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THE GRAND EXPERIMENT

AT INYOKERN

$? -3 J^- /V^
History of the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California

Volume 2

THE GRAND EXPERIMENT

AT TNYOKERN

Narrative of the Naval Ordnance Test Station During

the Second World War and the Immediate Postwar Years

By

J. D. GERRARD-GOUGH

and

ALBERT B. CHRISTMAN

Naval Weapons Center

Witli an Introduction by

REAR ADMIRAL JOHN D. '1. KANE, JR., USN (RETIRED)

Director of Nava' History and Curator

for the J\ < >• Denartment

Naval History Division

Washington, 1978
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The distinguished scholar Dr. Vincent Davis, in reviewing Sailors,

Scientists, and Rockets, the first volume of this series, stated, "If the

first volume is a reliable indicator, all the books in this serie; will be

required reading for ev-v -yone with an interest in science and

technology, contemporary military history, government-science

relationships and related subjects." We believe this second volume

meets the same high standards as the first and in its own right

provides new insights into the weapon development process.

It is fitting, as has been done in this history, that we examine

boi-h past successes, which should help us reatfirm fundamental

principles, and past difficulties, which should be avoided in charting

future courses. The historica! perspective that comes from such

examination is essential in understanding the process of weapon

develooment with its many unique interactions between the military

and science, headquarters and laboratory, and laboratory and the

Fleet.

For these reasons, this Command regards this history series as a

useful tool to help the Naval Weapons Centefulfill its essential

mission: Developing missile weapon systems ana air warfare systems

for the Fleet. But this is more than a local history, for the research

and development process that evolved at this Center has had its

influence on the research and development philosophy of the Navy

and most certainly upon the weaponry of the Navy ana other armed

services of this nation and those of the free world.

In view of the broad application of this history, we of NWC are

especially appreciative of the continuing suppcrt we have enjoyed

from the Director of Naval History, Rear Admiral John D. H. Kane,

USN (Ret.), and his predecessors Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper,

USN (Ret.), and Rear Admiral E. M. Filer, USN (Ret.). With that

support we are hopeful that this second volume will enjoy the same
success as the first and will ad i further dimension to the story of

military-scientific cooperation in provitUng the superior weapons

needed by this nation in this era of technological complexities.

R. M. hILLYf ; W. L. HARRIS, RADIvl, USN

Technical Direcor Ccm-nander

Naval Weapons renter Naval Weapons Center

April 3, 1978
Introduction

Sever years ago the Naval H'story Division published the first

volume of this series. That book tr.^ed the background leading to the

establishment of the Naval Ordnance Test Station, Cnina Lake, in

November 1943 and discussed the Station's initial months of

operation. It assessed the Navy's early work with rocketry and the

evolution of naval-scientific relationships before turning to the

wartime rocket program undertaken for the government by the

California Institute of Technology. The actions of the Navy's Bureau

of Ordnance in creating the Naval Ord'a ice Test Station at China

Lake were directly related to the latter project, for at this barren

tract in the Mojave Desert, the Navy's initial task was to support the

California Institute of Technology in the development of air-launched

rockets.

In the present work, Albert B. Christman, the author of the

earlier volume, has joined with J. D. Gerrard-Gough to record the

history of China Lake from its commissioning in 1943 throng!: the

spring of 1948. They recount hew, in the last two years of World

War 11, the rocket program reached its full development as the

weapons tested at the Naval Ordnance Test Station were used by

American combat forces throughout the world. During the same era,

the Navy completed major construction projects to provide ehe

necessary faculties and housing at this '•emote location. In 194^ the

Navy also oversaw the building at China Lake of the Salt Wells Pilot

Plant. Here the skills developed by the California Institute of

Technology in producing rocket propellants were applied to the

manufacture of the nonnuclear explosive charges used in atomic

bombs.
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INVUvERN

Equally as significant as this wartime record was the fundamental

change in the Station's mission during tiie firr three years of the

postwar era. From its original stavus as an activity that supported a

wartime contract, China Lake evolved into a command with an

exceptionally broad span of capabilities. This change had been

foreseen for some time by leaders of the Bureau of Ordnance who

realized that the naval establishment needed a permanent center for

the development of advanced weapons; they recognized the Station

built for the World War II rocket program as the nucleus for such an

organization. But, in the midst of the drastic demobilization following

the end of hostilities, it is remarkable that their objective was

maintained and that the Navy was able to provide the major resources

necessary for the further expansion of China Lake.

The problems of implementing tlvs transition were manifold.

They ranged from the task of fitting the civilian scientists and

technicians-many of them former employees of the California

Institute of Teclmology-into the civil service system, to the challenge

of organizing the efforts of naval officers and civilian scientists in

pursuing their common goal of developing superior weapons. There

also was the task of expanding the range of the command's work. By

1948, in addition to testing rockets, China Lake was involved in the

full spectrum of research, development, and pilot production of these

weapons, as well as guided missiles, underwater ordnance, and other

systems. The N;vy additionally assumed from the California Institute

of Technology the management of the Salt Wells Pilot Plant that

through the postwar years continued to provide components for the

nuclear weapons being produced by the Manhattan Project and its

successor, the Atomic Energy Commission.

In tracing this record of notable achievement, the authors place

their narrative in the context of the Navy's overall approach to

ordnance research and development. Many readers will be interested

to note how China Lake related to other efforts of naval technical

bureaus to provide advanc, d weapons systems. Students of effective

organization will be impressed by the short and direct lines of

communication that allowed the Bureau of Ordnance to take a wide

range of initiatives in ...-.veloping China Lake with a minimum of

reviews by othur byers of government. The mutually supporting roles

of civilian scientists and technicians and naval officers responsible for

the operational employment of weapons are another central element

in the history, rut, perhaps above all, the authors remind us once

again that in the last analysis any successful undertaking depends

upon the competence and dedication of its assigned personnel.

vui
INTRODUCTION

In reviewing this history lor publication, I am indebted to my

predecessor as Director of Naval History, Vice Admiral Edwin B.

Hooper, USN (Ret.), and to Dr. Caryl P. Haskins, a member of the

Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Committee on Naval History, for

their perceptive comments. I share with these reviewers the belief that

this volume will serve not only as a record of China Lake's numerous

successes but also as a case study of the general process by which

science and technology may be integrated into the development ot

modern naval forces.

JOHN D. H. KANE, JR., RADM, USN (Ret.)

Director of Naval History and

Curator for the Navy Department
Preface

One of the first decisions facing us us authors of this, the second

volume of a historical series on the Naval Weapons Center, was to

determine what time span .should be covered. Volume 1, Sailors,

Scientists, and Rockets, traced the history of rocketry and the

interactions between naval ordnance and science from World War 1

through a sequence of events that led to the establishment of the

U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern. California, th«

predecessor of NWC. That volume ended with a brief look into the

future, covering a period that extended a few months beyond the

official date of the Executive Order establishing the Station. Vol ime

2 begins and continues the story from that same date, November 8,

1943. This slight overlap made it possible for Volume 1 to bring

major streams of events involving the early history of military rockets

and the founding of NOTS to logical stopping points and for this

second volun:" to begin at an equally logical starting point, the

official establishment of NOTS. One result is that the reader of

Volume 2 need not read Volume 1 unless background information is

desired on two important historical roots at NOTS: the history of

naval rocketry and the history of military-scientific relationships in

weapon research and development.

Volume 2 spans a relatively short period of the . Center's

three-decide existence: only four and a half years-from November 8,

1943, to May 1948 but these were crucial years. They were the

formative years. They include the final, intense years of World War II

when the new Station's ability to respond to urgent combat needs foi

the new wonder weapons-rockets-was put to the test. They also

includ i a critical period of the Station's transition from war to peace

when the issue at stake was whether the new naval facility on the ^
THE GRAND EXPER1MEN1 AT INYOKERN

deberl would continue to serve merely us a test station, as its name

implied, or whether it would become a laboratory as originally

envisi [ied, with the primary function of "research, development, and

testing of weapons." These were the years of the construction miracle

that transformed the raw desert near Inyokem into the Navy's largest

research and development complex for weaponry, rin these few years

more facilities were constructed than in the next two decades at

NOTS. In brief, these were th"1Inyokem years. To the Navy research

and development community, "Inyokern" was not only a small desert

town but also the name of a grand new expeiiment to bring within

the Navy framework its own team of scientists and engineers to

develop new weapon systems.

In defining the scope of this volume we recognized that the

crucible in which NOTS was shaped and tempered was not delineated

by the bounds of the desert Station; rather, it had dimensions as

broad as the defense of the nation itself and a depth that would

influence the whole process of weapon research and development.

Accordingly, we did not limit the scope to that of a local history.

Of necessity, in covering the broad picture of the Station's role

in national defens' we have been unable to give recognition to the

many employees and associates of NOTS who gave dedicated and

capable service to NOTS in the period covered. We hope they will

take well deserved pleasure in seeing recognition and interpretation

given to the era at NOTS to which they contributed.

Volume 2 is derived largely from the same body of research and

interviews as Volume 1, This includes more than 80 taped interviews

with military and civilian principals associated with NOTS in the

formative years. Many of the principals who contributed so much of

their interest and special knowledge earlier gave invaluable support to

this second work. It is a pleasure to identify these individuals and

accord them a sincere vote of gratitude:

Rear Admiral Sherman E. Burroughs, Jr., USN (Ret.)

Dr. and Mrs. Emory L. Rhs

Dr. William A. Fowler

Captain Clarence H. Haugen, USN (Ret.)

Vice Admiral John T. Hayward, USN (Ret.)

Mr. A. L. Pittinger

Captain Thomas F. Pollock, USN (Ret.)

Rear Admiral James B. Sykes, USN (Ret.)

Dr. L. T. E. Thompson

Rear Admira" Curtis F. Vossler, USN (Ret.)
PREFACE

The California Institute of Technology and the Naval History

Division i the üepartment of the Navy have been eminently

responsive to requests for archival support; and much lias been

necessary.

Of special importance, Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, USN

(Ret.), formerly Director of Naval History Division, and Dr. Dean C.

Allard, Head of the Division's Operational Archives, have provided

guidance, aid, and encouragement without which this hislory would

not have been possible. Likewise it is a pleasure to acknowledge the

support of H. G. Wilson and the late Dr. William 13. McLean, former

NWC Technical Directors, in initiating this historical project and for

their continuing aid.

The Federal Records Center at Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania,

provided the long-term loan of NOTS logs-185 ledgers in all. This

"treasure trove" made it possible to inject human interest into

otherwise prosaic accounts.

For lack of a better statement, we repeat from Volunv' I,

". . . it should be clear that like a research and development project,

this history was not the creation of one man but of many." As with

Volume I, there has been a profound collective contribution made to

this work by many "early timers" of NOTS. Principally, an accolade

for services rendered is extended to Dr. Hugh Hunter, K. H,

Robinson, and D. T. McAllister, who reviewed final draft material and

provided valuable insights. Similarly, John L. CON, A. S. Gould, and

the late James D, DeSanto applied their expertise and special

knowledge of "huw things were in the old days" to individual

chapters, and thereby earn grateful acknowledgment.

Happily -for NWC and the history project the list of "early

timers" still serving the Center is long; less happy is the fact that

limited space does not permit a mention of all who have graciously

responded to telephoned or similarly informal queries. Their presence,

support, and refreshing enthusiasm made the history-writing burden so

much lighter, and helped to personify the fabled, friendly "spirit of

NOTS" that is an inherent and a recurring theme throughout our

chronicle.

The pride held by NWC for its history has been amply

demonstrated by the degree of support so freely given at all levels of

command, ranging from the Commander and the Technical Director

down through the Center's organizational chain of command to the

working level. In particular, we thank C. E. Van Hagan and Dr. Robert

H. Pearson, former and current Heads of the Technical Information

Department where this history was written and transformed by a
THE GRAND EXPERIMEN1 AT 1NY0KERN

professional publication team into publishable f'urm. We gratet'ully salute

all our associates of the TID team. Special thanks are extended to

Florence Dinsmore, Georgia Cabe, and Jane Casey, who so capably

edited the history and guided it through production; to Gayle

Ammerman for her devoted effort in manuscript preparation; and to the

s'caff of the Composition and Layout Branch of fli) for their dedication

in readying this volume for printing

For assistance in chronicling the history of tne outside

community and the Indian Wells Valley, the authors are also

indebted to Richard C. Bailey. Director, Kein County Museum, and

Ardis M. Walker of Kernville,

In attempting to make this an interpretive history rath;] than a

mere chronicling o\ facts and dates, our aim has been to liscovcr and

highlight the key trends, events, and problems. As the authors we

accept full responsibility lor these interpretations and for the content.

lins volume ends with the dedication of Michelson Laboratory

on May S, FMS. The completion of this modem research laboratory

assured the -uccess of the Inyokem experiment. The laboratory was

solid evidence that the Navy considered MOTS permanent and that it

was going to provide a first-class working environment for its

scien'ists. 1 lie crucial formalise years were over; hut this is not to

say the .Station had all its great challenges behind it. flic years ahead

would be filled with vital technical, administrative, and human

challenges. It is to tiiese challenges in a neu environment of weapon

sophistication that succeeding volumes of tins Inslop. should be

addressed.

.1. I). CFRRARD-GOUGH and ALBLRT B. (I IRIS I.MAN

Tcc/micvl liil'irnuiiuii Department

SlIMll \\\\ipniis ' 'I'IIII r
Contents

Foreword v

Introduction vil

Preface xi

List of Illustrations xix

Clupters

1. Desert Ship Under Way 1

Captain on Board 3

An Expanded Concept 7

Operations 13

Air Support IS

AODU-1 18

Rocket Training for Fleet Squadrons 19

Aircraft Service Unit 22

Land Acquisition 23

Initial Construction 27

Early Laboratory Planning 34

Capfain at the Helm 36

References 40

2. V- '« . ? Metamorphosis 43

Slumbering Desert Stirs 44

Life at the Airstrip 47

Boom Town of Inyokem 50

Miracle City 52

Navy-Built Community 55

Need for Additional Land 60

A Natural Preserve 64

References 66
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT IWYOKERN

3. Flood Cunenls in Rocketry 69

Fowler Follows the Rockets to War 69

Ranges and Targets 77

"Holy Moses" 82

Air Facility Problems 87

The Experimental Officer 93

A -'Really Big Rocket" 97

Later Wartime Programs '08

References 120

4. Boomtime Construction 123

Permanent Versus Temporär) Structures ... 123

Design Problems 1 26

Command Post 128

Some Construction Highlights 130

The Labor Force 132

Supplies and Sabotage 135

China Lake Pilot Plant 136

Departure 147

References 153

5. Ebb Tide of War 157

Consultant Ex raordinary 157

Constmction Wnds Down 162

"Building Numb'r Five" 166

Controversy and Reassessment 171

The Airfields 1 74

Planning for Peacetime 180

Inyokern: The War Contribution 190

References 197

6. CAMEL and Salt Wells 203

Prologue to Victory 203

The Los Alamos Connection 207

A New Pilot Plant 211

Project CAMEL 217

References 222

7. Peace and Transition 223

A New Commanding Officer 224

Beginning of a Crucial Era 227

The Pasadena Complication 228

"Like a Battleship. , . " 231

References 240
CONTENTS

'i. Problems of the Postwar Watch 243

Search for a Director 243

The Laboratory: Hope Renewed 245

Duncan Buys Equipment 248

"We Never Had Enough Houses" 252

Organization: A Key Problem 255

Weather Still Stormy-Outlook Fair 261

Old Problems Resolved 265

1947: Perspective 268

References 271

9. Headway in the Missile Era 275

Criteria for Weapon Planning 175

Struggle for Cognizance 277

Postwar Navy Missile Programs 281

NOTS Air Missile 288

Early Blueprint for a Wonder Missile 289

Peacetime Rocket Development 293

Underwater Ordnance 298

Thompson Assesses the Programs 304

The Salt Wells Program 306

References 311

10. NOTS: Flag Command 315

A New Style of Management 315

"What's in a Name?" 319

Acquiring Laboratory Status 324

Ranges: A Question of Involvement 329

The Problem of Production Engineering 333

The Advisory Board 336

Latent Identity Crisis 338

Striving for an Integrated Community 339

A Tradition Continues 345

11. Landfall: Michelson Laboratory 351

Dedication 351

Some Monday Morning Thoughts 161

References 363

NOTS Chronology, June 1943 to June 1948 365

Appendixes

A. List of Planned Facilities and Construction for

NOTS (January 1944) 371
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

B. California Institute of Technology Scientist ana

Supervisory Personnel (Winter 1944-1945) 379

C. Organization of NOTS Experimental Department

(September 1944) 385

D. Summary of NOTS Construction Progress

(May 31, 1945) 389

E. First Postwar Organization for Research, Development,

and Test (December 1945) 397

F. NOTS Principles of Operation as Approved by the

Bu.-eau of Ordnance (October 21, 1946) 401

Sources 405

A General Note on Methods and Sources 405

Interviews 406

Bibliography 410

Index 417

XVIU
Illustrations

Captain (later Rear Admiral) Sherman E. Burroughs. Jr.. the

Station's first Commanding Officer 4

Dr. Charles C. Lauritsen. head of the California Instil' 'i

of Technology rocket program 8

A new Chief lor the Bureau of Ordnance: Rear Admiral W. II. P. Blandy

(left) is relieved by Roar Admiral G. F. Ilussey,

December 10, 1943 10

Tentative map of MOTS Inyokern, 1

1

)44 12

The 3.5-inch aircraft rocket: the California Institute of

Technology's first forward-firing aircraft rocket 14

Lieutenant Commander (later Captain) Thomas F. Pollock,

NOTS test pilot and head of the Aviation Ordnance

Development Unit 1 17

Inyokern airfield in early 1944 21

Captain Oscar A. Sandquist. Officer in Charge of

Construction during major thrust of Station's

construction in 1944 32

Proposed wheel-spoke layout ror the main research and

development laboratory, l

c

)44 36

Desert site of INOTS at the time of one of the firs; California

Institute of Technology's reconnaissance tours on

October 17, 1943 46

Early NOTS insignia 50

Camp Burroughs 59

Dr, William A, Fowler, Assistant Director of Research

for the California Institute of Technology rocke; program 70
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

First forward-firing rocket used at sea: loading 3.5-inch

aircraft rockets on carrier U.S.S. Mission Bay in late 1943 73

The range harp: early NOTS instrumentation used to determine

aircraft dive angles during air-to-ground rocket at'ack 80

A B-25 light bomber equipped with 5-inch HVAR Ho.' ' Moses 83

The 5-inch aircraft rocket installed on zero-length launcher 84

Concrete wall target hit by Holy Moses 85

The NOTS-Calift.-nia Institute of Technology team. Left

to right: Commander J. 0. Richmond, Dr. C. C. Lauritsen,

Captain S. E. Burroughs, Jr., Commander J. T. Hayward, and

Drs. W A. Fowler and E. L. Ellis 95

The "really big rocket"-Tiny Tim 98

TBF aircraft used to ground-launch first Tiny Tim rockets 99

Distinguished visitors observe first Tiny Tim firing,

July 1944. Left to rigiu: Dr. W.' A. Fowler, Captain S. E.

Burroughs, Jr., ConnruMider D. B. Young, Lord Cherwell,

Lieutenant Colonel E. Boulton-King, and Dr. E. L. Ellis 101

Crash scene of August 21, 1944. Lieutenant John M. Armitage

was killed while test firing a Tiny Tim rocket from his

SB2C aircraft 105

Displacement launcher developed for Tiny Tim (F^U) 110

Dr. Ira S. Bowen, Pr 'lessor of Physics at the California

Institute of Technology, and inventive genius for

rocket test instrumentation 117

First Headquarters buildings at NOTS, China Lake, circa April 1944 129

Typical construction at NOTS showing one of many inconvenicncesthe open trend 131

Dr. Bruce H. cjge, pilot plant boss 139

China Lake Pilot Plant, Janua y 30, 1945 146

A community takes shape! /amily housing with gymnasium (left)

and Station theater (rght) in foreground 150

Dr. L. T. E. Thompson, first NOTS Technical Director - 158

Captain Lewis N. Moeller, Officer in Charge o, Construction

at NOTS in early 1945 165

Michelson Laboratory under construction 167

Aerial view of Armitage Field with F7F aircraft in foreground 176

The 5-inch HVAR for the Fleet being loaded on zero-length wing

launcher of F6F fighter aircraft 191
ILLUSTRATIONS

During April-June 1945 forward-firing rockets were used

extensively by Marine Corps combat aircraft against

Japanese strongholds on Okinawa 195

Rear Admiral William S. Parsons, ordnance pioneer and staunch friend

of NOTS 204

Salt Wells Pilot Plant under construction, July 1945 216

Captain James Bennett Sykes, the Station's first peacetime

Commanding Officer 225

Captain John Tucker Hayward, NOTS Experimental Officer,

1944 to 1947 234

Architect's drawing of Michelson Laboratory, July 1947 24S

Captain James A. Duncan, NOTS Laboratory Officer, 1944 to 1947 25^

First permanent Administration building, December 1946 264

Bumblebee on launcher 283

Lark (KAO-1) ready for firing on 450-foot ramp; Big Richard

is used as booster 284

The variable-angle launcher at Morris Dam, Pasadena, California 30IJ

Weapon A 303

Permanent structures of Salt Wells Pilot Plant, August 1946 309

Rear Admiral Wendell G. Switzer. NOTS Commander, 1947 to 1949 316

NOTS and its community, February 1948 323

Admiral Nimitz inspects NOTS, October 25, 194/ 330

Rear Admiral Malcolm F. Schoeffel, Deputy Chief of the Bureau

of Ordnance, 1947 lo 1950 (later became Chief of the Bureau

of Ordnance) 335

Drs. C. C. Lauritse- -"id L. R. Hafstad, members of the fct

NOTS Advisojy Board 337

John O. Richmond, die Station's first Executive Officet rw

Community Manager 342

First NOTS Chapel, formerly "the old movie hut,"

October 1947 344

Michelson Laboratory at the time of its dedication. May 1948 355
1

Desert Ship Under Way

Center stage in the history of the founding of the Naval

Ordnance Test Station (NOTS) was shared ;- tue tun half of 1943 bj

Dr. Charles C. Lauritsen of the Calif )rnia Institu.'e of Technology

(CalTech) and Commander Sherman E. Burroughs, Jr., of the S'avy's

Bureau of Ordnance. In that period, as reported in Volume 1 of this

series, the scientist and the young naval officer combined separate

requirements for a rocket proving ground and an aviation ordnance

station into one proposal covering both needs.

Acceptance of the proposal by the Navy represented for

Lauritsen the clearing of the last major hurdle in the path of the

large wartime military rocket program that had been initiated under

CalTech through his aggressive leadership. With that achieved, he was

free to shift most of his own time and attention to aid another

unique weapon program that he believed would hasten the end of the

war, the atomic bomb. In so doing, he left the center stage in the

NOTS drama to Burroughs.

Before proceeding with that story, it will be helpful, particularly

for those who have not read Volume 1, to have a brief summary of

the rocket work conducted for the Navy by CalTech as part of the

wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD).

Simply put, before Lauritsen personally went on a promotional

rampage in 1941 for an accelerated rocket program using the British

example of dry-extruded ballistite propellant, there was no large-scale

military rocket program in the United States. Work by Dr. Robert H.

Goddard, extending back to the pre-World War I era, ai.d work by

Dr. Clarence Hickman and others under separate tasks of OSRD
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

would eventually have their impact on the wartime and postwar

rocket programs, but it was Lauritsen's demands for action that

launched the main rocket effort of the United States in World War II.

And it was the dramatic growth of this CalTech rocket program

under Lauritsen and the resulting urgent demands for space for testing

that provided the primary justification for the establishment of NOTS.

The Navy's priority program to develop CalTech's 3.5-inch

aircraft rocket and put it into combat on thousands of aircraft on a

rush basis was the immediate pressure triggering favorable action on

the Burroughs-Lauritsen proposal for what became NOTS. But this

was but one factor in the military's growing fascination for rockets at

this time.

Early in 1943 the first word of German aircraft rockets

reverberated throughout the United States military. Field reports were

shocking to those who could comprehend the significance of the new

weapons. Rare indeed were those who could foresee that rocket

propulsion was an inevitable trend foi weapons in the future. But

what was immediately apparent was the danger of a "secret" weapon,

both in psychological and tactical terms, in the hands of the enemy.

One of a number of aftershocks came on November I, 1943, at the

very time the final decisions were being made on the opening of

NOTS. It was a scathing syndicated article by the aviation pioneer

Major A. P. de Seversky. For our purpose the title alone provides the

impact and tone of the story: "Nazis New Air Rockets Caught Our

Side Napping."

Along with the knowledge of the enemy's tactical rockets came

classified reports on the German's secret rocket center of

Peenemlinde. Even the scant reports gave ordnance officers like

Burroughs a clear idea of the immense military value of an isolated

research, and development center where civilian scientists could

concentrate their talents in secrecy on the new technology of rockets.

In addition to the goading of critics and the burgeoning

awareness of the enemy's advances in rocketry, there were Fleet and

battlefield needs for the new weapons that were being keenly felt by

late 1943. The United States had moved to the offensive in the

Pacific war and urgently needed the hard-hitting power of rockets. In

the age-old competition between firepower and armor, it was

becoming increasingly clear that 50-caliber aircraft machine guns were

decreasingly effective against improved enemy armor.

All of the above factors helped bring about a reorganization in

l943 of the rocket programs being conducted for the armed forces
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

by OSRD. OSRD work for the Army was transferred from the old

Naval Powder Factory -'o the newly established Allegany Ballistics

Laboratory that had initial contract support from George

Washington University in much the same way that the Navy's OSRD

work was done by 'r.ract to CalTech. The 1943 reorganization of

recket work endorsed the de facto arrmgermnt whereby CalTech

rocket work was primarily for the Navy. In essence, the CalTech

program was the Navy's rocket program, and If it was to succeed it

needed Navy supoort, particularly in providing est ranges and aircraft.

One effect was to focus attention on the newly born NOTS as the

future center for naval rocketry and on the needs of the newly

promoted officer who would command the fledgling Station, Captain

S. E. Burroughs, Jr.. USN.

CAPTAIN ON BOARD

There was no ceremony. The young Navy captain simply arrived

and took charge. So inconsequential seemed the occasion that the

exact time and date were never recorded. But evidence indicates it

was December 21, 1943, when Captain Sherman Everett Burroughs,

Jr., took command of the Naval Ordnance Test Station.

The lack of ceremony was undoubtedly determined by the

paucity of the new command itself: a remote airstrip built some ten

years earlier, six Quonset huts, and a crude mess hall that had only

just been hastily assembled in this desolate corner of California's

Mojave Desert that the map designated "Inyokern." If a ceremony

had been held on Burroughs' assumption of command, the "all-hands

muster" would have produced a lean assortment of four officers and

a scanty crew of enlisted men. As guests of the command it might

have been possible to lure a half-dozen of 'lie scientists and

technicians who commuted to the Station from the California

Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, and perhaps a

construction worker or two could have peered up from the task of

assembling Quonset huts.

As he viewed the endless miles of open desert, the slender,

Academy- ,rect captain, known as "Ev" to his associates, had much to

ponder in a way that had not been possible back at the Bureau of

Ordnance "aviation desk" in Washington. The Station he had

originally proposed in the spring of that year, 1943, had become a

reality.
rill- GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

: ,,";•;; ■■^'^ ;^:'

Captain (later Rear Admiral) Sherman E.

Commanding Oflieer.

liurroughs, Jr., the Station's first
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

An Oiuu. .y Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox just six weeks

before had. In fact, proclaimed the U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station

"hereby established." But actually being here in command of

i .. vV.k'vw.ess site gave the captain pause to consider his relationship

with the new Stalion in a aifferent light.

The assignment to the undeveloprd desert Station with so much

space and ro few of civilization's amenities might expectedly have

been accepted with a dutiful but aching heart. Not so with

Burroughs. He wanted the Inyokern assignment as much as any naval

officer ever wanted command of a ship. Standing in front of the

Quonset hut that was both his headquarters and residence, Burroughs

could recall the disappointment caused by the initial summary

rejection of his suggestion that he command the new Station. In

proposing the Station, while still at the rank of Commander, he had

boldly written his superiors, "The commanding officer should be an

aviator captain and I nominate myself for this job. . . ."' The offer

had been as tersely rejected as it had been boldly offered.

Having seen his proposal for a station grow and take form, he

sincerely feit that the concept might lose something in translation

under the hands of others. Burroughs, a former squadron commander

in combat, felt a compelling obligation to all pilots of the Navy to

build a center where better weapons for Fleet aircraft could be

developed and tested. Burroughs recalled that when he had left the

Pacific in March 1943 for duty at the Bureau of Ordnance, Vice

Admiral William F. Halsey had said to him, "Go back and get things

straightened out back there! Try to get those guys off the dime!" In

no sense an order to the young commander, Halsey's parting

admonition was an expression of concern that naval aviation was no'

getting the advanced weapons so desperately needed.

As evidenced by a firmly set square jaw. Burroughs was a

determined man, and the detennination to upgrade naval aircraft

ordnance stemmed from more than his experience of flying in combat

with inadequate weapons. In addition to being a Navy pilot, he was

an ordnance postgraduate and therefore a member of the elite of

naval ordnance known as the "Gun Club." His wide experience in

both ordnance and aviation heightened his awareness that the

development of weapons specifically designed for aircraft had long

been neglected. In the prewar years he and Commander (later Rear

Admiral) Malcolm F. Schoeffel had tried unsuccessfully to get the

funds for research in aviation ordnance greatly increased. Their failure

stemmed largely from the priorities of the time whereby shipboard
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INVOKERN

ordnance and armor claimed the lion's sha^e of" the Bureau of

Ordnance's tiny research budget. Burroughs personally felt that the

offensive mission cf naval aviation w.,s generally subordinated to the

"eyes of the Fleet" observation role.2

Pearl Harbor drove home a hard lesson in naval a:r strike

warfare. And this lesson—together with others in the widening theaters

of World War II-dramatically rearranged priorities and pointed up the

need fcr superior aircraft weapons. Coming back from the Pacific,

Burroughs had felt that the time was right to strike hard for new

technological emphasis on these weapons.

In December 1943, here on the undeveloped deseit near the

village of Inyokem, he knew the time was indeed right. The

reconsidered decision had placed him in charge of the new Station.

He was in a unique position to strike a blow for better aviation

ordnance.

The snow on nearby Mount Owens of the Sierra Nevada

reminded the captain it was but a few days until Christmas. It would

be another Christmas away from his wife Kay and their two

daughters, who were in Washington,

In 1943, December meant more than Christmas; it meant that

the war had already advanced two years on its deadly course. While it

was felt that the tide had turned in the battle ior control of the

sea -as a result of the Solomons campaign and the Battles i f Midway

and the Coral Sea-nobody doubted that a determined enemy would

fight with even greater ferocity now that he was hJng ^ reed into a

defensive role.

The "var was more than a morning headline; if loomed behind

every discussion, every justification, every decision of Burroughs and

others in ordnance. In considering every major action, the ever-present

qi estion was, What will be the effect on the war? The projected

effects were often perceived to be quite different by the separate

individuals when it came to developing and testing new weapons and

in constructing facilities for experimental work. As a result, there

were many administrative battles when it came to implementing the

plans for the new Station. In Burroughs' mind the two kinds of

battles were inseparable, marked indelibly by the recollection of

machine guns that jammed under the high g forces of aerial combat;

and the memory of the torpedo pilots who had died to deliver "fish"

that failed to explode when they hit enemy shipj.

The war-particula;ly the air war in the Pacific-was clearly in

the mind of the new Commandmg Officei .-/hen, without ceremony, he
1)1 SI R 1 SHIP UNDI K S\'\\

assumed command of NOTS. In the administrative battles ahead, the

sustaining force would be his deep feelings oi the urgency and

importance for giving the pilots of the Navy the best of weapons. In

essence, lie had not left behind His squadron in the Pacific,

AN EXPANDED CONCEPT

The concept of the Station when Burroughs look command in

December was one that had been considerably expanded since the

spring of 1943 when Burroughs first began pressing for a new naval

proving ground for both testing and developing aviation ordnance.

The lirst expansion resulted from an informal discussion with Dr.

Charles C. L.auritsen. the head of the wartime rocket development

program being conducled by the California Institute uf Technology

for the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD).

Lauritsen's .ocket program, particularly for the air-launched rockets,

war undergoing momentoir. growth. Once overlooked as weapons of

war. rockets were suddenly in great demand -the new "secret"

weapons of both the enemy and the allies. Among other things,

rockets were the new hope lor giving aircraft the heavier firepowei

they needed. When Burroughs and Lauritsen looked at the needs of

their separate programs. I hey saw the advantages ol combining the

aviation ordnance requirement for a proving ground with tin" CalTech

need for space for rocket testing and training. Burroughs pulled the

combined proposal togc.'ier and presented it to his superior' m the

Bureau of Ordnance, including .he Chief himself. Rear Admiral Cater

Admiral) Wjlnm H. P. Blandy. As with everything else that ha.I

happened to the charmed proposal the liming was perfect. Bir.ndy

was winding up his Washington tour in preparation for an assignment

at sea. and he was concerned that what he had learned in his

tjmultuous years as the Bureau Chief could be lost. Above all, Blandy

was a man of foresight, so while others were considering the next

battle, he was concerned about the next war. Having led efforts to

make the old peacetime Bureau responsive to the needs of global war.

Blandy in late i943 had a different concern, that of using some of

the wartime momemum and insights into securing a continuing naval

research and development effort in peacetime.

In the midst of the deadliest war in human history. Blandy was

deeply concerned with postwar planning. In his final report as Bureau

Chief he stated, "'In the postwar period, which, of course, will also be
IH! GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Dr. Charles C. Lauritsfen, head üf tlie California Institute of Technology rocket

program.
DI'SFRT SIIII' UNDER WAY

the next prewar period, determined efforts mast be made to maintain

the contact now existing between the Bureau of Ordnance and the

best scientific brains and research facilities in the country."3

The role of government laboratories and their contracts with

educational institutions and private industry concerned Blandy. He felt

that developing these ties should rank high in planning postwar

programs because "Ordnance more than other naval activities needs

this special attention to research, because, unlike ships, aircraft,

communications, etc., it has no counterpart in civil life, and thus

derives little from developments springing from the normal pursuits of

the people in time of peace."4Blandy's analogy likened the nation's

postwar needs to that of adequately manning and rearming a fort

after every siege. This reasoning was based on past history where the

traditional national retrenchment and inevitably reappraisal of military

priorities that usually followed a war wouk' most likely preclude the

building of an adequate peacetime ordnance development

establishment after hostilities ceased.

It was while Blandy was preoccupied with long-range plans for

Navy research and development that the Burroughs-Lauritsen proposal

was presented to him.

On important decisions Blandy's management style was

consistent: so it is safe to presume that when the proposal for a new

ordnaii-'e station was made, Blandy met with the key personnel in the

Bureau who had a stake in the venture. In his typical style, Blandy

would have asked each for his opinic . and then have taken these

inputs into account in forming his own position. Then all would have

Iumed n eager ear to hear from Blandy what the Bureau's position

would . e. They would hear that eventually the Station should be

adequate to conduct research and development for all forms of naval

ordnance, but for the immediate future the emphasis would be on the

testing of rockets and other weapons for aircraft.-'

Blandy's impact upon the concept was to switch the long-term

emphasis, although nor the immediate priority, from the wartime

needs that preoccupied Burroughs and Lauritsen to the broader

concept of a pennanent research and development center for ordnance

that would serve the Navy's needs in both war and peace.

The broadening of the concept had been taken one step further

by November 8 when the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, signed

the order establishing the Station. In tat order, the mission

statement did not make reference to the otation working on any

particular type of weapon. But it was clear when Burroughs assumed
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

command that the priority on the work would in fact, if not in

words, be in getting rockets and improved systems of aviation

ordnance into combat. It was up to Burroughs not only to meet the

immediate needs as perceived by him and Lauritsen but also to work

toward the enlarged concept that had evolved.

Bkrndy left the Bureau of Ordnance for Fleet duty less than a

month after NOTS was founded. Fortunately for the Station and

naval ordnance in general, Blandy's successor. Rear Admiral George F.

Hussey, shared the same enlightened philosophy toward weapon

research and development.

Following his appointment on December 10, 1943, Hussey faced

the enormous job of providing the Navy with the weapons it needed

A new Chief for the Bureau of Ordnance; Rear Admiral W. H. P. Blandy (left) is

relieved by Rear Admiral G. F. Hussey, December 10, 1943.

10
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

to win the war. But, like Blandy, he saw the need to build for

peacetime. He saw his wi' :-ranging responsibilities as also including

parenthood to the fledgling desert Station. He would closely watch its

formation in fpraway California and provide the necessities for its

healthy growth and future development.

For four action-packed montBis, mid-December 1943 to mid-April

1944, Burroughs maintained the Station's headquarters in the

combination office-bedroom Quonset hut at the Inyokem airfield.

