components, with a

total strength of 643 officers and men,

moved to Marseille. Soon after, the 2674th

Company, JRC, was disbanded and, on 1

November, the remaining unit was reorganized as the 6834th Training Regiment,

JRC.51

The arrangement by which FTS had

been placed under the control of JRC was

not designed to decrease the authority of

the former or to subordinate it in any way

to the JRC, rather to obtain the greatest

co-operation possible between the two

agencies. Although the chairman of the

Joint Rearmament Committee issued orders

to the FTS, these were usually initiated at

the instigation and always with the complete

concurrence of General Kingman. Liaison

was effected by Colonel Knox who served

as the FTS representative on the JRC.

Colonel Knox continued in this capacity

until the end of the North African rearmament operations.52

 Possibly because of the

technical requirements involved and of the

need for continuity in the program, the key

personnel of FTS changed very little. General Kingman and his American and French

assistants carried on this assignment during

almost the entire period.

General Kingman's selection as director

of FTS appears to have been due to his

knowledge of U.S. equipment, especially

armor, his knowledge of the French language and of the French Army, which he

greatly improved while attending the Centre

d'Etude des Chars de Combat at Versailles

in 1923-24, and the fact that as a general

officer he held a rank commensurate with

the functions involved. French officers interviewed since the war have been unanimous in their praise of General Kingman's keen understanding of the training

and material problems then facing the

French Army, and of his ability in developing a sound and effective program.53

General Kingman's deputy was Colonel

L'Huillier of the French Army. His official

51

 Much later, on 11 January 1945, the regiment,

renamed 6834th Rearmament Regiment, served as

the training organization for the Rearmament Division, SHEAF Mission to France. See pp. 386, 387,

below.

52

 As a vice consul in Algiers, Colonel Knox had

taken an active part in the secret preparations for

the Allied landings of November 1942. 53

 Intervs with L'Huillier, Tiers, Devinck, Regnault. In recognition of General Kingman's work

in training the North African forces, the French

Army awarded him the Order of the Legion of

Honor (Chevalier) in September 1944. See also

p. 388n, below.
AGENCIES HANDLING REARMAMENT 295

title was Chief, French Liaison Section with

FTS. Before his appointment to that post

on 18 August 1943, he had been assistant

to his predecessors, Col. Raoul Bonvalot and

later Lt. Col. René Préclaire, each of whom

served only a short term. Colonel

L'Huillier's main responsibility consisted in

effecting the necessary spadework before

each inspection conducted by the FTS. Assisting the deputy were several French officers, among them Lt. Claude Tiers, who

participated in the activities of FTS from

July 1943 to the end of the North African

rearmament operations.54

The officers whom General Kingman detailed as senior advisers to the divisions contributed greatly to the success of FTS. Not

only did their daily presence among the

troops help the latter considerably during

the training phase, but their gallant conduct under fire, in the case of those who accompanied the divisions to Italy, drew from

the French no small degree of admiration.

These senior advisers were: 1st DB, Capt.

Henry Jacobson, later, Lt. Col. Everett A.

Luckenbach; 2d DB, Maj. Robert M.

Luminaski; 5th DB, Lt. Col. Robert W.

Burke; 1st DMI, Lt. Col. W. C. Parnell

(in North Africa only) and Lt. C. S. Campbell (who accompanied the Reconnaisance

Regiment in Italy); 2d DIM, Lt. Col. Roy

Stephens; 3d DIA, Lt. Col. Robert J. Shaw;

4th DMM, Maj. Archibald W. Green; 9th

DIC, Lt. Col. C. H. Cheatham. No advisers were attached to the Moroccan

tabors, only teams, none of which, however,

accompanied them to Italy.

The success of the program instituted by

the FTS, attested to frequently by French

and U.S. military authorities both during and after World War II, is due largely

to the manner in which the section itself was organized and the way it operated. Having sensed that the closest

co-operation between his staff and the

French must be effected in arranging for

the instruction and inspection of units, General Kingman resolved to make of the

FTS a mixed French-U.S. organization. Not only did he see to it that the

teams sent to inspect units were bipartite in

nationality, but, in addition, he requested

and obtained the assignment to the section

of French officers and made the French

senior officer his own deputy. This system

had many obvious advantages. Not only

did Colonel L'Huillier participate in the

planning and implementation of the training and inspection programs, thereby

ensuring that these would be consonant

with French capabilities and desires, but he

was able to act as liaison between FTS and

French unit commanders. In addition, if

it became necessary to consult the French

High Command before reaching a decision

affecting policy, he could judiciously advise

General Kingman on how best to approach

the responsible officials, General Leyer and

Colonel Blanc in particular.

The responsibility for making all necessary arrangements with French commanders regarding the training and inspection

of their respective units rested largely with

the deputy. To him also fell the task of

preparing, on the basis of individual afterinspection reports submitted by the various

teams, the synthesis which General Kingman used for the drafting of his final report

to the Joint Rearmament Committee.

In June, July, and August 1944, French

Training Section inspected nearly all

French training establishments to determine the degree of efficiency of the training

54

 Lieutenant Tiers was awarded the Bronze Star

Medal in December 1945.
296 REARMING THE FRENCH

program and to check on the state of preparedness of units being trained. At the

end of August, as the North African program was drawing to an end and the

French themselves were assuming the

responsibility for the training of replacement troops, plans were made for moving

FTS to the Continent. On 25 September

an advance party consisting of a few officers

and enlisted men reached Marseille.

Another party arrived soon after, General

Kingman meanwhile remaining in North

Africa to instruct and inspect the last program units. On 8 October General Kingman and Colonel L'Huillier left Oran for

Marseille, turning over the supervision of

the remaining FTS activities in North

Africa to Col. Richard F. Fairchild. Shortly

after his arrival in France and while at

Headquarters, 6th Army Group, en route

to 1st French Army, General Kingman,

Colonel L'Huillier, and personal staff were

ordered to Paris to establish a French

Training Section there. The rear echelon

commanded by Colonel Fairchild was composed of about six officers and fifteen

enlisted men. As these men also moved

to France on or about 15 November, all

FTS activities ceased in North Africa.55

55

 Msg LX-46516, Larkin to CG MBS, 11 Oct

44, JRC 320/001 Orgn of JRC.
PART TWO

THE METROPOLITAN FORCES

CHAPTER XVIII

Initial Assistance

Even while they were supplying arms to

the North African ground, air, and naval

forces, Allied officials as well as the French

High Command gave considerable attention

to two other important logistical problems

connected with French participation in the

war. One was the continuance of material

assistance to the increasing number of

patriots engaged in subversive operations

against the German forces occupying the

mother country. The other was the eventual provision of equipment to the forces

likely to be raised upon the liberation of any

part of France.

Supplying arms to the French Resistance

began before the North African rearmament operations and continued simultaneously with them. Until the cross-Channel

operation (OVERLORD), the commitment

was largely a British one. From OVERLORD

on, the United States, which by that time

was assuming an increasing share of the

burden, was more seriously concerned, as

was Britain, with the larger aspect of

the problem, namely, the equipping of

French liberated manpower. Indeed, plans

as formulated by SHAEF contemplated

that, as fast as Resistance groups were

overrun by advancing Allied armies, they

were to be incorporated, as all other

liberated manpower recruited for service,

into regular Army or labor units. It appears logical, therefore, in view of the U.S.

role in the matter, to consider the two problems—material assistance to the Resistance

and provision of equipment to liberated

manpower—as part of one single undertaking, the rearmament of the Metropolitan

forces.

Supply of the Resistance Forces

Organization

In the fall of 1940 two agencies were established in London for the purpose of maintaining in France a will to resist the enemy,

and of providing patriots with material

means for conducting subversive operations

against the occupying forces. One of these

agencies was a staff section of General de

Gaulle's headquarters, known first as

Service de Renseignements (SR), later as

Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (Militaire) (BCRA). The other was a

British organization, known as the French

Section of Special Operations Executive

(SOE), the latter being responsible to the

Ministry of Economic Warfare.1

Although the BCRA enjoyed a substantial measure of autonomy, it was, nevertheless, entirely dependent upon SOE for

obtaining the material means with which to

carry out its operations. As a result the

brunt of the task of assisting the Resistance

rested on SOE and the other British agencies

(the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the

War Office, the Admiralty) upon which

SOE itself was dependent for support. Be1

 The French Forces of the Interior, MS, I, 3,

copy in OCMH. See Bibliographical Note.
300 REARMING THE FRENCH

ginning with the spring of 1941, SOE, together with BCRA, infiltrated into France

British as well as British-trained French

leaders, agents, radio operators, intelligence

officers, and saboteurs. Most were

dropped by parachute, although some went

by sea. SOE also dropped such small

amounts of equipment and supplies as were

permitted by meager air transport facilities.

Working in collaboration with SOE, from

1942 on, was a special Committee on Equipment for Patriot Forces appointed by the

British Chiefs of Staff to consider the problems of equipment for Resistance groups

and liberated manpower.

In the summer of 1942 a Special Operations branch of the American Office of

Strategic Services (OSS) was set up in

London, bringing into being an American

counterpart of SOE which, although independent of the British organization,

worked in close collaboration with it.

This co-operation led to the unification of

the operational control of the London

group of SOE and the Special Operations

branch of OSS-London, and to the establishment, during the last months of 1943,

of a single headquarters known first as

SOE/SO and later, on 1 May 1944, as

Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ).

Such activities of SOE/SO as fell within

the sphere of the Supreme Commander for

western Europe were placed under the operational control of his chief of staff.2

Determined that fuller assistance should

be given to the French Resistance, Prime

Minister Churchill organized, in January 1944, a special informal committee

headed by Lord Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare, and composed of representatives of SOE, OSS, BCRA, and the Air

Ministry. The committee was instructed

to devise ways and means of increasing the

flow of military equipment, because airlift

rather than availability of matériel was still

the limiting factor in supplying Resistance

groups.3

Finally, to complete the organization of

assistance to the Resistance, a Mediterranean counterpart of SFHQ was established on 14 May 1944 under the name of

Special Project Operations Center

(SPOC). Its function was to implement

SHAEF's control over Resistance groups in

southern France.4

Meanwhile, the BCRA was continuing its

relatively independent existence. With

the approach of the cross-Channel operation, the need was felt for more co-ordination, not only between the Resistance

groups and Allied agencies engaged in their

support, but also between the activities

themselves of the various agencies involved.

As a preliminary step, on 6 June the Resistance forces, renamed officially Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (FFI), or French

Forces of the Interior, were placed under

the command of Lt. Gen. Pierre Koenig,

who was to operate directly under the command of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Two weeks later, at the

insistence of the French, SHAEF approved

the constitution of a tripartite headquarters

and staff to co-ordinate all Allied activities

in support of the FFI. The staff, called

Etat-Major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (EMFFI), with headquarters in

London and commanded by General Koenig, was composed of representatives from

SFHQ, BCRA, SOE, OSS, and other

2

 SHAEF G-3 Ops C 322-7 (2 and 3) SFHQ

Orgn and Terms of Reference.

3

 Msg B-270, Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 Mar

44, ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 2-A. 4

 Memo, Wilson To All Concerned, 14 May 44,

AFHQ History of Special Operations, Mediterranean Theater, 1944-45, DRB AGO.
INITIAL ASSISTANCE 301

agencies. Finally on 8 July, in anticipation

of the launching of ANVIL, the command of

the FFI in southern France was vested in

Maj. Gen. Gabriel Cochet under the supreme command of General Wilson.5

American Contribution

Before the establishment of SOE/SO

(hereafter referred to as SFHQ) in the fall

of 1943, the effort to arm the French Resistance had been solely British. Even for a

short period afterward, the effort continued

to be largely British. Except for three

planes operating from North Africa, U.S.

air force commands were reported to be

unable to place the necessary aircraft and

specially trained crews at the disposal of

SFHQ. The sum total of Anglo-American

assistance was still inadequate, this at a time

when some 50,000 Frenchmen who had fled

to mountainous and wooded areas were said

to be organizing into Maquis, or guerrilla

groups. With many thousands more expected to join, it was imperative that Allied

effort to supply them with arms and equipment be sharply increased. Already the

men in the Maquis were reported to be

growing impatient, even indignant at what

they regarded as Allied unwillingness to

keep promises. U.S. political representatives in Algiers were warning that the situation was fraught with military, psychological, and political dangers.6

It was not until January 1944 that, at the

direction of the British Prime Minister, who

had just discussed the matter with General

de Gaulle, substantial additional temporary

British airlift was made available to SFHQ.

By February the British were carrying out

their commitment with the utmost vigor and

were reported to be giving very high priority

to the undertaking.7

In the meantime, the first American

transport planes to be permanently assigned

to SFHQ for operation from the United

Kingdom had, in January 1944, begun to

fly supply missions over northern France.

Attempts by the chief of OSS, Brig. Gen.

William J. Donovan, to get an increased

allotment of American aircraft were unsuccessful. As the Combined Chiefs of Staff

were informed in February, the U.S. Army

Air Forces warned that it could not for the

present divert any more airplanes to SFHQ.

It could only authorize local air commanders to use such aircraft as in their opinion

could be spared for the purpose.8

By March the disproportion between the

British and the American efforts was so

great (approximately ten to one) that the

impression was reported to be gaining

credence among French officials in North

Africa and in the United Kingdom that,

not only was the undertaking an entirely

British one, but the United States was even

opposed to arming the French underground

for political reasons.9 Eager to counteract

the unjustified comment being directed

against the U.S. Government, the Secretary

of State, Cordell Hull, sought the views of

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the matter. On

17 April General Marshall furnished Hull 5

 The French Forces of the Interior, II, 425, copy

in OCMH; Memo, Wilson To All Concerned, 8 Jul

44, AFHQ History of Special Operations,

Mediterranean Theater, 1944-45, DRB AGO. 6

 Msgs, Edwin C. Wilson to Cordell Hull, 110,

11 Jan 44, and 129, 12 Jan 44, and Memo, McCloy

for OPD, 27 Jan 44, ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43),

Sec 2-A.

7

 Msg ML-382, Donovan, OSS, to Eaker, 11 Feb

44, AFHQ 0100/12A G-3 Div Ops BIGOT Fr. 8

 Min, CCS 145th Mtg, 11 Feb 44; Memo, JPS

for JCS, 13 Apr 44, ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43),

Sec 2-A. 9

 Memo, Cordell Hull for Leahy, 20 Mar 44, in

same file.
302 REARMING THE FRENCH

with information which, he hoped, would

help in dispelling "any impression that may

exist that the U.S. is less aware than the

British of the potential importance of the

French Resistance groups, and less willing

than the British to utilize the very valuable

aid the underground can render to our operations." Marshall explained, first of all,

that the committee organized in London by

the Prime Minister was, according to General Eisenhower himself, working "in full

cooperation with and under the general

supervision of" the Supreme Commander.

As for the supplies dropped to French Resistance groups, they were, in a large part,

furnished by the United States. General

Marshall then reminded Secretary Hull that

the United States had been engaged for

some twelve months in equipping a French

expeditionary force "comparable in size to

our own peace-time army," an undertaking,

he added, to which the British had made no

substantial contribution.10

At the same time the French Committee

of National Liberation had approached

both the American and British Governments

with the suggestion that a special conference be held in London for the purpose of

increasing further the flow of military

equipment into France. The U.S. Chiefs

of Staff seized the occasion to clarify the

American position on the matter by pointing out to the CCS that the special committee already functioning in London rendered the French suggestion inopportune.

Such was the substance of a message which,

at the request of the JCS, the CCS addressed to General Eisenhower on 24 April

1944.11

It was then that a disquieting report

reached Secretary Hull which quoted General de Gaulle as having expressed, in the

course of a press conference given in Algiers

on 21 April, his satisfaction at British efforts to supply the Resistance, efforts which,

he implied, were solely British.12 Such a

statement, in the opinion of the Secretary of

State, could not remain unanswered.13 Apprised of the incident, the JCS agreed with

Hull's suggestion to draw the matter to the

immediate attention of the responsible

American military and civil authorities in

Algiers and in London. In the belief that

it could be more effectively handled at CCS

level, JCS drafted a message for General de

Gaulle and proposed to the representatives

of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington

that it be delivered to him via General

Wilson.14 The communication, intended to

clarify the apparent misunderstanding indicated by General de Gaulle's statement to

the press, pointed out that the arming of

the Resistance had, for some three months

past, been a joint U.S.-British effort, not

an exclusive one of either nation; that the

matériel dropped in France was being drawn

from a common pool; finally, that the entire

operation itself was under the control of

both the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Supreme Allied

Commander in the Mediterranean. This

message, incidentally, never was sent. The

British Chiefs of Staff having subsequently

indicated informally that they did not in10

 Memo, Marshall for Hull, 17 Apr 44, in same

file.

11

 Msg FACS 18, CCS to Eisenhower, 24 Apr 44,

in same file.

12

 The exact words of General de Gaulle were:

"Je puis vous dire avec beaucoup de satisfaction

que, depuis trois mois, les efforts de nos alliés

britanniques—car ce sont eux qui en ont le mérite—

pour armer la Résistance française ont été grands

et couronnés de succès." Text in de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, p. 434. 13

 Memo, Hull for Marshall, 26 Apr 44, ABC

400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 2-A. 14

 Memo, JCS for Hull, 29 May 44, in same file.
INITIAL ASSISTANCE 303

tend to take any action on the issue, the

JCS decided, in August, to withdraw their

original proposal.15

General Eisenhower, meanwhile, had

taken the matter in his own hands. In a

message to the JCS dated 1 May, supplemented by a personal letter to General

Marshall, he reviewed the situation with

respect to American material assistance to

the Resistance forces. He recognized that,

in the past, the effort had been predominantly British since no U.S. aircraft had

been made available for airlift to France

until 1 January 1944, and only a very few

thereafter. But the situation had changed

considerably in recent weeks. Exclusive

of aircraft operating from North Africa,

the number of planes as then permanently allotted to SFHQ in the United

Kingdom was 32 American as against 22

British. The British, it was true, had

made available to SFHQ supplementary

airlift averaging approximately 65 aircraft

per month since February. Plans were

afoot to increase the permanent U.S. allotment by 25 aircraft. In addition. U.S.

supplies were being drawn upon by SFHQ

at an increasing rate. Given adequate

personnel and means both in the United

Kingdom and in North Africa, the United

States would shortly be in a position to

"equalize" its effort with that of the

British.16

A few days later, General Devers, commanding general of the U.S. forces in North

Africa, likewise reported on the situation

as it related to his theater. Judging from

the figures he quoted in a message to General Marshall, the American contribution

in terms of tonnage of supplies delivered

was still greatly inferior to that of the British. But an improvement was in sight, for

9 U.S. aircraft had just been added to the

3 operating from that theater.17

A compilation of the data contained in

the messages from Generals Eisenhower

and Devers was immediately forwarded by

General Marshall to President Roosevelt.

The memorandum assured the President

that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had the matter

"under continuing review" and that General Eisenhower had advised that he would

explain fully to the French in London the

position of the U.S. Government in the

matter.18

By mid-May the American effort had

sharply increased and General Eisenhower

was able to report that, under the current

allotment of aircraft to SFHQ, the Americans could now deliver 160 tons a month as

against 132 tons from the British. Furthermore, an additional allotment of U.S.

aircraft, just granted, would make it possible to raise the figure for the American

effort to 280 tons by 1 July 1944.19 That

this was not wishful thinking, but a firm

intent to expand American participation

in the combined commitment, was amply

substantiated by later events.

Meanwhile, units of the French Forces

of the Interior, particularly active since the

beginning of the year, were redoubling

preparations in anticipation of the forthcoming Allied landings. From 6 June,

when OVERLORD was launched, to the end

of July, the period of the battle in Normandy, they embarked on large-scale

15

 CCS 492/4, 29 May 44, JCS Memo, 3 Jul 44,

and other papers, in same file. 16

 Msgs S-51066, Eisenhower to JCS, 1 May 44,

and S-51396, Eisenhower to Marshall, 6 May 44,

in same file.

17

 Msg, Devers to Marshall, 5 May 44, CM-IN

3917. 18

 Memo, Actg CofS for President, 8 May 44,

ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 2-A. 19

 Msg S-52023, Eisenhower to Marshall, 17

May 44, SHAEF SGS 475/1, Vol. I, Policy.
304 REARMING THE FRENCH

guerrilla and sabotage operations. To

co-ordinate their effort with that of the

assaulting Allied forces, assist further in

their organization and supply, and

strengthen their fighting potential, EMFFI

dispatched to them by parachute, from the

United Kingdom and North Africa, several thousand American, British, and

French Commandos, liaison officers, and

other troops. The Commandos included

11 U.S. Operations Groups, each composed of 4 officers and 30 men, and the

British Special Air Service (SAS) Brigade,

of which two battalions were French—the

2d and 3d Parachute Regiments. The

liaison troops comprised some 90 threemen teams (called "Jedburgh" from the

name of the small town in southern Scotland), each composed of 1 American or

British officer, 1 French officer, and 1 noncommissioned officer acting as signalman.

Other personnel included individual agents

(organizers, leaders, sabotage experts) and

missions (command staffs, medical teams),

all drawn from the ranks of the three

nations.

In some areas, the FFI acted spontaneously and without sufficient co-ordination with the Allied High Command. In

southern France the revolt against the German forces gathered too much momentum

to be checked. General Donovan feared

that failure to support the FFI troops in

that area on a sufficient scale to prevent

their liquidation by the enemy would not

only destroy a valuable military asset but

produce unfavorable political repercussions.20

 With this in view, OSS arranged

to have additional U.S. aircraft assigned

for a mass daylight supply drop, the first

such undertaking in the European Theater

of Operations. The venture, which took

place on 25 June, was highly successful.

Five combat wings of the 3d Bombardment

Division, U.S. Eighth Air Force, representing 180 bombers, delivered to some 20,000

guerrillas scattered over four separate areas

in southern France more than 300 tons of

supplies, mostly American, all packed in

some 2,000 American containers by personnel in OSS packing stations. It had

been a "100-percent-American show" and

the Prime Minister was then urged to put

on a similar British performance. A week

later, General Donovan, writing to General Marshall, prefaced his account of the

operation as follows: "It is now possible to

publicize our aid to the French Resistance

and thus to cultivate for the U.S. the good

will of the French people." The chief of

OSS then voiced the belief that the daylight

operation had been "a tremendous morale

builder" and had generated gratitude from

the FFI. One Maquis leader had expressed his feelings in these words: "The

Maquis' thanks to the U.S. Air Force for

damned good show! When is the next?"

 21

The next was to follow soon; in fact it took

place on 14 July, Bastille Day. It, too,

was a 100-percent-American operation.

On 22 July General Donovan summed up

for the benefit of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

the American effort expended since 1 January to assist the French Resistance. In

addition to infiltrating about 70 U.S. agents,

American planes had dropped all together

some 6,000 containers and 2,000 packages

packed by OSS, representing 1,000 tons

gross weight of arms and equipment.22

By then, the FFI had grown by leaps and

20

 Memo, Donovan for Marshall, 9 Jul 44, ABC

400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 2-A.

21

 Ibid.; Rpt, OSS Opn ZEBRA, 24 Jul 44, in same

file.

22

 Memo, Donovan for JCS, 22 Jul 44, in same

file.
INITIAL ASSISTANCE 305

FRENCH FORCES OF THE INTERIOR at a staging area in southern England,

about to receive American clothing and equipment before returning to duty in France, October

1944.

bounds to an approximate strength of 200,-

000 men. Even with the limited armament at their disposal, these men were

rendering considerable assistance to the

advancing Allied armies by fighting the

enemy behind his own lines. They were

blowing up bridges, cutting rail lines and

wire communications, and setting up roadblocks and ambushes, all so effectively that

enemy units, even armored divisions, were

hopelessly cut off and, in the case of some,

unable to reach the battle area in time or

in a condition to fight. As both the War

Department and the War Office were having difficulty in supplying equipment on a

scale much larger than originally contemplated, General Eisenhower requested and

obtained from the CCS the authorization to

issue to Resistance forces on a temporary

basis captured enemy matériel, largely small

arms.23

Throughout the summer, areas containing the scattered groups of FFI were, one by

one, overrun by the victorious Allied troops.

By October, with most of France liberated,

some 60,000-75,000 Maquis were still actively engaged against the German pockets

23

 Msgs, SCAF 59, Eisenhower to CCS, 2 Aug

44, and FACS 56, CCS to Eisenhower, 15 Aug

44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5.
306 REARMING THE FRENCH

entrenched on the Atlantic coast, or were

behind the front lines in eastern France.

Supply of these groups continued to come

from the United Kingdom until November

when EMFFI, the Resistance headquarters

in London, closed down. Meanwhile, the

other "liberated" groups of FFI had for the

most part chosen to continue the fight alongside the Allied armies and were being incorporated either in the 1st French Army or in

units organized by the French High Command at the direction of SHAEF. From

that point on, their rearming was but one

aspect of the larger problem of equipping

French liberated manpower.24 For the part

they had played in the liberation of their

country, the FFI had .paid heavily. The

number of men and women killed in action

or executed by the enemy up to October

1944 has been estimated at 24,000.25

Employment of French Liberated

Manpower

The question of employing French liberated manpower against the Axis had come

up for brief discussion just before the landings in North Africa. In October 1942

first General de Gaulle, then General

Giraud, anticipating an early Allied assault

on continental France, had submitted proposals for raising troops on French soil and

requests for armament. The Allies having

chosen instead to land in North Africa, de

Gaulle and Giraud devoted their efforts

thereafter to rearming the forces available

in that territory. For months afterward the

Allies carefully avoided making any commitments with respect to equipping a

French continental army either upon the

liberation of France or after victory was

won. But as time passed it became evident

that, sooner or later, they would have to face

the problem of employing liberated manpower once an assault had been successfully

launched on continental France.26

In August 1943 the U.S. Joint Staff

Planners submitted a report on the general

question of "equipping Allies, liberated

forces and friendly neutrals." With regard

to France, they pointed out that, for purely

military and logistical reasons, no units

formed from liberated manpower could be

employed for from ten to thirteen months

after an initial assault on continental

France. They recommended that the

equipping of liberated manpower be confined to forces required for garrison or

guard duties and that no attempt be made

to organize assault forces. Endorsing these

recommendations, the CCS agreed that, for

the present, the re-equipping of army units

would be limited to the obligations of the

North African rearmament program.27

Meanwhile, the Committee on Equipment for Patriot Forces had submitted a

memorandum to the Combined Staff Planners for examination and report to the CCS.

The committee recommended that the

equipment ordered for both Resistance

groups and Patriot forces (the latter being

defined as "forces which may be embodied

in areas liberated by Allied armies to fight

on the side of the UN") be pooled for allocation among countries in accordance with

the strategic situation. The committee then

pointed out that equipment requirements 24

 For partial list of equipment delivered by OSS

to the French Resistance, see Table 4. 25

 Lt. Col. P. Santini, "Etude statistique sur les

pertes au cours de la guerre 1939-1945," Revue

du Corps de Santé Militaire, X, No. 1 (March,

1954).

26

 Rpt, JPS to JCS, JCS 201/1, 20 Mar 43. See

pp. 12-13, above. 27

 Rpt, JPS to JCS, CCS 317, 18 Aug 43,

QUADRANT Conf; Min, CCS 115th Mtg, 23 Aug

43, QUADRANT Conf.
INITIAL ASSISTANCE 307

TABLE 4—QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT PACKAGED BY OSS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND

AIRDROPPED INTO FRANCE: JANUARY-OCTOBER 1944 a

a Excludes equipment dropped into France by OSS-Algiers. Source: Statistics furnished by OSS-Paris, Nov 45, to Fr Gp, Hist Sec, ETOUSA. Copy in OCMH.
308 REARMING THE FRENCH

for European countries had been formulated

in London and that action had already been

taken to allocate matériel for Patriot forces

while continuous deliveries were being

made to Resistance groups.28

Reviewing the various aspects of the

problem on the basis of the findings and

recommendations of the JPS and the Committee on Equipment for Patriot Forces,

the British Chiefs of Staff pointed out to the

CCS that, in their opinion, there were three

separate commitments to be considered:

equipment to Allied forces and neutrals,

equipment for forces useful in winning the

war (Resistance groups and Patriot forces),

equipment for postwar armed forces. The

last of these commitments, they explained,

was being made the object of a study by the

Post-Hostilities Planning Committee, also

established in London.29 There the matter

rested for several months.

In the meantime, French military authorities in North Africa were giving increased attention to the question of liberated

manpower. Hampered as they were in

their efforts to organize service and specialized units by the lack of technicians in North

Africa, they were heavily counting on this

new source of manpower, which they expected to be large, for the fulfillment of

their commitments. Actually, they were relying on it also for the discharge of other

obligations which they had set for themselves : "to fight the Axis powers in Europe

to the finish, to contribute to the occupation of Axis territories and the maintenance

of security in Europe, to assist in the war

against Japan, and to restore French sovereignty to all territories of the French

Union." In the belief that they could not

carry out these commitments without additional forces, they were contemplating a

vast conscription program for the years

1944 to 1946. In a memorandum addressed to the War Department on 16 October 1943, the National Defense Committee

estimated that sufficient liberated manpower could be found to extend the 11-

division North African program by the end

of 1945 to 36 divisions (23 infantry, 10

armored, and 3 airborne) with reserves and

services, and to expand the air force to

2,800 first-line aircraft. The committee

then urged the War Department to consider

without delay the assignment of the equipment necessary for the additional forces and

for the rehabilitation of military establishments in France.30

On 20 October General Leyer forwarded, for inclusion in the U.S. Army

Supply Program for 1944-45, requisitions

for the 25 divisions to be raised from liberated manpower. A few days later, General Bouscat, chief of staff of the French

Air Force, submitted a detailed plan calling for the equipping of new air combat

and auxiliary units during 1944, 1945, and

the beginning of 1946. If the new program was much larger than the original

ANFA Plan, General Béthouart explained

to General Marshall, it was because of the

will of the French people to make the maximum contribution to the liberation of

their country.31

The proposal was received by War

Department officials with considerable

28

 Rpt, Committee on Equipment for Patriot

Forces and Resistance Groups, 31 Aug 43, ABC

400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A. 29

 Memo, COS for CCS, 12 Oct 43, ABC 400.-

3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A.

30

 Memo, National Defense Committee, 16 Oct

43, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 1-A. 31

 Memos, Bouscat for JAC and JRC, 2 Nov 43,

and Leyer for JRC, 20 Oct 43, JRC Misc Doc,

Item 5-b, Fr Liaison 5; Memo, Béthouart for

Marshall, 30 Oct 43, ASF Planning Div Files.
INITIAL ASSISTANCE 309

skepticism, even some hostility,32 for it was

being made at a time when the North

African program itself appeared unattainable in its entirety for lack of adequate manpower and was about to be re-examined

with a view to scaling it downward.

Moreover, AFHQ officials definitely felt

that the CFLN was empowered to concern

itself only with the North African forces

and that some sort of an agreement must be

reached at government level before plans

for Metropolitan French forces could be

considered. Both Generals Leyer and

Bouscat had been aware of this fact when

they submitted their respective requisitions.

They pointed out that neither the Joint

Rearmament Committee nor the Joint Air

Commission was in position to take any

action until a decision of principle was

reached on a governmental level. Washington held the same view. Discussing

the French proposal in a memorandum to

the U.S. JCS, General Marshall expressed

the opinion that the question of arming

the French over and above the ANFA commitment was one of national policy. It

involved such issues as the attitude of the

U.S. Government toward the CFLN

insofar as matters outside North Africa

were concerned, the attitude of the U.S.

Government toward the rearmament of

French units to be used in the present war,

and, finally, the American policy on the

establishment and maintenance of military

forces by France after the war. These

matters clearly were for the decision of the

President.33 At General Marshall's suggestion, the French proposal was referred

to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

for study and appropriate recommendations to the JCS on which the latter might

advise the President.

In their report, the members of the Joint

Strategic Survey Committee expressed the

belief that the current North African rearmament program would enable the

French to assist in the war against Germany

to the full extent of their capabilities. They

considered it undesirable at this time to

promise an increase in armament for purposes other than winning the war in Europe.

They recommended therefore that no additional U.S. military assistance and equipment be offered to the French beyond that

already contemplated.34 Endorsing this recommendation, the JCS agreed that "generally, except for minor readjustments from

time to time to utilize trained French personnel," the current program would not be

extended.

Theater officials greatly doubted that substantial forces could be raised on French

soil, as the Germans were draining the country of able-bodied men for employment in

Germany. They felt that no great expansion of the French forces could be contemplated before the capitulation of the

enemy.35

At the end of December 1943 the French

military authorities, who had received no

answer to their October proposal, instructed

the chief of their Military Mission in Washington, General Beynet, to query the War

Department as to the intentions of the

American Government on the matter.

General Marshall could only assure General

32

 From the chairman of the MAC (G) the proposal elicited a curt "Nuts," which he penciled in

the margin of a report on the proposed French

plan addressed to him by the secretary. Memo,

Secy MAC (G) for Chmn MAC (G), 27 Dec 43,

ASF Planning Div Files. 33

 Memo, Marshall for JCS, 2 Nov 43, ABC

091.711 (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A.

34

 Memo, JSSC for JCS, 8 Nov 43, in same file. 35

 Memo, Timberlake Med Air Comd for Deputy

Theater Comdr, 7 Nov 43, JRC 907 Rearmt Plan,

1944-45.
310 REARMING THE FRENCH

Beynet that the desire of the French to participate in all phases of the operations in

their homeland was fully appreciated and

that it was planned to make the fullest possible use of the French forces in this crucial

phase of the war.36

Meanwhile, the CCS had referred to the

Combined Staff Planners for study both the

JPS 18 August memorandum recommending that no attempt be made to organize

assault forces from French liberated manpower and the British memorandum of 12

October regarding the equipping of Resistance and Patriot forces. To enable the

CPS to formulate plans for arming liberated

manpower, the CCS requested General

Eisenhower to determine the total number

and breakdown by nationalities of the

liberated manpower which he desired to

have equipped.37 On 9 March General

Smith communicated to the CCS, on behalf of the Supreme Commander, a proposal for the employment of French and

other western European liberated manpower. It was now assumed that a large

reservoir of manpower, estimated for the

French alone at five and a half million men,

would become available. A study of what

proportion of this manpower should be

equipped had led to the following conclusions. Since a French task force was being

equipped and trained in North Africa to

take part in the defeat of the German land

forces, the Supreme Commander's operational requirement in liberated manpower

did not extend beyond troops to relieve

British and U.S. fighting forces from lines

of communications duties and to garrison liberated territory for internal security

reasons. The need was for units no larger

than battalions, 175 (a total of 140,000

men) to be raised by France, 40 by Holland

and Belgium. It was essential that the

arming of these battalions be completed by

D plus 300. The figure of 140,000 men

for France did not include members of Resistance groups whose equipment was the

concern of SFHQ in London. Nor did it

include mobile labor elements for which

clothing was to be provided by the army

group headquarters concerned, or static

labor elements to be used for military and

civil affairs purposes and whose equipment

was to be furnished under a civil affairs

plan.38

On 14 April the Combined Chiefs approved General Eisenhower's proposal.

They reached no decision, however, on the

question of tables of organization and equipment, nor did they stipulate from what

source, how, and when the necessary equipment was to be furnished.39

The plan reckoned without French views.

These were made clear in May when Brig.

Gen. Charles Noiret, chief of the French

Military Mission in London, told SHAEF

that the French military authorities were

determined to reconstitute the metropolitan

army, using members of the Resistance

forces as cadres, and the existing territorial

system for mobilization and administration.

Their plan was first to muster available Resistance personnel into battalions or regiments for immediate participation in operations alongside the Allied armies, later to

convert these units into larger organizations.

In the meantime they would mobilize and

train several classes of young men and assign Territorial units made up of older

36

 Ltrs, Beynet to Marshall, 27 Dec 43, and Marshall to Beynet, 7 Jan 44, OPD 400 France, Sec III. 37

 JSM 1426, CCS to Eisenhower, 16 Jan 44,

ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A.

38

 Ltr, Smith to CCS, 9 Mar 44, in same file. 39

 Min, CCS 155th Mtg, 14 Apr 44; Msg WX25272, Marshall to Eisenhower, 19 Apr 44, ABC

400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A.
INITIAL ASSISTANCE 311

classes to lines of communications and internal security duties. For reasons of

morale, they considered it highly desirable

that all this personnel be suitably equipped

and armed as soon as practicable. General

Noiret then proffered this warning—to use

Resistance groups merely in the role presently contemplated for them by Allied authorities and not as combatants was to risk

serious repercussions.40

That the French were determined to rebuild their metropolitan army was substantiated to some degree by reports received

from North Africa. General Loomis, then

chief of the JRC, had just expressed his

suspicion that the unduly large requisitions

currently being submitted to the JRC by

the French military authorities in Algiers

were intended for purposes other than the

North African forces. It was quite possible

that the French were desirous of building

up stocks for use in continental France

either for the civilian population or for new

units to be organized there.41 On the assumption that Allied planning included adequate provision for these purposes, General

Loomis recommended that the French be

advised accordingly so as to put an end to

their "futile attempts" to obtain supplies which the JRC had no authority to

provide.42

On 6 June the Anglo-American Allies

entered France in the great OVERLORD attack still without any firm policy on the use

of liberated manpower. A step toward

compromise with the French desire for combatant troops had been made in late May

by a SHAEF suggestion to train French

Commando and Ranger units soon after the

beginning of operations. These would use

only a small number of men and would

require only light equipment.43 The

French, however, had not agreed to this

proposal. No concrete plan meanwhile

had been made to provide equipment for

the security and labor units authorized by

the CCS. The Supreme Commander had

only the assurance of the British Chiefs of

Staff, given on 11 May, that they would

make every effort to place at his disposal

British and U.S. equipment in sufficient

quantities.44

General Eisenhower, on 13 June, urgently

asked the CCS for a policy decision. He

pointed out that western European Allies

were contemplating the reconstitution of

their national armies and submitting requirements ranging, in some instances,

"from musical instruments to heavy equipment." It was "not impossible," he explained, "that Governments of the U.N.

might cloak their desire for large post-war

armies by pleading that they want to give

maximum assistance to OVERLORD." From

an operational point of view, he did not

consider it necessary to arm and equip any

forces beyond those already authorized for

security and garrison duties, and the forces

required for various types of labor. Nonetheless, it might be necessary, in order to

satisfy the French, to equip a few Commando-type units for immediate action. It

might also be desirable to form French

training centers in the United Kingdom

where liberated manpower might train,

under French arrangements, to become reinforcements for the units raised in North

40

 Min, Confs with Fr Military Mission, 2 and 9

May 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I. 41

 See p. 173, above. 42

 Memo, Loomis for CofS NATOUSA, 17 Apr

44, JRC 902/1 Rearmt Plan.

43

 Memos, Lt Gen A. E. Grasett for SHAEF G-3,

21 May 44, and Lt Col M. D. Molloy for Chief

Plans and Opns Sec G-3, 25 May 44, SHAEF G-3

091 France, Vol. I. 44

 Memo, COS for SAC, 11 May 44, SHAEF SGS

475/1, Vol. I, Policy.
312 REARMING THE FRENCH

Africa. SHAEF needed an early statement

of policy on which to base its answer to the

proposals submitted by the various military

missions concerned.45

It soon became evident that the concession which General Eisenhower was willing

to make to the French would not satisfy

their ambitions. Writing to General Marshall on 14 June, General Béthouart, then

Chief of Staff of National Defense, reaffirmed the desire of his government to enlist

in the Army, once they had been cleared

and screened, all able-bodied men, whether

or not they had been enrolled in the Resistance forces. This, he explained, was the

best way to avoid internal disorder and to

provide the strongest possible support to

Allied militar y action.46 General

Béthouart's memorandum having been

communicated to the CCS, the latter referred it to General Eisenhower for comment on which to base a reply. Speaking

for the Supreme Commander, General

Smith pointed out on 27 June that General

Eisenhower, while fully conscious of the

valuable assistance rendered to his operations by the Resistance forces, had made it

clear to the French that his operational

needs must take priority over any reconstitution of the French Army. In this connection, General Eisenhower wished to remind the CCS that he had referred to them

for decision the whole question of the reconstitution and arming of national armies

of liberated Allies. Lack of guidance from

them was proving embarrassing to him in

his discussions with the various Allied military missions. A firm decision on the matter was urgently required.47

On 8 July General Béthouart, who had

accompanied General de Gaulle to Washington, called on a number of War Department officials. The purpose of these visits

was to renew the requests submitted some

nine months earlier by the National Defense

Committee for equipment to arm an additional 25 divisions and to expand the air

force before the end of 1945. With the

liberation of France under way, the government, he declared to General Marshall,

wished to increase the size of the Army in

proportion to the liberation of the territory

itself. Béthouart then handed the director

of the International Division, ASF, an armament program calling for the equipping,

initially, of 30 infantry battalions, 72 artillery batteries, 3 tank battalions, and other

miscellaneous units. All these units would

be formed with some 100,000 men from the

Resistance and would constitute the nucleus

of 1 armored, 1 airborne, and 3 infantry

divisions. On the same date General

Béthouart requested of General Arnold,

chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, the equipment to arm 25 combat squadrons in addition to the units already re-equipped under

the North African program.48

Both proposals were immediately examined in the light of equipment availability

and of other commitments. After a preliminary conference between officers of the

French Military Mission and representatives

of International Division, ASF, Maj. Gen.

LeRoy Lutes, director of Plans and Operations, ASF, expressed the belief that the

45

 Msg SCAF 51, Eisenhower to CCS, 13 Jun 44,

OPD Cable Files. 46

 Memo, Béthouart for Marshall, 14 Jun 44,

SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I. 47

 Ltr, Smith to CCS, 27 Jun 44, ABC 091.711

France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5.

48

 Memo, National Defense Committee, 16 Oct

43, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 1-A;

Memo, Béthouart for Marshall, 6 Jul 44, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5; Memo, Fr

Military Mission for Director International Div

ASF, 8 Jul 44, ASF Planning Div Files; and Msg

WX-62001, Arnold to Eaker, 8 Jul 44, JRC Cable

Log.
INITIAL ASSISTANCE 313

matériel for the 5 divisions could be made

available with some exceptions.49 Before

taking any action, both Generals Arnold

and Marshall sought the views of theater

officials on the matter.

General Eaker promptly informed General Arnold that, in his opinion, it would be

a grave error to allow the French in Washington to present an air rearmament plan

and obtain its approval without full theater

concurrence. He doubted that the French

High Command could furnish at an early

date the men to form the contemplated

units. "We must insist that they show us

definitely a manpower capacity for another

unit before we authorize and equip it."50

General Eaker's skepticism confirmed the

impression which General Marshall had already gathered from information available

to him. In asking Generals Devers and

Eisenhower to comment on the latest French

proposals, Marshall expressed his own views.

It was doubtful whether French Resistance

groups and other liberated personnel would

provide sufficient effectives to furnish replacements for 1st French Army, to make

up for shortages of supporting troops, to

activate security and lines of communications battalions, and to organize new combat units as well. However, since the Resistance forces were reported to be effective

not only in guerrilla action but in largescale operations as well, it might be desirable

to consider the possibility of organizing them

forthwith into combat units. Meanwhile,

other available liberated personnel would be

utilized to form replacements, security battalions, and noncombat units. It might be

practicable to start with a program of modest proportions and build up toward the

total indicated in the French proposals, depending on manpower availability and operational developments. Such a course of

action would mean greater strength for

OVERLORD and would help to eliminate any

shortage of combat troops on the Western

Front which might occur should the war

continue to the middle of 1945. The matter of equipment would depend on whether

or not the decision was made to form additional U.S. divisions and on operational requirements as currently estimated. Matériel for new French units would be drawn

from the strategic reserve. On the present

commitments, it would be possible to equip

at least some of the five divisions proposed

by the French for activation in 1944. The

arming of these units would, of course, be

handled in the same way as that of the divisions re-equipped under the North

African program.51

The first to answer General Marshall's

query was General Devers. The French,

he explained, had shown a marked aptitude

for organizing and training combat units

and had demonstrated their "outstanding

ability in combat." But, because of their

slowness in organizing supporting combat

and service units, it had been necessary to

place U.S. troops of this type at their disposal on an appreciable scale to ensure their

success. The French proposal therefore

was not consonant with current policy.

The rearmament program was designed to

equip an expeditionary force for operations

on the Continent and not to furnish supplies for liberated areas in France nor to

build up a postwar French army.52 Yet,

Devers admitted, a true appreciation of

French capabilities and limitations "dic49

 Memo, Lutes for ACofS OPD WD, 8 Jul 44,

OPD Exec 10, Item 52-E. 50

 Msg M-23957, Eaker to Arnold, 8 Jul 44, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-A.

51

 Msg WX-62685, Marshall to Eisenhower and

Devers, 9 Jul 44, OPD Cable Files. 52

 Msg FX-70274, Devers to Marshall, 9 Jul 44,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.
314 REARMING THE FRENCH

tated" that Resistance troops be organized

and equipped by the most expeditious

means possible into small combat units,

ultimately divisions, so as to enable them to

continue to fight in a more efficient manner.

Such a course of action would necessitate

that supporting combat and service requirements be met from other sources, most

likely American. Furthermore, to reduce

supply problems, it would probably be advisable to equip and maintain the new units

through U.S. base sections. In conclusion,

General Devers recommended that the

150,000-200,000 Frenchmen expected to

become available in AFHQ's zone of responsibility be employed, in order of priority: (1) to establish a replacement pool

sufficient to carry the North African units

through the rest of 1944, (2) to make up

for the existing shortages of French supporting combat and service troops currently

estimated at 60,000 men, (3) then and only

then, to organize one infantry division (the

sixth on the North African program but

never activated) and one armored division

(the fourth likewise on the program but

deferred indefinitely).53

General Eisenhower, in his answer to

General Marshall's query, first restated his

own requirements in French liberated manpower, namely, essential labor units and

internal security and lines of communications troops. The Supreme Commander

then recommended that manpower available over and above his requirements be

used in combat units on the assumption that

the war in Europe "might continue well

into 1945" and in the light of the fact that

the French themselves were eager to have

units fighting alongside British and U.S.

troops in northern France. He did not

consider it advisable, as suggested by General Marshall, to organize the Resistance

forces into combat units. While excellent

in a guerrilla role in their own native area,

they were likely to be ineffective if engaged

in combat alongside U.S. or French regular

units in a strange territory. In fact they

could become an administrative encumbrance. The most advantageous manner

of using this "prolific and first-rate source

of manpower" was to take the best of them

for recruits and form the remainder, already armed, into internal security and lines

of communications units. In conclusion

he recommended that French liberated

manpower be employed, in order of priority: (1) to fill requirements of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary

Force; (2) to fill requirements of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean;

(3) to activate three divisions, two in southern France and one in northern France,

complete with administrative and service

elements, for use in European operations in

1945; and (4) to form a limited number

of Ranger or Commando-type units to be

quickly trained in the United Kingdom.

The organization of these smaller units

would, he believed, satisfy French eagerness

to participate fully in the European

campaign.54

By this time War Department officials

were convinced that the question of the use

of French liberated manpower was becoming entirely too complex and, as pointed out

in a memorandum from OPD to the Joint

Logistics Committee (JLC), "would have

to be tied together in order to be handled 53

 Memo, Devers for Marshall, 11 Jul 44, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Rearmt, Vol. II; Msg

BX-13549, Devers to Marshall, 11 Jul 44, OPD

Exec. 10, Item 52-E.

54

 Msg FWD 12414, Eisenhower to Marshall, 18

Jul 44, AFHQ 0100/26 Liaison Sec LX 320, Order

of Battle.
INITIAL ASSISTANCE 315

intelligently." The recent communications

from Generals Eisenhower, Devers, and

Eaker, letters from Generals Béthouart and

de Gaulle, a talk by General Donovan before the JLC in which he had urged that

Resistance groups be issued heavy equipment, each had stressed one phase or

another of the problem and often expressed

conflicting views. To arrive at some sound

solution, General Marshall directed that all

papers, radios, and letters be turned over to

the JLC for a comprehensive study of the

most effective use of liberated manpower.

He emphasized that the committee was to

give no consideration to the development of

a postwar French army but was to proceed

on the assumption that only those troops

should be equipped and armed which could

participate in the war at an early date.55

Most eager to see some sort of a decision

reached on the matter were, of course, the

French themselves. On the ground that the

"reorganization of the metropolitan army"

was already raising a considerable number

of problems, General Noiret proposed, on 1

August, to attach to SHAEF the Rearmament Section of his staff headed by Colonel

Chanson, who in the past had dealt with

similar problems in connection with the

North African rearmament operations. A

few days later General Noiret and representatives of SHAEF reached an agreement on

the division of responsibility between

SHAEF and French headquarters in the

United Kingdom for handling problems

arising in connection with liberated manpower, such as availability and allocation

of personnel, submission of requisitions, and

distribution of matériel.56

On 2 August 1944 the CCS finally took

action on the matter of the reconstitution

and equipping of armies of liberated nations. They communicated to General

Eisenhower, who had been waiting since

13 June, a policy statement to guide him in

his discussions with Allied military missions.

The statement merely confirmed their

earlier decision authorizing the formation of

security units totaling not more than 172,-

000 men for western Europe (140,000 for

the French).57 It shed no light on the

subject of labor units (not included in the

172,000-man ceiling) or of French combat

units. It simply directed the Supreme

Commander to inform Allied military missions that any requests from them considered by him to include, in effect, requirements for postwar armies, should be taken

up "as between governments and not on the

military level." Moreover, the statement

provided no clue on the question of the

provision of equipment.

With operations in progress on the Continent, the Supreme Commander was eager

to proceed with the organization of the labor

and security units necessary for the conduct

of the war. The question of the provision

of equipment needed to be settled without

further delay. Yet the CCS still had not

given any indication as to what proportion

of the equipment required was to come from

U.S. and what from British sources. In a

memorandum to the British Chiefs of Staff,

dated 8 August, General Smith urged that,

pending a CCS decision on the matter, the

requirements of the British 21 Army Group

for mobile labor units and internal security

units, as well as the requirements of the U.S.

forces for internal security up to D plus 90,

be met from British sources, that is, from

55

 Memo, Brig Gen Patrick H. Tansey for JLC,

20 Jul 44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec

2-A.

56

 Memos, Noiret for SHAEF, 1 Aug 44, and

Whiteley for Noiret, 9 Aug 44, SHAEF G-3 091

France, Vol. II.

57

 Msg FACS 49, CCS to Eisenhower, 2 Aug 44,

ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A.
316 REARMING THE FRENCH

stocks held by the War Office for liberated

manpower. The War Office replied that

the equipment requested would be released

at once except for some items that were unavailable. However, the release would be

made on the assumption that the figure of

172,000 (140,000 for the French) represented both security and labor units. If

the Supreme Commander wished to increase the total beyond 172,000 in order to

include labor units, he was advised to put

the necessary proposals up to the CCS.58

On 9 August General Eisenhower informed the War Department that his combined requirements for static and mobile

French civilian labor units were estimated

at between 140,000 by D plus 60 and 468,-

000 by D plus 240. These units were over

and above the 175 French battalions authorized earlier in April by the CCS for

assignment to internal security and lines of

communications duties. New, additional

requirements were for the Garde Mobile

(about 6,000 men), abolished by Vichy but

whose reorganization he considered necessary, the Gendarmerie (approximately 10,-

000 men), and fire-fighting personnel

(2,500 men). Also, it was intended to

form another French Special Air Service

(SAS) parachute battalion (in addition to

the two activated earlier in the United

Kingdom) for service behind enemy lines,

and two Ranger battalions. The formation

of these three units was essential in view of

the attitude of the French. "While they are

anxious to assist us to the greatest degree,

they must for morale reasons be given an

opportunity to fight." These several requirements concerned only the French.

There were other Allies to consider. It was

imperative, then, that an early decision be

reached on the question of allocation of

responsibility for equipping all the units involved. Most of these were operationally

required and none could be raised in the

absence of a directive from the CCS.59

Such was the situation as ANVIL got under

way on 15 August. Already large groups

of Frenchmen, including Resistance units,

had been liberated as a result of the progress of OVERLORD. No commitment had

yet been made regarding their employment

other than the formation of security and

lines of communications units. Even for

these, the question of equipment had not

been settled.

It was difficult to see how the French liberated manpower question could be solved

to the satisfaction of the three allies concerned considering the conclusions each had

reached on the matter after months of negotiations.

For the French military authorities in

Algiers, liberated manpower could be best

used by enrolling it without delay in new

combat units. They had already completed

plans to this effect and were about to submit appropriate requisitions. On 16 August, just as the first North African divisions

were landing on the beaches near St. Tropez, General Leyer asked the JRC what

Allied agency would examine and process

the requisitions. General Loomis could

only reply that the CCS had the whole question of employment of Allied liberated manpower under consideration.60

For the British Chiefs of Staff, the question involved not only the immediate fulfillment of the Supreme Commander's re58

 Memos, Smith for COS, 8 Aug 44, and COS

1425/4, Office of War Cabinet for CofS SHAEF,

15 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I.

59

 Msg FWD 12731, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 9

Aug 44, OPD Exec 10, Item 52-E. 60

 Memos, Leyer for Loomis, 16 Aug 44, and

Loomis for Leyer, 18 Aug 44, JRC 320/001 Orgn

of JRC.
INITIAL ASSISTANCE 317

quirements, but, in view of the French position on the matter, the early building up of

a nucleus of forces to assist in the occupation

of Germany. Such a concession would, in

their opinion, make the French more

"amenable" to the wishes of the Supreme

Commander and appease their understandable desire to organize more than internal

security troops and Commandos.61 On 22

August they broached the subject in a memorandum to the CCS. The British, they

explained, desired strongly that the western

European Allies have forces available for

use in the period immediately following the

cessation of hostilities in Europe and after

the resumption of effective control by indigenous governments. Such forces would

be required for the maintenance of internal

security within the Allied territories concerned. In addition, by contributing to the

occupation of Germany, they would assist in

alleviating the British manpower situation

and permit the United Kingdom to play a

greater role in the war against Japan. As

for their equipping, the British Chiefs of

Staff considered it highly undesirable that

the French or any other European Allies

adopt a policy of accepting arms of enemy

make as this could lead to a continued demand for spare parts, replacements, and

ammunition. In their opinion, the responsibility for arming the forces in question

should be divided as follows: pending the

re-establishment of French industry, a

"clearly military desirable" objective in itself, the United States would undertake to

furnish the French with the needed equipment; the equipping of other western Allies

would remain a British commitment.

These proposals, they emphasized, were put

forward on "purely military grounds," their

belief being that it was "in the vital strategic interest of both the U.S. and U.K. that

the forces of our Western Allies should be

closely integrated with our own." They

estimated that the size of the French contingents required for the occupation of Germany would be eight divisions at the end of

twenty-four months.62

For the Americans, the urgent question,

as emphasized by a report just published by

the JLC, was not the organization of postarmistice armies, but the best and most expeditious possible employment of liberated

manpower during the current hostilities in

Europe. Armed forces formed from liberated manpower in excess of those authorized

for operations in the sphere of the Supreme

Commander were, in effect, postwar armies

which should be the subject of agreement

between the governments concerned.63

Commenting on the British Chiefs of Staff

memorandum of 22 August to the CCS,

General Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff,

OPD, voiced the opinion that their proposal was a purely postwar matter and urged

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to approach it carefully and to make no commitment without

the approval of the President.64

On 29 August the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

submitted to the CCS a long memorandum

(CCS 661) setting forth their latest views

and recommendations. Ruling out the organization of forces over and above the requirements of the Supreme Commander as

being postwar armies, they proposed that

both he and General Wilson, the Supreme

Allied Commander in the Mediterranean,

61

 Memo Washington COS (W) 180, COS for

JSM, 19 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I.

62

 Memo, COS for CCS, CCS 653, 22 Aug 44,

ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-A. 63

 Rpt, JLC 140/3, 16 Aug 44, ARC 091.711

France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B. 64

 Note, Handy, 23 Aug 44, ABC 400.3295 (2

Aug 43), Sec 1-A.
318 REARMING THE FRENCH

be asked to determine, on the basis of operational considerations, the priorities for

the use of French liberated manpower

within their respective areas. Any new

combat units organized by them would be

equipped by the United States. Internal

security battalions, on the other hand, would

be equipped by the United Kingdom. Taking into consideration the desire of the

French for a more active part in the fighting, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff then recommended the formation of new combat units

not exceeding, for both theaters, 27 infantry battalions, 9 105-mm. artillery battalions, and three engineer combat battalions,

all to be put in action as speedily as possible.

Only such units should be re-equipped

which were "essential to the completion of

approved operations" and which were

"likely to be trained and equipped in time

to take part in operations."

 65

Thus was the American position made

quite clear. In essence it had not varied

since 18 July when General Eisenhower had

proposed that the formation of new French

combat units be restricted to three infantry

divisions (or the equivalent of the battalions

now recommended by the U.S. Chiefs of

Staff), in addition to a limited number of

Ranger or Commando-type units for immediate participation in operations.

By the end of August, as the CCS were

examining the latest U.S. proposal, the

French still were without a clear statement

as to what material assistance they could

expect from the Allies in equipping their

liberated manpower.

65

 Memo, JCS for CCS, CCS 661, 29 Aug 44, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 44), Sec 2-B.
CHAPTER XIX

Arming Liberated Manpower

Interim Organization and Equipping of

Labor and Internal Security Units

The spectacular speed with which the

liberation of France progressed from the

beginning of August through September

1944, as a result of the lightning advance

of the Allied armies from both west and

south, raised for the French military authorities insuperable problems of personnel and equipment. With more of the

territory freed from enemy forces each

passing day, larger numbers of Resistance

troops, reservists, volunteers, and liberated

prisoners of war became available. The

French High Command was faced with

one of two alternatives: to incorporate these

men into regularly constituted units or to

give them immediate employment in the

civilian economy. With national resources

exhausted, industry and commerce at a

standstill, communications and transportation paralyzed, and a territorial military

establishment completely disorganized, the

constitution of new units was in itself a difficult task. It was made more troublesome

as a result of the natural desire of a large

part of the liberated men to resume the

fight against the enemy rather than serve as

laborers or guards in rear areas. Adding

to the confusion was the absence of a clear

indication of Anglo-American intentions

with regard to the ultimate employment of

liberated manpower, thus forcing the

French High Command to take piecemeal

measures in an effort to solve at least the

short-term aspect of the problem.

The most serious question was what to do

with the former FFI forces. Immediately

after the liberation of Paris on 26 August,

the irresponsible behavior of some of the

units in the capital and vicinity became the

source of grave concern to French and

Allied authorities, as it constituted a threat

to the security of the rear. In an attempt

to regain control of the situation General de

Gaulle decided to weed out and disarm the

disaffected elements and to put the rest into

uniform without delay. With this in view,

he requested and obtained from General

Eisenhower the emergency issue of 15,000

sets of clothing and some armament.

Another request from General Koenig, then

military governor of Paris, for arms and

equipment to enable the Paris Gendarmerie

to maintain order in the capital was likewise granted.1

 The situation quickly deteriorated, however. Armed, undisciplined

groups were reported wandering through

Paris and country towns, seriously threatening order. General Koenig, technically still

the commander in chief of all FFI, estimated that, by this time, some 200,000

armed men and boys, and possibly another

1

 Memo, Smith for G-4 SHAEF, 28 Aug 44,

SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I; Msg (unnumbered), SHAEF Mission Paris to SHAEF FWD,

5 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II.
320 REARMING THE FRENCH

200,000 unarmed but organized into bands,

were at large in the liberated areas. Responsible French authorities were said to be

reluctant to disarm or disband them in view

of the services they had rendered. Furthermore, it was unlikely that they could be absorbed into civilian life for several months.

In General Koenig's opinion, serious trouble

would be forestalled only if 100,000 of them

were promptly mustered into the Army or

given employment.2

It was largely in an attempt to reduce

the FFI problem that the French military

authorities then launched their mobilization program. As a first step, they began

organizing two infantry divisions, one in

the north, one in the south. In Washington

General de Saint-Didier, chief of the French

Military Mission, explained to General

Marshall that the new units were two of

the three divisions whose organization Generals Eisenhower and Devers had "approved." Anticipating that their status

would be debated for some time, General

de Saint-Didier urged that, in the interim,

consideration be given forthwith to the supply of clothing and equipment for the 30,-

000 men involved. Such a step would help

to speed up their employment and thereby

maintain their morale. In referring the

matter to Eisenhower and Devers for advice, Marshall pointed out that since the

U.S. Chiefs of Staff had approved as a general principle the equipping of "such French

units as could be used at an early date

against the enemy," the Supreme Commander might wish to consider the desirability of granting the request. Pending a

reply from the theater, General Marshall

advised General de Saint-Didier that the

present plan as approved by the U.S. Chiefs

of Staff did not contemplate equipping complete additional divisions but "permitted a

charge for clothing and equipment to be

made against the plan should it prove desirable."

 3

Meanwhile, the organization of security

battalions and labor units was getting under

way. In Brittany, ten battalions formed

from FFI personnel were being employed in

mopping-up operations. They were being

issued fuel and food, as well as captured

German weapons and ammunition. Similar measures were being taken to equip the

security battalions being organized in southern France also from FFI personnel.4

To meet SHAEF's requirements for security battalions and labor units, the French

High Command agreed on 23 August to

make available at once, as a first increment,

100,000 men distributed as follows: 53,000

in the U.S. zone of communications, 26,000

in the British zone, and 21,000 in their own

zone. SHAEF promptly initiated action to

obtain from the War Department and the

War Office the matériel necessary to equip

these men. Without waiting for the CCS

to determine the source of equipment for

liberated manpower, the British Chiefs of

Staff agreed to the immediate release of the

equipment needed for the security units

being activated within both the British and

the U.S. zones. Simultaneously, General

Marshall assured the Supreme Commander

that War Department officials were making

every effort to meet the requirements for

2

 Msg FWD 14014, SHAEF to State Dept, 6

Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II.

3

 Memos, de Saint-Didier for Marshall, 2 Sep

44, and, Marshall for de Saint-Didier, 6 Sep 44,

OCS A-48-11, 091 France, Sec I; Msg WX-25757,

Marshall to Eisenhower and Devers, 5 Sep 44, OPD

Exec 10, Item 52-E. 4

 Msg FWD 13729, Eisenhower to Somervell,

4 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I; Memo,

Gammell for CofS Fr Ground Forces, 8 Sep 44,

AFHQ 0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER QUESTION 321

civilian labor in support of the U.S. forces.5

By early September plans had been completed for activation of the units required

by SHAEF. Tables of organization and

equipment had been determined for each

category: military mobile labor companies,

civilian mobile and static labor units, and

security battalions. Pending a CCS decision regarding the responsibility for the procurement of equipment, the War Office had

offered to provide an initial 40,250 individual sets of clothing and equipment from

the pool of equipment for 172,000 men

which it was holding.6

At the request of the French, plans also

were made to rehabilitate the Territorial

Command, the organization normally

charged with recruitment and administration. The nineteen military regions and

ninety subregions comprising this command

being completely depleted of material resources, arrangements were made to provide them with a minimum of equipment

drawn from British, Canadian, and U.S.

sources.7

In the belief that a decision on the longterm aspect of the liberated manpower question could be postponed no longer, General

Juin, Chief of Staff of National Defense

since his return from Italy in early August,

appealed directly to General Marshall on

7 September. Liberated effectives, he explained, were now available in large numbers. Their immediate absorption into the

Army, most desirable at this time, could be

effected only under strict military discipline

and by integration into divisional units. On

the hypothesis, which he considered "plausible," of a very rapidly approaching cessation of hostilities, it would be sufficient to

organize, as already started, security units

equipped with light matériel. Later, as the

necessary heavier matériel was made available, these units could be formed into divisions to be used as a "supplementary security force" for maintaining order within

the country. General Juin "assumed" that

the principle of arming five such new divisions had been accepted by War Department officials as a result of their conversations with Generals Béthouart and de

Gaulle in July. He hoped that the U.S.

Chiefs of Staff would approve his proposal,

since the French military authorities needed

their agreement to guide them in planning

the reorganization of the metropolitan

army.8

General Juin's conviction about the need

of building up a large security force of the

size of five divisions was not shared by General Devers. The latter, in fact, was now

reversing his earlier stand with respect to

the use of French liberated manpower in

the light of the current operational situation. Answering General Marshall's message of 5 September, he not only questioned,

from a military viewpoint, the necessity of

organizing the 175 security battalions for

which equipment had been requested, but

declared himself no longer in favor, as he

5

 Msg FWD 14795, Eisenhower to SHAEF Mission to France, 14 Sep 44, SHAEF G-3 091 France,

Vol. III; Msg FWD 13217, FWD SHAEF to CG

COMZONE and CG 12th Army Gp, 24 Aug 44,

SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. II; Msg EX-45523,

CG ETOUSA to WD, 28 Aug 44, OPD 400 France,

Sec 4; Memo, SHAEF for CG COMZONE

ETOUSA, 30 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France,

Vol. I; Msg WX-23756, Marshall to Eisenhower,

30 Aug 44, ASF International Div File Cable Log

OUT A-45-192, France, Aug-Nov 44. 6

 Memo, SHAEF for CG COMZONE, 6 Sep 44,

SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. III. 7

 Memos, Bull for CofS SHAEF, 18 Aug 44, and

Smith for CG COMZONE ETOUSA, 21 Aug 44,

SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I; Ltr, Noce to Director Liaison and Munitions WO, 18 Sep 44, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip.

8

 Ltr, Juin to Marshall, 7 Sep 44, ABC 091.711

France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B.
322 REARMING THE FRENCH

had been in July, of activating new divisions

on the ground that they would not be ready

before the spring of 1945. He recommended instead the formation of a maximum of five infantry regiments, amounting

to approximately 15,000 men, for use as

replacements for the existing North African

divisions currently engaged in operations.

The maintenance of these divisions at effective combat strength was, in his opinion,

the most urgent problem to be considered.9

The British Chiefs of Staff, on the other

hand, were more convinced than ever, also

in the light of the current operational situation, that discussions on the employment of

French liberated manpower should not be

restricted to the period preceding the cessation of hostilities. Elaborating on their

earlier statement of 22 August, they urged

the CCS, on 10 September, to examine the

long-term aspect of the problem and to do

so "in a realistic manner." While agreeing

with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that SHAEF

must have priority in calling French manpower for immediate essential duties, they

pointed to the "very real need of encouraging the creation of substantial French forces

to assist in the occupation of Germany."

They felt that what was required was the

establishment of a broad plan to equip

forces of all western European Allies including the French, in which due consideration would be given to the employment of

manpower during the earlier posthostilities

stage as well as before the cessation of

hostilities.10

The stand taken by the British Chiefs had

already been made the subject of a study by

the U.S. Joint Logistics Committee upon

the receipt of their first memorandum. The

JLC had come to the conclusion that any

discussion concerning the build-up of posthostilities internal security armies must be

tripartite, that is, it must include the USSR.

This course of action was indispensable in

order to promote the confidence of that

country and to avoid strained relations

likely to result from any steps toward the

establishment of a military bloc in whose

creation the USSR had not been consulted.11

No solution appeared yet in sight which

would reconcile the divergent positions now

taken by the British, Americans, and

French.

On 22 September General Marshall,

answering General Juin's proposal of 7 September, informed him that because of the

scope and importance of the question, it was

one to be ultimately decided by the CCS.

No action could be taken by them until the

British Chiefs of Staff had been heard from.

General Marshall then referred to what he

called General Béthouart's "apparent misunderstanding" on the question of additional divisions. The present intention of

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff was to equip 3, not

5, new infantry divisions thereby bring the

original ANFA commitment of 11 divisions

to completion.12

In the theater, the equipping of security

and labor units was proceeding at a much

slower pace than originally contemplated.

The French military authorities were reported to be showing "great unwillingness"

to meet the requirements for labor units.

Concerned over the situation, SHAEF reminded them of their agreement of 23 August to place a specific number of men at

the disposal of the Allied command and

9

 Msg BX-16065, Devers to Marshall, 9 Sep 44, OPD Cable Files. 10

 Memo, COS for CCS, CCS 653/1, 10 Sep 44,

ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-B.

11

 Rpt, JCS 1039, JLC to JCS, 6 Sep 44, in same

file.

12

 Ltr, Marshall to Juin, 22 Sep 44, OCS A-48-

11, 091 France, Sec 1.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER QUESTION 323

warned that if the agreement was not carried out the Supreme Commander would

be compelled to revise the commitments

already undertaken to equip the men.13

All things considered, it appeared to be

not so much a case of unwillingness on the

part of the French military authorities as of

quasi impossibility for them to require

the former members of the Resistance to

drop their rifles in exchange for shovels.14

Already large numbers of the FFI (40,000

by 20 September) were swelling the ranks

of 1st French Army, meanwhile raising, for

the latter, considerable equipment and

maintenance problems. To the French

General Staff it was clear that the labor and

internal security program was not, in itself,

sufficient to solve satisfactorily the liberated

manpower problem.

Eager to co-operate with the Supreme

Commander, General Juin immediately

contacted the responsible Allied headquarters only to be told that the 40,000-odd individual sets of clothing and equipment

promised by the War Office as a first allocation for labor and security units were still

in the United Kingdom. Earlier messages

from Communications Zone, ETOUSA, to

the War Office requesting information on

where and when to obtain the matériel had

not yet been answered. Thus the already

difficult task of forming the required units

became even more troublesome, as the U.S.

and British Armies could make only piecemeal emergency issues pending the replacement of matériel from War Office stocks.15

Partly as a result of the slowness with

which the labor and security program was

progressing, but mainly because of the currently favorable operational situation,

SHAEF authorities were gradually reversing their earlier stand in favor of activating

additional French divisions. In spite of

French pressure, it appeared no longer desirable or feasible, as it did in July and early

August, to form any unit larger than a battalion from liberated manpower. It was no

longer to be assumed that the war would

last well into 1945. The total number of

French nationals suitable for full military

service had not reached the expected figures.

Shipping commitments wer e severely

strained. Furthermore, if French divisions

were formed, a large portion of available

manpower would thus be lost for immediate

and direct assistance to the Allied Expeditionary Force, thereby greatly aggravating

the labor and internal security problems.

On 22 September General Eisenhower informed General Marshall that he desired

to form only internal security units (including the Gendarmerie), labor units, ten

Ranger-type battalions, and certain administrative units, for all of which plans were

going forward and full details were being

communicated to the CCS for decision. He

stressed that no unit larger than a battalion

was required at that time. With this pronouncement, the issue with respect to additional French divisions was to rest for

some weeks to come.16

To co-ordinate the various equipment

problems then involving the French, such as

the continued maintenance of their expeditionary forces engaged in combat and the

implementation of the current labor and

security program, as well as of any future

13

 Msg FWD 14795, Eisenhower to SHAEF Mission to France, 14 Sep 44, SHAEF G-3 091

France, Vol. III. 14

 Interv with Regnault, Sep 50. 15

 Ltr, Juin to Smith, 17 Sep 44, and Memo,

SHAEF Mission to France for Smith, 19 Sep 44,

SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. I.

16

 Memo, Bull for CofS, 14 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS

France 475/2, Vol. I; Msg FWD 15331, Eisenhower to Marshall, 22 Sep 44, OPD Cable Files.
324 REARMING THE FRENCH

armament program, the decision was

reached, at the urging of the French themselves and of Allied authorities in the Mediterranean theater, to establish a central armament authority similar to the North African JRC. Soon after the organization, on

15 September, of the SHAEF Mission to

France to act as a channel through which

the French Provisional Government could

raise matters with SHAEF, the latter authorized the setting up of a Rearmament

Division within the mission. Selected

American, French, and British personnel

from the various agencies heretofore

charged with supervising the rearmament

and training of the North African forces

gradually were transferred to the Continent

for the purpose of staffing the division.

By 16 October Rearmament Division,

SHAEF Mission to France, headed by General Loomis, was in full operation.17

Meanwhile, the question of the disposition of former Resistance personnel was becoming increasingly acute. Within the

area of 1st French Army, sufficient elements

had become available to form twenty security battalions over and above those which

the French authorities were organizing for

combat. Equipping the security battalions

offered no great problem since the necessary

matériel was provided by the War Office on

call. It was with respect to combat battalions that difficulties were being experienced. Neither 1st French Army nor U.S.

6th Army Group had excess stocks available

for the purpose. The French General Staff

then turned to SHAEF for assistance and

submitted a request for equipment.

SHAEF replied that if General Devers,

Commanding General, 6th Army Group,

wished to employ FFI combat battalions as

part of 1st French Army, their equipment

would have to be drawn from captured war

matériel, at least temporarily, or from other

6th Army Group resources. Whereupon

General Devers pointed to the considerable

confusion which existed regarding the matter and urged that the responsibility for

equipping and maintaining FFI combat

battalions be made to rest solely with the

French High Command. Pending final

settlement of the question, the Supreme

Commander authorized Devers, on 2 October, to equip at his discretion such units

as he considered necessary to assist in military operations, using for the purpose captured war matériel and local French

resources.18

By then the situation had reached a critical point. General Devers reported on 7

October that some 52,000 former FFI troops

had enlisted in the French Army for the

duration of the war. Of this number, approximately 12,000 were already in combat. To provide them with adequate

equipment was beyond the means of 6th

Army Group. With respect to weapons,

the French authorities expected to have

sufficient German, Italian, British, and

French rifles to meet the requirements.

But no clothing was available. Because of

this, there was danger of these men returning to their homes where their presence

might result in public disturbances. It was

17

 Ltr, Juin to Smith, 20 Sep 44, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr); Msg NAF 783,

Wilson to CCS, 16 Sep 44, OPD Cable Files; Msg

14930 SCAF 83, SCAEF to CCS, 15 Sep 44, JRC

Cable Log. For additional information on the

Rearmament Division, see Chapter XXIII, below.

18

 Msgs, Eisenhower to Devers, FWD 15582, 24

Sep 44, and FWD 15887, 26 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS

475 France, Vol. I; Msg BX-16780, Devers to

SHAEF FWD, 27 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France,

Vol. I; Msg FWD 16836, Eisenhower to Devers, 3

Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER QUESTION 325

essential that the clothing problem be settled without delay.19

General Smith promptly advised General

Devers to submit a request to the CCS,

through SHAEF, for the necessary clothing

and equipment for the 52,000 men if he

wished to use them. He then requested

General Devers to remind the French in his

area that the size and composition of the

French Army was a matter for the decision

of the CCS. SHAEF itself was not in a

position to authorize the French High Command to enlist personnel for the national

army in excess of units provided for under

the current approved programs.20

The next day, 12 October, Mr. André

Diethelm, Minister of War, whose previous

requests had been turned down and who

had been advised by General de SaintDidier in Washington not to entertain the

hope that combat units drawn from FFI

personnel might be equipped, appealed directly to General Eisenhower. It was essential, he urged, that for military, moral,

and political reasons a few at least of the

FFI units then engaged in operations be

issued a minimum amount of modern

equipment. The force s in question

amounted to some 112,000 men, 52,000 of

whom were fighting as part of 1st French

Army and the rest, or 60,000, were engaged

in operations on the Atlantic coast. The

conditioning of these forces would interfere in no way with the labor and security

program. Mr. Diethelm's request was no

more fortunate than his earlier proposals.

The Suprem e Commander directed

SHAEF to inform him that no consideration would be given French requests until

SHAEF's requirements in labor and security

units had been met.21

Answering General Smith's letter of 11

October, General Devers submitted his plan

for the employment of the 52,000 FFI personnel now incorporated in 1st French

Army. It contemplated the organization

of 1 infantry regiment, 2 infantry battalions,

and 3 armored battalions; the activation of

relief and rest battalions for each of the existing infantry regiments, or a total of 19

battalions; the building up of a replacement

pool of 12,000 men for 1st French Army;

finally, with the coming of cold weather,

the replacement of all Negro troops in the

9th Colonial Infantry Division (9th DIC)

and 1st March Infantry Division (1st

DMI).22 These Negro elements, largely

from Senegal and amounting to approximately 15,000 men, were already being

withdrawn and move d to southern

France.23

With the approach of winter the problem

of clothing liberated effectives swelling the

ranks of the French armed forces was becoming serious. The Allies were providing

clothing only for the security battalions,

none for the ill-clad FFI troops currently

engaged in operations. To those FFI units

fighting on the Atlantic coast, the French

High Command was able to allocate 72,000

French uniforms recovered in a depot at

19

 Msg B-17326, Devers to SHAEF FWD, 7 Oct

44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II. 20

 Memo, Smith for Devers, 11 Oct 44, in same

file.

21

 Ltr, Diethelm to Eisenhower, 12 Oct 44,

SHAEF Mission to France 421-1 Combined; Memo,

SCAEF for SHAEF Mission to France, 19 Oct 44,

SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. III. 22

 This was the former 1st Motorized Infantry

Division, known before September 1943 as the 1st

Free French Division. 23

 Memo, G-3 SHAEF for CofS, 21 Oct 44,

and Msg S-63760, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 24 Oct

44, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II; Msg S65011, SCAEF to AFHQ, 1 Nov 44, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-1 (Fr); Msg SCAF 130,

Eisenhower to CCS, 13 Nov 44, ABC 380 France,

Sec 1-A.
326 REARMING THE FRENCH

Troyes after the withdrawal of the Germans.

But for those in 1st French Army area, it

could only provide 25,000 sets from Canadian clothing stocks then in Algiers. This

quantity was woefully insufficient.24

In an effort to solve the problem of clothing and equipment for FFI personnel, representatives of SHAEF, Communications

Zone, Rearmament Division, and other

agencies met on 25 October. They agreed

that changes in liberated manpower requirements brought about by new conditions on the Continent necessitated review

and a fresh approach to the CCS for the

purpose of obtaining both an increase of the

equipment allotments to SHAEF and a

covering authority for equipment commitments entered into without previous sanction of the Combined Chiefs. The latest

such commitment concerned the various

Allied Resistance forces currently estimated,

for the French alone, at 105,000 men, for

whom neither clothing nor equipment was

available. It was essential that the provision of matériel to them be fitted into a longterm program for equipping liberated

manpower.23

Organization and equipping of labor and

internal security units, meanwhile, were

lagging behind schedule. The French

military authorities were not making available all the manpower necessary to meet

SHAEF's requirements. In addition, matériel was slow in coming from the United

Kingdom because of the very limited port

and shipping facilities and the fact that shipment of the equipment was competing with

that of other matériel considered essential to

the further advance of the Allied armies.

The French themselves were responsible for

activating the units, for distributing to them

matériel issued through army groups or

Communications Zone channels, and for

their training which was conducted with the

assistance of Inspection Group, the Rearmament Division's training section headed by

General Kingman. Once ready, the units

passed under Allied operational control, the

French High Command retaining full disciplinary powers.26

While the launching of the labor and

security program was making some headway, the issue with respect to additional

combat forces was no nearer solution. The

only new development in the controversy

was that the British had given up, in the

face of American opposition, their earlier

proposal to equip liberated manpower

units for posthostilities occupation duties.

In late September the Joint Strategic Survey Committee had advised against arming

such forces because at that juncture they

would be of no advantage to the United

States and the United Kingdom. The committee urged the JCS to adhere to the position that any discussion of the British proposal must be held at government level in

order to include the USSR, since it was not

an appropriate subject for consideration by

the CCS.27 The JCS promptly informed

the CCS that, in their opinion, the subject

24

 The 25,000 were part of 100,000 sets originally

intended for Territorial forces in North Africa. In

late October the Canadian Government offered a

further 100,000 sets and 20,000 greatcoats. Msgs

WX-47757, Somervell to SHAEF, 17 Oct 44, and

S-64381, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 27 Oct 44, and

Memo, SHAEF Mission to France for SCAEF, 8

Oct 44, SHAEF Mission to France 421-1 Com- bined. 25

 Min, Mtg at SHAEF Main, 25 Oct 44, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.4 Liberated People.

26

 Memo, Smith for Juin, 27 Sep 44, SHAEF

SGS 475 France, Vol. I; Memo, SHAEF AG-400-1

(Fr), 4 Oct 44, SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. III;

Ltr, Hq COMZONE to Sec Comdrs, 27 Oct 44,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-1 (Fr). 27

 Rpt, JSSC to JCS, JCS 1039/1, 28 Sep 44,

ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-B.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER QUESTION 327

of re-equipping postwar forces must be

divorced from the question of equipping

additional French forces for early participation in active operations against Germany.

They urged the British Chiefs of Staff to

approve their 29 August proposal without

delay so as to permit its early implementation. Ten days later, in the absence of a

reply from the British Chiefs of Staff, the

JCS submitted a second memorandum to

the CCS, reiterating their belief that the

British counterproposals involved long-term

matters of policy requiring decision and

agreement not at CCS but at government

level. They were therefore referring the

matter to the U.S. Government and recommending that an agreement be reached on

a governmental level or through the European Advisory Commission "since it would

appear that tripartite control of occupation of Germany is involved." A few days

later, on 21 October, the British Chiefs

having decided to pursue the matter no

further, the controversial proposal was removed from the CCS agenda by secretarial action.28

The French of course had not given up

hope for the equipping of new combat units.

Told on several occasions that the matter

was one to be taken up directly with Washington on a governmental level, General de

Gaulle had, in early October, considered

sending General Juin to Washington with

full authority to explain the French point

of view to General Marshall and the CCS.

Informed of the proposed visit, OPD officials urged General Marshall to tell the

French that matters would be expedited if

concrete proposals, cleared beforehand with

General Eisenhower, were submitted by

General Juin to the CCS before he arrived

in Washington. General Juin's trip did not

materialize, for in the meantime General

Marshall had flown to the Continent where

he had an opportunity to discuss the rearmament issue with General Juin. On his

return to Washington, he was handed a

memorandum from General de Saint-Didier

restating the position of the Provisional

Government. The French recognized that

General Eisenhower was above all justly

concerned with the conduct of operations

now in progress and the security of his

armies, but they were "under obligation"

to take into account requirements of national import, such as the incorporation of

FFI units into the army to enable them to

fight in a normal way as an integral part of

large units. France owed it to herself to

have more than 8 divisions in action to

pursue the war and at the same time to

"satisfy her domestic needs and those of

occupation." The French hoped that the

equipment necessary for the 5 divisions

requested by General Juin, or at least for

the remaining 3 on the ANFA program,

would be authorized.29

At that very moment SHAEF was submitting to the French in Paris for their concurrence the draft of an agreement between

their government and the Supreme Commander to regulate the command of labor,

internal security, and other units raised for

service with the Allied Expeditionary Force.

Examination of the document prompted

General Juin, on 31 October, to make two

important observations. To achieve the

rapid success of future operations as well

28

 Memos, JCS for CCS, CCS 653/2, 11 Oct 44,

and Leahy for Hull, 11 Oct 44, ABC 400.3295 (2

Aug 43), Sec 1-B; Memo, JCS for CCS, CCS

661/1, 29 Sep 44, ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec

2-B.

29

 Ltr, de Saint-Didier to Marshall, 24 Oct 44.

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B; Ltr,

de Saint-Didier to Marshall, 6 Oct 44, ABC 091.711

France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5; Memo, OPD for Marshall, 19 Oct 44, in same file.
328 REARMING THE FRENCH

as to permit the French to play the part

which they desired to play, it was necessary

that the Allies facilitate the development of

the French Army. The Provisional Government, moreover, could not envisage the

creation of auxiliary units as required by

SHAEF except within the framework of a

reconstituted army requiring, first of all, the

equipping of a certain number of large

units.30

The situation was reaching an impasse.

Ten weeks after the launching of ANVIL,

the CCS were no nearer a decision on the

French liberated manpower question. The

British Chiefs of Staff still had not answered

the U.S. proposal of 29 August calling for

the equipping of some additional French

combat battalions. Now the French were

renewing their demands for the reconstitution of their metropolitan army.

Yet, in the course of the preceding weeks,

some progress had been noted in the rehabilitation of the French war machine.

Arrangements had been made for the supply of French ports not under immediate

U.S. or British control. At the request of

the French, SHAEF had authorized the organization of a French tactical air command

to give air support to 1st French Army.

Particularly noteworthy had been the efforts

of the French to rehabilitate part of their

armament industry. The manufacture of

automatic pistols and rifles was under way,

and it was expected that within a few

months production could be expanded considerably to include machine guns, mortars,

vehicles, and other items. The French

were also planning to reopen shortly their

ordnance depots for the repair of French

ordnance matériel, including vehicles.31

The Liberated Manpower and Metropolitan

Programs

Bridging the gap between the respective

positions taken by the three allies on the

matter of French liberated manpower came

rather suddenly as a result, not of the weakening of any of the stands taken, but because

of the unexpected turn of military events.

The summer dash of the Allied armies

through France, which had brought with it

high hopes for a not-too-distant cessation of

hostilities, had slackened toward the end of

September. The slowing-down period, in

fact, had just begun at the time of the

Supreme Commander's intimation, given

on 22 September, that he desired no new

French combat units larger than a battalion.32

 The Germans had managed to

stop their hasty retreat and appeared determined to dig in for a prolonged defense.

In a message to the CCS dated 31 October,

General Eisenhower disclosed that events of

the past few weeks were causing him to

review the situation with respect to the employment of French liberated manpower.

He believed that, in addition to the current

labor and security program for which he

was sending final recommendations in a

separate communication, some divisions

could be made ready in time to be of use

provided the necessary equipment and shipping were made available. The units

raised in North Africa had fought well in

Italy and France, he explained. Arming

them with U.S. matériel had resulted in

saving thousands of American and British

lives. After the long campaigns in which

they had been involved, some of them

needed to be withdrawn and replaced. In

lieu of the ten Ranger battalions recommended earlier, Eisenhower now proposed

the activation and equipping of two addi30

 Ltr, Juin to SHAEF Mission to France, 31 Oct

44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B. 31

 SHAEF Mission to France, Appendix to Fortnightly Rpt 15-31 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS 475/3

France.

32

 Msg FWD 15331, Eisenhower to Marshall, 22

Sep 44, OPD Cable Files.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER QUESTION 329

tional infantry divisions to be used as replacements. He believed that the French

could provide the necessary personnel and

organize and train the two units to be ready

for combat by 1 March 1945.33

In a second message of the same date,

the Supreme Commander reviewed for the

CCS the whole question of SHAEF's requirements in Allied liberated manpower

and recommended that, in the light of the

experience gained to date and of the current operational situation, the ceiling be

raised from 172,000 men (as estimated in

March of the same year and approved by

the CCS on 9 July) to 460,000 men. For

the French, this meant an increase from

140,000 to 243,000 men. This revision

upward was essential to take care of additional commitments, such as Territorial

Command headquarters, Gendarmerie, and

Garde Mobile, which, in the absence of specific authority, SHAEF had undertaken to

assume for operational reasons. There

were, in addition, 48,000 FFI troops which

6th Army Group desired to equip and

organize in light infantry battalions. Matériel for these various additional requirements had been drawn from the War

Office pool of equipment for 172,000 men.

This pool was now nearly exhausted. So

far, the supplies released from British

sources had been sufficient to equip 108,000

men out of the authorized 140,000. General Eisenhower then broached the question

of the division of responsibility between the

United States and the United Kingdom

for providing the matériel to outfit the

460,000 men required under the revised

program. He proposed that the United

States be asked to furnish all vehicles and

other types of equipment which the

British normally obtained fro m the

Americans.34

The Supreme Commander's views, together with General Juin's communication

of 31 October on the reconstitution of the

French Army, were transmitted to the CCS

by General Loomis, then on a short visit

in Washington. In a personal memorandum, the chief of the Rearmament Division informed the CCS that General Juin's

letter had filled Supreme Headquarters

with considerable apprehension. The

letter appeared to be in effect a declaration

by the French that they considered the reconstitution of their Army as taking precedence over aid to the Allies in winning the

war. Such a proposal was inacceptable to

SHAEF. In fact General Smith's first reaction had been to consider the withdrawal

of the recommendations already made for

additional equipment and the cancellation

of orders. This course of action had now

been ruled out in favor of immediate discussions with the French. In the forthcoming negotiations with them, the Supreme

Commander's hand would be greatly

strengthened if he had the authority of the

CCS to furnish equipment for such units

as could be agreed upon to fill SHAEF's requirements. The authority, if granted,

would be used only if the French agreed to

provide units of a type and priority required

by SHAEF for current operations. Should

no such agreement be reached, it might then

be desirable to stop further issues of equipment to the French and utilize Polish,

Czechoslovakian, and other sources of

Allied manpower.35

33

 Ltr, Eisenhower to CCS, CCS 661/2, 31 Oct 44,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B.

34

 Ltr, Smith to CCS, CCS 627/4, 31 Oct 44, in

same file. 35

 Memo, Loomis for CCS, 6 Nov 44, ABC 091.-

711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-B; Memo for Rcd,

SHAEF G-3, 13 Nov 44, and Memo, SHAEF G-3

for CofS, 14 Nov 44, SHAEF SGS 475 France,

Vol. II.
330 REARMING THE FRENCH

During this time the two communications

of 31 October from the Supreme Commander had been referred to OPD and the

JLC with a view to weighing his proposals

in the light of availability of equipment and

shipping space. On the recommendation

of the JLC, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff informed the CCS on 23 November that as far

as France was concerned, General Eisenhower's requirements could be met in general under the provisions of their earlier

memorandum of 29 August (CCS 661)

which, incidentally, was still awaiting

British action.36

To settle the liberated manpower issue,

General Smith, at a meeting held at Supreme Headquarters on 18 November, invited Generals Juin and Leyer to present

the French point of view. The discussion

resulted in complete agreement. After

paying tribute to the efforts exerted by

SHAEF to equip the French armed forces,

General Juin outlined the progress of

French action in meeting the Supreme

Commander's requirements. He pointed

out that a number of labor units as well as

120 security battalions had already been

activated. His recommendations on the

control, functions, and equipping of the

security battalions appeared satisfactory to

General Smith and his associates, who, after

some discussion, expressed their complete

approval. General Juin then turned to the

subject which his government had most at

heart, the reorganization of the metropolitan army. The French, he explained, were

most anxious to participate in the war with

more than 8 divisions in the line. They

wanted, in fact, 8 more divisions—6 infantry, 1 mountain, and 1 armored—grouped

in 2 army corps. Even if there could be

no guarantee of equipment, the military

authorities were determined to proceed with

the organization of these new units and to

equip them progressively. At the invitation

of General Smith, General Leyer then explained how the French General Staff

hoped to equip these 8 new divisions.

The proposed plan, entirely separate

from, and in addition to, the current security and labor program, contemplated three

phases, as follows: Phase I, 1 mountain and

2 infantry divisions, equipped largely with

French matériel in order to save on shipping; Phase II, 1 infantry and 1 armored

division, equipped entirely with matériel of

Allied source; Phase III, 3 infantry divisions

equipped also with French matériel.

General Smith pointed out that the program was an excellent one but that the possibility of its implementation would be

determined by two factors: the fulfillment

of other priority commitments and availability of equipment and shipping. After

some discussion, the conferees agreed upon

the following armament priorities: (1)

completion of the security and labor program, (2) Allied equipment to complete

Phase I of the proposed French plan,

(3) instructional equipment for Phase II.

They further agreed that the FFI would be

completely absorbed in the plan and that

all details of implementation would be

worked out between the French military

authorities, the Rearmament Division, and

other responsible SHAEF staff sections.37

One factor apparently not discussed at

the meeting but bound to condition the

speed of implementation of the plan was

that of manpower. Figures which the

Ministry of War had just released on 10 36

 Memos, OPD for Col George A. Lincoln, 9

Nov 44, and Hull for Marshall, 14 Dec 44, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 1-B.

37

 Min, Rearmt Conf, 18 Nov 44, SHAEF 388.3/3

Fr Rearmt.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER QUESTION 331

November indicated that 382,000 liberated

men were then available. Of these, 52,000

were at the disposal of 1st French Army and

36,000 were engaged in operations on the

Atlantic coast , leaving approximately

294,000 men. SHAEF's own requirements

being estimated at 216,000, the net excess

numbered only 78,000 men. Since the 8-

division proposal required over 200,000

men, it was apparent that its implementation could be effected only very gradually

as the units of the labor and security program reverted to French control. The

mobilization of additional effectives could

hardly be considered at this juncture as all

civilian manpower was urgently needed for

the rehabilitation of the national economy

and the maintenance of existing public

services.38

Two days after the French had outlined

their intentions, they held a conference with

British military authorities to determine the

extent to which the United Kingdom could

assist in providing equipment for the proposed new divisions. Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald

Weeks, representing the Imperial General

Staff, informed General Leyer that some

surplus stocks of equipment in the United

Kingdom could be made available. At his

suggestion, the French Chief of Staff agreed

to send a team to tour British depots and

determine what items would be acceptable

and in what quantities. It was then decided that all subsequent negotiations on the

matter would be channeled through the Rearmament Division.39

To ensure closer co-ordination with

SHAEF on armament matters, in anticipation especially of an approval of their new

program, the French military authorities

merged their Armament Liaison Section,

currently attached to G-3, SHAEF Mission

to France, with the French Section already

operating with General Loomis' Rearmament Division. They placed the new section, called French Group of the Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to France,

under the command of Colonel Regnault

and gave it full authority to represent them

at SHAEF.40 Meanwhile, SHAEF undertook to determine the procedure and responsibilities for processing the detailed plan

which the French General Staff was preparing in pursuance of General Juin's proposal.41

The final plan was submitted by Mr.

Diethelm on 30 November. Known thereafter as the 30 November Plan, it consisted

of three separate projects: Liberated Manpower (or SHAEF) Program, Far East

Program, and Metropolitan Program. The

Liberated Manpower Program, to be completed at a pace to be determined by

SHAEF, consisted of 120 security battalions

grouped in 40 regiments, 34 labor groups of

4 companies each, Gendarmerie and Garde

Mobile units, and 10 Ranger battalions.

The Far East Program, which had already

been submitted to General Marshall on 1

October, contemplated the activation of

units amounting to 18,000 men. The

Metropolitan Program envisaged the constitution of 8 divisions and 213 supporting

army corps and general reserve units, with

a combined total strength of 207,000 men.

Its implementation, according to Mr. Diethelm, was conditioned, not by availability

of manpower which, he stressed, was adequate, but to a great extent by the output

of French industry, as 6 of the divisions were

38

 Rpt, Fr War Ministry, 10 Nov 44, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711-1 (Fr). 39

 Min, Mtg on Fr Rearmt, 20 Nov 44, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr).

40

 See p. 386, below. 41

 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France for G-3

SHAEF Main, 24 Nov 44, SHAEF G-3 091 France,

Vol. IV.
332 REARMING THE FRENCH

to be equipped largely from French sources.

The 5 divisions of Phase I and Phase II, of

which 3 were already activated, were to be

made ready by 1 May 1945, and the 3 divisions of Phase II by 1 August of the same

year.42

Apprised of the French intentions, the

British Chiefs of Staff expressed the fear

that the proposed Metropolitan Program

was in conflict with the recommendations

submitted on 29 August (CCS 661), recommendations which, incidentally, were still

awaiting British concurrence. General

Loomis assured General Weeks that there

was no conflict between the two proposals.

CCS 661 had urged the equipping of a number of infantry, artillery, and engineer

battalions equivalent to three of the infantry

divisions now requested by the French.

These could be considered as representing

the balance of the old ANFA program.43

After a careful study of the 30 November

Plan, SHAEF concluded that it contained

implications requiring further examination.

In particular, the Metropolitan Program, as

it stood, did not include sufficient service

troops. It contemplated the activation of

divisions on the basis of a 25,000-man division slice, a much lower figure than the

corresponding U.S. slice of 40,000 and even

lower than the current 1st French Army

slice of 32,500.44

In transmitting a copy of the plan to the

CCS on 18 December, General Smith

limited his comments to the Metropolitan

Program since the Liberated Manpower

Program was already before the CCS for

their consideration, and the Far East Program was obviously not the concern of the

Supreme Commander in western Europe.

He explained that the French planned to

equip six of the new divisions largely from

their own sources, either from stocks already

on hand, or from local manufacture provided they obtained raw materials and other

commercial products from the outside. It

was the opinion of SHAEF officials that the

Metropolitan Program or any portion

thereof would be of great value to the Allied

forces. The program was a reasonable one,

although it would require considerable revisions. Smith then urged the CCS to approve it without delay.45

The British Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile,

had finally taken action on CCS 661 nearly

four months after its submission. On 16

December their representatives in Washington informed the CCS that they were

prepared to agree to the issue to the Supreme Commander of authority to proceed

with the program recommended by the JCS

on 29 August. They were doing so on the

understanding that such authority would in

no way prejudice the reconsideration of the

whole question of French rearmament upon

the receipt of the Supreme Commander's

latest proposal, which, they understood,

was shortly to be submitted. The British

Chiefs of Staff had also taken simultaneous

action on the over-all liberated manpower

program submitted by General Eisenhower

on 31 October. While agreeing to the

higher ceiling proposed by the Supreme

Commander, they considered that the equipment load should in the future be shared on

a "more equitable basis." To this end they

proposed that the War Department be made

to assume the responsibility for procuring

42

 Ltr, Diethelm to Eisenhower, 30 Nov 44,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711 (Fr). 43

 Memo, Loomis for SHAEF G-3, 5 Dec 44,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr). 44

 Memo, Hull for Smith, 15 Dec 44, SHAEF SGS

475 France, Vol. II.

45

 Ltr, Smith to CCS, CCS 752/1, 18 Dec 44,

SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER QUESTION 333

equipment required by the liberated manpower controlled by the U.S. forces.46

British approval of CCS 661, in practice,

merely formalized the action already initiated by the War Department to begin

equipping the 27 infantry, 9 artillery, and

3 engineer battalions recommended by the

JCS. In proceeding with shipments,

American officials had acted on the justification that the battalions in question represented the completion of the old ANFA

program.

Apparently warned that U.S. industrial

output was currently falling far short of

requirements in a number of items, War

Minister Diethelm advised General Eisenhower of the" steps contemplated by the

French High Command to reduce to a minimum the requirement for U.S. matériel.

The survey just completed of depots in the

United Kingdom had revealed the existence

of excess British stocks probably sufficient

for six divisions. Although much of the

matériel was in poor condition, the French

would accept it and use it as "transition

equipment" pending its ultimate replacement. In this manner, the United States

would be called upon, for the present at

least, to furnish only a comparatively small

but essential amount of equipment unobtainable from either British or French

sources.47

The equipment situation of the Resistance forces fighting on the Atlantic coast

and to a lesser degree of those forces absorbed by 1st French Army had, by this

time, dangerously deteriorated. Returning

from an inspection tour through eastern

and southern France, a representative of

G-3, SHAEF, reported that these forces

were in general poorly equipped and using

whatever clothing and arms were available.

The disparity between their equipment and

that of 1st French Army was causing considerable ill feeling among the men. With

the unusually cold weather then prevailing,

it was urgent to furnish them at least boots

or shoes and overcoats or jackets. To improve their lot, the Supreme Commander

directed, on 16 December, that, pending

their absorption into civilian life or into

authorized military units, they were, when

employed on operationally necessary duties,

the responsibility of SHAEF with respect

to maintenance, clothing, and, if need be,

equipment. He urged, however, that all

steps be taken to expedite their early

disbandment.48

As the French military authorities had

received no reply to their 30 November proposal, they instructed their representative in

Washington to try to obtain a decision from

the CCS. In a preliminary conference held

on 18 December with General Marshall,

General de Saint-Didier outlined the aims

and implications of the proposed Metropolitan Program and pointed out that General

Eisenhower himself had "seemed interested"

in its operational possibilities. He then

listed the heavy matériel and the technical

items of lighter equipment which would be

required from the United States. The

French, on their side, would provide from

their own resources the necessary light infantry weapons, mortars, machine guns,

46 most of the engineer equipment, and other Memo, COS for CCS, CCS, 661/3, 16 Dec 44,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 44), Sec 2-C; Memo,

COS for CCS, CCS 627/6, 16 Dec 44, ABC

400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-B. 47

 Ltr, Diethelm to Eisenhower, 17 Dec 44, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C.

48

 Memo, Lt Col D. K. Griffith for ACofS G-3

SHAEF, 16 Dec 44, SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol.

IV; Ltr, SCAEF to Comdrs Concerned, 16 Dec 44,

SHAEF SGS 475/1, Vol. I.
334 REARMING THE FRENCH

miscellaneous items.49 General de SaintDidier then communicated to the CCS, in

advance of his appearance before them, a

memorandum setting forth the background

and aims of the Metropolitan Program. It

was not a postwar plan, but one designed to

increase to the maximum France's war

effort. General Eisenhower had not

reached a decision but "seemed to have been

greatly impressed."

 50

On 19 December the Supreme Commander, postponing his comments on the 30

November plan until further study, proposed

to the CCS that, in the event a rearmament program was implemented for any

country in western Europe, his headquarters

be made the co-ordinating authority and,

where necessary, the responsible agency for

processing, formulating, and implementing

the program, subject of course to CCS approval. Such a procedure would tend to

avoid any conflict likely to result from the

fact that present demands for rearmament

were diverse and might compete with

SHAEF's operational requirements for personnel and equipment. Simultaneously,

he requested that the scale of equipment for

liberated manpower be increased, as he now

considered it inadequate. Finally, his deputy chief of staff for air, Air Marshal James

M. Robb, transmitted a proposal calling

for an extension of the French Air Force.

The plan envisaged the activation of new

air and ground units and, if approved, was

to go into effect on 1 January and be completed by 30 June.51

In the hope of prodding SHAEF into

quick action, Mr. Diethelm called on General Smith on 20 December and urged him

to take steps for the speedy issue of the

matériel that would have to be delivered

from the United States under the new eightdivision program. He explained that

Prime Minister Churchill had agreed in the

course of his recent visit to France that some

obsolete equipment then in the United

Kingdom would be turned over to six of the

infantry divisions awaiting equipment.52

This would be a makeshift solution pending

reception of the modern U.S. equipment

"promised" earlier by General Smith. He

then requested that SHAEF approve the

transfer to the French forces of the captured war matériel then stocked up at Trun

in Normandy.53

The scheduled appearance of General de

Saint-Didier before the CCS took place on

22 December. The French representative

briefly outlined the details of the Metropolitan Program. The French High Command

expected to complete it by 1 May 1945, for

the British had just given assurances that

sufficient used British matériel would be

made available earlier than originally anticipated. Admiral Leahy, after paying

tribute to the combat record of the French

forces in Italy and France, assured General

de Saint-Didier that the CCS would consider the proposed program with sympathy

but warned him that the recent operational

events on the western European front had

increased the difficulties of delivering mili49 tary equipment even to the U.S. armies in Min Conf, Marshall and de Saint-Didier, 18

Dec 44, and Memo, Marshall for Hull, Somervell,

and Handy, 18 Dec 44, OCS A-48-11 091 France,

Sec I. 50

 Memo, de Saint-Didier for CCS, CCS 752, 19

Dec 44, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C. 51

 Msg SCAF 148, Eisenhower to CCS, 19 Dec

44, OPD Cable Files; Msg SCAF 147, Eisenhower

to CCS, 19 Dec 44, ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43),

Sec 1-B; Ltr, Robb to CCS, 19 Dec 44, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C. See discussion in Chapter XXII, below. 52

 The Prime Minister visited France in October

and again on 11 November. 53

 Min Conf, Smith and Diethelm, 20 Dec 44,

SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. II.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER QUESTION 335

France. After the meeting, the CCS referred the matter to the Combined Administrative Committee for comment and

recommendation.54

In Paris, examination of the Metropolitan

Program was continuing. As an interim

measure, G-3, SHAEF, on 24 December

recommended that the Supreme Commander approve the French proposal to use

British matériel available in the United

Kingdom and acceptable to them, and that

the CCS be urged to approve the transfer.