The office was crude and the living accommodations equally

coarse, but they provided the epitome of efficiency for a man who

needed every moment he could muster for the staggering job of

simultaneously building and operating the new Station.

In those first four months that the headquarters v/as at the

lirfield, Burroughs was able to add sporadically to the number of

enlisted personnel and to the original officer complement that had

consisted of Lieutenant Commander David E. Saunders, Officer in

Charge, Inyokem airfield; Lieutenant Commander Jim Tom Acree,

Executive Officer (Acting); Lieutenant Richard W. Henderson. Supply

Officer; and Ensign Ardell L. Cody, Aircraft Maintenance Officer.

Starting with these officers. Burroughs immediately began

delegating responsibilities. But no matter how the tasks were divided

and subdivided, all pieces had to fit together in Burroughs' mind.

Others could worry with'n the confines of individual problems:

aircraft operations; ground range facilities and rocket testing logistics

for training squadrons; construction of ranges, a new airfield,

laboratories, housing, shoppirg facilities, roads, and utilities; personnel;

acquiring the land; management; and funding. Burroughs had to fit all

these into one comprehensive and meaningful framework so that he

could judge progress, schedule work, and identify bottlenecks. He had

to be concerned not only in meeting the immediate wartime needs

but also the long-term need for a permanent research and

development center. So many things had to be done; most cried out

for immediate action. There could be no waiting to acquire the land

before building at least the most critical facilities on it. There could

be no holding back of the testing and of the training operations until

permanent facilities were built. This was war. Just as Burroughs in

combat had displayed excellent judgment and cool courage in the face

of heavy enemy antiaircraft fire, he faced with steady determination

the needs at NOTS for simultaneously starting air and ground

operation, land acquisition, construction, and the planning and

development of the future research and development laboratory.

II
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

U> Kili)inel<>ra

("ontoiir inlt'i-val lOOi'eet

Dtitittti l.i nurtwl .Vttfi (evel

Courtesy Milliknn Libra;)', California Institute of Technology

Tentative map of NOTS Inyokern, 1944.

12
PESERT SHIP UNDER W.V1»

OPERATIONS

Burroughs did not have to start the NOTS rocket testing

operations. In a style fully characteristic of the new Station, they had

been started before his arrival and within less than a mCiith of the

official establishment of the Station.

A few days before November 16 when the Bureau of Ordnance,

CalTech, and NOTS planners had finished drawing up their "wish list"

for facilities. Dr. Emory L. Ellis of CalTech had started on his way

to Inyokem to direct the start of work on the ranges. Accompanying

him in a CalTech four-wheel-drive vehicle were two of the Institute's

staff members: Calvin Mathieu and Burnham Davis. Their job was to

stake out the flight lanes for rocket tests that would take place four

weeks hence. All had the foresight lo take sleeping bags along.

When they arrived at the NOTS cite, the magnitude of their task

was immediately apparent in the vast expanse of raw desert.

Nevertheless, there was hope in the person of Chief Carpenter F. J.

Snyder, whom Ellis described as "the only Navy man in this whole

valley." There was evidence, too, that the massive Navy machinery for

building a new shore establishment was slowly beginning to grind in

the form of a 40-man civilian construction crew, bulldozers, and a

cookshack at the Inyokern airfield where Ellis and his companions

managed to get a meal.

Ellis describes his accomplishment:

Our problem then was to stake out these flight lines and get them

marked by bulldozui, so that the pilots could find them. Also we needed to

get a banicade bucked up so that we could put a field radio transmitter and

some observers behind this safe embankment because these were

high-explosive tests. ... We got the bulldozer operator pointed toward a

mountain up there and told him to drive. .. straight ahead through that

country for about eight miles until he came to a road. ... We said, "Now

you turn left and you go down the road until you come to the yellow flag

and then lay out the line along the lath."... So he started out across

country in that bulldozer and the next morning we v/ent out and he'd

bladed that line out and was busy clearing a rectangular area which was the

impact area.6

Thus, the first aircraft range at NOTS—Charlie Range (C-l)-was

marked indelibly in the Indian Wells Valley. A white cross designated

the 200-yard-square impact area. NOTS was now ready for the first

"shoot." Other similar ranges would just as quickly come into being,

notably, one to the west of Charlie Range that would serve the horde

of Fleet squadrons whose arrival was imminent.

As Ellis' personally directed bulldozer was marking the aircraft

ranges, another was reshaping the desert to the east on .vhat was to

13
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT Al INYOKERN

becorric the ground ranges. These ranges (G-l and G-2) were more

elaborate than the aircraft ranges as chey required telephone lines,

spotting stations, locations for special instrumentation camera, and

detailed test equipment.

The rush to put the NOTS ranges into operation was based on

urgent needs. The Navy's priority expansion of the 3.5-inch

forward-firing aircraft rocket (AR) program was creating demands for

more tests than could be accomplished with the limited facilities and

space available to CalTech at Goldstone Lake, the test area they were

using near Barstow, California, on part of the Army's Camp Haan

(later Fort Irwin).

The first NOTS ^est featured the 3.5-inch AR with a

high-explosive b;ad instead of the original solid-steel shot head. The

fact that the rocket was not fully satisfactory because of insufficient

high explosive was not clear in December 1943 when it became the

first rocket tested at NOTS. The purpose of the historic tests was to

help solve some problems concerning instantaneous nose fuzes that

were in production '. :'< were causing an unacceptable percentage of

duds.

The 3.5-inch aircraft rocket: the California Institute of Technology's first forward-firing

aircraft rocket.

14
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

In the terse style of a technical report, the event was recorded:

Forty rounds ol 3.5-inch AR Model 9 were fired from two SBD

airplanes at Inyokern (December 3, 1943] ... to test the functioning of the

Mk 148 fuze or a land target.7

The December 3 firings not only marked the beginning of

operations at NOTS, but also provided some answers. They indicated

that the 30% malfunctions were probably caused by the arming wires

staying with the rounds on firing. These data were typical of the kind

of critical information the NOTS ranges began to supply weapon

developers.

Fuze tests predominated in the NOTS tests of early December.

But there were other kinds of tests. Some led to improvements in the

rockets. Some pointed to the need for strengthening structural

members of the aircraft. Others proved the capability of firing rockets

at night and under different flying conditions. All led to the

maiter-of-fact acceptance of NOTS Inyokern, limited though it was, as

a promising frontier where the pervasive problem of finding space to

test rockets would be solved, finally.

AIR SUPPORT

The role of air operations-the planes and the men who flew

them-is an inseparable part of the NOTS story.

The air operations for NOTS were a continuum of CalTech's

rocket testing activity at Goldstone Lake and other interim facilities.

It had all started in San Diego in April 1943 before NOTS was

proposed and stemmed from CalTech's desperate need for pilots and

aircraft to pursue '.heir program of aerial rocket experimentation and

c'evelopment. But combat aircraft in war are scarce indeed for

anything but operations or training. Lauritsen found tins to be true in

attempt after attempt 10 obtain aircraft from operating levels of the

Navy. But with each refusal his determination grew, ard the level of

the request went higher. Finally he reached a sympatho+ic hearing

from Captain (later Rear Admiral) H. B. Temple; Temple happened to

be U.S. Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Ernest J. King's staff

head for antisubmarine warfare. Through "Brownie" Temple's

intercession, the Commander Fleet Air, West Coast, Rear Admiral

(later Vice Admiral) Charles A. Pownall, directed his energetic

Gunnery Officer, Commander (later Rear Admiral) Jack C. Renard, to

establish a small experimental unit exclusively for the air support of

CalTech. As Renard was also Commander Fleet Air's (ComFAir)

15
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Assignments Officer, lie was able to select a particular individual to

head up the new unit: Lieutenant Commander (later Captain) Thomas

F. Pollock. Pollock had recently completed a distinguished tour of

combat duty in the Pacific, but his candidacy was assured when

Renard learned how Pollock, who was awaiting reassignment, hud

contrived to go on a flight test of a MAD/retro-rocket against a

submarine. MAD (magnetic anomaly detector) was a sensor mounted

in the aircraft that detected changes in the earth's magnetic field

caused by submarines or other ferrous objects and even variations in

the earth's own magnetic field. Developed before the war by Gulf Oil

Research Laboratory, it was turned into a submarine detector through

additional defense programs sponsored by the U.S. Navy and OSRD.

Renard considered anyone so fascinated with the new wonder

weapons was obviously a candidate to head the first unit of aircraft

for experimental testing of rockets.

The Hedron 14* Experimental Unit was informally organized in

San Diego starting with one airplane (a TBF), one pilot (Pollock), and

one mechanic (Bill Edward Campt). Within a month the unit's

complement had been augmented by four more personnel,t and a

PBY airplane was acquired.

A major function of the unit during April and May 1943 was to

test MAD equipment in PBY and TBF aircraft in conjunction with

retro-rockets.^ At the same time some limited testing was done in

support of the (as yet) unauthorized experimental work CalTedi was

doing on forward-firing rockets. This was a foretaste of things to

come. But what came was not a gradual, foreseeable flowing of the

tide, but a sudden, dashing tidal wave. No sooner had the effort on

forward-firing aircraft rockets gotten afloat than it was hit by the

overpowering demands of the massive rocket program initiated by the

"June 7 Comlnch memorandum." Renard recalled the circumstances

later:

Once Adminil King and his staff knew we had a real thing-a thing

that we could reaiiy progress in and turn out quick-then they were on our

back. Get going; not today, we want it yisterday.,0

* The name "Hedron 14" derives from its parent organization-Headquarters Squadron

14. This squadron supported Fleet Air Wing 14 located at the Naval Air Station, San Diego,

under ComFAir, West Coast.8

fAMMl/C Camp was transferred to NOTS in November 1943. In 1959, after a

distinguished naval career, he transferred to civil service and at the present time is employed

as a planner and estimator in the Center's Public Works Department.

t Lieutenant (jg.) Rodney L. i .~...e, CURE Harry C. LeGoube, ACRM James E.

Barnes, and AM1/C Harry J. Amos, Jr.

16
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

Lieutenant Commander (later Captain) Thomas F. Pollock, NOTS test pilot and head

of the Aviation Ordnance Development Unit 1.

17
THE GJtAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Ever increasing numbers of Fleet squadrons were to be equipped

with the new rockets and launchers. On October 19, 1943, the vice

Chief of Naval Operations issued a jumbo order for 6,000 planes to

be so equipped by June 1, 1944.11 Of this number, 4,500 were

earmarked for the Pacipc Fleet. Responsibility for these fell squarely

in the lap of ComFAL, West Coast, but the bmnt of the work fell

on Lauritsen's scientists for development, Renard for coordination,

and Pollock's Experimental Unit for testing.

Thanks to Lauritsen's prodd'ng for aircraft support. Rear Admiral

Pownall had anticipated the oig drive for rockets earlier when he

formed the Hedron 14 Experimental Unit in April 1943. He

continued enthusiastically to provide for the "expeditious pursuit of

the development" until August 6, when he was succeeded as

ComFAir, West Coast, by Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher.

Mitscher was just as enthusiastic about the new weapons as his

predecessor. He had just returned from a "hot" war in the Pacific as

a carrier division commander and as Commander Aircraft Solomon

Islands (Guadalcanal). He was particularly aware of the aircraft

rocket's potential. As Renard put it:

...it didn't take a hit over the head for |Mitsclier| to grasp thi?

immediately ... he was an operational man . . . irom an operational point o''

view, boy, it didn't take him two ininutes to see [that] if he had Ihi:

weapon, his firepower increa ed a hunlredfold . . . he wanted it because he

knew he was going hack to sei. . . . he wanted rockets on his planes.12

AODU-1

Mitscher was not alone in his enthusiasm for rockets. In a

remarkable conversion at this point in history, many officers in, the

Bureau of Aeronautics and ComFAir, West Coast, recognized that the

forward-firing rocket could revolutionize aerial warfare. Again the

timing for NOTS was just right. Not only was it established at the

peak of the rocket demand, but also when the importance of aircraft

support was proven.

When NOTS was estabhshed no one in authority any longer

doubted air operations were essential to the accomplishment of the

Navy's mission. Consequently the scope of air support was visualized

on a scale far beyond the already strained capability of the Hedron

14 Experimental Unit. This group had done a magnificent job, and

although its personnel complement had grown in six months from the

one-pilot, one-mechanic, one-plane outfit to 16 officers and 103
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

enlisted men,'-5the planned air operations at the new test station

implied a force more than double that strength.

The requirement for a large-scale operating air unit was translated

into action on December 3, 1943, when the Chief rf Naval Operations

(CNO) directed the Commandant, Naval Air Center, San Diego, to

establish an aviation ordnance development unit "on or about 15

December 1943." The unit was to be temporarily assigned to the

Naval Air Station, San Diego, but was to be permanently assigned to

the Naval Ordnance Test Station as soon as facilities were available.

The name of the unit, "Aviation Ordnance Development Unit 1

(AODU-I)." showed that CNO was planning ahead. Eventually,

Aviation Ordnance Development Unit 2 was jstablished on the East

Coast to provide similar support for ordnance experimental work in

the East.

The Chief of Naval Operations called for ComFAir, West Coast,

to transfer ordnance (.evelopment personnel, including those of

Hedron 14, to the A/iation Ordnance Development Unit.

On December 21, 1943, AODU-I was officially commLssioned at

the Naval Air Station, F-m Diego, as an activity under the cognizance

of ComFAir, West Coast; Pollock was in charge. Twelve days latei, on

the morning of January 2, 1944, the first contingent of 10 enlisted

men departed for Inyokem by planed4

The plan called for AODU-1 to be permanently assigned to

NOTS "as soon as facilities were available." That happy state of

affairs was not reached for another six months. But in the meantime,

there was a gradual move, made by increments of personnel and

equipment, to occupy the Quonset huts and temporary facilities that

were feverishly being erected at the Inyokem airstrip.

The commissioning of AODU-1, coming as it dio with the

establishment of NOTS in late 1943, marked the end of the old

struggle of Lauritsen and his rocket developers in obtaining aircraft to

conduct tests. Within tie year aircraft support had evolved from the

pleading stage to that of continuous support on the flight line.

ROCKET TRAINING FOR FLEET SQUADRONS

The aircraft and equipment for AODU-1, whose mission of air

support to the rocket experimental work was integral to the NOTS

mission, arrived at Inyokem at a slow pace starting in January. By

contrast, the arrival of the Fleet squadrons for rocket training, which

19
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INV'JKERN

was secondary to the Station mission, was quite like that of a swarm

of wasps. Inyokem was but one stop on their journey to combat in

the Pacific. Pilots and aircraft were combat ready. Ai Inyokem their

mission was io simulate diving attacks on imaginary targets and to

fire their 3,j-inch and 5-inch aenal rockets at a white cross on the

desert floor. Facilities ready or not, the first Fleet squadrons swarmed

into Inyokem in January 1944 with the latest torpedo bombers,

submarine-hunting TBFs and TBMs, in their Fleet color trim of

"scmigloss sea blue un surfaces viewed from above and non-specnlar

insignia white on surfaces viewed from below."*

The two-month old Station was unprepared to cope with the

new burden. While the Inyokern airfield boasted two adequate

hard-surfaced runways tor aircraft takeoff and landing, gasoline

supplies ind refueling facilities barely existed. Hangars, maintenance

shops, storehouses, assembly buildings, and magazines had not been

completed; neither had the barracks, shower and latrine building, or

galley and mess halls. Such working and living facilities as had been

built were barely enough to accommodate the handful of officers,

enlisted men, and CalTech representatives that comprised the first

permanent staff of NOTS. Each new squadron that arrived meant that

the overtaxed resources of NOTS had to bear the additional load of

men and machines, averaging some 40 crew members and 14 aircraft

per squadron.

The large presence of the Fleet squadrons added to the pressures

of AODU-1 mainte nee personnel who faced a round-the-clock duty

of servicing the tei. mt planes in addition to their own; a brutal task

performed in the open without the benefit of hangars or workshops.

Some ordnance officers at NOTS and in the Bureau of Ordnance

had seen experimental work squeezed out bv the pressures of training

in the past, and now saw heav; training as a threat to the primary

research, development, and testing function of NOTS. The rocket

developers themselves, the CalTech scientists, did not share this view.

They felt the Fleet squadrons offered a valuable opportunity for a

meaningful dialogue between weapon developers and weapon users. C.

C. Lauritsen, ;n particular, considered tins a good way for the

technical staff to learn firsthand about the unforeseeable little

* The Grumman TBF (popularly known as the "Avenger") was a single-engine, mldwing

torpedo bomber. The- designation TBM was used for the same aircraft produced under conlract

by the Eastern Aircraft Company of General Motors.

20
1)1 SI irr SHIP INDI R WAY

Imokom airfiold in t\irl\ 1944.

problems that could sabotage an otherwise sound advancement in

weaponry.

Burroughs stood midrange between the extremes. As an ordnance

postgraduate, he cherished the dream of a permanent research and

development center; as a former combat pilot, he knew the critical

importance of adequate training in the use of new weapons. He did

not question Fleet training per sc at NOTS: rather, his concern was,

"Mow much training?" And "What type of training'.'" In earlier

discussions during the Station's planning phase, it had been implied

that training would be given to but a few to make them instructors

in rocketry; they, in turn, would train the bulk of combat pilots in

the new science of aerial warfare.

But in January 1944, the problem was no longer philosophical; it

was tangible and real. No one at NOTS or the Bureau of Ordnance

had a better solution to Mitscher's training problem, but some actions

could be taken to minimize it. Burrougns asked the Bureau of

Ordnance if it could arrange for some means of servicing the Fleet

aircraft without absorbing the time needed by AODU-1 to maintain

its own aircraft for the rocket testing. Reflecting the Bureau's early

21
Uli GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

paternal concern for its new Station, Hussey pressed for separate and

additional aircraft maintenance support for the Fleet squadrons

undergoing training.

AIRCRAFT SFRVICE UNIT

On February 15, 1944. Carrier Aircraft Service Unit (CASU* 55

was ordered commissioned by the Chief of Naval Operations and

stationed at the Naval Ordnance Test Station. Its mission was to

"take care of the needs of the Training Squadrons."' ^

On paper. CASU-53 was to have a standard personnel strength to

support a 90-plane carrier group: 31 officers and 617 enlisted men.

This complement was to be drawn from ComFAir. West Coast, with

the equipment and maierial supplied by the Bureau of Aeronautics.' ^

In actual fact, when the Unit was commissioned at NOTS on

February 24, only 3 officers, 6 aviation machinist's mates, and 100

recruits were present. (As Burroughs was initially understaffed, he

applied his command prerogative and "shanghaied" 70 of the latter

number,) In addition, the maintenance equipment inventory of the

new Unit was woefully small.

Limited personnel was but one handicap of the Unit. Facilities

were limited. Working conditions on the flight line varied with

weather and there seemed to be no doubt that whoever initially

selected the site of the Inyokern airfield picked the windiest spot in

Indian Wells Valley. Getting needeu parts tlown in from San Diego,

nearly 200 air miles away, was an ever-present problem. Just getting

an adequate supply of aviation fuel was in itself a major challenge.

Two trucks froir the Marine Corps Air Station at Mojave, 50 miles

away, brought in the fuel, but the daily consumption was greater

than the capacity of the trucks. According to the officer in charge of

CASU, Lieutenant Commander Harold H. Randecker, it regularly

happened that a half-filled truck had to be dispatched to Mojave for

filling so there would be sufficient fuel for the next morning's fights.

As Randecker reported, "The visit of a Liberator, or the break-down

of either truck, was all it took to drive the CASU to

near-distraction."'7Cut thanks to the t vo trucks, constant night

work, and legerdemain, CASU kept the rocket training planes of

Inyokem flying.

The caree- of the Carrier Service Unit at NOTS was relatively

short-lived—b?rely six months, ending in August 1944 when it was

22
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

transferred to the Naval Air Station, Hoitvillc, California. But diese

were critical months as they covered the peak of the training for the

operational squadrons of which 28 Fleet and one Army Air Force

Squadron were trained between January and July 1944.

But the brief sojourn of CASL1-53 at Inyokern during the first

lew hectic months of the Station's career gave more than a badly

needed "hand at the pump." Lke AODU-I and the visiting F' et

squadrons, it helped lay the foundations of what would become

MOTS' own Naval Ah Facility.

LAND ACQUISITION

"Worthless desert land" was the description generally applied to

the area by those who had reconnoitered it by air and land in the

summer and fall of 1943. But by the time Burroughs assumed

command in December, it was quite clear there were some people

who for quite diverse reasons felt it was far from worthless.

The first volume of this series describes the problems of

obtaining permission to use the land and the airstrip for the duration

of the war. But this was only half the battle. For NOTS to be a

permanent research and development center, as called for in the

mission, it was essential that the Navy acquire clear title. To put

millions of dollars into facilities and to stake out a large share of the

future of Navy research and development in weaponry on land that

could be withdrawn dkl not appear reasonable to Burroughs nor to

the Bureau of Ordnance leadership.

Whatever had been their hopes for resolving the land problem

promptly, these soon disappeared at the time Burroughs came on

board, and the complexities and intensity of the problems became

apparent.

Some of the land was in the public domain; other parcels had

been homesteaded. There was land claimed for mining, and even for

curative mineral baths. Cattlemen held grazing rights on some critical

land areas. The legal difficulties attendant to acquiring the various

properties were often compounded by questions of easement, airspace,

and mineral rights. The Navy negotiators faced a wide spectrum of

claimants including private individuals, companies, and other

government agencies.

The most immediate problem to be resolved concerned a sister

service, the U.S. Army, who held a strong prior claim on the

23
IHK GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Inyokem airfield. This unpretentious two-runway airfield was

originally built in 1933 under the National Recovery Act by the

County of Kern with the assistance of the Civil Aeronautics

Authority. On September 2, 1942, the Interdepartmental Air Traffic

Control Board, formed a year earlier by President Franklin D.

Roosevelt to resolve land claims by military and civilian aviation

groups, approved the assignment of the Inyokern airfield to the U.S.

Army Fourth Air Force for use as a dispersal field and a glider

school, which never materialized. The lease issued at that time gave

the government exclusive use of the property for the duration ot the

national emergency plus six months.

Apart from resurfacing the runways, the Army had not

implemented any plans for the use of the airfield. Through the

persistence of Admiral Mitscher, and considerable bartering among the

services, the Interdepartmental Air Traffic Control Board or October

29, 1943, reassigned the use of the airfield and the adjacent "danger

area" near dry China Lake to the Navy for experimental test

operations. This was an acknowledgement that, among the various

possible government uses, the Navy's needs should be recognized and

supported. 11 was also a clear signal that plans and work could be

started on the Station, but one that left the question of title

unresolved.

Similarly, only a temporary solution was found for the problem

of acquiring the large tract of land needed for the ranges, the Station

headquarters, and the community. Fortunately, most of the original

area planned for the new Station was in the public domain. Also,

considering the vastness of the first claim (estimated to be 650 square

miles), relatively few people were involved. Burroughs reported that

only 27 people were actually moved from the area encompassed by

the original claim. Despite the limited number of people involved, the

problems incurred by their dispossession were complex, and in some

cases, personally distressing.

The process of acquiring lands efficiently and with minimum

stress on their proprietors demanded a close working relationship

between NOTS anc! Navy offices, particularly the Bureau of Ordnance

and the Bureau of Yards and Docks. The cooperation of all these

with the Department of the Interior was also essential. This latter

relationship in respect to NOTS, although never antagonistic, was not

close.

The Secretary of the Navy on December 31, 1943, requested

"that the Department of the Interior take the necessary action to

24
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAV

transfer complete control and jurisdiction over all of the public

domain lands in the area described ... to the Navy Department and

that all revocable permits affecting such land, in favor of private

parties, be cancelled."18

The Department of the Interior had a different point of view.

Since the beginning of the national emergency, the Department had

been assailed by ever-increasing demands of the military services for

vast tracts of the public domain. Although the Department recognized

how essential it was to meet these wartime needs, it also believed

that it was in the public interest to preserve the means for reversing

the trend after the war.

As sound as the policy might have been for the lands used for

wartime training and maneuvers, it did not take into account the

need for a permanent weapon research and development center. This

was the first of the Navy's many unsuccessful efforts in succeeding

decades to convince other agencies of government that NOTS was

being developed and would continue to be supported as a permanent

research, development, and test center.

The humble cow presented one of tiie biggest land problems of

the wartime years. When the Navy came to the Indian Wells Valley, a

few stockmen held Department of the Interior grazing licenses for

some of the public lands planned for inclusion within the military

reservation. The stockmen protested the impending loss of these rights

to Congress. To satisfy them, the Navy agreed to allow grazing in

specific areas. The animals were allowed on the land at the owner's

risk, and prior permission was to be obtained to enter the area for

roundup, feeding, branding, or any other purpose. By the end of the

war only about ten stockmen still operated under this agreement.

However, despite their small number, they complicated the Navy's

attempts to have the land transferred under its exclusive control. The

arrangement, for example, led one commissioner of the General Land

Office to conclude:

Inasmuch as your Department proposes to permit grazing on these

lands to continue under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior

and apparently will make only intermittent or seasonal use thereof, it would

appear that the primary jurisdiction c.er the lands should remain in this

Department.19

The commissioner proposed that when the Navy desirea to use

that portion of the ranges occupied by cattle, the cognizant ranchers

should be notified early enough to round up and remove the stock in

time for the Navy to yroceed with the tests. The proposal was

received with profounü dismay by Burroughs and project managers

25
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

who were planning complex tests with rockets and other weapons.

Tests of untried weapons from fast-moving aircraft required scheduling

flexibility and buffer zones free of people around target areas. The

same managers could visualize long test "holds" during which aircraft,

range instrumentation, and hundreds of test personnel would be kept

idly waiting for the word that the last cow had exited the danger

area.

Those familiar with the past history of ordnance perhaps saw the

ordinary cow again changing the history of Navy proving grounds as

it did in 1918, when civilian litigants claimed that a cow was severely

traumatized by a shell that exploded on its grazing pasture. Molly

Skinner, the cow's c ,vner, complained to the Navy Department that

the frightened animal had refused to give milk since the incident. As

reported in the Dahlgren Laboratory's history, the affair was

satisfactorily closed when the Naval Proving Ground's Commanding

Officer purchased the cow for $30.00 and had her transported by

barge to a farm' near the Proving Ground.-^ Despite a certain

retrospective humor in this incident, it dramatically illustrated the

need for longer firing ranges and was instrumental in bringing about

the eventual n ove to Dahlgren, Virginia.

But NOTS was not an old proving ground. It was the new hope

of the Navy for a place where, finally, there would be sufficient

space to conduct all manner of experimental work. If nothing else,

the prospect of handling the cows through a mixed chain of

command-from NOTS headquarters, to Interior Department officials,

to stockmen, to cowboy, and ultimately to cow-hardened the Navy's

conviction as to the necessity of obtaining exclusive control over the

land vital to its operations.

The first land acquisition of 650 square miles seems to have met

comparatively little resistance from the mining interests. This was

probably because the Station's confines at the northern boundary fell

short of a concentration of mining claims in the Coso and northern

Argus Ranges. This original boundary wojid have given a firing range

of about 25 miles from the launching area at the south end of dry

Chim Lake, a distance that appeared to be ample by comparison with

any existing U.S. proving ground of the period. But rocketry and

.vcaponry in general were moving at a rapidly accelerating pace by

1944. A review of the increased ranges of planned weapons already

en the drawing board mado it evident that not only longer ranges but

also mere firing ranges would be needed in the near future. This

trend was becoming increasingly apparent in those first months that

26
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

Burroughs operated his headquarters at the Inyokern airfield, But as

with the total bag of land acquisition problems, there was no

immediate solution. Most of the land problems that he inherited upon

arrival would be with him and his successors in one form or another

for many years to come.

INITIAL CONSTRUCTION

Most of the early construction story is told in a later chapter

devoted to that subject. The major highlights of the first months are

presented here, however, because it is important to an understanding

of the NOTS story to note the incredible speed with which the

building was started. It is also important to recognize the difficulties

imposed in those first months because of the attempt to acquire the

land and to start this enormous construction job at the same time

that the command had to begin air and ground operations to support

the training of squadrons in the use of the new rocket weapons.

For every great cause there is a skeptic. History hints that one

chief skeptic as to the long-range survival of NOTS was the man most

responsible for the Station's initial construction. Captain A. K. Fogg,

Civil Engineer Corps. But personal feelings had nothing to do with

performance. Fogg was a dedicated naval officer who knew how to

carry out orders. He had been told that, in addition to his regular

position as th«. Public Works Officer for the Eleventh Naval District,

he would be the Acting Officer in Charge of Construction for NOTS.

Fogg worked out of San Diego, and it is not certain that he ever

visited the Station on which he was responsible for sf ting the

construction. But his presence on the desert was not important, for as

Head of the District's Public Works he was able to bring the wartime

resources of the District to bear on the immediate problems of

getting the new Station under way.

It did not appear to Burroughs that Fogg shared the same

enthusiasm that was felt by ordnance officers like himself who were

elated over the prospect of realizing, at last, c complete naval

ordnance facility for new experimental work. As these ordnance

officers and the equally enthusiastic CalTech scientists contrived plans

for what seemed to be an endless list of technical facilities, Fogg was

shaking his head as if thinking, "This can't go on; at the end of the

war this will all fall apart."

At their working level, the two captains. Burroughs and Fogg,

27
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

personified and epitomized the relationship that existed between their

respective Bureaus, Ordnance and Yards and Docks, throughout the

entire NOTS experience. While the viewpoints of the two Bureaus

often differed-and their interrelationship in the building of NOTS

was at times somewhat less than warm—their cooperation could never

be faulted.

And so, whether or not Fogg and his associates believed that

NOTS would ever be anything but a temporary wartime base, they

responded diligently to their instructions to get the new Station under

way. They also kept a watchful eye out for any increases in scope

sought by ordnance visionaries and took pains to ensure that any

enlargement was approved by a higher authority. It was easy enough

for the ordnance officers to dream up new facilities and make endless

additions to their "wish list," but it was up to Fogg and his staff to

get them built. Their protection was adherence to approved plans.

Fogg had the position and the know-how to expedite

construction of the immediately required temporary structures. He

knew the system. He knew how to cut procedures short. He had the

authority. By the time the Secretary of the Navy signed the order

establishing the Station, unassembled Quonset huts were on railroad

cars rolling to Inyokern; and contracts were drafted for construction

of temporary quarters, interim range structures, and aircraft support

facilities.

From the start there was a clear delineation between temporary

and permanent facilities. Consequently, dual lists of facility

requirements were prepared. Although this hd to some confusion, it

allowed the urgent work to be done immediaely without getting into

the quagmire of the prolonged discussions thrt were associated more

frequently with the permanent facilities. Also, the dual list provided

more time for the planning of structures for the permanent Station.

In essence, the temporary structures were identified as being those for

the wartime programs; for example, the CalTech test work, the rocket

training program, and support of the larger-scale construction program.

The permanent structures were designed according to an integrated

plan for technical, administrative, and community facilities that would

provide a center capable of fulfilling the continuing weapon research

and development needs of the Navy-in war or peace.

The first funds for the temporary facilities were made available

on October 28, 19^3, immediately following the Vice Chief of Naval

Operations' approval to proceed with the Station and eleven days

before the official establishment of the Station. This informal

28
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

approval cleared the way for $160,000 from funds designated

"Increase and Replacement of Naval Vessels." Instead of being used

for any Navy vessel, the $160,000 was transferred for "expedition of

the rocket program" by starting construction of temporary housing,

magazines, and a minimum of access roads. In February 1944, an

additional $550,000 of naval vessel funds were provided to

"complete" financing of temporary facilities. The alternative to

waiting for adequate funds would have meant delaying the start of

NOTS and, in turn, critical wartime rocket testing.

The contract for the work performed with the original $160,000

was let to Macco Construction Company in early November 19^3.

The exact date work started is not known, but Admiral Blandy in his

proposal for the Station written to the Secretary of the Navy on

November 2 reported tiiat "The installation of temporary facilities is

under way."2'

When Chief Carpenter Snyder gave the word that moved the first

diri there were neither politicians nor Fleet dignitaries, cameramen,

nor the press around to mark the occasion. Neither was there a

liistorian aboard to duly record the exact date, indications are that

the work started early in November—at least the railroad cars with

sections of Quonset huts were recalled as being seen then on an

Inyokern siding.22In any event, by the time of the first NOTS tests

on December 3, when aircraft from the Inyokern airfield fired rockets

on the NOTS aircraft range, a number of Quonset huts were

assembled on their foundation in a livable, though windowless,

state.23

The short era of Captain Fogg as Acting Officer in Charge of

Construction was distinguished by the astonishing speed with which

temporary laciiiiius were erected. But Fogg's contributions were not

limited to expediting temporary construction. Despite his reported

pessimism, Fogg's early administrative actions paved the way for fast

progress in planning and constructing permanent facilities. The Bureau

of Yards and Docks, responding to pressures from Captain James C.

Byrnes, Jr., in the Bureau of Ordnance, sought from Fogg an overall

plan for a permanent station, including specific layouts of the

technical facilities and the community. A formal request for

$9,500,000 had been presented to the Congress expressly for Station

construction. The ordnance officers wanted to be certain that when

these funds were approved, there would be no delay in using them.

Plans were needed. Admiral Blandy and Captain . mes in the Bureau

of Ordnance and Captain Burroughs at NOTS r Dgnized that fiscal

29
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

and policy winds were favorable for the NOTS launching, but as men

of the sea they knew that winds change. They wanted to get the ship

as far from shox~e as possible before any budgetary or policy storms

could threaten it.

Fogg's greatest difficulty in getting under way was caused by the

same ordnance officers who most wanted the Station. These officers,

with added stimulation from the CalTech scientists, had opened wide

the flood gates, virtually inundating the system with an onrush oi

new facility proposals. At the same time, they were not able to

provide the precise technical data and specifications that Fogg felt

were needed for effective planning. This was ameliorated somewha*. by

Burroughs working closely with the construction staff in preparing

Station layouts.

Another ^"tor that helped to resolve the problem was the

constant attention given to establishing realistic priorities. Captain

Byrnes, who appointed himself the ex-officio spokesman for Blandy

on KOTS-related matters, was the watchdog for priorities. Speaking

for the Chief of the Bureau of Odnance, Byrnes established what

work would go forward and what would be delayed. Tim

authoritarian role did not enhance his popularity with NOTS officers,

but it did create a semblance of order out of chaos. Most important,

Byrnes put the full force of his position behind whatever had the top

priority. If, for example. Burroughs could justify a proposed addition,

Byrnes, with magnificent confidence and dignified bearing, would

tirelessly roll over any who dared to oppose him in the Bureau.

Insight into the decisiveness and forcefulness of Byrnes even on

matters of detail can be had by eavesdropping these decades later on

a telephone conversation of December 28, 1943. (Byrnes' practice of

having telephone conversations with field stations recorded and

transcribed was in itself a hint as to his thoroughness.)

BURROWS |sic]: I had planned on flying either today or tomorrow

and according to Saunders he said you wanted me to stay out here until this

thing was pretty well jelled.

BYRNES: No, that isn't what 1 said. I told him that this Bureau and

the Bureau of Yards and Docks were anxious to get ahead with the

construction of the permanent facilities as fast as possib'e and was

apprehensive that we might get part way through the project and find

ourselves embarrassed with the lack of funds so we wanted you to stay out

there long enough to give Captain Fogg adequate information so that he

could submit to the Bureaus for review a tentative layout, a general layout

of all the areas.

BURROWS: A complete job.

BYRNES: No. A general layout. That simply means showing the size

of the buildings in the various areas and vvhere you are going to put them as

30
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

we have got to plan the water supply to them and the power and heating

and all that kind of thing because all those factors enter into the cost of

development. .. .

On January 12, three days before Fogg was to be relieved of his

"second hat" duties as Acting Officer in Charge of Construction, he

completed the site plans and schematic drawings of all the buildings

and facilities then contemplated (see list in Appendix A).

When Captain Fogg signed the letter tramimitting the NOTS site

plans he should have felt the satisfaction of a runner having

successfully finished the starting lap in a relay race. Others would

take the baton and run, but he had given them a critical lead. Many

temporary facilities were close to completion. A plan for the

permanent facilities was in hand.

In mid-January, 1944, the baton of master building passed to

Captain Oscar A. Sandquist, Civil Engineer Corps. This officer entered

the constiuction race on the run and never let up until one year and

approximately 1,000 buildings later.

Sandquist's specialized Navy experience went back to World War

I, when as a liei .tenant, he was Officer in Charge of Construction of

two large stations in succession. Between wars he was a successful

contractor. Recalled to duty in 1940, he led the task of constructing

a large naval airfield at Norfolk, Virginia. Sandquist shared with

Burroughs similar personal assets-calmness, perseverance, and geniality.

His professional assets included two equally strong suits. As a former

contractor, he knew contractors and how to work with them; as a

naval officer, he knew the Navy's needs and the Navy's ways of

getting things done.