Meanwhile, 43,000 FFI personnel had been

issued equipment from sources in the

theater. In addition, matériel for eleven

infantry battalions had been received or was

en route to the Continent as a result of the

action initiated by the War Department.55

The impatiently awaited comments of the

Supreme Commander finally reached the

CCS on 28 December. Clearly, they reflected the operational developments of the

preceding few days. The situation on the

western front had taken a sudden turn for

the worse. The Ardennes offensive

launched by the Germans on 16 December had met with considerable initial success. Within ten days the enemy had advanced over fifty miles. Although the

momentum of the German drive had slowed

by 26 December, the situation was still

critical. Under the circumstances, Eisenhower was now eager to make the maximum use of liberated manpower—Belgian,

Polish, but more especially French. No

quicker, more economical, or more effective way to increase Allied fighting power

could be found, he explained to the CCS,

than by furnishing the equipment for at

least 5 of the proposed 8 divisions. He

added that it would be a great help if 2

divisions equipped with excess British matériel apparently acceptable to the French

could be placed at the disposal of Field

Marshal Montgomery, then in command of

the British 21 Army Group. The Supreme

Commander then turned to the labor and

security program. The War Office pool of

equipment was exhausted. Some 43,000

FFI troops were fighting on the Atlantic

coast, for whom SHAEF was unable to provide anything. Although sympathetic to

their plight, the War Office was hampered

by lack of authority from the CCS. It was

essential that the Liberated Manpower Program be given prompt approval.56

The CCS lost no time in taking action.

With the prospect of a longer war, the realization that the Germans were stronger than

it was thought earlier and the knowledge

that the dearth of U.S. infantry replacements, already felt before the Ardennes offensive, was critical, the CCS quickly endorsed General Eisenhower's recommendations. Within twenty-four hours, they approved the eight-division Metropolitan Program, the Liberated Manpower Program,

and the French Air Force Program. They

then directed the Combined Administrative Committee to determine the responsibility for the provision of the necessary

equipment.57

The question of the employment of

French metropolitan manpower was at last

solved in a manner which, it was hoped,

would satisfy the wishes of all concerned.

54

 Min, CCS 180th Mtg, 22 Dec 44, ABC 091.711

France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-G; Memo for Rcd, MIS

WD, 27 Dec 44, OCS A-48-1 091 France. 55

 Memo, Hull for Smith, 24 Dec 44, SHAEF SGS

475 France, Vol. II; Memo, Hull for Smith, 27 Dec

44, OCS A-48-11 091 France, Sec I.

56

 Msg SCAF 159, Eisenhower to CCS, 28 Dec 44,

OPD Cable Files. 57

 Min, CCS 181st Mtg, 29 Dec 44, ABC 091.711

France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5; Msg FACS 120, CCS to

Eisenhower, 29 Dec 44, ABC 091.711 (6 Oct 43),

Sec 2-C.
336 REARMING THE FRENCH

The Liberated Manpower Program provided, for the Supreme Commander, a sufficient force to maintain the security of the

rear and a labor force to assist in the

physical support of his armies. The Metropolitan and Air Programs would give him,

by the spring of 1945, a substantial increase

of his fighting force and, at the same time,

would satisfy the long-felt desire of the

French to reorganize their national army.

To some French authorities, on the other

hand, the Metropolitan Program as it stood

was only a beginning. In General de

Gaulle's opinion, France could do much

more than activate eight divisions from her

liberated manpower. Apparently impressed by the speed with which the CCS

had acted on the eight-division program

(barely a month had elapsed since the submission of the program on 30 November),

and in the belief that he must strike while

the iron was hot, the French leader wasted

no time in trying for a much larger program.

In a personal letter to President Roosevelt, dated 1 January 1945, de Gaulle, after

expressing his gratefulness for the agreement reached three days earlier to rearm

8 divisions, declared that his government

could have before the end of 1945 "about

fifty good divisions" if it had the means to

equip them. Should the President give a

favorable reply in principle, he would send

General Juin to Washington at once to discuss all technical arrangements. General

de Gaulle's letter did not clearly indicate

whether the 50 divisions were to be in addition to the 8 already equipped under the

North African program and the 8 to be

rearmed under the recently approved program. Even assuming that these 16 units

were included in the total, this meant a

further increase of 34 divisions by the end

of 1945, still a sizable figure. The proposal at any rate was referred immediately

to the JCS and the JLC for examination and

recommendations, and three weeks later to

General Eisenhower for comment. Meanwhile the State Department dispatched a

noncommittal reply to the U.S. Ambassador

in Paris for delivery to the Minister of

Foreign Affairs.58

General Somervell, then in Paris, was

discussing with Supreme Headquarters the

details and implications of the new 8-division program. He and theater officials had

already agreed that the program would require considerable revisions in view of its

insufficiency in service units. In fact,

SHAEF's Rearmament Division was busy

drafting a revised program in which the

necessary service units would be placed on

a higher priority than most of the divisions

themselves. On 30 January General Eisenhower informed General Marshall that in

his opinion the recently approved program

represented "the maximum effort which the

French could make in time to be of use in

operations" in his theater. French rearmament industry, he explained, was still

directly dependent upon import of raw

materials largely from U.S. sources. As for

manpower, it was doubtful that enough of

it could be made available to fulfill all

existing commitments including the 8 new

divisions, much less the activation of 34

additional divisions as proposed by General

de Gaulle.59

A few days later the JLC reported that

existing and expected shortages of essential

equipment, present requirements placed on

U.S. production which exceeded produc58

 Ltr, de Gaulle to President, 1 Jan 45, and Msg,

Grew to U.S. Ambassador Paris, 27 Jan 45, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C. 59

 Msgs CM-OUT 26436, Marshall to Eisenhower, 25 Jan 45, and S-77124, Eisenhower to

Marshall, 30 Jan 45, in same file.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER QUESTION 337

tion capabilities, and a strained shipping

situation ruled out the provision, in 1945,

of further equipment to meet General de

Gaulle's request. On the basis of this conclusion and of the recommendations of the

Supreme Commander, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff decided that, since the French could

not provide the necessary personnel and the

United States could not furnish the necessary equipment, the commitment to rearm

the French should be limited to the 16 divisions and supporting troops approved under

the North African and Metropolitan Programs. Such was the tenor of the letter

which President Roosevelt himself addressed to de Gaulle on 24 March. "In

view of all the factors involved," he concluded, "you will appreciate the fact that

attempts at French rearmament beyond the

commitments which can clearly be met by

France and the U.S. would interfere with

the prosecution of the war."

 60

Any implication that the American rejection of the de Gaulle proposal was based

on a veiled desire to crush French ambition

for the future, as then rumored among the

French, must be dismissed if one considers

the position which American officials had

taken with respect to French military power.

This position had been made unmistakably

clear only a few weeks before by the StateWar-Navy Coordinating Committee, the

highest American policy-making agency.

In briefing President Roosevelt on the proposal made earlier by the British to reorganize the French and other Allied postwar

armies, the committee had this to say:

Our present policy toward the French is

based on the belief that it is in the best interests of the U.S. that France resume her

traditional position as a principal power

capable of playing a part in the occupation

of Germany and in maintaining peace in

Europe. The recruiting and equipping of

French land forces would be a natural corollary of this policy, and politically such a move

could be portrayed as a further evidence of

American friendship for France and a proof

of our desire to see her as a strong nation.61

That, in the light of such a statement, the

U.S. Chiefs of Staff had now come to reject

the latest French proposal could be explained only by motives of a sound, practical, military nature such as were given in

the reply to General de Gaulle. Shortages

of U.S. matériel were known to exist, a fact

which the JLC had emphasized in their

9 February report. But more serious was

the situation with respect to French manpower availability itself.

As matters stood, 1st French Army, with

a reported strength of 241,000 men, was

already short some 58,000 supporting

troops—lines of communications personnel

for the most part—thus throwing a considerable burden on the U.S. forces. In

addition, its regiments were short from 700

to 800 white effectives each. They had in

fact received no replacements from liberated

France. Without wishing to prejudice the

plans currently being made for the activation of new divisions, largely from the

former FFI, General de Lattre, Commanding General, 1st French Army, had urged

General de Gaulle on 18 December to place

at his disposal without delay the 8,000 to

10,000 young Frenchmen needed to restore

to his Army "its initial moral equilibrium"

and "fighting qualities."

 62

 The new 8-

60

 Memos, JLC for JCS, 9 Feb 45, and Leahy for

Secy War and Secy Navy, 2 Mar 45, in same file;

Ltr, President to de Gaulle, 24 Mar 44, ABC

091.711 (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D. See also Memo,

Daly for Craig, 11 May 45, OPD 336.2 France,

Sec V.

61

 Memo, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for President, 28 Dec 44, ABC 091.711 (6

Oct 43), Sec 2-D. 62

 Ltr, de Lattre to de Gaulle, 18 Dec 44, quoted

in de Lattre, Histoire de la Première Armée Française, p. 337.
338 REARMING THE FRENCH

division program as planned by the French

called for a total of 205,000 men with a

division slice of only 25,600 men, a

level regarded by SHAEF as totally inadequate. The Liberated Manpower Program, meanwhile, was still in process of implementation and absorbing considerable

effectives. It was difficult to see how the

French could raise, in addition to these various commitments, 1,275,000 men for 34

new divisions before the return and rehabilitation of prisoners of war then detained in

Germany, or without extensive mobilization. So far only the class of young men

twenty-one years of age had been called to

the colors. Even if the necessary effectives

were raised, General Eisenhower did not

consider it likely that they could be

equipped and trained in time to participate

in operations. His skepticism regarding the

de Gaulle proposal was shared by those who,

at Supreme Headquarters, were grappling

with the armament problem. The Americans regarded it as an example of "utter

folly." Their French colleagues, when apprised of it, registered considerable embarrassment.63

The action taken by the CCS at the end

of December had firmly established the

principle of two separate armament commitments (if one considers the new Air

Force Program as part of the Metropolitan

Program) involving French liberated manpower, with one, at least in the eyes of the

Allied command, having priority over the

other. The French, while agreeing to this

distinction, regarded the Liberated Manpower Program rather as a transition program, one forced upon them and one in

which they saw no advantage to themselves

other than the formation of units to be absorbed as speedily as possible in the Metropolitan Program. Judging from the enthusiasm they had shown consistently since

November 1942 for the activation of combat divisions at the expense of service units,

it was to be expected that they would now

likewise throw all their energy into expediting a program from which they were to

gain additional combat units, meanwhile

devoting less attention to the organization

of labor and security troops.

63

 Msg S-77124, Eisenhower to Marshall, 30

Jan 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C;

Intervs with Loomis, Jun 50, with Regnault.

Sep 50.
CHAPTER XX

The Liberated Manpower and

Metropolitan Programs in Operation

Implementing the Liberated Manpower

Program

Implementation of the Liberated Manpower Program, begun long before the CCS

approval on 29 December, had already produced some tangible results. By 15 January

the French had activated or were in process

of activating approximately 45 security

battalions, as well as 23 transport and 13

labor units.1 Equipping of these units was

effected as follows. First G-3, SHAEF,

indicated to G-4 the priorities in which

equipment was to be released and to what

units it was to be allocated. G-4 then obtained the release of equipment from U.S.

or U.K. sources. Shipments involved

questions of over-all priority as they tended

to compete with the maintenance and

build-up requirements of armies in the field.

Equipment arriving on the Continent was

unloaded at either Le Havre or Rouen. As

there were no depots available in these two

ports, the matériel was transported to the

French reception center at Caen where it

was held until distributed to the units.

Once equipped, the units were inspected by

General Kingman's Inspection Group for

the purpose of determining completeness of

equipment. After this inspection, they

were subjected to an initial training period

by the military region commands, at the

end of which the latter informed SHAEF

Mission to France that the units were ready

for operational employment. SHAEF

Mission then notified the appropriate headquarters and co-ordinated the issue of instructions placing the units under the command or at the disposal of British or U.S.

forces. As Inspection Group and the

French War Ministry did not always agree

on dates of readiness, the Rearmament Division acted as a check on statements by these

authorities. One of the principal difficulties

encountered appeared to be insufficient

liaison between the War Ministry and the

military regions. Another resulted from the

fact that the French were simultaneously

reorganizing Metropolitan Program units,

a process which involved a constant reshuffling of units. Thus within 6th Army

Group area, it was not always too clear

which battalions were security battalions

and which were units intended for the

Metropolitan Program.2

Adding to the difficulties in setting up

the units required under the Liberated

Manpower Program was the fact that the

program itself included no service troops.

Logistical support of these units, especially

the security battalions, could not be im- 1

 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France G-3 for

SHAEF Main, 15 Jan 45, SHAEF Mission to France

320-2-NA Orgn of Fr Army.

2

 Min, Conf at SHAEF Main, 16 Jan 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.4 Liberated People.
340 REARMING THE FRENCH

posed upon U.S. service troops and installations as these were already working to

capacity and in any case were not organized

to service British equipment. Arrangements were finally made in mid-January

with commanders of the military regions

and of the battalions themselves for the

activation of French service units. Equipment for these was drawn from that issued

to the battalions or from other French

sources.3

In Washington, the question of the division of responsibility between the United

States and the United Kingdom for providing equipment for labor and security units

was still unsolved. The U.S. members of

the Combined Administrative Committee

were now recommending that the British

be asked to supply all the requirements and

that they be urged to indicate specifically

what they could or could not do so that the

United States would know the extent of its

obligation.4

By the end of January, the equipment

situation of Liberated Manpower Program

units had become critical. Already three

months had elapsed since the submission of

the original request to the CCS and the

latter had so far given only an approval in

principle. Resources were dwindling rapidly while demands for liberated manpower

had risen. Equipment could be obtained

only for certain limited and specific requirements approved by the War Office. It was

therefore not possible for the theater to

keep any phased program to meet requirements for the Allied Expeditionary Force

as a whole. Lack of approval of the proposed increased scale of equipment added

to the seriousness of the situation. Units

were being employed under the most exacting weather conditions and many were reported to be suffering serious sickness rates.

Additional equipment, especially clothing,

was urgently needed. SHAEF was in a

position neither to provide adequately for

existing units nor to meet further requirements.5

In a message dated 30 January the Supreme Commander brought these facts before the CCS. He urged them to approve

forthwith an increase in the scales of equipment, such as a second pair of boots, a

fourth blanket, and a second set of battle

dress. These increases were particularly

essential where units were serving with U.S.

or U.K. forces, as they had no facilities for

the rapid replacement of soiled or damaged

clothing. Resources were exhausted,

warned the Supreme Commander, and the

British War Office was unwilling to make

further issues pending the decision of the

CCS. The whole program had come to a

standstill thus "tying up" U.S. and British

combat troops.6

When, on 2 February, the CCS met to

discuss General Eisenhower's recommendations, they were faced with a difficult decision. The operational situation had greatly

changed for the better in the past few days.

The Allied drive eastward, resumed after

the Ardennes setback, was gaining momentum. On the Eastern Front, the Russian

offensive launched on 12 January had

brought the Red Army deep into the Reich.

These successes were reviving hopes for an

early end of hostilities. Preferring not to

reach a decision on the provision of equip- 3

 Msg EX-80374, Lee to Base Secs, 31 Dec 44,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-1 (Fr) ; Memo,

Loomis for Regnault, 5 Jan 45, SHAEF Mission

to France 091.4 Liberated People. 4

 Memo for Info, CAdC, 25 Jan 45, ABC 091.711

France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C.

5

 Memo, Bull for Smith, 27 Jan 45, SHAEF SGS

475 France, Vol III. 6

 Msg SCAF 193, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Jan 45,

OPD Cable Files.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN PROGRAMS 341

ment for the Liberated Manpower Program

until they had received the report they were

expecting from the Combined Administrative Committee, the CCS merely ordered,

in the interim, a reduction of the over-all

program from 460,000 to 400,000 men.7

This forced a revision downward of the

French part of the program. The 20,000-

odd effectives of the military regions, Gendarmerie, and Garde Mobile, who had been

issued only a small fraction of the equipment initially promised them, were stricken

off the program. The number of security

battalions and labor units was reduced to

103 and 30 respectively.

On 21 February the Supreme Commander and the French Provisional Government reached an agreement on the

general subject of the command and employment of the units raised under the

Liberated Manpower Program. The

agreement formalized an earlier informal

understanding reached on 18 November

1944. Signed by Maj. Gen. John T. Lewis,

Chief, SHAEF Mission to France, and

General Juin, it stipulated that when employed within French territory the units

concerned were commanded by the military region commanders who in turn received their missions from army and army

group commanders in the zone of armies,

or from the Commanding General, Communications Zone, in the zone of interior.

When operating in Germany, the units were

to be organized in task forces consisting of

a minimum of five to ten battalions and

commanded by French officers, the latter in

turn receiving their missions from the army

and army group commanders concerned.8

Finally, the agreement authorized the

limited transfer of men, but for replacement

purposes only, from Liberated Manpower

Program to Metropolitan Program units.

On 24 March General Lewis reminded

General Juin that men so transferred were

to leave behind clothing and individual

equipment so as to prevent the loss of this

matériel to labor and security units.9

Pursuant to the agreement, the French

were requested to organize 7 headquarters

to command a corresponding number of

task forces for operation in Germany. The

headquarters were tentatively allocated on

the basis of 1 to 12th Army Group, 4 to 6th

Army Group, and 2 to Communications

Zone. Each task force was to include six

battalions and some service units, a list of

which was subsequently forwarded to the

French military authorities.10

The Combined Administrative Committee finally submitted on 24 March its overall study of the rearmament programs for

western European Allies. The committee

recommended in part that the United Kingdom be made to assume the equipment

responsibility for the 400,000 labor and security troops required by SHAEF 11

 "without upward revision of the present U.K. requirements against the War Department."

It also offered an important recommendation affecting all western European rearmament programs, namely, that any units

which had not been equipped by the time

active hostilities with Germany ceased

should not be equipped.12 Two weeks later,

7

 Min, CCS 185th Mtg, 2 Feb 45, ABC 400.3295

(2 Aug 43), Sec 1-C. 8

 Text of Agreement in Memo AG 091.711-5

(Fr) GCT-AGM, SCAEF To All Concerned, 2

Mar 45, SHAEF G-3 091, Vol. VI.

9

 Memo, Lewis for Juin, 24 Mar 45, SHAEF Mission to France 421-1 Combined. 10

 Msgs EX-21116 and EX-22400, SCAEF to

SHAEF FWD, 15 and 18 Mar 45, SHAEF G-3 091

France, Vol. VI; Ltr, Lewis to Juin, 30 Mar 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-1 (Fr). 11

 As well as for six Belgian infantry brigades. 12

 Rpt, CAdC to CCS, CCS 768/7, 24 Mar 45,

ABC 400.3295 (2 Aug 43), Sec 1-C.
342 REARMING THE FRENCH

on 6 April, the CCS, by informal action,

approved the recommendations of the committee and advised the Supreme Commander accordingly.

By the beginning of April implementation

of the Liberated Manpower Program had

made but little progress. Of the 103

French security battalions required under

the revised program, 49 only were equipped

and operational or about to become operational—18 in Communications Zone area,

24 in 6th Army Group area (of which 12

were administered by 1st French Army),

none in 12th Army Group area, and 7 in

the British zone. Fifty-four battalions had

not yet been activated or, if activated, had

not been equipped. As for labor groups,

of the 30 units required, no more than 6

were operational, all in the British zone,

leaving 24 still to be formed and equipped.13

The program, obviously, had bogged

down. The reasons ranged from lack of

personnel, suitable clothing, and organizational equipment to lack of interest by key

French officers. In some instances, it was

reported that battalion commanders had

not inspected or visited companies under

their command for periods of three to six

weeks.14 In addition, considerable confusion appeared to exist in 6th Army Group

area in connection with security battalions.

General Devers reported that the 24 battalions assigned to his command had "gotten out of hand" and were being absorbed

by the French for employment in other than

lines of communications duties. SHAEF

immediately took steps to recover the control

of these units so that they could be used as

originally contemplated and not for

combat.15

It was then that the French, by injecting

a political note into the matter, precipitated

a crisis which brought the implementation

of the program to a sudden end. In late

March General Juin had been requested by

SHAEF to assign additional security battalions for service with Allied armies operating in Germany. Writing to General

Lewis on 5 April, he announced that, with

the exception of the 12 battalions then at

the disposal of 1st French Army, no other

battalions would be assigned to the Allied

Expeditionary Force in Germany until the

French zone of occupation had been determined. An additional 45 battalions would

then be made available but for employment

in that zone only.16

This announcement could not fail to

bring forth a violent reaction from SHAEF.

Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, Assistant Chief

of Staff, G-3, considered that the restrictions proposed by the French were in violation of the understanding reached between

Generals Smith and Juin on 18 November

and the formal agreement signed on 21 February. He recommended that if the

French remained adamant in their position,

the Supreme Commander should be asked

to order a suspension of the Liberated Manpower Program.17

In an attempt to ward off such drastic

action, General Smith requested the French

Chief of Staff to clarify his earlier statement

as well as French intentions. "As this headquarters," he went on to explain, "is concerned only with operations for the defeat

13

 Tab D to Memo, Bull for CofS, 7 Apr 45,

SHAEF SGS 474 France, Vol. III. 14

 Memo, Theater Comdr ETOUSA for Lewis,

18 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-13

(Fr).

15

 Memo, Bull for Chief Orgn and Equip Sec

SHAEF, 6 Apr 45, SHAEF G-3 091 France,

Vol. VI. 16

 Ltr, Juin to Lewis, 5 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS 475

France, Vol. III. 17

 Memo, Bull for Smith, 7 Apr 45, in same file.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN PROGRAMS 343

of Germany and has nothing to do with

political questions such as the delimitation

of the French zone of occupation, it is difficult for me to understand the connection

between the two matters. ... It is possible that I have misinterpreted your

meaning."

 18

On 9 April, as no word had been received

from General Juin, then on a tour of inspection of the troops engaged on the

Atlantic coast, the Supreme Commander

directed that initial issues of equipment to

French security and labor units be suspended pending clarification of the conditions under which the units were to be employed in Germany.19

 This action, taken,

ironically enough, only three days after the

CCS had approved the program itself,

brought immediate response from the

French. The agreement of 21 February,

General Juin assured General Smith, was

not questioned at all by the French military

authorities; what was involved at the moment, he explained, was a discussion of the

"specific arrangements." In support of this

contention he referred to a paragraph of

the agreement which, as quoted by him,

stipulated that "separate and specific arrangements must be made with respect to

the place and time of employment of the

security battalions." He urged that the

matter be discussed at once between General Smith and himself.20

In the course of a meeting held on 11

April, General Smith pointed out that the

paragraph quoted in General Juin's letter

referred, as worded in the agreement, only

to the organization and not to the employment of the units. It was not clear, he

added, why the French authorities considered that any discussion was justified at this

juncture. General Juin replied that his

government was concerned with the political aspects of the question. The employment of the French forces in Germany was

tied up with basic political questions, such

as the ultimate problem of occupation and

of French security. The French Government was being "kept in the dark" concerning the attribution of a zone of occupation

to France and could not be expected to

agree to the use of its forces as mere "colonial auxiliaries." French authorities, General Juin stated flatly, had no part in the

direction of the war although they remained

at all times ready to contribute within the

full limits of their resources to the defeat of

Germany.

Replying to these and other arguments,

General Smith emphasized that he was concerned with and must be guided by strictly

military considerations. If no other solution could be found, SHAEF would, however reluctantly, have to dispense with the

French battalions. These would be replaced by U.S. troops and additional units

now being offered by the Belgian and

Netherlands Governments. Having made

unmistakably clear SHAEF's position in the

matter, General Smith then, on a conciliatory note, asked General Juin to consider

the following solution: the employment

under Allied control of French battalions up

to a total of 52 for lines of communications

duties in the area west of the Rhine, with

the understanding that no rigid restrictions

would be placed on their employment later

in other areas should this become necessary.

In return, three Metropolitan Program

divisions, the 1st, 10th, and 36th Infantry,

would be placed at the disposal of the

French High Command; the first two would

18

 Ltr, Smith to Juin, 7 Apr 45, in same file. 19

 Msg FWD 18819, SCAEF to COMZONE, 9

Apr 45, in same file. 20

 Ltr, Juin to Smith, 10 Apr 45, in same file.
344 REARMING THE FRENCH

be assigned to the maintenance of security

in the Strasbourg and Saar areas, and the

third would be moved to the Franco-Italian

border to replace the 1st DMI. The latter

would then become available for employment with 1st French Army.21

After he had consulted General de

Gaulle, the French Chief of Staff announced

that the plan proposed by General Smith

was satisfactory. The French Government

consented, for the time being, to placing at

SHAEF's disposal initially 24 battalions organized in 8 regiments and later, other units,

all under the command of a French general

officer, Lt. Gen. Henri Préaud, provided

they be employed in the territory lying between the 1939 French border, the Rhine,

and a line running from Aachen to Cologne

both inclusive.22 Two weeks later, on 30

April, with the issuance of equipment still

suspended, the French authorities reiterated

that they were prepared to place 24 battalions (10 at once, 14 after they had been

equipped) at the disposal of the Allied command but only during the period of active

operations against organized German

forces.23 Thereafter their employment

would be made the subject of a new agreement.

This latest French note brought to the

fore a question already under consideration

for some time, namely, the employment of

Liberated Manpower Program units after

the signing of an armistice in Europe. The

Supreme Commander, anticipating an early

end of hostilities, had requested the CCS,

on 24 April, to authorize him to continue

to equip, for employment in Germany, such

units as would be required for up to a maximum of one year.24

 His requirement in

French security troops was estimated at 47

battalions (13 for the British zone and 34

for the U.S. zone), of which 22 only were

currently equipped and available. Without waiting for a reply from the CCS, General Smith informed the French on 7 May

that the issue of further equipment to security and labor units was not justified unless

these units could be operationally employed

under Allied Expeditionary Force command for a period of six months.25

On the same day the German forces were

surrendering to the Western Allies and to

the USSR. In pursuance of the directive

from the CCS, all rearmament programs in

western Europe were to terminate. Yet the

end of hostilities brought no change in the

status of the French programs. Implementation of the Liberated Manpower Program

already had been suspended and the question of its resumption was now before the

CCS. The Metropolitan Program had suffered a similar fate a week before the cessation of hostilities.

Implementing the Metropolitan Program

By the time the Metropolitan Program

had been approved on 29 December 1944,

its implementation had made some headway as a result of action taken in anticipation of a favorable CCS decision. It will be

recalled that the War Department had already shipped equipment for eleven infantry

battalions, that the British War Office was

prepared to deliver stocks of old matériel

acceptable to the French, and that the 21

 Min Conf, Smith and Juin, 11 Apr 45, in same

file.

22

 Ltr, Juin to Smith, 14 Apr 45, in same file. 23

 Ltr, Sevez to Smith, 30 Apr 45, SHAEF SGS

France 475/2, Vol. II.

24

 Msg SCAF 304, Eisenhower to CCS, 24 Apr

45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D. 25

 Ltr, Smith to Sevez, 7 May 45, SHAEF G-3

091 France, Vol. VII.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN PROGRAMS 345

French themselves had activated several of

the eight divisions scheduled to be reequipped.

As the CCS signified approval, implementation went into high gear. Yet the

prospects of success did not look too encouraging. Considering the implications of the

program itself and, in the light of experience

gained in North Africa, the factors on which

it was dependent for its progress, it appeared

almost certain that the undertaking would

face serious obstacles and might well make

no more than a limited start.

From the standpoint of matériel, there

were a number of unfavorable factors, such

as the multiplicity of sources from which

equipment was to come—British, American,

Canadian, French, and enemy-captured;

the fact that French industry was experiencing considerable difficulties, not likely to

be solved for some time, in reaching production goals especially with respect to clothing

requirements; finally, the current and anticipated shortages of U.S. equipment.

From the manpower standpoint, two problems had to be considered: the competitive

requirements of the two French programs

and the possibility of insufficient numbers

of trained men for the required service units.

Finally, there were psychological and political factors. Should the tempo of operations be stepped up again and the cessation

of hostilities appear closer at hand, as in

August of 1944, a corresponding slackening of interest in the program on the part

of the Allies would probably result. Should,

in addition, political complications arise between Allied and French authorities, as they

had on occasions during the North African

rearmament operations with regard to command or employment of troops, the program might well be dealt a death blow.

Fewer such complications, it was hoped,

were likely to arise as a result of a political

step taken by the Allies a few months back.

On 23 October 1944 they had finally recognized the Provisional Government of the

French Republic, headed by General de

Gaulle.26 On 1 January 1945 Mr. Henri

Bonnet presented to President Roosevelt his

credentials as French Ambassador to the

United States and signed the United Nations

Declaration in the name of his government.

France had now joined officially the fraternity of nations aligned against the Axis.

On 6 January 1945 the CCS approved

the transfer of British equipment requested

by the French for their new divisions.

They stipulated that all items of U.S. lendlease origin were to be turned over to the

theater commander and by him transferred

to the French on behalf of the United States.

The transaction involved a much smaller

volume than the amount initially offered by

the British, for the matériel available was

largely obsolescent. Items transferred included machine guns (light, medium, and

heavy), automatic rifles, ammunition, miscellaneous vehicles, all to be used for training purposes and as part of the equipment

for the six divisions of Phases I and III.27

Further French-British conversations led to

new French demands for other British items,

such as 150 Cromwell tanks, armored cars,

and a number of miscellaneous trucks not

in running order but repairable. The

French wished to use the tanks and armored

26

 The United States and the French Provisional

Government signed, on 28 February 1945, the LendLease and Reciprocal Aid Agreement which, in

practice, continued in force the agreements reached

earlier with the former French Committee of National Liberation. Twentieth Report to Congress

on Lend-Lease Operations, August 30, 1945. 27

 Msgs SCAF 162, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Dec

44, and FACS 122, CCS to Eisenhower, 6 Jan 45,

OPD Cable Files.
346 REARMING THE FRENCH

cars to equip the six reconnaissance regiments of the six infantry divisions.28

In the opinion of Allied officials, the one

factor likely to determine the success of the

new program more than any other was

availability of manpower. On 31 December they had requested General Juin to

submit an estimate of effectives available

for the following purposes: replacements

for the divisions of 1st French Army then

reported to be considerably understrength,

the Liberated Manpower Program, the

Metropolitan Program, and "any other program which the French might be considering and about which SHAEF had not been

informed."

 29

 In his reply, General Juin

assured Supreme Headquarters that while

no estimate, even approximate, could possibly be made at the moment of the manpower available for each of the various commitments, there would be no difficulty in

obtaining the needed personnel. The

essential problem that remained was matériel. The Allies should "stick firmly" to

the program as it stood, not depart from it,

and bend all efforts to provide forthwith as

much of the necessary equipment as

possible.30

An important conference, meanwhile,

had been held in Washington at which some

thirty representatives from the International

Division, Ordnance, Operations Division,

and Army Air Forces discussed the two

problems of supply and accounting for the

Metropolitan Program. They agreed that,

because the program involved many different sources of equipment and the time

schedule was short, the commanding general in the theater should have the maximum amount of latitude in equipping the

new units. With this in view, they set forth

a new method of effecting supply and accounting to replace the existing Commanding General Shipments system.31

Under the new procedure, in which both

SHAEF and the French subsequently concurred, matériel shipped thereafter to the

French from the United States was sent

through U.S. Army supply channels to U.S.

supply depots in the theater. Co-ordination between the theater and the International Division was assumed by General

Loomis' Rearmament Division. The latter and other SHAEF agencies concerned

were responsible for determining what

units should be activated and the time at

which it would be possible to do so. In

addition they surveyed the various sources

of supply to determine the amount of equipment needed to be furnished from the

United States. The War Department forwarded the necessary requisitions to the

MAB which allocated the matériel to the

U.S. Army on the basis of operational

urgency. All accounting was, of necessity,

accomplished in the theater.

The new system represented a complete

departure from the one followed formerly

in North Africa. Whereas equipment used

to be shipped to the French even before

their units were organized, now it was delivered to them only after theater officials

were satisfied that units were ready to receive it. Thus the theater was given complete control over the rearmament operations. Under this system it would feel no

reluctance in pushing any program which

it deemed reasonable and necessary. As a

28

 Memo, Leyer for Eisenhower, 5 Jan 45, SHAEF

SGS 475 France, Vol. III. 29

 Memo, Lewis for Juin, 29 Dec 44, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711-13 (Fr); Memo, Lewis

for Juin, 31 Dec 44, SHAEF Mission to France

091.711-3 (Fr). 30 Ltr, Juin to Lewis, 7 Jan 45, SHAEF Mission

to France 091.711-3 (Fr).

31

 Min Conf, 4 Jan 45, ABC 091.711 France (6

Oct 43), Sec 2-C.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN PROGRAMS 347

result of the change in procedure, the Rearmament Division became, more than ever

before, the central authority and the source

of all information with respect to French

rearmament.32

By 5 January Army Service Forces had

already completed a detailed analysis of requirements of U.S. matériel for the Metropolitan Program. Of the entire 1,600-odd

items needed, nearly 1,400 could be furnished in accordance with the desired schedule without significant interference with

other estimated demands and without major

additional encroachments upon existing deficiencies, if any, in stock levels in the United

States. Of the remainder, only fifty critical

items, including artillery, ammunition,

tanks, and certain categories of trucks, could

not be furnished from the United States

except at the expense of U.S. demands in

the theater. To fill the French program as

completely as possible, Army Service Forces

took immediate steps to increase American

production in all cases where necessary.

On 8 January ASF informed the theater

that the War Department had authorized

the shipment of available items. Simultaneously, General Marshall urged the

theater to consider the use of available

enemy-captured equipment.33

The first shipment of matériel was due

to leave U.S. ports within a few days in two

ships bound for Marseille. It contained

first-priority items, such as clothing and

individual equipment, and matériel for the

first three divisions and supporting units.

Deliveries were being made on the basis of

the phasing established for the divisions by

the Supreme Commander in his letter of 15

December, and for the supporting units by

the French Military Mission in Washington.34

 General Loomis then informed the

French that the shipment of available

equipment for Phase I would be substantially completed by 1 May. He also advised

them that revisions of the troop basis of the

program and of the shipping schedule were

in progress and would be discussed with

them soon.35

Meanwhile, the first of the new divisions,

the 10th Infantry (or Paris) Division,

assembled and organized in September primarily from FFI troops in the Paris area

and commanded by Brig. Gen. Pierre Billotte, was being moved to 6th Army Group

area. Its strength was approximately

14,000 men. Its matériel, consisting largely

of enemy-captured equipment of assorted

types, was wholly inadequate. American

inspecting officers considered that the unit

would not be in a condition to be used in an

offensive role until it had received suitable

equipment and had been trained for a

period of not less than four months.36 The

division was one of the several units which

General Juin had offered, on 30 December,

to put into the Strasbourg area in an effort

32

 Interv with Loomis, Jun 50; Memo, International Div ASF for Col Delalande, 30 Jan 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 475-10 Equip of Troops

Metropolitan Program; Msg S-75501, Eisenhower

Personal to Marshall, 18 Jan 45, SS and P Planning

Div Files. 33

 Memo, Maj Gen W. A. Wood for Somervell,

5 Jan 45, sub: Analysis of Requirements for Fr

Rearmt Program, SHAEF Mission to France 091.-

711 (75) Analysis; Memo, Styer for Chiefs of Tech

Servs, 12 Jan 45, SS and P Planning Div Files

A-46-371; Msg W-88550, Styer to Eisenhower,

8 Jan 45, SS and P Planning Div Files, Fr Rearmt,

A-46-371, Dr 2407; Msg W-89078, Marshall to

Somervell, 9 Jan 45, SS and P Planning Div Files.

34

 Msg WX-20034, Styer to Lee, 12 Jan 45, International Div Cable Log, A-45-192. 35

 Memo, Loomis for Regnault, 16 Jan 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr). 36

 Msg BX-22426, Devers to SHAEF Main

COMZONE, 6 Jan 45, SHAEF Mission to France

091.711-2 (Fr); Memo, Hinton for DACofS G-3,

SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. V.
348 REARMING THE FRENCH

to retain control of that city at a time when

the Supreme Commander was contemplating the possibility of its abandonment.37

French authorities, incidentally, were planning to move other units into 6th Army

Group area, such as six infantry regiments

of two other newly activated divisions, apparently without prior consultation with

either SHAEF, SHAEF Mission to France,

or 6th Army Group itself. Fearful that the

unauthorized movement of these units would

place an unbearable burden on his already

strained supply facilities and resources,

General Devers urged SHAEF to warn the

French against such action.38

By mid-January the only equipment

readily available in the theater for Metropolitan Program units was captured enemy

matériel and a limited number of French

items. Considering that British and American matériel would not arrive for some

weeks to come, SHAEF officials revised

their estimates as to the dates of readiness of

the new divisions. They came to the conclusion that only three would be ready some

time in June (and not 15 April as originally

contemplated), the rest in July and August.39

 The French were naturally getting

impatient. The Office of War Information was reporting a growing bitterness in

France over the alleged inability of the

United States to equip French divisions with

American arms, and a tendency among the

French to believe that the United States did

not want France to become a strong

power.40 To dissipate such misgivings,

SHAEF considered the possibility of holding a press conference at which information

on the American effort to rearm the French

would be released. The conference was

postponed pending the drafting of pertinent

reports by the Rearmament Division and

other responsible agencies.

Revising the Metropolitan Program

It will be recalled that the Metropolitan

Program consisted initially of 8 divisions and

213 supporting combat and service units.

In submitting the program to the CCS on

18 December, General Smith had warned

that it would require revisions as it contained no base service or lines of communications units. If implemented in its original

form, it was feared that it would place an

unbearable burden on the U.S. Army. The

latter was already heavily committed to the

support of 1st French Army. As General

Somervell, then in the theater, pointed out

in a message to the War Department, Communications Zone did not have enough

American service units for the U.S. forces,

much less to support the French. By building up some extra French service units, he

explained, "we will be doing ourselves a

favor."

 41

 In line with this contention, the

theater drew up for addition to the program

a list of 915 supporting combat and service

units for both the 1st French Army and the

new divisions, thus increasing the Metropolitan Program to a total of 8 divisions and

1,128 supporting units. In submitting the

revised program to Washington on 17 January, the theater recommended an entirely

new phasing in which the supporting units

37

 Memo, Whiteley for G-4 SHAEF, 30 Dec 44,

SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. IV; Pogue, The

Supreme Command, pp. 398-402. 38

 Msg BX-22565, Devers to SHAEF Main, 8

Jan 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-2 (Fr). 39

 Memo, Col H. A. Twitchell for Chief Plans Sec

G-3 SHAEF, 12 Jan 45, SHAEF G-3 091 France,

Vol. V. 40

 Memo, Director Bureau of Public Relations

WD for Asst Secy War, 10 Jan 45, OPD 336.2

France, Sec V. 41

 Statement by Somervell in telephone conversation with Gen Wood, 23 Jan 45, SS and P Planning

Div Files.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN PROGRAMS 349

would be given first priority over the divisions. The perennial issue over service

troops had, once again, come to the fore.42

Apprised on 27 January of the contemplated revisions, the French military authorities promptly objected that "in spite of

their insistence" they had not been given an

opportunity to discuss the matter with

American officials. They pointed out that,

since the plan as originally submitted by

them had been accepted by the CCS, they

had gone ahead with their activation program and they could not at this juncture

accept any changes likely to delay the equipping of the larger units.43

War Department officials meanwhile had

informed the theater that the complete revision of the phasing as now proposed would

disrupt the procurement program and cause

delays in the shipment of available matériel.44

 They recommended that the phasing suggested by General Somervell on 5

January be adhered to with only such modifications as would be required for the incorporation of additional supporting units.

The recommendation was endorsed by the

theater. Pending a conference which he

planned to hold with General Leyer in the

near future, General Loomis outlined the

plan now under consideration for the

French Chief of Staff. The War Department, he explained, would ship the equipment already set up except that the matériel for the last five infantry divisions would

be withheld to the extent that this could be

done without disrupting the schedule. The

next phase would then consist of the equipment for such additional supporting units

as would be considered necessary for both

the 1st French Army and the first corps of

three divisions of the new program, plus

supporting corps troops as well as an appropriate share of army and base units. Only

when substantial progress had been made in

the equipping, organization, and training of

these units would SHAEF authorize the

arming of further divisions.45

By this time the French had designated

the units to be activated under the program.

They included 2 new corps (3d and 4th),

6 infantry divisions (the 10th DI, 1st DI,

36th DI, 19th DI, 14th DI, and 25th DI),

1 mountain or Alpine division (the 27th

DIA), and 1 armored division (the 3d

DB).46 The first three units scheduled to

receive U.S. and British equipment under

the program were the 10th DI, 1st DI, and

27th DIA. The 10th DI, although poorly

equipped, had been operational since 7

January. It was to be withdrawn as soon

as practicable into the zone of interior

where it would receive its new matériel.

The 27th DIA, commanded by Col. Jean

Vallette d'Osia, had a strength of 20,500

men comprising mostly former FFI troops

from the Alps area and some North Africans. It was equipped almost entirely with

French matériel. So was the 1st DI (not

to be confused with the 1st March Division,

or 1st DMI, then part of 1st French Army),

activated on 1 February from various FFI

groups and commanded by Brig. Gen. Jean

Callies.

Toward the end of January the Supreme

Commander came to the conclusion that it

would be inadvisable, as he had recom- 42

 Msg S-75390, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 17 Jan

45, SS and P Planning Div Files. 43

 Memo, Leyer for Regnault, 28 Jan 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr). 44

 Msg W-23517, Styer to Eisenhower, 19 Jan

45, SS and P Planning Div Files.

45

 Memo, Loomis for Leyer, 31 Jan 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr). 46

 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France for SCAEF,

23 Jan 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-1

(Fr).
350 REARMING THE FRENCH

mended earlier, to place 2 of the 8 new divisions at the disposal of the British 21 Army

Group, largely because of the supply complications likely to result. He felt, and so

recommended to the CCS, that it would

be better both tactically and logistically to

combine the 16 French divisions in two

French armies operating alongside each

other in the American sector.47 On the

basis of this and other considerations, the

U.S. members of the Combined Administrative Committee recommended, on 25

January, that the United States be asked

to underwrite the entire Metropolitan

Program.48

While the French were studying the proposed revision of the program, implementation of Phase I had begun and, by the end

of the first month, had made substantial

progress. American equipment for 2 infantry divisions and 46 supporting units was

currently leaving U.S. ports and due to

arrive in Marseille at the end of February.

A second shipment consisting of matériel for

the mountain division and its supporting

units was scheduled to leave in early March.

British training equipment as well as matériel for 3 divisions was about to be shipped

to Cherbourg. Deliveries were to include

.30-caliber M1917 rifles, Browning automatic rifles (BAR's), .30-caliber machine

guns, 40-mm. and 3.7-inch antiaircraft artillery, 57-mm. antitank guns, and various

other items all available from British sources

and therefore not required from the United

States.

The French themselves were to furnish,

depending on their ability to manufacture

them, 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars, some

155-mm. howitzers, pistols, and other equipment. To enable their war industries to

resume production, a military import program had been set up, supplementary and

parallel to a civilian import program,

through which they obtained raw materials

from the United States. All requirements

for the purposes were channeled to the War

Department for appropriate action.49 Production of a number of items being slower

than originally contemplated, it was expected that these would now have to be

furnished from Allied sources.

Stocks of captured enemy matériel offered

many items but, because of the maintenance

and replacement problems involved, they

could only be used for training purposes.

As for Canadian equipment, only a few

items were readily available. The French,

with an eye on the second phase of the program, proposed to submit to the Canadian

Government a request for the entire equipment for two infantry divisions. Apprised

of this intention, the Canadian Chiefs of

Staff, on 22 January, approached the CCS

on the matter. When, on 6 April, the CCS

finally acknowledged the Canadian inquiry,

it was too late for action to be initiated.50

After a detailed study of the contemplated revision of the program, the French

military authorities notified General Loomis

on 7 February that only about one half of

the supporting combat and service units

newly proposed by SHAEF were acceptable

to them. SHAEF officials promptly expressed their disappointment. "This is the

same old story as in North Africa," General

Smith pointed out. "French officers who

have participated in modern battle realize

47

 Msg SCAF 186, Eisenhower to CCS, 24 Jan

45, OPD Cable Files. 48

 Memo cited n. 4.

49

 Msgs E-92846, Eisenhower to Somervell, 31 Jan

45, SS and P Planning Div Files. 50

 Ltr, Maj Gen H. F. G. Letson to CCS, 22 Jan

45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C;

Memo, CCS for Letson, 6 Apr 45, ABC 400.3295

(2 Aug 43), Sec 1-C.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN PROGRAMS 351

the necessity for these services and maintenance units, but such officers are few. The

remainder are perfectly naive and cannot

comprehend the necessity." The chief administrative officer, Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey

M. Gale, urged that SHAEF insist on the

French providing adequate service troops

of their own. "Why should the U.S. do all

the housemaiding for the French due to the

faulty organization of the latter?"

 51

In an attempt to reconcile the French and

SHAEF's points of view, General Leyer

submitted a counterproposal listing the maximum supporting units which the French

military authorities could organize within

the time limits established in the original

program. The reduction, which amounted

to one half of the units proposed by SHAEF,

was legitimate, explained General Leyer,

since the French forces were not in the situation of an expeditionary corps fighting overseas but, on the contrary, were "supported

to an ever-increasing extent by a territorial

organization whose effectiveness was expected to grow daily." Judging from General Leyer's statement, the French were assuming that the CCS, in approving the

Metropolitan Program, had prescribed a

time limit for its implementation. The

CCS, in fact, had done no such thing; their

approval had been one in principle only.

In submitting to the CCS the troop list and

shipment priorities as now revised by

SHAEF, General Smith urged them, on 15

February, to consider a new course of action.

The French being unable to activate more

supporting units than the number indicated

in their counterproposal, he recommended

that only such combat divisions for which

they could provide adequate support be

equipped by the Allies.52

In notifying the French of this recommendation, SHAEF emphasized that the

Supreme Commander reserved the right to

defer the provision of equipment for combat

units which could not be furnished adequate

support and which therefore could not be

employed in the prosecution of the war

against Germany. Thus were the prospects

of an early build-up of a second army of

eight divisions greatly reduced. SHAEF

was now inclined to believe that no new

divisions could possibly be equipped and

trained before June, and their employment

even at this date might well be impracticable for lack of adequate supporting troops.53

Meanwhile, SHAEF was seriously concerned over the fact that 1st French Army

was still considerably understrength. The

slow push toward Colmar throughout

January had whittled down its effectives.

The replacement program instituted with a

view to maintaining the divisions at strength

appeared to have broken down in its initial

phase. Under the program, 10,000 men

recruited in France were to be moved to

1st French Army training centers in January and 4,500 monthly thereafter.54

By 5 February only 2,500 men had reported for instruction. In addition the

program was short 1,600 North African

51

 Memo, Lutes for Crawford, 7 Feb 45, and

Notes by Smith and Gale, 8 Feb 45, SHAEF SGS

475 France, Vol. III.

52

 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 9 Feb 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr); Memo, Bull for

Smith, 15 Feb 45, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol.

III; Ltr, Smith to CCS, CCS 752/3, 15 Feb 45,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D; Msg

S-79317, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 16 Feb 45, SS

and P Planning Div Files. 53

 Memo, Lewis for Leyer, 19 Feb 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr); Rpt, SHAEF

Main G-3, 16 Feb 45, SHAEF SGS 475/2 France,

Vol. II. 54

 Ltr, Leyer to Lewis, 24 Jan 45, SHAEF Mission

to France 091.711-13 (Fr).
352 REARMING THE FRENCH

INSIGNIA OF 1ST FRENCH ARMY AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS,

15 February 1945, except for the 27th DIA and the 1st DI.

natives. The situation greatly worried

General Devers who was constantly being

informed by French division commanders

of personnel shortages in their units. To

maintain 1st French Army at strength, General Devers estimated that a pool of no less

than 12,000 reinforcements (80 percent

infantry) must be maintained at all times

in the training centers. In his estimation,

efforts by the French High Command to

carry out a satisfactory replacement program were not energetic enough. He considered that proper support of 1st French

Army should be secured before any French

manpower was allocated to future rearmament programs. His views were upheld

by the Supreme Commander, who on 14

February directed SHAEF Mission to

France to inform the French that it was not

sound policy to form and equip new units

when at the same time operational forces

were becoming inefficient due to lack of

reinforcements.55

The French War Ministry attempted to

remedy the situation by establishing a replacement program based on General

Devers' recommendations.56 But the program was not put into effect until 1 April

with the result that the personnel situation

of 1st French Army did not materially im55

 Msg BX-23931, Devers to SHAEF, 5 Feb 45,

and Memo, SCAEF for Lewis, 14 Feb 45, in same

file.

56

 Ltr, Leyer to SHAEF, 17 Mar 45, in same file.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN PROGRAMS 353

prove during the remaining weeks of hostilities. The deficiency in divisional personnel

was partially offset by the gradual addition

to the Army reserves of light infantry battalions and of Metropolitan Program

divisions.

The 1st French Army as of 15 February

1945 comprised the following corps and

divisions:

Commanding General: General Jean de

Lattre de Tassigny

*1st Corps Lt. Gen. Emile Béthouart,

from 6 September 1944

*2d Corps Lt. Gen. de Goislard de

Monsabert, from 2 September

1944

* 1st DMI (1re Division de Marche

d'Infanterie)

Brig. Gen. Pierre Garbay,

from 21 November 1944, in

replacement of General Brosset killed in line of duty on

20 November 1944

*2d DIM (2e Division d'Infanterie

Marocaine)

Maj. Gen. Marcel Carpentier,

from 25 November 1944, in

replacement of General Dody;

replaced by Brig. Gen. François de Linarès on 12 April

1945

*3d DIA (3e Division d'Infanterie

Algérienne)

Maj. Gen. Augustin Guillaume, from 2 September

1944, in replacement of

General de Monsabert

*4th DMM (4e Division Marocaine de

Montagne)

Maj. Gen. René de Hesdin,

from 13 December 1944, in

replacement of General Sevez

*9th DIC (9e Division d'Infanterie

Coloniale)

Maj. Gen. Louis Morlière,

from 26 December 1944, in

replacement of General Magnan; replaced by Brig. Gen.

Jean Valluy on 10 March

1945

*1st DB (1re Division Blindée)

Brig. Gen. Aimé Sudre, from

6 December 1944, in replacement of General du Vigier

*2d DB (2e Division Blindée) (assigned to 1st French Army

from 5 to 31 December 1944

and from 20 January to 21

February 1945)

Maj. Gen. Jacques Leclerc

*5th DB (5e Division Blindée)

Brig. Gen. Jacques de Vernejoul, replaced by Brig. Gen.

Guy Schlesser, 23 April 1945

**10th DI (10e Division d'Infanterie)

(activated 30 September

1944)

Brig. Gen. Pierre Billotte

**27th DIA (27e Division d'Infanterie Alpine) (activated 17 November 1944; under control of 1st

French Army until 1 March

1945; thereafter part of Détachement d'Armée des Alpes

under the control of U.S. 6th

Army Group)

Col. Jean Vallette d'Osia

Two other divisions activated in February 1945 were assigned to 1st French Army

in early April:

**1st DI (1re Division d'Infanterie)

Brig. Gen. Jean Callies

** 14th DI (14e Division d'Infanterie)

Brig. Gen. Raoul Salan

Note: Five U.S. divisions were assigned to 1st

French Army at one time or another during operations on the Western Front: 3d Infantry, 28th Infantry, 36th Infantry, 75th Infantry, and 12th

Armored Divisions.