When Sandquist arrived he was responding, as he later recalled,

to "very secret orders." These orders had brought him and his wife

and daughter to an innospitable desert, for when they arrived at

Inyokem they could find no quarters for the night and had to drive

on to Trona. "It was very impressive, all this vacant, desert country!

We thought we were going down into Hades or something, all those

signs 'Don't Drink-Poison Water'."24

The next morning, January 15, Sandquist met Captain Burroughs

and Chief Snyder at the NOTS site. The three of them immediately

went into a prolonged conference on the status of ^he work in

progress and the proposed construction. The next day Sandquist

inspected the plans and work sites and on the third day he flew to

San Diego with Snyder to meet with Captain Fogg. In three days,

Sandquist absorbed a complete background-including concepts, plans,

and layouts for hundreds of facilities. He was ready for action.

31
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Captain Oscar A. Sandquist Officer in Charge of Construction during major thrust of

Station's construction in 1944.

32
DESF.RT SHIP UNDER W\Y

He immediately saw the problems incurred by continuing to have

the Station headquarters at the Inyokern airfield while the main

construction job and the heart of the weapons work would be

centered increasingly at China bike, some 10 miles to the east.

Burroughs agreed, and on January 17, while Sandquist was still at San

Diego in conference with Fogg, a call was put through to Washington

requesting that the 20 Quonset huts anc' Stran Steel buildings

intended for the Inyokern airfield be const ucted at the China Lake

site instead. This would make it possible for burroughs to set up

headquarters there immediately rather than wait for the permanent

ii^Hquarters building. It would also make it possible for Sandquist to

have of^ce spac^ ik'irby. Bureau of Ordnance aupro-al voiced by

Byrnes was granted with'-i minutes. Thus through a simple phone call,

China Lake, rather than Inyokern, was assured of becoming the

headquarters ot what would later become the Navy's largest weapon

research, devclopmeiu, and test center.

Another Sandquist decision, made in the first few days, was to

continue the contract with Julian T. Stafford for the design of the

permanent facilities. This design contract was later extended to bring

in a combination of three highly recommended architects and

engineers—Stafford, J. H. Davies, and H. L. Gogerty. Subsequent

events showed this to be a wise move. The design work, although

subject to more than the normal amount of changes, maintained a

close but important lead over construction so that the latter was

never held up substantially for lack of plans.

Sandquist had the ability to visualize broad plans and keep a

long-range construction job moving. At the same time he knew how

to meet immediate problems and how to concentrate on items that

he and Burroughs felt were critical.

It is interesting to note an example of the Kind of permanent

facilities that were given precedence by Sandquist and Burroughs. On

his fourth day, Sandquist began plans to contract for the construction

of the Bachelor Officers' Quarters and the Officers' Mess Hall and

Recreation Building. The structure later became known as the

Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open) and serves as such to this day.

in the realities of opening up a desert frontier, precedence over

office, laboratory, and machine shop went to bed, bar, and mess.

In the facilities planning, Sandquist experienced the same

difficulty Fogg had had in obtaining information on what was to be

done and at what magnitude for the permanent research and

development laboratories. The blue-sky discourses of the ordnance

33
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

officers on the value of exploring the unknown and applying the

latest technology to weapons problems were of little help without

accompanying data leading to specific sizes and requirements. For

specifics, Sandquist would have to wait; not because the problems

were being ignored, but because no single individual or group had the

answers. The Navy was moving into a new arena. The question of

what kind of research and development laboratory was needed

required projections into the needs of the Navy through and beyond

the war predictions of what aspects of science and technology would

be most applicable to future weapons. The answer also depended on

the collection of information on the past experiences of existing

laboratories with similar or related missions.

EARLY LABORATORY PLANNING

Laboratory planning had in fact been a matter of concern of

Burroughs from the time it became clear that the Navy would be

accepting his proposal for a new station. And when tlie opportunity

to do something about the problem appeared, he seized that

opportunity.

Again in the charmed life of early NOTS, the opportunity came

at the proper moment and with a lead player ideally suited for the

role: Lieutenant Commander (later Captain) James A. Duncan, a

former student of Dr. Albert A. Michelson, a Navy reservist, an

instructor in physics at the United States Naval Academy, and a man

of broad v'sion and perseverance.

For Duncan, the episode began at the start of his Christmas

vacation from the Academy in 1943, which he took as an

opportunity to see if there was some research assignment that would

be more directly related to the war than teaching physics. For

Burroughs, the episode occurred as he was preparing to leave his

Washington office in the Bureau of Ordnance for his desert

assignment.

In an unusual way to start a Christmas vacation, Duncan

presented a letter of introduction to the head of the Bureau's

Research Division, Captain Carroll Tyler. When he told Tyler his

objective was to get into research work for the Navy, the Captain's

response, as later recalled by Duncan, was as follows:

He suggested that ! walk down one side of the hallway and back on

the other and stick my nose in every door that 1 came to and tell them that

1 was looking for a job for a physicist. When 1 went all the way around and

34
DESERT SH1H UNDER WAY

gol back to Reb, I found Captain Burroughs, and he was interested in

somebody lo help him build a laboratory. Ho Ihoughl maybe 1 might be able

to help a little. So he agreed lo put a request for my transfer from the

Naval Academy to Ihe Bureau of Ordnance.25

By early February, Duncan received orders designating him

"Laboratory Officer. Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokem,

California" and calling for him to proceed to NOTS. But as he was

about to drive out of the gate at Annapolis he received a telephone

call saying that he was to go to the Naval Proving Ground a)

Daiilgren, Virginia, first in order to make a brief study of weapons

experinumtal work there. This was the beginning of a circuitous

two-month road to Inyokem.

Back at the Bureau of Ordnance following his brief visit to

Dahlgren. Duncan reported to Captain Byrnes, the bureau's

administrative head for oidnance stations, who told him that the

Bureau of Yards and Docks had a committee that was going to visit a

number of laboratories* to study the facilities. Duncan was to

accompany them as the Bureau of Ordnance icpresentative. As he

recalled:

I had very interesting instructions from Captain Byrnes. His

inst'uctiuns were, "You are lo go with this committee and see that Ihe

Bureau ol Yards and Docks gives the B'ireau ol Ordnance what they want."'

Nothing was said about what the Bureau wanted!

Alter we tailed the trip 1 asked the BuY&D people what Ihe Bureau

ol Ordnance had told them about what thev wanted. And the answer ti ">

gave me was... they wa,ued a laboratory in which the Bureau of Ordnance

couid late, do anything that it decided it wanted to do. This really led tc a

pretty definite picture of what the oiganlxation had to be like and what the

laboratovj had lo be like.'

This first trip presaged what was to become a veritable traveling

career for the NOTS Laboratory Officer aimed at planning, equipping,

and finally recruiting for the laboratory. In two years Duncan would

make 26 round trips from Inyokem to Washington, D.C., alone. In

fact he spent very little time actually at NOTS. He operated

principally out of the Bureau of Ordnance, physically occupying the

very same desk that Captain Burroughs had used before he became

the Commanding Officer of NOTS. But this first tour of the nation's

* Ihe facilities visited included the Mellon Institute. Pittsburgh, the Bell Laboratories,

Murraj Hill Division; the Radio Corporation ol America. 1'rincelon. New Jersey; Battelle

Memorial Laboratories, Columbus, Ohii); Armour Research 1 oundation, Chicago; Gulf

Research, Pittsburgh; the Bureau of Mines, Bruceton, Pennsylvania; Armament aim Projectile

Laboratory, Dahlgren; the Naval Ordnance Laboratory Ithen located at the Naval Gun

factory in Washington); Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio; and a plastics laboratory at Silver

Spring, Maryland.

35
THE C.RANÜ EXPERIMENT AT INYOKHRN

principal laboratories was all-important; it helped answer tiie question,

"What kind of laboratory or laboratories docs the Bureau of

Ordnance want?"

The answer did not come as soon as Sandquist and the other

on-sitc builders had desired, but as it subsequently developed, had the

search not started when it did, the chances are that what is now

Michelson Laboratory would either not have been built at the desert

site or it would have been built on a smaller scale. In cither case

NOTS as a desert facility probably would have remained a test station

and would not in future years have become a principal research and

development center for the Navy.

Proposed wlieeJ-spoke layoul tor the main research ami development laboratory, 1944.

CAPTAIN AT THE HELM

Burroughs received Duncan's periodic reports on the laboratory

as tonic for the soul. He wanted the NOTS laboratory to be "the

finest laboratory of its kind in the world." He visualized it as the

36
Dl-Si RT SHIP UNDER WAY

heart of the total research, development, test and evaluation complex,

which he characterized as being "an American Peenemlinde." Duncan's

reports confirmed that the dream was attainable.

Despite Burroughs' personal desires to be more involved in the

details of laboratory planning, lie recognized that his own role in

those early months had to be focused on more tangible and

immediate problems but in a way that would also ensure the future

of the laboratory operations.

In pulling together all the facets of Station building into

meaningful work plans and schedules, Burroughs' greatest need was

tor a strong executive officer in whom he could have confidence to

serve as his alter ego. But this he did not have in those first months

at Inyoken..

It is not clear when and why the rift began between Burroughs

and his Acting Executive Officer. ' ieutenant Commander Acree, but

it was sometime within the first two months of Burroughs' arrival.

For whatever reasons, the effect was that Burroughs had no

confidence in his assigned second. As .1 consequence he kept for

himself tasks that normally would have been transferred to his

I xee."

bach succeeding pressure, whether from immediate problems or

long term concerns for the future, appeared, at least to the casual

observer, to have little effect on the seemingly .mexcitable captain.

The same warm smile and intensely personal co icern were there for

all with whom he dealt, lbs natural courtesy r.ever left him even in

the midst of administrative crisis. In the ".lost umse circumstances he

took the time to extend the h'ile gestures of gracioi.sness that

siiowed he cared for all who crossed his path, whether fellow officers

of higher or lower rank, enlisted men and women, scientists, bulldozer

operators, messboys, or whoever. His intense personal inteiest in

people made him want to know about the family of his new yeoman.

When lie saw someone in n :ed of .1 rule, lie wovdd halt the jeep and

with ;, big smile, bid them lo hop aboard. These were little things,

but they revealed the total man.

Although the natural gemalm, of the man masked his reaction to

stress, those who knew him best could tell when the pressure was

building inwardly -and so could he. fortunately, he knew how to

obtain relief. Word would be sent to his "plane captain" Bill Camp to

"rev-up" an F6F-3 (Hellcat) or some other fighter if available. More

often than not. Burroughs would tie the flight in with other business,

such as discussions with I he cattlemen at Lone Pine, but in any

37
THE GRAND EXPER1MEN1 AT INYOKERN

event, alone at the controls of the plane in that realm of peacefulness

reserved for pilots, lie found relief from the earthbound pressures.

There in the desert sky he was able to gain the broader perspective

of what he was doing at NOTS. There above it all, the multitude of

little problems became manageable parts of the one big problem:

TIME.

But tiiat is what the battle for ordnance development was all

about. CalTech and the NOTS command would have to do what they

could to make up for the years that had been lost before the war

because the armed forces had not recognized the potential of rockets,

particularly for aircraft. Although remarkable technological progress

had been made with slender defense budgets in many fields, rocketry

was not one of them. Burroughs had been in the Bureau of Ordnance

m thcs'' days when naval budgets had been pared to the quick. He

had bed' among the few who had sought research funds specifically

for aviation ordnance. Then there was plenty of time, but little

money. Now he had the reverse.

But in the new fight he was not alone. The Bureau of Ordnance

was behind him, fully awake to the needs of aviation and capable of

pouring millions of dollars into any reasonable method of

foreshortening the war and strengthening the role of ordnance

research and development for the future.

It was a powerful Bureau and it recognized its responsibilities for

its new Station. At that time, as contrasted to later history, its lines

of authority and accountability were not ambiguous. They were direct

and effective. Burroughs was aware of various inter-Bureau conflicts,

but when it came to funds or approvals for NOTS, he knew he had a

concerned parent Bureau to go to and one that would deliver without

having to go through a confusing administrative labyrinth. If it took

money called out for naval vessels to do a needed job in weapon

development, it would be done. That was the policy and the strength

of the wartime Bureau.

Burroughs also felt the indirect support of an operating Fleet

that was becoming increasingly aware of the importance of having

technologically advanced weapons. And in his leadership in building

NOTS, he had a ready-built scientific staff. It was true that these

CalTech scientists worked "with" rather than "for" him, but under

the circumstances of wartime motivations the effect was the same, if

not better. The CalTech team included members of the National

Academy of Sciences, men of world-wide reputation in science, and

scientists who were not humbled by bureaucracy nor timid about

38
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

seeing whoever, or doing whatever was needed to aid a wartime

project (see Appendix B).27

But for every takeoff there had to be a coining back to earth.

For Burroughs it was a return with thoughts and plans reordered and

enthusiasm revitalized.

Perhaps the new Skipper had just returned from a flight when he

called a meeting of all his officers during those early months. Among

the ten mustered was young Lieutenant (jg.) A. Lincoln Pittinger who

had recently reported aboard. The gist of Burroughs' message to his

staff made a profound impression on the young officer; so much so

that he was able to recall the message after nearly thirty years:

I think we still have a long war ahead of us. We're yjing to have to

blast out the Japs dim every little island in the Pacific. Then we're going to

have to invade the main Japanese islands and fight a foot by foot battle

until we capture Hirohito. This may take another five years.

Now this Station is going to be an important factor in '■■eating the

Japs, and the work is going to be done mostly by civilians with you men

backing them up. 1 don't like this situation any better than you c D, but we

just don't have Navy personnel to do tlie job-we have to use thr brains of

these professors to dream up solutions to our military prob'ems.

It is the job of all of us to see that these civilians jet everything they

need to do their jobs. One thing I want to say- you're all going to be asked

to plan programs and think out answers to problems you've never heard of

bofore-and for God's sake, think big!28

39
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

REFERENCFS

NWC identification numbers are those under which copies of documents are filed in

the Technical Information Department, Naval Weapons Center. The following abbreviations

are used to identify record collections where documen's were found:

LTET Papers of L. T. E. Thompson, Scarsdale, New York

FRCB Naval Weapons Center records stored al Federal Records Center, Bell,

California

FRCM Naval Weapons Center records stored al Federal Records Center,

Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania

OA Operational Archives, Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.

NA National Archives, Washington, D.C.

1. Albert B. Christman, History of the Naval Weapons Center. China Lake.

California, Vol. 1. Sailors. Scientists, and Rockets, p, 189,

2. Sherman E. Burroughs interview, April 1966, pp. 6-7. (NWC 2313, S-2 )

3. Final report of the Chief, Bureau of Ordnance to the Secreiary of the Navy,

December 9, 1943, p. 19. (NWC 2315, 20-33.)

4. Ibid.. p. 20.

5. Memorandum from Ad3 to Re, via Ad, on "Naval Ordnance Test Station,

Inyokern-Laboratory," March 23, 1944. LTET. (NWC 2313, 21-30.)

6. Emory L. Ellis interview, May 1968, pp. 14-16. (NWC 2313, S-54.)

7. Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research

Committee, Division 3, Section L, Contract OEMsr-418, CalTech, Pasadena.

Calif., Weekly Progress Report No. Ill, Period Ending December 19. 1943.

FRCB Box 76975. (NWC 2313, 14-35.)

8. Unpublished manuscript history of Experimental Unit, Hedron Fleet Air Wing

14 and Aviation Ordnance Development Unit No. 1, May 21, 1945. Pollock

Papers. (NWC 2,31,3, 16-12.)

9. Ibid.

10. Jack C. Renard interview. May 1969. (NWC 2313, S-64.)

11. Memorandum (FF1/F4I, Serial 03591) from Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

to Vice Chief of Naval OpenUions, on ''Forward-Firing Rocket Projectiles

Fquipmenl in Aircraft-Installation of," October 19, 1943. Pollock Papers.

(NWC 2313, 16-7,)

12. Renard interview. May 1969. (NWC 2313, S-64.)

13. Unpublished manuscript, "War Histuiy of Naval Air Facility, Naval Ordnance

Test Station, Inyokem, California," February 9, 1946. Sykes Papers. (NWC

2313, 15-11.)

40
DESERT SHIP UNDER WAY

14. Log of the NOTS Officer of the Day, January 1944. FRCM.

15. Unpublished manuscript history, "History of the Naval Ordnance Test

Station, liiyokern, California (to August 15, 1945)," compiled by Robert W.

Leach, Lt., USNR, October 4, 1945, p. 56. (NWC 2313, 20-30.)

16. Ibid., pp. 57-58.

17. Unpublished narrative history. "History of U.S. Carrier Aircr''rt Service Unit

Number Fifty Three," M^y 31, 1945, p. 7. OA. (NWC 2313, 15-49.)

18. Letter (NDll/Ni-13) from Secrecary of the Navy James Forrestal to

Secretary of the interior on land acquisition, December 31, 1943. Record

Group 74, NA. (NWC 2313, 18-63.)

19. Letter (Serial 1975467 "K") from Commissioner, Department of the Interior

to Chief, Bureau of Yards and Docks, January 9, 1946. FRCB. (NWC 2313,

22-86.)

20. Kenneth G. McCollum, ed. Dahlgren, p. 1.

21. Memorandum (Ad3a/A4-2) from Chief, Bureau of Ordnance to Secretary of

he Navy, on "Naval Ordnance Test Stat'on, Inyokein, California,

Establishment of," November 2, 1943. OA. (NWC 2313, 15-3.)

22. Ellis interview, May 1968. p. 13. (NWC 2313, S-54.)

23. Ibid.. p. 14.

24. Oscar A. Sandquist interview, July 6, 1966. p. 1. (NWC 2313, S-13.)

25. James Duncan interview, April 26 •

(

)66, pp. 3-4. (NWC 2313, S-9.)

26. Ibid.. p. 7.

27. John E. Burchard, ed.. Rockets, Guns and Targets, pp. 221-25.

28. Letter from A. L. Pittinger to author, Septembei 25, 197.. (NWC 2313,

47-1.)

41
2

Mojave Metamorphosis

Just as rocketry had been a sleeping giant among U.S. weapon

programs, the Indian Wells Valley in the northwestern Mojave Desert

was another kind of slumbering giant; the arousing of one brought a

startling awakening to the other. The economic, social, and cultural

impact of the Navy on a remote and undeveloped desert area is a

historically significant story in its own right. However, the long-term

significance of the desert transformation to national defense was not

foreseen by many except some founders like Blandy, Burroughs, and

Byrnes. They knew that with the end of the war it would take more

than a call to duty to bring the quality of scientific and engineering

talent to the desert that would be necessary to make NOTS into the

kind of permanent weapon research and development center they

envisioned. They knew the success of the Inyokern experiment would

depend not only on having superior laboratories and nearby

well-instrumented ranges but also in having a re 'sonable social and

cultural environment. As men of foresight they could see beyond the

frustrations of sandstorms, miles of open ditches, and overpopulated

shanty towns to a new kind of life in the upper Mojave; an

environment that would assure the success of the experiment at

Inyokern.

Unique circumstances brought NOTS into being at a time when

military rockets reached a peak demand, when the CalTech

development team had reached its zenith, when training in the use of

rockets had become critical, and when the postwar planning for Navy

research and development in weaponry was beginning to take form.

Under these unusual circumstances the young Station was able within

43
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

its first year of existence to have an impact on weapons going into

the war and upon the weapon planning in Washington. Besides these

effects linked to the Station's mission, tlv building of the Station

triggered a major transformation of the upper Mojave Desert. To

appreciate the magnitude of this change it is nee :ssary to go back to

the beginnings of man's known history in the area and to recognize

that through the aeons preceding the Navy's arrival, Indian Wells

Valley was, with few exceptions, a place to go through and not to.

SLUMBERING DESERT STIRS

Centuries earlier, before the coming of the white man, tribes of

migrant Indians traditionally used the water holes at the base of the

southern Sierra Nevada during their peripatetic pursuit of game. It

was for these early people and their wells that the Valley was named.

The Indian wells were a welcome stop for all who subsequently

ventured into an otherwise inhospitable desert valley: trappers,

adventurers, missionary priests pathfinders, trailblazers, and immigrant

settlers.

The evidence is not conclusive, but it appears that the first

Caucasians to pass through part of Indian Wells Valley were early

trappers seeking a way through the Sierra Nevada, the majestic

mountain range marking the western boundary of the Valley.

Unfortunately, Jedediah Smith, trapper and explorer extraordinary,

was more interested in furs and adventure than in recording which

trails he took; hence, clear confirmation is lacking as to whether his

excursions along the east face of the Sierra brought him through the

Valley in 1825. It is quite likely that the pathfinding of another early

trapper, Peter Ogden of the Hudson Bay Company, took him through

the Valley in 1829. More certain is the trip by Joseph Walker in

1834 in which he led a party through the Valley and through the

famous pass in the Sierra that now bears his name.

To none was the water more vital than to the fragmented groups

of the ill-fated 49'ers who sought a shortcut tc the California

goldfields and had to abandon their wagons in Death Valley. The

heroes of this episode were William Manly and John Rogers, who,

during the rescue of the Bennett and Arcane families, thrice traversed

the Indian Wells Valley on their way back and forth between Death

Valley and the San Fernando Valley nearly 200 miles away. The first

trip, on foot, was to find a way out. On thp'r return trip, their

44
MOJAVK METAMORPHOSIS

horses weakened and succumbed to the torturous enviomment of the

Indian Wells "alley, leaving the adventurers with only a little

one-eyed ra.:.. for packing purposes. The final crossing was to lead

the way c or the Death Valle" families with two of their small,

sick childi^ hanging on opposite sides of the family ox, "Old

Crump," in slings made from their fathers' shirts. Needless to say,

these travelers were not impressed with the Indian Wells Valley other

than for its providential water supply.

John Goller, one of the 49'ers who made the Death Valley

escape, supposedly stumbled upon a canyon filled with placer gold

and brought back some nuggets to substantiate his find. There was a

delayed reaction of some years, but as the story of "Goller's gold"

spread, it spurred a whole legion of prospectors to seek their fortunes

in the Indian Wells Valley and its environs. For more than half a

century, on through the time of the Navy's arrival, prospecting and

mining played an important role in the Valley's chronicles,

particularly in times, of economic panic when the jobless would seek

their dream bonanza on the desert.

The era characterized by "one-burro-and-a-blanket" prospectors

soon passed, and in the 1870s, the Valley began to witness an

upsurge of trade represented by the regular passing of ore wagons

from the Cerro Gordo silver mine along well-defined wagon roads. It

also saw the emergence of a freight and passenger service based at

Coyote Holes just south of the Indian wells. The stage coaches, in

particular, attracted the attention of frontier bandits like Tiburcio

Vasquez. His former hideout in a large outcropping of rocks in the

Va'ley is called "Robber's Roost" to this day.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, the inhabitants

of the Valley changed from itinerant wanderers to a few permanent

settlers. The Desert Entry Act brought in a few homesteading

families, and construction of the Los Angeles aqueduct (begun in

1908) resulted in a further population increase. This project, to tap

the waters of Owens Lake in an adjoining valley to the north,

realized an influx of laborers, some accompanied by their families.

After the aqueduct was built (in 1914), a few of these families

remained to homestead and seek subsistence from fruit growing and

limited diversified farming. Two small clusters of homes were called

out as the towns of Leliter, a former aqueduct supply station, and

Brown, which was primarily noted for George Brown's hotel.

During the aqueduct construction period, the Southern Pacific

Railroad established a siding for building supplies at a

45
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

"dot-on-the-map" hamlet, close to the boundaries of Inyo and Kern

Counties; it was first named Magnolia, but in 1913 the name was

changed to Inyokern.

For the most part the fortunes of the first hardy settlers in the

Indian Wells Valley were never realized. The desert aridity and savage

summer climate proved to be too extreme for profitable farming, and

by the 1920s farms were abandoned, eventually reverting to a natural

landscape of creosote scrub bushes, cacti, and tumbleweeds. Only a

handful of people were left to their near-hopeless task of trying to

tame the Mojave Desert.

The Valley's resumed slumber at the beginning of the 1930s

might well have remained indefinitely undisturbed. However, while it

slept, the outside world was softly making significant encroachments:

Highways 6 and 395 running through the Valley were paved; an

88,000-volt power line was installed parallel to the aqueduct; and the

;; .,.-•

^-.'f ' SWt^*S^^*--'-^^g:

w.-<^-^iiÄ>;.r?r--1-;»^.,fl.-^'r5«r!. ^ ^wrnmiffaur . ,ir^ .■■cost

Desert silc of NOTS at the time ol' one of the first California Institute of

Technology's reconnaissance tours on October 17, 1943.

46
MOJAVE METAMORPHOSIS

Inter-State Telegraph Company strung a telephone trunk line alongside

the railroad steel, eonnecting the tiny General Store at Inyokern with

Loc Angeles. Most significant to our story, an airstrip with 4,500-foot

pa^ed runways was built at Inyokern under the National Recovery

A'J. It was intended to be an auxiliary landing field for Kern

County; however, it was an airfield virtually without aircraft.

At the onset of World War II, ironically-and without any

predetermined plan-the Indian Wells Valley, with about a hundred

permanent residents, had its own water supply, railroad, paved

highways, electricity, telephone, and a serviceable, albeit modest,

airstrip!

It was into this scene that the Navy had moved in late 1943.

Before looking ai the impact of the move on the small

communities that existed in the Valley, it will be helpful to examine

the first population buildup, that of the military in the winter of

1943-44 at the Inyokern airstrip.

LIFE AT THE AIRSTRIP

As the pattern of Quonset huts grew, there was an influx of

naval officers and men to fill them. Joining them were a few

scientists, engineers, and technicians of CalTech who for the most

part came and left with each series of tests. But it was the Navy

personnel who set the cultural tone. And it was the isolated, untamed

desert that gave life a unique coloring. As one early unpublished

history understated the problem, "The Mojave Desert can in no way

be considered as conducive to morale."'

Even before he arrived on the desert. Burroughs knew that there

would be serious difficulties in trying to achieve a morale level

somewhere between bearable and good in an undeveloped desert

lacking in soual and recreational resources.

But just as fate had helped Burroughs find an officer-physicist

(James Duncan) when the problem of planning the research laboratory

first came up, so too it seems did he have some "outside" assistance

in finding someone ideally suited to the job of morale building just as

the problem was coming into focus.

Shortly after Burroughs learned he was to assume command of

NOTS, he had a flight layover at the Naval Air Facility, El Centro,

California. By chance he came in contact with Chief Warrant Officer

John S, ("Baldy") Ewing, an outgoing, zestful individual whose

47
THE GRAND tXPERlMENT AT INYOKERN

avocation was having fun for himself and whose vocation was to

make fun for others. Up until his chance meeting with Burroughs, he

enjoyed a pleasant job as the head of entertainment for the Eleventh

Naval District. Oi- this occasion he had taken a show to El Ccntro,

where he met Burroughs. After the show they shared some drinks-to

quote Ewing, "It was hot country!"2

Burroughs, with the congeniality he would later use in recruiting

scientists, told the ebullient recreation officer that he was going to be

the Commanding Officer of a new Station at Inyokem and asked if

Ewing would like to go there. Ewing later recalled his reaction, "He

was a Captain and I was a way down the line ... so I said, 'Sure.' 1

thought it would be forgotten. He doesn't forget! Three or four days

later 1 was walking across tue compo ind down at the 11th Naval

District and . . . the Personnel Officer said, 'Hey, . . . where did you

know Ev Burroughs?' I said, 'Who?' He said, 'Ev Burroughs.' 1 said,

'You've got me wrong, I don't know him.' 'Oh yes, he's put in for

you. You're going to Inyokern.' Then I thought it must be India

someplace."^

Ewing reported in on December 31, 1943, to Lieutenant

Commander David E. Saunders, Acting Officer in Charge of the

Inyokern airfield, as Burroughs was in Washington ut the time.

Saunders was delighted to have the recreation-orier.ted chief warrant

officer aboard. Every military unit needs at lea; t one resourceful,

social-minded scrounger as was recognized by Saunders, and later

Burroughs, as qualities of Ewing. Saunders first asked Ewing to start a

ship's service store, which he did, but not without difficulties. He

called the Naval Air Station in San Diego and arranged for them to

send a lot of items. When the shipment anived, he found that most

of it was intended for the woman consumer. In recollecting his

surprise he said, "And you could look in any direction up here 100

miles and never see a woman." But financial catastrophe for the i ew

ship's service was averted by ihe fortuitous arrival of some Navajo

Indian laborers who eagerly purchased the hitherto unusable hems of

feminine adornment.

Saunders then introduced his next objective for NOTS by stating

to Ewing, "I understand Captain Burroughs likes to drink once in a

while so we've got to start an Officers' Club. I'll put in S25, and

you'll put in $25. Ensign Cody will put in $25, and I'm sure the

Captain will put in $25." It is uncertain whether this proposal ever

realized cash in hand, but in any event a decision was made by

Saunders that mail delivery could be suspended for a couple of days

48
MOJAVE METAMORPHOSIS

so that Ewing could take the mail truck to Sa:. Diego to obtain

Officers' Club supplies. Ewing reports, "T came back with a pickup

truck of liquor, and in those days you took what you could get and

the majority of it was Three Feathers. . . I hauled it in, but when 1

got back I had no place to put it, and that's when I got really

acquainted with Emory Ellis [supervisor in charge of CalTech

personnel at MOTS]. Dave said 'Go over and see Emory. He'll help

you out.' So the;, had a little wired-oft section of one of those

Quonset huts and in that v/ere confidential papers and everything, but

they weren't valuable: the liquor was valuable. So Emory said, 'Well

let's put it in here.' So 1 put my iiquoi" in there and fortunately we

dir n't have any thieves in that day on the base."

With the stock of Three Feathers stored with the cc afidential

papers, tiie future of the NO'i... Officers' Club was assured. A.

Quonset hut served as the first Jubhouse, and two Filipino sailors

were assignee to the duties of mess attendants. They not only acted

as barteaders, but also served sandwiches and hard-bulled eggs. For a

while ham sandwiches were sei 'ed, but their availabilit> as prefened

foe caused officers to forsake the general mess; so their sale was

restricted to after-dinner hours. A final touch was given to the

Officers' Club after Ewing spoke to Sheriff I. E. ("Johnny")

Loustalot cf Kern County about the recreational needs in the desert

outpost; three or four days later the sheriff delivered five slot

machines for the club's use. (Slo;; machines were legal in Kern County

at that time, although delivery by an officer of the law was a service

obviously over and above the call of duty.)

Some twenty-five years later, in recalling some ol the

lighthearted moments in otherwist grim days, Burroughs still retained

hi, warm regard for Ewing: "'He's a scrounger; he's an organizer; he's

the greatest guy to get things going and particularly to keep

everybody laughing all day througn."4

Symbolic of the spirit of early NOTS at I.iyckern was the

special NOTS insignia-a cross-eyed jackrabbit riHIny on a rocket. The

first version of this emblem was designed by personnel ol AODU-1

while they were at San Diego and it originally contained the letters

"AOr.'U." For the ear'v use at Inyokern these letters were replaced

with a larg? question mark. This insignia appeared on a wide range of

objects from aircraft and flight jackets to Officers' Club decorations.5

Appropriately, like the perplexed desert rabbit on the rocket, its

creators were aware of their unique suuation but were not

particularly enjoying the ride.

49
1111 GRAND F"'PERI MtNT AT INYOKIKN

I ,irh NO I S insignia.

BOOM TOWN OF INYOKERN

I ssonti;i!ly overnighl, Inyokcrn was on its way lo becoming ihc

neu boom town of the Mojave Desert. As such, il compared well

with the lustiest ol the Old West mining towns with a share of shady

characters, gunplay, high spending, saloons, gambling, fist fights, and

raucous entertainment.

Despite the intlux ol twentieth century dwellers, the town's

setting and its cast ol characters retained an old frontier flavor. The

wide unpaved main street with .1 water towei in the middle was the

center of action. Spreading out from the center was a miscellany of

trailers, tar paper shacks, und adobe huts. Buildings of indescribable

decrepitude were pressed into service for lodging. There was allegedly

but one public eating place, boasting a lunch counter with six seats.

An article in Pageant magazine describes its operation with some
MwJAVK METAMORPHOSIS

journalistic enhancement: "With 6,000 men trying lo get in, spirited

bidding arose for available food; blue-plate specials are said to have

cos* Up to $40, Other lunch counters soon appeared and made similar

profits . . ."6However, there is some doubt as to the veracity of

Pageant's reporting. A former naval officer stationed at NOTS in the

early days commented, "None of this is true. The Navy kept out

profiteers."7

The character of booming Inyokern was determined not only by

its staggering number of people but also by the roughneck nature of

a large percentage of new citizens. The building ol NOTS had no

priority when it came to the national labor market. Oilier major war

construction projects had started much earlier. Consequently, the

labor pickings were none too good when NOTS got under way.

Moreover, the desert environment and its remoteness from normal

labor markets made recruiting extremely difficult for the contractors

building the Station for the Navy. It was not a matter of selecting

people but of hiring whoever would come.

There was no town government, and it was more than the

county officials, with their headquarters at Bakersfield, 130 miles

away, could do to preserve any semblance of law and order. The

impossible task of administering justice fell upon Ardis Manley

Walker, the justice of the first judicial township of the County of

Kern, which included the Indian Wells Valley. He recently recalled:

... 1 can remember suddenly being faced with tJ'c problem of scrviiif!

a community of several thousand people when previousi, ' could count the

total numbej . . . by tens oi twenties and in my total township perhaps by

the hundreds 8

The Navy tried to aid the county's law-enforcement efforts, but

generally it was impossible to curl' the boom-town spirit. In one epic

fight 47 persons were hospitalized and there would have been more

had not the Navy sent in truckloads of Shore Patrol. Robberies

ranged the full gamut from simple back-alley heists to the robbery of

the mail truck by masked highwaymen quartered in Inyokern.

Another element of the Old West was added with the arrival of

several hundred Navajo Indians who had been recruited from their

New Mexico reservation to build the railroad spur for the Station.

Their colorful heritage added a fascinating blend to the melting pot

of many different cultures that were suddenly being mingled at

Inyokern: cultures that were rooted in the old world as well as the

new. Whatever bewilderment these first Americans may have

previously felt about 'he ways of the white man, these feelings were

probably confirmed in the frontier madness of Inyokern.

51
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN 

The opposite was also true. The Caucasians did not understand 

the customs and sociology of the Navajos. For example, one early 

timer arriving at NOTS when the temperature was well over 1 00 

degrees was amazed to see the Indians wearing blankets. Apparently, 

he was unaware of the fact that the Navajos were a desert people, 

and as such could thrive in an environment in which most Caucasians 

cottld barely survive. 

There is no doubt that the lack of sociological understanding was 

equally shared by Caucasian and Indian. To the Navajos, the aspects 

of labor unionism must have seemed totally arcane, as did the 

technology of twentieth century facility construction. Unfortunately, 

there was a language barrier that precluded widespread 

communication. One early timer tended to oversimplify the difficulties 

of the Navajos. He said in retrospect: "Most of the troubles with 

[them I were solved when it was found that what they really wanted 

was one of their traditional sweat baths-sort of sauna . .. [the Navy I 

agreed to build one for them, and after that there were no more 

complaints. "9 

Little is recorded about the long-haired, blanket-clad men who 

played a short but significant role in the building of NOTS. When 

their job was done, Mark Sodapop, Fatty Charlie, Black Goat, Red 

House, and their tribal brethren quietly returned to their reservation, 

probably unaware of the import and impact of their sojourn in the 

Indian Wells Valley. 

As with most boom towns, the isolated desert community had 

few traditional recreational resources for the thousands of workers 

(some with families) who lived there. Piano playing and gambling 

enlivened the action at the local saloons. For a price, a person could 

get a 50-mile-round-trip ride in a battered old touring car, marked 

"Taxi," to the mining town of Red Mountain, then notorious for its 

ladies of the evening. But the principal pastime at Inyokern was to 

play the role of spectator in watching and reflecting upon the main 

street activity of the last of the great frontier boom towns of the 

Mojave Desert. 

MIRACLE CITY 

Eight miles east of Inyokern, a miniscule farming community 

called Ridgecrest-with neither a ridge nor a crest-was ill prepared as 

52 
MOJAVE METAMORPHOSIS

Inyokern had been for a sudden Navy onslaught. But the assault on

the quiet life of the desert hamlet was on its way with the beginning

of the first construction at the main site of NOTS at China Lake. It

was then clear that a Navy village of undetermined size would be

built adjacent to Ridgecrest, and it could be surmised that the

on-base village could not take care of all the community needs. With

this observation, the population center of Indian Wells Valley began

to make its shift from Inyokern to Ridgecrest.

In November 1943, Ridgecrest had 15 homes and 96 residents.1^

In contrast, at the end of the war in August 1945, it would have

over 75 licensed business establishments and would become the trade

center for approximately 500 permanent residents in the Valley.