*Equipped under the North African Rearmament

Program.

**Equipped under the Metropolitan Program.
354 REARMING THE FRENCH

Carrying Out the Revised Program

The progress of the Metropolitan Program by the end of February 1945 can be

summarized as follows. The revisions prepared by SHAEF and submitted to Washington were awaiting CCS action. The

French had raised a total of five infantry

divisions, largely from FFI personnel. The

1st DI and 10th DI were being moved to

the Châteauroux area where they were to

receive their new equipment and undergo

training. The intention of the French High

Command was to use these two units together with the 2d Armored Division (2d

DB) to form a third army corps. The 27th

Alpine Division was still being employed in

a defensive capacity on the Alps front. The

36th and 14th Infantry Divisions were the

latest units to the activated, the latter from

FFI battalions in 1st French Army area.57

Considering that FFI troops had, in addition to being absorbed in these divisions,

been used also to form security battalions,

to replace Negro personnel in the 1st DMI

and 9th DIC, and to organize replacement

infantry regiments for the battle-weary

North African program divisions (at. the

rate of one per North African division), it

was expected that they shortly would be

completely liquidated. Liquidation of the

FFI in the 1st French Army area had

strongly been urged by General Devers, who

wanted all troops in that area to be placed

on a "recognized status" and be maintained

adequately.58

The first shipment of U.S. matériel had

reached Marseille on 21 February. It was

consigned to Communications Zone with

special markings to indicate the intent of

ASF in shipping the equipment. From arrival at quayside to final distribution, the

matériel was processed according to a relatively simple method. All items, with the

exception of boxed vehicles and ammunition, were loaded directly in rail cars on the

pier and moved over U.S. lines of communications to a depot located at Lyon. Boxed

vehicles were taken on trucks to a motor

vehicle assembly area two miles away from

the pier where they were assembled before

being convoyed to Lyon. Ammunition was

taken directly from shipside to U.S. ammunition depots where it was held earmarked for the French. Assisting in the

handling of equipment at Marseille were

several French service units organized for

the purpose and for which Communications

Zone had furnished equipment and

clothing.59

The depot at Lyon, called Delta Base

Section Depot for Rearmament, was, in

theory, an integrated French-American organization. Actually it was a U.S. depot

maintaining stock records and the equipment was part of U.S. theater stocks until

issued to the French. Lend-lease accounting was, as a result, based on shipping

tickets issued by the depot. This arrangement necessitated the use of American clerical, technical, and supervisory personnel

until French personnel could be trained and

taught sufficient familiarity with American

equipment to take over their share of the

work. The French service units at the Lyon

depot formed a base called Base du Sud.

Their activation being too slow, only very

57

 Memo, Regnault for Loomis, 21 Feb 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-1 (Fr); Ltr,

Juin to Eisenhower, 21 Feb 45, SHAEF SGS 475/2

France, Vol. II; Memos, SHAEF Mission to France

for Juin, 6 Feb 45, and Juin for SHAEF Mission to

France, 9 Mar 45, SHAEF Mission to France

091.711-13 (Fr). 58

 Msg BX-23958, Devers to SHAEF, 5 Feb 45,

SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. VI.

59

 Memo, Loomis for Regnault, 19 Jan 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711-1 (Fr).
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN PROGRAMS 355

few had been made available to the depot

by the end of February.

The entire plan for the receipt, storage,

and distribution of matériel was considered

adequate except for the shortage of French

personnel. It was a much simpler system

than the one used in North Africa under

which the equipment was turned over at

shipside to French supply agencies for issue

to units. More important, it marked the

beginning of a new era during which American management assumed the entire responsibility for distributing U.S. equipment,

since Communications Zone controlled

rigidly both priorities and flow of equipment.60

British equipment also had begun to arrive. A first shipment consisting of training matériel had reached Cherbourg on 8

February. Three other shipments, with the

first to arrive 8 March, were scheduled to

bring matériel for the initial three divisions.

Shipments would then be postponed until

further advice from SHAEF. The British

were placing a Port Ordnance and Workshop Detachment at the disposal of the

French to assist in handling equipment both

in Cherbourg and at the French depot in

Le Mans. They were particularly concerned over the risk of damage to vehicles at

the hands of the "Paris taxi driver" type of

French workman currently taking them over

on discharge from the ships. The British

were also offering training teams to instruct

the French in the proper use of British

equipment.61

All things considered, the responsibility

for the implementation of the Metropolitan

Program was divided generally between

the Americans and the French. The

French were charged with the provision

and issue of French and British items, while

the U.S. Army was responsible for the provision and issue of Canadian and captured

enemy items as well as matériel of U.S.

source. Co-ordinating all activities was the

Rearmament Division which obtained from

the French themselves reports of initial

issues of equipment not provided by the

United States.

In spite of the abundance of sources of

equipment, some shortages were anticipated

or already being felt which, it was feared,

would threaten the combat effectiveness of

the new units. General-purpose vehicles,

for the most part, were reported to be unavailable. In addition, a number of items

which the French had agreed to furnish

immediately could not be produced by their

industry. The Rearmament Division succeeded in obtaining from the United States

a number of the missing items. In the case

of clothing, however, its efforts were

unsuccessful.

A serious shortage of clothing was hampering the efforts of the French High Command in calling up classes of recruits for the

Metropolitan Program. General Juin currently estimated the immediate requirements at 130,000 sets of uniforms. As no

new clothing was provided for recruits inducted under the program, SHAEF directed Communications Zone to survey the

availability of worn surplus or salvaged U.S.

clothing. Communications Zone reported

that all available stocks of such clothing

were required to meet "anticipated needs

for prisoners of war expected to be taken in

the near future" and for other commit60

 For additional information, see Rpt with illustrations, SHAEF G-4 FWD to Loomis, 11 Mar 45,

SHAEF Mission to France, Rearmament. 61

 Msg, SHAEF G-4 to Crawford, 1 Mar 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 475-10 Equip of Troops

Metropolitan Program; Memos, Weeks for Loomis,

26 Feb 45, and Loomis for Weeks, 4 Mar 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr).
356 REARMING THE FRENCH

merits.62 With this source of supply closed

to the French, the latter would have to turn

elsewhere for assistance.

On the basis of the progress achieved in

two months and on the premise that it

would continue unabated, General Loomis

estimated that two infantry divisions should

be ready for operations in a secondary role

sometime in April and a third sometime in

May. All three should be ready for offensive operations as part of a corps, with adequate supporting and service troops, late in

August or early in September.63

As the third month of implementation

opened, the French, while declaring themselves in agreement with the priorities

recommended by SHAEF on 15 February,

urged the Allied authorities to speed up the

distribution of matériel to the units of the

first phase, and not to delay the launching

of the second phase. Only complete unity

of action, General Leyer wrote to SHAEF

on 3 March, would make it possible to

secure, within the desired time limit, the

benefits of the efforts agreed to by all

concerned.64

During the four weeks of March matériel

continued to arrive from the United Kingdom and the United States. By the end of

the month, the British had delivered training equipment, maintenance supplies, and

replacement items for the whole eight-division program, as well as matériel for the

first three infantry divisions. Subsequent

shipments were being held up in order to

phase the arrival of British equipment with

that of American matériel for later priority

divisions. It was expected that shipments

would be resumed in June.

General-purpose vehicles and clothing still

remained the most critical items. Some improvement in the vehicle situation was in

sight as the British now were offering 5,200

trucks which, if found serviceable, might

replace corresponding U.S. vehicles then in

short supply. With regard to the provision

of clothing for newly inducted men, little

progress had been made. Efforts to obtain

surplus uniforms from the British War

Office had been unsuccessful. The War

Department, also approached on the matter, had given no encouragement other than

promising to ship to France the rest of the

200,000 sets of Canadian clothing originally

intended for Sovereignty troops in North

Africa.65 In answer to their repeated appeals, including a formal request for 130,-

000 sets submitted directly to the War Department, SHAEF reminded the French

that critical shortages in both British and

U.S. stocks were so acute, in the case of

woolen clothing, shoes, and blankets, that

the initial issue of these items to Metropolitan Program units would be made only with

the greatest difficulty. SHAEF then explained to them that their requirements

with respect to newly inducted men could

be filled only by taking every advantage of

existing French stocks, Canadian clothing,

French manufacture, and materials sup62

 In informing Colonel Regnault of the substance

of Communications Zone's report, General Loomis

wisely refrained from making any reference to the

"anticipated needs for POW's," a statement which

might well have angered the French. Memos,

Loomis for Regnault, 4 Mar 45, Lewis for CG

COMZONE, 21 Feb 45, and CG COMZONE for

Lewis, 1 Mar 45, SHAEF Mission to France 421-1

Combined. 63

 Memo, Loomis for SCAEF, 8 Mar 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711-3 (Fr). 64

 Ltr, Leyer to SHAEF, 3 Mar 45, in same file.

65

 French industry was reported to be currently

producing, since January, not more than 45,000 sets

monthly. These sets were incomplete and adequate

only for men in training. Furthermore, production

was not expected to continue after April. Memo,

Regnault for Loomis, SHAEF Mission to France

421-1 Combined.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN PROGRAMS 357

plied under the civilian import program.66

Incidentally, American officials also urged

them, as they had once in connection with

the North African Rearmament Program,

to replace all U.S. buttons and insignia by

French ones on American clothing turned

over to program units "so as to permit ready

identification and in the interest of esprit

de corps."

 67

In Washington, War Department officials

were still examining the revised program of

eight divisions and 1,128 supporting units.

ASF had undertaken an analysis of availability of equipment and, on 13 March, reported that, with the exception of some

items, the program could generally be met.

The Combined Administrative Committee

meanwhile had pursued its study of the division of responsibility between the United

States and the United Kingdom for the provision of matériel to meet the various western European rearmament programs. In

the report which it finally submitted to the

CCS on 24 March, the committee made no

commitment with respect to the Metropolitan Program as the latter was still not firm.

It merely recommended that unfilled portions of the Metropolitan Program and of all

other rearmament programs be canceled

effective V-E Day.68

The same recommendation, it will be

recalled, had been made earlier, in August

1944, by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum to the CCS (CCS 661). It had

already led ASF to develop a procurement

schedule in which no provision was made

for the shipment of the rest of the equipment required to complete the Metropolitan

Program upon the cessation of hostilities.

Such action was based on the premise that

the program itself would then become postwar in character.69

 Incidentally, it was the

same stand which had guided the U.S.

Government, only four days before the publication of the Combined Administrative

Committee's report, in its decision to reject

a certain request from the British. The

latter had, earlier in February, approached

the State Department regarding a proposal

they had received from the French for the

manufacture in France of aircraft of the

British Mosquito type. The matter involved an immediate U.S. commitment for

the allocation of certain materials. Deciding that the proposal was in the nature of a

postwar enterprise, the State Department

informed the British, on 20 March, that the

United States Government could not concur

in it.70

At the end of March the War Ministry

announced a reorganization of the French

rearmament services. SCAMA was being

abolished and its work taken over by a new

army headquarters section called Mission

de Réarmement. Simultaneously, a Rearmament Inspection Section was created

whose function was generally to ascertain,

in co-operation with Inspection Group of

SHAEF's Rearmament Division, the completeness of equipment of the units being

rearmed.71 Both organizations were placed

66

 Msg WX-57738, Somervell to Eisenhower, 22

Mar 45, ASF International Div Cable Log A-45-

192; Ltr, Lewis to Juin, 21 Mar 45, SHAEF Mission to France 421-1 Combined. 67

 Memos, Theater Comdr for SHAEF Mission to

France, 17 Mar 45, and Lewis for Juin, 12 Apr 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 421-1 Combined. 68

 Rpt, Availability Study of Fr Rearmt Program,

13 Mar 45, and Memo, Lutes to SCAEF for Loomis,

22 Mar 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711,

File 92, Analysis of Availability; Rpt, CAdC to

CCS, CCS 768/7, 24 Mar 45, ABC 400.3295 (2

Aug 43), Sec 1-C.

69

 Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 25 Mar 45,

OPD 336.2 France, Sec IV-A. 70

 Aide Mémoire, Secy State to Br Ambassador,

20 Mar 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec

2-D. 71

 Dir 1756/EMA/CAB, 26 Mar 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711-9 Combined.
358 REARMING THE FRENCH

under the command of General Granier

who, it will be recalled, had been serving as

commanding general of Base 901, supporting 1st French Army, and was now being

replaced in that capacity by Col. Henri

Coudraux. Assisting General Granier was

Lt. Col. Maurice Labarbarie who had been

associated with SCAMA for over a year and

in recent months had served as SCAMA's

deputy director.72

The equipment status of Metropolitan

Program units was then as follows. Pursuant to a decision which, for operational

reasons, SHAEF had made in mid-March

in agreement with the French, three infantry divisions, the 1st, 10th, and 36th, were

now scheduled to be re-equipped in first

priority. Detachments from the first two

were currently being ordered to the Lyon

depot where they were to receive U.S. initial

equipment beginning on or about 4 April.

Very little organizational equipment was

available for the 36th DI as shipments from

the United States of matériel for a mountain

division had started before the action had

been taken to replace the 27th Alpine (27th

DIA) by an infantry division. Except for

British training matériel, the remaining

divisions, being second and third priority

units, were not scheduled to receive equipment until the Supreme Commander gave

his approval. Two of them, the 19th and

25th Infantry, were currently employed on

the Atlantic coast, and two others, the 3d

Armored and 14th Infantry, although activated, were not expected to be fit for employment for a long time.73

The French military authorities were

also in process of organizing the service units

required in first priority. These included

both the units needed for employment with

Base du Sud operating in support of 1st

French Army and those necessary for the

support of the first three Metropolitan Program divisions. It was the firm intention

of Rearmament Division to continue to

exercise rigid control by not authorizing

equipment for the next group of divisions

until reasonable progress had been made in

the organization of all first priority service

units.74

By the end of March the operational

situation on the Western Front was most

favorable. General Eisenhower's armies

were already deep in German territory.

With the prospect of an early cessation of

hostilities and in view of the relatively small

progress of the Metropolitan Program,

SHAEF re-examined the question of employment of the new units. Both the U.S.

6th Army Group and U.S. 12th Army

Group were requesting two or three French

divisions each for occupational duties under

their control with a view to relieving U.S.

divisions for employment elsewhere. In

the belief that the presence of partially

equipped and insufficiently trained divisions

among units of 1st French Army might result in considerable confusion, SHAEF

temporarily ruled out the employment of

new divisions under 6th Army Group.

SHAEF, on the other hand, approved the

request from 12th Army Group and asked

General Juin to nominate the 1st and 36th

72

 In November, Labarbarie had replaced Colonel

Charpentier, who had become gravely ill and whose

death took place in early 1945. Colonel Charpentier was posthumously awarded the Legion of Merit

(degree of Officer) in April 1945. 73

 Msg MF-13626, Loomis to AGWAR, 10 Mar

45, and Memo, Lutes for Crawford, 2 Apr 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711 Rearmt Plan

and Policy 900-5; Memo, Bull for Smith, 31 Mar

45, SHAEF SGS 475/2 France, Vol. II. 74

 Memos, G-4 SHAEF FWD for Crawford, 10

Mar 45, and Loomis for Kingman, 17 Mar 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711 Rearmt Plan

and Policy 900-5.
THE LIBERATED MANPOWER AND METROPOLITAN PROGRAMS 359

Infantry to serve under U.S. Fifteenth Army

(itself part of 12th Army Group) in an

occupational capacity while continuing

their equipping and training, and to consider similar action in connection with the

10th DI.75 The latter, incidentally, had

been earmarked for operations on the Atlantic coast. The 27th DIA, although still

poorly equipped, was to be maintained on

the Franco-Italian border.

In early April, pending approval by the

CCS of the revised program of eight divisions and 1,128 supporting units, the War

Department prepared to effect the shipments scheduled to take place during that

month for the units of the first priority.

Simultaneously, the Combined Administrative Committee submitted to the CCS a report on its study of the revised program.

In it, the committee recommended that the

program be approved in spite of shortages

of equipment, and that the United States

be made responsible for the supply of initial

equipment as well as replacement and maintenance supplies. The committee then reiterated its earlier recommendation, made

on 24 March, that the unfilled portion of

the program be canceled effective V-E

Day.76

Taking immediate action on the report,

the CCS, on 6 April, approved its recommendations. They formalized, and so notified General Eisenhower, the action already taken by the United States to supply

the initial equipment as well as replacement

and maintenance items to the first increment of three divisions and 167 supporting

units. At a later date they would advise the

Supreme Commander of the decisions taken

with respect to the size of the program.

Finally, they directed, as recommended by

the committee, that any units which had not

been armed by the time active hostilities

with Germany had ceased would not be

equipped. Four days later, after the War

Department had completed its analysis of

the revised troop list proposed by General

Smith on 15 February, the CCS approved

the list. The action of the Combined

Chiefs, it must be noted, was taking place

five weeks after they had approved the

French Air Force Program. The latter included the same proviso directing the cancellation of the incompleted portion of the

program upon the cessation of hostilities.77

Among the currently reported shortages

of equipment for the new program, the most

important was still that of clothing. In

view of the critical situation in the United

States of woolen clothing and of blankets

in particular, the French were urged once

again to investigate the possibility of manufacturing these items and to arrange with

responsible American authorities in the

theater for the delivery from the United

States of the necessary raw materials.78

In Washington, ASF estimated that of

the equipment scheduled to be shipped for

the Metropolitan Program in January, February, and March, 99, 98, and 94 percent,

respectively, had been floated. The French

Military Mission was now pressing for ship75

 Ltr, Smith to Juin, 4 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission

to France 091.711-12 Combined. 76

 Msg WX-64492, Somervell to Eisenhower, 5

Apr 45, International Div Files Cable Log; Rpt,

CAdC to CCS, CCS 768/10, 5 Apr 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711 Rearmt Plan and Policy

Rpt.

77

 Msg FACS 172, CCS to Eisenhower, 6 Apr 45,

SS and P Planning files; Msg FACS 175, CCS to

Eisenhower, 10 Apr 45, ABC 091.711 France (6

Oct 43), Sec 5; Msg FACS 147, CCS to Eisenhower, 1 Mar 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43),

Sec 2-C. See pp. 374-75, below. 78

 Ltr, Loomis to Juin, 10 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France 421-1 Combined.
360 REARMING THE FRENCH

ments due to be made in April and May.79

As three infantry divisions and certain

corps troops had by this time already received much of their standard combat

equipment, most of it American, some of it

British, plans were made to begin their

training. A considerable quantity of British matériel, the greater part of which had

not been accepted as standard equipment,

was available for the purpose. A training

program was drafted which contemplated

making the best possible use of existing resources and of U.S., British, and French

training personnel, within the shortest possible time.80

On 20 April, with hostilities seemingly

about to end, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed

that equipment intended to complete the

Metropolitan Program but not likely to be

used against the German forces would not

be shipped from the United States. They

then requested the theater on 26 April to

review the whole rearmament question in

the light of their decision and to submit to

the War Department a list of units for which

initial equipment need no longer be provided. Their request was consonant with

General Marshall's recommendation made

a few days earlier that the choking off of the

program should not be done automatically,

effective V-E Day, but rather should be reexamined by the General Staff in consideration of the probable French requirement for

occupation forces.81

In anticipation of the cessation of hostilities, SHAEF was preparing a plan to transfer the supply responsibility for the French

forces from ETOUSA to the French Government. The proposed plan envisaged the

establishment of a French Advance Section

charged with the supply, maintenance, and

movement of French troops. It also contemplated a new requisitioning procedure

under which the French would submit

monthly requisitions to be forwarded

through military lend-lease channels to the

MAB in Washington.82

It was then, near the end of the month

of April, hardly three weeks after the Liberated Manpower Program had been suspended by order of the Supreme Commander, that a serious political complication subjected the Metropolitan Program to

a similar fate. 79

 Memo, ASF for Director Plans and Opns, 18

Apr 45, SS and P Planning Div Files A-46-371;

Msg WX-69225, Somervell to Loomis, 18 Apr 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 475-10 Equip of Troops

Metropolitan Program. 80

 Memo, Loomis for Regnault, 14 Apr 45,

SHAEF Mission to France Training 353-1; Memo,

Loomis for Leyer, 19 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to

France 091.711-1. Also, see below, p. 390.

81

 Memo, JCS for ACofS OPD, 20 Apr 45, OPD

336.2 France, Sec IV-A; Msg WX-73760, Marshall to Loomis, 26 Apr 45, OPD Cable Files;

Memo, Lincoln for Policy Sec OPD, 21 Apr 45,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D. 82

 Memo, SHAEF G-4 FWD for Crawford, 27

Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711 Rearmt

Plan and Policy 900-5.
CHAPTER XXI

The Rearmament Operations End

Suspension of the Metropolitan Program

For a question of national prestige, the

French unwittingly were about to throw the

armament operations out of gear. On 24

and again on 26 April, General Devers had

directed General de Lattre to evacuate the

city of Stuttgart then occupied by units of

1st French Army. The city was in the operational zone of the U.S. Seventh Army

and was urgently needed as a link in the

supply and communications system supporting the current military operations of that

army. On instructions from General de

Gaulle, the French commander refused to

comply with General Devers' order.

In a strongly worded letter dated 28

April, the text of which was immediately

communicated to the CCS, General Eisenhower called General de Gaulle's action in

issuing orders directly to 1st French Army a

violation of existing agreements. French

divisions armed and equipped by the United

States were under the control of the CCS

representative in the theater. It was with

complete faith in this understanding that he,

as Supreme Commander acting for the

CCS, had "so long and so earnestly" supported the French request for matériel to

equip new divisions. In the present circumstances, he had no other alternative but

to inform the CCS of the incident and to

point out to them that he could no longer

count with certainty upon the operational

employment of any French forces which

they might contemplate equipping in the

future.1

On the same date General Eisenhower

informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in

line with their suggestion of 26 April, the

shipment of any equipment not yet floated

could be stopped, and that he was revising

the list of units for which equipment need

not be furnished.2 Simultaneously and apparently without prior notification to

French headquarters, the Supreme Commander directed that all issues of equipment

to Metropolitan Program units be suspended. In informing the French as well

as the British of this decision, SHAEF made

no reference to the Stuttgart incident, but

gave the following reasons for the action.

With the approaching end of the campaign

in Europe, the need no longer existed for

equipping additional French units as the

Allies had sufficient divisions on hand to

liquidate pockets of resistance and to police

occupied areas. Furthermore, all American matériel in Europe was destined for use

in the Far East theaters.3

1

 Msg SCAF 319, Eisenhower to CCS, 29 Apr 45,

OCS A-48-1 091 France. 2

 Msg MF-14139, Eisenhower to Marshall, 28

Apr 45, SHAEF SGS 475/1 France, Vol. IV. 3

 Msg FWD 20357, Eisenhower to WO, 1 May

45, SHAEF SGS 475/1, Vol. II; Ltr, SHAEF to

Juin, quoted by de Saint-Didier in Conf with

Marshall, 3 May 45, Min Conf, ABC 091.711

France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D; Memo, Loomis for

Leyer, 30 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France

475-10 Equip of Troops Metropolitan Program.
362 REARMING THE FRENCH

In replying to General Eisenhower's communication on the Stuttgart episode, de

Gaulle used some of the arguments that

General Juin had advanced in connection

with the controversy over the control of security battalions. The French Command,

he pointed out, had no representation in the

CCS, and, as a result, decisions reached by

the latter did not take into account French

"national requirements," thus forcing him

personally, although to his "great regret,"

to "step in" sometimes either with respect to

plans or their execution. He explained

further:

You are certainly aware that while agreeing to placing French operational forces in

the Western Theater under your supreme

command, I have always reserved the right

of the French Government eventually to take

the necessary steps in order that French forces

should be employed in accordance with the

national interest of France which is the only

interest that they should serve. I have, naturally, never made any distinction with respect

to French forces which have had the benefit

of American equipment. I should, moreover, call your attention to the fact that this

armament has been turned over by the United

States on the basis of Lend-Lease agreements

by virtue of which France and the French

Union provide on their part, and in accordance with their means, important services for

American forces. On this point, I note with

much regret that, as of the present moment,

no new French division has been completely

equipped by the United States since the beginning of operations in Western Europe in

spite of all that had appeared to have been

understood a long time ago.4

General de Gaulle's letter brought this

brief acknowledgment from the Supreme

Commander. ".. . I understand your

position, and while I repeat my regret that

you find it necessary to inject political considerations into a campaign in which my

functions are purely military, I am gratified

to know that you understand my situation

and attitude."

 5

With the issue apparently closed in the

theater, the French immediately took steps

to reopen it in Washington with a view to

obtaining a resumption of equipment deliveries. Calling on General Marshall on

3 May, General de Saint-Didier, chief of the

French Military Mission, sought, in behalf

of General Juin who had just advised him

of the deadlock, assurances that the United

States would complete the equipping of the

first three divisions and of certain supporting units. He pointed out that the action

taken by the Supreme Commander was "not

in accord with the supply agreement of 30

December 1944 or with the personal letter

of President Roosevelt to General de Gaulle

dated 24 March 1945." What General

de Saint-Didier probably meant by the

"supply agreement" was the message dispatched to SHAEF by the CCS on 29 December advising that they had accepted in

principle the Metropolitan Program. The

CCS, however, had made no further commitment. As for the President's letter to

de Gaulle, nothing in it implied that a

promise had been made to complete the

program. Replying to General de SaintDidier, General Marshall explained that he

had not been informed that SHAEF had

ordered a stoppage of issues. He would

look into the matter at once before discussing it with General Juin on the latter's return from the United Nations conference

then taking place in San Francisco.6

In the meantime, War Department offi4

 Ltr, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 1 May 45,

SHAEF SGS 094 Stuttgart.

5

 Ltr, Eisenhower to de Gaulle, 2 May 45, and

Msg SCAF 328, Eisenhower to CCS, 2 May 45,

SHAEF SGS 094 Stuttgart. See p. 337, above. 6

 Min Conf, Marshall with de Saint-Didier. 3

May 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D.
THE REARMAMENT OPERATIONS END 363

cials had informed General Loomis that, in

accordance with the Supreme Commander's recommendation, they were canceling the unshipped balance of initial

equipment for both the Metropolitan and

Air Force Programs.7 SHAEF then advised the French that the two programs were

being re-examined to determine what units,

if any, could be equipped in time to operate against German forces, and that pending revision issues of matériel were being

suspended.8 On 6 May the Supreme Commander submitted to the War Department

the list of some twenty-two organizations,

all service units, which the theater considered operationally necessary and desired

to equip fully. He then took this opportunity to discuss the fate of the first three

divisions on the program. Inasmuch as it

had been agreed that they should be employed as soon as they were operational, the

question now arose, "as a matter of good

faith," as to whether or not it might be

desirable to complete their equipping. The

units in question had been issued approximately one third of their authorized U.S.

equipment, and had made considerable

progress in training. The rest of their

equipment could be provided from matériel

likely to become available at the time of

redeployment following the cessation of hostilities. If not contrary to the policy of the

U.S. Chiefs of Staff, this course of action,

if authorized, would result "in postponing,

rather than in entirely eliminating," the

equipping of the three divisions.9

The cessation of hostilities on 7 May

found 1st French Army deployed in enemy

territory over a wide area which included

parts of western Austria and southwestern

Germany. The long dash from the French

coast was now completed. All together the

campaign of France and Germany had cost

the French ground forces (excluding the

FFI troops before their integration in regular units in October 1944) some 74,000

casualties, including nearly 15,000 killed in

action.10

The end of the campaign also found the

implementation of both the Liberated Manpower and Metropolitan Programs already

suspended pending a review of the theater's

requirements for the postarmistice period.

Fully or partially equipped units were being

furnished maintenance but no replacements

for equipment used. This provision was

extended to the units of 1st French Army on

8 May, when the Supreme Commander directed Communications Zone to discontinue

immediately the issue of initial equipment

and of major replacement items, but not

of maintenance.11

By then the status of the Metropolitan

Program was as follows. Three infantry

divisions and only approximately 40 supporting units, representing a total of some

50,000 men, had been partially equipped.

They had received the greater part of their

British equipment, almost no French ma7

 Msg WX-76320, Hull to Loomis, 1 May 45,

SS and P Planning Div Files. 8

 Msg FWD 20647, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 5

May 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C. 9

 Msg FWD 20723, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 6

May 45, SS and P Planning Div Files.

10

 The breakdown of casualties per major ground

force component is estimated as follows:

Source. Lt. Col. P. Santini, "Etude statistique sur les pertes

au cours de la guerre 1939-1945," Revue du Corps de Santé Militaire, X, No. 1 (March, 1954).

11

 Msgs FWD 20723, SCAEF to AGWAR, 6 May

45, and FWD 20921, SCAEF to COMZONE, 8

May 45, SHAEF SGS 475/1 France, Vol. IV.
364 REARMING THE FRENCH

tériel as the French themselves had been

unable to provide it, and about one third

of the U.S. equipment shipped to France

for them. All together they had been issued

most of the required individual and housekeeping items, but only one quarter of their

organizational equipment. Outstanding

shortages were in clothing items, signal

equipment, and general-purpose vehicles.12

The Joint Logistics Committee meanwhile had studied the Supreme Commander's request that the equipping of the

first 3 divisions and of 22 selected supporting

units be completed. In its final report the

committee approved the proposal as it related to the supporting units, but urged that

the question of the further issue of equipment to the divisions be taken on a governmental level as being a postwar armament

problem. In a review of the Supreme Commander's request and of the recommendations contained in the JLC report, Maj.

Gen. Howard A. Craig, Deputy Assistant

Chief of Staff, OPD, urged General Marshall to exercise the utmost caution in his

forthcoming meeting with General Juin.

He advised him to make no commitment

regarding the rest of the equipment for the

3 divisions in view of the probable difficulty

in making such equipment available, and to

limit any discussion of supporting units to

the 22 organizations currently under consideration. He then furnished some data

to enable Marshall to review for General

Juin's benefit the extent of military aid provided the French to date.13

Pressed to comment further on the advisability of completing the equipment of

the three divisions, General Eisenhower

pointed out that, although inadequately

equipped, the 1st DI and 10th DI had been

used in operations. The 10th DI had been

committed at the edge of the Colmar Pocket

in January and in the Bordeaux area in

April; the 1st DI had served in an occupational role first west of the Rhine during

April, later in early May east of the Rhine.

It was feasible to equip these two divisions,

as well as the 36th Infantry which had not

yet served under Allied control, up to a scale

suitable for occupational purposes by using

equipment available in the theater. The

Supreme Commander then urged that he be

authorized to carry out his proposal, subject

to operational needs for other theaters and

to availability of stocks. Such an undertaking, he declared, would be "an act of

good will."

 14

In the course of his conference with General Marshall on 11 May, General Juin

spoke of his government's hope that some

means would be found to complete the

equipping of the three divisions. He suggested that this be done by using the equipment which U.S. divisions would leave behind before moving to the Pacific theater.

General Marshall replied that, for the moment, it was impossible to promise the definite delivery of specific items by any fixed

date. Feeling certain that some sort of an

arrangement could be worked out, he

recommended that General Juin on his return to France contact the Supreme Commander with a view to arranging the details

of a possible allocation of matériel. The

financial aspects of the problem would of

course have to be handled by the civil rather

12

 Msg MF-14197, Lewis to SHAEF FWD G-4,

6 May 45, SHAEF SGS 475/1 France, Vol. IV;

Msg FWD 20888, Eisenhower to Marshall, 7 May

45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D. 13

 Rpt, JLC 1012/8, 9 May 45, and Memo, Craig

for Marshall, 9 May 45, OPD 336.2 France, Sec

IV-A.

14

 Msg FWD 21192, Eisenhower to Marshall, 11

May 45, SHAEF SGS 475/2 France, Vol. II.
THE REARMAMENT OPERATIONS END 365

than the military agencies of both governments.15

On 12 May the Supreme Commander

informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that,

in accordance with the policy they had established on 6 April, he was directing

SHAEF as well as the British War Office to

stop initial issues of equipment to all units

of the French air and ground rearmament

programs with the exception of twenty-two

service units already partially equipped.

He then instructed SHAEF Mission to

France to notify the French War Ministry

of his decision.16 Implementation of the

programs, heretofore suspended, was now

stopped.

At the conference which General Smith

held the next day with Minister of War

Diethelm, the latter sought some indication

concerning the future of the three partially

equipped divisions. His government

eagerly hoped that the equipping of these

units would be resumed as early as possible

as they would be required for occupational

tasks in Germany. The order to discontinue deliveries of equipment had had a

harmful effect on the morale of the troops

involved. General Smith replied that the

program, originally conceived as an operational commitment, was no longer so considered now that hostilities had ceased.

SHAEF's authority did not extend to the

consideration of the broader problem of the

restoration and re-equipment of a French

national army. This was a matter for intergovernmental negotiations. The Supreme

Commander, he added, was fully aware of

the French point of view and was urging

the JCS to authorize delivery of the rest of

the equipment for the three divisions.17

Meanwhile, the question of the continued

logistical support of the French forces had

been restudied. Because of the anticipated

early redeployment of U.S. service units and

streamlining of the U.S. lines of communications, it was imperative that the French

authorities be made to assume the administrative support of their forces as soon as

possible. With this in view, on 16 May the

theater submitted to the War Department a

supply plan contemplating the transfer to

the French, in two stages, of the responsibility for the maintenance of their troops.

Under the proposed plan the War Department was ultimately to furnish the authorized maintenance on an automatic basis

with the French assuming the complete responsibility for shipment, reception, storage, and distribution.18

As the question of the delimitation of a

French zone of occupation was still pending, War Department officials favored another solution of the maintenance problem.

They felt that, until the French had formally

taken over their zone of occupation, the

issue to them of maintenance supplies should

be done on a military lend-lease basis.

Thereafter, the issue of such supplies should

be regulated under a new program to be

negotiated by the French Government and

the appropriate civil agencies of the U.S.

Government. The whole matter being

properly one for decision by the Joint Chiefs,

it was referred to them on 22 May.19

The question of whether or not it was 15

 Min Conf, Marshall with Juin, 11 May 45,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D. 16

 Msg SCAF 387, Eisenhower to CCS, 12 May

45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C;

Msg FWD 21251, Eisenhower to WO, ETOUSA,

SHAEF Mission to France, 12 May 45, SHAEF

SGS 475/3 France.

17

 Min Mtg, Smith with Diethelm, 13 May 45,

SHAEF SGS 475/2 France, Vol. II. 18

 Msg 21662, SHAEF to AGWAR, 16 May 45,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C. 19

 Memo for Rcd, OPD, 22 May 45, OPD 336.2

France, Sec V.
366 REARMING THE FRENCH

desirable to complete the equipment of

twenty-two supporting units as requested

earlier by the Supreme Commander was

still under study. There appeared to be

considerable disagreement among the

members of the JCS as to whether these

units were essential to the American war

effort and could be properly considered

as a military lend-lease requirement, or

whether they were of "postwar benefit" to

the French and should then be supplied

through civilian lend-lease on a governmental level. On 25 May the JCS finally

agreed to authorize the Supreme Commander to finish equipping the units from

theater stocks. The decision with respect

to the three divisions was being withheld

pending further information from the

theater.20

The status of the Liberated Manpower

Program had not changed to any appreciable degree. The question of its resumption was still under consideration by

the CCS. It will be recalled that on 24

April the Supreme Commander had requested that he be authorized to form and

equip such security and labor units as

might be required for a period not exceeding one year after V-E Day. On 12 May

General Eisenhower reminded the CCS of

this request and informed them that pending their approval SHAEF planned, to continue the formation of labor and security

units if the governments concerned agreed

to the proposal. Some progress had been

made toward solving the controversial issue

of the control of French units. General

Smith and War Minister Diethelm, meeting on 13 May, had discussed the matter

and come to an agreement. The agreement, confirmed in writing by General Juin

on 31 May, stipulated that the Supreme

Commander was to continue to control for

six months, beginning 1 June, the 25 security battalions and 6 labor groups then

employed under Communications Zone and

21 Army Group. An additional 20 battalions were to be made available to him

as soon as they would be equipped. None

of the units were to be employed outside

French territory.21

At the end of May SHAEF was taking

steps to complete the equipping of the 22

service units approved by the JCS at least

up to the scale required to accomplish their

assigned mission. These units were already

being employed by Communications Zone

and army groups to release corresponding

U.S. units required to support forces under

U.S. command. Three additional French

units (2 railway operating battalions and 1

railway grand division), proposed by

SHAEF in early May as operationally necessary, had still not been authorized by the

JCS. As for the three divisions, the decision to complete their equipping was being

withheld by the JCS, pending receipt from

the theater of a detailed list of the items

required. The Lyon depot meanwhile was

being maintained in operation and the matériel stocked there for the French was being

held in reserve, except in the case of items

in critical short supply required for U.S.

troops in process of redeployment.22

20

 Msg W-87143, Marshall to Eisenhower, 24

May 45, SHAEF SGS 475/1 France, Vol. IV; Msg

WX-87996, JCS to Eisenhower, 25 May 45, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D.

21

 Msg SCAF 387, SCAEF to CCS, 12 May 45,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C; Ltr,

Juin to Lewis, 31 May 45, SHAEF G-3 091 France,

Vol. VII. 22

 Msg FWD 22447, Eisenhower to Marshall, 27

May 45, OPD Cable Files; Msg FWD 21005,

SHAEF to AGWAR, 8 May 45, ABC 091.711

France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D; Msg FWD 22658,

Eisenhower to COMZONE, 29 May 45, SHAEF

SGS 475/1 France, Vol. IV.
THE REARMAMENT OPERATIONS END 367

Political Developments Doom Rearmament

The hope, which the French still entertained, that the first phase at least of the

Metropolitan Program would be completed

was suddenly shattered, once again as a result of a political complication arising in

the theater. The incident, more serious

than any of those preceding, threatened to

bring Franco-American co-operation to an

end.

In the spring of 1945 German forces still

occupied a narrow strip of French territory

west of the Franco-Italian border. Facing

them were French units reorganized since

1 March as the Détachement d'Armée des

Alpes commanded by Lt. Gen. Paul Doyen,

who was under the operational control of

the U.S. 6th Army Group. The detachment included then the 27th Alpine Infantry Division (27th DIA) still poorly

armed, the U.S.-equipped 1st March

Infantry Division (1st DMI) temporarily

detached from the 1st French Army, and a

number of units of FFI origin. All together

it represented a strength of some twenty infantry battalions with several artillery and

engineer units. The detachment was to

launch an attack in co-ordination with the

planned offensive of the 15th Army Group

in Italy. By direction of Field Marshal Sir

Harold R. L. G. Alexander, then Supreme

Allied Commander in the Mediterranean,

the French units were not to go beyond a line

extending from the Swiss frontier to the

Ligurian Gulf.

The attack came on 9 April. The French

successfully drove the Germans off French

territory, and continued their push eastward. They had nearly reached the restraining line when, on 27 April, 15th Army

Group informed 6th Army Group that any

further advance by the French detachment

could have no appreciable effect on operations in Italy. The next day General Devers

ordered General Doyen to halt and prepare

to withdraw to the Franco-Italian border.

This border delimited the boundary between the Mediterranean and European

theaters. The withdrawal of the French

was necessary as Alexander was establishing Allied military government within his

theater including all of liberated Italy.

Doyen ordered his troops to halt but declined to bring them back to the border without instructions from his government. By

the end of May the French detachment had

still not withdrawn in spite of repeated orders from Devers.23

The situation was reminiscent of the

Stuttgart episode in which another French

commander, General de Lattre, on orders

from de Gaulle, had refused to comply with

instructions from his superior. It was all

the more regrettable considering that General Juin, on 11 May, had given assurances

to American officials in Washington that

there would be no recurrence of the Stuttgart affair.

Allied officials learned that, for reasons

of prestige and honor, the French were not

prepared to evacuate the disputed area

largely in the belief that such a move would

appear to the Italians as a retreat on the

part of France. They learned moreover

that France was planning to annex part of

the area. Determined to carry out the establishment of Allied military government

even in the territory occupied by French

troops, Field Marshal Alexander urged

SHAEF to make strong representations to

the French Government with a view to obtaining prompt compliance with General

Devers' orders.

23

 Hq Fifth Army, "The French-Italian Border

Problem," Sec II, Chronological Summary, DRB

AGO.
368 REARMING THE FRENCH

On 30 May General Doyen wrote to his

immediate superior, Maj. Gen. Willis Crittenberger, Commanding General, U.S. IV

Corps, then on his way to assume control

of the area occupied by the French detachment. Doyen protested against Allied attempts to establish military government in

the Province of Cuneo, which his government had ordered him to occupy and administer. The installation of any Allied

administrative agency in that area being incompatible with his mission, he would be

compelled to oppose it. Any insistence in

this direction "would assume a clearly unfriendly, even hostile, character, and could

result in severe consequences."

 24

 Two days

later the French commander informed General Crittenberger that General de Gaulle

had instructed him to make it as clear as

possible to the Allied Command that he was

to prevent the establishment of Allied military government in the territories occupied

and administered by French troops "by all

necessary means without exception."

 25

Alexander immediately apprised the CCS

of the impasse now reached with the French

High Command and recommended that he

be allowed to complete the occupation of

northwestern Italy and establish Allied military government there, using force if need

be. Informed of the situation, President

Truman on 6 June cabled to General de

Gaulle his deep concern over the action of

the French Army in ignoring orders issued

by representatives of the CCS. General

Doyen's letter of 30 May contained the "unbelievable threat" that the French might

fight the Americans. Pointing out that the

American people would be shocked if they

were apprised of this threat, the President

urged General de Gaulle to reconsider his

stand in the matter. In the meantime, he

had no alternative but to order the stoppage

of issue of military equipment and munitions.26

In the belief that, largely as a result of the

prompt and effective intervention of General

Juin and Foreign Affairs Minister Georges

Bidault, the matter was about to be settled

in a satisfactory manner, General Smith

recommended to the War Department that

execution of the stoppage order be delayed

a day or two pending clarification of the

situation. He feared that, if action were

taken at once, the French might give the

incident considerable publicity.27 General

Marshall replied that the order remained

in effect. Further, it was to apply also to

the labor and security units supplied from

U.S. sources. Excepted from the order were

rations and sufficient quantities of gasoline

to maintain the normal life of troops and

to allow for such movements as might be

required. In anticipation of an acceptable

answer from General de Gaulle, the Supreme Commander was to prepare for the

resumption of the issuance of supplies but

"only upon specific instructions" from the

War Department.28 In a second message

of the same date, General Marshall informed General McNarney, Commanding

General, U.S. Forces in the Mediterranean

24

 Ltr, Doyen to Crittenberger, 30 May 45, Fifth

Army Files, "The Fr-Ital Border Question," No.

20, DRB AGO. 25

 Msg 44/CEM, Doyen to Crittenberger, 2 Jun

45, in same file.

26

 Msg NAF 1002, Alexander to CCS, in same

file; Msg W-12923, Marshall to Eisenhower and

McNarney, 6 Jun 45, Staff Message Center Cable

Log. 27

 Msg FWD 23981, Smith to Handy, 8 Jun 45,

SHAEF Cable Log, Fr Forces, A-49-70 TS. 28

 Msg W-13700, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 Jun

45, SHAEF Cable Log, Fr Forces, A-49-70 TS;

Msg WX-14512, AGWAR to ETOUSA and

MTOUSA, 8 Jun 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct

43), Sec 2-E.
THE REARMAMENT OPERATIONS END 369

Theater of Operations, that military lendlease support of the French Sovereignty and

Territorial forces in North Africa was being

terminated forthwith. Only such matériel

as had been floated would be delivered.29

This action was being taken on the ground

that support of these forces was no longer

justified militarily now that hostilities had

ceased in Europe.30

In compliance with the presidential decision, the Supreme Commander ordered

the cessation, as of 9 June, of all issues of

equipment, except rations and some gasoline, to all French forces, including air,

whether in North Africa or in Europe. The

next day Alexander received word from

General Juin that de Gaulle had consented

to the withdrawal of French troops west of

the 1939 Franco-Italian border. French

and Allied commanders, meeting on 11

June, agreed that the relief of all French

troops from the disputed area was to be accomplished progressively and completed by

10 July. No publicity was to be given to

these arrangements and no communique issued by any military headquarters concerned. The operation was to be referred

to as a "normal military relief" and the use

of the word "withdrawal" was to be

avoided.31

In an attempt to obtain the rapid lifting

of the ban on the further issue of equipment,

Ambassador Bonnet called on State Department officials on 13 June and urged that

lend-lease shipments be resumed. He was

told by John J. McCloy that the matter

was in the President's hands and would have

to be taken up with him. The President,

in fact, had just been sounded out and had

indicated that he was prepared to lift the

ban "in a few days."

 32

 His policy appeared

to be that the embargo order would be

rescinded only after completion of the planned withdrawal of French troops from

northwestern Italy. This was made clear

in a message from General Marshall requesting General McNarney to keep him informed of French preparations for and

progress in withdrawal, so that he could

recommend to the President the appropriate

time for the resumption of supply to the

French forces. General McNarney then

urged that he be authorized to tell General

Juin that deliveries would be resumed upon

completion of the French withdrawal.

General Marshall replied that the matter

rested entirely with the President, since it

was he who had made the original decision

to stop the supply of equipment.33

While the ban imposed on 9 June continued in force, the War Department examined its implications. On 18 June the

International Division pointed out that

should all military lend-lease to the French

be definitely ended, it would mean the stoppage of the further issue of replacement

and maintenance supplies to the forces

now equipped, of rations to approximately

29

 Msg WX-14512, AGWAR to McNarney, 8

Jun 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-E. 30

 Memo, McFarland for de Saint-Didier, 9 Jun

45, in same file. 31

 Msg FWD 24154, Eisenhower To All Concerned, 9 June 45, SHAEF SGS 475/3, Vol. I; Msg

NAF 1008, Alexander to CCS, 10 June 45, SHAEF

Cable Log, Fr Forces, A-49-70 TS; Msgs NAF

1009, Alexander to CCS, 11 Jun 45, and NAF 1010,

Alexander to CCS, 11 Jun 45.

32

 Memo, McCloy for Marshall, 14 Jun 45, ABC

380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A. 33

 Msgs FX-94233, McNarney to Marshall, 16

Jun 45, WX-18779, Marshall to McNarney, 18

Jun 45, and FX-13943, McNarney to Marshall, 27

Jun 45, AFHQ Cable Log; Msg WX-20076, Marshall to McNarney, 21 Jun 45, SHAEF Cable Log;

Msg FX-98608, McNarney to AGWAR, 24 Jun 45,

Staff Message Center Cable Log; Msg (unnumbered), Marshall to CG U.S. Armed Forces in

Med, 28 Jun 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43),

Sec 2-E.
370 REARMING THE FRENCH

300,000 troops, of matériel to complete the

first three divisions of the Metropolitan

Program, as well as the nondelivery of 100

airplanes then en route to Europe. It

would also spell the end of the current negotiations regarding the equipping of the

forces offered by the French for employment in the Far East. Finally, it would

have far-reaching implications with respect

to the civilian import program.34

One problem, meanwhile, had come up

for examination, namely, the ultimate disposition of the units equipped under the

Liberated Manpower Program. The advisability of maintaining in operation under

U.S. control the thirty-five security battalions and two labor groups furnished by the

French was seriously being questioned.

Communications Zone, which regarded the

units as "the least efficient of all Allied

liberated manpower units," felt that their

maintenance placed a heavy load on the

U.S. supply system. On 8 June Communications Zone urged that they be released to

French Government control without delay.35

As new commitments were being thrown

in the lap of the U.S. Army, such as the

feeding of large numbers of prisoners of

war and displaced persons, the supply situation of the theater was being severely

strained. It was becoming increasingly essential that national governments be made

to assume the supply responsibility of their

respective forces at the earliest practicable

date. With this in view, SHAEF advised

the French High Command on 23 June

that the requirements of the U.S. forces

for security and labor units had been revised. It was no longer proposed to raise

and equip any new units of this type. In

addition, ten security battalions were being

returned forthwith to French control. On

29 June SHAEF officials informed the CCS

that they were gradually releasing all liberated manpower units except a few truck

companies. They then proposed, in anticipation of the termination of combined

command, that thereafter matters connected

with Liberated Manpower Program units

be handled by American and British commanders—with the War Office for the issue

of initial equipment and maintenance, and

with the national governments concerned

regarding the employment and movement of

units.36

By early July all liberated manpower

units, with the exception of a few truck

companies, had been returned to French

control. As the French military authorities were proposing to disband the units no

longer considered necessary, SHAEF was

satisfied that they would have sufficient surplus equipment to maintain the others in

operation, including military regions headquarters, the Gendarmerie, and the Garde

Mobile.37

The embargo on the issue of equipment

to the French never had a chance of being

lifted. On 5 July President Truman announced in a directive to the Joint Chiefs

of Staff that thereafter the issue to Allied

governments of lend-lease military equipment would be limited to that which would

be used in the war against Japan exclu34

 Memo, Lt Col Don G. Shingler for Asst Secy

War, 18 Jun 45, OCS A-48-1 091 France. See

Ch. XXIV, below. 35

 Memo, G-3 COMZONE for CofS, 8 Jun 45,

SHAEF G-3 Orgn and Equip Sec 091, Vol. III.

36

 Msg EX-59933, COMZONE to SHAEF, 21

Jun 45, SHAEF G-3 Orgn and Equip Sec 091, Vol.

III; Memo, Lewis for Juin, 23 Jun 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711-12 (Fr) Combined; Msg

S-93960 SCAF 468, Tedder to CCS, 29 Jun 45,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-E. 37

 Memo, Bull for OCofS, 5 Jul 45, SHAEF SGS

475/1, Vol. II; Memo, SHAEF for CG COMZONE,

USFET, and SHAEF Mission to France, 7 Jul 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.4 Liberated People.
THE REARMAMENT OPERATIONS END 371

slvely.38 While leaving the door open to

further negotiations on the French proposal

to equip an expeditionary corps for the Pacific, the directive put an end to the possibility that at least the first phase of the

Metropolitan Program would be completed.

The French would find only small comfort

in the decision reached by the War Office

on 9 July to resume the delivery of British

items of equipment to fill shortages existing

at the time of initial shipments, and of supplies required for the maintenance of equipment currently in the hands of French

units.39

As a result of the presidential decision,

the activities of the rearmament depot at

Lyon came to an end and all equipment

stored there was ordered returned to U.S.

theater stocks. All records of the depot

were subsequently moved to Delta Base

Section.40

With the termination of the combined

command and SHAEF's dissolution on

13-14 July, 1st French Army reverted to

French control. Simultaneously the responsibility for the remaining U.S. activities

in connection with French armament and

training passed to the new U.S. command

in the theater, United States Forces, European Theater, the successor to ETOUSA.

The British, meanwhile, organized an

agency of their own for the purpose of

handling matters of interest to the War

Office.41

The presidential directive of 5 July had

hardly been put into effect when it became

apparent that its provisions were too restrictive. In the case of the French, their

occupation forces would not long maintain

their normal life unless the issue to them of

U.S. rations and gasoline was resumed for

some time at least. The matter, which was

of equal concern to the British forces of occupation, was discussed by President

Truman and Prime Minister Churchill in

the course of the Potsdam Conference (17

July-2 August).42

On 29 July President Truman communicated to the JCS an "interpretation" of his

original directive. The continuation of

lend-lease aid was authorized when, in the

opinion of the JCS, such aid was to be used

in direct support of American or Allied redeployment in the war against Japan. Also

authorized was the issue to U.S.-equipped

French units, on a military lend-lease basis,

of rations until 31 August 1945 and of replacement and maintenance items (including lubricants) until 30 September of the

same year. The interpretation authorized

further the supply for all other purposes of

maintenance items for U.S. equipment now

in the possession of Allied armies "against

payment under such terms and conditions

as may be determined by the State Department and the Foreign Economic Administration in accordance with established

procedure."

 43

Pursuant to this clarification, General

Eisenhower issued, on 2 August, an instruction to all headquarters under his command

defining the extent and nature of further

material assistance to the French.44 The

latter were then advised by United States

38

 Directive communicated to CG USFET in Msg

W-28135, 6 Jul 45, repeated in WX-41696 of

30 Jul 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec

2-E.

39

 Rearmament Division, Notes for Conference,

10 Jul 45, in SHAEF Mission to France Rearmt

Div, Misc Papers "Notes for Conferences." 40

 Msg EX-73131, Lee to Delta Base Sec, 26 Jul

45, SHAEF Mission to France 475-10 Equip of

Troops Metropolitan Program. 41

 See pp. 387-88, below.

42

 International Div, ASF, Lend-Lease, I, 315. 43

 Msg VICTORY 407, 29 Jul 45, CM-IN 29906. 44

 Msg S-15196, Eisenhower To All Concerned,

2 Aug 45, SHAEF SGS 475/3, Vol. I.
372 REARMING THE FRENCH

Forces, European Theater, Mission to

France, of the terminating dates of lendlease issues as prescribed by the President.

On 5 September, three days after the

surrender of the Japanese forces, President

Truman issued a second directive on military lend-lease to become effective V-J Day.

Although virtually ending lend-lease by the

War and Navy Departments, the directive

stipulated that aid could be furnished to

Allied forces in the form of rations, shelter,

medical supplies, and services, where these

could not be reasonably furnished by the

foreign government concerned and where

denial would work immediate hardship on

Allied forces, or on U.S. forces which were

dependent upon continued support by elements of Allied forces. Such aid was to be

considered as a liquidating measure and, in

any case, was to terminate within six

months, or in March 1946.45

Except for minor transfers of maintenance items, ammunition, and training matériel, effected purely as a liquidating measure, the rearmament operations had come

to an end, much to the chagrin of the

French. Subsequent efforts on their part

to purchase surplus American equipment

proved unsuccessful, the State Department

having established the policy that the sale

of combat materials in an undemilitarized

state was not authorized.46 The matter, in

any case, being of a strictly postwar nature,

exceeds the scope of the present study.

45

 Msg WX-59961, OPD WARCOS to CG

USAFMEDTO, 5 Sep 45, OPD Cable Files. 46

 Memo for Rcd, OPD, 30 Nov 45, OPD 400

France, Sec 4.
CHAPTER XXII

Re-equipping the French Air Force and

French Navy

The Air Force

It will be recalled that in October 1943

the French military authorities had submitted an extensive rearmament program

for the years 1944, 1945, and 1946 based

on the premise that a large reservoir of manpower would become available as the liberation of France was undertaken. The air

part of the program contemplated the activation by May 1946 of a total of 172

squadrons with 2,800 first-line planes and

the corresponding ground and service

troops. It was to be an extension of Plan

VII then being implemented in North

Africa. The Allies had declined to examine the program at the time as they considered it premature. Later, a few weeks

before the launching of ANVIL, the French

resubmitted their proposal. General Arnold seemed more disposed to consider it

provided that it had General Eaker's approval and that equipment could be furnished largely from theater stocks. There

the matter rested.1

In the fall of 1944, as the liberation of

France progressed, the French military authorities then established in Paris renewed

their proposals. Implementation of Plan

VII was virtually completed. Additional

effectives were available in France. At the

end of November the French High Command estimated that 20,000 former aviation personnel needing but little refresher

training could be put to useful employment

provided they were given the necessary

clothing, equipment, and aircraft. The

new French Chief of Staff for Air, General

Valin, approached Allied air officials in the

theater. They in turn instructed the newly

created Air Section of Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to France, to draw

up a second air program.2

In the meantime, the units equipped

under Plan VII were actively pursuing the

missions assigned to them as component elements of Allied air pools. They included

1st French Air Corps operating under the

control of the U.S. First Tactical Air Force

and the seven British-equipped squadrons

operating under the British 2nd Tactical

Air Force or under RAF Bomber Command. In addition, other nonprogram

squadrons, equipped by the French in North

Africa largely with obsolete matériel, were

1

 See pp. 308-09, above. Memo, Bouscat for

JAC and JRC, 2 Nov 43, JRC Misc Misc Doc, Item

5-b; Msg W-62001, Arnold to Eaker, 8 Jul 44,

JRC 360/001 Air Force Rearmt Plan and Policy.

2

 General Valin's predecessor, General Bouscat,

was now inspector general of the French Air Force.

Air Section was headed first by Colonel Ervin,

former chairman of the Joint Air Commission in

North Africa, later by Brig. Gen. Jack W. Wood.

For details on Air Section and its successor, Air

Component, SHAEF Mission to France, see pp.

384-85, below.
374 REARMING THE FRENCH

operating in the Middle East and in French

West and Equatorial Africa as police and

security units. The 1st Parachute Regiment, equipped and trained in North Africa,

was currently engaged in operations as a

general reserve infantry regiment of 1st

French Army. The British-equipped 2d

and 3d Parachute Regiments had been

severely decimated during the summer operations. They had returned to their base

in the United Kingdom for regrouping, refitting, and further training in anticipation

of new missions. They would still operate

as battalions of the British Special Air Service Brigade.3

U.S.-equipped squadrons and service

troops were being maintained through

American supply channels in the same manner as corresponding American units, all

supplies furnished being incorporated in

monthly theater lend-lease lists. Britishequipped units were maintained by the RAF

except for clothing and some items of

equipment which were provided from U.S.

sources in the interests of uniformity.

To provide an adequate reserve of combat crews, French students were still being

sent to schools in the United Kingdom and

the United States. In late September the

number of students undergoing training in

the United States was approximately 300 officers and 1,600 men.4

Such was the situation of the French Air

Force as Air Marshal Robb, Deputy Chief

of Staff for Air, SHAEF, on 19 December

submitted to the CCS details of the program proposed by Air Section of Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to France.

The program, prepared in collaboration

with the French Air Ministry and concurred in by Allied air and other officials in

the theater, was in the nature of a "complement" or extension of Plan VII. Scarcity of trained aviation specialists in North

Africa had prevented the formation of a

French tactical force as independent and

efficiently organized as a comparable U.S.

or British force. To fill existing gaps, it

was now proposed to add to Plan VII the

following units: (1) 9 combat squadrons

(8 to be provided with equipment by the

United States, 1 by the United Kingdom),

thus bringing U.S.-equipped "groups" and

British-equipped "wings" currently composed of 3 squadrons up to the normal

complement of 4 squadrons as in corresponding U.S. and British organizations;

(2) a number of headquarters units to enable the French to operate on their own,

as well as service units to ease the load on

U.S. and British service facilities. The

plan, if approved, was to go into effect on 1

January 1945 and be completed by 30

June.5

On 29 December the CCS accepted the

program in principle and requested the

Combined Administrative Committee to

work out the responsibility for the provision

of equipment. It was not until 1 March

that the CCS, endorsing the recommendations of the committee, announced the policy

to be followed with respect to the new program, thereafter known as Extension of

Plan VII (CCS 350/7). SHAEF was

given the entire responsibility for its implementation. It was charged with establish3

 The 2d and 3d RCP were dispatched to northern Holland by parachute in early April 1945 to

operate in support of the 21 Army Group. Chief de

bataillon Rocolle, L'Arme aéroportée clé de la

Victoire (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1948), I,

102-15. Memo, Fr Military Mission AFHQ for

Liaison Sec AFHQ, 30 Nov 44, sub: FAF Order of

Battle, AFHQ 0100/4 SACS Rcd Sec, Fr Matters,

Vol. VI. See pp. 182, 211-12, above. 4

 International Div, ASF, Lend-Lease, II, 774.

5

 Memo, Air Marshal J. M. Robb for CCS, 19

Dec 44, ABC 091.711 (6 Oct 43). Sec 2-C.
RE-EQUIPPING THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY 375

ing the priorities for the supply of equipment

strictly on the basis of operational factors

and in co-ordination with other rearmament

programs in the theater. It was also to

observe the rule established for all programs: any unit of the new air program

which had not been equipped by the time

organized hostilities with Germany ceased

would be deleted.6

As in the past, Army Air Forces headquarters was to provide U.S. aircraft and

items peculiar to air, following their assignment by the MAB. Organizational

equipment and spare parts were to be

shipped directly to U.S. Air Forces depots

in the theater, and their issue to the French

was to be controlled by the United States

Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF).

Aircraft were to be shipped directly to

French depots in Marseille where the FAF

had adequate assembly facilities. International Division, ASF, meanwhile, was to

handle and ship items common to air and

ground in the same manner as for the

ground rearmament program. Shortages

were to be filled from U.S. theater stocks

wherever possible. All units, once

equipped, were to be placed under the operational control of the Supreme Commander and employed in the Allied pool of

air units.7

By the end of March 1945 a priority list

of units for which the French could furnish

the necessary personnel had been drawn

up jointly by the French Air Ministry,

SHAEF Air Staff, and Air Component of

SHAEF Mission to France, the successor

to Air Section of Rearmament Division.

The list, submitted to and approved by First

Tactical Air Force, included the units as desired by months. The new phasing no

longer corresponded to that originally contemplated. The program was now to start

in April with the delivery of equipment for

several headquarters and four combat

squadrons and terminate in SeptemberOctober.8

Throughout the month of April a detailed

procedure was worked out under the general supervision of Air Component of

SHAEF Mission to France for the activation and equipping of units upon the reception of matériel due to arrive from the

United States. By the end of the month

none had yet reached the Continent, however, and, as the Supreme Commander decided on 28 April to suspend all further

shipments of equipment to the French as a

result of the Stuttgart episode, only the

matériel for the April phase was on its way

from the United States. On 1 May War

Department officials informed the theater

that, in accordance with the Supreme Commander's request, shipment of the remaining equipment was being canceled with the

exception of aircraft which would continue

to be delivered until further advice from

the theater.9

After a rapid re-examination of the program in the light of the current operational

situation, the theater informed the War Department that a number of units in the April

and May priorities were being eliminated

6

 Msgs FACS 120, CCS to Eisenhower, 29 Dec

44, and FACS 147, CCS to Eisenhower, 1 Mar 45,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C. 7

 Memo, Twitchell for Gen Bull, 20 Dec 44,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711 Rearmt (Fr)

900-2; Msg FWD 19714, Schlatter to Arnold, 19

Apr 45, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Vol. III.

8

 Memo, Ervin for Loomis, 28 Mar 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 091.711 Rearmt (Fr) Air Force

900-2. 9

 Memo, Ervin to U.S. Component SHAEF Air

Staff, 20 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France 091.711

Rearmt (Fr) 900-2; Msg WX-76320, Maj Gen

John E. Hull to Loomis, 1 May 45, SS and P Plan- ning Div Files. See pp. 361 ff., above.
376 REARMING THE FRENCH

as no longer required, leaving others, already operational but only partially equipped, still on the program. With respect to

these, SHAEF planned to complete their

initial equipment insofar as possible from

U.S. theater stocks and by using matériel

currently afloat. No further initial equipment was desired from the United States as

no other units were to be activated and

equipped.10

Throughout the winter 1944-45 and the

following spring months, units of the FAF

had continued in operation on various

fronts. The squadrons of 1st French Air

Corps acting in co-operation with 1st French

Army and for the benefit of U.S. Seventh

Army had participated, under the control

of First Tactical Air Force, in the liberation

of Alsace, the reduction of the Colmar

Pocket, the crossing of the Rhine, the bombing of German communication centers, and

the final drive eastward through enemy territory. The British-equipped squadrons,

still under either the 2d Tactical Air Force

or the RAF Bomber Command, had

been active in support of operations carried out by the British and Canadian

Armies. Other units had been engaged

on the Atlantic coast front and on the

Franco-Italian border. The Russianequipped Normandie Squadron had continued to operate as part of the Red air

forces.

By 7 May, as hostilities ended in Europe,

the air program was still suspended except

for the few units which the theater commander wished to be equipped for operational reasons. With the embargo ordered by President Truman on 6 June as

a result of the northwest Italy incident,

French hopes for a resumption of the program fell off sharply. They vanished completely when it became known that the

Allied commander in the Pacific, General

Douglas MacArthur, on 2 June, had expressed his opposition to the use of French

air squadrons in his theater.11

With the dissolution of SHAEF in midJuly, all FAF units reverted to French control as did the rest of the French armed

forces. To enable them to carry out their

mission in occupied Germany, U.S.-

equipped units continued to be dependent

on American supply installations for spare

parts and maintenance items. Britishequipped units remained dependent on the

RAF for almost all their service facilities.12

After President Truman's second directive

of 5 September, virtually ending all lendlease aid, such U.S. assistance as was still

required by the FAF for the maintenance

of its units during the immediate posthostilities period was made the subject of negotiations between the French and U.S.

Governments.13

As estimated by General Loomis at the

end of August 1945, the results of the efforts

expended by the United States between

December 1942 and May 1945 toward the

rehabilitation of the FAF had been far from

negligible. All together the French had received from American sources the complete

initial equipment for 19 combat squadrons

and 60 supporting units, representing a personnel strength of some 30,000 men, for

which the United States had also furnished

the entire necessary maintenance. The

10

 Msg FWD 20564, Eisenhower to Arnold, 4

May 45, SS and P Planning Div Files.

11

 See pp. 368, above, and 397, below. 12

 Memo, Loomis for CG USFET, 23 Aug 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 370-1 NA Employment of Units. 13

 Transfers of supplies effected after that date,

as well as requests by the French submitted in midSeptember for a further expansion of the FAF, are

postwar in character and exceed the scope of the

present study.
RE-EQUIPPING THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY 377

supporting units had been used to form an

air defense wing, an air depot group, 3 service groups, as well as suitable command

headquarters. The British, for their part,

had equipped a total of 10 squadrons.14

The Navy

The vast rearmament program for the

years 1944 and 1945 submitted in Algiers

by the National Defense Committee in midOctober 1943 envisaged the further buildup not only of the ground and air forces,

but of the Navy as well. The entire program, it will be recalled, was based on the

assumption that considerable numbers of

effectives would become available as a result

of operations in continental France. The

part relating to the Navy contemplated a

substantial increase in the number of destroyers, aircraft carriers, cruisers, submarines, and other types of smaller vessels.

The request was considered to be a postwar

project and, like the rest of the program, had

been turned down as inopportune.15

When, in mid-September 1944, the first

French naval vessels re-entered the battered

port of Toulon, the earlier program initiated

in December 1942 for the rehabilitation of

the French Navy was nearly completed. A

few ships were still being overhauled in

North African dockyards under the general

direction of French, British, and American

naval authorities in the Mediterranean.

The more important problem now was

that of restoring ports and naval installations in France, some of which had been

greatly damaged before and during the

landing operations. Toward the end of

1944, as the entire French territory passed

under the control of SHAEF, the latter became responsible for assisting the French

in carrying out this difficult assignment.

SHAEF also became responsible for the

maintenance and supply of such French

ships as were operating within its sphere,

AFHQ meanwhile maintaining a similar

responsibility for French ships and naval installations in its area. The old supply policy, CCS 358 (Revised), put in force on 4

October 1943 and applicable to the French

Navy while it was based on North Africa,

was no longer adequate. There was need

of coordinating the activities between the

two theaters and between them and the

French, and of determining the share of responsibility of the United States and the

United Kingdom.

After some discussion between officials of

both theaters, the task of co-ordination was

finally vested in Vice-Adm. Alan G. Kirk,

deputy for Navy, SHAEF. Admiral Kirk

carried out this assignment through the

Naval Division established for the purpose

at SHAEF Mission to France in December

1944 and functioning parallel to the Rearmament Division and the Air Component.16

 In this manner, Admiral Kirk and

Naval Division, composed of U.S. and

British officers, were able to deal effectively

with the French Admiralty in Paris, now

the sole authority in French naval rearmament matters, and to co-ordinate American

and British responsibilities with respect to

French naval problems arising in the two

theaters. To achieve further co-ordination,

Admiral Fénard, chief of the French Naval

Mission in the United States, was directed

to refer all requests for equipment to be used

in French port operations to SHAEF for

consideration. No action would be taken

14

 Memo, Loomis for CG USFET, 23 Aug 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 370-1 NA Employment

of Units. 15

 Memo, National Defense Committee for WD,

16 Oct 43, OCS 45-466 France 1942-43. See pp.

308-09, above. 16 See p. 385, below.
378 REARMING THE FRENCH

BATTLESHIP STRASBOURG, Toulon Harbor, September 1944. Note four lower turret

guns, the ends of which were cut off when the French scuttled the ship in November 1942.

in Washington without SHAEF's recommendations.17

Thanks to the efforts of Naval Division,

the French obtained until the end of the

campaign in Europe substantial amounts of

equipment, such as cranes, derricks, barges,

and other materials, for the rehabilitation

of their ports, Brest and Cherbourg in particular. French naval vessels continued to

operate throughout the world as part of

the Allied naval pool. In April 1945 a

number of them were released from Allied

control for participation in the combined

land, air, and sea operations launched,

under the direction of Lt. Gen. Edgar de

Larminat, for the purpose of reducing the

German pockets of resistance on the Atlantic coast. Together with a flotilla of British

mine sweepers, the French vessels, which

included the battleship Lorraine, one

cruiser, three destroyers, and several escorts

and mine sweepers, were grouped into a

naval task force commanded by Rear Adm.

Joseph Rue.

By the time operations in Europe ended,

the French Navy had increased further in

size as a result of the acquisition of additional Allied ships and the refitting of salvaged French ships. The number of its

vessels was now estimated at 350 including

auxiliary craft, its air arm at 10 squadrons,

and its effectives at close to 100,000 men.

17

 Msg W-20574, Styer to Loomis, 13 Jan 45,

International Div Files, Cable Log, A 45-152.
RE-EQUIPPING THE AIR FORCE AND THE NAVY 379

Its fighting power was regarded as being

nearly equivalent to that of 1939.18

In June 1945 Admiral Fénard submitted

to the JCS a detailed list of machinery, tools,

and other materials still needed for the restoration of ports and naval yards. Although the French Government was prepared to pay for the equipment on the basis

of 20 percent cash and the balance within

30 years, the CCS turned down the request.

Now that hostilities had ended in Europe,

the materials involved were needed in other

theaters and could not be spared for French

naval installations.19

Other requests from Admiral Fénard had

likewise been denied by the CCS. They

had been submitted throughout the fall and

winter of 1944 in connection with attempts

by the French military authorities to set up

an expeditionary force for participation in

operations in the Pacific. It was not until

June that the CCS took into consideration

some of Admiral Fénard's proposals. By

this time it was too late for any constructive

program to be put into effect before the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific.20

It will be recalled that in the winter of

1943-44, the French had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain equipment and planes for

the rehabilitation of their Naval Air Arm

(Aéronautique Navale). The CCS had

turned down their requests largely because

of the dearth of trained personnel.21 When,

in the fall of 1944, the liberation of part of

France produced a substantial increase in

naval effectives, the French renewed their

requests for equipment.

On 29 September 1944 Admiral Fénard

submitted to Admiral King a plan for the

complete rehabilitation of Aéronautique

Navale. The plan contemplated the reequipping of existing squadrons, the formation and equipping of new units, and the

rehabilitation of the naval air bases whose

equipment and facilities had been destroyed

in the course of operations. The existing

number of squadrons had been raised from

4 in 1943 to 10. They included 2 dive

bomber, 2 fighter, and 6 coastal command

squadrons. Except for 2 coastal command

squadrons equipped with U.S. aircraft and

the 2 fighter squadrons equipped with

P-47's and Spitfires and currently engaged

in operations as part of the FAF, the units

were using obsolescent or obsolete French

and British equipment. To standardize

equipment and simplify maintenance problems, the program submitted by Admiral

Fénard envisaged the utilization of American equipment exclusively. It contained

also a request for clothing, tools, ground

handling and ground training equipment,

and other miscellaneous materials.22

Admiral Fénard's proposal was immediately referred to the Joint Strategic Survey

Committee for study. On the recommendations of the committee, the JCS

urged the CCS, on 31 October, to reject

the proposal. The French plan, they

pointed out, contained no substantial military advantage in the prosecution of the

war or in the solution of immediate postwar

problems in Europe. In addition it would

have an adverse effect on the prosecution of

the war in the Pacific to the extent that it

involved the diversion of U.S. resources and

18

 Lemonnier, "La Marine Nationale," La France

et son Empire dans la Guerre. 19

 Memos, Fénard for JCS, 22 June 45, and CCS

for Fénard, 17 Jul 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct

43) Sec 5. 20

 see pp. 393, 395-96, below. 21

 Min, CCS 147th Mtg, 25 Feb 44; see

pp. 222-24, above.

22

 Ltr, Fénard to CinC U.S. Fleet, 29 Sep 44, ABC

091.711 France (12 Oct 43).
380 REARMING THE FRENCH

effort.23 Endorsing this view, the CCS disapproved Admiral Fénard's request on the

ground that it contained implications regarding postwar rearmament. The issue

was definitely closed and the French were

forced to continue operating their Naval

Air Arm with the equipment already on

hand.

23 Ltr, JCS to Cordell Hull, 31 Oct 44, in same

file.
CHAPTER XXIII

Rearmament Division, SHAEF

Mission to France

Membership, Organization, and Operation

When, on 3 October 1944, General

Loomis arrived at Supreme Headquarters,

Allied Expeditionary Force, he was appointed deputy chief of a special staff section organized two weeks earlier for the

purpose of handling all matters involving

the French. The section, known as SHAEF

Mission to France, was commanded by

General Lewis. As problems of French

equipment were arising in increasing number, General Loomis was directed to take

over the responsibility for their solution.

With the party of officers from the Joint

Rearmament Committee whom he had

brought along from North Africa, he organized a rearmament division within the

mission, giving it a structure somewhat

similar to that of the former JRC. The

division began operating at once under the

name of Rearmament Division, SHAEF

Mission to France. Within a short time

SHAEF directed General Loomis to extend

the division's activities to include the rearmament of other western European Allied

nations as well, including Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. Only the role played

by the division in connection with French

rearmament will be presented.

The Rearmament Division's position in

the staff structure and its relationship to

other SHAEF agencies and sections concerned with French armament matters did

not vary until July 1945 when SHAEF itself

was disbanded and a reorganization of Allied command and headquarters took place.

(Chart 5). The transformation which the

Rearmament Division underwent then and

the role that it played for a short time thereafter are matters treated separately at the

end of the chapter.

During its relatively short existence the

division was made responsible, first for the

continued implementation of the North African program, later for the initiation, establishment, and implementation of the Liberated Manpower and Metropolitan Programs. In carrying out these assignments, it

effected the necessary co-ordination with all

French and Allied agencies concerned, kept

SHAEF informed of the status and progress

of the units being re-equipped, directed the

operations of the U.S. instructor personnel

assigned to Inspection Group, and co-ordinated with SHAEF all questions arising

in connection with units not included in approved rearmament programs.1

Membership

The British having assumed most of the

commitment with respect to the Liberated

1

 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France for Chief

Rearmt Div, 30 Nov 44, and Memo, SHAEF

(Brig Gen T. J. Davis, Adj Gen) for SHAEF Mission to France, 22 Dec 44, SHAEF Mission to

France 320-1.
382 REARMING THE FRENCH

REARMAMENT DIVISION, SHAEF MISSION TO FRANCE. Seated in center,

wearing glasses, is General Loomis; left of him is General Kingman; General Regnault is on

the right.

Manpower Program and a small part of

that for the Metropolitan Program, the Rearmament Division was made, from the

outset, a U.S.-British agency with French

representation. As the work of the division progressed, the number of U.S. and

British members varied in proportion to the

respective participation or interest of the

United States and United Kingdom in the

rearmament operations being carried out.2

The French members, meanwhile, operated

as they had under the JRC—as a liaison

group.

U.S. Members. The division began

functioning with a nucleus organization

consisting of approximately twelve officers,

all Americans and formerly members of both

the JRC and the Joint Air Commission.

U.S. membership fluctuated very little. Its

increase was slowed down as a result of

the difficulties encountered by SHAEF

Mission to France in securing from AFHQ,

and from agencies controlled by the latter,

additional personnel formerly assigned to

the JRC and now needed for service with

the Rearmament Division. It had been

agreed in September 1944 by Generals

Eisenhower, Devers, and Marshall that all

JRC personnel was to be held for transfer

2

 Memo, Loomis for Lewis, sub: Proposed Plan

for Fr Rearmt, 5 Oct 44, SHAEF Mission to France

320-1.
REARMAMENT DIVISION, SHAEF MISSION TO FRANCE 383

CHART 5—POSITION OF REARMAMENT DIVISION IN SHAEF: 1 JANUARY 1945

Source: Ltr AG/091.112-2 GCT-AGM, SHAEF To All Concerned, 29 Dec 44, SHAEF Mission to France 320-1 Rearmt Div, Orgn and

Functions, Annex A.

to SHAEF if and when required. Apparently fearing an undue reduction of its own

personnel strength, AFHQ showed considerable reluctance in authorizing the transfers requested by General Loomis. This

produced an intertheater tug-of-war lasting

over a period of four months.3 All together

not more than six U.S. officers were added

to the initial roster.

British Members. The appointment of

British members was not effected as speedily

as it had been hoped, with the result that

British membership never reached the expected ratio. The first officer to join the

division, Lt. Col. R. G. Fullerton, was given

the post of deputy executive officer shortly

after his appointment in November.4 Later,

in March 1945, he was joined by two other

officers.

Internal Organization

During the period in which the Rearmament Division was an agency of SHAEF

Mission to France (October 1944-July

1945), its internal organization went

through two different phases. In the

initial period, which lasted to the end of

December, the Rearmament Division comprised an Executive Staff, Ground, Air,

and Naval Sections, a French Group, and a

training section known as Inspection Group,

3

 Msg S-78109, SHAEF Main to MTOUSA for

Nelson, 7 Feb 45, in same file.

4

 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France Rearmt Div

(Lt Col Conrad L. Christensen), 1 Nov 44, in same

file.
384 REARMING THE FRENCH

CHART 6—THE REARMAMENT DIVISION, SHAEF MISSION TO FRANCE: MARCH 1945

*Officers formerly with the JRC in North Africa.

†Attached to Inspection Group.

Source: SHAEF Mission to France 320-1 Rearmt Div, Orgn and Functions, Annex A.

all under the command of General Loomis.

The arrangement whereby the various sections dealing with French armament matters were consolidated in one single agency

had been adopted to facilitate the transfer

to France of personnel and records from the

former North African JRC and JAC, and

to speed up the launching of the new organization. However, when the armament

programs began to crystallize and multiply

toward the end of December 1944, it was

felt advisable to set the air and naval sections apart from the rest of the division,

leaving the latter responsible for ground

force armament matters only. (Chart 6}

Until then, the Naval Section, although

established in principle, had remained unstaffed and inoperative. The Air Section,

on the contrary, had done considerable work

in supervising the continued implementation of the North African air rearmament

program and in planning for an extension

of that program on the basis of manpower

then available in continental France. It

was composed of six U.S. officers, formerly

members of the North African Joint Air

Commission. It was headed, first by

Colonel Ervin, who, it will be recalled, had

served as the last chairman of the JAC, later

after 1 December, by Brig. Gen. Jack W.

Wood. In carrying out its mission, the section co-ordinated all air armament matters

between appropriate agencies of the French

Air Force, the Royal Air Force, and the

U.S. Army Air Forces, recommended approval or disapproval of French requests

for matériel, made suggestions on the employment of units, and maintained liaison
REARMAMENT DIVISION, SHAEF MISSION TO FRANCE 385

with U.S. Strategic Air Forces and with the

1st French Air Corps created in the fall

of 1944.5

When the two sections left the division,

on or about 1 January 1945, there were

created parallel to the Rearmament Division and under the jurisdiction of SHAEF

Mission to France an Air Component under

the command of General Wood, and a

Naval Division under the command of Capt.

D. D. Dupre (USN), the representative of

Admiral Kirk, Deputy for Navy, SHAEF.

The Air Component took over the duties of

Air Section, and the Naval Division was

given the task of carrying on the rehabilitation of the French Navy under the general

direction of Admiral Kirk.

In its final stage of organization, the Rearmament Division included three of the

original sections, namely Ground Section,

French Group, and Inspection Group.

Ground Section. In matters of equipment, the Ground Section constituted the

central authority. Placed under the direct

control of General Loomis, it was composed

of an executive staff, a British Equipment

Group under the command of Colonel Fullerton, and a U.S. Equipment Group under

the command of Maj. Erwin S. Graham, the

two equipment groups working in close coordination. The section was responsible

for initiating programs and implementing

them once they had been approved by the

CCS. In the discharge of this function, it

worked in full and constant collaboration

with the French Group.

The problems faced by the Ground Section and by the division as a whole were

fewer than those encountered by the JRC

in North Africa. This was largely because

most of the responsibility for the rearmament operations was now vested in the division, French agencies no longer being involved in the handling and distribution of

equipment. Yet the task of the section was

somewhat complicated by the fact that it

was dealing with three separate programs

and that the American commitment was not

as clearly defined as under the ANFA program when the United States had undertaken to furnish all the matériel for the

French Ground Forces. To expedite action, General Loomis or members of the

Ground Section held frequent conferences

with outside American, British, and French

officials and agencies. They maintained

close contact with the British War Office

and the London Munitions Assignments

Board, both of which, on several occasions,

sent representatives to discuss matters of

common interest. When, in the fall of

1944, it was urgent that the War Department reach a decision on the Metropolitan

Program, General Loomis flew to Washington to present the case and soon returned

with a promise of speedy action.

French Group. Shortly after the organization of SHAEF Mission to France, the

French military authorities in Paris detailed

a liaison section, headed by Colonel Chanson, to work with the G-3 Section of the

mission on armament problems in which

they and SHAEF had a common interest.

Before his transfer to the French capital,

Colonel Chanson had served briefly in General Noiret's headquarters in London as

chief of the Rearmament Section. Earlier

he had headed the Rearmament and Technical Studies Section at the French General

Headquarters in Algiers. In October another French section, composed of Colonel

Regnault and several officers formerly associated with the JRC, began operating as

5

 Memo, Air Sec for Loomis, 26 Oct 44, SHAEF

Mission to France 320-1 Orgn and Function, Rearmt Div.
386 REARMING THE FRENCH

part of Rearmament Division. To ensure

closer co-ordination on armament problems

and prevent duplication of efforts, the

French military authorities decided, on 21

November, to merge the two sections into

one thereafter known as French Group, Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to

France. The group, placed under the command of Colonel Regnault with Colonel

Chanson as his deputy, became the official

representative agency of the French High

Command empowered to deal with SHAEF

on matters pertaining to armament.6 In

addition to Colonels Regnault and Chanson, the group included approximately ten

officers, most of whom had contributed

earlier to the success of the North African

rearmament operations.

The specific duties of the French Group

were to work out with Rearmament Division questions concerning matériel from

U.S., British, enemy-captured, and French

sources, as well as problems of activation,

organization, maintenance, and training of

French units. All such matters, whether

they involved the National Defense headquarters, the Ministry of War, the General

Staff, or any other commands, were channeled through the French Group. Other

questions were handled directly between

SHAEF Mission and the French headquarters concerned.7

To effect closer liaison with the War

Office on questions involving the shipment

of British equipment to France, Colonel

Regnault detailed one officer to London.

Likewise, to keep both SCAMA, then established in Marseille, and the base in Cherbourg informed of British deliveries, he dispatched to London another officer whenever required.8

 No French Air Force or

Navy officers were appointed to the group,

as all air and naval rearmament matters

were handled by the appropriate French

headquarters directly with the Air Component and Naval Division of SHAEF

Mission to France.

By establishing almost daily contact with

Generals Leyer and Blanc, chief and deputy

chief of General Staff, Ground Forces, and

by holding frequent informal meetings with

General Loomis or with individual U.S. or

British members of Rearmament Division,

Colonel Regnault was able to maintain the

cordial and fruitful co-operation which had

existed between French and Allied Headquarters in North Africa.

Inspection Group. Commanded by General Kingman, assisted by his French deputy,

Colonel L'Huillier, Inspection Group was

composed of American and British instructors.9

 American instructors were organized

as the 6834th Rearmament Regiment,

SHAEF (the former 6834th Training Regiment, JRC). The regiment, after being

based for some months in the Marseille area,

was moved near Paris early in 1945. A

small group of officers headed by General

Kingman posted themselves in the French

capital in proximity to the other components of the Rearmament Division. British

personnel did not join Inspection Group for

some months. Initially the War Office

placed a small number of instructors directly at the disposal of the French soon

after the first deliveries of British matériel.

In April 1945 three officers were assigned

to Inspection Group for the purpose of setting up a training program in the use and

6

 Memo 701 EMGG/CAB, 28 Nov 44, SHAEF

Mission to France 091, 711-9 (Fr) Combined. 7

 Ibid.

8

 Memo 1396, EMGG/LA, Leyer for Regnault,

6 Feb 45, SHAEF Mission to France 320-12. 9

 Colonel L'Huillier was awarded the Legion of

Merit with the degree of Officer on 25 January

1946.
REARMAMENT DIVISION, SHAEF MISSION TO FRANCE 387

care of British equipment and of arranging

the assignment to Inspection Group of a

detachment of British instructors. The

detachment ultimately grew to a size of 100

officers and enlisted men.10

During the first few months of its existence, beginning October 1944, Inspection

Group devoted its activities to assisting the

training centers run by 1st French Army,

With the arrival in February 1945 of British

training matériel for the units of the Liberated Manpower and Metropolitan Programs, Inspection Group found its responsibilities greatly increased. It was given the

task of inspecting all units scheduled to be

equipped to make sure that they were fully

activated and organized on appropriate U.S.

tables of organization and equipment, the

intent being that any unit failing to meet

the requirements was denied matériel.

Once the units were equipped, Inspection

Group assisted them in their technical training. Later it inspected them once again to

determine their fitness for operations.11 Inspection Group also undertook to provide

assistance in the form of training teams to

the French troops engaged in operations

along the Atlantic coast. The training

teams effected the necessary liaison between

the units involved and the U.S. 66th Infantry Division assigned to their support.

Posthostilities Period

AFHQ officials had long recognized that

even after the termination of the Supreme

Command there would still be French rearmament problems of mutual interest to

the United States and the United Kingdom.

As early as April 1945 General Loomis proposed that upon the dissolution of SHAEF

the Rearmament Division either remain a

joint British-American unit operating as

agent for the CCS, or be split into two separate sections functioning under their respective chiefs of staff.12

 The second of these

suggestions was accepted by SHAEF and

made the object of a directive.13

On 13-14 July, as SHAEF was dissolved

and ETOUSA became USFET, all American responsibilities toward the French

passed from SHAEF Mission to France to

USFET Mission to France. Part of the

U.S. personnel of Rearmament Division

was then transferred to the new mission as

a staff section known as the Rearmament

and Operations Division. This agency

simply took over the work heretofore performed by its predecessor except that it confined its activities to matters involving the

United States. It co-ordinated with the

British such matters as were of common interest to both America and the United Kingdom. General Loomis headed the division until 12 September. He was then replaced by Colonel Christensen. Attached

to the division were a French Group headed

by Colonel Regnault, brigadier general since

May, and an Inspection Group commanded

by General Kingman and composed of personnel of the 6834th Rearmament Regiment. The regiment was active until 1

November 1945, when it was disbanded.

Meanwhile, air and naval matters continued to be handled separately by the air and 10

 Informal Routing Slip, SHAEF Mission to

France (Col Alden K. Sibley, ACofS) to Chief

Rearmt Div, SHAEF Mission to France 353-1

Training; Interv with Kingman, Jul 50. 11

 Interv with Loomis, 51; also International Div,

ASF, Lend-Lease, II, 1217.

12

 Memo, Loomis for SHAEF G-3, 9 Apr 45,

SHAEF Mission to France 320-1- 13

 Ltr, SHAEF AG 400-1 (Fr) GCT-AGM to

CG ETOUSA, 22 Jun 45, SHAEF Mission to

France 091.711 Rearmt Plan & Policy 900-5.
388 REARMING THE FRENCH

naval components of the USFET Mission

to France.14

The British also had organized a Rearmament Division of their own which included

the personnel heretofore part of their training teams and ordnance and engineer detachments. The division, placed under the

direct control of the War Office, was

charged with completing existing commitments with respect to British equipment and

training.15

Considering the late start of the armament programs enacted and carried out in

continental France, the intricacies of their

implementation traceable largely to the

multiplicity of equipment sources and the

frequent revisions made necessary by the

fast-changing operational situation, and

finally the time element involved, the Rearmament Division and its successors

achieved substantial results. These were

made possible, as in North Africa, by the

excellent co-operation between the British,

American, and French members of the division, and between the division itself and

outside Allied agencies.

Training Under Inspection Group

When the four French Army training centers which had been operating in North

Africa and Italy reached France in the fall

of 1944, they began training the replacements earmarked for 1st French Army.16

For some weeks thereafter, training operations on French soil were limited largely to

the instruction given in these centers with

the technical assistance of U.S. instructors

detailed by General Kingman from his Inspection Group. Training in the United

States, meanwhile, was still being offered to

selected groups of French students. As of

20 September 1944, some 2,100 officers and

men, mostly Air Force personnel, were reported to be attending schools in the United

States.17

The inability of the training centers to

provide the number of replacements required to maintain the units of 1st French

Army at authorized strength has already

been related. By the end of December

three of the centers were still furnishing too

few replacements, the fourth none at all.

The assignment to them of insufficient numbers of trainees was not the only reason for

the unsatisfactory situation. The centers

were reported to be lacking adequate matériel 

French military authorities to reserve what

equipment was still available in North African training centers for use in centers being

set up in France to train Metropolitan Program units. In spite of SHAEF's repeated

objections to such an arrangement, the

French continued to maintain that they had

no other alternative, at least not until the

arrival of equipment expected to be shipped

14

 Memo, Rearmt and Opns Div (Christensen)

for SGS, 17 Jul 45, SHAEF Mission to France

320-1.

In 1945 the French Government conferred on

General Loomis the grade of Officer in the Order

of the Legion of Honor, and awarded him the

Croix de Guerre (with Palm). The U.S. Government conferred on him the Distinguished Service Medal (May 1945) and the Legion of Merit

(October 1945). General Regnault was promoted

to the degree of Commander in the Order of the

Legion of Merit on 15 June 1945. General Kingman was promoted to the grade of Officer in the

Order of the Legion of Honor and simultaneously

awarded the Croix de Guerre (with Palm) (October 1945). 15

 Memos, RDB/A/11, Fullerton GSO-1 Br Sec

Rearmt Div SHAEF for Chief Rearmt Div, and

Fullerton Br Sec Rearmt Div SHAEF for Maj Gen

Harold Redman, 1 Jul 45, SHAEF Mission to

France 320-1.

16

 For training during the North African rearmament operations, see Ch. XIV, above. 17

 International Div, ASF, Lend-Lease, II, 774.
REARMAMENT DIVISION, SHAEF MISSION TO FRANCE 389

from the United Kingdom and the United

States.18

Within a short time, SHAEF officials

came to the conclusion that the existing replacement system, by which 1st French

Army itself was charged with the induction

and training of reinforcements for its units,

was not satisfactory. They felt that the

provision of replacements was a responsibility for the French zone of interior and so

advised the French General Staff. The

latter replied that the system could not be

changed as the zone of interior lacked adequate facilities and personnel to train both

Metropolitan Program units and replacements for 1st French Army.19

 Until the

end of hostilities, 1st French Army retained

its replacement system and, in an attempt

to meet requirements, even raised the number of its training centers from four to eight.

It must be noted that, in addition to these

army centers, there existed divisional training centers, one for each division, constituting pools of personnel from which reinforcements could be made readily available to the divisions.20

Meanwhile the launching of the Liberated Manpower and Metropolitan Programs had sharply increased the scope of

training activities and raised for the French

many difficult problems. Among these

were creation of new schools and camps,

rehabilitation of those few not utilized by

the Anglo-American forces, provision of

training personnel and matériel, and establishment of programs of instruction.

The training of security battalions and

labor groups constituted a relatively small

commitment, so it was made the responsibility of military region commanders. The

training of personnel recruited under the

Metropolitan Program, on the other hand,

represented a substantial undertaking. To

carry it out in an orderly and efficient manner, the French War Ministry put into effect

in late November 1944 a detailed procedure. Infantry, artillery, and armored instruction was given at basic level by the

military regions, at advanced level (for

specialists and cadres) in replacement training centers. Training for other branches,

(Engineer, Signal, Transportation, Antiaircraft Defense, Ordnance) was given at

recruit training centers. Initially, instructional matériel used was that then available

in France or in the centers formerly operating in North Africa. All centers,

whether recruit training or replacement

training, were under the control of the Ministry of War. Army training centers, meanwhile, remained under the direct control

of the Commanding General, 1st French

Army.21

In early December some consideration

was given by G-3, SHAEF, to the possibility of sending FFI personnel sufficient

for two divisions to the United States for

training. The project was abandoned, for

it involved too many difficulties and the

scope of the Metropolitan Program had not

yet been firmly determined.22 Similarly, in

March 1945, a proposal to organize courses

18

 Memo, Kingman for Loomis, 30 Dec 44,

SHAEF Mission to France 091.711-13 (Fr); Msg

L-18152, SOLOC to Loomis, 22 Dec 44, and

Memo, Regnault for Loomis, 21 Feb 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 400-3 (Fr). 19

 Memo, Lewis for Juin, 25 Feb 45, and

Ltr, Leyer to SHAEF, 5 Mar 45, SHAEF Mission

to France 091.711-13 (Fr); Ltr, Lewis to Leyer,

26 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France 353-1

Training. 20 Memo, SHAEF Mission to France for CG

COMZONE, 16 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France

353-1 Training.

21

 War Ministry Dir 1782 EMGG/4-1, 29 Nov

44, SHAEF Mission to France 320-2 NA Orgn of

French Army. 22

 Memo, ACofS G-3 for Reber, 18 Dec 44,

SHAEF G-3 091 France, Vol. IV.
390 REARMING THE FRENCH

in the United Kingdom for training French

personnel in the use of British equipment

was abandoned. Instead, the War Office

dispatched to France a detachment of instructors which was placed at the disposal

of General Kingman's Inspection Group.

In mid-April 1945, when the first three

divisions (the 1st, 10th, and 36th Infantry)

and some corps troops of the Metropolitan

Program had received a proportion of their

standard equipment, Generals Kingman

and Loomis worked out and put into effect

a detailed plan to assist the units in their

training. General Kingman arranged,

much as he had done in North Africa, to

detail to each of the divisions a U.S. senior

adviser, initially to serve as liaison between

Inspection Group and the division commander, later to determine the number of

instructors to be assigned to the training of

the division. The training program was primarily the responsibility of French instructors supplemented by U.S. and, where necessary, British instructors. It raised no more

problems than had the program established

earlier in North Africa since most of the personnel being called to the colors had had

prior military training. Hence, for most

of the troops the object of training was familiarization with new weapons more than

basic training In addition to detailing

teams of instructors to the three divisions,

General Kingman also assigned teams to

various French specialist centers and, incidentally, several to other western European Allied armies.23

Upon the dissolution of SHAEF in midJuly, the responsibility for assisting the

French in the technical training of their

forces was split between Inspection Group

of USFET Mission to France and the newly

created British Rearmament Division.

When U.S. deliveries of initial equipment,

already suspended since May, came definitely to a stop as a result of the cessation of

lend-lease aid, U.S. training assistance similarly was cut off. Only the three teams assigned to French divisions were allowed to

continue in operation until October, when

their mission was completed. French air

personnel no longer could be sent to the

United States for instruction. Several

training projects which the French wished

to continue or initiate, such as the dispatch

of students to airborne schools and centers

in the United Kingdom and the United

States, were turned down by the theater.

For all practical purposes, these were postwar projects and as such were matters to be

taken up by the French directly with the

War Department and the War Office.24

By 1 November 1945 all U.S. technical

training assistance to the French had been

terminated.

23

 Memos, Kingman for Regnault, 5 Mar 45,

Fullerton for Kingman, 14 Apr 45, and Capt David

H. K. Flagg for Kingman, 6 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France 353-1 Training; Memo, Loomis for

Leyer, 19 Apr 45, SHAEF Mission to France

091.711-1 (Fr). 24

 Ltr, Foreign Liaison Office WD to Maj Gen

Charles Luguet, 25 May 45, ABC 091.711 France

(12 Oct 43); Ltr, Juin to Lewis, Incl to Memo,

Lewis for CG USFET Main, 31 Aug 45, SHAEF

Mission to France 320-2 NA Orgn of Fr Army.
CHAPTER XXIV

French Plans for a Far East

Expeditionary Corps

From the earliest days of Franco-Allied

collaboration in North Africa, the French

military authorities entertained a strong desire to participate in operations in the Far

East, primarily for the purpose of liberating

Indochina which the Japanese had occupied

since July 1941. Their desire was legitimate, the more so considering they had

American assurances, given in November

1942, that French sovereignty would be reestablished "as rapidly as possible in all territories over which the French flag waved

in 1939,"1 and that French forces would

"aid the United Nations in restoring integrally the French Union."

 2

By the fall of 1943 the French desire had

crystallized and led to a decision by the National Defense Committee to organize,

equip, and train an expeditionary corps for

the Far East. On 20 October, when General Leyer submitted to AFHQ the over-all

armament requirements for the calendar

years 1944-45, he included a tabulation of

the matériel which he considered necessary

for the proposed corps.3 The corps, later

designated Corps Expéditionnaire Français

d'Extrême-Orient (CEFEO), was to include two brigades—one recruited in Madagascar, the other in West Africa—plus naval

and air units to be added, all to be ready by

the fall of 1944. Simultaneously, the

French representative in Washington, General Béthouart, handed General Marshall

a memorandum indicating the intention of

the French military authorities to petition

for representation in the Pacific War Council as they considered themselves "eminently

qualified to assist the allies in the preparation of operations with their own counsels."

 4

It was becoming increasingly evident that

the French were going to insist upon a decision both as to the principle and the extent

of their participation in the war in the Pacific. To determine a policy in this regard,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 2 November,

referred the various French notes on the

matter to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and to the Joint Staff Planners for

collaboration in preparing recommendations.5

If there remained any doubt as to the

French position and determination, the

doubt was soon dispelled once and for ail as

1 a result of a trivial incident involving a high- Ltr, Murphy to Giraud, 2 Nov 42, text in

Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 133. 2

 Preamble, Clark-Darlan Agreement, 22 Nov 42,

AFHQ 0100/5 CAO/320/1 MAEB. 3

 Ltr, Leyer to Loomis, 20 Oct 43, and Memo,

Loomis for CofS AFHQ, 29 Oct 43, JRC Misc Doc,

Item 5-b.

4

 Ltr and Memo, Béthouart to Marshall, 28 Oct

43, ASF Planning Div Files, A-47-192 Theater Br,

15-Fr Military NA. 5

 Memo, Handy for CofS, 4 Nov 43, OPD 336.2

France, Sec II.
392 REARMING THE FRENCH

ranking figure of the U.S. Government. In

a public statement which he delivered in

late December regarding the war in the

Pacific, Vice President Henry A. Wallace

made no mention of France when listing

the countries expected to take part in that

theater once Germany had been defeated.

Apprised of the fact, the French Committee

of National Liberation promptly directed

General Beynet in Washington to express

to General Marshall its "legitimate surprise" at an omission which it regarded

as "unfair . . . even if it did not represent

a definite stand." The committee did intend to wage war against the Japanese, who

now occupied a part of the French Union,

and it intended to do so with all its might

and will. The committee moreover wished

to remind the U.S. Chief of Staff of the

measures already taken by the French High

Command to organize an expeditionary

corps and of the requests for armament submitted earlier on behalf of the corps. Lacking a policy on which to base a firm answer

one way or another, General Marshall

merely acknowledged his satisfaction that

the CFLN was "so keenly aware of the requirements for forces in all theaters of

war."

 6

By May 1944 the French still had no

word from the War Department. The

British War Office, more responsive to the

French proposals, not only had promised

to help, but were already sending equipment, in limited quantities, to the Madagascar Brigade. The French had none with

which to outfit the other brigade then in

process of organization in North Africa.

At first they had planned to equip it with

British matériel withdrawn from the 1st

Motorized Infantry Division (1st DMI),

but at the request of AFHQ they were compelled to return a considerable part of this to

British stocks. Faced with a dilemma, the

French High Command on 4 May urged

General Wilson, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, to intervene

with Washington and London with a view

to obtaining the speedy equipping of the two

brigades. Ten weeks later AFHQ informed the French that the War Office had

agreed to deliver some additional matériel

including general-purpose vehicles, as well

as signal and radio equipment for five infantry battalions and one artillery group.7

As late as August 1944 no high-level decision had yet been communicated to the

French with respect to the major issue of the

problem, namely, whether or not they were

to participate in Far East operations, especially in Indochina. The fact was that

no decision had been reached because of

the divergent views held by American and

British statesmen. President Roosevelt was

reported to be increasingly opposed to a

return of the French in Indochina in the

belief that their administration of the colony

in the past had been a total failure.8 The

British Foreign Office, on the contrary,

considered French aspirations in the matter

with sympathy. They were prepared in

fact to grant a recent French request for

the accreditation of a French military mission to Headquarters, Southeast Asia Command, and the establishment in India of

some of the expeditionary troops already assembled in North Africa. Lord Halifax

sounded out the State Department on these

matters; Secretary Hull decided that, al6

 Ltrs, Beynet to Marshall, 26 Jan 44, and Marshall to Beynet, 12 Feb 44, OCS A-48-11 091

France, Sec II.

7

 Ltr, Béthouart to Wilson, 4 May 44, AFHQ

0100/12C G-3 Div Op Corres From the Fr; Memo,

Gammell for Béthouart, 14 Jul 44, AFHQ 0100/12C

G-3 Div Ops Fr Equip. 8

 The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, 1596-1601.
PLANS FOR A FAR EAST EXPEDITIONARY CORPS 393

though ostensibly military in character, they

had wide political implications. He then

referred them to President Roosevelt for

decision.9

By the time Paris had been liberated in

late August, the question was still in suspense, with the result that no plan was yet

in sight for the provision of equipment to

the CEFEO. General Loomis, chief of the

JRC, who had long been aware of French

efforts to organize their Far East corps,

had watched these efforts primarily because

of the possibility of diversion of U.S. equipment, as well as diversion of personnel, at

the expense of the units of the North African

rearmament program. As far as he had

been able to ascertain, the CEFEO was

made up of a headquarters company, two

brigades, and some supporting elements,

with a total actual strength possibly not

exceeding 1,300 men.10

No sooner had the French military authorities moved to Paris in September than

they reopened the Far East issue. Thus

far only the British had shown a definite

interest in their plans to the extent of beginning deliveries of matériel, but the attitude of American officials remained polite

and noncommittal. Militarily, Indochina,

the Far Eastern territory where the French

with their knowledge of the country could

be of most assistance, was in the China

theater of operations and, as such, in an

area of U.S. strategic responsibility. American strategy, however, did not contemplate

any operations in that territory. Politically,

President Roosevelt's apparent determination to keep French administration from

returning to Indochina constituted the

major stumbling block in the path of equipping a French expeditionary corps.11

As the liberation of France progressed

and the victorious outcome of the war in

Europe appeared a certainty, the French

once again focused their attention on what

they regarded as the next commitment of

their armed forces and renewed their attempts to obtain Anglo-American approval

of their participation in the Far East. First

they sounded out U.S. officials in Washington. Writing to Admiral King on 19 September 1944, Admiral Fénard, chief of the

French Naval Mission in the United States,

urged that serious consideration be given to

the employment of the French Navy in the

war against Japan, a war in which France

was "anxious to take her part."