But not even this rapid growth trend could truly presage the

community's subsequent growth. Today, with a population of more

than 14,000, the City of Ridgecrest closely competes with Delano,

California, for the distinction of being the second largest city in Kern

County. The city's wide range of modern facilities-shopping centers,

banks, colleges, and county buildings-all evidence the dynamic nature

of its continuing growth.

The first permanent settlers in Ridgecrest were George Robertson

and his family, who, in 1912, homesteaded land on which much of

downtown Ridgecrest now stands. A year later the Grant Bowman

family also filed a homestead chim on 160 acres that comprise the

southern area of the present city.

After George Robertson's death, his homestead passed through

several ownerships i.'eluding that of Robert Crum, who, with his

brother Jim and cousin Wilbur Crum, operated a dairy on it in the

early 1930s. The settlement of six or eight dwellings was made up

largely of various Crurns and became unofficially known as

"Crumville" and the natural target o! jokesters.

When Robert Crum left the area in 1936, he sold his lands -Mid

daiiy to Joe Fox. who had come to the area two years before to set

up and operate a diesel pump for irrigation on Bowman's ranch. Fox

was a resourceful man as indicated by the hand digging of his first

well through more than 60 feet of sand and caliche. After taking over

the Crum properties he soon had more than 40 acres of alfalfa and

7,000 chickens.

In 1939 William Bentham brought his family to the area and

erected the town's first store and gas station on property bough!

from Fox, at the site of what is now the intersection of the city's

main streets: China Lake and Ridgecrest Boulevards.
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

In 1940 with the population approaching 100, the leading

citizens gathered at Bentham's store to discuss a new name for

"Crumville." They submitted "Sierra View" to the Post Office

Department, at the same time requesting a post office for the town.

The postal authorities agreed to establish a post office but rejected

the suggested name because there were already too many "Sierras" in

the State of California. They asked for another name proposal.

Residents posted their suggestions on the bulletin board in Bentham's

store. A visitor of Bentham's who was not a resident, and therefore

not strictly eligible to participate, had pleasant memories of

Ridgecrest, Missouri, and wrote his name on the board. By selection

day, there were numerous candidate names, but ma;.y of them were

uncomplimentary—for example, "Rattlesnake Gulch." By a single vote

"Ridgecrest" won over "Gilmore," which was the proprietary name of

the brand of gasoline sold by Bentham. The name was accepted, and

Bill Bentham became the town's first postmaster with the post office

in a corner of his store.

In 1944, when the Navy started to construct a station and a

community next door, the town of Ridgecrest would promptly begin

to grow. The commercial and home growth would center in the area

of the Fox ranch largely because a ready water supply existed, and

also because Fox was interested in helping a town develop.

Construction workers were lodged in eveiy habitable house and

shack in the area. To meet the huge demand for housing, new

structures built from a hodgepodge of materials went up overnight.

Building supplies were at a premium; so anything that could be

located was used. Corrugated steel roofing and packing crates were

common materials; so too, was lumber stolen by night from stacks of

supplies designated for Station construction. It was a war economy

and there was a nationwide shortage of materials for "nonessential"

construction. Local sources for purchasing new building supplies were

virtually nonexistent. Also nonexistent was any significant long-term

financing for homes or businesses. But then, who besides a few

officers in the Navy and a rare desert philosopher like Joe Fox was

thinking of anything permanent for Indian Wells Valley?

The prevailing boom-town attitude profoundly affected the

quality of the early homes and stores. Few were the optimists who

expected Ridgecrest to survive the war. Future planning was seldom

attempted; and, as reported in the Ridgecrest Titties Herald, "Tie

town grew just as it pleased—in all directions."'1

Although with manifest deficiencies, an instant town miraculously

54
MOJAVü METAMORPHOJIS

emerged from the fields of alfalfa and creosote bushes. It was with

some truth that buoyant promoters referred to it as the "Miracle

City" and called the road between the two main shopping districts

the "Miracle Mile." But the true miracle was yet to come, kidgecrest

survived its tumultuous unplanned genesis.

NAVY-BUILT COMMUNITY

The planning for what would later be the largest Navy-built,

Navy-managed community had begun with the faciiities study of

November 1943, but that planning did little more than indicate that

there would be a "village" adjacent to the Station headquartcs in the

main Station area.

On New Year's day 1944 a meeting of Bureau of Ordnance

officers was convened to discuss the kind of village needed. These

officers c.t the pattern of the thinking for years to come by

recognizing that the village was "of prime importance" to ihi mission

of the Station. I aving concluded this, they urged that the houses not

be temporary structures of the type available through sponsorship of

the Federal Housing Administration.1-

Although the first facilities plan called for a small on-base

community of ;boui 1,000, there was nothing firm about this figure,

nor indeed, about the location. Active consideration of alternate

locations continued for several months vvhile the borders of the

Station were being defined. One proposal was for the Navy to take

over most of the Valley, including the Inyokern area. In this case

there was the possibility of building the Navy town near the existing

Inyokern airstrip. One proposal, supported by Lauritsen, was to

extend the Station's southern border into the El Paso Mountains at

the southern end of Indian Wells Valley taking in the area where

Cerro Coso Community College now stands.'^ This proposal was

promptly vetoed by Captain Byrnes. He objected to the Station being

divided by public highways. Also, he knew land acquisition would be

further complicated by an increased number of private holdings to be

wrested Irom their owners. As the person closest to the Chief of the

Bureau, Byrnes prevailed in his determination not to change the

location. So for all the discussion there was only one change, and

that was to combine the community, the headquarters area, and the

planned laboratory into one common area.

55
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Although the construction was started before mid-April 1944, it

is convenient to think of that date as the beginning of the China

Lake community. That was when Burroughs moved his headquarters

to the new area, again going into a Quonset hut that served as both

office and bedroom.

The naming of the Navy community as "China Lake" after the

dry playa 0,1 the Station was not something done by proclamation. It

just happered as part of the natural process of referring by that name

to the main Station area containing the lake. The lake itself had

received its name somelime in the 1870s, althoui;h the precise origin

has been lost. Most piobably, the dry lake was originally noted for

the presence of a few CninRse workers who harvested the surface

borax during their brief sojourn there.

While Burroughs' objective was to establish a balanced

community, he also recognized that isolation and military traditions

worked against him. It would be difficult to develop and preserve a

sense of normalcy in a town owned and managed by the Navy, and

characterized, by the absence of a private property ownership, as well

as many of the normal legal, social, and commercial institutions. One

of Burroughs' strengths was a readiness to seek the advice of people

with experience related to his problems. In January 1944 he Hew to

the Naval Ammunition Depot at Hawthorne, Nevada, which. Ii/.e

NOTS, was in the desert and had faced the problems of developing

its own federal community.

Burroughs had a battery of questions to fire at Commander John

Odonnel Richmond, the Executive Officer at the Depot: heavy-caliber

questions concerning the type of housing suitable for the desert. Bui

there were also other questions about the experience at Hawthorne in

the whole range of community services- schools, banks, post office,

roads, sewage, telephones, hospital, and recreation.

Burroughs was immensely impressed as R-chmond readily

provided insights, facts, and solutions. Beneath Burroughs' amiable

casualne^s, a keenly perceptive and analytical brain was at work.

While recording Richmond's answers to his questions, his mind was

also registering impressions about Richmond personally: an ordnance

postgraduate ("he knows the ordnance side of the Navy as well as the

Fleet"); a medical retiree called back for wartime duty ("whatever his

bronchial ailment it's OK on the desert"); approaching 50 years of

age ("nine years older or not, he would work with me-he's that kind

of an officer";; class of 1917 ("a World War I vintage year"):

Executive Officer of an ammunition depot ("he could use a bigger

challenge").

56
MOJAVE METAMORPHOSIS

Burroughs was not one to reveal his hand in a serious game. He

made no mention to Richmond that he had gathered more than ideas

about the community. But as soon as Burroughs arrived back at

Inyokern, he telephoned Admiral Hussey and told him how vitally

important it was that he have an Executive Officer who could help

carry the mounling administrative and management load. The rift

between him and his Acting Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commarder

J. T. Acree, had become irreconcilable and he needed help. Richmond

was the man who would perfectly fill the need. Burroughs stressed it

was absolutely essential that he have an Executive Officer in whom

he could have confidence. He made a personal, energetic, and frank

plea.

Insight into the human workings of the Navy is gained from

comparison between the report of tins episode as reconstructed from

a later interview with Burroughs and a separate one with John

Richmond. The latter is quoted as follows:

1 thought he just came up here to see the Stadon [Hawthorne] and

to see what type of housing we had up there. I had no idea that I was

being considered to go to China Lake at all. ... I goi a letter from Admiral

Hussey who was then Chief of the Bureau. ... I'd known him for many

years and he said they were looking for an Exec, for China Lake and that

he had tossed a number of names to the different department heads in die

Bureau and they all came up with my name and therefore he was asking the

Bureau of Personnel to order me to China Lake. I went to Captain Vossler,*

who was at that time my boss, and I said, "Look Captain, I don't want to

go down 'nere, I'm perfectly comfortable here." He wrote back to the

Bureau anc said, "Richmond would like to stay at Hawthorne and I'd like to

keep him." But the Admiral wrote back and said, "Well no, never mind,

Richmond is going to China Lake so you tell him to get packed up and go

down there-period." So that was that.14

In a later interview, Rear Admiral Vossler commented about

Richmond's reassignment as follows; "My father thought the sun rose

and set in John Richmond and he was very reluctant to lose him.

But he also realized-especially since I was here (at NOTS)—the

importance of what we were trying to do to advance the state of the

art, and increase the effectiveness of air weapons... so he finally

reluctantly agreed to let John go, which was a boon for Inyokern and

a big loss for Hawthorne."15

The rapidity with which new buildings went i-p in China Lake

was a source of pleasant amazement to most old residents of the

Valley; spectacular eviiface of what a nation at v/ar could do. But at

* Captain Francis A. L. Vossler, in addition to being the Commanding Officer at NAD,

Hawthorne, was also the father of a young naval aviator then serving at NOTS, Lieutenant

(later Rear Admiral) Curtis F. Vossler of AO^'.' ;,

57
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

least one old prospector, "Blue-Eyed Pete," personally complained to

Burroughs about the new structures going up on the desert, "I don't

like it a bit; you're spoiling my view!"16

Following Burroughs' move to the new area, there was a

continuous buildup of quarters for Navy personnel and some of the

CalTech employees at China Lake. As will be described in the chapter

on construction, this wrs the period of miles of open ditches and

sandstorms.

High on the list of Burroughs' social concerns for his personnel

at China Lake as well as those remaining at the Inyokern airfield was

that of recreation.

From the onset there was a policy to create opportunities for

military personnel to get away from the area on occasion. As

Burroughs informed his staff, "If you see a man sitting out in the

sand looking off into the sun banging two rocks together, you'd

better get him off on liberty someplace before he flips."17

!t was the "Skipper's" concern for the welfare of his men that

led to the development of a special recreation area for the military

personnel of NOTS. This area on the south edge of the Sequoia

National Forest some 30 miles away—250 acres of grazing land, trees,

and a trout stream-was loaned to the Station by the Paul Gardiner

family as a contribution to the war effort. Burroughs had a jeep road

built to the otherwise inaccessible arec, and arranged for tents, a

wooden cookshack, and a small mess hall.

Camp Burroughs, as it was called, offered a special kind of

diversion to those who hungered for a peaceful, natural environment.

It provided an interesting change of scenery from the desert. The men

were allowed to go there for their liberties on a rotational basis.

Burroughs was always on the lookout for an opportunity to

augment the recreational resources of the retreat that bore his name.

One of these reveals not only his regard for his command's welfare

but also his initiative and ingenuity in accomplishing a goal. In this

case the first step in meeting a recreational need was to requisition

horses from the Army to form the "NOTS Horse Patrol."

Ostensibly, Burroughs' request to the Army Remount Officer in

Los Angeles was valid. The Station was confronting a serious security

problem in that building supplies and materials were being pilfered at

an alarming rate. The Navy's use of horse patrols was not

unprecedented; they had been used in California at the Navy bases at

Port Hueneme and San Pedro.1" But in addition to the inherently

bizarre idea of sailors riding Army horses in the desert, there is a

58
MOJAVE METAMORPHOSIS

Camp Burroughs.

gentle, liglithearted humor throughout the correspondence negotiating

the equine transfer, (n one letter, Lieutenant Gg.) Frank H. Habicht

stated that he had "been nominated Vice President in Charge of

Horses" and conveyed his thanks for the Army Field Manual on

Animal Transport, which had helped the sailors understand their new

charges a little better.'^

The transfer was successfully concluded as noted in a letter

acknowledging the happy receipt of the horses. Haoicht wrote:

The horses and gear arrived in very good shape and were promptly

taken care of at this end. The only exception was "Snuffy", [the black) had

skinned up his left hind leg. We doctored this up immediately ami so far the

horse has no limp and shows no ill effects.20

In the same letter, a hint is given as to the true destiny of the

"patrol" horses:

Temporarily we have the horses in a pasture on the ranch where our

summer camp is located, as we still have no facilities here on the desert and

have not yet received the forage which we requested.

59
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKT.RN

From the onset, Snuffy, Jiggs, Buck, Devil, Sherman, Jasper,

Four-F, and Lee were destined to enjoy the softest duty of their

Army-Navy career. Even after the stables were completed at China

Lake and the horses returned to the desert, their mission shifted from

that of the "NOTS horse patrol" to recreation. But the modest

cluster of stables represented only a small concession to recreation in

a growing community where, for the most part, the word recreation

was synonymous with leaving town for a few days in pooled

transportation, the Trona Stage (bus line) or the CalTech Shuttle (a

Navy bus or station wagon depending on the number of passengers).

NEED FOR ADDITIONAL LAND

The approvals for the Navy to use the original 650 square miles

of desert and the Inyokern airfield for the duration of the war had

started the metamorphosis of the upper Mojave Desert. That change

was accelerated by the need in late 1944 to add another 362 square

miles.

The problems of acquiring this land were compounded because

the necessity for it could not be publicly explained. Much later it

could be revealed that the addition was to support testing for a

segment of the highly secret work of the Manhattan Project in the

development of the atomic bomb.

Essentially, the project demanded range space for air drops of

various bomb shapes to determine such critical factors as aerodynamic

characteristics, fuze functioning, and ground penetration. Also, for

reasons of security, safety, and minimum interference with the rocket

programs, it was desired to conduct these tests on ranges removed

from those being developed and used for the rockets There was only

one way to go-northward. The Station was bounded on the west by

a stale highway, a high-tension line, and a railroad. To the east there

was a north-south military airway and the town of Trona and its

associated large potash plant. To the south was another highway and

the growing community of Ridgecrest. Although the logic of acquiring

an additional 362 square miles to the north was clear to the

government planners, it was not at all clear to the people with mining

interests there. There were about 200 mining properties and more

than 1,000 mining claims within the area proposed for acquisition. Of

the 231,040 acres in this northern extension, 2,840 were patented

lands in private ownership.^1

60
MOJAVE METAMORPHOSIS

A typical exchange of views is seen in co.respondence between

Burroughs and one of those with mining interests, Paul \. Wilbur,

who had spent many years prospecting and developing his mining

property in the Coso Mountains. Wilbur wrote:

Several reputable mining engineers have spent enough time there to

agree with our estimate of almost limitless mineral possibilities in the district.

If • were only for "the duration" and essential to the "war effoit" and we

were assued of adequate compensation for damage to our properties we

could not object. But to be permanently debarred and for the community

and Nation to lose the great natural resource 5 bound up in those hills is

quite another matter. To that program we want to enter our most forceful

and determined objection! It would mean a very great financial loss to every

person who has holdings in that district-many of who:, arc now away from

the district and engaged in various phases of National service both at home

and abroad. What are these people going to think when they learn that their

properties have been absorbed by the Navy while they were away serving

their Country?22

Burroughs, with the highly classified Manhattan Project in mind,

responded that the land was needed for "an extensive test program at

the highest possible priority." With reference to the "people in

service" he wrote.

In my own judgment, those people who are now engaged in various

phases of national service, Army or Navy, at the righting fronts, would

willingly gi/e up their interest in the proposed extension area in order that

essential ordnance test work may be carried on expeditiously and with

minimum interference. I can assure you that one weapon which has been

designed in Pasadena and tested at this station is alone responsible for saving

thousands of American lives. Only by means of extensive research,

development, and test work are we able to keep ahead of our enemies -.nd

thus prevent the last two or three years of this war from being terrifically

costly in war casualties.

Just as the original northern boundary of NOTS had been drawn

to avoid the relatively high concentration of mining interests, so too

had it been shaped to skirt around a small health spa at Coso Hot

Springs. However, the Manhattan Project plus the increased range

space needs of the rocket program and the emergence of a clearer

concept of the Station's permanent peacetime role made it necessary

to acquire the health spa property located within the proposed

northward extension. Considerable objection was raised to this

proposed acquisition. Mark Dailey, proprietor and manager of Coso

Hot Springs, wrote to the Secretary of the Navy and to the President

of the United States:

This property is being taken over by the Inyo-Kern (sic| Navy Testing

Base simply as we are given to understand, an addition to the acreage used

for testing purposes. This is an injustice to suffering humanity, these natural

mud and natural steam baths at these Springs are considered by thousands of

people who have been cured at this resort as the only means in the world of

curing arthritis, neuritis, and kindred ailments.

61
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Dailey was sincere in his beliefs as to the curative powers of the

hot springs. He and others urged tha^ if the land had to be taken for

military use, it be made into a sanatorium for the wounded of the

Armed Services.

The Navy made a detailed study of the Coso Hot Springs area

for appraisal purposes, including investigation into the possiole

medicinal properties of "the natural mud and natural -team."

Opinions from medical authorities denied any such curative propeities,

and the Medical Officer of the Eleventh Naval District concurred in

these findings. Concerning Dailey's las1recommendation, the study

concluded that even if the property had possibilities for the

establishment of a naval hospital, "its location in the center of the

present station wou'd preclude such use."25 '

While efforts were in progress to extend the Station's northern

boundary, two other acquisitions were also sought. These were

described as the "west extension" and the "east extension." The

proposed west extension contained about 6,460 acres of which some

4.570 acres were patented lands in privatu ownership. The basic

purpose of this extension was to eliminate confusing jogs in the

Station's western boundary so that test pilots making hiph-speed firing

runs, and also the public exploring t'^j desert, could more easily

determine the precise location of the boundary. The proposed line

was along the high-tension electrical power line in that area.

The east extension, an area of approximately 10,360 acres,

embraced lands betw ;en the boundary of the NOTS village and the

Ridgecrest-Tiona road. Although in the acquisition request it was

.ermed the "east extension," it was actually an exiension of the

Station's southern and eastern boundaries. This proposed extension

was intended to provide a buffer zone so that any future expansion

of the outside communities wotHd not be too closely adjacent to the

NOTS village area. As Burroughs told Byrnes, the extension was

needed "to protect us from people putting up 1 ese honky-tonk

places right aaoss the road from the station."-6

A fourth proposed extension never went beyond limited

discussion. This would have extended NOTS, with its full width of 30

miles, to a distance of 150 miles northward and close to the town of

Tonopah, Nevada. A testing range of this dimension would have beei.

particularly use.'ul for the postwar guided missile programs of the

Navy, but ^'..nng the war it was not pressed with any vigor and

consequently never materialized.

As compared to the rapid-fire achievements ir the Station's

1,:
MOJAVK METAMORPHOSIS

technical arid building programs, the iegjl prccess of acquiring the

Stition's lands and settling land claims was a Sicv process. These

continued throughout the months-and ye'irs—ahead. The process of

making settlements was complicated. Neither *;ie Navy fepartment

nor the Depjitment of Justice could settle clai.-.is until they were

cleared through 'he Department of the Interior and declared valid.

Within the Navy several differeni cife'?nde^ and commands had an

inrerface with the claimants, and it was not always easy to determine

whether action should be taken by NOTS, the Elevenl"1 Naval

District, or the Bureau of Ordnance. This governmental ma.e often

confused claimant« leaving them with a distinct impression that they

were being given the proverbial runaround. M an example, Burroughs

with full honesty had to respond to a concerned mine owner as

follows:

1 cannot give you anv definiio information as to tl^e action that may

be taken in Washington on this proposed acquisition, nor whether it will be

a permanen' acquisition or merely for tlK duration.2

A particularly distressing but necessary action was that of moving

out those who had homesleaded within the area claimed for the

Station. Although but few hoinesteading ranchers had to move, the

uprooting process was a painful one according to some observers.

Duane Mack, one of the first CalTech staff members to work at the

NOTS ra iges. gives tin's reaction.

I knew the ranchers that were in the area. You see when we first

came her; we'd go in there for water because they ail had little weils, and

we got acquainted W'th them. They were wonderful people. I just had a lot

of respect for them because they were real pioneers in my opinion. You

kmw . . . without water, without electrical pov/er, . . . they'd carved these

little ranches out of the middle of the desert and the conditions weie pretty

darn rough. So we liked them and they were extremely concerned because

they realized they were probably going to have to move. And they didn't

know where to go. Many of thjm had come here as young people and a 101

of them were elderly-and where would they go?... In talking to them . felt

what they were offered for the land was very inadequate. Some sr 1d and

some refused to sell.28

From Commander Richmond, NOTS Executive Pjficer, we have

another reaction,

... in the early days we moved about 6 or 8 families off the Station

and relocated them over here ju0! this side of Route 6 [now Highway 14 j

but off the Station and there were some who were unhappy about it but

apparently they didn't complain too bitterly.29

The Department of the Interior did not approve t' 9 request to

transfer the lands outright to the Navy, Instead, a temporary-use

permit was issued, to expire six months after the termination of the

declared national emergency. This decision not only preserved the

o
THE GRAND l.XPl-RIMl-N" AT 1NY0KERN

status of the unclaimed lands in the public domain, but also left the

Department of the Interior untmnmeled in such complex matters as

grazing rights and mining claims. No battle line was drawn over the

issue. In the face of a aal war the Navy did not wish to open fire in

an interagency skirmish as long as there were no immediate

obstructions to building NOTS and getting test operations under way.

Thus NOTS would be built and operated during the war and the

immediate postwar period on a permit that gave it but temporary use

of unclaimed lands in the public domain.

A NATURAL PRESERVE

The Navy's arrival on the Mojave not only moved back the

frontier but it also resulted in the preservation in its natural state of

most of the 1,095,926 acres that would come into its borders. This

area contains rrmy unique features. Amor^ these is the most

extensive display of Indian petroglypiis in North America, totaling

over 14,000 different images chipped into stone by Indians as long as

3,000 years agoN0It contains the historic Coso Village site. Feral

horses freely roam the upper reaches of the ranges without fear of

ill-intentioned men with guns. It provides one of the last California

refuges for the free-roaming burros whose ancestors came with the

first land parlies ol the California iniasionanes and whose later

generations carried the supplies of the prospectors and miners who

opened up development of the desert. Animal and plant life exists in

most of the area much as it did in 1943, relatively safe from the

encroachments of civilization. A few changes have been made like the

introduction of the chukar game bird, but these have only enhanced

the value of the preserve.

The contemporary view of the advantages of the desert location

was limited. The founders, albeit men of foresight in matters of

science and thv neeos of the Navy, saw the desert as a beastly

place -a place without its own set of attractiens Tor living. They saw

the advantages of good flying weather, and lots of u, available water,

power ready to be tapped, and lots of space. Bit as a place to live,

to bring a fsmily, that was where a price would oe paid. A chronic

recruiting problem was foreseen. The time would come when

improved transportation, recreational growth, community development,

and advances in air conditioning would cause people to prefer this

"land o

f

little rain'" to the cities with their traffic and smog. Bui the

64
MOJAVF METAMORPHOSIS

metamorphosis was just beginning. In 1944, Indian Wells Valley,

including the swollen villages of Inyokern and Ridgecrest and the

planned town of China Lake, was still a place to go through and not

to—unless yocr wartime orders or duties required otherwise.

65
THE (iKANU EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

REFERENCES

NWt itienlification numbers are those under which copies of docu-nenls .trc filed in

hie rechnical Information Department, N^ival Weapons (.enter. I he following abbreviations

.ire used to identif) record collections where '.'ocuinents were found

OA Operational Archives, Naval II.story Division. Washington, DC.

''ARD Collection of Archival and Reference Documents at the Naval Weapons

Center

NA National Hrchives. Washington. D.( .

t-'RCB Naval Weapons Center 'cords stored .it federal Re ords Center. Bell

Calilornia

1. L'npublisheci narrative history, "History of U.S. CarricT Aircraft Service U.-.i.

Numhei Fifty 1 nnv." Mas 31, 1945. p. 8, ü \. (NWC 2313, 15-49.)

2, Unpublished tian1rip1of recording of "Parly Timers' Meeting," Naval

Weapons (Vn'et. C.ana Like. Calif.. May 17, 1 Ofi.S, p. 34, (NWC 2313, S-56.)

/bid.

Ibid . p. M>.

.WO.T.S. RIH keteer. June 2. I94S.

Pageant, /oi, 2, No. M (December 1946), p. 2

C>.

Leitet from A. !. Piiin.ger to author, September 25. 1973. (NWC 2313,

47-1.)

\ Unpublished transcript of recollections by Ardis M. Walker. February 1974

(NWC 2313. CARD ':1c.)

9. Pnuiiger letter, cited in Kef. 7 ibove.

10. Valley Indcpendeitt. Ridgec.est, Calif., July l

c

)7(l.

11. 77;<' Times Herald. Special l

o

50 Community Progress Editi^'o. Ridgecrest,

Calif., p. 30.

12. Memorandum of telephone conversation between VAdm. C

:

. F. Husscy. Jr.,

Chief. Bureau if Ordnance and Mr. Richards (FHA) on March 27. 1947,

Record Group 71. NA. (NWC 2313, 18-6.)

13. Fmi ry L, and Marion Ellis inter/iew, February 23, !97l, p 36. (NWC 2313,

S-77.)

14. John 0. R.:lir.iond interview, January 19.57. (NWC 2313, S-33.)

15. Curtis F. Vossler interview, April 1973. (NWC 2313. S-85.)

16. Unpublished transcript of comments by RAdn . Burroughs speaking at the

NWC 25th Anniversary Dinner at the NWC Commissioned Officers" Mess.

November 9, 1968. p. 7. (NWC 2313, S-58.)

66
MOJAVE Min AMORPIK .SIS

17. Frank H. Habicht interview. May 1967, p. 32. (NWC 2313, S-44.)

18. Leiter from Lt. C, W. Rickctts, Jr., USNR, of the Commandant's Office,

Eleventh Naval District, San Diepo, Calif., to Capt. Burroughs, February 26.

1944. C5343 N33-13, FRCB. (NWC 2313, 22-97A.)

19. Letter from Lt. (jg.) F. H, Habicht to Capt. Lawrence C. Phipps, Long

F-ach. Calif,, March 26, 1944. FRCB. (NWC 231?, 22-97B.)

20. Leiter from Lt. (jg.) F. H. Habicht to Maj. l^iwrence C. Phipps, Long Beach,

Calif., July 26, 1944, FRCB. (NWC 2313, 22-97C.)

21. Leiter (ND1I/N1-13) from Chief. Bureau of Yards and Docks to Secretary of

the Navy, on "Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California; Acquisition

of Additional Land. Project No. Ord. 504," Januar, ^ 1945 FRCB. (NWC

2313, 22-58.)

22. Letter from Paul Wilbur to ComNOTS, February 1, 1945. FRCB. (NWC

2313. 22-63.)

23. Leiter from ComNOTS u Paul Wilbur, February 7, 1945. FRCB. (NWC

2313, 22-56.)

24. Letter from Mark Dailey to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, January

16, 1945. FRCB. (NWC 2313, 22-64.)

25. Lettei (ND11/NP36/N1-13 Serial P-20900) from ComFlcven to Bureau of

Medicine and Surcery, on "Proposal of P. J. Sanders to Establish Naval

Special Hospital in Inyo County, Californk'," üclober 13, 1945. FRCB.

(NWC 2313. 22-87.)

26. Memorandum (Ad3/\,P36) of teleplionc conversation between Capt. J. C.

Byrnes, Jr., and Capt. S. E. Burroughs, February 11, .944. Record Group

74, NA. (NWC 2313, 18-56.)

27. ComNOTS letter, cited in Ref. 23 above.

28. Duane Mack interview, January 1969, pp. 27-18. (NWC 2313, S-60.)

29. Richmond interview. J-,nuary 1967, p. 96. (NWC 2313, S-33.)

30. Campbell Grant. James W. Baird, and J. Kenneth Pringle. Rock Drawings of

the Coio Rrngc. China Lake, Maturango Press, 1968, pp, 15, 57.

67
Flood Currents in Rocketry

The urgent dmmbea' of war was quickening when NOTS was

established. And the new Station lost no time falling into the brisk

step of the compelling tempo.

As was noted in a previous chapter, test ope: itions began within

month of the Station's establishment. Subsecptent to Burroughs

moving his headquarters from Inyokem to China Lake in April 1944,

operational resources multiplied rapidly. We will now see how the

Station operations in support of the CalTech rocket development and

the Navy's rocket training program began to have an immediate effect

on the quality of the weapons and their usage in the war.

FOWLER FOLLOWS THE ROCKETS TO WAR

The day-to-day technical progress in rocketry was apparent with

each successful test at the recently establ-shed NOTS. But the real

measure of rocketry in this era was its performance in battle.

To obtain a brief view of the initiation of American rockets into

the battles of World War II, we will follow the trail of Dr. William A

Fowler, Lauritsen's r-unber one man in the technical direction of the

program, in his tour of the Pacific combat theaters shortly after

NOTS was founded.

Fowler started his mission by visiimg headquarters groups to

learn how the rockets were being used in battle and to determine

what he or his associates b.-'ck in Pasadena could do to aid "veapon

introduction into the Fleet. He promptly passed what he had learned

69
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

.

Courtesy Millikan Library, California Institute of Technology

Dr. William A. Fowler, Assistant Director of Research for the California Institute of

TechnolOKV Fcchnology rocket program. nrnmm

70
F

:

LOOÜ CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

to his CalTech prers-whether tacts or statistics, or personal

impressions and feelings such as those expressed below.

'2 Mar 44

Dear Stall':

Tliis is bcinp vvritlcn because I feel that each and every one of you

should shaie with me an experience which truly belongs to all t-f us. Ii is

being written aboard a C47 (DC-3j of the Air Transport Command bound

from one of our island fortresses to another, getting closer to the real

McCoy even 'te. Accompanying us is a Navy squadron with our gear

aboard. They IK i"ing us because we ' ave a navigplot and this is a long,

overwater hop.

After taking off from our last st.)p we circled die field for quite

awhile and we all wondered what was up. Then :i!l at once die squadron

swooped up alongside of us and we were off in formation with the tn.nspon

in the lead. When I noticed four rails [70-inch CalTech rocket launcher rails]

on each and every wing 1 got so excited I almost started to cry. Now for

over an hour I've been watching them, just fascinated. Here is our gear going

up to combat, and I'm so damn proud of it and all of u« cha' 1 can't help

writing this letter. Sentimental or not sentimental, they can't stop us now!

This squadron happens to be the one which adopted insignia with three of

our gadgets "rampant." To me it is a symbol that we are doing our part and

that our part, our share, is contributing to the final victory.

1 showed several reels of the 16 millimeter movies id Admiral Halsey

and talked with him briefly His command outfitted a squadron in the field

some time ago and it has been very successful. The Admiral wants more

planes and more ammunition and now he is getting vnal he want:-this

squadron alongside is very real proof of that fact.

More and more must come and all us musi redorble our efforts to

keep it coming. Don't doubt for a nun Uc that the boys out here want it

and will use it. Theirs :s die toughest job of all and they want everything in

the book to throw at the enemy.

With my best regards

WILLIE FOWLER

P.S. I plan to mail this the minute we land, betöre I get self-conscious about

it.

As one of the scientists to become involved in rocketry just

prior to United States entry into World War II, Fowler had w'tnessed

the skepticism and general indifference to rockets then prevailing

within the armed services. All that was now changed, and Fowler was

impressed by the phenomenal speed with which the Navy was coming

up from behind.

The most striking evidence of now the Navy could so quickly

rise to an emergency was seen in the aircraft with their rocket

launchers. The program for these rockets had started only nine

months before. The rocket-equipped Fleet aircraft were but the

71
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

forerunners of thousands already being similarly equipped. And it

would not be long before orders would be issued that all carrier-based

and twin-engine land combatant type aircraft delivered by the

contractors be fully equipped to fire rockets.'

Although Fowler and the other CalTech scientists were

enthusiastic about the unprecedented progress in rocket development,

it was not known whether this enthusiasm was shared with the armed

services who had but recently been called on to use the new

weapons. This was the kind of feedback needed back home, at

Pasadena, and at NOTS.

Fov/ler flew 21,000 miles in 66 days, a period that he broke

down :nto 53 days of active work, 6 days and 4 hours of flying, and

7 days "sweating out" visit and transportation requests. He visited the

headquarters of Commander in Chief, South Pacific, Admiral W. F.

Halsey and the U.S. Army Forces, South Pacific Area in New

Caledonia; the Third Amphibious Command at Guadalcanal; the

Fourteenth Army Corps and the Thirteenth Air Force at Bougainville;

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East in Australia; the

Second Engineer Special Brigade in New Guinea; as well as numerous

combat areas. He "talked rockets" at all levels throughout the

Pacific—with admirals, generals, other officers, and enlisted personnel.

How were rockets used? What were the problems? What could the

scientists do for the fighting men?

The CalTech emissary was especially interested in learning of the

first use of aircraft rockets in the Pacific. Apparently, in December

1943, Marine Corps Squadron VMTB-134 had received a shipment of

experimental rail launchers that had been dispatched to Halsey's

gunnery officer; it was understood that the rockets would follow

within the month. To assure the earliest possible use of the new

"secret" weapon, 22 TBFs were immediately equipped with eight Mk

4 rocket launcher rails apiece. There were no accompanyiup

blueprints, drawings, or instructions, and a determined crew went to

work on the puzzle. The initial installation required more than 300

man-hours for the first TBF; however, this time was reduced to only

16 man-hours by the time the last aircraft had been equipped.

Despite the problems, initiative and ingenuity triumphed, and the

launchers were ready. All that was lacking now were the rockets

themselves; however, a tired, but proud, crew was confident that

there would be no delay in getting the new weapons into combat

against the enemy. What they did not know was that a higher

priority use had been assigned, and the rockets, so eagerly awaited,

72
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

were being sent to the carriers in the Atlantic Theater. Also, the

rocket i apply was as yet quite limited because of certain fuze

problems that were being ironed out in the desert at Inyokern.

Each day of waiting for the rockets brought fresh reports of

targets seemingly ideal for the new weapon. Halsey's aviation units

were harassing land installations and shipping around Rabaul. Intense

antiaircraft fire made it hard to get close enough for accurate

bombing. Hopefully, the new rockets could do the job. This optimism

for a weapon-albeit untried in battle-was an extension of the aura

of high expectation that had characterized the 3.5-inch aircraft rocket

project since Comlnch had launched it six months earlier.

First forward-firing rocket used at sea; loading 3.5-inch aircra''t rockets on carrier

U.S.S. Mission Bay in late 1943.

The month of January slipped by and still no rockets were

forthcoming. The pilots of the 22 TBFs were beginning to have

unkird thoughts about rockets in general and launcher rails in

73
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INVOKERN

particular. Four 70-inch-Iong rails projecting out from under each

wing caused enough drag to reduce airspeed by about 5 knots,

thereby increasing the advantage of enemy fighters as well as cutting

down the effective range of the TBFs. One pilot with this handicap

reported tiiat 17 planes without launchers passed him in 15 miles.

Finally, a cargo ship arrived in Noumea harbor, and someone

found she had rockets aboard. Halsey issued orders that they be

delivered to the rocket squadron with highest priority.

The ship's officers knew exactly where the rockets were—at the

bottom of the hold covered by assorted material that would take

days to unload. But the pilots had waited long enough! Through their

demands, an unorthodox solution was found—an acetylene torch to

cut through a steel bulkhead. An ordnance officer told Fowler that

the packing crates were scorched, but the rockets were in good shape.

The enthusiasm with which they were unloaded approached that for

the Christmas mail!

The precious rockets were air transported to VMTB-134, which

had moved to Bougainville. As a strike was imminent, there was little

time for training and practice with the new weapon. Within three

days, the pilots and ;rews improvised their own familiarization

program. On February 15, 1944 (only a week after their "liberation"

from the ship's hold at Noumea), the first U.S. aircraft rockets were

fired in the Pacific Theater. Their targets were large Japanese

transport ships in Keravia Bay, in the Rabaul area of New Britain

Island. John E. Burchard describes the strike:

Toming down to their attack through heavy antiaircraft fire, they fired

their 'jcket at practically point-blank range (500 to 600 feet). Two of the

P'^is pulled out of their attack run before they could see whether they

icored hits, but reported that they didn't believe they could have possibly

missed. Two other pilots saw their rockets hit.