 12

 Without waiting for a reply, Admiral Fénard, a

few days later, submitted a request for four

long-range submarines, a request promptly

turned down on the ground that no submarines were available in excess of U.S.

naval requirements.13

The French, meanwhile, were stepping

up preparations even to the extent of increasing the size of the expeditionary corps.

On 13 September the National Defense

Committee decided to create two divisions

in addition to the light task force (Corps

Leger d'Intervention) and the brigade

(Brigade d'Extrême-Orient) already activated. One division was to be of the U.S.

Marine Corps type, with a strength of from

17,000 to 20,000 men. The other was to

be of the British two-brigade type, with a

strength of 26,000 men. On 1 October

9

 Memo, State Department for President, 26 Aug

44. ABC 380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A. 10

 Memo, Loomis for G-3 AFHQ, 22 Sep 44,

JRC 370/001 Employment of Units—General.

11

 Memo, Gen Hull for Marshall, 14 Dec 44, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C; The Memoirs

of Cordell Hull, II, 1596-1601. 12

 Memo, Fénard for King, 19 Sep 44, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5. 13

 Memos, Fénard for King, 30 Sep 44, and King

for Fénard, 7 Oct 44, in same file.
394 REARMING THE FRENCH

General de Gaulle informed General Eisenhower that he intended to transfer to the

two divisions a large part of the 15,000

Negro troops then being withdrawn from

the 1st French Army in anticipation of the

cold season. Both new units were to be

assembled in southern France. If equipped,

they could be made ready by January and

March 1945 respectively.14 The augmented CEFEO was being placed under the

command of Lt. Gen. Roger Blaizot.

Apparently thinking that a direct approach to the War Department would speed

matters up, de Gaulle instructed the French

representative in Washington to broach the

subject to General Marshall. When he

called on the Chief of Staff on 22 October,

General de Saint-Didier submitted a memorandum outlining in great detail the National Defense Committee's plan and pressed

for an early decision.15 His memorandum

was then forwarded to the CCS, who in

turn handed it over to the Combined Staff

Planners for study and recommendations.

General Eisenhower already had communicated to the CCS his views regarding

the French proposal. The formation,

equipping, and maintenance of additional

divisions, with the attendant demand on

strained transportation facilities, were likely

to interfere with planned operations in

Europe by detracting from the main effort

of the 6th Army Group currently being supplied from French ports in southern France.

For these and other reasons, General

Eisenhower could not concur in the

proposal.16

In a report submitted to the CCS on 29

November the Combined Staff Planners,

fully supporting the Supreme Commander's opinion, recommended that the

French request be rejected. They could

not see the value of the proposed divisions

in the light of current Allied strategy in the

Far East; nor could they agree to providing

the necessary shipping and equipment at

the expense of U.S. and British forces.17

By then, President Roosevelt had been

informed that a large French military mission headed by General Blaizot had arrived

in Ceylon where it was said to have received

American approval and official recognition,

with the same status as other Allied missions

to the Southeast Asia Command. In a

memorandum to Navy Secretary James V.

Forrestal dated 17 November, the President directed that no American approval

be given to any French mission being accredited to that command and that no U.S.

military or civilian representatives be authorized to make decisions on political questions with the mission or with anyone else.18

Six weeks later Roosevelt reiterated his position in a memorandum to the State Department. He still did not want to "get

mixed up" in any Indochina decision, nor

did he want to get mixed up "in any effort

toward the liberation of Indo-China from

the Japanese." He had made this clear to

Mr. Churchill. Action at this juncture

was, in his opinion, premature from both

the military and civil point of view.19

With regard to U.S. material assistance

to the Resistance forces, French and native, 14

 Ltr, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 1 Oct 44, SHAEF

G-3 091 France, Vol. III. 15

 Memo, de Saint-Didier for Marshall, 20 Oct

44, ABC 380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A. 16

 Msgs SCAF 106, Eisenhower to CCS, 16 Oct

44, and SCAF 117, Eisenhower to CCS, 1 Nov 44,

in same file.

17

 Rpt, CPS to CCS, CPS 147/1, 29 Nov 44,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 44), Sec 2-B. 18

 Memo, President for Forrestal, 17 Nov 44, ABC

380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A. 19

 Memo, Stettinius for Forrestal, 11 Jan 45, ABC

384 Indochina (16 Dec 44).
PLANS FOR A FAR EAST EXPEDITIONARY CORPS 395

engaged in guerrilla operations against the

Japanese on Indochinese territory, the

President already had ruled out such aid.20

Not until February 1945 would he modify

somewhat his position on the matter and

agree to extend help to the underground

in Indochina. And even then such aid

would be extended provided that it did not

interfere with planned operations in the

area, that it would be limited to what was

necessary for the defeat of the Japanese

forces, and that it would not be construed

as an official U.S. recognition of the French

interests in Indochina.21

In mid-December Admiral Fénard, still

without reply to his long communication of

19 September, submitted a letter, this time

directly to the CCS, setting forth the views

of his government concerning the conditions

under which French land, sea, and air forces

could bring the maximum possible assistance

to the Allied forces engaged against Japan.

Significantly, he made no reference to Indochina and even emphasized the French

Government's agreement that whatever

French forces the Combined Chiefs chose to

employ against Japan would be utilized by

them in whatever way they deemed best.

Appended to the letter were five memorandums, one of which was a copy of General de Saint-Didier's communication of 20

October, also still unanswered.22

In the replies which they addressed first

to General de Saint-Didier on 4 January

1945 and a few days later to Admiral

Fénard, the CCS expressed their deep appreciation of the "generous offers" to assign

French forces to operations in the Far East.

But because of considerable logistical commitments in Europe, they were compelled

to forego the diversion at this juncture of

critically needed equipment and shipping

for use by such forces. Nor could they determine at present the time when it would

be feasible to employ them in the Far East.23

In the belief that the operational situation

in western Europe had sufficiently improved

during the month of December to warrant

a re-examination of the question, Admiral

Fénard, on 19 January 1945, again approached the CCS. He requested, as an

initial step toward the program "to which

the French Government had pledged itself,"

the supply of equipment for use in the training of a Marine division to be formed from

colonial infantry troops. The division could

be used "under American command in any

operational theater where Marine forces

were in action." The Joint Logistics Committee examined the proposal and concluded that the reasons which had prompted

a refusal to equip new French divisions for

the Far East applied equally to the provision

of training matériel. The United States,

the JLC pointed out, had just undertaken to

equip eight more divisions under the recently approved Metropolitan Program and

could accept no further commitments. Endorsing the recommendations of the committee, the CCS informed Admiral Fénard

on 28 March that, as Allied resources had

been further taxed by the sharply increased

requirements of the war against Germany

"as evidenced by the new Metropolitan and

20

 The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, 1598. 21

 Memos, Gen Hull for Wedemeyer, 9 Feb 45,

and McFarland for Marshall, 13 Mar 45, Msg WX55402, Wedemeyer to Chennault, 19 Mar 45, and

other papers, in F.I.C. Book I, China Theater

Files, DRB AGO. 22

 Memo, Fénard for CCS, 18 Doc 44, ABC 380

France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A.

28

 Ltr, CCS to de Saint-Didier, 4 Jan 45, ABC

380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A; Ltr, CCS to

Fénard, 10 Jan 45, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct

43), Sec 5.
396 REARMING THE FRENCH

Liberated Manpower programs," his request could not be met.24

Still determined to carry out their plans,

the French reopened the issue in April, when

the cessation of hostilities in Europe appeared to be near at hand. The French

Government, Admiral Fénard explained to

the CCS, believed that the time was ripe

to reach a decision on the proposal to equip

two divisions. The units were ready to be

put at the disposal of the CCS "to be used

wherever they would think it advisable"

against the Japanese.25

No action on the matter had been taken

when, a week after the armistice in Europe,

General Juin, then on a visit to the United

States, called on various officials to discuss

French military problems. In the course

of the interview which he held with General Marshall, General Juin raised the question of France's participation in the war

against Japan. The U.S. Chief of Staff

could give him no encouragement. The

matter, he explained, would have to be decided "on the highest levels." His own

view was that the matériel and shipping

necessary to equip and transport two divisions to the Pacific war front could not

be spared until after the defeat of Japan

when it would be too late. The United

States, he pointed out, had sufficient welltrained and battle-tested troops to defeat

Japan alone, "although it would prove difficult and costly." Furthermore, it might

well be that there would be no need to fight

in Indochina as it was his opinion that the

Japanese would evacuate the area so as to

concentrate their forces in north China to

meet a Red Army advance.26

General Juin's conversation with Admiral Leahy offered a slight ray of hope.

Leahy first questioned him about the recent

Stuttgart incident in which a French commander had refused to comply with orders

from his American superior. General Juin

assured him that there would be no repetition of such a situation. In this connection

he intended to make it clear to General de

Gaulle that French divisions would be accepted by the Allied command for action

in the Pacific only if their disposition remained "wholly a U.S. function." Admiral Leahy declared that, under these conditions, he was prepared to recommend to

the American members of the CCS that

they approve the French proposal. He

added that the final decision rested with the

heads of governments and that any ultimate

agreement would have to be reached between them.27

A week later, on 18 May, Foreign Affairs

Minister Georges Bidault, also on a visit to

the United States, called on the President.

Mr. Truman signified his acceptance in principle of French participation in the Far

East, but carefully indicated that the determination of whether or not such participation would be practicable and helpful

would be left to General Douglas MacArthur, the Allied commander in the Pacific.

Elaborating on the President's statement,

State Department officials made it clear to

Mr. Bidault that the question was to be

judged on its military merits, and that General MacArthur would decide "just how

24 much and where" the French contribution Ltr, Fénard to CCS, 19 Jan 45, and Memo,

CCS for Fénard, 28 Mar 45, ABC 091.711 France

(6 Oct 43), Sec 2-C; Memo, Craig, JLC, for

Handy, 6 Feb 45, OCS A-48-1 091 France. 25

 Memo, Fénard for CCS, 7 Apr 45, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 5.

26

 Min Mtg, Marshall with Juin, 11 May 45,

ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D. 27

 Min Interv, Juin with Leahy, 11 May 45, ABC

091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec 2-D.
PLANS FOR A FAR EAST EXPEDITIONARY CORPS 397

could be best utilized. Such was the tenor

of a message which General Marshall addressed to General MacArthur. In it the

Chief of Staff outlined the French offer of

four air squadrons and a corps of two divisions with supporting combat and service

units to be commanded by General Leclerc.

"The French," he pointed out in conclusion,

"have, when well led and where political

considerations were not involved, fought

well in this war."28

General MacArthur replied that he had

the greatest admiration for the fighting qualities of the French and would be glad to

include in his command the corps offered

by them. He felt that because of language

and other difficulties, the French divisions,

if used, should be employed with the reinforcement echelons, just as was contemplated for the Canadians, and not in the

initial stages of operations. As for the air

squadrons, he considered that the introduction so late in the campaign of units of nonEnglish speaking personnel would run

counter to the intimate co-ordination and

teamwork so essential in operations. For

these reasons, he urged that the offer of air

squadrons be declined.29

General Eisenhower also had been requested by General Marshall to submit his

views on the French proposal. In his reply, he first commented on the composition

of the corps. The French were offering the

9th Colonial Infantry (9th DIC), commanded by Brig. Gen. Jean Valluy, and the

1st Colonial Infantry (1st DIC), commanded by Brig. Gen. Georges Nyo, the two

divisions to be placed under General Leclerc

as corps commander. The Supreme Commander pointed out that only the 9th DIC

was suitable, the other division being a

newly created organization which had no

combat experience. As a second division he

suggested the 3d Algerian Infantry commanded by Maj. Gen. Augustin Guillaume,

which had distinguished itself in Italy,

France, and Germany. He also recommended that Maj. Gen. Marcel Carpentier

 30

 be named corps commander. Turning to the more important issue, that of the

manner in which the proposed corps should

be employed, General Eisenhower urged

that a detailed written agreement be negotiated beforehand with the French Government covering all major aspects of the question. He recommended, among the points

to be agreed upon, that the organization

and equipping of units be made to conform

to U.S. tables of organization and equipment; that a firm troop list providing a selfsufficient corps be drawn, and a sound replacement program established; that the

corps be placed under complete operational

control of the U.S. commander; and that its

supply and maintenance be effected on the

same basis as for U.S. forces.31

No more valuable commentary could

have been furnished those officials of the

War Department then engaged in planning

for the introduction of French forces in the

Pacific theater. It represented a comprehensive policy, established on the basis of

experience, which, if followed, would tend

to prevent a recurrence of the often difficult

problems raised in the course of some two

and a half years in connection with the rearmament and deployment of the French.

In a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Smith amplified the Supreme Com28

 Msg W-10226, Marshall to MacArthur, 1 Jun

45, ABC 380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A. 29

 Msg C-17621, MacArthur to Marshall, 2 Jun

45, in same file.

30

 CofS, CEF, in Italy; CofS, 1st French Army,

until 15 Sep 44; CG, 2d DIM, from 25 Nov 44 to

12 Apr 45. 31

 Msg FWD 24298, Eisenhower to Marshall, 9

Jun 45, ABC 380 France (7 Aug 44), Sec 1-A.
398 REARMING THE FRENCH

mander's comments, urging in particular

that the detailed written agreement with the

French be executed on a governmental level

with copies furnished to the interested commanders.32

 This insistence regarding a firm

agreement was no doubt the result of the

unfortunate recurrence, in the first days of

June, of the situation in which a French

commander had refused to comply with

orders from his American superior. At

that time the possibility of a clash between

French and Allied troops in northwestern

Italy had caused President Truman

promptly to order a complete stoppage of

issue of matériel to the French. When

Ambassador Bonnet called on Assistant Secretary of War McCloy on 13 June, his first

words were to confirm that a satisfactory

agreement had just been reached in the

matter. Broaching the question of the expeditionary forces for the Far East, he declared that French officials were prepared

to give "any assurances that were required"

that these forces would have no relationship

to Indochina and that they would fight

under an American command wherever decided by the latter.33

On 26 June General de Saint-Didier once

again appealed to the Combined Chiefs and

urged them to reach a decision so that preparations and training could get under way.

He emphasized that further delay was harmful to the morale of the troops, who, with the

full support of the nation, had eagerly

awaited for several months their opportunity to participate in the Far East operations

against the common enemy. Then on 6

July General de Saint-Didier informed General Marshall of the steps already being

taken with regard to the setting up of the expeditionary corps. Without waiting for the

American command to make known its desires in the matter of supporting units, the

War Ministry, he declared, was in process

of activating and training a number of such

units. The corps, as currently planned,

would total 62.000 men, all volunteers and

all white.34

President Truman's directive of 5 July,

limiting thereafter the issue of war matériel

to Allied governments to that which was

to be used in the war against Japan, gave

the French a slight ray of hope that their

project might still come to realization.

What was required was a policy statement

from the CCS. With events now moving

swiftly in the Far East, and with the prospect

that far-reaching decisions would be taken

at the Potsdam Conference then opening,

the fate of the French proposal was hanging

by a thread. On 19 July the CCS finally

took action. They agreed, and so notified

the French, that they accepted in principle

their offer of a corps on the understanding

that (1) the corps would serve under U.S.

or British command, in an area to be determined later; (2) final acceptance of the

corps would involve an agreement with the

governments concerned on basic matters including command, combat efficiency, replacements, and logistical support; (3)

maximum use would be made of equipment

delivered under the North African and

Metropolitan Programs; (4) because of

pressing shipping and other requirements,

it would not be possible to commit the corps

to operations before the spring of 1946.35

While pleased with the CCS acceptance

32

 Ltr, Smith to JCS, 9 Jun 45, in same file. 33

 Memo, McCloy for Marshall, 14 Jun 45, in

same file.

34

 Memos, de Saint-Didier for Leahy for CCS, 26

Jun 45, and de Saint-Didier for Marshall, 6 Jul 45,

in same file. 35

 Min, CCS 196th Mtg, 19 Jul 45, and Memo,

CCS for de Saint-Didier, 19 Jul 45, ABC 380 France

(7 Aug 44), Sec 1-B.
PLANS FOR A FAR EAST EXPEDITIONARY CORPS 399

in principle, the French, through General

de Saint-Didier, promptly pointed out that

to equip the corps with matériel in the hands

of North African and Metropolitan Program divisions would not be satisfactory.

For one reason, a large part of this equipment had deteriorated both during the campaigns in Italy, France, and Germany and

since then as a result of the presidential

order of 8 May stopping the further issue of

maintenance. In addition, the French

Army needed its present equipment to continue operating in occupied Germany.36

There the matter rested. It had made

no progress by 2 September, the day of the

Japanese surrender. With the armistice,

nearly three years of fruitless negotiations

were coming to an end. A few days later

the CCS informed General de Saint-Didier

that they did not intend to take further action on his last memorandum, and that military problems relating to the area of the

Southeast Asia Command thereafter were

to be taken up directly with the British

Chiefs of Staff in London.37 The question

of the return of the French to Indochina,

still unsolved, was now clearly a matter for

the decision of the governments. More

than that, it was a postwar problem.38

36

 Memo, de Saint-Didier for CCS, 3 Aug 45, in

same file.

37

 Memo, CCS for de Saint-Didier, 13 Sep 45, in

same file. 38

 For an account of the political and military

problems arising in Indochina in the immediate

postwar period, see History of U.S. Forces in China

Theater, Ch. XV, MS in OCMH Files.
Conclusion

The rehabilitation of the French armed

forces in World War II constitutes an unprecedented achievement if one considers

the results attained in relation to the difficulties encountered. The undertaking had

one aim—to enable the resurgent military

power to assume as large a share as possible

of the United Nations' war effort against

the Axis. On this there was complete

agreement between the three parties directly involved: the French themselves,

whose position made them entirely dependent on outside assistance; the British,

who initiated the rehabilitation process

when they equipped the Free French; and

the Americans, who rearmed the North

African forces and, along with the British,

supplied first the Resistance groups operating underground on French soil, then

the forces of liberated France.

The first major difficulty arose with the

re-entry of French North Africa into the

war, when the three partners disagreed as

to the extent of rehabilitation. The French,

understandably, wanted the greatest number of their troops equipped and readied

for combat and this as speedily as possible.

The Americans, while sympathetic with

this ambition, reasoned that only those

units should be rearmed that could be made

self-sustaining in combat. The British,

while they bore only a small portion of the

burden of rearming the French, shared with

the Americans control of allocation of matériel to all United Nations forces, and in

this capacity objected that too large a program would cut across existing commitments—such as those made to the USSR

and China—and interfere with the planned equipping of U.S. and U.K. forces.

With both the Americans and the British

standing firm on their respective positions,

the French had no alternative but to scale

down their initial expectations and let their

rearmament proceed at a pace determined

by global demands for implements of war.

Such was the basis on which the successive

rearmament programs were established and

carried out. Still the French continued to

press for fuller re-establishment of their national military power.

The diversity of the forces re-equipped,

each with its respective needs, constituted

a serious hindrance. Some were Free

French; others, the majority, were the forces

raised in North Africa. A large proportion were natives, with distinctive language,

habits, and physical constitution. To complicate matters, the bulk of the troops

emerged outside their national home base

and therefore lacked the logistical support

normally provided by a zone of interior.

Difficulties were multiplied by temporary

or permanent deficiencies of one sort or

another. The language barrier was one

problem. Others arose from differences in

customs, dietary habits, and clothing tariff

sizes, especially where non-European troops

were involved. Most acute were shortages

of various kinds: of Allied shipping, of port

facilities for receiving, stocking, and distributing equipment; and of French technical personnel necessary to man depots, repair shops, and base units and to provide

combat and service support troops. Then

there was the lack of familiarity on the part

of the French with the newer weapons and

with American technology and working
CONCLUSION 401

methods. For these or other reasons the

French were persistently reluctant to accept

fully the importance of logistics and by the

same token found themselves excessively

dependent on American logistical support in

combat. The reluctance was so persistent

as to suggest that the French Army had

forgotten, or not learned, the importance

of logistics in a period in which logistics

had become more than ever vital to the

effective conduct of war.

But the difficulties, seemingly insuperable at first, were overcome, one by one, by

dint of good will and mutual respect, hard

work, and an unflagging determination to

complete the assigned task. In record time

a sizable French force was equipped,

trained, and put in battle on land, in the

air, and on the sea. While this force never

succeeded in becoming self-sustaining and

the U.S. Army was compelled to provide

a large part of the necessary support, once

in combat it proved to be highly effective

and its contribution to final victory was impressive.

The War Department furnished equipment to the French largely through theater

transfers (66 percent) and Commanding

General Shipments (33 percent), and a

small proportion (1 percent) through direct shipments, that is, by ships flying the

French tricolor. All items delivered,

whether initial equipment, combat maintenance supplies, or petrol, oil, and lubricants, were charged to the French lendlease account for settlement at the end of

the war.

At first deliveries were made on the basis

of units to be equipped under approved rearmament programs, the French themselves

being responsible for distribution as they

saw fit. Later the system was revised to

give the U.S. commanding general in the

theater complete control over the distribution process, and units were furnished equipment only after they were fully activated.

Thus American management followed

American matériel. Once the units were

equipped, U.S. personnel provided the necessary technical training in the use, care, and

maintenance of matériel.

In terms of units and men, the United

States furnished full initial equipment as

well as complete maintenance for 8 divisions

and 300 supporting units raised in North

Africa, a total of 250,000 men. It provided partial equipment (approximately

one third of the table of organization and

equipment) and all the maintenance on the

equipment issued for 3 more divisions and

some 40 supporting units activated in continental France and totaling about 50,000

men. The United States also furnished

full equipment for 19 air squadrons and 60

supporting units representing another

20,000 men. It carried out an extensive

repair and refitting program for the French

Navy. To Sovereignty and Territorial

forces in North Africa, numbering over

200,000 men, it furnished old clothing, construction materials and machinery, and certain expendable supplies. Finally, the

United States provided rations for all effectives re-equipped under the various armament programs (approximately 360,000 as

of 1 March 1945). All together these commitments represented about 3,250,000

measurement tons. To draw up a detailed

schedule of the myriad individual items

furnished by the United States would serve

no useful purpose. By way of illustration,

however, a list of selected items is given in

Table 5.1

1

 Memo, Craig for Marshall, 9 May 45, OPD

336.2 France, Sec IV-A; Memo, Loomis for CG

USFET, 23 Aug 45, SHEAF Mis Fr 320-NA Org

of Fr Army.
402 REARMING THE FRENCH

TABLE 5—MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

FURNISHED BY THE UNITED STATES TO

THE FRENCH FORCES

In terms of dollar value (value at the time

of delivery), the supplies and services furnished by the United States to the French

Army, Air Force, and Navy have been estimated at about $1,527,000,000, $457,000,-

000, and $310,000,000, respectively, or a

total of $2,294,000,000. Of the total, the

War Department furnished $2,039,474,000;

the remainder, representing items such as

vessels and special supplies, was furnished

by the Foreign Economic Administration;

Comparative figures show that France came

third in the list of recipients of War Department lend-lease shipments and transfers:

 2

In addition the United States furnished

the French civilian economy, up to V-J Day,

supplies representing another $548,000,000.

Thus, for the period 11 November 1941

(when the benefits of lend-lease were first

extended to the French) to 2 September

1945 (V-J Day), the total French military

and civilian lend-lease account amounted

to approximately $2,842,000,000.3 The

account for the immediate postwar period

of September 1945 to September 1946

amounted to a further $391,000,000. The

French, in return, made available to the

U.S. armed forces as reciprocal aid goods

and services amounting to $868,000,000.

By agreement reached in Washington on

2

 Theodore E. Whiting et al., Statistics, a volume

in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II. Lend-Lease. MS in OCMH. 3

 Unsuccessful efforts were made to obtain from

the British War Office statistics on the British contribution to French rearmament. The only figures

available are those published by the French Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs in "Le PrêtBail et l'Aide Réciproque Franco-Alliée," Notes et

Etudes Documentaires (Paris, 2 and 3 November

1949), which states that the French received from

the United Kingdom supplies and services estimated at approximately $435,000,000, and from

Canada matériel to the amount of $25,000,000.
CONCLUSION 403

28 May 1946, the governments of the

United States and France disposed of the

accounts for lend-lease and reciprocal aid

and settled all outstanding claims arising out

of the conflict. After credit for $232,000,-

000 already paid by France during the war

years for goods supplied through lend-lease

procedures, the settlement figure stood at

$420,000,000, subject to some adjustment

to cover additional post-V-J Day transactions. Such was the sum which France

agreed to pay, with interest at 2 percent,

beginning 1 July 1951.4

All things considered, America received

good value for the money and effort it expended in rearming the French, a value

difficult to assess in quantitative terms but

none the less real. True, the undertaking

posed a host of baffling problems, which absorbed the attention of countless persons.

But it made it possible for the United States

to reduce its outlay of combat manpower in

the Mediterranean and European theaters

by eight to ten divisions and nineteen air

squadrons, possibly more, considering that

American troops used in lieu of the French

would have been relatively inexperienced.

By the same token, the U.S. forces incurred

fewer losses in these two theaters. There

the French themselves suffered, from the

beginning of the Tunisian campaign to the

end of the war in Europe, losses estimated

for the ground forces alone at 23,500 killed

and 95,500 wounded in action.5

Without American assistance in World

War II, it is unlikely that France would

have assumed its present important position in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European Union,

so vital to American policy. American insistence on French self-reliance in supply

matters definitely consolidated the French

position. Whereas in 1943-44 this insistence was construed by some French military

men as a manifestation of unreasonable

autocracy, in postwar years it was referred

to as a blessing in disguise For, it was

then argued, had the French Army not been

compelled to organize its supply services

properly, what would its prospects of survival have been in May 1945 when, with

the cessation of hostilities in Europe, it

found itself suddenly cut off from further

U.S. assistance and left to its own devices?

As it was, it had forged, albeit the hard way,

an adequate if not perfect maintenance and

4

 Memorandum of Understanding Between the

French and U.S. Governments, signed by Léon

Blum and James F. Byrnes, 28 May 46, in files of

Department of State. "French Lend-Lease Settlement," Twenty-Third Report to the Congress on

Lend-Lease Operations, H. Doc. 41, 80th Cong., 1st

Sess., January 3, 1947. For subsequent revisions

of the settlement figure to cover all post-V-J Day

transactions, see Twenty-Eighth Report to the Congress on Lend-Lease Operations, H. Doc. 263, 81st

Cong., 1st Sess., July 18, 1949, and Thirty-Second

Report to the Congress on Lend-Lease Operations,

H. Doc. 227, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., October 3, 1951.

5

 Casualties (deaths only) incurred by the French

armed forces during the entire 1939-45 period are

estimated as follows:

*Excepting the 1,200 casualties suffered by "Armistice Army"

units in the course of operations against Allied forces (Syria, JunJul 41; Northwest Africa, Nov 42).

**No breakdown available.

Source: Lt. Col. P. Santini, "Etude statistique sur les pertes au

cours de la guerre 1939-1945," Revue du Corps de Santé Militaire, X,

No. 1 (March, 1954).
404 REARMING THE FRENCH

supply machinery. The advantages it had

gained in so doing were such as to make it

unlikely it would soon forget the techniques, not to mention the "jargon of the

trade," learned from the American Army

in the formative years of 1943-44.6

Far more important, of course, is that the

American undertaking made it possible for

the French armed forces to regain the honored position they had long occupied but

momentarily lost. True, the small band

of General de Gaulle's followers had kept

the French flag flying high during the dark

months which followed the June 1940 armistice. But only a large-scale re-entry of

the French into the common struggle, as

took place in mid-November 1942, could

regain for them the esteem of the Allies

and a place among the democratic nations

of the world.

Seen in retrospect, French participation

in the major campaigns of northwest Africa and Europe underwent definite

changes. In a sense, the Tunisian campaign proved to be the testing ground for

French loyalty and French determination

to fight. Engaged in battle on greatly unequal terms, French troops achieved only

limited military objectives. But they succeeded in winning American confidence, in

overcoming British skepticism, and in restoring faith in themselves. These intangible gains, more than actual victories, amply

justified the large investments in matériel

and effort then being made on their behalf

by the United States.

The Italian campaign was the testing

ground for French ability to make the fullest use of modern weapons in combat. Then

fighting on equal terms, the French quickly

demonstrated that they possessed this ability

and moreover could match a formidable

enemy. Their achievements were such, in

fact, as to convince the Americans that

the rearmament program, then in progress,

must be completed without delay.

The campaign of France and Germany

marked the end of the testing period and

the beginning of a new phase: the rebirth

of France as a military power. The new

French Army, proud of its equipment and

of its skill in the use of modern weapons,

and determined to give the full measure of

its will to fight, had reached the stature of

a full-fledged, independent force. Side by

side, Americans and French marched forward, along with the other Allies, to reap

the fruits of victory. Side by side, today,

they stand ready to defend the free world.

6

 Interv with Col de Beaumont, Jul 50; with Gen

Regnault, 50.
Bibliographical Note

Rearming the French is based almost entirely on documents now in the possession

of the Department of the Army. These

sources have been supplemented by documents made available by the French Service

Historique de l'Armée, by interviews with

American and French officers who participated in the rearmament operations and by

documents from the latter, by published

memoirs and histories, and finally by detailed comments on the manuscript by persons mentioned in the volume.

Primary Sources

I

The two most important single collections of documents used in the preparation

of this volume are those of the Allied Force

Headquarters (AFHQ) and Supreme

Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

(SHAEF). From these collections must

be singled out, respectively, the files of the

Joint Rearmament Committee (JRC) and

those of the Rearmament Division of

SHAEF Mission to France. Both of these

files include letters, cables, memorandums,

reports, minutes of conferences, plans,

drafts of plans, and miscellaneous papers.

Details of high-level planning on French

rearmament are based largely on the formal

record of the wartime proceedings of the

Combined Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Joint

Chiefs of Staff. This record contains

minutes of their meetings, together with

papers embodying the proposals which they

formally considered. The record also includes minutes of the plenary conferences

presided over by President Roosevelt and

Prime Minister Churchill. War Department records contain message files of cables

and letters between the CCS and JCS and

the Supreme Commander, between the War

Department and the North African and

European theaters, and between Allied

commanders and Allied planners. Supplementing these are letters and cables exchanged by General Marshall and General

Eisenhower.

The author also has drawn on documents

made available by the Service Historique de

l'Armée and by French officers who took

an active part in the rearmament operations.

The sources have been supplemented by

interviews conducted by the author with

French and American officers in the period

1948-55. (See list at end of bibliographical note.)

II

The principal document collections used

in this volume are as follows:

ABC files. A collection kept by the Strategy and Policy Group of OPD (q.v.).

AFHQ files. Records of Allied Force

Headquarters. The collection consists

of separate files for each of the general

and special staff sections. For the present work the richest file is that of the

JRC, the section most directly concerned

with the rearmament of the North African forces. The files are held by the

Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant

General's Office. (DRB AGO.)
406 REARMING THE FRENCH

ASF files. Especially important on the subject of French rearmament are the International Division files, the Planning

Division files, and the Somervell file.

Among the records of the International

Division are the minutes and papers of

the Munitions Assignments Committee

(Ground) and a virtually complete file

of those of the Munitions Assignments

Board. Located in DRB AGO.

CCS. Combined Chiefs of Staff papers

and minutes of meetings. All of these

may be found in the OPD collection

(q.v.). The collection includes memorandums, reports, and copies of cables and

letters prepared by the British or U.S.

Chiefs of Staff or their subordinate agencies. Minutes of the meetings are not

stenographic. Notes were kept by British

and U.S. secretaries. The minutes in

final form were specifically and individually approved by each of the Combined

Chiefs.

C/S file. Contains documents from wartime files of the Office of the Chief of

Staff, War Department. Now held as a

separate collection by Departmental Records Branch, AGO.

ETO file. Files of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

(ETOUSA). Now held by Organizational Records Branch, Records Administration Center, AGO.

JCS. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff papers and

minutes of their conferences. Copies of

all JCS documents cited can be found

in OPD files (q.v.). The JCS collection is located in G-3 Records, Department of the Army.

JPS. Joint Staff Planners (U.S.) papers

and minutes of meetings. Copies of JPS

documents are in OPD ABC files, which

include in most cases not only the planners' final memorandums, but OPD

drafts, discussions, and working papers.

JWPC. Joint War Planning Committee

(U.S.) papers, many of which were reissued as JPS or JCS documents. All

documents cited are in OPD files.

NATO USA and MTO USA files. Files of

Headquarters, North African Theater of

Operations, U.S. Army, and Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S.

Army, respectively. Now held by Organizational Records Branch, Records

Administration Center, AGO.

OCMH files. A miscellaneous collection

containing documents prepared or collected by the author or members of the

Office of the Chief of Military History

staff. Some of the material cited in this

volume consists of interviews, answers by

former members of French and U.S. staffs

to special questionnaires, and certain

French documents not found in U.S. files.

OPD files. Collection of cables and papers

of the Operations Division, War Department. The division at present is a part

of the G-3 Division.

SHAEF files. Records of the Supreme

Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary

Force. One of the basic sources for this

volume. The collection consists of separate files for each of the general and

special staff sections. For the present

work the richest file is that of the Rearmament Division of the SHAEF Mission to

France, the division most directly concerned with the supply of war matériel

to the French Metropolitan Forces. Files

are held by DRB AGO.

WD Cable files. A large collection of cables

which cleared through the War Depart-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 407

ment Message Center, filed by date in

incoming and outgoing books.

Secondary Sources

Unpublished preliminary historical

studies by Army, Navy, and Air Force

historians:

Hq, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

The History of MAAF: December 1943-

1 September 1944; Vol. II. April 1945.

AAF Hist Office Archives.

Hq MAAF, The French Air Force in

MAAF, A Preliminary History, 1945, copy

in AAF Hist Office Archives.

Role joué par les Forces Françhises de

l'Intérieur pendant l'occupation de la

France avant et après le débarquement du

6 Juin 1944. Commandant Rogé, Service

Historique de l'Armée, Section Etudes, 21

May 1946. Copy in OCMH.

Fifth Army History (in nine volumes) :

5 January-6 October 1943; 1 April-4 June

1944: Part I, From Activation to Fall of

Naples; Part V, The Drive to Rome. DRB

AGO.

History of Allied Force Headquarters

and Headquarters, NATOUSA: Part

Three, December 1943-July 1944. Copy

in OCMH.

AFHQ Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch.

North African Campaign: 1942-1943.

Copy in OCMH.

History of Allied Force Headquarters,

Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

Copy in OCMH.

Resume des Operations de Réarmement.

Undated and unsigned. Original provided

by Maj. Gen. Paul Devinck. Copy in

French Records File 218, OCMH.

Hq, Peninsular Base Section, Naples.

History of the Peninsular Base Section,

North African Theater of Operations,

United States Army: Vol II, Covering the

Period 28 August 1943 to 31 January 1944.

Copy in OCMH.

International Div, ASF. Lend-Lease as

of September 30, 1945. Copy in OCMH.

The French Forces of the Interior, a

1,500-page history prepared in the European Theater of Operations under the direction of Col. S. L. A. Marshall by Capt.

Lucien Galimand, Capt. Marcel Vigneras,

Maj. R. A. Bourne-Paterson, Capt. Harry

S. Griffiths, and Lt. Louis Kervran, based

on documents of the French Resistance and

the Allied agencies dealing with these forces.

Copy in OCMH.

Dunham, H. H. U.S. Army Transportation and the Conquest of North Africa,

1942-43. OCT HB Monograph 9, Jan

45, OCT HB.

Mathews, Sidney T. The Drive on

Rome, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II.

Published Sources

World War I

Ayres, Col. Leonard P., Chief of Statistics

Branch of the General Staff. The War

With Germany: A Statistical Summary.

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919.

Chambrun, Col. Jacques de, and Capt.

Charles de Marenches. The American

Army in the European Conflict. New

York: The Macmillan Company, 1919.

Clarkson, Grosvenor B. Industrial America in the World War. Boston and New

York: Houghton Mifflin Company,

1923.
408 REARMING THE FRENCH

Crowell, Benedict. America's Munitions:

1917-1918. Washington: Government

Printing Office, 1919.

Crowell, Benedict, and Robert Forrest Wilsom. The Armies of Industry, I, Our

Nation's Manufacture of Munitions for

a World in Arms: 1917-1918 New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1921.

Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff. Organization of the Services

of Supply, American Expeditionary

Forces. Monograph 7. Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1921.

Historical Division, Department of the

Army. UNITED STATES ARMY IN

THE WORLD WAR: 1917-1919,III,

Training and Use of American Units

With British and French. Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1948.

Historical Division, Department of the

Army. UNITED STATES ARMY IN

THE WORLD WAR: 1917-1919,

XIV, Reports of Commander-in-Chief,

A.E.F., Staff Sections and Services.

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948.

Military Board of Allied Supply. Report

of the Military Board of Allied Supply.

Washington: Government Printing

Office, 1924.

Pershing, John J. My Experiences in the

World War. New York: Frederick A.

Stokes Company, 1931. 2 vols.

————. General Pershing's Story of the

American Army in France; Report of

General Pershing to the Secretary of War,

November 20, 1918. New York: John

H. Eggers Company, Inc., 1919.

Réquin, Lt. Col. Edouard. America's

Race to Victory. With Introduction

by General Peyton C. March, Chief of

Staff, U.S. Army. New York: Frederick

A. Stokes Company, 1919.

World War II

Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold

R. L. G. The Allied Armies in Italy

From 3rd September 1943, to 12th December 1944. London: His Majesty's

Stationery Office, 1950.

Arnold, General H. H. Global Mission.

New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.

Bajot, [Admiral] Pierre. Le débarquement

du 8 Novembre 1942 en Afrique du Nord.

Paris: J. de Gigord, 1948.

Bouscat, General René. "L'Armée de l'Air

française dans la Campagne d'Italie,"

Revue de la Defense Nationale (February, 1946.

Butcher, Capt. Harry C. My Three Years

With Eisenhower. New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1946.

Carpentier, General Marcel. Les Forces

Alliées en Italie; la Campagne d'ltalie.

Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949.

Clark, General Mark W. Calculated

Risk. New York: Harper & Brothers,

1950.

Maj. Gen. Coudraux, [Henri]. La Base

d'Opérations 901 dans la Bataille pour la

Liberation de la France, 1944-1945.

Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1947.

Crusoë. Vicissitudes d'une Victoire.

Paris: Les Editions de l'Ame Française

[1946].

Gaulle, Charles de. Discours et Messages.

Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1946.

Giraud, Général [Henri]. Un seul but, la

Victoire. Paris: R. Julliard, 1949.

Goutard, Col. [Adolphe]. Le Corps Expéditionnaire Français dans la Campagne

d'ltalie (1943-1944). Paris: CharlesLavauzelle, 1947.

Howe, George F. Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, UNITED

STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

Washington: 1957.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 409

Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell

Hull. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. 2 vols.

Joubert, [Lt. Col.] J. La Liberation de la

France. Paris: Payot, 1951.

Langer, William L. Our Vichy Gamble.

New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1947.

Lattre de Tassigny, General [Jean] de.

Histoire de la Premiere Armée Française.

Paris: Plon, 1949.

Leahy, Adm. William D. / Was There:

The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff

to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman

Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at

the Time. New York: Whittlesey House,

1950.

Leighton, Richard M., and Robert W.

Coakley. Global Logistics and Strategy:

1940-1943, UNITED STATES ARMY

IN WORLD WAR II. Washington:

1955.

Les Forces Aériennes Françaises de 1939 a

1945. Ed. Col. Pierre Paquier. Paris:

Berger-Levrault, 1949.

Logistical History of NATOUSA -MTOUSA 

vember 1945. Ed. Col. Creswell G.

Blakeney. Naples, Italy: G. Montanino, 1946.

Marey, Georges. "Le Réarmement français en Afrique du Nord (1942-1944),"

Revue Politique et Parlementaire (October, November, 1947.

Matloff, Maurice, and Edwin M. Snell.

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942, UNITED STATES

ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Washington: 1953.

Ministére des Finances et Affaires Economiques. "Le Prêt-Bail et l'Aide Réciproque Franco-Alliée," Notes 

Etudes Documentaires (Paris, 2 and 3

November 1949).

Mouilleseaux, Louis, Ed. La France et son

Empire dans la Guerre. Paris: Editions

Littéraires de France, 1947.

Pogue, Forrest C. The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY IN

WORLD WAR II. Washington: 1954.

Richard, René, and Alain de Sérigny.

L'Enigme d'Alger. Paris: Librairie

Arthème Fayard, 1947.

Rocolle, Chef de bataillon breveté, L'Arme

Aeroportée Clé de la Victoire. Paris:

Charles-Lavauzelle, 1948. 2 vols.

Santini, Lt. Col. P. "Etude statistique sur

les pertes au cours de la guerre 1939-

1945," Revue du Corps de Santé Militaire, X, No. 1 (March, 1954).

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. New York:

Harper & Brothers, 1948.

Spillman, Colonel. "L'Armée d'Afrique,"

Revue Historique de l'Armée (December, 1948).

Suttles, Col. E. A., Ed. A Photographic

Story of the Assembly of T.U.P. Motor

Vehicles by the New French Army in the

North African Theater of Operations.

Weygand, Général [Maxime]. Memoires:

Rappelé au Service. Paris: Flammarion, 1950.

Interviews

Col. George L. Artamonoff

Col. André Beaufre

Col. Roland de Beaumont

Brig. Gen. Paul Devinck

Col. R. Gilpin Erwin

Col. William Tudor Gardiner

General Henri Giraud

Lt. Gen. Augustin Guillaume

General Alphonse Juin

Brig. Gen. Alien F. Kingman
410 REARMING THE FRENCH

General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny Brig. Gen. Jean Piatte

Col. André L'Huillier Brig. Gen. Jean Regnault

Brig. Gen. Harold F. Loomis Brig. Gen. Gordon P. Saville

Lt. Gen. Aimé de Goislard de Monsabert Lt. Claude Tiers

Brig. Gen. Marcel Pénette Lt. Gen. Jean Valluy
List of Abbreviations

AAF Army Air Forces

AAFSC Army Air Forces Service Command (MTO)

ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff

Actg Acting

Admin Administration

A.E.F. American Expeditionary Forces (World War I)

AFAT Auxiliaires Féminines de l'Armée de Terre (French counterpart of

WAC)

AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters

AFSC Air Force Service Command

AGWAR Adjutant General, War Department

Asdic Antisubmarine direction indicator

ASF Army Service Forces

BAR Browning automatic rifle

BCRA Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (Militaire)

Br British

CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff

CEF Corps Expéditionnaire Français (French Expeditionary Corps)

CEFEO Corps Expéditionnaire Français d'Extrême-Orient (French Far East

Expeditionary Corps)

CFLN Comité Français de la Liberation Nationale (French Committee of

National Liberation)

CG Commanding general

CinC Commander in Chief

CM-IN Classified Message, Incoming

CM-OUT Classified Message, Outgoing

CofS Chief of Staff

Comd Command

Comdr Commander

Conf Conference

Corres Correspondence

COS British Chiefs of Staff

CPS Combined Staff Planners

CRMA Centre de Réception des Matériels Américains (Reception Center for

American Equipment)

DAD Defense Aid Division (to 1 Oct 41), Defense Aid Director

DB Division Blindée (Armored Division)

DFL Division Franchise Libre (Free French Division)

DI Division d'Infanterie (Infantry Division)
412 REARMING THE FRENCH

DIA Division d'Infanterie Algérienne (Algerian Infantry Division), or Division d'Infanterie Alpine (Alpine Infantry Division)

DIC Division d'Infanterie Coloniale (Colonial Infantry Division)

DIM Division d'Infanterie Marocaine (Moroccan Infantry Division)

Dir Directive

DMI Division Motorisée d'Infanterie, or Division de Marche d'Infanterie

(Motorized Infantry Division)

DMM Division Marocaine de Montagne (Moroccan Mountain Division)

DRB AGO Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office

EMFFI Etat-Major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur

EMGG Etat-Major General, Guerre (General Staff, War)

ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

Exp Expeditionary

FAF French Air Force (Armée de l'Air)

FFI Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (French Forces of the Interior)

Fr French

FTS French Training Section

GO General Order

G.O.C. General-officer-commanding (British)

GPF Grande Puissance Filloux

GTM Groupe de Tabors Marocains (Moroccan Tabor Group)

Hq Headquarters

Interv Interview

JAC Joint Air Commission

JCS U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

JLC Joint Logistics Committee

JPS Joint Staff Planners

JRC Joint Rearmament Committee

LMAB Munitions Assignments Board (London)

Ltr Letter

MAAF Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

MAB Munitions Assignments Board

MAC (G) Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground)

MAC (A) (Air)

MAC (N) (Navy)

MBS Mediterranean Base Section

MLB Metallic link belt

Msg Message

Mtg Meeting

MTOUSA Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army

NAAF Northwest African Air Forces

NAASC Northwest African Air Service Command

NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 413

OCMH Office of the Chief of Military History

OCT HB Office of the Chief of Transportation, Historical Branch

OPD Operations Division, General Staff

Opns, Ops Operations

OSS Office of Strategic Services

PBS Peninsular Base Section

PETN Pentaerythritol tetranite

POL Petrol (gasoline), oil, and lubricants

POW Prisoner of war

RAF Royal Air Force

Rcd Record

RCP Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes (Parachute Regiment)

Rearmt Rearmament

RTA Régiment de Tirailleurs Algérians (Algerian Tirailleurs Regiment)

SACMED Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean

SAS Special Air Service

SCAEF Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force

SCAMA Service Central des Approvisionnements et Matériels Américains (Central Office of American Supplies and Equipment)

SFHQ Special Force Headquarters

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

SO Special Order

SOLOC Southern Line of Communications

SOS Services of Supply

SR Service de Renseignements (Intelligence Service)

Sup Supply

Sv Service

TAC Tactical Air Command

TAG The Adjutant General

USAAF U.S. Army Air Forces

USSTAF United States Strategic Air Force

WAC Women's Army Corps

Wac A member of the Women's Army Corps

WD War Department

WO War Office
Glossary of Code Names

AFLOC A trans-Africa supply route for the supply of vehicles and equipment to

the Middle East and east Africa.

ANAKIM A large land operation for the reopening of the Burma Road and an

amphibious operation for the recapture of Rangoon.

ANFA Sometimes used by OPD officers as a code name for the Casablanca

Conference of January 1943.

ANVIL The planned 1944 Allied invasion of southern France in the ToulonMarseille area. (Later DRAGOON.)

BIGOT Special security procedure for OVERLORD.

BOLERO Build-up of troops and supplies in the United Kingdom in preparation

for a cross-Channel attack.

BRASSARD Operation to liberate the Island of Elba, June 1944.

CAIMAN Proposed operation in support of Resistance forces in central France.

Allies rejected the whole operation as impracticable.

EUREKA Tehran Conference, 28 November-1 December 1943.

FLAMBO AFHQ Advance Administrative Echelon, established at Naples, October

1943.

FREEDOM Code designation for radio station at Algiers.

HUSKY Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943.

OVERLORD Plan for the Allied invasion of northwest Europe, spring 1944.

QUADRANT First Quebec Conference, August 1943.

SEXTANT Cairo Conference, 22-26 November and 3-7 December 1943.

SYMBOL Conference at Casablanca, January 1943.

TORCH Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, November 1942.

TRIDENT Washington Conference, May 1943.

VESUVIUS Operation to liberate Corsica, September-October 1943.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department

Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943

Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945

The Army and Economic Mobilization

The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat Troops

The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces

The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific

The Fall of the Philippines

Guadalcanal: The First Offensive

Victory in Papua

CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul

Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls

Campaign in the Marianas

The Approach to the Philippines

Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

Triumph in the Philippines

Okinawa: The Last Battle

Strategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West

Sicily and the Surrender of Italy

Salerno to Cassino

Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations

Cross-Channel Attack

Breakout and Pursuit

The Lorraine Campaign

The Siegfried Line Campaign

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge

The Last Offensive
The Supreme Command

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I

Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East Theater

The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India Theater

Stilwell's Mission to China

Stilwell's Command Problems

Time Runs Out in CBI

The Technical Services

The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War

The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field

The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat

The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany

The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States

The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior

The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

Theaters

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply

The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I

The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan

The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany

The Signal Corps: The Emergency

The Signal Corps: The Test

The Signal Corps: The Outcome

The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations

The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply

The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special Studies

Chronology: 1941-1945

Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945

Rearming the French

Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt

The Women's Army Corps

Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors

Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces

The Employment of Negro Troops

Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial Record

The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas

The War Against Japan
Index

Aachen, Germany, 344

Accounting, 28, 141, 143, 144, 145, 266-70, 346,

354. See also Lend-lease,

of British equipment, 63

cash payments, 262, 263, 265

of Commanding General Shipments, 267, 268

per man per diem procedure, 269-70

of theater transfers, 267, 268-69

Admiralty (Br.), 222, 299

Admiralty (Fr.). See under French Navy.

Aéronautique Navale. See under French Navy,

Air Arm.

AFLOC, 53n

African Army. See under North African Forces.

Air Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean.

See Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W.

Air forces, Allied tactical

First Tactical Air Force, 212, 373, 375, 376

2d Tactical Air Force (Br.), 212, 373

Air forces, U. S. See Eighth Air Force; Twelfth

Air Force; U. S. Strategic Air Forces

(USSTAF).

Air Ministry (Br.), 300

Air Ministry (Fr.), 374, 375

Air Service Command (Fr.), 200

Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G.,

116, 369

on French combat performance, 178, 213n

and Franco-Italian border incident, 367, 368

Alexandria, Egypt, 90, 90n, 214, 221

Algeria, 11, 14, 194, 195, 196, 233

Algiers, 25, 63, 65, 84, 85, 131, 132, 135, 136, 138,

140, 151, 152, 188, 191n, 198, 203, 220, 230,

248, 260, 268, 272, 276, 280, 294n, 301, 302,

316, 326, 377, 385

Allied landings at, 16

celebration at, 59-60

French Committee of National Liberation established at, 79

vehicle assembly line at, 67-69, 67n

Allied Armies in Italy, 116

Allied Commander in Chief, 18, 49, 52, 53, 55, 62,

63, 71, 72, 79, 91, 117-18, 119, 120, 125.

See also Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) ;

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.

Allied commander in the Pacific. See MacArthur,

Gen. Douglas.

Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), 123, 142,

169, 180, 188, 314, 382, 383. See also Allied

Commander in Chief; Eisenhower, Gen.

Dwight D.; Gammell, Lt. Gen. J. A. H.; Mediterranean theater; Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter

Bedell; Wilson, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland.

and ANFA Plan, 40

and assistance to the French, 65, 67

and composition of French expeditionary forces,

87-88, 109, 110, 125-26, 127, 148, 157, 171

and control of French forces, 117-18, 119, 120,

149, 150-51, 194, 225

and employment of French forces, 108, 111, 112—

13, 116, 117, 159, 212, 259

and equipping French expeditionary forces, 140,

141-42, 163-64, 170

establishment, 25

and French Committee of National Liberation,

149-50

and French forces in ANVIL, 163, 164

and French High Command, 96, 153, 228

and French naval forces, 218, 220, 377

and French rearmament, 46n, 62-63, 70, 71, 75-

76, 77, 81-82, 84, 85, 88, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97,

101, 109, 110, 111, 113, 120, 121, 125, 126,

129, 148, 155, 156, 161, 165, 177, 199, 202,

205, 211, 227, 229, 241, 242-43, 244, 245,

248, 250, 251, 252, 258n, 260, 261-62, 281,

391, 392

and French service troops, 104-05, 107, 108,

109-10, 124, 128, 146, 166, 167, 168, 202

and French supply system, 130, 131, 133-34

and fusion of French armed forces, 81-82, 86

and Giraud, 98, 118-19, 150, 151-52

and the JAG, 93

and the JRC, 25, 92, 271, 272, 284

Liaison Section, 271, 274, 282

and maintenance of French expeditionary forces,

139, 145, 155, 254, 257, 258, 261, 262, 263,

264

and Metropolitan Forces, 192, 309

movement to Caserta, 276n

and nonprogram units, 121, 158

and training of French troops, 28, 230, 231, 235,

236, 293

Allied Military Government, Italy, 367, 368

Alps, operations in the, 349, 354, 363n, 367
418 REARMING THE FRENCH

Alsace, 376

American Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.). See

also Pershing, Gen. John J.