Major A. C. Robertson's Marine pilots undoubtedly felt that the

Rabaul strike was an exciting blow for victory as they watched their

rockets slam into the large transports. This excitement dimmed when

post-mission assessment showed the actual damage to be relatively

slight. When Fowler heard this, he understood at once why this was

so.

The rockets sent to Noumea were of two types, neither of which

was designed for the tactical application for which they were used.

One thousand of them were 3.5-inch aircraft rockets with solid-steel

heads designed for use against submarines. Although the rupture of a

submarine pressure hull need not be large to be disabling, the same

size hole through the hull of a transport would not have the same

74
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY 

consequences, particularly if above the waterline. There were also five 

hundred 5-inch ARs with high-explosive heads and fast fuze action for 

antipersonnel use. This fuze would function immediately upon impact 

and would not even penetrate the hull of a large vessel. It would also 

explode at water impact without causing damage to an adjacent ship. 

The need for a delay fuze was clearly evident. 

Finding the rockets ineffective against large ships, the Marines 

turned with spectacular success to other targets-antiaircraft 

emplacements that had no turrets, radar installations, and bivouac 

areas. Fowler was told that the TBFs with rockets damaged sc many 

antiaircraft emplacements that those without turrets no longt;r fired 

against TBFs for fear of revealing their positions. Targets were "more 

than plentiful. "3 

By March 7, when Fowler was in Noumea, he learned that a 

squadron of Dauntless dive bombers (SBD) had arrived at Bougainville 

fully equipped with rocket launchers and sights. Their p!lots had been 

"trained" in the use of rockets; that is, they had probably fired a 

dozen or so rockets each during a few days training at Inyokern. 

They were all anxiously awaiting the arrival of a supply of 

rockets-but in the meantime, they were taking off their launching 

rails. 

In the same period, another TBF squadron, VC-7 from the 

U.S.S. Manila Bay, had fired two hundred and seventy-three 5-inch 

ARs during the Marshall Island operations and were credited with 4% 

hits against small targets of opportunity. The pilots also claimed that 

a large ammunition dump exploded as the result of rocket hits. 

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's Gunnery Officer, Captain T. B. Hill, 

had been much impressed by the surprising accuracy of rockets in 

tests conducted in Honolulu. And the first combat uses by VMTB-134 

and VC-7 clinched the impression. Hill told Fowler that the 

Commander in Chief of the Pacific wanted 100,000 rounds per 

month. A few months earlier Fowler would have been amazed by the 

size of such a request for a new item. But he now knew that 

CalTech itself had just completed the emergency production of the 

first 100,000 rockets, and industrial plants under Navy contract were 

beginning to turn them out in production-iine fashion. Those who 

developed, tested, and produced the new weapons were ready to meet 

the Fleet needs. · 

Fowler's overall evaluation was that there was great enthusiasm 

for rockets in the Pacific Theater. He also listed a number of specific 

observations and recommendations. Despite the progress he had 

75 
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOK.ERN

observed in the introduction of rockets to the Pacific, Fowler was

concerned that the combat theaters were preparing to use relatively

few of the rockets that were beginning to come off the production

lines.

He reported, "At the present time, approximately one million

pounds of rocket propellant are extruded per month and several

hundreds of thousands of projectiles are being produced."4By

comparison, he doubted whether more than 10,000 rockets had beer

fired in combat in all the Pacific Theaters comoined. Moreover, he

pointed out that only a few of the various rocket heads and fuzes

designed for special combat purposes had yet been employed in

combat. This was to be expected in the introduction of a new

weapon, but Fowler wanted to make it clear in his recommendations

that considerable groundwork was still needed in order to take

advantage of what had been accomplished in both development and

production.

At the heart of the problem. Fowler identified the lack ol

adequate doctrine for the use of rockets. Studies of rocket warfare

were needed that would lead to the speedy development of tactical

and logistical doctrine. To emphasize the point, he stated that if such

studies could not be made, he doubted the merit of large-scale rocket

programs in the United States.

Although Fowler noted with admiration the spirit and ingenuity

with which field units installed rocket gear and used it in combat, he

also had to note that the absence of overall rocket policy, guiuelines,

and training materials often resulted in excessive man-hours being

required for weapon maintenance and handling. In many instances,

misfires and accidents were also incurred by these deficiencies.

Fowler was convinced that the difficulties encountered were not

the fault of the theater commands, but the result of information not

being available on new rocket developments. The services were geared

to guns and bombs. To fully exploit the potential of the new

weapons, their tactical uniqueness and peculiar logistical characteristics

had to be understood all the way from the theater commande to

the marine, sailor, or soldier who would be facing the enemy th

the weap^n

Fowler encouraged the technical writers of CalTech to press

forward with operating manuals and procedures. He wrote Dr. Joseph

Foladare, head of the Editorial Staff, "I have found G.l.s reading

your pamphlets in the most remarkable places and you can feel justly

proud of the fact that the works of your office ire ' opular reading

76
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY 

in foxholes, in jungle camps, and in 'sacks' under mosquito netting. "5 

The message was that publications were critical in the scheme of 

using weapons to defeat an enemy. 

FinaJly, Fowler recommended that a civilian scientific advisor on 

rockets be assigned to the Pacific Theater. On the basis of his own 

experience, he further recommended that the advisor be associated 

with a rocket development group, specifically, the CaJTech section of 

the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC). 

In one form or another, Fowler's main recommendations were 

acted upon. Less by decision than osmosis, a doctrine of rocket use 

evolved. As rocket successes mounted, there was no question that the 

services were at last using the new weapon in sufficient quantities to 

equal the huge production at home. Th.:! value of the Fowler visit was 

recognized, and other advisors from CalTech were later assigned to 

carry on where he left off. Rockets, whose potentialities had oeen 

largely overlooked before Wor· Var II, were coming into major 

military use by midpoint of thal war. A new field of ordnance had 

been opened! 

RANGES AND TARGETS 

Feedback from the Pacific combat theater influenced the Naval 

Ordnance Test Station in many ways; not only in the development 

and testing of rocket hardware, but also in developing its ranges and 

testing facilities. A case in point was seen in the spring of 1944. At 

this time Fowler's firsthand observations of CalTech rockets in a 

combat role were starting to arrive from the Pacific Theater. On 

March 9 he wrote: 

It has beer. defmitely established that instantaneous functioning for 

anti-personnel fragmentation is of little use since the Japs are always 

underground or behinc! pill boxes or block houses. Areas in which all of the 

foliage and bark had been completely stripped from the trees by fragments 

and concussion cont&ned live and f~ghting Japs. The enemy must be dug out 

by penetration and delayed fuze action. 6 

A month later he addressed his comments in an informal letter 

to Dr. Robert B. King, supervisor of CalTech's fuze group: 

It is my impression that three coconut logs in thickness should be 

taken as the wood target to be penetrated. Cover the logs with 2' of dirt or 

preferably sand. Ask Comdr. Renard to have some logs shipped in from 

Hawaii or dig some up in the States. Don't worry too much about concrete 

although penetration of at least one foot would be desirable. 7 

77 
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

He closed his letter with the admonition to "keep up the good

work and assure your gang that their efforts are really worthwhile."

And so some of the earliest special-purpose targets constructed at

NOTS were simulated Japanese gun emplacements fortified with logs;

however, it is not known whether these logs were "shipped in from

Hawaii or [dug up] in the States." Concrete reinforced

pillboxes-described in a CalTech report as being of "native elaborate

Japanese design"—were also constructed.8 NOTS was not the only site

of pillbox targets; some were built on San Clemente Island off the

southern California coast. Several rocket rounds were fired at these

targets in March 1944.

The building of ranges and targets enjoyed top priority at the

desert Station in early 1944, as dictated by the urgency of the

CalTech program. Although there had been much progress since the

initial drive of a single bulldozer marked oui the first air firing range

on the desert floor, the range facilities in early 1944 were relatively

crude when compared to the highly sophisticated test ranges of a

latter-day NOTS. More often than not, a "range" was tiie hasty

rearrangement of the desert terrain by the ubiquitous bulldozer into

the form of earthworks, bunkers, and trenches. Wooden shacks and

sometimes a lone Quonset hut served to protect test instrumentation

and ground „. ews from the harsh elements of the upper Mojave

region. Cables and telephone wires were simply laid down on

scrub-covered sand-highly vuhvrabie to the passage of jeep,

constructioi vehicle, and wild desert burro alike.

Crude as they were, the ranges were helping CalTech to do their

job. Besides getting ooerations under way, the early tempo-ary ranges

represented the beginning of the present range complex with us

sophisticated systems of collecting performance data or. a wide range

of ordnance tests.

Construction of even the most temporary range facilities wis

often plagued by planning and funding problems. But Captain Byrnes

in the Bureau of Ordnance continued to give his staunch support to

the NOTS-Callcch needs. Not only Byrnes but also some exceptional

young reserve officers who worked for him ii the Bureau gave their

support. One of these was Lieutenant Commander (later Commander)

Gerald K. Lake, whom Byrnes described more than twenty years later

as being "simply splencid ... a remarkable memory . . smart as ho

can be."9

Like his boss, "Gerry" Lake was a man of action, possessing a

marked talent for sidestepping bureaucratic hurdles. Sometimes his

78
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

initialive surpassed even that of Byrnes himself, as revealed in the

transcribed record of a telephone call from Burroughs at NOTS

Inyokern, on April 12, 1944. The topic under discussion was a

request for construction funds for range facilities:

Lake: Yes sir, I've been working on your $100,000 ever since you

called yesterday.

Burroughs: Have you fixed it up?

L<.ke: Just about. Here's ehe thing Captain, I'd like you to answer one

question for me, did you make an effort to transfer that $'00,000 through

your Pay Master to the Officer in Charge of Construction?

Burroughs: We can't do that.

Lake: That's all I wai.ted to hear you say Captain.

Burroughs: It just can't be done out here, it has to be done back

tli ere.

Lake: That's the information that I g"' from Bureau of Yards &

Docks. The tiling that concerns me was that Captain Byrnes was not

confident that it could be done. I felt that rather than delay matters by

having a lot of arguments as to whether it could be done or couldn'. be

done, I would try and get the thing straightened out so that you coi id get

going this afternoon. If I tried to transfer O&OS over to Yards & Docks I'm

going to run into more delay because there will be arguments as to whether

that appropriation is available. You told Captain Byrnes that that $5f 000 I

think r: was, item was to prove test and experiment. However, since it's

concrete targets and roads, it is possible that the Financial Division might

object, again resulting in delays so I went to Admiral Kitts this morning and

said, "Sir, as a matter of policy I don't agree with this, but as a matter of

getting something for Captain Burroughs tliii afternoon, will you approve my

giving Yards & Docks $100,000 under the appropriation IRNVAA [Increase

and Replacement of Navy Vessels Appropriation Act (1944)] about which

there can be no argument?" And he heard my story and he said yes.

Burroughs: That's swell.

Lake: I will go dov n this afternoon, I've got the letter written here

but 1 haven't read it and deliver by hand to Yards & Docks their

authorization to spend $100,000 for the 5 items that are included in your

personal letter to Captain Moses. That's what you want, isn't it?

Burroughs: Yes.

Lake: Then they will call up the Officer in Charge of Construction

and tell him to go ahead.

Burroughs: Fine.

Lake: If anything goes wrong with my plans in the next couple of

hours I'll telephone you sir.

In July 1944 a six-month construction effort was providing

ranges complete enough for effective testing work. At C-l Range-the

aircraft range located about 12 miles northwest of the Station-the

target was still a large white cross in the center of a cleared area 200

yards square. However, a control tower was now in place some 4,500

yards removed, with radio equipment to provide contact with the

NOTS airfield and the pilot of the shooting aircraft. In addition,

remote stations gave shelter to "stakers" (or spotters) and telephones

to notify the tower of the impact for each pass.

79
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

As dive angles and trajectories were critical to rocket firing

analysis work, the NOTS range engineers devised an ingenious

instrument called a "harp." This was described as a quarter-round

gadget with wires radiating out at angles; another set of wires

intersected them at points representing distances to target. So, as an

aircraft came Hying in, the observer could sight through this harp and

see what wire the aircraft was following down and gel its di"e angle

and approximate range.10

Spotting towers had also been built at G-2 Range (the ground

firing range for inert ammunition) 8 miles from China Lake. These

..-..

,:i.-^ '

The range harp: early NOTS instrumentation used to determine aircraft dive angles

during air-to-ground rocket attack.

8(1
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

towers were equipped with rakes—sighting instruments long used in

Fleet surface gunnery to determine the impact points of projectiles.

Three months earlier, in April 1944, before the spotting towers

were built, Burroughs was concerned about their nonavailability.

Accordingly, he wrote to the Bureau of Ordnance and requested six

obsolete Army tanks "for use as camera stations and observation

posts in connection with rocket and fuze tests."' ' There is no evidence

that such an expedient w.s resorted to. Happily for the prospective

occupants of such a shelter '.airing a Mojave summer, the spotting

towers were built and soon operational.

Special-purpose ranges were constructed to handle special

problems and programs. For example, a plate range designated K-l

was established for the critical fuze testing program. In addition to

steel-plate targets of varying thicknesses arrayed in staggered rows, a

permanent 30-foot launcher (a length of steel rail that constrained the

rocket) was also in place at K-l. At a companion plate range {K-2) a

similar 200-foot launcher was Hearing completion.

Yet another special-purpose range was located 26 miles away

from the Station. This was Area L-also to be used for fuze tests,

tests of high explosives, and any test that required the aircraft to be

landed nearby. For these reasons, Area L was chosen for its

remoteness and the proximity jf a dry lake bed smooth and long

enough 'j be used as a landing strip. 11 was here that tho earlier

mentioned Japanese pillboxes were constructed.

The program was not limited to obtaining ballistic data on

rockets in flight; underwater behavior of rockets also posed many

unanswered questions. How strong does a rocket body structure have

to be to withstand breakup on water impact? What trajectory changes

are imposed upon water entry? What are the \elocity changes? How

about penetration, fuzing? Th.-ough its comprehensive work on the

air-launched torpedo for th; Office of Scientific Research and

Development, CalTech was able to providf some duswers. But

theoretical data for torpedje^ had to be extrapolated for aerial

rockets, and the application had to be tested. The torpedo testinp,

facility at Morris Darn was totally unsuitable for aircraft rocket tests

because of its topography and small size; consequently, NOTS sought

an underwater range within reasonable flight time from Inyokern.

Haiwee Reservoir 40 miles to the north appeared to be a perfect

solution. As it was part of the water supply system feeding into Los

Angeles, permission was needed for its use. This was given under

conditions safeguarding against water contamination. It was also

81
Till- GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

stipulated that no live warheads be fired into the reservoir. Further,

the conditions imposed on the use of Haiwee made it necessary to

obtain the use of Walker Lake in Nevada for underwater firings.

In the meantime problems were appearing with MOTS firing of

inert rockets into the haiwee Reservoir waters. Under the conditions

prevailing, the compression forces of the rockets were killing large

numbers of the fish, mainly carp. In one case, Duane Mack recalls

that, to prevent contamination, 50 men from NOTS were sent in with

gunny sacks to pick up 3,500 fish. This was one of the reasons that,

after thirteen months, NOTS lost the use of this nearby underwater

range

Following tne history of the test ranges from simulated Japanese

dugouts to underwater ranges gives the impression that the wartime

development of NOTS ranges was a continuous string of practical

adaptations to meet immediate needs. This is but half of the story.

Simultaneously with the day-to-day scurries to idapt to war needs,

there was a persistent, albeit second priority, effort to build

well-planned facilities for efficient handling of the long-term needs.

With a quiet, steady pace this work went forward. In brief it can be

stited that at the end of World War II, NOTS emerged not only as a

lead laboratory of the Navy, but it could also claim the most

completely instrumented ranges in the nation for rocket and midrange

guided missile testing.

"HOLY MOSES"

In 1944 the main focus was not on ranges but on rockets for

the war. Among these none had greater potential for battlefield

impact than the new 5-inch high velocity aircraft rocket (HVAR). the

progenitor of a second breed of aircraft rocket. It would make

history for NOTS and the nation.

To appreciate the historical significance of the 5-inch HVAR, its

relationship to the early efforts to develop aircraft rockets must be

established. It will be recalled that the United States lagged far

behind the enemy, Germany, and behind such allies as Great Britain

and Russia when it entered World War II. That the United States at

the end of the war had the most effective aircraft rocket, the KVAR,

and was employing it in the largest numbers and with the greatest

effect represented a remarkable achievement in the annals of ordnance

development.

82
FLOOD CURRENTS IN .ROCKETRY

1

A U-25 light bomber equippeti with 5-iri .h H

V

AR Holy Moses.

But the success of the 5-inch HVAR cannot be separated from

its predecessors, the 3.5-inch and the 5-inch ARs. Together they stand

as an achievement of a military-scientific-industrial team that, by the

middle of World War II, had reached a peak in its newfound

capabilities. All that it had needed was the order to give aircraft

rocket development a top priority, and Admiral King had provided

that.

As the volume of rocket testing grew, so did die learning and

experience of both developer and user. The 3.5-inch AR had

performed fairly well and wim sufficient velocity to be reasonably

accurate. But while the expedient of installing a converted 5-inch

artillery shell as a warhead (the 5-inch AR) improved the on-target

effect, the extra poundage up front cut flight velocity :ind hence,

accuracy. After several explosive tests, CalTech determined that the

shrapnel-making capability and particle pattern of this projectile were

excellent, Fowler is reported to have said, "You can't improve on this

head that Dahlgren has already spent years developing."12

The need was obvious, a rocket with the velocity of the 3.5-inch

AR and the explosive power of the 5-inch AR. The job was to design

a new motor. A solventless-extruded grain w?s developed with a

cruciform cross section. As early as December 1943, versions of the

83
THE GRAND EXPERIMEN. AT 1NY0KERN

The 5-inch aircraft rocket installed on zero-length launcher.

new motor had been ground-fired til Goldstone Range. The rocket's

official designation was the 5-inch High Velocity Aircraft Rocket

(HVAR). But thousands eventually came to know it as "Holy Moses."

There are different accounts of how the rocket acquired its irreverent

nickname. The commonly accepted version is that C'onway W. Snyder

of CalTech's projectile design group exclaimed "Holy Moses!" as he

witnessed the powerful blast of the rocket.

The new aircraft rocket's overall length was 73 inches, and its

weight was 140 pounds. Not only did the designers achieve the

velocity of the 3.5-inch AR, they improved on it by getting 1,375

feet per second—a gain of 200 feet per rccond. Two models were

eventually developed: one with a base fuze and a semiarmor piercing

head; the other with both base at'd nose fuzes. Instead of the

customary single nozzle, the motor had eight peripheral nozzles and

one central nozzle.

Despite the fact that the ground-testing phase had taken place at

Goldstone, Holy Moses was the first b-and-new aircraft rocket to be

air-tested at Inyokern, and also the first to be exclusively identified

with the youthful desert test station.

Lieutenant Crmmancler Curtis Voller later recalled that

Thursday, M-Tch 30, 1944, was a fine day with no wind. He and

84
l-LÜOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

several brother pilots of Aviation Ordnance Development Unit 1

(AODU-1) were spending the week at Inyokern on a very busy

schedule of rocket testing.

Concrete wall tür^t" h,' by Holy Moses.

Vossler had already made four rocket firing 'lights that day.

shooting a mixed bag of 3.5-intl AR., and some subcaliber combat

training rockets, and was ready for a filth one. At this time it was

casually noted that the ordnancemen had unceremoniously installed

two new rockets on fBF-lC -24516 along with four 3.5-inch ARs.

Holy Moses was ready to be test-fired in the air!

Vosslcr and Lieutenant John M. Armitage Hipped a coin to see

who would take the flight. Vossler won the toss. Pollock later

recalled the incident with characteristic good humor: "Those

conniving buzzards pulled a fast one on me. They stuck a daily flight

schedule on my desk to sign without pointing out that IIVARs were

| to be fired] that day for the first time. They knew it was my

policy to make the first flights. . . but they figured tney'd get one

out on me. I guess. 1 signed the thing without checking it too closely

|and| they went out and flew it."'3

It was a horizontal firing at 10.000 feet. Performance met all

expectations. To Vosslcr in the cockpit of the T3F, the greater

velocity of Holy Moses was immediately noticed, but as he said later,

85
r

HE GRAND EV'ERIMENT AT INYOKERN

"we expected to notice it." Wlv': specific details of this important

test were not recaüed, Vossler added, "The only thing that really

sticks in my mind is that it was successful."'4

That would be the story of Holy Moses. One success after

another through its whole development cycle, from inception to

combat use; a cycle of almost unprecedented brevity-little more than

six months. This success is reflected in all the air-firing test reports at

Ir.yokern, both in the large numbers fired from many different types

of aircraft and the few problems apparently encountered. The

six-month development cycle is all the more remarkable when one

considers the scope of the entire program, embracing internal and

external ballistics, safety precautions, assembly procedures, launcher

installation, fuze behavior, and sighting tables that were concurrently

derived and delivered as a package with the operational round in July

1944. Also to be considered is the successful design and test of

zero-length wing launchers for the 5-inch HVAR (including one for

the Army's P47 Thunderbolt aircraft).

Holy Moses established a new leadership for the United States in

aviation ordnance that would be maintained for decades to come.

Navy and Army Air Corps aircraft now had far greater striking power

than ever before. Aircraft had the hitting power equivalent o! a

5-inch shell in each rocket they carried. As compared to attacks with

machine gun:; alone, their exposure to defensive firepower during the

deliveries was greatly reduced. The attack pilots now had what they

had long sought: an effective and reasonably accurate weapon against

small targets such as submarines, destroyers, shipping, antiaircraft

positions, ammunition and oil storage dumps, tanks, and locomotives.

And in the combat arenas of Europe and the Pacific they

courageously applied this advantage to good measure.

But credit for the wartime success of the naval aviation combat

units with rockets should be shared with a small group of naval

aviators-the test pilots of NOTS who. despite continuing attempts by

their leaders, received few formal honors in recognition of their

hazardous d'.ity. These men, together with a lough, hard-working

aircraft maintenance team that kept them flying, constituted the

N?vai Air Facility at Inyokern.

Naval aviation support was a vital aspect of the desert Station's

miss'on and a crucial necessity for fulfilling its primary function in

the "testing of weapons." And yet, from the onset, difficulties were

being " ' '>-' '' in the air operations capability at NOTS. Although

dismisseu . consequential by some, these dilTailties appeared to

«6
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

others as having a dangerous potential-one thai might conceivably

have an adverse impact on the rocket program.

AIR FACILITY PROBLEMS

Although Burroughs moved his headquarters from the Inyokcrn

airfield in April 1944. he did not leave behind the p

r

oblems plaguing

that air facility.

Ironically, outward appearances seemed to belie any existence of

problems; on the contrary, the air facility appeared to be vigorous

and essentially healthy. Such a conclusion would have been easily

reached in view of the sheer volume of aircraft activity over the

Indian Wells Valley: planes of AODU-1 making rocket flight tests;

squadrons of Fleet aircraft arriving and departing and conducting

training sorties- the constant traffic of aircraft carrying freight and

passengers; and the full-time maintenance and refueling operation of a

carrier aircraft servicing unit on the ground.

But appearances are deceptive. What appeared to be a unified air

operation run by the new Station was in reality a loose group of

distinctly separate organizations. Their only common bond was the

fact that they were all generally associated with the forward-firing

rocket program, and that they all operated from the same

airfield Inyokcrn.

The crux of the problem was centered in the fact thai the

flourishing air facility was not formally a par! of the NüTS

command.

Ostensibly, the various air units at NOTS AODU-I, Carrier

Aircraft Service Unit (CASU) 53, and the Fleet squadrons were

tenant activities assigned to the Station and as such were subject to

the standing orders of the host command. But as far as technical

guidance and support were concerned, they depended on ComFAir,

West Coast, and their reporting channels were in a direct line to San

Diego.

There is no evidence of any conflict resulting from the complex

and delicate command structure at NOTS during the early months.

Rather, the officers in charge of the tenant units, to a man, seem to

have e \joyed a warm relationship with Burroughs. Consequently, there

were few problems that could not be ironed out through an informal

chat by a warm stove in the headquarters Quonset hut.

87
Uli- CUWD 1 Xi'l KiMlNl Al IN^OKIR.

Nor did ihc tciianl Lmit> led compcHcd N i,i;, HI close toiui'

with tlicir parmi organi/.aUons. As a Innnci AUI)U-1 pilol pul d,

"There was never any doubl in Die minds ol those who were doin^

the work up here |NOTS| as to where we fitted ir., and we let the

paper work go ahead as ii would and proceeded to do oui job'" The

Commanding OfTieer o* AOÜU-1. Toni Polloek. was even more

plulosoplueal regarding command relationships. As he later recalled,

"It didn't make an\ ditlerence, we all belonged to the Navy and the

lau ted Stales. '' ^

Al higher levels, however, cogni/.auce wa-^ iraditionally a maltei

oi concern. Al Ihe same time he had designated NOTS as an aclivits

ol the 1 levenlli Naval Histrict. the Secretan ol the Navy. 1 rank

Knox, liad directed lUireaus .md oitices coiuerned to take necessary

action. ImmediateK tollowiug this, the ( ommandant. Naval Air

Center, San Diego, proposed ike establishment ol a Naval Auxilian

Air Station at Inyokern under hi*- jurisdiction.'''

llusse\ objected, lli.i position was thai the principal function ol

the Station was research, development, and test of weapons. The

aircraft testing ol the weapons and the naming in the use of the

weapons were concerns ol the NOTS Commanding Hficer. lie

recommended that the Imnkern airfield be operated as a naval air

faciliu under the Commanding Officer of NOTS. Although there were

no official orders, the net effect was tint llussey hac won Ins point

foi the time being.

hi what would prove to be a long campaign lor control ol the

air facility at Inyokern. this carh exchange beiween the Commandant.

Na.al An Center, San Diego, and Hussey represented only the first

desultory shots of random skirmishes

Die cause ol the struggle was not merely a question ol

command prerogatives. The main problems stemmed Iron a much

more tangible commodiu : aircraft.

In brief, aircraft were absolutely essential to Ihe success ol the

Bureau of Ordnance rocket program at NOTS. One officer pul it

succinctly. "If you run a program ... you must have control of the

assets. If you don't have control of the assets, you're not running

it."17In the NOTS program, a principal asset was the aircraft used

to an-lesl the nev. rockets. And according to a long established, and

inviolable, tradition, the aircraft of the Navy belonged to the Bureau

of Aeronautics, This fundamental dominion and control was implicit

from the moment a particular aircraft was purchased and a Bureau

number was assigned. For as long as that particular aircraft remained

HH
ri OOl) CUKklMS IN IUX Kl I K V

in MT\K\- IN life WIN subjccl i" l!ic strict system of clicckcvii

niami IKIIAT .uul nioditiciilioii as pu'scnhcii In that Bureau.

Such systom. iho ßiircau of Aeronautics felt, could üMI\

iinctinn in ,111 c mi/iiion stalled and run b\ naval aviators: in othei

Aonis, a traditional air faeility controlled by tin bureau of

\cronaulics and crieratini! in an air base command structure.

Al Inyokern. the NO IS proponents for local control ol tlic air

la ilits and ihc air.i.ill also had a valid point ol view.

Th experimenters fell thai it was impnrtaul that tlic\ ha\ 'he

licalom lo moilih the planes as lhc\ tleemed ueccssarv Ii' lr\ new

inslallaiion.s -ach as rocket launchers, sights and conirols. In ihe

l-'leet, such activit\ was i'rowninplv icyardcil as "gadizeleei e

Modification lo service aircraft had lo be acccmiitislied accoulmg i. a

speci'icd proccduic with approved drawings ji hand I ven in ihe

accelerated k.npo i I wartime, these changes otlen look mouths I lie

NO IS program could not afford such delavs.

II aucrall can be identilied as ihe cential issu-. ol ihe

controversv. iheu one ol the additional problems had to di with then

procurement for use in the NO IS piogram Quit; obviously, the

experimenters wanted models ol ihe ver\ latest service type. Hut

NO 1 S was not alone, and within the Bureau ol Aeronautics system ol

assigning such aircraft, there v..i- still competition among all who

needed them. I oi example, th. Bureau ol Aeronautics would buy

onh a limited number ol am new l\pe aucrall lor evaluation ol

structure, design, aerodynamics, elecliome s\ stems carnei .uitabihlv

eti

I'sualK there ^as onh oiie nev^. plane earmarked lor oidnance

and armament purposes, and this w,i hotl\ soughi by the Bui au ol

Aeronautics" I'atuxenl River facililv which had the chartei for all

arnuiment testing of new aircral t.

l-or NOTS to get the airciaft it badl\ need d. il was ihouglM

thai aircrali procurement would be greatly enhanced il requirements

could be goneratcu direclK b\ an air lacility controlled b\ the

Bureau of Ordnance and handled with lop pnoritv at the highesl level

of that Bureau.

Despite lUiK'amental dillerences in philosop.u and deep desires

to protect their areas ol control, the two Bureaus shared a common

concern thai made it possible for NOTS to function. 1 his is well

brought home by the words of a highly placed officer involved m the

air facility controversy; he said, "If Ae.onautics at any tune [had]

realh wanted to cut off the Naval Oidnance Test Station thev could

S'f
Uli GRAND I-XPI-RIMIM Al l^^()Kll<\

luivc withdrawn Ihcir iiircr.'.M."',sThis was HCIIIUT done nor even

suggested. On the contrary, there was a stauneh elTui! b\ all invvheti

to "I-''.', p them llying" at Inyokern. Nevertheless, tlie efforl eontinued

tu be eliaracterized In intraBu.reau problems tor as long as the air

laeilih at NOTS remained without a elearl> defined charter. On the

local scene al NOTS, Burroughs continued his elTorts to realize an

integrated air facility under his control.

One ol Burroughs' effoits ilial met with success was Ins

recommendation dial the Inyokern airfield be renamed to honor a

former comrade. Lieutenanl Commander Warren W. Harvey.

Burroughs' choice ol name was appropuate as indicated in his letter

of ixeommendation:

rili' I,iic Warren W. Harvc\ was .1 brillianl posi luaduaU' in Xvia'.um

ürdnana'. lie eontribiHed iiKitcnalU lo ihc dtvelupmom il urdn.nm' Im

aircral'l dtirinj! his lile. He ednimanded I ifihtinf! Siiuadrnn Hiree sliwrth

belore ilu vvai started and was K) ,1 large e\tuni respnnsiblc loi ilie

devclajinient o\ Meluinu plane ladies now in use Suen l.imuus lliets as

Commander Diaeli and I 1. C'dr. O'Hare nwe much o: :heir sue.ess Ui th :

ininnen leehniquc and laeiies developed In Harve;-, ana would, 1 feel sure.

heartih endorse this reeommendatum.'''

Bui there were personal reasons, too. for tlu choice Burroughs

and Harvey were classmates al the Naval .Academy in the Class of

'24; their careers as naval aviators and ordnance postgraduates had

been close

On Ma\ 10. P'44. the Secretary of the Navy made the name

' Harvey Field'" official. At the same time lus order slated

I'he aviation i.uililies al 'he Naval ürdnunee testing |sie| Sialion,

Inyokern, California are herein isutblislied under an offieer-in-eliarge .. cl

designated

C S. Naval Air I aeilil\

l;i\ okern, ' alifornta

this is an aetiMU under the ' ommanding Officer, Naval Ordnanee testing

|sie| Station, Imokern. California.-

On June 2M. 1

(M4, Harve} Field was dedicated in a br'.M

ceremony In all the officers and men attached to NOTS, The Station

newspaper noted that "Mrs, Harvey, widow of Commander Harvey,

was present at the ceremony.""-'

But the formal name and newfound status can be mislec .ling.

The airfield was still totally lacking in hangar space. Operations and

maintenance were carried out under the harshest of conditions. For

example, a contemporary historian noted:

Maintenance of aircraft has been difficult throughout. During the

winter and spring, high winds and oust storms prevail. During the summer,

temperatures are such that touching " plane withoui gloves alter 0830 re> it's

in a burn.22

90
FLOOD CURRENTS IN RO'XETRY

However, these were essentially physical problems that would be

solved by the overall boomtime construction program at NOTS.

Significant improvements at Harvey Field would include the new

Kodiak hangar* that could house a four-motor bomber, oiled airstrips,

enlargement of the Ship's Service and recreation facilities, and a

separate transportation pool,

Progress was obvious. And there was time to appr-ise the

phenomenal achievements to date.

If Burroughs-in his new temporary headquarters at China

Lake-used this opportunity for reflection, he may well have noied

with satisfaction that the mission of his new Naval Air Facility

command some 9 miles away was being fulfilled. The CalTech rocket

development program was forging ahead with obvious success, and the

Fleet training activity no longer threatened to overwhelm Inyokern's

limited resources. Now these resources were at last able to cope with

the burden, CASU-53 was up to strength, as was AODU-1, the latter

unit having completed the transfer )f all its men to Inyokem on June

5, 1944,

Burroughs' original tiny command now represented quite a

sizable force. The three principal groups that contained the largest

number of on-board personnel were AODU-1 with approximately 250

personnel; CASU-53 with a unit strength of 170; and the permanent

NOTS force, which, including headquarters staff, numbered about 300

officers and men.

After July 18, 1944, the term "officers and men" would be

figurative only, as on this date 2?. Waves joined Burroughs' command.

Within a year, the number of Navy uniformed women would grow to

150, functioning in almost every phase of NOTS activity,---'

In addition to the manpower, the Naval Air Facility also now

had most of the tools to do its job. The Bureau of Aeronautics and

ComFAir, West Coast, had done their part extraordinarily well under

difficult circumstances, NOTS now boasted 25 aircraft representing a

score of carrier combat and utility types, together with a hug^

quantity of maintenance, servicing, and repair equipment. The Bureau

of Ordnance had also subscribed the appropriate shop equipment

necessary for e :perimental ordnance installations.

The period of calm reflection that began in June 1944 was

shortlived. Two months later events happened that impacted

significantly upon NOTS and its air facility: CASU-53 was detached

from its Invokern assignment b^ ComFAir, West Coast; AODU-1 was

* , o called because its prototype was first used at Kodiak, Alaska,

9;
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

organizationally incorporated as a part of the NOTS Experimental

Operations Department; and the Naval Air Facility was once again

• 'rested from Burroughs' command.

When viewed within the context of a single month, these events

appear untoward and mystifying; but examined individiu ily, a logical

explanation for each is revealed. The departure of CASU-53 was not

unexpected. As described earlier, their mission was to support the

Fleet training effort. The flood tide of squadron aircraft had crested

and by August had diminished to a manageable stream. Training

(arget ranges had been established in the Holtville-Twentynine Palms

area of the Mojave Desert; CASU-53 was no longer needed at

Inyokern.

Similarly, :he incorporation of AODU-1 within the NOTS

Experimental Operations Department had been anticipated from the

beginning. After all, the unit was expressly formed to further the

forward-firing rocket program, and its mission was tailored to fit the

needs of CalTech and NOTG. I* made more sense for the Station to

exercise operations cognizance rather than San Diego, which was 200

miles away. But although AODU-1 had been closely folded into the

NOTS organizational structure, the Bureau of Aeronautics still had a

string attached. It was at that Bureau's strong insistence that a naval

aviator head up the new Experimental Operations Department.

The abrupt transfer of the Naval Air Facility from NOTS to the

newly organized Naval Air Bases Command, San Diego, was quite a

different matter, being a direct consequence of General Order No.

210 that established the Naval Air Bases Command to replace the

Naval Air Center, San Diego, on August 10, 1944.

The new command was large and powerful, having acquired—in

addition to the nine activities of the former Naval Air Center-some

15 Navy and Marine Corps stations, auxiliary air stations, and air

facilities. Eighteen days later, CNO Directive OP-31-D21-MLA

specifically included the NOTS air facility to further enlarge the Naval

Air Bases empire.

Thus, by a stroke of the CNO's pen on August 28, th? complex

split-command status of the NOTS air facility was essentially restored

to what it had been at the start. The only differences were that i.

was now an officially designated Naval Air Facility, and the parent

command was Naval Air Bases rather than Naval Air Center. The net

result was unchanged: Burroughs had lost military control of his air

r

acility.

92
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

Again the reflexes of the Bureau of Ordnance and NOTS

tightened on the rope in the never ending tug of war witli the Bureau

of Aeronautics and the Naval Air Bases Command of the Eleventh

Naval District.

Hu'.ey again took up the cudgel. He pressed the point with the

Chief of Naval Operations that operational training was at this time

barely a token activity. On the other hand, AODL'-l, indcr the

technical control of the NOTS Experimental Operations Department,

comprised a lion's share of the total air activity.

Added to Hussey's voice of authority was the persuasiveress of

the new Experimental Officer for NOTS, Commander (later Vice

Admiral) John Tucker Hayward, whom Burroughs sent to Washington

to press the issue.

Commenting about this activity in later years, Hayvvam recalled,

1 went back at Hv Burroughs' direction ;md fought the battle for the

Air Facility and my biggest champion ... in the Commander-in-Chief's Office

|wa.s| Admiral Temple,. ..who then directed this be dope. He said it wouW.

be done. . . . i was convinced if we lost this, that the whole purpose of the

place (NOTS| would be destroyed.24

It was dor:. On October 23, 1944, an OpNav letter "removed

the Naval Air Facility [Harvey Field I Inyokern from under the

command of 'he Naval Air Bases Command, Eleventh Naval

District. »5

THE EXPERIMENTAL OFFICER

Commander J. T. Hayward was not impressed when he arrived

upon the NOTS scene on August 4, 1944. Yet, contrary to the

impressions of many others who reported in the month of August, it

was not the full blast of the Mojave summer that caused the

unfavorable reaction. Nor was it the unprepossessing, burned-out

desert landscape, although the latter caused some misgivings, as

recalled by Hayward many years later:

I pulled up over Red Rock Canyon, and ... liiere was nothing... 1

mean, lilcrally. There was Harvey Field, and there was a lot of dust in the

middle where people were building things. Oh, it was grim!

Hayward's disenchantment had begun earlier when he had learned

of his assignment to "this strange place." As he put it:

1 was real upset about it because I thought I'd done a real good job

at the war. 1 had a squadron; I wanted to slay at die war. . .

26

93
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

But the young commander's career was irrevocably linked with

NOTS sometime before the moment of his arrival in the busy cloud

of dust in the Indian Wells Valley. As the Station's first Experimental

Officer, this outspoken and dynamic naval officer was destined to

leave an indelible mark on NOTS.

Hayward's acquaintance with the rocket program began with a

visit to CalTech. He met C. C. Lauritsen, W. A. Fowltr, Carl D.

Anderson, and Richard C. Tolman and from them acquired some

sound technical information on the rocket programs before going to

Inyokern. It was the young combat pilot's first association with

scientists, and his first impression was that they were "crabs"-Navy

term for strange animals found on land. But this reaction was soon

dispelled when Hayward saw not only their round-the-clock dedication

but also the strength of what their scientific methods could do for

the Navy's weapon programs. However, there was a world of

difference between Pasadena and Inyokern in August 1944.

August was significant for the air operations at Inyokern not

only with regard to the Bureau of Aeronautics and Bureau of

Ordnance conflict and the organizational shifts that affected AODU-1

and the Naval Air Facility, but also in tenns of the rocket testing

program itself. "Ev" Burroughs had his hands full. If ever help was

needed, it was now!

fart of Hayward's strength in helping came from his being the

"compromise candidate" that the Bureau of Aeronautics and the

Bureau of Ordnance had selected to head the Experimental Operations

Department. Although not an ordnance postgraduate, he was a

distinguished naval aviator with a long string of decorations who

brought to the desert Station the personal experience of nineteen

months of combat in the South Pacific. He also possessed a sound

technical and scientific background, having served as Assistant Chief

Engineer in charge of instruments at the Naval Aircraft Factory,

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. For four years he had studied physics at

the University of Pennsylvania and at Temple University.

As the compromise candidate of the Bureaus, Hayward was

expected to reconcile differences regarding the control of the Naval

AIT Facility.

To comprehend the complex role of the Experimental Officer, it

is important to recall the two-part mission of NOTS during its first

two years: to build a permanent research and development capability

for Navy ordnance, and to support CalTech's rocket program.

Burroughs, Richmond, and Sandquist can be identified closely with

94
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

the fi^t part ol" this mission. The second part was largely delegated

to Hayward by Burroughs.

Hayward's interpretation of his role given twenty years hter is

presented below:

I was the Experimental Officer, and of course Captain Burroughs was

the Cap'ain. But I reported directly to CalTech. 1 worked directly for Dr.

Willie Fowler and Dr. Lauritscn. 1 made all the arrangements to do whatever

was required in covering everything from the spin-stabilized rockets to

aircraft firings. All of the actual technical work that was done up there was

done under the test request and schedules, all put out by CalTech. Dr.

Fowler was my imniedi;ite boss and so was Dr. Lauritsen. Fowler worked

directly for Dr. Lauri'.sep. Fred Hovde was the boss money man for Section

Three of OSRD. The Navy input of course came from the Bureau of

Ordnance/7

The NOTS-Califomia Injtitute of Technology team. Left to right: Commander J. 0.

Richmond, Dr. C. C. Laaritsen, Captain S. E. Burroughs, Jr., Commander J. T.

Hayward, and Drs. W. A. rowler and E. L. Ellis.

As revealed by the above, one of the prime attributes of the

Experimental Officer was the ability to gel along with civilian

scientists and be responsive to their needs, and yet exercise the duties

and responsibilities of a professional naval officer to maintain an

95
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

effective military support structure. A special kind of personality was

crucial to be able to function and deliver under a schizoid command

structure, and "Chick" Hayward was such a personality. He became

known as a very human character, who not only was predisposed to

buck the system when it slowed progress, but also was a grand master

in that particular science.

A NOTS organization chart dated September 1, 1944, shows the

scope of the Experimental [Operations] Department headed by

Hayward (Appendix C). Beginning with a top echelon comprising

Ordnance School, Pilot Plant. Harvey .

r

ield and Air Unit, Laboratory,

Ground Projects and Gunnery, 80 subsequent organizational base

elements are shown on the chart.

That Burroughs was content to delegate responsibility and

authority for so many of the Station's key functions is' testimony

enough to his style of leadership aiu1 his confidence in Hayward. In a

nutshell, the organization worked-and worked well.

While Hayward's organization effectively supported the civilian

technical efforts of CalTech, there was concern that there would be

future problems in having all of the experimental operations in a

department headed by a military officer. Commander James A.

Duncan, the Laboratory Officer, predicted that as NOTS was able to

move into the research and development roles called out in its

long-term mission, there would be difficulties in recruiting and

retaining civilian scientists of merit into an organization where they

would report to military officers for supervision of their technical

efforts. A predominant characteristic of Hayward's Experimental

Operations Department was that its top echelons were staffed mainly

by young military men subject to frequent reassignments.

Meanwhile, in a wartime situation, the organization ufficed.

After all, the few civilian scientists at NOTS were part of CalTech,

and the wartime program emphasis was on weapon testing.

Hayward established the pattern for an impressive list of

distinguished officers who would follow him as NOTS Experimental

Officer.* Although there would be a decline in the responsibilities

delegated to the first Experimental Officer after the war, the

importance of the position (known as Plans and Operations Officer

and subsequently as Technical Officer) would be preserved.

During llie fir; twelve years of NCTG' existence (until 1955), there were six

Experimenlal OITicers of whom five ultimately achieved flag rank. These are: J. T. Hayward

(1944-47), J. P. Monroe (1949-50), T. 11. Moorer (1950-52), T. F. Connolly (1952-54), and

T. J. Walker (1954-55).

96
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

A "REALLY BIG ROCKET"

Much has already been said about the summer of 1944 and its

seemingly climactic significance for the Naval Ordnance Test Station.

Some of this significance relate, to the development of CalTech's

brand new rocket that had arrived at NOTS for air testing in the

spring. By prevailing standards and aircraft this was a huge rocket,

measuring nearly a foot in diameter.

The rocket had its genesis in "Charlie" Lauritsen's direct and

simple logic. If a rocket 5 inches in diameter could be fired

effectively against small targets by an aircraft, why could not a larger

rocket be developed that could be as effectively employed against

ships heaviei than the destroyers? It could be fired, he believed, from

higher altitudes and at longer ranges than could aerial torpedoes.

Characteristically, Lauritsen discussed the possibi .ty of a "really

big rocket" with various naval officers and his own staff. The

consensus was that the project was worth exploring. Tne wartime

family relationship between the Navy and OSRD was flexible enough

to allow CalTech to develop the original design and proposal without

a formal request by the Navy. Early in March 1944 Lauritsen

presented calculations to the Navy to demonstrate the practicability

of a large-caliber rocket. Captain H. B. "Brownie" Temple was

impre;sed; as a result, his boss, the Chief of Naval Operations,

directed development of the rocket at the highest priority, since

according to his philosophy, "the main strength and offensive striking

power of naval aviation lies in the carrier based aircraft squadrons."2"

Practical considerations determined the size of the mammoth

rocket, which was ironically nicknamed Tiny Tim. There are no clues

a

c

to why or by whom the nickname was rnosen beyond the obvious

irony that Tiny Tim was one of the mildest and gentlest of Dickens'

fictional characters. The rocket was supposed to weigh less than 1,000

pounds so that it could be carried on aircraft installations designed

for LOOJ-pound bombs. To speed production it was desirable to

select a size in which there was commercially available steel tubing. It

was also desirable that the size be compatible with some existing

bomb or shell adaptable for use as a warhead. A diameter of 11.75

inches was that of a readily available 500-pound semiarmor-piercing

bomb, as well as the size of a standard oil-well casing. This casing

was in short supply during the war. In an NDRC Summary Technical

Report, Conway Snyder writes, ". . . we were reduced for a time to

97
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

-

The "really big rocket"-Tiny Tim.

the expedient of salvaging [oil-well casing] from abandoned oil

wells."29

No press was available for extruding a propellant grain large

enough for Tiny Tim. For this, as well as other technical

considerations, a historic first in the shape of a multigrain nutor was

designed using four grains, each weighing about 40 pounds. The total

propellant weight was 149 pounds, a fact not overlooked by pilots

«ho foresaw that they would be asked to take this aloft and fire it

from their aircraft. It was }ss$ Lhan reassuring when the blasi from

one of the completed four-grai i motors lifted the concrete loof off

the walls of a static firing b,'y at Eaton Canyon and flattened the

walls outwpj-d. From that poinV on full-size motors got their static

tests in the open desert at Inyokern.

By late April 1944 a complete round was successfully launched

from the NOTS ground ranges. But firing a half-ton experimental

rocket from the ground was only one step toward ilie vastly more

difficult task of launching it from the air.

Of critical concern in an air launch was the effect of the blast

on the aircraft. Field tests showed the rocket had to be at least 4

feet fro"', the aircraft before the motor ignited.

98
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

A special ground launcher ibr Tiny Tim made of steel girder was

erected on the desert at Inyokern. A TBF fuselage was placed near

the launcher so that the center of the round was 4 feet from the

open bomb bay door. Three rounds were fired. The CIT News Letter,

No. 1, May 15, 1944, laconically summarizes this important test:

Results of this firing lead tc the co-idusion that launching of the

11."75 AR from aircratt will be possible.

TBF aircraft used to ground-launch first Tiny Tim rockets.

For five weeks in early summer 1944, testing at NOTS reached

fever pitch in efforts to translate feasibility into practicality. The key

to this was to perfect a launcher for the huge rocket. One was

quickly built: a massive device consisting of twin tubular frames

pivoted at one end in the bomb bay. The round was designed to

swing down on cue from the pilot and fire when it reached the

bottom of the arc. This formidable assembly was allied a

"displacement launcher," but pilots who saw this aerodynamic

nightmare undoubtedly had other names for it.

For two weeks the Station personnel were treated to the strange

sight of a TBF—first, only a fuselage, then an in-service

model-perched atop a 12-foot-high platform with the engine running.

From some remote location a contact was closed, the displacement

C/C)
THE GRAND EXPER1MEN1 AT INYOKERN

launcher would swing violently down, and a Tiny Tim would hurtle

across the desert. Buried in the report of the first such test on June

^ is an ominous notation;

The only injury to the aircraft was to the elevator, each rib of which

buckled about 5 in. froir the trailing edge. It was thought that this was

caused by reflection of the blast Irom die ground, and that such damage

would not occur in air firing.

This blast damage to the TBFrs elevator was wrongly diagnosed

and, although passed lightly over at the time, was clearly the first

harbinger of a later tragedy.

There were some doubts from the outset of the practicality of

the displacement launcher. An alternative method was considered

briefly: simply to drop the rocket as one might a bomb, and have a

lanyard (fixed to both rocket and aircraft) ignite the propellant. To

some the "lanyard method" appeared as simple, and haphazard, as the

displacement launcher seemed complex, and impractical. The lanyard

method was held in abeyance until drop tests could be made tc chow

what happened to a free-falling rocket dropping out of a turbulent

body of air.

In the meantime it became clear that a displacement-type

launcher would present many difficulties with certain aircraft, often

requiring major structural changes in the aircraft itself. There was

concern, loo, that inaccuracy might result from sudden aircraft

attitude changes in the interval between the release of the gear into

the down position and the firing of the round. Ground tests had

shown that there was a definite pitching down of the aircraft at the

end of the gear's downward swing. Nevertheless, a decision was made

to use this gear for the first air-firing test of the formidable Tiny

Tim. This test was scheduled for June 22, 1944; Tom Pollock elected

to be the pilot.

Pollock was the master of first firings. He fired the first

forward-firing rockets for the Navy at Goldstone Lake on July 14,

1943. His subsequent firsts included the prototype CalTech 3.5-inch

AR, the 5-inch AR, and the first aircraft spinner rockets developed

by NOTS. As commander of AODU-1, he exercised his leadership

prerogative by flying the initial tests on what he termed "radically

new installations." When Pollock felt that the installation was

satisfactory, he passed the project on to one of his pilots.

Thursday, June 22, 1944, must have been a busy day for NOTS

in general and Lieutenant Commander Pollock in particular. There

were many distinguished foreign visitors on board to witness the

important test, including Lord Cherwell, Churchill's chief scientific

too
ILOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

Distinguished visiuus ubsorve llrst Tiny Tim llrinj;, July 1944. Ld'i to right: Hr. VV, A.

r'owler, Captain S. I. Burroughs, Jr., Commander U. li, Young, Lord Chcrwell.

Lieutenanl Ciilonel I. Houlton-King, and Dr. I . L. Fllis,

advisor, and Lieutenant Colonel E. Boulton-King of 'he Britisli Army

General Staff. The leadership of the Bureau of Ordnance and CalTech

was well represented. Pollock later IT called, ". . . there was an awful

lot of 'brass'... al least two captains. Chief of Naval Operations, and

officers from Washington, BuAer, BuOrd and heaven knows what else,

to observe this test." lie also recalled his concern for the unknowns

of this particular "first" he wore a brand-new parachute.-''

There were to be four separate flights of TBF-I #01575 during

the day, each flight carrying a Tiny Tin. whose size never failed to be

the main point of discussion. The first two rockets were to be

dropped inert to test the action of the displacement launcher; if this

proved to be satisfactory, two further Tiny Tims were to be fired in

flight. The entire test series was to be photographed by motion

picture cameras carried by a companion aircraft.

For the team of ordnancemen who would load the big rockets

on the TBF, il would be a long, find literally hot, summer day.

compounded by the apprehension of a delayed schedule that might

101
III! GRAND i:X."i:RIMlNI Al IMVOKIKN

subject the important visitors and Navy "brass" to undue broiling in

the hot desert :un. Moreover, the ground handling of Tiny Tim had

not yet reached a high level of expertise, and the Station logs of fie

time record many lacerations and pinched lingers as the consequences

of unlmüliarity with constantly revised launching gear.

Despite Pollock's robust attitude toward rocket testing, he might

have had things on his mind oilier than the imminent venture with an

untried rocket of Tiny Tim's magnitude. Two days before the maiden

flight for Tim, one of his pilots. Lieutenant Donald A. "Skinny"

Innes, had died in his F6F-3 while diving onto a target in Salton Sea;

a rocket nad apparently exploded while still on its launcher. Pollock

had flown immediately to Salton Sea and returned to NOTS without

any specific knowledge as to the cause of the accident. Today,

Thursday, while he was airborne and about to drop the first Tiny

Tim, his office would receive a dispatch at 1045 that the body of

Lieutenant limes had been recovered.

The torpedo bomber soon reached its test altitude of 8,000 feet

above the desert, and Pollock trimmed for level flight, lie pressed the

firing control, and the big rocket fell away smoothly. In this inert

drop test, the displacement launcher had functioned perfectly.

The next drop test also went well. It 'vould be the third test

that would tell the story when the full force of the largest aircraft

rocket of World War 11 would be unleashed.

Aloft for that critical third llighl. Pollock leveled his TBF out at

10.000 feet and lined up with the bulldozer blade mark on C-1

Range far below. At 1230 he pressed the rocket firing switch. With a

roar, the first air-launched Tiny Tim streaked away.

The exultation of Pollock and of the watchers on the ground

can only be imagined. At last the potential of the "really big rocket"

could be fully grasped. To the British observers, particularly, here was

a possible weapon to knock out the launching sites of the German

V-l robot bomb that had struck London five days earlier.

The apparent success of the first air firing was quickly

duplicated. In Pollock's words, borrowed from submariners' parlance,

the second "shot .vent hot and true." But immediately after the

firing he encountered sluggish controls. Ground inspection revealed

that a large section of on" elevator was missing.

This failure caused considerable concern. From that point on

aircraft would be inspected both before and after firings of Tiny Tim.

But whatever the cause of the structural failure, it did not dim the

radiance of the success with the big rocket.

102
n.OOD CURRENTS IK ROCKETRY

T'v radiance spread. Ininiediately following the tests. Fowler

v i. i't '. a telegram for Pollock to send to Lauritsen, who was in

Washington on other rocket business:

UAVI IIIIS DA\ GIVEN BIRTH TO TWIN TINY TIMb WITHOL'T

ADVERS1 I III-CI

(Signed) MOTHER POLLOCK

The next da}1, as soon as the motion picture film of the lets

was processed, it was flown to Washington. Tiny Tim's succe.v-.

became immediately apparent at the highest levels of the Navy

Department. The priorities assigned to Tiny Tim development by the

Navy Chief of Staff presaged an even higher rate of activity for the

busy des.'rt Station, primarily in further launcher development for a

host of Navy aircraft tTBM, SBX, FuF, F4U). The Army Air Forces

were also eager to have their A-26, an attack ligtit bomber built by

Douglas, li'ted with a Tiny Tim launcher. And, although the

air-launch feasibility had ^"cn verified, there was s'ill a lot of work

to be done on ballistics determination, fuzes, and a warhead suitable

for underwater trajectory.

The manifest success of June 22 was not sustained over the

ensuing three months. The problems centered on the displacement

launcher. Of the service aircraft scheduled for launcher modification,

only the TBF, TBM, and the F4U (a fast, powerful single-seat fighter

aircraft developed by Chance Vought) proved to be really suitable.

The Army's Ä-26, in particular, was obviously unsuitabJe, as tests

revealed considerable blast damage to the elevators.

For other reasons, too, the CalTech-NOTS team was taking a

second, hard look at the displacement launcher technique. For

example, there was an interval of nearly one second between release

of the launcher for its downward swing and the firing of the roiket.

This delay was unconscionably long for a pilot to hold his sii'Ji!

rock-steady on target. Moreover, as had been anticipated, when ehe

rocket and launcher slammed down into firing position, the aircraft

pitched down violently, inducing a considerable sighting error at a

most critical moment.

There was also the slight, but ubiquitous problem of structural

damage to the elevators that manifested itself in many tests, groundand air-fired. It was a problem encountered with different types of

aircraft (lor example, the A-26), and was one that quite obviously'

niggled the minds of CalTec'n and the Navy alike.

A consensus held that the blast of the big rocket's propellant

was responsible, and that the solution lay in the proper separation

103
Uli C;«AND 1-XPl-RIMINI M IN VOX I RN

distance bctwvcn the lircral't .ind ilk' round as n iiicd r.ius1lliougln

that tlic length ol the displueeiiieni laiiiuhci was iiisuil'ieient.

Test t'nllowed test all knuis "i tesis in detennir.e thi: exact

nature ot the mcket's Masi. i-.nw n api'lir,! in an inlmitel^ vaüahle

set ol conditions, and i's elteei on aircull sliuctiire.i (jinuiui tests

invoh'ed aircraft siispciulcd Iroin ntassiw Dianes and perched on

specially huill ramps, lione-tireil enuiin-eis, oninmcenien. pilots, and

scientists repealed a single tesi rnv.' liter nine vvneneve: lhe\ felt

tiie\ vvare getting close lo sohin.g the problem Repe-uedh !he\ asked

the ciuestions, "Whal is die prob'em'.' What are wa ap arainst'.'" Al

uorst. the problem v.'as soen m a \

J

,irvmg ilei,ree ol damage to the

pi.mi "s tail structure: sometimes, espeeialh allei ;iir-launv!:,ng a I in\

Tim. there was no damage ai ..11 Ma:u oi the .omli it-touglienei.1

pilots ol A'JIU 1 lended lo \iaw ,, i-w biuki^d ribs .r irivial

damage. PossibK Lienlenunl Arnnt igL' was (vne ol diese.

i ven as displ icenii'iit Lnmcher ilevelopmen! was. quile litcally.

in full swing, the imtialh consideret.1 lanvard metnod oi a.;-launching

i in\ 1 im was becoming mcreasingh a'liaclne. Drop icsts with inerl

rockets in earl;. August l

lMd attirmed i!;at the drop ittilude ol the

rocket wcntld not he a signdicanlb eanalik factor. These lests furthei

affirmed thai the rale and angle of live fall weie umfonn for an\

given airspeed and dive angle from tlv lesi data it could be

Loncluded that the use o! a lanyard In n the aireralt 'o 'ore liie

rocket sliouki provide a rea-onaldv aen rale launch,

11K aireralt selected lor the "hot" air ics'.s • as an SH_'( . and

the first two Tim Inns ined bv the lain an1dio- method on August

17 and IX were successhd So wa: the ihiiu on A'^uu ' -I. Bui on

the test oi the fourth linv Tim on Ihe sime dav. .oiiiething went

terribly wrong At a l"lig!it alinude ot 1.5l!J U.;. ihe rocket dropped

clear and the lanyard liriiig functioni'il perfecliv .is betöre at the

proper displacement distance ol ap'^'oximately .' le-M below tlu

aircraft. But as Ihe hoirihed ground obseneis walcneil the big rockel

ignite and speed away, the SB2( piloted b\ Vi milage suddenlv nosetl

over into a sleep dive .aid crashed headlong into M-' desert Hour.

Wditin minutes, the Assistanl I iigli! Oftuer at Harvey field.

Lieutenant Floyd i'ewiii, atrived at :i-J ranee in an Nl-l* with a

doctor as a passenger. Almost immediately. Pollock landed a second

Nh-1 near the cia^h. ilie seem wa- , ppallmg. No semblance ol an

' I llC Nl'-I V ,1 .hi' .S,.\ UTS!.Ill i.l ihl l'i;H'i "' l.lvsluv|)ll ." J llülll . \>-,cv r.Mn .Ml',

liaisi n inop.i.plane winisi.' -.h )^,l.in.liii)' .aul MkiM'l run aul ,al laiionn lues in.i.lr a ul.'al n

lnyokv.'rii loi quick trips mil i.i ihi. IICM-II '.... ■■s

KM
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKi-.TKY

Crush scene of August 21, 1944 Lieutenanl John M. Annitage was killrd wliile test

Hrinp ü liny Tim rocket from his SB2C' aircraft.

aircraft could be detected in the twisted fragments bestrewing the

desert .-.and.

Nothwithstuiding the tragic loss of a warm-n.'iured, extremely

likable yonng officer, whose early reporting date of December 2'.

19^3, made him a respected MOTS pioneer, there was an immediate

question of grave concern: What had happened'.' On the schedule were

numerous air launchings 01 Tinv Tim in order to meet the target date

of November 1, 1944, for service testing. Were there more such

tragedies ahead? The answer rested somewhere in the fire-blackened

debris JI what had been SB2C, Serial Numbei 18248.

As soon as the numbing shock lifted from the Station, activity

continuea. An entry in tin Duty Officer's log for August 23, 1944,

reads: "0820: Lieutenant Dibb took off on first operational flight of

the day. Ammunition authorized to be fired includes 3.5-inch AR.

5.0-inch AR and HVAR." Tiny Tim womd not be air-fired again for

many weeks to come. Instead, there was a feverish burst of

investigative activity, including the use of elaborate test setups with

instrumentation for exact measurement of the forces exerted on the

aircraft structure when the rocket was fired.

Ki
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

But the first real clue came by happenstvce. A Navy chief petty

officer photographei, on temporary assignmeiu from the Hollywood

office to make a training film, happened to get some footage of

Armitage's plane from the moment ihe Tiny Tim was released and

fired. When analyzed by CalTech's master of precision, Dr. Ira S.

Bowen. this fortuitous piece of film revealed the tremendous negative

g forces imposed on the SB2C as it nosed into the desert floor.

Pollock describes the significance of this revelation:

U was a terrific force. Had Jack not been surpiised by this, had he

known it was coming, [with] his feet on the dashboard and both hands on

die slick, it is doubtful if he could have hold die plane from crashing into

the ground ... it l:ad to be a "flipper"-soinething of terrific leverage.^

The blackened wreckage yielded a further clue. This was one of

the two trim-tabs fitted to the elevators. Dr. Emory Ellis, one of the

original investigators, later elaborated:

In the design of the plane . .. they discovered that they had more trim-tab

area than they needed, so they disconnected one; just simply fastened one

permanently lined up snoodily widi die surface of the airfoil, and 'rt die

other one serve as the balance tab which was activated from the cockpit.

The job of fixing this other tab so that it wouldn't move was done with two

metal clips-one at each end-and when the shock wave from the ignition of

that rocket hit the tab it simply forced it out and then the points of the tin

stuck and we found diem that way. It just forced it beyond the strength of

these two little pieces of tin that were holding die tab and dien it wouldn't

come back because it was jammed and of course that gave full down

elevator, and down he went with an 8-i' [push] out or somediing like

dial.33

Ellis was quick to point out that no blame could be attached to

the aircraft designers for the trim-tab fix, as it would have operated

quite successfully under any normal conditions.

In the final analysis, the source of the tragic sequence was a

shock wave caused by the igniter rather than by the propellant. The

solution was now clear. Instead of the 1,200 grains of black powder

originally used, it was found that one fifth of the quantity (235

grains) would do the job-without the shock wave. Moreover, the

lanyard was lengthened for a greater separation distance between

rocket and aircraft at the moment of ignition.

The death of Armitage had an effect far beyond the loss of a

life and the failure of one test. The accident of August 21, 1944,

marked a difference in the tone and pace of NOTS-CalTech

operations. The feverish pitch of training, testing, reworking, and

flying had pushed the rocket efforts to an unsustainable level.

Henceforth, the pace would be more measured. Impatience would be

tempered with more caution; risks would be better gauged against

106
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

potential advances; technical work would be viewed closer for its

human implications. Why did the death of Armitage have this effect?

In 1944 hundreds of thousands of young servicemen were dying in

the wide arena of the war. Three fatalities had already been

experienced by NOTS in the eight months it had existed.

The Armitage crash had not been the first. As previously

mentioned. Lieutenant Innes had lost his life at Salton Sea on June

20, 1944, as the result of a rocket exploding under the wing of his

F6F. Three days later. Lieutenant Douglas J. Walthall and his

crewman Wilson M. Keller of Squadron VC-82, attached to NOTS for

Fleet training, were killed under similar circumstances over the

Inyokern range. Both of the tragic accidents were believed to be

causjd by improper rocket ordnance assembly; namely, the failure tu

install a base plug between prope'.iant and warhead explosive.

Nor was the Armitage crash the last of the woeful series of

losses in the summer of 19'W. Only 8 days later, on August 29,

Lieutenant Robert A. Dibb was flying an F6F Hellcat fighter on a

rocket sight calibration test. He fired a 5-inch AR with an inert head

at a ground target from 500 feet altitude. The rocket hit hard and

ricocheted upwards into the path of the F6F, tearing off a wing;

Dibb was killed instantly in the ensuing crash.

Fach of these tragedies had its own special circumstance and

meaning. But in none was the relationship between the lives of pilots

and the responsibilities of weapon developeis so dramatically

portrayed as with Armitage. In this case it had been the differencebetween 235 and 1,200 grains of black powder. The fact that

Armitage was a zestful youth whose impulsive, fun-loving ways had

made him close to military and civilian alike intensified the message,

as too did the circumstances of the test, occurring as it did at a

dramatic moment in the test program when all eyes were focused on

the scene of tragedy. The result was the intense realization that men's

lives as well as military missions frequently depend on an exacting

discipline, a regulation, a procedure, a small metal base plug, two

little pieces of tin, or 1,000 grains of black powder.

The change of tone and pace that became evident in August

1944 cannot be attributed solely to the Armitage and other tragedies

of that period. It was also part of a general maturing of the Station.

The primitive environment was fading away behind newly constructed

facilities. Answers once obtained by trial and error now came from

data banks. There was a growing body of experience to draw from.

107
THE GRAND UXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

No longer was there a question as to the tactical value of

rockets. Rockets tested and used in training at NOTS were proving

their value in war, and there were even those who dared predict the

end of guns as the primary armament of the Navy.

LATER WARTIME PROGRAMS

There is a hoary cliche that states, "One test is worth a

thousand opinions." in the summer of 1944 the saying was bright

and fresh and certainly applied to NOTS.

The test work so predominated the wartime activities at NOTS

that there were some with serious doubts whetner the research and

development functions called out for the Station in the Secretary of

the Navy's establishing order would materialize. It was certain that

the test function was critical then and would continue to be so.

Although there were those who supported the research and

development functions, the "test people" were strongly convinced that

the Station's role should be limited to testing. No testimony

supporting this viewpoint is more revealing than the statement by

Rear Admiral W. A. Kitts, the self-styled "rocket czar," who also

happened to be Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance:

This is a test station and if Captain Burroughs doesn't realize this, I

will send out some 16-ineh guns and make him test them out there on the

desert, so that he will remember that this is a test station.34

But no one pressed for a redefinition of the future role of

NOTS. It was clear during the war that NOTS was primarily a test

station, not only in name but in fact. Its biggest cont.ibution to the

war was through its rocket test work for CalTech, which was critical

in bringing the new weapons into battle. But tests were not limited

to rockets. Other significant work included test ng of fire control

systems for guns, incendiary bombs, machine-gun packages, proximity

fuzes, and radar. And there was also testing not necessarily geared to

any particular development hardware; for example, studies of aircraft

vulnerability in a diving attack and "toss-dehvery" techniques for

air-launched weapons.

The number of Station projects for the war years was well over

a thousand.35 Of these, the emphasis toward the end of the period

was on Holy Moses and Tmy Tim, two air-launched rockets. There

was still a lot of work to be done on both of these rockets. The gulf

between demonstrating the feasibility of any weapon and employing it

under combat conditions is traditionally wide. Although the 3.5-inch

108
1LUOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

AR (predecessor of Holy Moses) and the 5-inch HVAR (Holy Moses)

were in large-r>caie production and actually being used by the Fleet,

they were not finished weapons in the sense that their performance

could not be improved. There was also a need for better fuzes, more

effective warheads, improved launchers and fire control, und, most

important, accurate sighting devices. Many more thousands of the

rockets would still have to be fired over the desert at Inyokern

before these improvements could be realized.

Above all, the CalTech scientists needed data, especially ballistics

information about the fundamental behavior of rockets: their

trajectories, velocity, and dispersion under a host of varying launch

conditions. Until this basic information was acquired, there could be

no meaningful development of improved launchers and rocket sights.

While hundreds of air firings were conducted under simulated combat

conditions, a large proportion of the data testing was accomplished by

use of specially developed equipment at the new NOTS ground

ranges. This equipment took the form of fixed launchers capable of

being set up at any desired angle and complex photo instrumentation

to record the rocket's flight from launch to impact.

One of the "test tools" perfected during the latter part of 1944

is worthy of special mention as it pioneered the technique of

supersonic rocket-sled testing used by NOTS in later years. The

200-foot launcher vas modified so that the test round could be

accelerated on its rail to aircraft velocity by "pusher" rockets. At the

desired speed, the test round was ignited automatically and fired from

a zero-length launcher mounted on the pusher-rocket assembly. The

principal advantage of this high velocity booster, first tested in

October 1944, lay in its capability for tests of fuzes and plate

penetration at impact velocities hitherto obtainable only by forward

firing from aircraft in flight. In addition to saving much precious

flying time (and wear and tear on the men and machines of the

Naval Air Facility), accuracy was improved by the high velocity

booster over that of aircraft firing. Thus, it permitted the use of

smaller targets with a higher percentage of hits.

The main thrust of the CalTech development work and the

NOTS test work in the fall of 1944 was to complete the weapons

under active development and get them into combat. This applied not

only to the weapons themselves but also to the weapon support

systems. One of the priorities was a launcher for Tiny Tim.

At 0800, on Thursday, October 5, 1944, an F4U-1D took off

from Harvey Field with a Tiny Tim rocket aboard-the first to be

l d')
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

air-fired since Lieutenant Armitage was killed ;> little more than six

v/eeks earlier.

The six vecks had been productive; the Tiny Tim igniter

problem had been solved. Now it was back to the business of solving

the residual problem of launching the giant rocket.

Special emphasis was on the testing of the displacement launcher

on the F4U. This priority was a natural nsult of the selection made

in July of Marine Air Group 51, which flew F4Us, as the unit to be

trained in the use of Tiny Tim against the European launching sites

of V-I flying bombs.

The Tiny Tim test on October 5, 1944, was successful, as were

dozens of subsequent tests of the displacement launcher on the F4U.

But this success was not matched with other aircraft. For some the

structural modifications became staggering. For these aircraft the

lanyard drop method was the obvious alternative, and eventually, even

the F4U was included in the long list of aircraft that adopted this

method.

In addition to this and other launcher work for the Navy, there

was significant work on rocket launchers for the Army. Some of the

launchers in use on Navy aircraft could not be mounted on Army

aircraft because of decided differences in their wing structures.

Displacement launcher developed for Tiny Tim (F4U).

110
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

Brand-new launchers had to be designed. Much of the flight testing of

the redesigned launchers was conducted by a new neighbor in the

desert: the Flight Test Base, Muroc, California. This installation some

70 miles south of Inyokem was the genesis of what was later to

become the huge Edwards Air Force Base-an important flight test

center for supersonic and space flight development. During the war,

however, it was only a field test facility for the Army's rocket

program, which principally was centered at Wright Field, Ohio, and

Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.

Next on the list of program priorities was rocket sights.

Ironically, in the early days of the forward-firing rocket program,

little regard was paid to sighting devices for the new weapons. It was

apparently considered that the gun platform philosophy of attack

aircraft applied equally to rockets as to machine guns: all the pilot

had to do was point the aircraft at the target and shoot. Tom

Pollock recalled that his first rocket sight was a small pointed piece

of adhesive tape on his windshield, positioned as the result of

observing the trajectories of a rocket fired from the aircraft on the

ground at Goldstone Lake.

Soon, the Bureau of Ordnance's excellent Illuminated Sight Mark

8—developed for fixed, forward-firing machine guns in 1941-was

modified for rocket use. This was done by adding an adjustable

reflector that permitted the line of sight to be raised to compensate

for the rocket's greater gravity drop. The main objection to this

expedient stemmed, not from inaccuracy, but from the addition of

one more manual task to the many already facing pilots. In mid-1944

the Bureau met that objection by replacing the adjustable reflector by

a si^ht whose reticle had a vertical ladder of crossbars that allowed

the pilot's eye to raise or lower his line of sight. Of course the pilot

had to be familiar enough with the different rocket types to select a

particular line on the crossbar. Accordingly, pilots needed sighting

tables that would indicate the necessary sighting information for a

particular plane, rocket, airspeed, dive angle, and slant range.

The CalTech scientists working with Navy pilots and range

officers undertook the job of collecting range data from rocket firings

and reducing them to tabular form. In the process thousands of

aircraft rockets were fired on the NOTS ranges. And as Burchard, the

OSRD historian, points out, "the editorial section of the California

Institute group worked under forced draft to get the results into print

and the tables started on their way to the fighting fro. ts."36

in
luE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKI.RN

As the war progressed, it became apparent that tue accuracy of

forward-firing rockets could stand a lot of improvement. The Bureau

was already working hard to enhance the accuracy of fixed machine

guns with a sophisticated system of fire control. The result late in the

war was a gyroscopic lead computing gunsight—the Gun Sight Mark

23—that was almost completely automatic. All the pilot had to do

was keep a constant sight on his target and control an expandable

circle of dots to continually embrace the target's wingspan (a

rotatable knob on the throttle handle was used).

Bui where a mass volume of fire from multiple fixed machiiT.-

guns usually compensated for any pilot sighting inaccuracy, the same

was not true for individual rocket projectiles. Moreover, the flight

characteristics for conventional ammunition were well-known; those

lor rockets were not. Had they been, there would have been fewer

problems in modifying the Gun Sight Mark ^3 for rocket use. This

was done evcvc.uul'y. but it was not ready for operational use until

late in the war.

In the meantime, CalTech became entrenched in the rocket sight

developmem business, applying their specialized expertise and amassed

data toward the design of a rocket sight.