British assistance to, 2, 3, 6, 6n

French assistance to, 2-5, 6

training of, by the French, 5-6

American Red Cross, 265

Ames, Maj. John W., 275, 288

Ammunition, 89, 142, 144-45, 251, 252-53

Amphibious Forces, Northwest African Waters, 218

ANAKIM, 49n, 54

Anfa, French Morocco, 38

ANFA Agreements. See under Casablanca Conference.

ANFA Plan. See under Rearmament programs.

ANVIL (DRAGOON), 122, 145, 252, 301, 328, 373.

See also Force 163.

command for, 163

French forces in, 119-20, 125, 126, 127, 128,

129, 144, 146, 148, 151, 153, 156, 157, 163,

165, 173, 174, 181, 182-83. See also 1st

French Army.

air units, 211, 212, 213

commanded by de Lattre, 125. See also

Lattre dc Tassigny, Gen. Jean de.

maintenance, 186, 187, 257, 258. See also

Base 901.

naval units, 225

shortage of replacements, 183

shortage of support troops, 165, 166, 167,

168-69

training, 238-39

troop list, 156, 157, 159, 164, 171, 182-83,

191, 194, 210, 238

launching, 183, 209, 276, 316

U. S. forces in, 163

U. S. support troops for the French, 167, 168,

169, 187

Ardennes, 335, 340

Armée B, 183. See also 1st French Army.

Armée de l'Air. See French Air Force.

Armies, U. S. See Third Army; Fifth Army;

Seventh Army; Fifteenth Army.

Armistice Army. See under Metropolitan Forces;

North African Forces, African Army.

Armor, 347

British tanks for the French, 60, 244

for Sovereignty Forces, 161-62

substitutions, 80n, 244-46

Armored divisions, U.S.

2d, 283

12th, 353

Armored Force Detachment, 294

Armored Force Training Company, 6704th, 294

Army Air Forces Service Command (AAFSC),

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 207

Army Air Forces, U. S. See U. S. Army Air Forces

(USAAF).

Army Exchange Service, 260

Army Geographic Service (Fr.), 266

Army Group, 6th U. S., 188, 212, 296, 347, 348,

358, 394. See also Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.

commanded by Devers, 183

and Détachement des Alpes, 353, 367-68

and FFI, 324-25, 329

and French security battalions, 339, 342

Army Group, 12th U. S., 341, 342, 358-59

Army Group, 15th, 367

Army Group, 21 Br., 315, 335, 350, 366

Army Nurse Corps, U. S., 260

Army Service Forces (ASF). See also International Division, ASF; Somervell, Lt. Gen.

Brehon B.

Army Supply Program, 22, 56, 122, 205, 308

and French rearmament, 22, 31, 45, 47, 48, 56,

78, 99-100, 241, 248, 269, 347, 354, 357, 359

Victory Program, 15

Army Supply Program. See under Army Service

Forces (ASF).

Arno River, Italy, 179

Arnold, Gen. Henry H., 197, 199, 202, 209, 223,

223n, 312, 313. See also U. S. Army Air

Forces (USAAF).

and equipping French air units, 15, 35, 83, 196-

97, 373

on French contribution to war effort, 213n

member CCS, 10n

Artamonoff, Lt. Col. George L., 104, 131, 132, 202,

232, 272, 274, 275, 282, 283, 284. See also

Joint Rearmament Committee (JRC).

Artillery, 347

Canada's offer of guns, 85n

substitutions, 242-44

Atlantic Base Section, 85

Atlantic coast, operations along, 305-06, 325-26,

331, 333, 335, 343, 358, 359, 363n

Auboyneau, Rear Adm. Philippe, 87, 214, 221

Austria, 363

Auxiliaires Féminines de l'Armée de Terre. See

Women's Auxiliary Corps (Fr.) (AFAT).

Auxiliary Territorial Service (Br.), 260
INDEX 419

Baker, Newton D., 5

Barnard, Capt. Geoffrey, 273, 275

Bartron, Brig. Gen. Harold A., 202, 207

Base 901 (Fr.), 166, 167, 178, 266, 358. See also

Peninsular Base Section (PBS),

difficulties facing, 187, 188, 189

establishment, 146

movement to Marseille, 187

reorganization, 187

role and missions, 188

strength, 188

Base du Sud, 354-55, 358

Battet, Rear Adm. Robert, 225

Beaufre, Maj. André, 14, 36n, 82n

Beaumont, Capt. Roland de, 272, 275, 279-80, 282

Belfort, France, 183

Belgium, 310, 341n, 343, 381

Bermuda, 220

Béthouart, Lt. Gen. Emile, 26, 30, 38n, 41, 75, 82n,

85n, 92, 124n, 196, 217, 279, 308, 391. See

also French Military Mission in the United

States.

and ANFA Plan, 39-40, 40n, 46, 48

Chief of Staff, National Defense, 152, 153, 157,

165, 174, 183n, 244

commander, 1st Corps, 183, 353

and equipping liberated manpower, 312-13, 315,

321, 322

program. See under Rearmament programs.

Beynet, Lt. Gen. Paul, 124, 124n, 309-10, 392.

See also French Military Mission in the

United States.

Bidault, Georges, 368, 396

Billotte, Brig. Gen. Pierre, 347, 353

Biran, Lt. Guy de, 275

Bir Hacheim, Libya, 10

Blaizot, Lt. Gen. Roger, 394

Blanc, Brig. Gen. Clement, 64, 64n, 128, 134, 189,

249n, 280, 284, 285, 386

BOLERO, 49n. See also OVERLORD.

Bombardment Division, 3d, 304

Bonnet, Henri, 345, 369, 398

Bonvalot, Col. Raoul, 295

Boston, 220

Bouscat, Gen. René, 201, 204, 207, 212, 287, 288,

309

appointed Chief of Air Staff, 87

appointed Chief of Staff, French Air Force, 211

Appointed Inspector General, French Air Force,

373n

and equipping French air units, 202, 203, 205,

209, 262-63, 308

and JAG, 287-88

Bradley, Lt. Gen. Omar N., 182

BRASSARD. See under Elba.

Brazilian Expeditionary Force, 275-76

Brest, 378

British Chiefs of Staff, 300, 302, 399. See also

Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan F.; Portal,

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles; Pound, Admiral Sir Dudley; United Kingdom,

and French rearmament, 40, 49-51, 52-53, 54,

57, 161, 332

and liberated manpower, 308, 311, 315, 320,

332-33

membership, 10n

and North African Forces, 33-34, 35-36

and posthostilities forces, 316-17, 322, 326-27,

327, 337

British Commonwealth, 402

British equipment for the French. See under

United Kingdom.

British Far Eastern Fleet. See under Royal Navy.

British forces, 143. See also Units, British.

British Joint Staff Mission, 10n, 36n, 40n

Brittany, 320

Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan F., 10n, 34, 36, 57.

See also British Chiefs of Staff; Combined

Chiefs of Staff.

Brosset, Brig. Gen. Charles, 117, 178, 353

Buckley, Lt. John W., 275

Bull, Maj. Gen. Harold R., 342

Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action

(BCRA), 9n, 299, 300

Burke, Lt. Col. Robert W., 295

Burnett, William E., 284

Buter, Lt. Gordon H., 275

Caen, 339

CAIMAN, 204

Cairo Conference, 111, 119

Callies, Brig. Gen. Jean, 349, 353

Cameroons, 9

Camp Hood, Tex., 234

Camp Lee, Va., 234

Campbell, Lt. C. S., 295

Canada, 227, 402, 402n

forces of, 397

Giraud's visit to, 85

matériel for Metropolitan Forces, 350, 355, 356

matériel for North African Forces, 85n, 209-10,

326, 326n
420 REARMING THE FRENCH

Canadian Chiefs of Staff, 350

Cape of Good Hope, 221

Carpentier, Maj. Gen. Marcel, 147, 235, 353, 397,

397n

Casablanca, 63, 65, 84, 131, 135, 138, 218, 220, 221,

229, 283

Allied landings at, 16, 16n

celebration at, 60n

conference at. See Casablanca Conference.

French base at, 78, 85, 86, 91, 94, 97, 133, 137

Casablanca Conference, 33, 48, 52, 218, 273, 281

ANFA Agreements, 36-38, 49-50, 56, 59-60,

125, 152, 241

ANFA Plan. See under Rearmament programs.

Caserta, Italy, 276n

Cassino, Italy, 117

Casualties, French

all forces, summary, 403, 403n

in Corsica, 101

in Elba, 182

in France and Germany, 363, 363n

Free French Forces, 11

in Italy, 180

Resistance Forces, 306

in Tunisia, 32, 57

Centre d'Etude des Chars de Combat, 294

Centre de Reception des Matériels Américains

(CRMA), 135, 136

Ceylon, 394

Chanson, Lt. Col. Charles, 285, 315, 385-86

Chantiers de Jeunesse, 8, 8n, 68n, 230, 230n

Chanzy, Algeria, 238

Charpentier, Col. Emile, 136, 137, 138, 175, 290,

291, 292, 358n. See also Service Central des

Approvisionnements et Matériels Américains

(SCAMA).

Chateauroux, 354

Chauncey, Brig. Gen. Charles C., 287

Cheatham, Lt. Col. C. H., 295

Cheek, Lt. Atlas L., 275

Cherbourg, 350, 355, 378, 386

Cherchel, Algeria, 1, 14, 15, 48

Chief of Staff, AFHQ, 32, 126, 284. See also

Gammell, Lt. Gen. J. A. H.; Smith, Lt. Gen.

Walter Bedell.

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. See Marshall, Gen.

George C.

China, 15, 44, 393, 396, 400, 402

Christensen, Lt. Col. Conrad L., 275, 387

Churchill, Prime Minister Winston S., 57, 118,

334n, 371, 394

and ANFA Agreements, 39, 53, 54

at Casablanca Conference, 33, 34, 36n

and French rearmament, 51, 334

and French Resistance, 300, 301, 302, 304

and de Gaulle, 9, 33

Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W., 178. See also Fifth

Army.

agreement with Darlan, 16, 16n, 117, 220

at Cherchel meeting, 1, 14

commands Fifth Army, 111

and French Expeditionary Corps, 140, 146, 159,

255, 256

and French rearmament, 62-63, 141, 170, 283

on French performance in Italy, 179, 179n, 213n

Clothing

for labor and security units, 325, 340

for Metropolitan Forces, 355-57, 356n, 359, 364

for North African Forces, 82, 82n, 83, 85, 85n

problem of identification, 259, 357

problem of sizes, 258-59, 258n

for Resistance Forces, 325, 326, 333

for women in the armed forces, 259—60

Coastal Base Section (COSBASE), 186-87, 189,

248

Cochet, Maj. Gen. Gabriel, 301

Collonges, France, 8n

Colmar, France, 351, 364, 376

Cologne, 344

Colonial Forces (Fr.), 194

Combined Administrative Committee, 335, 340,

341, 350, 357, 359, 374

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), 23, 36n, 84, 95,

121, 123, 124, 129, 227, 326-27, 334, 365,

368, 387. See also British Chiefs of Staff;

Joint Chiefs of Staff, U. S. (JCS).

and British equipment for the French, 27

on control of French forces, 149-51, 202, 361

and controversy over French rearmament, 40-41,

48-51, 52-53, 54-57

and employment of French forces, 76, 95-96,

101, 111, 118, 119-20, 171, 361

and French High Command, 362

and fusion of the de Gaulle and Giraud forces,

86, 87

and equipping western European liberated manpower, 306-08, 310, 311, 312, 315-18, 320,

321, 322, 323, 326, 328, 330, 332, 335, 338,

340-41, 342, 343, 344, 357, 366, 370

and Munitions Assignments Board (MAB), 22-

23
421

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS)—Continued

organization, 10n

and equipping Free French Forces, 10

and equipping French air units, 196, 206, 223-

24, 374

and equipping French forces for the Far East,

394, 395-96, 398-99

and equipping Metropolitan Forces, 322, 325,

327, 329, 332, 333-35, 336, 344-45, 348, 349,

350, 351, 354, 359, 362

and equipping French naval and naval air units,

217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224,

225, 226, 379-80

and equipping nonprogram units, 160, 191

and equipping North African Forces, 28, 31,

33-36, 45, 47, 63, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82-83, 94,

95-96, 104, 122, 125, 128, 148-49, 155, 156,

157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 167, 177, 197, 198,

199, 205, 207, 212, 234, 238, 385

and equipping Resistance Forces, 301, 302, 305

and equipping Sovereignty Forces, 161-62, 173

and equipping Territorial Forces, 123, 128, 173

CCS 142/1, 54, 199

CCS 350/7, 374

CCS 358, 221-22

CCS 358 (Revised), 222, 225, 377

CCS 661, 317, 330, 332-33, 357

Combined Shipping and Adjustment Board, 57

Combined Signal Board, AFHQ, 234

Combined Staff Planners (CPS), 306, 310, 394

on French rearmament, 54, 82-83, 155, 197, 199

on employment of French naval units, 220-21,

222

Comité Français de la Libération Nationale. See

French Committee of National Liberation

(CFLN).

Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy. See

Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G.

Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in North

Africa, 18, 49, 55. See also Allied Commander in Chief; Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight

D.; Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ).

Commander in Chief, French, 21, 39, 42, 79, 80,

87, 94, 98, 117, 118, 119, 134, 150, 151, 174.

See also Giraud, Gen. Henri.

Giraud appointed, 16

post abolished, 151-52

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, 222. See also

King, Adm. Ernest J.

Commanding General Shipments. See under

Supply and maintenance.

Commissariat for National Defense. See under

French Committee of National Liberation

(CFLN).

Commissioners (Fr.). See under French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN).

Committee on Equipment for Patriot Forces, 300,

306, 308

Communications Zone, ETOUSA, 323, 326, 341

342, 348, 354, 355, 356n, 363, 366, 370

Communications Zone, NATOUSA, 278

Continental Advance Section (CONAD), 187-88

Corps, U. S.

IV, 368

VI, 111, 183

Corps Expéditionnaire Français. See French Expeditionary Corps (CEF).

Corps Expéditionnaire Français d'Extrême-Orient.

See French Far East Expeditionary Corps

(CEFEO).

Corsica, 56, 93-94, 111, 113, 142, 159, 172, 183,

211

campaign in (VESUVIUS), 101, 181, 224

French casualties in, 101, 403n

postcampaign defense of, 156, 160

Coudraux, Col. Henri, 358

Courbet, battleship, 225n

CPS. See Combined Staff Planners (CPS).

Craig, Maj. Gen. Howard A., 364

Crane, Brig. Gen. William C., 128

Crawford, Col. David J., 100

Crittenberger, Maj. Gen. Willis, 368

Cross-Channel operation. See OVERLORD.

Crump, Col. Ira A., 133, 193, 275, 291

Cuneo Province, Italy, 368

Cunningham, Adm. Sir Andrew B., 10n, 217, 218,

224

Curtis, Brig. Gen. Edward P., 202

Dakar, Senegal, 12, 220, 221

Darcy, Col. Thomas C., 181

Darlan, Adm. Francois

agreement with Clark, 16, 16n, 117

and Allied landings in North Africa, 16

replaced by Giraud, 21, 78

Deane, Brig. Gen. John R., 49n, 51

De Gaulle, Gen. Charles. See Gaulle, Gen.

Charles de.

De Lattre de Tassigny, Gen. Jean. See Lattre de

Tassigny, Gen. Jean de.

De Long, Maj. E. S., 275

Delta Base Section, 187, 188, 193, 239, 371
422 REARMING THE FRENCH

Delta Base Section Depot for Rearmament, 354

Demetry, Thomas A., 284

Denmark, 381

Dépot Français de Publications Américains, 175,

229

Deputy Theater Commander, NATOUSA, 72-73,

275, 283. See also Hughes, Maj. Gen. Everett S.

Détachement d'Armée de l'Atlantique. See under

Units, French.

Détachement d'Armée des Alpes. See under

Units, French.

Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L., 179, 212, 238, 286, 342,

348, 382. See also Army Group, 6th U. S.

commands NATOUSA, 275

commands 6th Army Group, 183

on Franco-American relations, 153-55, 254

and Franco-Italian border incident, 367

and French rearmament, 121, 148, 164, 165, 170,

171, 247-48, 265, 269, 276

and French service troops, 166-67, 168

and nonprogram units, 156, 159-60

and rations for French troops, 255, 258, 263

and replacements for 1st French Army, 183, 352

and Resistance Forces, 303, 324-25, 354

and Stuttgart incident, 361

on use of liberated manpower, 313, 314, 315,

320, 321-22

Devinck, Brig. Gen. Paul, 96, 114-15, 117, 121,

158. See also French High Command (North

Africa).

Dexter, Lt. John L., 275

Diethelm, André, 325, 331, 333, 334, 365, 366.

See also Ministry of War (Fr.).

Dijon, 183, 187

Dill, Field Marshal Sir John, 36, 36n, 53. See

also British Chiefs of Staff.

Division slice

U. S., 168n, 332

French, 168, 178, 332, 337-38

Djibouti, French Somaliland, 9

Dody, Maj. Gen. André, 111, 178, 353

Donovan, Brig. Gen. William J., 301, 304. See

also Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Doyen, Lt. Gen. Paul, 367, 368

Dufourt, Lt. Col. A., 141

Dunkerque, 247

Dunton, Maj. Gen. Delmar, 200

Dupre, Capt. D. D., 275, 385

Dye, Charles F. Jr., 284

Eaker, Lt. Gen. Ira C., 285-86, 287. See also

Mediterranean Air Command; Mediterranean

Allied Air Forces (MAAF).

on efficiency of French air units, 208-09, 237

and employment of French air units, 211

and equipping French air units, 206-07, 210, 373

on extension of French air program, 313, 315

on issue of Norden bombsight to the French, 208

Eastern Front, 340

Eastern Task Force, 28

Ecole de Guerre, 280

Eden, Anthony, 55

Edmonston, Lt. John S., 275

Eighth Air Force, U. S., 304

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 23, 32, 35, 37n, 44,

45, 49, 50, 55, 59, 60n, 65, 69, 74, 84, 88,

129, 136, 153, 205, 212, 276, 331, 348, 382.

See also Allied Commander in Chief; Allied

Force Headquarters (AFHQ); Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force; Supreme

Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

(SHAEF).

on ANFA Agreement, 73

appointed Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 124

and arming western European Allies, 334, 342

on Canadian equipment for the French, 85n

commands Allied forces in North Africa, 18

commands TORCH forces, 15, 16

conference with de Gaulle, 124-25, 228

conference with de Gaulle and Giraud, 80

on control over French forces, 79—80, 117—18,

119-20, 150, 151,

on employment of French forces, 40, 56, 71, 76,

94, 108, 125, 236-37, 335, 349-50

and employment of liberated manpower, 310, 311,

313, 314, 315-16, 317, 320-21, 322-23, 332,

335, 336, 341

and enemy captured equipment, 91-92

and equipping the French, 24-25, 26, 27, 28-29,

30-31, 33, 40, 42-43, 45-47, 46n, 48, 62-63,

82n, 86, 94, 95, 96, 109, 110, 123, 124-25,

197-98, 199, 201, 202, 205-06, 217, 220, 222,

223, 335, 347

on French forces for the Far East, 394, 397-98

on French missions to the United States, 26-27,

217

and French political developments, 80, 80n, 119n

and French service troops, 105, 108, 109, 121,

124-25
INDEX 423

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.—Continued

on fusion of French forces, 86, 117, 117n

and JRC, 25

and labor and security units, 325, 327, 335-36,

337, 340-41, 342-43, 344, 366

and maintenance of French forces, 217-18

and Mast Plan, 15, 30

and raising of Metropolitan units, 314, 318, 320,

323, 327, 328, 329, 333-34, 335, 336, 338, 352,

358, 359, 364-65, 366

and Resistance Forces, 302, 303, 305, 319,

324-25, 333

and Stuttgart incident, 361-62

and suspension of French rearmament, 343,

360-61, 362-63, 368-69, 371-72, 375

and tonnage for French rearmament, 41, 42, 51,

53, 74-75, 77-78, 83, 255

and training French forces, 28, 101, 231

and U. S. service troops for the French, 104, 108,

109, 125

El 'Alamein, Egypt, 10

Elba, 159

campaign in (BRASSARD), 180-82, 183, 212, 225

French casualties in, 182, 403n

Ervin, Col. R. Gilpin, 208, 208n, 286, 287, 288,

373n, 384

Etat-Major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur

(EMFFI), 300, 304, 306

EUREKA. See Tehran Conference.

European Advisory Commission, 327

European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army

(ETOUSA), 270, 304

and French rearmament, 25, 193, 264, 269, 360

replaced by USFET, 371, 387

Expeditionary forces, French. See also individual

campaigns; French Expeditionary Corps

(CEF) ; French Far East Expeditionary Corps

(CEFEO) ; Service troops, French; Units,

French.

control, 118, 119, 149, 152

maintenance, 103, 133, 135, 136-37, 138-39

need for self-sufficiency, 100, 105, 107, 108, 109,

110. 113-14, 121, 138, 155

organization and equipping, 56-57, 69, 71-72,

75-76, 82, 87-89, 94, 104, 105, 108, 109-11,

118n

strength, 194

U. S. and British service troops for, 71, 104,

105-07, 124, 125, 166-67

Fairchild, Col. Richard F., 296

Far East, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 398. See

also French Far East Expeditionary Corps

(CEFEO); Pacific theater.

Far East Program. See under Rearmament programs.

Fénard, Vice Adm. Raymond, 82n. See also

French Naval Mission in the United States.

chief, French Naval Mission in the United

States, 217

and employment of French forces in the Far

East, 393, 395-96

and equipping French naval air units, 223, 223n,

379-80

and equipping French naval units, 219, 220, 224,

377, 379

15 August (43) Plan. See under Rearmament

programs.

Fifteenth Army, 358-59

Fifth Army, 94, 140, 141, 178, 257. See also

Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W.

component French forces, 95-96, 111, 112-13,

116, 146, 159, 258. See also French Expeditionary Corps (CEF).

French mule pack companies operating with,

113, 159

and French rearmament, 62-63, 283, 285

and maintenance of French components, 138-

39, 141-42, 146, 170, 171, 255, 256-57

and training French forces, 62-63, 72, 89-90,

231, 293. See also French Training Section,

at Airborne Training Center, 211, 236

at Invasion Training Center, 235

under Rearmament Advisory Section, 293

Fighting France. See Free France.

Fighting French Forces. See Free French Forces.

1st French Army, 187, 266, 296, 342, 367, 374, 376.

See also Lattre de Tassigny, Gen. Jean de.

casualties, 363n

component elements, 183, 186, 212, 343-44,

353, 358

controlled by 6th Army Group, 183, 212

FFI and other liberated manpower enrolled in,

186, 186n, 188, 306, 314, 323, 324, 325, 326,

331, 333

logistical support, 186-88, 363. See also Base

901.

Negro troops withdrawn from, 325, 354, 394

operating initially as Armée B, 183

replacements for, 186, 313, 314, 322, 325, 337-

38, 351-53, 354, 388-89
424 REARMING THE FRENCH

1st French Army—Continued

reverts to French control, 371

short of service troops, 186, 188

strength, 186, 337-38, 351-53

and Stuttgart incident, 361

support troops build-up, 348-49, 358

training centers of, 351-52, 387, 388, 389

U. S. divisions assigned to, 353

U. S. support troops for, 186, 188, 313-14, 337,

348

Flint, Col. Harry A., 231-32

Florence, 179

Force 163, 156, 163, 164, 210, 238. See also

ANVIL (DRAGOON); Patch, Maj. Gen. Alexander M.

Forces Françaises Combattantes. See Free French

Forces.

Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur. See French

Forces of the Interior (FFI).

Forces Françaises Libres. See Free French Forces.

Foreign Economic Administration, 263, 266, 371,

402

Foreign Office (Br.), 392

Forrestal, James V., 394

Fort Benning, Ga., 234

Fort Dix, N. J., 234

Fort Sill, Okla., 237

Foster, Air Vice Marshal W. F. MacNeece, 54

France, 1, 9, 12n, 13, 14, 115, 150, 152, 173, 192

Armistice Army, 7-8, 11, 17

assistance to A.E.F., 1-3, 5-6

casualties (1939-45), 403n

Chantiers de Jeunesse, 8, 8n

civilian import program, 357, 370, 402

employment of liberated manpower. See Metropolitan Forces.

French forces in liberation of, 12, 13-14, 119,

144, 194, 308, 309-10, 328-29, 334, 343-44,

347-48, 354, 377, 404. See also ANVIL; 1st

French Army; OVERLORD.

German occupation of, 7, 17, 309

and German offensive in the Ardennes, 335

and June 1940 armistice with Germany, 7, 11,

404

and manufacture of war matériel, 328, 332, 336,

345, 348, 350, 355, 356n, 357, 359

military import program, 350

and occupation of northwest Italian territory,

367

operations in the Alps, 354, 367

France—Continued

operations on Atlantic coast, 305-06, 325, 343,

358, 359, 378, 387

and overseas territories, 391

rehabilitation of military establishment, 328, 337

Resistance forces of. See French Forces of the

Interior (FFI) ; French Resistance.

and reverse lend-lease. See under Lend-lease.

and settlement of lend-lease accounts, 402-03

slowness of rearmament resented by, 348

and zone of occupation in Germany, 342, 343

Franco-Italian border incident, 367-69, 398

Free France, 9, 9n

Free French Forces, 400. See also Units, French.

air units, 10-11, 195

casualties, 11, 403n

equipping, 10, 12-13, 81-82, 86, 87

ground units, 11

incidents involving, 80n

inclusion in North African rearmament program,

87, 88-89, 115

lend-lease extended to, 10

merged with North African Forces, 86-87, 201,

221

Military Mission in the United States, 27n

naval units, 214

renamed Fighting French Forces, 9n

strength, 9

Free French Military Mission in the United States,

27n

Freetown Project, 53n

French Advance Section, 360

French Air Force (FAF), 223. See also Free

French Forces; North African Forces; Training; Units, French.

and Air Component, 385. See also SHAEF

Mission to France, Air Component.

Armée de l'Air organized, 201

casualties, 403n

employment and control, 202, 204-05, 207, 211,

373-74, 375, 376

equipping, 200, 201-02, 203, 206, 207-08,

212-13, 248, 334, 375-76, 401, 402. See

also under Rearmament programs.

ground support organizations, 209, 210

issued Norden bombsight, 208, 287

and JAC, 286-87. See also Joint Air Commission (JAC).

maintenance and supply, 205-06, 207, 262, 374,

375, 376

morale, 201, 208-09
INDEX 425

French Air Force (FAF)—Continued

operating in ANVIL, 186, 209, 210, 211, 212

operating in campaigns of France and Germany,

212, 328, 373-74, 376

operating in conquest of Elba, 181—82

operating in Mediterranean theater, 178, 181-82,

204, 207, 209, 210, 212, 223-24

operating in OVERLORD, 182, 210

and Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to

France, 385, 386

relation with Allied air forces, 198

units for the Far East, 396, 397

French Commander in Chief. See Commander in

Chief, French.

French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN),

119n, 258, 345n. See also Gaulle, Gen. Charles

de; Giraud, Gen. Henri.

Allied missions to, 150

Allied recognition of, 79, 96, 98

Commissariat of National Defense, 87

Commissioner of Armament, Provisioning, and

Reconstruction, 81 n

Commissioner of Finance, 263

Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, 119, 149.

Commissioner of National Defense, 98

Commissioner of Navy, 118, 153

Commissioner of War and Air, 118, 118n, 147,

149-50, 153, 174, 177, 280

and control of forces, 79-81, 86-87, 117-18,

119-20, 149-50, 151

and control over military affairs, 98, 118, 150,

151-52, 280, 309

Cordell Hull and, 80-81

and de Gaulle, 79-80, 98

establishment, 79

and French participation in Far East operations, 392

and fusion of forces, 86

lend-lease agreements with, 345n

National Defense Committee, 98, 151

National Defense General Staff, 151

Permanent Military Committee, 80, 81, 81n, 87

and reorganization of armed forces, 80

and reorganization of high command, 151-53,

174

and Resistance Forces, 302

succeeded by Provisional Government, 191

French Communications Zone, 121-23, 128, 155,

158. See also Sovereignty Forces; Territorial

Forces.

French Equatorial Africa, 9, 374

French Expeditionary Corps (CEF), 230, 235, 255,

280. See also Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W.; Fifth

Army; Italy; Juin, Gen. Alphonse; Units,

French.

casualties, 180, 256

component units, 111, 112-13, 117, 171, 178,

225, 251, 275, 397

controversy over 1st DMI assignment to, 116-17

performance, 147, 155, 178-79, 179n

replacements, 115—16

service troops, 165-67, 178

shortages of equipment, 136, 139-40, 147, 170,

171, 264

strength, 178

supply and maintenance, 133, 138-39, 142,

143-47, 155, 174-75, 186, 254, 255-56, 257-

58, 263, 265. See also Base 901; Rations,

training centers, 237-38

U. S. advisers and instructors with, 170, 237, 295

U. S. support troops for, 168, 186

withdrawal from Italy, 179-80, 210

French Far East Expeditionary Corps (CEFEO),

122, 370, 371

command and control, 394, 397-98, 399

employment, 395, 396-97

organization and equipping, 391, 392, 393-94,

395-96, 397-99. See also under Rearmament

programs.

French Forces of the Interior (FFI). See also

French Resistance,

absorbed in regular forces, 306, 310, 312, 313,

314, 316, 319-20, 323, 324-25, 327, 329,

330, 333, 337, 347, 349, 354, 363

activities, 182, 303-04, 305-06, 312, 320, 324,

325, 335, 367

aircraft allocations to, 301, 303, 304

Allied personnel with, 304

casualties, 306, 403n

control, 300-01, 319

dissolution, 333, 354

equipment for 252, 299, 301-02, 303, 304,

306-08, 310, 315, 320, 324-26, 333, 335, 400

French Air Force units in support of, 211

operation to support, 204

strength, 301, 304-05, 319-20, 325

training, 389

French General Staff. See French High Command

(France) ; French High Command (North

Africa).
426 REARMING THE FRENCH

French High Command (France), 8, 17. See also

Juin, Gen. Alphonse; Leyer, Lt. Gen. Roger,

and employment of liberated manpower, 319-20,

321

and forces for the Far East, 393-97, 398, 399

General Staff, Paris, 191, 386

and labor and security units, 320, 322-23, 326,

327-28, 338, 344, 370

and Metropolitan units, 325, 327-28, 331, 332,

333, 334, 336, 349, 350, 354, 373

Mission de Réarmement, 357

and mobilization program, 320, 338, 355

National Defense headquarters, 322, 386

and Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to

France, 331, 386

Rearmament Inspection Section, 357

and rehabilitation of Metropolitan Army, 330

relationship with Allied command, 343, 362

and replacements for 1st French Army, 351-53

and Resistance Forces, 319, 323, 324, 325-26, 327

and training of units, 389-90

French High Command (North Africa), 11, 21}

24, 26, 111, 113, 116, 120, 121, 122-23,

128-29, 130, 188, 204, 212, 229, 252, 259.

See also Béthouart, Lt. Gen. Emile; Blanc,

Brig. Gen. Clement; Devinck, Brig. Gen. Paul;

French Committee of National Liberation

(CFLN) ; Giraud, Gen. Henri; Leyer, Lt. Gen.

Roger; National Defense Committee,

and AFHQ, 96, 149-50, 228

and ANVIL, 163, 164, 167

armament responsibilities, 69, 85, 170, 263

and defense of North Africa, 160, 244

difficulties facing, 63-65, 237, 255, 264, 266, 281

and distribution of U. S. matériel, 245, 251-52,

261-62

and equipping of units, 140-42, 144, 156, 166,

223, 225

and equipment substitutions, 241, 244, 246-47,

248-49, 250

and establishment of SCAMA, 288, 290

and establishment of National Defense General

Staff, 151, 153

and forces for the Far East, 391, 392, 393

and the JRC, 271, 280, 284

and liberation of Indochina, 391-92

and maintenance of troops, 103, 135, 138-39,

142, 143, 144-45, 207, 254, 258

and Metropolitan forces, 165, 306, 308-11, 316

and organization of expeditionary forces, 70-72,

105, 113-14, 146-47, 165

French High Command (North Africa)—Cont.

position in Allied command structure, 140, 278

Poste de Statistique, 166, 166n, 285

Rearmament and Technical Studies Section, 279,

285, 385

reorganization, 86-87, 118, 151-52, 201

and requisitions for U. S. equipment, 63, 142-

43, 144, 145, 154-55, 157-58, 164, 169, 172-

74, 255, 281-82, 311

and service units, 94-95, 105, 114-15, 127, 146,

165-69, 174, 239. See also Service troops,

French.

and supply system, 131-33, 134-36, 137-38

and training of units, 233, 234-35, 236, 293,

295

French Military Mission in the United Kingdom,

310

French Military Mission in the United States, 26-

27, 27n, 92-93, 122, 124, 124n, 128, 196,

208, 217, 229-30, 259, 260, 261, 262, 265,

279, 309, 347, 359, 362. See also Béthouart,

Maj. Gen. Emile; Beynet, Lt. Gen. Paul; SaintDidier, Brig. Gen. Auguste Brossin de.

French Morocco, 11, 50, 56, 88, 131, 133, 191, 196,

202, 203, 231, 232, 233

contribution to war effort, 194

pre-TORCH concealment of troops in, 11-12, 12n

French National Committee, 9, 12, 78. See also

Gaulle, Gen. Charles de.

French Naval Air Arm. See under French Navy.

French Naval Mission in the United States, 217.

See also Fénard, Vice Adm. Raymond.

French Navy. See also Free French Forces; Lemonnier, Rear Adm. André; North African

Forces; Rearmament programs; Units, French.

Admiralty (Algiers), 222, 224

Admiralty (Paris), 377

Air Arm (Aéronautique Navale), rehabilitation,

strength, and employment, 204, 206, 218, 222,

287, 379-80

Allied vessels for, 221-22, 224

casualties, 403n

CCS policies regarding, 221-22, 225-26, 377

employment and operations, 181, 182, 221-22,

378, 393

fusiliers marins (marines), 225

Marine Nationale organized, 221

operational control, 222

participation in ANVIL, 186, 225

participation in OVERLORD, 182, 224-25, 225n
INDEX 427

French Navy—Continued

ports and naval installations rehabilitated, 377,

378

rehabilitation of vessels, 221-22, 225-26, 282,

377, 401, 402. See also Joint Rearmament

Committee (JRC); SHAEF Mission to France,

Naval Division.

repairs in the United States, 221

scuttling at Toulon, 17, 17n, 214

strength, 221, 222, 224, 378-79

French North Africa, 11, 183, 189, 191, 192, 214,

215, 239, 264, 265, 301, 303, 304

Allied landings, opposition to, 16, 16n. See also

TORCH.

civilian economy, supplies for, 402

Clark-Darlan Agreement, 16, 16n

contribution to war effort, 194

defense and internal security of, 123, 160-62,

162n, 186

effect of political strife on troops, 80, 80n

food production, 142—43

forces of. See North African Forces,

political developments, 21, 78-79, 80-81, 97-98,

119, 119n

re-entry into the war, 1,16

French Provisional Government, 324, 327, 328, 341,

345n

movement to Paris, 191

recognized by Allies, 345

successor to CFLN, 191

French rearmament. See also specific entries such

as Accounting; Nonprogram units; Shipping;

Supply and maintenance,

and Allied logistical plans, 31, 108-09, 400

British equipment for. See under United Kingdom,

captured enemy equipment for, 57, 60, 91-92,

284, 324, 334, 347, 350

compared with rearmament of other Allies, 402

cost in dollars, 402

difficulties encountered, 400-01

French equipment for. See under France,

hampered by lack of French technical personnel,

71, 94-95, 189, 308, 400

hampered by lack of liaison personnel, 227

hampered by language barrier, 228, 400

justification, 57, 209, 328, 394, 403-04

objectives, 43-44, 62, 73, 76, 93, 95-96, 113-14,

129, 146-47, 148, 152-53, 155, 308, 312, 316,

318, 400. See also Rearmament programs.

French rearmament—Continued

payment of French personnel, 217-18

political aspects, 24, 32, 33-34, 42, 42n, 43, 84,

86, 348, 362

political complications affecting, 80-81, 97-98,

342-43, 361, 367-68

procedures and policies, 21-23, 62, 63, 70, 158,

177, 345, 346-47, 354-55, 397, 401

terminated, 361, 365, 368-72, 398, 399

termination governed by end of hostilities, 341,

357, 359, 360

U. S. contribution, summary, 401

U. S. responsibility toward, In, 90, 355, 400

value to U. S., 111, 155, 178, 403, 404

French Resistance

Allied agencies assisting, 9, 299-300, 302

early organization, 8-9, 17

and Fighting France, 9n

forces of. See French Forces of the Interior

(FFI).

Maquis, 301, 304, 305

relations with de Gaulle and Giraud, 86—87

French Training Section (FTS), 89, 101, 130,

229, 235, 240, 271, 291. See also Kingman,

Brig. Gen. Alien F.

creation, 231, 293

French Liaison Section with, 295

French participation in, 295

and inspection of units, 99, 142, 164, 165, 234,

237, 239

and JRC, 92, 233-34, 283, 293-94

movement to France, 192, 193-94, 239, 296

movement to Oran, 233

training program, 236. See also Training,

under Fifth Army control, 293

U. S. advisers with French divisions, 172, 231,

276, 295

U. S. instructor teams with French units, 170,

231-33, 237, 295

and 2674th JRC Headquarters Company (Provisional), 293-94

and 2674th JRC Regiment, 294

and 6834th JRC Training Regiment, 294, 294n

French Union, 308, 391, 392

French West Africa, 195, 201, 374, 391

contribution to war effort, 194

Pre-TORCH build-up of forces, 12

French West Indies, 53, 214, 221

Fullerton, Lt. Col. R. G., 383, 385
428 REARMING THE FRENCH

Gale, Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey M., 81, 351

Gammell, Lt. Gen. J. A. H., 126, 148, 152, 158,

168. See also Allied Force Headquarters

(AFHQ).

Garbay, Brig. Gen. Pierre, 353

Garde Mobile, 316, 329, 331, 341, 370

Gardiner, Col. William Tudor, 135, 196, 274, 274n,

283. See also Joint Rearmament Committee

(JRG). chairman, JAC, 208, 286, 287

chairman, JRC, 25, 208n, 272

and French rearmament, 56, 198, 272n, 284

Gaulle, Gen. Charles de, 11, 39, 39n, 78-79, 80,

105, 115, 116, 153, 163, 166, 183, 192, 194,

202. 273, 315, 337, 344, 345, 404. See also

French Committee of National Liberation

(CFLN); French National Committee; French

Provisional Government.

at Casablanca Conference, 33

conference with Eisenhower, 124-25, 228

and control of French forces, 119

and Darlan, 21

and equipping French forces, 12-13, 124-25, 157,

203. 221, 306, 327, 336-37, 338

excluded from TORCH, 13

and forces for the Far East, 393-94, 396

and Franco-Italian border incident, 368, 369

and Free French Forces, 9, 82, 195, 214

and Giraud, 32, 78, 86-87, 98, 125, 151-52

and Resistance Forces, 299, 301, 302, 302n, 319

and Stuttgart incident, 361-62, 367

in Washington, 165, 312, 321

Gendarmerie, 316, 319, 323, 329, 331, 341, 370

Geraghty, Col. Michael J., 135, 136, 137, 138, 175,

283, 290, 291, 292. See also Stock Control

Section, JRC.

Gérardot, Brig. Gen. Paul, 212

Germany, 1, 9, 309, 338, 340, 392, 395

armistice of June 1940 with, 7, 11, 404

armistice with (V-E Day), 341, 344, 358, 359,

360, 363, 366, 369, 376, 396, 402, 403

French casualties incurred in, 403n

French occupation forces in, 317, 322, 327, 337,

359, 365, 399

French security units in, 341, 342, 343, 344

French units participating in campaign of, 363,

364, 397, 404

French zone of occupation, 342, 343, 365

operations in, 390, 396, 399

Gibraltar, 13, 78

Giles, Maj. Gen. Barney McK., 208

Giraud, Gen. Henri, 1, 16n, 17, 24, 45, 49, 72, 114,

115, 123-24, 134, 139, 144, 145, 149, 180-81,

195, 196, 214, 220, 228, 231, 233, 255, 256,

273, 280, 284. See also Commander in Chief,

French; French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN); French High Command.

appearances before the CCS, 35-36, 82

appointed Commander in Chief, 16, 18

appointed Inspector General, 152

at Casablanca Conference, 33, 35-36, 48, 218

and CFLN, 98, 118, 152-53

and conquest of Corsica, 101

and control over French forces, 79-80, 86, 98,

116, 117-119, 151-52

and de Gaulle, 32, 78-79, 125

and employment of French forces, 56-57, 76,

82, 224

and equipping of French forces, 29, 32, 43, 46,

48, 58, 65, 65n, 70, 75, 79-80, 82, 94, 107-

08, 109, 110, 125, 148, 152-53, 158, 159, 202,

203, 211, 219, 221, 257-58, 306

his estimate of French capabilities, 23

and Free French Forces, 86-89, 107-08, 110,

117, 117n

and French forces in Italy, 113, 116-17, 147,

153, 167

and French forces in Tunisia, 18, 27-28

and French merchant shipping, 74

message to America, 59-60

message to Roosevelt, 32

messages to Marshall, 86, 97, 124, 126-27, 148

misgivings about ANFA Agreement, 39-41

negotiations with Roosevelt at Anfa, 36-38, 49n,

52, 53, 152

and organization of expeditionary forces, 71, 75,

87, 88-89, 115-16, 126, 155

and payment of troops, 217-18

Pre-TORCH negotiations with, 13-14, 306

relations with AFHQ, 96

relieved of command, 152

replaces Darlan, 21

sends missions to the United States, 26, 27n,

217, 279

and service troops, 104-05, 107, 125, 166-67.

See also Service troops, French.

and substitutions of equipment, 243-44

and U. S. assistance, 69

visit to Canada, 85, 85 n

visit to the United States, 77-78, 81, 82-84, 86,

92, 94, 152-53

wants four armored divisions, 127, 128, 129,

148-49
INDEX 429

Glassford, Rear Adm. William A., 218

Godfrey, Adm. René, 214, 221

Goumiers, 12, 12n

employment, 82, 111, 112-13, 113n, 159

equipment for, 149, 160, 250-51

goum, tabor, and tabor group organization, 112-

13. See also Units, French.

Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française. See French Provisional Government.

Graham, Maj. Erwin S., 385

Granier, Brig. Gen. Georges, 187, 188, 358. See

also Base 901.

Green, Maj. Archibald W., 295

Gross, Brig. Gen. Jean, 167, 187. See also Base

901.

Gruenther, Maj. Gen. Alfred M., 63

Guillaume, Maj. Gen. Augustin, 12n, 113, 178, 353,

397

Gustav Line, 178, 179

Halifax, Lord, 392

Hall, Rear Adm. John L., 217

Hampton Roads, Va., 220

Handy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T., 55, 317. See also

Operations Division, War Department

(OPD).

Hartemann, Col. André, 286, 288

Henry, Flight Lt. A. L. W. R., 286

Hesdin, Maj. Gen. René de, 353

Hewitt, Vice Adm. Henry Kent, 225

Holland, 310, 374n, 381

Holmes, Col. Julius C., 274

Home Fleet. See under Royal Navy.

Home Guard (Br.), 247

Hopkins, Harry L., 36n

Hughes, Maj. Gen. Everett S., 72-73, 105, 317

Hull, Cordell, 80-81, 301-02, 392-93. See also

State Department.

Hull, Brig. Gen. John E., 52. See also Operations Division, War Department (OPD).

HUSKY, 54, 54n, 77-78, 77n, 83

Imperial General Staff (Br.), 10n, 331

India, 392

Indian Ocean, 224

Indochina, 391, 398, 399

French desire to liberate resisted by Roosevelt,

392, 393, 394

Resistance forces in, 394-95

Infantry Divisions, U. S.

3d, 353

4th, 182

28th, 353

36th, 353

66th, 387

75th, 353

Infantry weapons. See also Ammunition,

automatic arms, 89, 247

BAR's, 250, 252

for nonprogram units, 250, 252

for program units, 249-50, 252

for Sovereignty troops, 252

fusil-mitrailleur, 249, 249n, 250, 251, 252

in hands of forces engaged in Tunisia, 249

machine and submachine guns, 249-51

pistols and revolvers, 249, 251, 252-53

carbines, 246, 247-48, 248n, 249, 250

controversy over French infantry fire power, 248,

253

of French manufacture, 246, 249-50, 251, 328

rifles

for former Resistance forces, 324

in hands of forces engaged in Tunisia, 246

for nonprogram units, 246, 247

for program units, 45n, 83, 85, 91, 246-47,

248, 249

for Sovereignty troops, 246

substitutions, 246, 247, 249, 250

Inspection Group, Rearmament Division, SHAEF

Mission to France, 326, 381, 383-84. See

also Kingman, Brig. Gen. Alien F.; Training,

activities, 339, 387, 388

establishment and composition, 386—87

and Metropolitan Forces, 357, 390

transferred to USFET Mission to France, 390

6834th Rearmament Regiment, 294n, 386, 387

Inspector General (Fr.), 152

International Division, ASF, 219, 263, 312. See

also Army Service Forces (ASF).

and arming the French, 22, 27, 99, 198, 346,

369-70, 375

on Franco-American relations, 154

Italy, 116, 144, 168, 169, 183n, 191, 237, 238,

255, 258, 263, 264, 275, 276, 295, 321, 388.

See also Fifth Army; Sicily,

campaign in, 72, 117, 399

French air units engaged in, 207, 209, 210, 211-

12

French casualties in, 403n

French ground units engaged in. See French

Expeditionary Corps (CEF).
430 REARMING THE FRENCH

Italy—Continued

French participation in campaign of, 72, 94, 95—

96, 101, 114, 121, 129, 147, 151, 152, 153,

155, 159, 166, 167, 171, 174, 178-80, 194, 248,

328, 334, 367, 404

incident in northwest Italy, 367-68, 369, 376,

398

maintenance of French forces in, 139, 143, 257

postcampaign re-equipping of French units, 173,

182-83

Jacobson, Capt. Henry, 295

Japan, 317, 398

French participation in war against, 308, 371,

391-92, 393, 395, 396

occupation of Indochina by, 391, 394, 395

surrender (V-J Day), 372, 399, 402

Jaujard, Rear Adm. Robert, 225

Jean Bart, battleship, 220, 221

Jedburgh teams, 304

Joint Air Commission (JAG), 204, 205, 209, 210,

262, 271, 309, 373n. See also Saville, Brig.

Gen. Gordon P.

activities, 286-87

chairmen, 203, 208, 286, 287

composition, 286—87

disbandment, 212, 286

establishment, 93, 202-03, 282, 285-86

functions, 203, 206

and the JRC, 288

and MAAF, 286

and Mediterranean Air Command, 286

movement to France, 212, 382, 384

Joint Chiefs of Staff, U. S. (JCS), 317, 370, 371,

379. See also Arnold, Gen. Henry H.; King,

Adm. Ernest J.; Leahy, Adm. William D.;

Marshall, Gen. George C.

and employment of liberated manpower, 317-18,

322, 330

and employment of North African Forces, 84

on French participation in Far East operations,

391, 397

membership, 10n

and organization and equipping of Metropolitan

units, 309, 318, 320, 322, 333, 336-37, 357,

360, 361, 363, 365-66

position on French rearmament, 34-36, 48-49,

51, 53-54, 55, 55n, 56-57, 82, 95

position on postwar forces, 327, 337, 366

and U. S. assistance to French Resistance,

301-03, 304

JCS 206/1, 55n

Joint Logistics Committee (JLC), 314-15, 317,

322, 330, 336, 337, 364, 395

Joint Rearmament Committee (JRC), 103, 128,

139, 208n, 227, 229, 236, 241, 254, 291, 309,

311, 316, 324, 382, 385

activities, 282-84, 285

and ANFA Plan, 41

and Brazilian Expeditionary Force, 275-76

chairmen, 25, 92, 107. See also Artamonoff, Lt.

Col. George L.; Gardiner, Col. William Tudor;

Loomis, Brig. Gen. Harold F.; Spalding, Brig.

Gen. Sidney P.

composition and organization, 271, 281-82

disbandment, 278

and equipping of French air units, 196, 200, 201,

202, 203, 205-206, 209, 285

and equipping of French forces, 65, 70-71, 72-73,

76, 89, 91, 92, 94-96, 100, 104, 120, 122, 126,

142, 156, 163-64, 169, 191, 193, 244, 249,

252, 260, 281

and equipping of French naval units, 214, 215,

222, 282

establishment and functions, 25, 62, 271

on Franco-American relations, 154, 159

and French ANVIL forces, 164

and French forces in Tunisia, 281, 282-83

and French High Command, 280, 281, 284

and French requisitions, 143, 158, 161, 169, 172-

73, 255

French Section, 278-81. See also Regnault,

Brig. Gen. Jean,

and French service troops, 105, 106, 107, 108,

109, 189, 235

and French supply system, 130, 131, 133, 135,

283

and French Tables of Organization and Equipment, 70-71

and French Training Section, 92, 275, 282,

293-94, 295. See also French Training Section.

and JAG, 288

JRC Advance, 276-78

JRC Rear, 193, 278

and maintenance of French troops, 257, 261, 262

and Mast Plan, 29

membership, 272. 274-75

movement to France, 192, 212, 276, 381, 382-83,

385-86

position in theater staff structure, 92, 271,

273-74, 275, 282

reports issued by, 284-85
INDEX 431

Joint Rearmament Committee (JRC)—Continued

and shortages in French units, 99, 141, 170,

232, 234

and Stock Control Section, 135, 137, 234. See

also Stock Control Section, JRC.

and U. S. support troops for the French, 71, 104

Joint Staff Planners, U. S. (JPS), 95, 391

and French rearmament, 55, 55n

and liberated manpower, 306, 308, 310

Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 203, 309, 326,

379, 391

Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC), 93

Jousse, Lt. Col. Louis, 14

JPS. See Joint Staff Planners, U. S. (JPS).

JRC Headquarters Company (Provisional),

2674th, 291, 293, 294. See also French

Training Section, JRC

JRC Regiment, 2674th, 294

JRC Training Regiment, 6834th, 294, 294n, 386

Juin, Gen. Alphonse, 11, 80, 94, 151, 194, 230, 248,

347, 367, 368, 396

chief of staff, French National Defense, 191, 369

commander, French forces in Italy, 72, 72n, 117,

141, 146, 147, 167, 178, 179n, 256. See also

French Expeditionary Corps (CEF).

commander, French forces in Tunisia, 27-28

and labor and security units, 323, 327-28, 330,

341, 342-44, 362, 366

and Metropolitan Forces, 321, 322, 327-28, 329,

330, 331, 346, 355, 358-59, 362, 364

Kesselring, Field Marshal Albert, I79n

King, Adm. Ernest J., 34, 379, 393

and French rearmament, 35, 51, 52, 83, 218

member CCS, 10n

Kingman, Brig. Gen. Alien F., 92, 107, 130, 131,

142, 147, 233, 294, 294n, 388n. See also

Training,

chief, French Training Section, 232, 293. See

also French Training Section (FTS).

chief, Inspection Group, 326, 386, 387, 388.