During the last year of the war, CalTech developed four such

sights; each was designated "C1T Aircraft Rocket Sight" and was

given a type number (1 througl. 4). A noted astronomer, Dr. Horace

W. Babcock (later Head of Hale Observatories), developed the first

CalTech rocket sight. Thousands of rockets were fired at NOTS in

testing these sights. On the first test of the CalTech Type ' sight on

June 4, 1944, the test pilots were reportedly enthusiastic.3'

The Type 1 sight never went info service use because Type 2,

following hard upon its heels, offered improvements. It had a

two-way th'ow switch tha' enabled the pilot to seie:t either of two

kinds of rocket ammunition, even after he had started his diving

attack. Neither Type 1 nor Type 2 was a completely automatic sight.

The pilot had to set dials in advance for predicted airspeed and

propellait temperature; he also had to make his diving attack at a

predetermined angle. However, the changes in altitude, automatically

fed into the sight from a barometric altimeter, continuously

readjusted the sight and permitted the pilot to fire at any point

within the effective range of his rockets. These early rocket sights,

while crude by modern standards, represented a large step toward

freeing the pilots from what some termed "worries."

112
PLOOU CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

In addition to a whole catalog of weapon projects -Holy Moses,

Tiny Tim, rocket sights and launchers—CalTech managed to include

yet another one in that exceedingly busy year 1944: aircraft spinner

rockets.

The technique of stabilizing the flight of ground-launched rockets

by spinning them—in much the same way as rifle bullets and artillery

shells-was recognized quite early in U.S. rocket work. A principal

advantage of "spinners." as «hey were called, was that of size. Finned

rockets need considerable length in proportion to their diameter for

stable flight characteristics; spinners can be much shorter. For

example, the 5-inch finned aircraft rocket was 69 inches long, while a

barrage spinner of the same diameter was only about 32 inches long.

Moreover, as the spinner's rotation is derived by directing the exit

thrust gases through canted exhaust nozzles, its external configuration

is veritably that of a conventional projectile. Consequently, the rocket

can be launched from a tube. The absence of protruding fins also

greatly simplifies storage, transportation, and handling. In view of

these desirable characteristics, it is not surprising that the

ground-deployed barrage spinner rocket became a prime candidate for

aircraft application.

No active program for spin-stabilized rocket development existed

until 1943 when CalTech and Section H of OSRD had independently

started investigations. The first exploratory work on spinners at

CalTech had taken definite form with a request from the Manne

Corps for a spinner that might replace the 75-millimeter pack

howitzer. The objective was to give ground troops lighter and more

portable weapons with significant striking power against point targets.

A 3.5-inch spinner rocket was developed; however, it was not

significantly superior to the howitzer it was designed to replace, and

hence never saw service use.

The next member of CalTech's spinner family was the 5-inch

high velocity spinner rocket (HVSR) developed to give PT boats

greater firepower, particularly against Japanese armored barges sent to

supply and reinforce their island garrisons. The 4.5-inch barrage rocket

(fin-stabilized) had been used to some extent for this cask, but it was

far from ideal because of low velocity and large dispersion.

The first sea tests of the HVSR, held at Terminal Island in San

Pedro Bay off Los Angeles in the summer of 1944, were plagued

with difficulties. However, despite these initial problems, the 5-inch

HVSRs proved to be capable performers, and the Bureau of Ordnance

113
III! GRAND 1 XPERlMf.Nl AI INYOKERN

initiated extensive procurement of launchers and rockets. Althougii

ilk rockets were originally intended for use by LCVP (landing craft,

vehicle and personnel) and LCM (landing craft, medium) "essels, and

even for jeeps, simultaneously with the development of the 5-inch

spin-stabilized barrage rocket, the Navy began development of a

rocket gunboat specifically designed for its use; s. design that featured

continuously reloadable rocket launchers.

Initially, three versions of HVSR were planned, each with a

different range: 5,000, 2,500, and 1,250 yards; however, it was the

ivpe with a high-capacity head and a 5,000-yard range that was

completed first and rushed into service use. This rocket ultimately

distingui'iied itself in support of the troops hitting the beaches at Iwo

Jima and Okinawa.

In experimenting with forward-firing spinners, the rocket

designers also took into account the seemingly greater advantages of

fin stabilization for aircraft rockets-highly effective under air-launch

conditions when the rockets had a considerable forward velocity even

before they left the launcher rail.

There was also an early recognition by the United States of a

' isie problem inherent to the use of spinners as aircraft rockets; a

problem that essentially centered on installation of fixed tubular

launchers on high-performance aircraft. These launchers reduced

airspeed and impaired aircraft maneuverability. A major significant

program for NOTS during the last year of the war was to solve this

problem and subsequently to develop a successful spinner aircraft

rocket.

Unlike Holy Moses and Tiny Tim, CalTech's aircraft spinner

rockets never acquired fanciful nicknames. Instead, they fell prey to a

mundane, although complex, system of rocket designations. A glimpse

at the list shows the broad range of use for the family of spinners

under development.

Surface-fired spin-stabilized rockets:

I1CSR for high capacity (medium shell thickness,

maximum HE),

GPSR for general purposes (thick shell, HE),

CnSR for common (semi-annor-piercing, HE),

SmSR for smoke (thin shell, FS or WP smoke),

CWSR for chemical warfare (thin shell, chemical agents), and

PySR for nyrotechnic (illuminating flare).

Air-fired spinner rockets:

CASR for common,

14
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

GASR for general purpose, and

PASR for pyrotechnic.38

Ironically, one of the uses first contemplated for aircraft spinners

in the United States was a simplistic reminder of the first use of an

aircraft-fired rocket; that is, a rocket fired backward, or "retrofired.'"

But where die MAD retro-weapon was a rocket-decelerated device

whose net result was a vertically falling antisubmarine weapon, this

early aircraft spinner rocket was to be fired backwards from the tail

turret of a bomber against pursuing fighters. This was a real need as

the latest German Messerschmitt 252 jet fighters, armed with heavy

nose guns, were att^ddng our bomber formations from astern beyond

the prot;^Live range of the '.ail gunner's 50-caliber machine guns.

Unfortunately the CalTech development of the retrofiring aircraft

spinner did not provide a solution. Tests at NOTS showed dispersion

in retrofirings to be very high, and the spinner behavior was erratic;

hence development was not completed.39From the evidence available,

it seems that NOTS attempted to design and install a turret launcher

on a B-25 aircraft. Lieutenant Eugene A. ("Gene") Valencia was the

project pilot. Similarly, Dr. Babcock was thinking in terms of a tail

launcher for use in B-17 and B-24 bombers as defensive armament.

Some testing of an experimental tail-turret launcher (designated

X2R-1) was conducted early in 1944. But the priorities for

backward-firing spinners gave way to the greater need for

forward-firing aircraft spinners.

The first forward-firing aircraft spinners tested at Inyokern were

fired from an F6F-3 aircraft on October 7, 1944; the aircnift was in

a three-point attitude on the ground. Launcher tubes made of 4-foot

lr.;gths of 6-incli-diameter steel pipes were attached to the fighter's

wings in place of the more conventional zero-length launchers.

Eight rounds were fired in this first ground test. Visual

inspection revealed no damage to the aircraft, except some small

dents, and the launcher itself was undamaged. More importantly, the

rocket's flight appeared to be reasonably true, with a final dispersion

that, although greater than that of fin-stabilized rockets, was not

unduly large. This was not the case three days later, on October 10,

when it was decided to test the aircraft spinner in flight. Pollock

recalls that his launch aircraft used for this test was a PV-1.

It would be an understatement to describe the results of the first

air test as "disappointing." They couldn't have been worse. Even the

usually imperturbable CalTech report writer found it difficult to

mitigate the spinners' wretched performance: ". . . the rounds left the

115
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT Al 1NYCKERN

aircraft i'1a wide spiral which increased in diameter, finally reaching a

diamcur of 50 feel ... at the end of burning, every round began to

tumble, rotating in a vertical plane . . . dispersion along range was

observed to be I:uge (from 30Ü to 600 feet) . . . lateral dispersion (400

to 500 feel) ... several rounds were observed to cartwheel along the

ground for va.ying distances up lo 400 feet."40 ll was devastalingly

clear that forward-firing aircraft spinners represented a brand-new ball

game.

CalTech scientists knew a lot about rocket ballistics. They had

acquired enomou' volumes of data, and had, in fact, "written the

book" about the subject. But aircraft spinners were radically different

from fin-stabilized rockets; a new book would have lo be written.

Burchard describes spinner development as "probably the most

complicated project which the California Institute group

undertook."41 The CalTech group investigating the erratic behavior of

spinners was headed by Clarence Weinland. It became known locally

as "the Spinner Society." Equally unofficial was the NOTS nickname

beslov eu upon the spinner; "Willie's Whirling Wocket" (for W. A.

Fowler). The true complexity of the spinners was fully realized when

the investigators began '.o contront all the interacting variables that

could adversely t/fect its Flight when launched from the air; dynamic

Hight Ibices imposed by She launch aircraft, the length and relative

axis position of the launcher lube, spin rale of the rocket. Hie

rocket's aerodynamic stale of balance, and even a critical wind effect.

In order lo understand, measure, and design for these ind other

variables, the business o. collecting observed information would

require additional thousands of air firings on the NOTS calibrateu

ranges. It would also require new methodology and new

instrumentation devices; specifically, a device thai could record a

spinner rocket's flight from launch to impact, as seen from the

rocket's point of view. Di. Ira bowen. working with an idea of

another CalTech scientist, W. R. Smyllie, developed such a device and

called it a "solar yaw camera."

This instrument, essentially a pinhole camera, was mounted as

the nose section of a spinner rocket and beyan operating as the

rocket fired. The rotational movement advanced a film strip

continuously past the light-admitting aperture, realizing one exposure

for each rotation. The angle of the sun's rays striking the film

produced lines of varying lengths. Analysis of these lines resulted in

complete position information about the rocket at any moment

during its flight. Thus, the solar yaw camera made it possible to

116
I LOOP < L RR1 MS IN KOt la.TRV

Courtesy Millikan l.uirory, California Institute of Technology

|)r IM 3, Howen, Professor of Physics m tlu' California Insliluto ol I'eclmolo.uy, and

inventive renms lor rocket lest inslriunent.ilinii.

117
mi i.KAND i y.i'i RiMi :>i \i INUJKIKN

estal a base line ot clala for a particular round's shape and

balance, and when augmented by known trajectory information,

enab.ed a determination ol aerodynamic forces dining and after

burning.

New instrumentation and experimental techniques helped solve

many ol the spinner's problems to such an extent that by live end o!

the war. a forward-fired 5-inch spinner would be developed that was

at least as accurate as the best of the forward-fired i'in-stabili/ed

rockets under certain conditions. But many problems would remain

unsolved. Prime among these was the old familiar ogre of rocket

development launchers.

In its simpl'st terms, a spinner launcher was just a tube, like a

gun barrel that could be hung on conventional pylons or ordnance

racks underneath a wing or fuselage. But the new breed of aircraft

were not being designed for such appendages. These were the jet

aircraft that were beginning to emerge: aircraft that were hHily

dependent upon a -mooth aerodynamic configuration for maximum

performance. Concerning the effect of externally mounted ordnance,

it may be recalled that the first 7U-incli launcher rails reduced the

airspeed of the redoubtable old TBF by many knots. The answer, of

course, would be to mount the tubes internally, either in the wing or

fuselage. But this solution implied almost a total redesign of the

aircrr.ft structure, and the practicability of this rested in the future.

But what of the future? There were many who pondered it in

tiie last ni aths of 1944 as they contemplated a new year America'

fourth veai of war.

Ostensibly, the war was going well, and there was a new

confidence in the American fighting man and his weaponry as the

offensive was pressed with new vigci in both theaters.

Following the spring landing in Norma idy and the subsequent

landing in the French Mediterranean, the Allied Forces were on the

Continent in massive numbers ready for dieir drives into Germany.

Heavy aerial bombardment aimed at Germany's industrial heart was

gathering ever more momentum.

Pie progress of the naval war, too, was realizing success after

success for the U.S. Navy as the favorable tide of battle pressed

irrevocably toward the Japanese homeland. Victories at Saipan, Guam,

and the Battle of the Philippine Sea, which marked the end of

Japanese carrier power in the Pacific, presaged the inevitable outcome

of the long hard conflict.

[18
FLOOD CURRENTS IN RCCKETRY

And in the theaters of war there was a burgeoning recognition of

the importance of rocketry in the campaigns to corr.r.

At NOTS Inyokern, there was also concern tor the future cf

military rockets after the war. Much of this concern was focused on

the survivability of the desert Station in the postwar years as a center

for the furtlier development of rockets and research leading to other

advanced weapons. Most recognized that a key factor in any such

speculation was the planning and quality vested in the construction of

facilities-test ranges, workshops, laboratory, and a community.

119
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

REFERENCES

NWC iclentincaiiim numbers are (hose under wliicli copies of documents iic filed in

the Technical Information Department, Naval Weapons Center. The following abbreviaiions

are used to identify record collections where documents were found:

NA National Archives, Washington, D.C.

1'RCH Naval Weapons Center records stored at federal Records Center, Bell,

California

1. John E, Burchard, ed.. Rockets, Guns and Targets, p, 172.

2. Ibid.. p. 169.

3. Papers, compiled on William A, Fowler's South Pacific Trip, 1944, p. 5.

(NWC 2313, 26-1.)

4. /hid., p. 62.

5. Ibid.. p. 57,

6. Ibid., p. 1.

7. Ibid.

8. ('IT News Letter No. 4. July 15. 1944, p. 17.

9. James C. Byrnes, jr., imervit-,., May 1967, p. 15. (NWC 2313. S-43.)

10. Thomas F. Pollock taped review commenis. July 1973, pp. 8-9, (NWC 2313,

S-45A.)

11. Letter (NP36/Reb) from S. H. Burroughs, Jr.. lo ('apt. W. M. Moses, Bureau

of Ordnance. April 14, 1944, Record Group 74, NA. (NWC 2313. 18-24.)

12. Pollock final review commenis, January 1974. (NWC 2313, S-45A.)

13. Pollock taped review comments. July 1973. (NWC 2313. S-45A.)

14. Curtis F. Vussler interview, April 1973, pp. 12-13. (NWC 2312, S-85.)

I?. Pollock taped review comments, July 1973. (NWC 2313, S-45A.)

16. The original letter regarding this pro losal is not available. However, it is

referred to as "Comdt., NAC, SD, Itr. NACll/Ni-9 (110459) of 17

December 1943." in letter (NP36/Reb) from the Chief, Bureau of Ordnance

to Commandant, Eleventh Naval District, Naval Operating Base, San Diego,

O.tif., on "Naval Ordnance Test Station, inyokern, Calif.," January 8, 1944.

Record Group 74, NA. (NWC 2313, 18-59.)

17. John T. llayward interview. May 1966, p. 26. (NWC 2313, S-6.)

18. John T. Hayw-rd interview, July 1973, p. 8. (NWC 2313, S-86.)

120
FLOOD CURRENTS IN ROCKETRY

19. Letter (NP36, Serial 020344) from Capt. S. E. Burroughs, Jr., to Chief of

Naval Operations, on "Renaming of Inyokern Airport-Harvey Field,"

February 4, 1944. Record Group 74, NA. (NWC 2313, 18-54.)

20. Letter (OP-13C, Serial 134813) from Secretary of the Navy to All Shipi and

Stations, on "Naval Air Facility, Inyokern, Calif.-Establishment of" May 10.

1944. NWC Mail, Files and Records. {NWC 2313, 19-7.)

21. N.O.T.S. Rocketeer. May 10, 1945.

22. Unpublished narrative history, "War History of Naval Air Facility, U.S. Naval

Ordnance Test Station, 'nyokern, California," by C. F. Vossler, February 9,

1946, p. 13. (NWC 2313, 15-11.)

23. N.O.T.S. Rocketeer. August 10, 1945.

24. Hayward interview, July 1973, p. 10. (NWC 2313, S-86.)

25. Letter (OP-31-DS. Serial 280931) from Chief of Naval Operations to

Commander, Eleventh Naval District, on "Naval Air Facility, Inyokern,

California," October 23, 1944. FRCB. (NWC 2313. 22-1I4A.)

26. Hayward interview, May 1966, p. 2. (NWC 2313, S-6.)

27. Ibid., p. 4.

28. Buford Rowland, LCdr., USNR, and William B. Boyd. Lt., USNR. U.S. Navy

Bureau of Ordnance in World War 11, p. 308.

29. Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research

Committee. Summary Technical Report of Division 3, NDRC, Volume I.

Rocke! and Undenvaler Ordnance. Washington, D.C. 1946, p. 186.

30. C1T News Letter. No. 3, July 1, 1944, p. 9.

31. Pollock taped review comments, July 1973. (NWC 2313, S-45A.)

32. Ihid.

33. Emory L. and Marion Ellis interview, November 1972, p. 25. (NWC 2313,

S-84.)

34. James Duncan interview, April 26, 1966, p. 61. (NWC 2313, S-9.)

35. Unpublished manuscript history, "History of the Naval Ordnance Test

Station, inyokern. California (to August 15. 1945)." compiled by Robert W.

Leach, Lt., USNR, October 4, 1945, p. 77. (NWC 2313, 20-30.)

36. Burchard, op. cit., p. 165.

37. CIT News Letter, No. 2, June 15, 1944, p. 14.

38. C!T Confidential Bulletin. No. 16, February 15, 1945.

121
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

39. Burchard, op. cit., p. 197.

W. CIT Confidential Bulletin, No. 11, November 15, 1944, p.

41. Burchard, op. cit., p. 198.

122
Boomtime Construction

Although construction was second in priority to operations, there

was nothing secondary about the wartime construction

accomplishment of NOTS, particularly the spectacular growth of the

first year. Homesteaders who had struggled for years under difficult

conditions to build meager homes and dig wells regarded it as a

miracle of the desert. Where there had been little but creosote bushes,

tumbleweeds, and sand, the progress of a few months revealed a

sprawling station with hundreds of buildings and facilities under

construction-test ranges, launchers, instrument stations, and utilities:

and a brand-new town beginning to be carved out of the desert.

The wartime construction of NOTS embraced three distinct

phases: the initial planning and erection of temporary facilities, the

construction thrust of calendar year 1944 when most of the

temporary and permanent facilities were built, and the last phase

comprising a wind-down at the end of the war. Phase 1 was covered

in an earlier chapter: the focus here is on Phase 2, which outstripped

all subsequent construction eras in the history of NOTS.

PERMANENT VERSUS TEMPORARY STRUCTURES

As the United States took the offensive in the European and the

Pacific Theaters, thinking also shifted more toward the future

peacetime Navy and long-range ordnance needs. Officers who had

witnessed the nation's traditional peacetime disinterest in ordnance

123
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

experimental facilities were prone to consider the moral of the Three

Little Pigs, and the differences between houses of straw and stone.

Consequently, in respect to NOTS, there was a decided shift toward

building permanent structures, and stubborn resistance began setting

in toward starting any more temporary buildings than were absolutely

essential. Byrnes and Burroughs led this shift.

As noted previously. Burroughs progressively came to regard the

new Station as an "American Peenemlinde." Military reports were

being received of Germany's secret rocket base where the formidable

V-2 rockets were being developed. Burroughs later described his

conviction that the United States needed an equivalent to

Peenemünc1:, "where you could build, design, develop weapons in

secret so that nobody knows what the hell you're doing . . . [we] felt

that we needed the whole laboratory, the shops and the tools to do

the whole job there because you can't farm things out if you are

going to keep things quiet."1

But the new emphasis on permanent structures ran counter to

another new trend, concern over rising costs. It was inevitable that

the specter of cost would rise to haunt the planners and builders of

NOTS and pose the first real threat to the realization of a permanent

Navy research and development center. Shortly after Captain' O. A.

Sandquist took over as the Officer in Charge of Construction, the

first realistic cost estimates were appearing: stark indicators to point

out the differences between temporary and permanent structures, and

the fiscal consequences of constantly revising a wish list.

Of course, the $160,000 "Navy Vessels" money initially

committed by the Bureau of Ordnance to start the ball rolling was

patently a token payment. However, it was generally acknowledged

that the $9,500,000 obtained for the Station through the Public

Works Appropriation Bill (passed at the end of 1943) was quite a

resoectable sum. Yet, even as the Secretary of the Navy released these

funds to the Bureau of Yards and Docks (February 1, 1944), the

estimated costs of the apprcv;d facilities had already reached more

than $22,000,000-considerably more than double the congressiona1

appropriation.

The problem of the deficiency being greater than the authorized

funds was further compounded by Burroughs, Sandquist, and the

CalTech scientists who kept adding requirements as their on-site

peispective and reports of rocket usage in the war gave them a fuller

comprehension of the needs. The Bureau of Yards and Docks

reported on January 27, 1944, that the "facilities submitted by the

124
BOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

Field" represented an increase in the scope and, if approved, would

bring the total cost up to $23,739,473 and the deficiency to more

than $14,000,000. In view of this, the Bureau felt it did not appear

"advisable from a planning standpoint to proceed with permanent

construction until the scope of the work had been defined."^

As the $9,500,000 appropriation was sufficient for the wartime

facilities and a permanent research and development establishment of

limited scope, the brunt of the question was whether or not the

Bureau of Ordnance had the determination and the resources to go

ahead with its plans for an uncompromised, complete, and permanent

R&D center. The new Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Rear

Admiral George Hussey, following a brief visit to the Station in the

midst of a howling sandstorm,-5reaffirmed the decision to go ahead

as originally planned. He instructed the Bureau of Yards and Docks

to proceed with the particular construction that could be

accommodated within the available $9,500,000 and declared that the

Bureau of Ordnance would separately sponsor the remainder of the

project. Hussey honored his commitment to aid in the sponsorship of

NOTS. On April 18, 1944, he wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations

requesting $14,206,217 for Inyokem. Hussey's suggestion was to add

$7,750,000 to the 1945 Public Works Appropriation Bill, and use

$6,456,217 from Bureau-sponsored funds in the 1944 Supplemental

Public Works Appropriation Bill, ". . . available after provision for

Bureau of Ordnance contemplated construction projects and a

reasoTPble allowance for unforeseen projects during the remainder of

the fisca' year."4

On February 24, 1944, a letter of intent was issued by the

Bureau of Yards and Docks for a cost-plus-fixed-ue contract with a

combination of construction firms for what would be the principal

contract for construction of the Station's permanent facilities.

Contract NOy-9088 was a flexible agreement between the Navy and

the combined firms of Macco Construction Company, E. S.

McKittrick, and Morrison-Knudsen, Inc. Official approval of the

contract would be forthcoming later, but work started immediately

with the letter of intent.

A second contract, NOy-9048, was let in the same period to the

group of Stafford, Davies, and Gogerty (mentioned earlier), for

architectural and engineering services pertaining to all construction

improvements.

Twenty-two years later Sandquist credited mach of the rapid

progress of the wartime building to the arrangement whereby selected

125
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

contractors were able to work on a fee that was based on the

percentage of the total costs and renegotiated at major stages.

According to Sandquist, the Station could not have been built under

the kind of competitive bidding followed after the war.5

One of the most significant impediments to building encountered

by Sandquist in the early days at NOTS was the same one his

predecessor, Captain A. K. Fogg, had experienced: nobody can build

from vague requirements. Firm plans, duly approved and signed off,

were necessary. For the NOTS laboratory, these were not immediately

forthcoming.

DESIGN PROBLEMS

When the committee of Bureau of Yards and Docks designers

and the NOTS Laboratory Officer, James Duncan, returned from their

tour of the nation's laboratories, they made their proposal to the

Bureau of Ordnance for not one laboratory but a number of them. If

the Bureau wanted to do the many kinds of research that were being

done in the laboratories visited, the committee would recommend "a

laboratory for physics, a laboratory for chemistry, a laboratory for

electronics, a laboratory for electrical engineering, a laboratory for

metallurgy, a laboratory for plastics, and a laboratory for explosives."

The committee further proposed that each laboratory building be

"separate and distinct . . . spaced far enough apart so that no work

being done in any one of them could interfere with work being done

in any other."6

The Bureau of Ordnance took a hard look at the overall

proposal and at once eliminateil the plastics laboratory. This decision

was based on the fact that existing facilities could take care of the

Bureau's needs in plastics research. They also decided that the

explosives laboratory should be located at some safer distance away

from the main laboratory complex and later dropped the explosives

laboratory. After many discussions with the Bureau of Yards and

Docks, a complex of six separate laboratories was agreed upon; they

were to be devoted to physics, chemistry, electronics, electrical

engineering, and metallurgy, with one for general use.

Next, the Bureau of Ordnance scrutinized the laboratory layout

that was part of the proposal and saw the buildings arranged

concentrically about a central facility connected by long passageways

like the spokes of a wheel; the passageways were to be open but

126
BOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

protected from the sun by a light roof. Duncan and some Bureau

planners had something to say about this design, as they had recently

returned from Inyokem and had experienced firsthand one of the

Mojave Desert's environmental spring specialties-a howling,

sand-packed windstorm. Understandably, they were disturbed by the

prospect of walking at the mercy of such elements in the open

passageways between the laboratories. Accordingly, the layout was

changed to an arrangement of six wings extended from a long central

corridor, three on a side.

Interestingly, the same "wheel-spoke" designer from the Bureau

of Yards and Docks appears to have drawn the original layout for

both the permanent Administration Building and the Station

Dispensary. A more conventional layout was adopted for the

Administration Building about the same time as »he one for the

laboratories. The proposed Station Dispensary layoi t, however, was

changed when the NOTS Senior Medical Officer, Commander M.

George Henry, vociferously conveyed deep emotions "that my patients

would die of pneumonia on the way from my surgery to their ward

bed unless they closed in the long connecting corridors to piotect

from the cold wind."7

In the original Bureau of Yaids and Docks proposal, each of the

individual wings in the main laboratory was a different size,

determined from the average amo'-.nt of <,pace devoted to a particular

discipline in the laboratories that were visited. Since this size

determination was entirely arbitrary, and since it was impossible to

forecast the relative importance of the various types of rese irch to be

done at NOTS, the Bureau of Ordnance requested Yards and Docks

to design all wings approximately the same size. Moreover, it was

decided to make them more or less interchangeable except for the

jhemistry and metallurgy facilities. It was felt that the special needs

of those (in terms of chemical benches, hoods, and furnaces) were

sufficiently specialized to make dermite selection of the wings in

ad-'ance.

But the decision to make all wings the same size fell short of

stating exactly what that size should be. Not even Byrnes could

answer this one, and in one of his internal memorandums to the

Bureau of Ordnance's Director of Research (Captain William M.

Moses) on March 23, 1944, he wrote:

It is the opinion of Ad3 that is next to impossible to accurately

compute what should be the physical : of the laboratory at Inyokem that

will satisfactorily meet the future needs . the Bureau.8

127
THE GKAND EXPERIMENT AT INYÜKERN

In the same memorandum, Byrnes acknowledged the usefulness

of the "reliable data" obtained by Duncan and representatives cf the

Bureau of Yards and Docks in their inspection tour of the nation's

loading laboratories. He continued by saying that the data would be

used to "develop the Inyokem Laboratory to 'spread eagle' all

sciences by its general arrangement [and] approximate sizes of the

various scientific divisions and services."

But apart from discussing the relative sizes of comparable

laboratories, the Byrnes memorandum is interesting because it reveals

a general philosophy regarding the laboratory and a reason for careful

planning at this early stage of the game:

Supplemental to the tonsideratiün of the adequacy cf the laboratory

in size, facilities, and arrangement for meeting the Navy needs, tiler' is the

further consideration that there will be little iiope of attracting to the

laboratory scientists of adequate stature if the laboratory is mediocre. With

emphasis after the war on developments catering to civil peacetime needs, it

is going to be difficult enough to get the proper men but with a mediocre

laboratory, it will be impossible.

But the considered detriment of a "mediocre" laboratory in

attracting top-flight technical and scientific personnel was not the

only cloud on the horizon. Where would they and their families live

and play? What about schools for their children, churches, chopping

facilities? Some answers to these questions were evolving in v modest

Quonset hut at China Lake.

COMMAND POST

The second terrporary NOTS headquarters building shared one of

the unusual qualities of its predecessor at Harvey Field as it provided

both office and living quartc-:. These were shared by Burroughs and

his new Executive Officer John Richmond. Office furniture consisted

of a desk, a long, low table for reviewing plans, and a group of chairs

and a coffee table in one corner ,or conferences. The rear of the hut

was partitioned into small areas for a maii-ordi-.r shower stall and

washroom. Heating was provided by one heater in the center of the

hut. The hut was strategically located, as the Officer in Charge of

Construction had a similar hut only a half block away that comprised

his quarters and an office for the drafting section. Building plans were

dra "ted in Sandquist's hut and then taken to the Burroughs-Richmond

hut for review and approval. For most of the facilities, this was all

the approval needed; so it was a quick step from design to

construction.

128
BOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

First lleadiiiiarters buildings at NOTS. China bike, circa April 1944.

These were but two of about 60 Quonset hats eventually sited

in tiie first temporary headquarters area on what is now Halsey

Avenue. The plan was to operate from this area during the main

construction period until the permanent Administration Building and

the first quarters for senior officers were completed.

Some of the other structures that went up in the temporary area

included a large water tower, a sprawling ship's service including the

"Desert General Store." a first-aid building, a photography hut, a

mess hall, 13 barracks, a temporary administration building for the

Navy and OlTech, and an administration building for Navy

construction and contract personnel.

Although the pressures were great to realize immediate goals at

the possible expense of long-range planning, adherence to certain basic

principles allowed a semblance of order in the construction. The

temporary headquarters and the construction camp were located away

from 'he permanent headquarters and housing areas. Also, Burroughs

resisted all attempts to develop housing outside of the planned central

community. Areas of open land were planned to be preserved within

the housing areas to minimize the hazard of fire, and to give space

for future expansion. Similarly, space corridors were kept between the

Station community and the outside community for future flexibility;

a bit of far-sighted planning that paid dividends in the future

development of Burroughs High School, Pierce Elememary School,

129
THL GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

two separate housin.i developments, a shopping center, and a

community park. All major permanent business, social, and

headquarters facilities were planned along a central street that is now

Blandy Avenue. And the loc '1 command was exerting all the influence

it could for permanent structu^s.

Despite the chaotic appearance of the construction work going

on outside the headquarters hut, the plans being prepared inside held

promise of better days to come. Unlike the early Indians, explorers,

and prospectors who drank at Indian Wells and then pushed on, the

naval officers in the small Quonset hut were laying the foundations

for the Navy's permanent stay in Indian Wells Valley.

SOME CONSTRUCTION HIGHLIGHTS

A "nail-by-nail" description of the building of NOTS would be

ponderous. However, a few construction aspects are appropriate to

provide the perspective necessary to understand this period of NOTS

history.

Burroughs once commented that the firt mistake at NOTS was

in starting construction by scraping off the bu.hes from large plots of

land OP the windward side of the community. With the ground cover

gone, there -vas an unlimited supply of loose gnund with which the

desert wind- could sandblast structures, automobiles, and people. The

stories of arly samMorms are legendary. The old-timers called it

"termination weather!" As one stated, "Due to so much of the desert

being torn up, when the wind would blow, which it almost always

did towards the end of the week, men would come into the office in

drover, to terminate, after working just a few weeks."10Another

postulated, "It seems the wind blew much harder during the early

times of NOTS . . . the wind would pick up from the bare ground

tons of sand to throw at us. At times [it] blew so hard and long we

got so used to leaning against the wind . . . that if it had stopped

suddenly, many people would have fallen flat on their back or face

depending on which way thoy were trying to go."1' While the

retrospect of a quarter century tends to soften the recollection of

"termination weather," to some the memory is still harsh. "When the

wind blew hard, it was like a blast furnace wi+h sand, or an ice flow

with sand." Women employees had to wear slacks "to avoid being cut

up on the legs by sand."

A second source of early-day irritation was the endless maze of

open ditches. In one progress report on the steam and hot water

130
BOOM mir CONSTRUCTION

Typjcul construction at NOTS showing one ol many inconveniences liic open trench!

distribution work, for example, there were 34,424 feet ol Ireneh

opened in the same period that 11,889 feet of pipe were laid. The

open trenches greatly interfered with other operations, as well as

aggnn-iting the blowing of loose sand.'-

Three batching p'ants were set up to supply the transit mixers

for the tons of cement that went into the building of liie Station.

Loose cement was received in bulk over a railroad spur from

Inyokern specially built by the Navajo Indians. It was also brought in

by tank trucks and stored in large silos.

To supply electrical power for construction, a special substation

was set up by the California Electric Power Company near the

Station's west gate. Temporary power lines were strung throughout

the construction area in netwoiks that frequently resembled spider

webs in respect to their amount, but without the logical and aesthetic

symmetry of arachnid design.

At ranches taken over by the Station there were water wells.

Some produced potable water: others produced water only fit for

construction use. i'here was a constant problem of having to truck

water to various areas on the Station, and this was relieved only

slightly by laying 5-inch steel pipes on the surface for distribution. To

supplement water from the wells, a 6-inch-pipe connection was made

131
nil GRAND IXI'IKIMIM Al INVOKIKN

to the Los Angeles aqueducl some 12 miles froni Cliinu Lake. A

major problem was the Station's early lack ol sewage disposal

taeililies. In lime a sewer system was developed, but portable privies

dotting the landscape were the mam solution.'-

There were a few existing roads, hut none was adequate for the

upsurge ol traffic. New roads had to be built. A large asphalt plant

was sei up and a pit was dug wesl of the main gale lo supply

materials for 'he roads.

At the beginning, the onl\ telephone line corneeting MOTS with

the outside world was a private one that the electric company strung

on an abandoned power line. The end instrument was located in the

general store in Inyokern, and even a key person like linory Ellis had

to wait hours to make a call to CalTech. The single line was

augmented In the addition of an aimy field-telephone system on the

same poles. And late in the construction period another line was put

in along the railroad.

1 he remoteness ol the Station from any large labor source,

together with the magnitude ol the construction task, imposed the

immediate problem ol shelter not only lot the Navy and CalTech

personnel but also for the construction workers numbering up to

7

.2ü0. lo accommodate them, one of the first undertakings was to

build a construction camp: a small city consisting of 162 bunk houses,

3'-' latrine buildings. l) barracks for foremen and engineers, 14

Quonset hub. 2 large warehouses, 2 mess hall buildings. 5 recreation

buildings, I open an theater, and a boxing ring. The combined

housing and messing facilities of the construction camp and the

temporary headquarters, when completed, were adequate to

accommodate the burgeoning population of China Lake. In October

LM-L not quite a year Tier the founding of the Station, the

population was approximately S,üü0.14

THE LABOR FORCE

The most perplexing problem for the construction contractors

was recruitment of labor; and having induced workers to come to a

remote desert area, further inducing them to stay.

Military personnel reported to the Station under orders and

generally accepted the untamed environment as just one of many

varied fortunes (or misfortunes) of service life. CalTech personnel

were generally a highly motivated group of professionals prepared to

132
HOOMTIME CONSTRUarON

serve wherever they could most benefit the war effort; however, there

were even some among them who resisted Inyokern duty. But the big

problem was with the large number of the laborers required to

physically build NOTS. Under conditions of a -Tationa1labor scarcity,

the average laborer readily felt he could serve the war effort quite as

patriotically in the metropolitan areas without taking on the

uncomfortable role of a pioneer opening up a frontier. There was a

patent need for special incentives, a fact that was clearly recognized

by the local NOTS command, the Bureau of Ordnance, and the

Bureau of Yards and Docks, but not by those who were in a position

to set national priorities.

The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance requested that the Bureau

of Yards and Docks obtain a class "A" labor priority rating. Although

this special priority rating was not obtainable, the Bureau of Yards

and Docks assigned the best priority it could within its own

programs.

Lack of a class "A" national priority was not the only reason

for the NOTS labor problem. Although the Station was 150 miles

from Los Angeles and in the totally different geographic environment

of an undeveloped desert fron'ier, it was officially classified as being

within the labor recruiting area of that city. Los Angeles, however,

with a host of active defense plants that offered lucrative jobs in an

attractive metropolitan area, was naturally one of the poorest

recruiting fields in the nation. Failure to get laboi for NOTS from

this area necessitated a large "vigorous recruitment program" on a

nationwide basis. While the recruitment rate of this program was

satisfactory, it was so largely because it provided a means for many

workers with, families to have their travel expenses paid to California.

All they had to do was report at the job site and begin work.

Thereafter, there was no legal way to ensure that they remained on

the job.

It is interesting to note that no special inducements were offered

for work at NOTS except for a few selected skilled tradesmen who

received free meals and lodging. The absence of any kind of living

accommodation for families, other than off-Station trailer camps, was

just one additional reason why most potential recruits preferred

working in the metropolitan area. It also helps to explain why the

construction contracts operated well below the established personnel

ceiling most of the time.