See also Inspection Group,

and inspection of French troops, 170, 234, 236,

237, 283, 295, 339

movement to France, 296

and training of French troops, 72, 89-90, 101,

231-32, 235, 236, 239, 390

Kirk, Vice Adm. Alan G., 225, 377, 385

Knox, Frank, 217

Knox, Lt. Col. John C., 235, 275, 294, 294n

Koenig, Lt. Gen. Pierre, 87, 320

commander, 1st Free French Brigade, 11

commander, 1st Free French Division, 10-11

commander, FFI, 300, 319

Military Governor of Paris, 319

Labarbarie, Lt. Col. Maurice, 358, 358n

Lafayette Escadrille, 196. See also under Units,

French, Air Force.

Laing, Capt. M. B., 275

Lake Chad, Africa, 10

L'Arba, Algeria, 236

Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B., 166, 188, 229, 238.

See also Services of Supply (SOS)

NATOUSA,

and equipping French troops, 155, 164, 170, 190,

241-42, 264

and French supply system, 132, 133, 136, 137,

143, 174

Larminat, Lt. Gen. Edgar de, 80, 81, 378

Lattre de Tassigny, Gen. Jean de, 187. See also

1st French Army,

commander, Armée B, 183

commander, 1st French Army, 183, 337, 353

commander-designate, French ANVIL forces,

125, 153, 163, 181

and Stuttgart incident, 361, 367

Lawley, Lt. Col. Douglas N., 272

Leahy, Adm. William D., 223, 223n, 396. See

also Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) ; Joint

Chiefs of Staff, U. S. (JCS).

and French rearmament, 50, 51, 52-53, 54, 56,

334

member CCS, 10n

Le Bel, Lt. Col. Albert, 82n

Leclerc, Maj. Gen. Jacques, 10, 182, 353, 397

Leclerc Column. See under Units, French.

Le Havre, 339

Lehman, Lt. René, 275, 281

Lemaigre-Dubreuil, Jacques, 26, 31, 32, 37n

Le Mans, 355

Lemonnier, Rear Adm. André, 87, 221, 222, 224,

225. See also French Navy.

Lend-lease, 25, 103, 146, 262, 285, 345, 360, 366

agreements on, with French authorities, 345n,

362

charges against French account, 144, 145, 263,

267, 401. See also Accounting,

end of, 361, 365, 368-69, 370-72, 398

for Free French Forces, 10, 402
432 REARMING THE FRENCH

Lend-lease—Continued

for North African Forces, 21

reverse (Reciprocal Aid), 257, 266-67, 345n,

362, 403

settlement of French account, 402-03

Lend-Lease Act, 21, 263, 267

Le Troquer, André, 118n, 149-50, 177. See also

under French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN), Commissioner of War and Air.

Lewis, Maj. Gen. John T., 341, 342, 381

Leyer, Lt. Gen. Roger, 64, 64n, 83n, 122, 123, 128,

132, 140, 143, 152, 157, 164, 170, 173, 177,

190, 237, 239, 244, 254, 255, 280, 284, 290.

See also French High Command (France);

French High Command (North Africa).

appointed Army Chief of Staff (Algiers), 87

appointed Army Chief of Staff (Paris), 386

and employment of liberated manpower, 192, 308,

309, 316

and 15 August (43) Plan, 105, 106, 108

and forces for the Far East, 391

and maintenance of troops, 257, 258, 262, 263,

265

and organization and equipping of' Metropolitan

units, 330, 331, 349, 351, 356

program. See under Rearmament programs,

rearmament requests from, 75-76, 86, 159, 200,

252, 257, 266

and reorganization of French supply system, 133

and service troops, 146, 166, 174, 351

L'Huillier, Lt. Col. André, 233, 237, 294-95, 296,

386, 386n

Liberated manpower

of Belgium, 325, 341n

of Czechoslovakia, 329

employment and equipping, 299, 306-08, 310,

311, 313-15, 317-18, 319, 326, 329, 332-33,

334, 335, 340, 341-42

of France. See under Metropolitan Forces; Rearmament programs, Liberated Manpower

Program.

of Poland, 329, 335

and problem of postwar armies, 313, 315, 317,

337

responsibility for equipping, 357

SHAEF's program of employment, 310, 313, 314,

315, 316, 329-30

Liberated Manpower Program. See under Rearmament programs.

Ligurian Gulf, 367

Linares, Brig. Gen. François de, 353

Liri River, Italy, 178

Lodge, Lt. (jg) J, 275

London, 22, 150, 302, 303, 386, 399

agencies in, supporting French Resistance, 9n,

299-301, 306, 310

French National Committee at, 9, 12, 78

Headquarters, ETOUSA, at, 25

Post-Hostilities Planning Committee at, 308

London Munitions Assignments Board. See Munitions Assignments Board, London.

Loomis, Brig. Gen. Harold F., 128, 135, 147, 155,

170, 173, 174, 177, 191, 193, 205, 237, 280,

311, 376, 388n. See also Joint Rearmament

Committee (JRC) ; Rearmament Division,

SHAEF Mission to France,

chairman, JRC, 107, 275, 393

chief, Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to

France, 192, 194, 233, 324, 331, 381, 383,

385, 386, 387

chief, Rearmament and Operations Division,

USFET Mission to France, 387

commands Headquarters, North African District, 276

and substitutions of equipment, 241, 242, 244,

248

on Franco-American relations, 154

and French ANVIL forces, 164, 239

and French service troops, 107, 146, 166

and maintenance of French forces, 257, 262, 263

and Metropolitan Forces, 316, 329, 332, 346,

347, 349, 350, 356, 356n, 363

and nonprogram units, 158, 159, 190

and rearming the French, 107, 108-09, 121, 122,

126, 241, 249

and Sovereignty Forces, 160-61

and Territorial Forces, 123

and training of the French, 390

Lorraine, battleship, 221, 225, 378

Lowry, Lt. Col. Howard J., 284

Luckenbach, Lt. Col. Everett A., 295

Luminaski, Maj. Robert M., 295

Lutes, Gen. LeRoy, 312

Lyon, 8, 186, 187, 354, 358, 366, 371

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 376, 396, 397

Macmillan, Harold, 119, 149, 152

Macready, Lt. Gen. George N., 40, 40n, 50, 52, 54.

See also British Joint Staff Mission.

Madagascar, 9, 255, 258, 391, 392

Magnan, Brig. Gen. Joseph, 181, 353

Maintenance. See Supply and maintenance.

Maquis. See under French Resistance.
INDEX 433

Marine Nationale. See under French Navy.

Marseille, 183, 347, 350, 354, 375

Base 901 at, 187, 266

Coastal Base Section at 186-87, 248

Delta Base Section at, 188, 193, 239

JRC training personnel operating at, 294, 296,

386

SCAM A office at, 188, 386

Marshall, Gen. George C., 15, 26, 27, 30, 31, 38,

41-42, 78, 82, 101, 105, 111, 118, 123, 126,

127, 129, 148, 155, 158, 179, 183, 203, 212,

221, 228, 231, 308, 312, 314, 382. See also

Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS); Joint Chiefs

of Staff, U. S. (JCS).

and ANFA Agreement, 40n, 43-44, 48, 49n

on ANFA Plan, 39-40

on control of French forces, 150

and equipping Metropolitan Forces, 122, 165,

309, 312-13, 320, 321, 322, 327, 333, 336,

347, 360, 362, 364

and equipping North African Forces, 34-36, 39-

40, 46-47, 48, 50, 55, 56, 75, 83, 84, 85, 86,

92, 93, 97, 98, 123-24, 165

and equipping Resistance Forces, 301—02, 303,

304

and Franco-American relations, 154, 254

and Free French Forces, 13

and French forces for the Far East, 331, 391-92,

394, 396-97, 398

member CCS, 10n

and termination of French rearmament, 368, 369

on U. S. service troops for the French, 104-05,

167, 168

and use of liberated manpower, 315, 320, 321,

323

Martin, Lt. Gen. Henry, 101, 181

Martinique, 53, 234, 237

Massigli, René, 119, 149

Mast, Brig. Gen. Charles

at Cherchel meeting, 1, 14

Plan. See under Rearmament programs.

McCloy, John J., 31, 42n, 369, 398

McCrea, Capt. John L., 36n

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T., 53, 368, 369

Mediterranean Air Command, 201, 205, 207. See

also Tedder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W.

assistance to French Air Force, 287

control over French units, 202, 203, 204, 223

Establishment Section of, 286

and the JAC, 93, 203, 285-86

superseded by MAAF, 206, 286

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF), 287.

See also Eaker, Lt. Gen. Ira C.

assistance to French Air Force, 209, 210, 212

establishment, 207, 286

Mediterranean Allied Coastal Command, 207

Mediterranean Base Section (MBS), 67, 174, 189,

193, 239, 245, 291, 294

Mediterranean theater, 324, 367. See also individual campaigns; Allied Force Headquarters

(AFHQ) ; French Air Force (FAF).

Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U. S. Army

(MTOUSA), 193, 267, 270, 368-69

Meknes, French Morocco, 189, 236

Mendigal, Gen. Jean, 195, 198, 200

Metropolitan Forces, 122, 191-92, 285. See also

French Air Force (FAF) ; French Navy;

French rearmament; French Resistance; Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to

France; Training.

Armistice Army, 7-8, 11, 17

British equipment for. See under United Kingdom.

Canadian equipment for. See under Canada.

captured enemy equipment for, 324, 334, 347,

348, 355

control of units, 326, 327-28, 341, 362, 366, 370

difficulties in arming, 345

effectives available for, 323, 330-31

equipping as planned by the French, 165, 306,

308, 310-11, 312, 316, 321, 327, 329, 330,

336, 373. See also Liberated manpower.

equipping suspended, 342-43, 345, 361, 363-64,

365

French equipment for. See under France.

large-scale activation resisted by Allies, 308-09,

313. 315, 336-37

maintenance, 365, 370, 371-72

manpower requirements, 337-38, 346, 351-53

organization and equipping of combat units, 313,

314. 317-18, 320, 321-22, 323, 324, 326, 328-

29, 331-33, 334-35, 336, 346-47, 348, 351,

354-55, 356, 358, 359-60, 362

organization and equipping of labor and security

units, 310, 311-12, 313, 314, 315-16, 318, 320,

321, 322, 323, 324, 326, 329, 330, 331, 336,

338, 339, 340-42, 368, 370

postarmistice issue of equipment to, 364, 365,

371

problem of postwar forces, 313, 315, 322, 326,

357, 364, 365

rehabilitation of military establishment, 328, 330,

336, 337
434 REARMING THE FRENCH

Metropolitan Forces—Continued

responsibility for equipping units of, 355

security units for use in Germany, 342, 343—44

support troops for, 313-14, 339-40, 348-49,

350-51, 358, 363

units for the Far East. See French Far East Expeditionary Corps (CEFEO).

Metropolitan Program. See under Rearmament

programs.

Michelier, Vice Adm. François, 214, 215, 217

Middle East Command, 82

Military Representatives of Associated (Pacific)

Powers, 30n

Minister of Defence (Br.). See Churchill, Prime

Minister Winston S.

Minister of Economic Warfare (Br.), 299, 300

Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (Fr.),

402n

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Fr.), 336, 368, 396

Ministry of War (Fr.), 325, 330-31, 339, 352, 357,

365, 386, 389, 398. See also Diethelm, André.

Mondin, Maj. Gilbert, 275

Monnet, Jean, 44, 81n, 280, 284

Monsabert, Lt. Gen. Aimé de Goislard de, 111, 178,

183, 183n, 353

Montcalm, cruiser, 82

Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L., 111,

335

Morel, Maj. Jean, 272, 279, 280

Morliere, Maj. Gen. Louis, 353

Morrow, Col. John, 272

Munitions Assignments Board, London, 22, 45n,

252, 385

Munitions Assignments Board, Washington, 26, 44,

47,99, 131, 141, 176, 220, 280

assignments to the French, 45, 55, 60, 84, 86, 89,

97, 125, 148, 156, 158, 164, 201, 208, 210, 241,

247, 252, 258, 346, 375

responsibilities, 22-23, 40, 48-51, 52, 53-54, 55,

79, 103, 360

Munitions Assignments Committee (Air), 22, 197

Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground), 22,

45, 85, 101-03, 265, 309n

Munitions Assignments Committee (Navy), 22

Murmansk, USSR, 224

Murphy, Robert D., 36n, 39, 98

on French rearmament, 43

Pre-TORCH negotiations with Giraud, 14, 37n

Muselier, Vice Adm. Emile, 214

Mutual Aid, Anglo-French. See under United

Kingdom.

Naples, 143, 146, 166, 187

National Defense Committee. See also French

High Command (North Africa),

establishment and functions, 98, 116n, 118, 153

and 1st DMI incident, 116-17

and forces for the Far East, 391, 393-94

and rearmament program, 105, 122, 126—27,

128, 148, 150, 177, 308, 312, 373, 377

National Defense General Staff (Fr.). See under

French High Command (North Africa).

Navy Department, 223, 372. See also United

States Navy.

Negro troops, French, withdrawn from Western

Front, 325, 354, 394

Netherlands, 252, 343

New York, 80n, 220

New York Port of Embarkation, 144, 219

Noce, Maj. Gen. Daniel, 170, 239

Noguès, Gen. Auguste, 11, 12n

Noiret, Brig. Gen. Charles, 310, 315, 385

Nonprogram units, 72, 190, 191, 191n, 193

equipping, 112-13, 121, 149, 158-60, 169, 246,

252

maintenance, 121

Normandy, 182, 303, 334

North Africa. See French North Africa.

North African District, 276

North African Economic Board, 255, 262

North African Forces, 311. See also French rearmament; Joint Rearmament Committee

(JRC) ; Rearmament programs.

African Army, Pre-TORCH rearmament plans,

14-15

African Army, status, 11-12, 17-18

agencies involved in equipping and training, 271

air units. See also French Air Force (FAF).

integration into Allied air forces, 198

maintenance and supply, 198, 199-200

operational control, 198

performance, 199

rearming, 30, 54, 55, 57, 61, 76-77, 83, 86,

90, 195-99, 200-01

casualties, 403n

CCS discussions on equipping, 33-36, 50, 52-53

combat performance, 24, 82, 178-79, 179n, 194,

199, 328, 334

control, 117-18, 150-51, 152, 309

effects and implications of their equipping, 30-

31, 47, 48-49, 50-51, 54, 56, 57, 82, 93n, 124,

196-97, 199. See also Shipping.
INDEX 435

North African Forces—Continued

fusion with Free French Forces, 80, 81-82, 86,

195, 201, 221, 273

JCS proposals for their equipping, 155

lend-lease extended to, 21

morale affected by equipping, 29, 30, 42, 43, 86,

127, 128-29, 159

naval units, 214-15. See also French Navy.

Allied aircraft and vessels for, 218

desertion of crews to Free French vessels,

80n, 218

employment and control, 214, 220-21

payment of personnel, 217

rehabilitation, 76, 77, 82-83, 90, 214-17,

218-20

repairs in the United States, 215, 218, 220

operational employment, 55, 78, 83, 93-94, 94n,

95-96, 101, 108, 111, 119

operations. See individual campaigns.

procedure for assigning equipment to, 22-23, 198

re-entry into the war, 16—17

strength, 23-24, 71, 82, 87, 105, 115, 194

units eliminated from rearmament program, 126-

27, 128-29, 149

white and native elements in, 23-24, 115, 254

women in, 259, 260. See also Women's Army

Auxiliary Corps, French (AFAT).

North African Shipping Board, 255

North African Theater of Operations, U. S. Army

(NATOUSA), 113, 153, 156, 159, 190, 239,

276, 284. See also Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.;

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.; Services of Supply (SOS) NATOUSA,

control over JRC, 275, 282

Devers commands, 129

Eisenhower commands, 25

and equipment for the French, 97, 107, 136, 140,

144, 156, 158, 164, 172, 176, 210, 212, 227,

249, 252, 259-60, 266, 267-68, 274

headquarters moved to Caserta, 276n

and maintenance of French troops, 103, 138, 141,

142, 144, 205, 254-55, 257-58, 263-64, 265,

266

and readying French ANVIL forces, 163, 164, 173

responsibility in arming the French, 25, 46, 63,

231, 264, 269

and training of French troops, 293

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 403

Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF), 198, 200,

204, 205, 207, 286. See also Spaatz, Maj.

Gen. Carl.

Northwest African Air Service Command

(NAASC), 198, 200, 206

Northwest African Coastal Air Force, 204

Northwest African Tactical Air Force, 198, 204

Northwest African Troop Carrier Command, 283

Nyo, Brig. Gen. Georges, 397

Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 300, 301, 304.

See also Donovan, Brig. Gen. William J.

Office of War Information, 348

Old, Capt. Francis P., 275

Operations Division, War Department (OPD), 327

and French armament, 22, 23, 47, 52, 55-56,

91, 97, 284, 346, 364

and use of liberated manpower, 314-15, 317, 330

Operations Groups, 304

Oran, Algeria, 63, 67n, 84, 193, 220, 235, 238

Allied landings at, 16

French base at, 135, 157, 166, 229

French Training Section at, 233, 293, 296

SCAMA established at, 132-33, 134, 290

Ordnance Group, 53d, 275

Ordnance Service, 346

Ordnance Training School, French, 189, 236

Organisation de Résistance de l'Armée, 17

Oudjda, French Morocco, 293

OVERLORD, 122, 299, 311, 313, 316

French participation in, 119, 125, 127, 129, 150,

151, 171, 228

French units in, 182, 210, 224-25

Resistance Forces and, 303-04

Overseas Supply Division, New York Port of Embarkation, 219

Pacific theater, 44, 364. See also Far East.

introduction of French forces in, 371, 391, 396,

397. See also French Far East Expeditionary

Corps (CEFEO).

operations in, 379, 396

Pacific War Council, 391

Paris, 86, 125, 157, 171, 192, 226, 336, 347

liberated, 182, 191, 276, 319, 393

movement of French armed services to, 191, 193,

212, 393

movement of French Training Section to, 296,

386

Parnell, Lt. Col. W. C., 295
436 REARMING THE FRENCH

Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M., 163, 183, 238, 239.

See also ANVIL; Force 163; Seventh Army.

Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr., 40, 182, 230, 283

Pénette, Capt. Marcel, 12n

Peninsular Base Section (PBS), 143, 146, 166, 167,

265. See also Base 901 (Fr.)

Permanent Military Committee (Fr.). See under

French Committee of National Liberation

(CFLN).

Pershing, Gen. John J., 3, 6n. See also American

Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.).

and equipping A.E.F., 2, 5

for a unified American force, 2, 5

Pétain, Marshal Henri, 7, 11, 16, 16n, 21, 33. See

also Vichy Government.

Philadelphia, 220

Pianosa Island, 182

Plat, Maj., 275

Poincelet, Lt. Comdr. R., 272

POL, 100n, 109, 369, 371

Port-aux-Poules, Algeria, 235

Portal, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles, 10n, 36. See

also British Chiefs of Staff; Combined Chiefs

of Staff (CCS).

Post exchange supplies. See under Supply and

maintenance.

Poste de Statistique. See under French High

Command (North Africa).

Post-Hostilities Planning Committee (Br.), 308

Potsdam Conference, 371, 398

Pound, Adm. Sir Dudley, 10n, 36, 218

Poupinel, Gen. R., 279

Poydenot, Brig. Gen. Antoine, 249, 249n

Préaud, Lt. Gen. Henri, 344

Préclaire, Lt. Col. René, 295

Première Armée Française. See 1st French Army.

Prioux, Lt. Gen. René, 64n

Provence, 183

Provisional Government of the French Republic.

See French Provisional Government.

Prytanée, 236

QUADRANT. See Quebec Conference.

Quails, Maj. J. R., 275

Quartermaster (Fr.), 257, 258-59

Quebec Conference (Aug 1943), 95, 96

Rabat, French Morocco, 283

Ramsay, Adm. Sir Bertram H., 224-25

Ratay, Brig. Gen. John P., 187

Rations, 100n, 103, 369, 371

considered inadequate, 155, 255-56, 257, 287

constitution of food stocks, 142-43, 254-55, 25

for expeditionary forces, 89, 143, 144, 145, 187.

207, 254-56, 257-58

French and Moslem menus, 255, 256-57, 258

Rearmament Division (Br.), 388, 390

Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to France,

294n, 329, 330, 385. See also Loomis, Brig.

Gen. Harold F.; Regnault, Brig. Gen. Jean,

activities, 381, 388

Air Section, 373, 373n, 374, 375, 384, 385

and equipping ex-Resistance Forces, 326

establishment, 192, 276, 324, 381, 382-83

French Group, 331, 383, 385-86

and equipping labor and security units, 339

membership, 381-83, 386

and equipping Metropolitan units, 331, 336.

346-47, 348, 355, 358

mission, 381

Naval Section, 384

organization, 383-84, 387-88

training section. See Inspection Group.

Rearmament and Operations Division, USFET

Mission to France, 387

French Group in, 387

Training Section in. See under Inspection

Group.

Rearmament problems. See French rearmament.

Rearmament programs

Air programs, 158, 177, 196-97, 199, 202, 308,

373

Plan VII, 204-06, 207-09, 210-11, 212,

223, 224, 373

Plan VII, Extension of, 335, 359, 363, 374

ANFA Plan, 37-38, 39, 53, 104, 155, 196, 308-

09, 385

implications, 38-42, 43-44, 48, 49n, 73, 105

implementation, 45, 61, 71, 72-73, 92, 95,

97, 322, 327, 332, 333

modifications, 87-89, 109

15 August (43) Plan, 94-97, 103, 105, 107-09,

110, 114-15, 126, 146, 148-49

Béthouart Program, 29-30, 31-32, 38, 45, 196-

97

Far East Program, 293, 294

23 January (44) Plan, 128, 129, 145, 146,-147,

148-49, 155, 156, 157-58, 160, 163, 166, 167,

177, 183

Leyer Program, 75-77, 86, 159
INDEX 437

Rearmament programs—Continued

Liberated Manpower Program, 331, 332, 335,

338, 339-42, 344, 346, 360, 363, 366, 370,

381, 387, 389, 396

Mast Plan, 14, 15, 24, 29-30, 38, 281

Metropolitan Program, 331-32, 333-35, 336,

337-38, 339, 341, 343, 344-45, 346-51, 354,

355, 356-57, 358-60, 361, 362-63, 367,

369-70, 371, 381, 382, 387, 389-90, 395, 398,

399

Naval programs, 215-17, 218, 224

CCS 358 (Revised), 221-22, 225

20 November (43) Plan, 109-10, 114-15, 117,

121

30 November (44) Plan, 331, 332, 334

proposed by de Gaulle, 12-13, 336-38

proposed by Giraud, 13

proposed by JCS, 55

proposed by National Defense Committee, 308

Rearmament Regiment, 6834th. See under Inspection Group.

Rébillon, Capt. Fernand, 196

Reciprocal Aid. See under Lend-lease.

Red Army, 340, 396

Regnault, Brig. Gen. Jean, 108, 113, 128, 131-32

356n, 386

chief, French Section, JRC, 92, 275, 280-81,

281n. See also Joint Rearmament Committee (JRC).

chief, French Group, Rearmament Division,

SHAEF Mission to France, 281, 331, 385-86,

388n. See also Rearmament Division, SHAEF

Mission to France.

chief, French Group, Rearmament and Operations Division, USFET Mission to France,

387-88

Replacements, 183, 238

for 1st French Army, 239, 325, 337, 346, 351-53,

354, 388-89

training of. See under Training.

Reunion, 9

Resistance. See French Forces of the Interior

(FFI); French Resistance.

Rhine River, 343, 344, 364, 376

Richelieu, battleship, 80n, 82, 215, 217, 220, 221,

224

Robb, Air Marshal James M., 334, 374

Robert, Rear Adm. Georges, 53, 214, 221

Rock de Besombes, Group Capt. J., 286

Rome, 179, 179n, 209

Rooks, Maj. Gen. Lowell W., 113-14, 118

Roosevelt, Lt. Col. Elliott, 36n

Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 10n, 32, 38-39,

43, 54, 57, 77, 82, 110n, 118, 122, 217, 223-

24, 303, 309, 317, 336

agreements with Giraud, 36-38, 39-40, 40n, 41,

43-44, 49, 49n, 51, 52, 53, 56, 84

at Casablanca Conference, 33, 34, 48

and CFLN, 79, 119n, 150

and Cherchel meeting, 1, 1n, 14

and de Gaulle, 79-80, 337, 362

and French political strife, 98

and lend-lease to the French, 10, 21

message to the French, 59

opposed to French return to Indochina, 392, 393,

394-95

Rouen, 339

Royal Air Force (RAF), 195, 200, 201, 204, 210,

212, 286, 374, 376, 384

Royal Air Force Bomber Command, 373, 376

SAS Brigade and French components, 182, 211,

304, 316, 374

2d Tactical Air Force, 212, 373

Royal Navy, 214, 223, 273, 275

Far Eastern Fleet, 224

Fleet Air Arm, 223

Home Fleet, 224

Rue, Rear Adm. Joseph, 378

Saar, 344

Saint-Didier, Brig. Gen. Auguste Brossin de, 128,

320, 327. See also French Military Mission

in the United States.

and forces for the Far East, 394, 395, 398, 399

and Metropolitan Forces, 325, 333-34, 362

Saint Exupéy, Maj. Antoine de, 209n

St. Tropez, 316

Salan, Brig. Gen. Raoul, 353

San Francisco, 362

Sardinia, 56, 208, 211, 262

Saville, Brig. Gen. Gordon P., 288. See also Joint

Air Commission (JAC).

chairman, JAC, 203, 275, 285, 286, 287

commander, XII Tactical Air Command, 211,

286

and equipping French air units, 202, 205

member, JRC, 275, 285

Schlesser, Brig. Gen. Guy, 353

Scotland, 304

Sea Frontier Forces, 217

Secretary of State. See Hull, Cordell.

Sedan, France, 13

Seine River, 182

Selborne, Lord, 300
438 REARMING THE FRENCH

Senegal, 325

Service Central des Approvisionnements et Matériels Américains (SCAMA), 135, 145, 166,

172, 176, 212, 227, 271, 295. See also Charpentier, Col. Emile.

abolished, 357

activities, 175-76, 193, 291-93

difficulties encountered by, 135-36, 137, 174-75

establishes "common language," 292

establishment and mission, 132-33, 137, 139, 288

forward echelon in Marseille, 189

and French ANVIL forces, 164, 189

and French supply system, 138, 175

growth, 138, 143, 175

movement to France, 194, 386

organization, 288-90

publications depot operated by, 175, 229

and Stock Control Section, 135, 138

U. S. equipment for, 136

Service de Renseignements (S. R.), 8, 299

Service du Matériel. See under Supply Services,

French.

Service troops, French. See also 1st French Army;

French Expeditionary Corps (CEF).

controversy over requirements in, 104-08, 109,

110, 113-15, 114n, 124-25, 166, 167-69, 189,

350-51, 358

and handling of U. S. equipment, 354-55

at PBS, 146

program of activation, 108, 109-10, 114-15, 153,

156, 168-69, 210, 348-49, 358, 363, 366

recruitment difficulties, 23-24, 94-95, 97, 104,

106-07, 110, 124, 126, 129, 130, 165-67, 189,

308

short of equipment, 174

training. See under Training,

white personnel for, 71, 106

Services of Supply (SOS) ETOUSA, 172

Services of Supply (SOS) NATOUSA, 130, 170,

188, 207, 241, 259, 290, 293, 294. See also

Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B.

and arming the French, 67-68, 85, 136, 156, 169,

172, 190, 205, 211, 244, 260, 264, 265, 268,

269

and French ANVIL forces, 164, 173

French liaison group with, 134, 137, 145

and French service troops, 107, 189

and French supply system, 132, 134

and maintenance of French forces, 133, 139, 141,

142, 143-44, 145, 146, 173, 186-87, 254, 255,

257, 258, 263, 264

Services of Supply (SOS) NATOUSA—Continued

and repossession of U.S. equipment, 176, 190—91

and requisitions for the French, 144-45, 172-73

and Stock Control Section, 135

Sétif, Algeria, 162n

Seventh Army, 163, 183, 361, 376. See also Force

163; Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M.

and support of French forces, 169

and training of French forces, 238—39

Sevez, Maj. Gen. François, 117, 178, 353

SHAEF Mission to France, 341, 348, 381, 382, 385,

386, 387

Air Component, 373n, 375, 377, 385, 386

and equipping French forces, 339, 352, 365

French Armament Liaison Section with, 331

Naval Division, 377-78, 384, 386

organization, 324

Rearmament Division. See Rearmament Division, SHAEF Mission to France.

SHAEF Rearmament Regiment, 6834th, 386, 387

Shaw, Lt. Col. Robert J., 275-76, 295

Sheeline, Lt. Paul C., 286

Shipments, 145

of British equipment to the French, 339, 350,

355, 356

cargo convoy symbols, 47n

Commanding General Shipments. See under

Supply and maintenance,

distinctive markings for, 46n, 354

miscellaneous, 60-61, 71-72, 72n, 77, 84-85, 94,

96, 97, 99-100, 111, 156, 164, 165, 236, 347,

350, 356, 359-60

UGS 61⁄2, 47-48, 51, 65-67, 69, 130

Shipping

allocations to French rearmament, 41, 42, 47-48,

51, 57, 74, 75-76, 77-78, 83, 84, 95, 255

French merchant ships, 35, 38, 42, 51, 53-54,

74-75

limiting factor, 30-32, 40, 43-44, 46n, 49, 50-52,

53-54, 75-76, 77, 83, 93, 241, 323

Shortages, 356

causes of, 159, 169, 171, 189

in deliveries from the United States, 89, 99, 148,

156, 174, 189

filling of, 172, 176, 190, 375

incurred by French units, 99, 113, 164, 190, 355-

56, 359, 364

inspections to determine, 170, 238

of spare parts, 99, 121, 140-42, 165, 169, 170,

171, 174

and substitutions, 89
INDEX 439

Sicily

campaign of, 83, 94, 286n

French participation in assault on, 72, 94n, 113

Siena, 179

Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell, 123, 126, 397-98.

See also Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ);

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary

Force (SHAEF).

and employment of French forces, 94, 113, 119,

343-44, 366

and French rearmament, 32, 40, 46n, 56, 81, 84,

88, 107, 113, 129, 159, 325, 330, 332, 334, 348,

351, 359, 365, 368

and French service troops, 350-51

on General Juin, 72n

and liberated manpower, 310, 312, 315, 330,

342-43, 344

and reconstitution of Metropolitan Army, 329

Smolensk, 195n

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 33, 35, 38, 44, 48,

82, 84. See also Army Service Forces (ASF).

and rearming the French, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 75,

78, 83, 95, 96-97, 269, 336, 348, 349

special convoy arranged by, 47

Southeast Asia Command, 392, 394, 399

Southeast Training Command. See under U. S.

Army Air Forces (USAAF).

Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), 188

Sovereignty Forces, 17, 156, 186, 191, 192-93, 356.

See also French Communications Zone.

British equipment for, 161, 244

employment, 123, 160, 162, 162n.

French-made equipment for, 250, 251, 252

strength, 123, 194

U. S. equipment for, 123, 142, 160-62, 173, 193,

368-69

Spaatz, Maj. Gen. Carl, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201,

202. See also Northwest African Air Forces

(NAAF).

Spalding, Brig. Gen. Sidney P., 105, 107, 142, 143,

202. See also Joint Rearmament Committee

(JRC). chairman, JRC, 92, 104, 274

and French supply system, 131-32

and equipment shortages in French units, 99

Special Air Service (SAS) Brigade (Br.). See under Royal Air Force (RAF).

Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ), 300-301,

303, 310

Special Operations branch of OSS, 300

Special Operations Executive (SOE), 299, 300,

301

Special Project Operations Center, 300

Special Services Division, ASF, 261

Special Services supplies. See under Supply and

maintenance.

Stalin, Marshal Joseph, 110n

Staouelli, Algeria, 191n

State Department, 37n, 150, 263, 336, 357, 369,

371, 372, 392, 394, 396. See also Hull, Cordell.

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 337

Stephens, Lt. Col. Roy, 295

Stock Control Section, JRC, 164, 172, 271, 282.

See also Geraghty, Col. Michael J.

activities, 291-92

disbandment, 175, 291

organization and functions, 283, 288, 290-291

and SCAMA, 135, 137-38, 174, 290, 291

Stourm, Comdr. André, 272, 275

Strasbourg, 344, 347

Strength. See under specific commands such as

North African Forces; French Navy.

Stuttgart incident, 361-62, 367, 375, 396

Styer, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D., 241

Sudre, Brig. Gen. Aimé, 353

Suez Canal, 221

Supply and maintenance, 100-01, 109, 121-22,

146-47, 169, 186-87, 188. See also Expeditionary forces; Territorial Forces,

of air units, 198, 207, 262, 374, 375, 376

classes of supply, 100n

Class I. See Rations.

Class II. See Armor; Artillery; Clothing;

Infantry weapons.

Class III. See POL.

Class IV, 264-66

Class V. See Ammunition.

Commanding General Shipments, 267-68, 346,

401

disposal of British equipment, 177

emergency transfers, 28, 29, 60, 70, 141, 173,

244, 282-83

excess stocks, 176, 190, 191, 193

of forces in Germany, 360, 365

45-day reserve, 143

of naval units, 220

of nonprogram units. See under Nonprogram

units.

replacements, 99, 145, 170, 171, 183, 249

repossession of items, 157, 164, 176-77, 190-91,

193
440 REARMING THE FRENCH

Supply and maintenance—Continued

requisitions, 169-70, 186, 192, 281-82. See also

under French High Command (North Africa) ;

Joint Rearmament Committee (JRC); Services of Supply (SOS) NATOUSA

shoes for animals, 258n

spare parts, 99-101, 130, 177

special supplies, 260

gratuitous components, 260, 263

miscellaneous, 265—66

post exchange supplies, 144, 207, 260, 261-

64

Special Services supplies, 144, 207, 261

substitutions of equipment, 241-42, 249, 253.

See also under Artillery; Armor; Infantry

weapons.

technical publications in French, 228-30

theater transfers, 103, 141, 144-45, 156, 160,

164-65, 172, 174, 210, 241, 243, 247, 257,

262, 264-66, 268, 346, 366, 376, 401

unnecessary items, 85

Supply services, French, 69, 139, 173, 227, 259.

See also Service Central des Approvisionnements et Matériels Américains (SCAMA).

Centre de Reception des Matériels Américains

(CRMA), 135, 136

dearth of personnel for, 135-36, 174

and French expeditionary forces, 133, 136-37,

145, 147

and goal of self-reliance, 134

progress in stock recording, 175, 291-93

and reorganization of supply system, 130, 131-32,

134, 138, 155, 174-75

and stockpiling, 142, 143

Service du Matériel, 131

shortcomings, 100, 130-31, 133, 136, 143, 144,

147, 169, 174

Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, 125,

145, 149, 152, 153, 302, 314. See also Alexander, Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G.;

Wilson, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland.

and control of French forces, 150-51

and French rearmament, 177, 392

Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force,

300, 302, 332. See also Eisenhower, Gen.

Dwight D.; Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).

and control of French units, 327, 375

Eisenhower appointed, 124

and liberated manpower, 310, 314, 316-17, 330

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force

(SHAEF), 157, 162n, 192, 212, 330, 383.

See also Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.; Smith,

Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell.

Air Staff and the French, 375

and arming the French, 193, 194, 226, 276, 324,

331, 332, 334, 335, 336, 338, 346, 348, 349,

350-51, 354, 355-56, 358, 360, 361, 362, 363,

365, 366, 385, 386

and control of French forces, 194

and control of labor and security units, 327—28,

342, 343-44, 366, 370

dissolution, 371, 376, 381, 387, 390

and employment of liberated manpower, 239,

299, 306, 311-12, 313, 314-15, 329, 334, 346

and employment of Metropolitan units, 358

and 1st French Army, 351

and French Navy, 377-78, 385

and organization and equipping of labor and security units, 310, 314, 315, 316, 320, 322-23,

325, 326, 329, 331, 339, 341, 366, 370

Mission to France. See SHAEF Mission to

France.

and requirements in French combat units, 313,

314, 323, 332, 338, 351

and Resistance forces, 300, 324, 325, 326, 333,

389

Suttles, Col. Ernest A., 68, 283

Syria, 9

Tableau d'Effectifs de Guerre (T.E.G.). See

under Tables of Organization and Equipment.

Tables of Organization and Equipment

French tables, 70-71, 140-41, 142, 163, 170-71,

176, 250, 250n

for liberated manpower units, 310, 321

Tableau d'Effectifs de Guerre (T.E.G.), 250n

U. S. tables and French rearmament, 73, 163-64,

169, 211, 248n, 251, 251n, 281, 387, 397

Tabors; tabor groups. See Goumiers; Units,

French.

Tanks. See Armor.

Technical Training Command. See under U.S.

Army Air Forces (USAAF).

Tedder, Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur W., 54, 201,

202, 203, 204, 206-07. See also Mediterranean Air Command.

Tehran Conference (EUREKA), 110n, 111

Terré, Major H., 260

Territorial Command (Fr.), 321, 329
INDEX 441

Territorial Forces, 17, 109, 186, 192-93, 260,

310-11. See also French Communications

Zone,

equipping, 72, 92, 123, 128, 142, 172-74, 193,

258, 326n, 369

strength, 123, 194

Third Army, 172, 182

30 November (44) Plan. See under Rearmament

programs.

Tiers, Lt. Claude, 295, 295n

Timberlake, Brig. Gen. Patrick W., 286, 287

Tompkins, Brig. Gen. William F., 284

TORCH, 14-15, 60

Free French excluded from, 13

launching, 16

North Africa's resistance to, 16, 16n

Toulon, 17, 183, 214, 377

Training, 130. See also French Training Section

(FTS); Inspection Group; Kingman, Brig.

Gen. Alien F.

of air personnel, 196, 203-04, 207, 208, 209-10,

211, 234, 236-37, 374, 388, 390

in amphibious operations, 235

British contribution to, 203, 355, 360, 374,

389-90

in continental France, 239, 240, 387, 389

difficulties encountered in, 235, 237, 238, 388-

89

under Fifth Army, 72, 89-90, 231, 235

of labor and security units, 326, 339, 389

matériel for, 164-65, 169, 211, 231, 236, 237,

238, 245, 360

of naval personnel, 220

ordered by Eisenhower, 28, 231

policies and procedures, 62—63

of replacements, 236, 237-38, 239, 245, 351-52,

388-89

schools and centers operated by the French, 233,

236, 237-38, 388, 389

scope and purpose, 230-31, 238

of service personnel, 107, 231, 234-35, 236, 239

in the United States, 30, 196, 197-98, 202, 208,

227, 234, 237, 374, 388, 389, 390

under U.S. instructors, 101, 230, 232-33, 235,

236, 237, 284, 387, 388, 390

U.S. responsibility toward, 231

in use of radar, 234

Treasury Department, 218

TRIDENT. See Washington Conference (May

1943).

Tripolitania, Africa, 10

Troop Carrier Wing, 51st, 286n

Troubridge, Rear Adm. Thomas H. (RN), 181,

225

Troyes, France, 326

Truman, President Harry S., 10n

ends lend-lease, 370, 371, 372, 376, 398

and Franco-Italian border incident, 368, 369,

398

and French forces for the Far East, 396

Trun, France, 334

Tunis, 60n, 138, 209, 283

Tunisia, 11, 195, 280

campaign of, 17, 56, 56n, 274

captured enemy equipment, 91-92, 283

equipment for French forces, 29, 60, 70,

92, 244, 246, 249, 273, 281, 282-83

French casualties, 32, 58, 403n

French participation in, 10-11, 18, 24, 27-

28, 31, 42,65, 113, 196, 404

Juin commands French forces, 27-28, 72n

contribution to war effort, 194

Twelfth Air Force, U. S., 201

XII Air Force Service Command, 198, 205, 206

XII Air Force Training and Replacement Command, 198, 209

XII Tactical Air Command, 211, 212, 286

French Section with, 212

20 November (43) Plan. See under Rearmament

programs.

23 January (44) Plan. See under Rearmament

programs.

Tyrrhenian Sea, 178

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 51,

52

forces of, 143. See also Red Army.

French squadron in Red Air Force, 11, 195,

195n, 376

U.S. equipment for, 15, 44, 400, 402

Unit of fire, 69, 69n

United Kingdom, 9, 11, 171, 182, 202, 204, 207,

225, 241, 286, 304, 316. See also British

Chiefs of Staff.

Anglo-French Mutual Aid, 177

assistance to Resistance forces, 144, 299-300,

301-02, 302n, 303, 335

disposal of British equipment, 177, 392

and equipping liberated manpower, 311, 315—16,

317, 318, 320, 321, 323, 326, 329, 340, 341
442 REARMING THE FRENCH

United Kingdom —Continued

and equipping Metropolitan Program units, 331,

333, 334, 335, 344, 345, 350, 355, 356, 358,

371, 381-82, 386, 388-89

and equipping North African Forces, 27, 28-29,

45n, 60, 177, 195, 196, 198, 201, 208, 210,

211, 218-21, 223, 224, 244, 246, 247, 248,

250, 251, 260, 302

and Free French Forces, 10

and French forces for the Far East, 392, 393

over-all assistance to the French, 377, 402n

responsibility toward French rearmament, 10,

81-82, 86, 87, 88, 90, 400

and training of French forces, 237, 314, 355, 360,

386-87, 388, 389-90

United Nations, 10, 30, 32, 35, 51, 93, 217, 306,

311, 391, 400

and CFLN, 96

conference of San Francisco, 362

and French Provisional Government, 345

lend-lease equipment to members of, 22-23

United States Chiefs of Staff. See Joint Chiefs of

Staff, U. S. (JCS).

United States Forces, European Theater (USFET),

387

successor to ETOUSA, 371

USFET Mission to France, 371-72, 387, 388.

See also Rearmament and Operations Division, USFET Mission to France.

United States Navy, 223, 223n

Units, British. See also Royal Air Force; Royal

Navy.

Army, First, 244

Army, Eighth, 10, 88, 111

Auxiliary Territorial Service, 260

Corps, 10, 80n

Port Ordnance and Workshop Detachment, 355

Units, French

Air Force

Air Depot Group, 212

1st French Air Corps, 212, 373, 376, 385

Lafayette Squadron, 196, 199

Normandie Fighter Squadron (NormandieNiemen Regiment), 11, 195, 195n, 376

1st Parachute Regiment (1st RCP), 211-

12, 248, 259, 374

2d Parachute Regiment (2d RCP), 182,

211, 304, 374, 374n

3d Parachute Regiment (3d RCP), 182,

211, 304, 374, 374n

Units, French—Continued

Armies and Army Detachments

Armée B, 183

Détachement d'Armée des Alpes (Army Detachment of the Alps), 353, 363n, 367

Détachement d'Armée de l'Atlantique

(Army Detachment of the Atlantic), 363n

Première Armée Française (First French

Army). See 1st French Army.

Army Brigades and equivalent

Brigade d'Extrême-Orient, 393

1st Free French Brigade, 10

2d Free French Brigade, 10

Leclerc Column, 10, 87, 195

Spahis Brigade, 112, 113, 127, 159, 160

Army Corps

1st, 181, 183, 183n, 353

2d, 183, 183n, 353

3d, 349

4th, 349

Corps Expéditionnaire Français. See

French Expeditionary Corps (CEF).

Corps Expéditionnaire Français en ExtremeOrient. See French Far East Expeditionary Corps (CEFEO).

Corps Léger d'Intervention, 393

Army Divisions, Armored

1st Armored Division (1st DB), 89, 111,

171, 183n, 186, 245, 295, 353

2d Armored Division (2d DB), 88, 111, 171,

172. 182, 225, 245, 246, 295, 353, 354,

363n

3d Armored Division (3d DB), 127, 128,

245, 349, 358

5th Armored Division (5th DB), 88, 89,

111, 171, 186, 245, 295, 353

Army Divisions, Infantry

1st Colonial Infantry (1st DIC), 397

1st Free French Infantry (1st DFL), 10-11,

87, 88-89, 88n, 246, 249, 273

1st Infantry (1st DMI), 343, 349, 353, 358-

59, 364, 390

1st Motorized (or March) Infantry (1st

DMI), 89, 89n, 97, 108, 110, 116-17,

120, 127, 171, 172, 178, 183, 225, 235,

246, 251, 295, 325, 325n, 344, 349, 353,

354, 367, 392

2d Free French Infantry (2d DFL), 10, 87,

88, 273

2d Moroccan Infantry (2d DIM), 70, 89,

111, 112, 116, 117, 140, 141, 146, 147,

173, 178, 183, 194, 251, 256, 295, 353
INDEX 443

Units, French—Continued

Army Divisions, Infantry—Continued

3d Algerian Infantry (3d DIA), 70,89, 111,

117, 147, 173, 178, 183, 183n, 251, 295,

353, 397

4th Moroccan Mountain Infantry (4th

DMM), 70, 72, 89, 101, 111, 117, 178,

183, 194, 251, 252, 295, 353

7th Algerian Infantry (7th DIA), 127, 128

8th Algerian Infantry (8th DIA), 126, 127

9th Colonial Infantry (9th DIC), 89, 111,

116, 127, 172, 181, 183, 265, 295, 325,

353, 354, 397

10th Colonial Infantry (10th DIC), 126,

128

10th Infantry (10th DI), 343, 347, 349,

353, 358, 359, 364, 390

14th Infantry (14th DI), 349, 353, 354,

358

19th Infantry (19th DI), 349, 358

25th Infantry (25th DI), 349, 358

27th Alpine Infantry (27th DIA), 349, 353,

354, 358, 359, 367

36th Infantry (36th DI), 343, 349, 354,

358-59, 364, 390

Army Regiments and equivalents

1st Algerian Spahis Regiment, 246n

1st Algerian Tirailleurs Regiment (1st

RTA), 157

1st Moroccan Tabor Group (1st GTM),

178, 183-86

2d Algerian Spahis Regiment, 246n

2d Moroccan Tabor Group (2d GTM),

101, 181, 186

3d Moroccan Tabor Group (3d GTM), 178,

186

4th Moroccan Tabor Group (4th GTM),

111, 178, 191

4th Zouaves Regiment, 156, 160

5th Moroccan Spahis Regiment, 113

7th Chasseurs d'Afrique Regiment, 68n

7th Algerian Spahis Regiment, 113

9th Zouaves Regiment, 157

Army Units, Miscellaneous. See also Base 901.

Bataillon de Commandos (Commando Battalion), 112, 113, 159, 160

Bataillon de Choc (Shock Battalion), 72,

101, 112, 113, 159, 160, 181

Commandos de France, 191n

Corps Franc d'Afrique, 72, 113

Groupe de Commandos d'Afrique, 181

Units, French—Continued

Army Units, Miscellaneous—Continued

4th Moroccan Tabor, 94n

parachute units. See under Units, French,

Air Force.

Staouelli Commandos, 191n

Marine and naval units

1st Fusiliers Marins (Marines) Regiment,

225

1st Fusiliers Marins Commandos (Marine

Commandos) Battalion, 225

Groupe de Canonniers Marins (Naval Gunners Group), 225

Regiment Blindé de Fusiliers Marins (Armored Marine Regiment), 225

U. S. advisers with French divisions. See under

French Training Section.

U. S. Army Air Forces (USAAF), 196, 198, 200,

204, 223n, 301, 312, 346. See also Arnold,

Gen. Henry H.

and French rearmament, 22, 205, 375, 384

Southeast Training Command, 234

Technical Training Command, 234

USFET Mission to France. See under United

States Forces, European Theater (USFET).

U.S. Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF), 375, 385

U.S. support troops for the French, 186, 188, 314,

348

Valin, Lt. Gen. Martial, 195, 373

Vallette d'Osia, Col. Jean, 349, 353

Valluy, Brig. Gen. Jean, 353, 397

Van Hecke, Col. Jean, 68n

V-E Day. See under Germany.

Vehicles, 347

Algiers assembly line, 67-69, 176, 283

Casablanca assembly line, 85, 131, 229

issues to the French, 356

shortages, 176, 189-90, 355

Vernejoul, Brig. Gen. Jacques de, 88, 186, 353

Versailles, 294

VESUVIUS. See under Corsica.

Vichy Government, 7-8, 9, 12n, 21, 316. See also

Pétain, Marshal Henri.

Victory Program. See under Army Service Forces

(ASF).

Vigier, Maj. Gen. du Touzet du, 186, 353

Virieu, Maj. Charles de, 8n

V-J Day. See under Japan.

Vitebsk, 195n
444 REARMING THE FRENCH

Wallace, Vice President Henry A., 392

War Department, 63, 109, 121, 126, 128, 227, 228,

231, 248, 308, 309

and ANFA Plan, 41, 45

and equipping French air and naval air units,

197, 203, 205, 208, 211, 223, 375-76

and equipping Metropolitan forces, 335, 344,

347, 349, 356, 357, 359, 360, 385

and equipping nonprogram units, 159

and equipping North African Forces, 84, 85, 96,

103, 108, 119, 122, 131, 141, 148, 155, 157,

158, 164, 172, 176, 193, 229-30, 236, 238,

258n, 259, 305, 346, 390

and filling of shortages, 169, 190

and French forces for the Far East, 392, 394,

397

and French service troops, 104, 108, 167, 168,

348

and lend-lease accounting, 267—69

and maintenance of French forces, 144, 145-46,

171, 257, 258, 263, 365

position on French rearmament, 31, 45-46,

308-09

responsibility toward French rearmament, 22, 70

and special items for the French, 262, 263, 264-

66

and substitute equipment, 241-42, 244, 245, 249,

250, 251, 252

and termination of French rearmament, 363,

368, 369-70, 372

and use and equipping of liberated manpower,

314-15, 316, 320-21, 332-33, 341

War Department Operations Division. See Operations Division, War Department (OPD).

War Office (Br.), 201, 299, 305, 371, 392, 402n.

See also United Kingdom,

and equipping French combat units, 335, 344,

356, 365, 370, 371, 385, 386, 388

and equipping labor and security units, 316, 320,

321, 323, 324, 329, 340

and training French forces, 386-87, 390

War Production Board, 265

War Shipping Administration, 52, 262

Washington Conference (May 1943), 56, 76

and French participation in operations, 171

and French rearmament, 57-58

Wavell, Gen. Sir Archibald P., 50

Weeks, Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald, 331, 332

West Africa. See French West Africa.

Western European Union, 403

Western Task Force, 28, 217

Weygand, Gen. Maxime, 8, 11, 12n

Whiteley, Maj. Gen. J. F. M., 76, 107, 134, 139-40,

228

Wilson, Maj. Gen. Arthur R., 174, 186, 187, 188.

See also Coastal Base Section (COSBASE);

Continental Advance Section (CONAD) ;

Mediterranean Base Section (MBS).

Wilson, Edwin, 119, 149, 152

Wilson, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland, 151, 152, 153,

158, 192, 211, 239, 301, 302. See also Allied

Force Headquarters (AFHQ) ; Supreme Allied

Commander, Mediterranean,

appointed Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, 125

congratulates the French, 194

and control over French forces, 149, 150-51

and French rearmament, 149, 155, 156-57, 161,

177, 191, 207, 223, 225, 238, 243, 244, 256,

392

and French service troops, 166

and maintenance of French forces, 257

and use of liberated manpower, 317

Wilson, President Woodrow, 5

Women's Army Corps, U. S. (WAC), 259, 260

Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (Fr.) (AFAT)

clothing for. See under Clothing,

organization, 260

strength, 259, 260

Wood, Brig. Gen. Jack W., 373n, 385

World War I, 1. See also American Expeditionary

Forces (A.E.F.) ; Pershing, Gen. John J.

Wright, Capt. Jerauld, 272, 275

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1989 0 - 242-456 (11) : QL 3