An early unpublished history of NOTS by Lieutenant Robert W.

Leach describes the early labor as being "deficient both as to quality

and quantity."
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Concerning quantity, progress reports for the main NOTS

construction contract (NOy-9088) show that by October 1, 194^,

more than 6,500 people v/ere at work; by December 15, the figure

had risen to 7,200.

Absenteeism was especially bad before or after the weekend

break; many would leave work a day or two early, and others would

fail to return on Monday. At times this necessitated a hasty

reorganization of work gangs. Also, many contractors operated on a

schedule of "twelve days work-two days off"; this made for

incredible "binges" on the two days off, incapacitating a large

percentage of the work force.

The clearest indication of the magnitude of the labor problem

was the ratio of hirals to persons actually on the job. Although there

were never more than 7,200 on the job at any one time, more than

24,000 persons were hired within one eight-month period.

As to the quality of the labor, the early historian said it was

"considered to be only poor to fair." He reported that very little

local labor was available and the labor imported from outside had

been "fairly well screened as to quality." Unfortunately, the NOTS

contractor received what was on the coarse side of the sieve.

Wartime conditions and remoteness of the location cannot be

used as an excuse for all the labor shortcomings. The recruitment

program itself laid the seeds for many problems. For example,

conditions at NOTS were flagrantly misrepresented to prospective

construction workers. Leach gives an example wherein the name China

Lake (from the dry desert playa) was misused.'-

One man arrived at Inyokern with his fishing boat which lie had

brought all the way from Pennsylvania. He had been told that there was

excellent fishing in the vicinity. He had been brought at government expense,

but he stayed less than one week. Another man from the middle west

arrived with the undersU'.nding that he u uld be able te commute daily from

Pasadena, where he liad planned to live with relatives.

Leach comments further

These are not isolated cases. Literally hundreds arrived expecting to

live in a lush, green well irrigated valley, complete With Southern California's

much touted sunny weather. Consequently, they weie appalled at the

conditions that met their eye in the bleak, dusty deseri of the Indian Wells

Valley.

Quite naturally they left almost as fast as they ai."ived to take more

attractive jobs in the aircraft industry or the shipyards. They felt no

compunction about leaving in spite of the free government transportation

they had received. As a matter of fact, most of them left disgustjd, and

with a deling that they had been cheated.

AccordL.g to Leach, another serious fault of the recruiting

program lay in the fact that no physical examination was required.

He reports:

134
liOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

.. . prospective employees arrived in all coiiditions of pliysical distress.

Venf-real disease and pulmonary disorders were especially common. Some

arrived barely able to walK tlnough the main pate under their own power.

This, naturally, creakd a terrific social problem, which was never solved and

continues even today [1945|.

Concomitant with the hiring problem was that of security. Due

to the extreme urgency of the construction program, it was

impossible to conduct exhaustive investigations of each man before he

was hired. It had to be done afterwards and usually was not

completed until he had been on the job many weeks. Leach observed:

Reports of investigations showed that a far too groat percentage of

employees had criminal records ranging from numerous arrests for

drunkenness to convictions for grand larceny and rape. Those in the latf i

categories were fired as soon as discovered, which added <o the already nigh

labor turnover.

Judge Ardis Walker, who faced between 30 and 40 criminal cases

each Monday morning, estimated that 60%' of the people had a

criminal record and stated, "Many of them were sent there as a

condition of probation to help build the base."16

Complaints that contractors were not providing adequate housing

and messing facilities were among the forefront of problems. The

following is Leach's account of the legendary NOTS '"Bacon and Egg

Riot."

Trouble finally developed on the morning of May 17, 1944, when the

men in the second seating at the m^ss hall (plumbers and electricians)

refused to eat the meal that was served them. The commissary steward, i«1an

effort to placate die men. asked tl.em what they wanted to eat. They

demanded bacon and eggs which wa then served. As soon as the men had

finished and gone to work, the word quickly spread among the construction

crews that a favored ;'ew Had been served bacon and eggs for breakfast. As a

consequence, men all over the Station pulled off Üieir work and by 9:30

A.M. approximately 1,000 men were milling around the mess hall demanding

bacon and eggs.

Captain Sandquisl and Mr. Case made personal appeals to die men to

remain orderly and go back to work, following which an open air discussion

was held regarding the pioblems of the men. Both Captain Sandquist and Mr.

Case ''ssured the strikers that strenuous efforts were being made to improve

mess hall conditions. An aftermath of die strike was dial die mess hall

served bacon and eggs until nearly noon when the men returned to work.'

SUPPLIES AND SABOTAGE

In addition to labor priority problems, there were difficulties in

obtaining construction supplies and equipment. Many were the

irritating delays in obtaining building materials, particularly those for

electrical, heating, and refrigeration systems. Often the completion of

a badly needed facility was held up, and an otherwise unnecessary

135
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

temporary facility had to be constructed on a stopgap basis. Original

designs were based on conservation of critical materials and not on

economy; and when construction started, the materials used were

often those within reach at the time regardless of design or cost.

The supply problem was greatly complicated by the magnitudt

of the job. Huge quantities of materials had to be stacked on the

open desert at widely separated sites. A unique feature of the early

NOTS terrain was that, with a little zigging and zagging between

creosote bushes, a truck could go just about anywhere without the

need for a road. Thus, an unscrupulous raiding party could approach

a stack of supplies from any point of the compass. An officer of

Burroughs' staff expressed the opinion that several houses in the

adjoining town of Ridgecrest were built from scratch with Navy

materials and supplies.18In time, the pilfering became so brazen thai

a thorough investigation was made of the situation and a more

effective system of vigilance was sought.

A few cases of saboUige were experienced during the NOTS

construction era, but usually tiiey were traced to disgruntled workers

whose number was legion in the Indian Wells Valley of the Mojave

Desert in 1944. In addition to the cause—the unduly low

morale-there was the ever-present opportunity to commit sabotage. In

the opinion of Lieutenant Norman F. Main, the Station Security

Officer, "any serious, well-planned attempt to sabotage construction

would have been comparatively easy."19Happily for NOTS, such was

•.iot the case!

Through it all-sandstorms, isolation, primitive accommodations,

rough-and-tumble social climate, labor problems, supply shortages,

thievery, bacon and egg riot, and pinpricks of sabotage -the work

moved on. And to the seemingly impossible building task originally

outlined, there was added the requirement for constructing a large

plant for the pilot production of rocket propellants.

CHINA LAKE PILOT PLANT

As previously noted, the key that unlocked the door to tiie

nation's massive rocket program during World War II was undoubtedly

CalTech's success in solid-propellant rocket technology.

In 1941 the Institute had leased a five-acre tract in the San

Gabriel foothills northeast of Pasadena to locate a safe experimental

ballistite production and testing facility, and thus remove explosives

136
BOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

from the campus. But as the national need for rocket propellant

expanded, "Eaton Canyon," as it was known, evolved into a major

production and test facility; nearly 5,000,000 pounds of ballistite

were eventually extruded there.

CalTech's assumed role of volume ballistite producer was jnot

sought. On the contrary, it was always intended that once the designs

and very special production techniques were worked out, they would

be passed on to the Navy for use by large-scale production

contractors. At that time CalTech would phase out of the production

business and focus its scientific expertise on improved propellants and

rocket designs. But demands for balhstite were overwhelming, and

industry could not quickly tool up for volume production of a

virtually experimental product. Hence, the experimenters became

manufacturers out of necessity and as a wartime duty.20

It was a situation that could not last. First, the anomaly of

having outstanding scientists and enginee-s doubling as plant

operations supervisors was costing much-needeJ experimental time and

effort. Second, the resources of Eaton Canyon were finite. Its limits

were reached in the fall of 1943 when a new 12-inch propellant press

was needed to make larger rocket motors. Adding a large press would

severely overtax the already marginal safety factors for large quantities

of potentially hazardous materials.

CalTech wanted a facility that would help meet the Navy's needs

for rush prod'iction of propellant grains as well as allow their own

experimental propellant work. Moreover, they wanted such a facility

to be at a safe distance, but not too far removed, from Pasadena.

The Navy was similarly concerned. It wanted a pilot plant where

the propellant processing techniques could be refined and firmly

established so that they could be readily adopted by the larger

industrial plants. Such a pilot plant would firmly establish the Navy

in the new rocket technology-especially if the facility was

constructed as a permanent one.

In the fall of 1943 a team of CalTech scientists had begun

looking at possible sites in Southern California. Two of taese, near

Hesperia and San Bernardino, seemed to be most promising for the

Institute's purposes. But before these siios could be given intensive

consideration, the prospects of NOTS being established near Inyokern

appeared.

From the Navy's viewpoint, the NOTS site at Inyokern was a

logical place to locate the new pilot plant. It was away from a densely

populated area. Moreover, the NOTS leadership consisted of a

137
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Navy-CalTech team that was blessed by an unusually warm

relationship-an important factor in view of the Bureau of Ordnance's

wish that the plant be under CalTech's management control. But most

important, the season was right for NOTS Inyokem. The

appropriations tap had been turned on in Washington for the new

Station, and a heilthy stream of funding was beginning to flow;

enough to include a propellant processing facility as part of NOTS.

CalTech was not as enthusiastic about locating the new plant at

Inyokem, but accepted the decision of the Bureau of Ord^nce.21In

late 1943 tentative agreements were reached among Dr. C. r..

Lauritsen, the National Defense Research Committee, and the 3ureau

of Ordnance that "such an experimental unit would be built jointly

by the Bureau of Ordnance and the [National Defense Research

Committee], and that the California Institute of Technology, under

Contract OEMsr-418, would furnish the detailed design and

equipment, and that the Bureau of Ordnance would control general

arrangements and safety matters."22 The ball was thrown to CalToch,

which ran for the goal line. The man selected to spearhead the drive

was Dr. Bruce Hornbrook Sage.

Sage was predisposed to hard driving: himself, the people who

worked for him, and a battered Mercury sedan in which he achieved

speeds up to 75 miles per hour over the tortuous mountain road and

long stretches of desert between Pasadena and Inyokern; this while

dictating into a wire recorder all the way at equal speed, often

turning his head to address passengers in the rear seats.

The young, tall, balding Professor of Chemical Engineering

perhaps had a need to drive hard. He was working at three jobs:

professorial duties at CalTech; research work for the American

Petroleum Institute; and together with Dr. William N. Lacey and Dr.

D. S. Clark, he was co-head of Section V, Propellants and Interior

Ballistics, Contract OEMsr-418-the largest section under this contract

having some 264 Institute personnel.23But the greatest part of Sage's

wartime effort was directed toward the new propellant plant at

NOTS.

Both by agreement and the force of his personality, Sage was in

complete charge. Design, construction, and subsequent operation were

al] within his responsibility.

Sage appears to ha^'e made the first of his furious drives to

Inyokem on Janusry 21, 1944. On that occasion ho met with

Sandquist and Burroughs to discuss tentative plans for the new pilot

plant as conceived by Oliver G. Bowen, head of a consulting

1

138
BOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

Courtesy Millikan Library, California 'mtitute of Technology

Dr. Bruce H. Sage, pilot plant boss.

139
THE (.RAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

engineering firm contracted by CalTech. Bowen had worked fast, since

he had only been given the task on January 14, and within the week

he had preliminary drawings showing floor plan and elevations, type

of construction, and costs for the plant. The drawings included two

large propellant press lines featuring the large 12-mch press needed for

motors of the new 5-inch rocket, and an even larger 18-inch press

capable of extruding grains 12 feet long and 9 inches in diameter.

(The terms "12-inch" and "18-inch" (press) derive from the

dimensions of the extrusion cylinder, not the diameter of the grain

extruded.) The plan for the press lines called for three types of

structures: 29 propellant processing buildings, 15 semipermanent and

18 temporary administrative buildings, and a large number of storage

magaziner.

The Bureau of Ordnance, after approving the plan "in principle,"

promptly (February 15) tapped their Naval Vessel Repair funds for

another $1,500,000. In turning the funds over to the Bureau of Yards

and Docks, they stipulated that detailed plans be sent to them as

soon as possible. The conflict between the desire to expedite and the

need for reliable planning, particularly in respect to safety, can be

observed by eavesdropping on a telephone conversation between

Captain Byrnes and Captain Burroughs on February 11, 1944:24

BURROUGHS: We had a conference out here the other day on the

Powder Plant and as a result of that conference, it was finally agreed by

everybody that if we must wait for detailed plans for the Powder Plant to

be completed before getting bids and going through that bid routine and

then before starting construction, it'd be impossible to get that first line into

operation before June 15 and then Capt. Sanquist [sic] would like very

much to go ahead with that Powder Plant on the—as the detailed plans are

submitted. He can actually start, if he had authority, he could start

construction here very soon. The plans are being turned out by CalTech and

the first detailed plans will be in his hands as of Monday. The June IS date

seems to be the bes; that anybody can promise unless that cost-plus-fixed-fee

arrangement is worked out.

BYRNES: Well, now, we want you to have the copies of those plans

sent also to the Bureau by airmail because it involves the safety engineer's

review of them.

BURROUGHS: Well, I was just going to ask you that question, sir. 1

wondered if the Bureau can give u~< dispatch approval of the general plan of

the Powder Plant as laid out by Bowen in that plan .. .

BYRNES: Yes.

BURROUGHS: Give us dispatch approval of that general plan as

regards safety distances between the buildings.

BYRNES: Yes, well, the safety engineer will also want to look at the

buildings too. The details on how the buildings are to be constructed because

there are certain features that he knows of construction such as making it

possible for the wall to blow out without the roof falling down. We'll have

to see the detailed plans too. That's why I say you'll have to send them in

by airmail

140
BOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

BURROUGHS: In otlicr words, the detailed plans for each building

before it's constructed?

BYRNES: Well, he, if he gets one building, he can probably review it

very quickly and send the comments nvt by teletype which will guide you i,-

the others.

BURROUGHS: I see, yes, sir. 1 think '' will be some time before the

detailed plans for the building arc completed. Captain.

BYRNES: Well, then . . .

BURROUGHS: If they have some approval, they could go ahead and

start some initial work in laying out sewage and a lot of the roads and

tilings of that nature, starting now.

BYRNES: Oh, well, we can give you that. We'll go over the plans and

give you that. It has already been more or less approved by the Bureau and

sent over to the Bureau of Yards and Docks.

BURROUGHS: Yes, sir.

BYRNES: So we can give you those details but for the individual

buildings, which the safety engineer will want to look into because his

experience is dictated by certain types and general forms of construction

which should be complied with.

In the meantime, 5625,000 had been made available by the

Office of Scientific Research and Development for the equipment for

the new China Lake Pilot Plant—which by this time was starting to

be known by the initials "CLPP." familiarly referred to as "Clip."

With the casualne^u of a man of professional confidence and the

enthusiasm of one who loved the desert, Sage spent the better part of

several days bouncing over the desert in a Navy jeep in search of a

location for what he then called a "small pilot plant."25 j-ie chose an

area just east of the China Lake village; a choice prompted by the

proximity of already planned housing for the workers who would

operate the "small pilot plant." Then, in the typical wartime

aggressive spirit of striking while the iron is hot, a spirit that was

essentially germane to the dynanic Sage, he gave the go-ahead signal

to Captain Sandquist, who passed it in turn to his contractors,

Holmes and Narver, architects and engineers; and Haddock Engineers,

Ltd., construction firm. Sage also hired Joe Waller, described a:, "a

tough breed of civil engineer," to be the resident engineer for the

pilot plant project.

On March 1 the bulldozers started to roll. The site was cleared,

and new roads graded. Within three weeks the loading building for

the 12-inch press line was 75% complete. Footings were poured for

the press barricade.26But even as the signs of progress increased,

there was a growing cloud of doubt.

On March 8, barely a week after work started, Byrnes and his

assistant. Lieutenant Commander Dexter Bullard, came west to study

the detailed drawings of CLPP.

141
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

A meeting, which took place in Bowen's office in Los Angeles,

was attended by Byrnes, Dexter Bullard, Burroughs, Sandquist,

Lauritsen, Sage, Palmer Sabin (CalTech's own staff architect), and R.

C. Stone (CalTech Plant Superintendent).

The reason for the meeting was clear. Byrnes had not received

;l detailed drawir^s and was apprehensive.27The drawings were, in

tact, only about 50% complete on March 8 when Byrnes and Bullard

arrived. However, they were complete enough for the Bureau of

Ordnance men to make a judgment that what was being built east of

China Lake village was unacceptable!

Principally, the Bureau of Ordnance felt that CalTech had

misinterpreted the "New Jersey Tables of Quantity and Distance" (an

ordnance plant designer's bible), which clearly prescribed layout as

determined by the volume of propellant versus the distance between

the various facilities—not only those of the plant itself but also

adjoining facilities. At NOTS, these happened to be the officers'

housing.

The whole crux of the matter centered on the question of

whether ballistite should be classified as "high explosive" or

"smokeless powder." Mr. F. F. Dick, Bureau jf Ordnance's "Safety

Czar," resolutely settled the question. According to Dick (known to

his associates as "Doc"), ballistite was to be treated as an explosive

and handled according to his strict safety directives that were

wholeheartedly endorsed by the highest echelon of the Bureau of

Ordnance and the Navy.

Architect Bowen had made his layout on the presumption that

the rules for smokeless powder would prevail. Now, under the new

ruling, the safety distance was not sufficient, not even for a smull

pilot plant as envisioned by Sage.

To the dismay of the CalTech scientists, the Navy asked not

only for a change of location but also for changes in size of the

plant and the type of structures. There were more than safety

considerations behind these changes. Byrnes recognized the lead that

the Navy, through CalTech, had taken in the development of

solid-propellant technology in this country. He was concerned that the

Navy be able to preserve this leadership after the war. It is reasonable

to surmise a conclusion on his part that such leadership could be best

ensured by having a first-class propellant pilot plant as part of NOTS.

What Byrnes wanted was a plant twice the size originally

proposed, nearly 100 buildings. The location would have to be

changed for reasons of safety and so there would be room for future

142
BOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

expansion. Construction would be for a permanent Class A plant

rather than the temporary one planned by CalTech. This is essentially

what Byrnes got as soon as he was able to report back to Hussey for

concurrence. For Bowen it was "back to the drawing board." For

Sage it was a bitter lesson in the importance of communication.

The new plant site, some 4 miles removed from the original site,

rested on the rocky slopes of the Argus Mountain foothills. Years

later, A. L. Pittinger, former Pilot Plant Officer for the Navy, recalled

the selection of this new site:28

The new plant site was actually selected by Sage, with the concurrence

of the CO. and OlnCC and Captain Byrnes. Sage and I took several jeep

trips to explore the area south of the mountain, which at that time was not

officially within the Station boundary. In a meeting with Joe Waller and

myself, Sage asked if we could run a fast survey of the approx. 3,000 acres

of land. Joe was reluctant, but 1 suggested that we run it by jeep, using two

jeeps, each with a rodman and driver, using the rear step of the jeep as the

rod position. We had an expert surveyor, Larry Caulkins and a girl named

Polly (later Polly Connable) who was the only female CIT employee on the

S'ation at that time. 1 said 1 would get the two jeeps and a couple of Navy

guys to help.

Sage liked the idea and asked us to start sending down topographical

maps just as soon as possible. Well, we got going on a Friday and worked

right through for ten days. We shot 5-fool contours over the entire 3000

acres, starting out right after breakfast and working until dark. Polly was the

draftsman, and she would take cm notebooks at the end of the day and

help reduce the data so that she could plot the maps. We all pitched in, and

for a bunch of amateurs (except Larry) a remarkable job was done. Bowen

griped about not getting the whole set at once, but actually we kept him

supplied with all the topo he could use for the preliminary plant layout.

Work was started in May 1944 with a small crew of workmen,

just as Station construction was moving into full stride. Labor was

scarce and so were building materials and construction equipment.

The complicated structures implied more than just permanent

(Class A) concrete buildings. In line with the Bureau of Ordnance's

rigid safety requirements, whole systems of intricate deluge sprinklers

had to be installed. The minimum lOO-pound-per-square-inch water

pressure, in turn, necessitated increased thickness in pipe walls; the

addition of pressure-reducing valves; and all valves, fittings, and fire

hydrants to be of extra-strength material. Moreover, all electneal

fixtures had to pass rigid explosion-proof standards.

Under the new plan the transfer docks of tbt 18-inch press line

were connected to their respective buildings by a covered walkway.

This required that the dock, building, and walkway be on a common

floor level—some were maintained for a distance of almost 500 feet.

Achieving this on rocky, sloping terrain was a monumental feat of

excavation and grading.

143
rill-: GRAND EXPERIMEN1 AT INYOKKRN

There were other problems. Each building in the desert

environment had to be designed with its own individual

air-conditioning and heating unit. Even sewers were a problem because

the prevailing rock and general imperviousness of the soil made it

necessary to develop a collection system and treatment plant for the

whole area rather than use septic tanks at individual buildings.

But the largest problem of them all was the fantastic rise in

costs of the new pilot plant. From January 1944 to the end of

March the original estimate of $1,081,406 had nearly doubled. Four

months later, in July, it had doubled again, and the rise continued.

Sage termed the trend', "disquieting" and asked for a

reevaluation of the policy, objectives, and designs of the plant. He

foresaw the plant cost at $5.000,000, not counting design costs,

special equipment, housing, or other general support facilities. He

compared this $5.000,000 facility with its expected capacity of

15,000 pounds of propellant per day with the 51,500,000 Eaton

Canyon facility processing 8,000 pounds per day.-1'

Despite a host of TWX's, speed letters, memorandums, and

phone calls on the subject of reevaluation, the work on the larger and

improved pilot plant went on. The Bureau of Ordnance wanted it,

and the time for discussion was past. The Bureau's position was that

rockets were important not only for the present war hut also would

become increasingly important in postwar defense; piopellants were

the key to rocketry; and an in-house propellant pilot plant was

essential to propellant experimentation, development, and production.

What was past was past, and the Bureau of Ordnance shared the

responsibility for what it considered a false start.

Even after thirty years, the desolate foundations of the

abandoned first pilot plant site can still be discovered to the east of

what is now a golf course: a reminder of the fast pace of wartime

development- both in mistakes made and in the rapidity with which

plans changed.

The remarkable fact is that the false start had little effect on the

tight schedule. In the rough log of the Felly Officer of the Watch for

November 16, 1944, a triumphant little entry stands out among the

more mundane reports of personnel returning from leave and the

dispatch of the Shore Patrol "to patrol Kidgecrest and immediate

vicinity." The entry in question reads:

The first grain of Bailislito PropeUant was extruded from the 12-inch

Press at the China Like Pilot Plant at 1731, 16 November 1944.

A. 1, Pittinger, LT (jg) USNR

Pilot Plant Officer30

144
UOOMTIMK CONSTRUCTION

This historic occasion had its lighter side, as recalled by Norman

Rurnpp: "...all the wires hadn't been hooked up yet [and] they had

an Admiral coming, Bruce [Sage] said, 'Have it working when the

Admiral comes.' So they bored a little peephole in the

concrete . . . they had a button for the Admiral." As the Admiral

pushed the button, someone signaled Rumpp through the peephole

and he touched two wires together, putting the press line in

operation.-^ '

Finally in operation, the China Lake Pilot Plant was largely a

self-sufficient entity. It had its own administration, construction,

maintenance, transportation, food services, fire-fighting and first-aid

facilities, supply, and safety sections, and the experts to staff them.

An efficient security force and a steel fence made it impossible for

the casual visitor to amble around the plant unescorted; and this even

applied to the NOTS people who lived down the hill.

This was the way Sage felt it ought to be. Having ascert.nned

the rigid safety code for ordnance plants as required by the Bureau

of Ordnance, the pilot plant boss felt that to achieve maximum

safety, everything should be tightly controlled. And Sage achieved his

goal. The China Lake Pilot Plant was a model ordnance plant.

If Sage's methods were sometimes regarded as totalitarian, that

did not diminish the high regard he had from his subordinates. He

was warmly referred to as "the Great White F ither." As Rumpp put

it, "He was a great guy-he pushed you but he never beat you!"

Even though the production of ballistite had started, the pilot

plant was still a long way from completion. Only the 12-inch press

line was operating, barely. To complete the i 8-inch facility and get it

into operation still posed a wide variety of problems that would need

Sage's particular drive and talent for their solution. The outpul of the

larger press was urgently needed for the huge, new Tiny Tim aircraft

rocket having a diameter of nearly a foot, and requiring the

production of grain in iripr-„edenteel dimensions.

But, for the most p. rt, the major problems of the pilot plant

were essentially over. If the rate of progress can be measured by the

diminishing size of problems, the pilot plant work was advancing in

greai strides. As the pioblems of construction and production

engineering were solved, the pilot plant boss found his attention

turned more and more to all the detailed procedures that assume

unusual importance in a plant where one spark at the wrong point in

the processing could spell disaster. This made it necessary to have

such procedures as requiring all employees to turn in matches and

145
THE GRAND EXPEHIMEN7 AT 1NYOKERN

cigarette lighters to the security gj'rd upon entry into the plant.

Tiiese procedures are still required today. However, in 1

CM4, all

employees were mbject to spot "shakedowns." if as much as a

common kitchen match was found, the transgressor (male or female)

was subject to instant dismissal, or at least suspension without pay

for a prescribed period. The search procedure was recalled recently as

having a lighter side. A former supervisor wrote, "We put out tables

for the ladies and asked them to empty the contents of their purses.

Usually the first time one package of paper matches might show up

in a lady's purse. However, we found out there were many other

things in the ladle-;' purses, somewhat and sometimes to the

embarrassment of the ladies. After the first une the contents of the

purses carried into the plant went down ve.y markedly and there

were only a few ;fems whii li would need to be poured out of a

purse in order to make sure that theie were no matches aboard."^2

The various advocates of a pilot plant I Inyokem had initially

held differing ideas as to its purpose. Nevertheless, as an

accomplishment, ihe pilot plant would eventually prove to be all

things to cill men. for CalTech it was a line, new propeHant research

and development facility, for the Bi""eau of Ordnance a fully

integrated rocket-motor-loading plant that eventually produeeu many

hundreds of thousands of complete weapons ready for shipment to

the combat theaters.

!Trrr-M»--w

Chiiu Lake I'IKH Plant. Jarnmy 30, 1945.

146
BOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

The Bureau of Ordnance also realized its principal goal of a pilot

plant, functioning in accordance with tried and proven production

techniques and safety practices, that could serve as a model by which

to set up Isrge-scaJe production facilities in various parts of the

country. It could also "take up the slack" before the high-volume

output of big industry could begin.

DEPARTURE

On November 30, 1944, suddenly and without warning, NOTS

lost its master builder. At the peak of constiuction, less than a year

after his arrival. Captain Sandquist received orders detaching him from

duty at NOTS (as of December 1) and instructing him to report to

Adak, Alaska.

If Sandquist was surprised. Burroughs was shocked! The Station

Commander knew Sandquist to be the one man who had the

complete construction picture in mind, the master in overcoming

difficulties. A case might have been made for rescinding the orders.

But it appears that it was Sandquist himself who insisted that

Burroughs let the change of duty orders stand. He assured Burroughs

that his leaving would not delay or hamper progress or seriously

affect the ground rules and principles that had been laid down.-'-' On

the other hand, it is probably safe to conjecture thai if a strong case

had been made for his staying, a controversy might have been stirred

up thai would have adverse'y affected the project; for there were

differing interpretations of Sandquist's role at NOTS.

The interpretation here is one gleaned a quarter century later

from the local record of accomplishment, and through the evaluative

statements of those in a leadership position at the Station

itself-where the work was done and the obstacles he overcame were

most apparent. In essence this interpretation reveals that Sandquist's

year at NOTS was the "miracle year" of construction

accomplishment, and no man played a more important role in that

miracle than Sandquist himself. For despite the acute labor problems,

the uncertainties of plans, and the constantly changing requirements, a

substantive part of what would be NOTS for decades to come was

well along toward completion by the time Sandquist received his new

orders.

An unanswered question remains to tan:ali^e the historian: Why

the sudden orders and the immediate detachment from NOTS? Some

147
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

of Sandquist's associates later speculated that it was the result of an

investigation of alleged delinquencies in safeguarding against the

misappropriation of Navy construction materials; a clear case of

imposing the doctrine of "the top guy gets the blame no matter

what."34

There is also room for speculation that in his practical approach

to construction problems, Sandquist had cut some of the regulations

too close, too often. For example, he had authorized an unusual plan

for getting an extra bedroom for Senior Officers' Quarters. At the

time, there was separate money authorized for the building of guest

quarters; Sandquist suggested, and Burroughs and associates agreed,

that instead of making one building for guest quarters, they add a

bedroom and bath to each of the Senior Officers' Quarters. When

distinguished visitors came to the Station they were indeed invited to

stay in the "guest quarters." albeit located under different roofs.35

Early in the game, Sandquist had embraced the Burroughs

philosophy of "why do it twice," and as a consequence escalated the

initial costs of the Station by leaning as far as possible toward

long-lasting construction.3^ The fact that these structures would

require relatively low upkeep costs for at least the next twenty-five

years was possibly less important to some reviewers of Sandquist's

performance than the immediate costs. From John Richmond we have

a retrospective viewpoint some t.'enty-five years later:

Well, I think thai Sandquist was a very excellent man. ... He was not

ever hidebound. He would listen to reason . . . Where he got in trouble, i

think, was |that| he had somewhat of an artistic temperament ... We went

to work and got a lot of that decora'ive stone that he put in the theater

and the facade of the stores and the library. Somehow or other I think the

Navy Department thought he was sort of "gilding the lily" out there, and

they weren't interested in making the place look pretty; they wanted a place

that people could live and operate and things Like that. S) all of a

audden-one day in December-they yanked him out of there and sent him

to Adak in Alaska. 1 fell sorry for him because he put in some touches, but

wc didn't tell him to take them out or anything like that. We thought it

would be nice to have things like that loo.-'7

A possible clue as to official opprobrium, if any, is discernible in

a Bureau of Yards and Docks "Memorandum for the Secretary's

Committee on Public Works Projects."

The development of the station has been seriously delayed and

performance of its function handicapped by the lack of business-like

procedure in obtaining necessary new construction.

The most pointed criticism was leveled at "the lack of plans and

change in design."38

148
UOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

When Captain O. A. Sandquist, USN (Ret.), was interviewed for

this published history, the interviewer w's not then aware of any

mysterious circumstances surrounding Sandquist's departure; therefore,

this subject was not brought up. However, the following informal

comment subsequently added by Sandquist upon reviewing the

interview transcript seems to apply to the situation.

Of course the problems piled on. The original idea ... on which the

basic estimate was based was on the temporary type of construction-so

much used at the beginning of World War II. A great deal of that had to be

done-bi't as the effective weapon results came in so good, it behooved us to

figure much of the work more substantial and permancnt-and more so as

the war went along-BuOrd saw that as well as BuDocks-and of course costs

piled up, the CO and Officer-in-Charpe of Construction had to work that

way "to win the war'"—even though it might give us severe criticism and

censure but commendations are not won that way.

Sandquist left without commendations and under a cloud of

implied criticism from distant quarters, but he took with him pride in

having successfully directed the construction of the Station through

its most d'fficult peiiod. He carried with him also the high esteem of

his own office staff, the Station Commander and Executive Officer,

the contractor personnel, CalTech employees, and a host of people,

uniformed and civilian, who worked and lived in the Navy city he

had striven to build.

In January 1944. the Sandquists had driven into what seemed a

land akin to "Hades with poison water." On their arrival at the

NOTS Inyokem headquarters, the Station consisted of an airstrip, a

few Quonset huts, and some barely scratched out rocket ranges. A

year later, when Sandquist departed for Alaska, he left a large Navy

station with comprehensive facilities for conducting critical wartime

test and training programs; also, some 10,000 people, many working

on wartime projects and many more building for a permanent

ordnance center.

If Sandquist left NOTS by air, as it is assumed he did, he would

have had the advantage of a unique overview of his eleven-month

accomplishment.

Immediately after takeoff he would be aware of the largest

community ever to be built, owned, and managed by the Navy taking

definite form below him: over 600 homes and apartments well on

their way to completion, He would recognize as completed the

Officers' Mess and Recreation Building, Bachelor Officers' Quarters,

EnUsted Men's Mess (the present Center Restaurant buildirg),

dormitories, dispensary and morgue buildings, a Waves' dormitory, a

149
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

fire house, the Marine Barracks, and a unique brig designed to

accommodate, if need be, both military and civilians. Incidentally, the

records show that only a few "guests" were housed in the civilian

side of the brig; principally, unruly laborers on a Friday night. The

joint brig, however, perhaps reaffirmed the NOTS philosophy of

military-civilian "togetherness."

Most impressive of all were the new community structures he

would see rising up within the towering scaffolds, principally the large

gymnasium and theater. He probably chuckled as he looked at the

excavation for the 5,250-square-foot swimming pool that was justified

in official planning documents as "water storage for fire

protection."40 If he happened to pick out the Navy Exchange and

L'brary structures, perhaps he took delight in knowing that despite an

overall simplicity of design, they had a little Sandquist touch of

decorative design in the form of a rock facing.

From the same imaginary vantage point, the bright new,

two-story Administration Building of permanent concrete construction

^^J^crxuraooi^M!*.

•4'.•.*:,• «•'•./ , « ;/

-: •• ■■ •-> '*äm

•-.. • -' i/mz

■■■* ' <y/w£ JMsM

/j tu? , r^*-"'

,^:i

A community takes shape! l-amily housing with gymnasium {left; and Station theater

(right) in foregrosmd.

150
HOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

would be in interesting contrast to the rambling, wooden building

tiiat had served as the temporary headquarters of NOTS; and

adjoining the temporary headquarters the Quonset hut that had been

the office-with-sleeping-quarters originally occupied by Burroughs. In

this same temporary headquarters area were about a hundred buildings

of which his own former Officer-in-Charge-of-Construction Building

was the largest. It might have been difficult even for the construction

magician himself to recall that less than a year ago there had been

just a patch of desert wilderness where he now looked upon a

bustling community area.

As impressive and as critical as these community and

administrative facilities were, Sandquist knew that it was the technical

facilities that would be the making of the new center. That is why he

would have been intrigued by a 10-acre maze of concrete forms

opposite the new Administration Building; forms from which

thousands of steel rods bristled like a bizarre new desert cactus. This

was the beginning of what would later become Michelson Laboratory,

the Station's main laboratory for ordnance research.

In the shadow of a small butte to the east of China Lake.

Sandquist might have glimpsed the rocket-propellant pressing and

other technical facilities of the China Lake Pilot Plant. Construction

work was still in progress, but the 12-inch press line and its

associated building were complete.

To the north of the community, the desert landscape had

acquired a new man-made scar in the form of two 10,000-foot-long

intersecting ninways. Nearby, busy construction was in progress on a

great hangar and a number of permanent buildings. This was the

Experimental Air Center (Area "E") that woidd be activated within

six months and later designated Armitage Field; a major construction

project in itself.

But to a man of Sandquist's sensitivity, the view of Harvey Field

below would have held special meaning. Behind the busy naval air

facility—living quarters, shops, offices, and storage magazines—he might

well have visualized the ghost of a solitary, rural county airstrip: the

place where it had all begun!

Today, just as it was in December of 1944, when one leaves or

approaches China Lake by air, the flight path comes close to an

isolated grove of trees about 5 miles to the west of the China Lake

Naval Air Facility. This patch of green in the desert was once a

private holding farm-the old Stayer Ranch—absorbed by the Navy.

On the property, Sandquist had arranged for a concrete slab to be

151
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

constructed, as well as a few picnic facilities beneath the trees, It was

originally intended to serve as a modest recreational site for

contractor personnel. Upon seeing these improvements, Richmond had

said in jest: "Well, it looks like you are huilding Sandquist Spa out

there." The name stuck, and today the area is known as Sai dquist

Spa; a small green spot for relaxation in a vast expanse of desert-an

appropriate but gentle reminder to all those who follow that someone

named Sandquist had passed this way and left hi. mark upon the

Valley.

152
BOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

REFERENCES

NWC identification numbers are those under which copies of documents are filed in

the Technical Information Department, Naval Weapons Center. The following abbreviations

were used to identify record collections where documents were found:

NA National Archives, Washington, D.C.

CARD Collection of Archival and Reference Documents at the Nava! Weapons

Center

FRCM Naval Weapons Center records stored at Federal Records Center,

Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvaüia

1. Sherrran E. Burroughs interview, April 1966, p. 9. (NWC 2313, S-2.)

2. Menio;andum (NP45/A1-1, Serial YD2355) from Chief, Bureau of Yards and

Docks to Chief, Bureau of Ordnance, on "Naval Ordnance Test Station,

Inyokern, California, Analysis of Requirements and Test Data," January 27,

1944. Record Group 74, NA. (NWC 2313, 18-14.)

3. A. B. Christman, History of the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake,

California, Vol. 1, Sailors, Scientists, and Rockets, p. 240.

4. Memorandum (NP36) from Chief, Bureau of Ordnance to Chief of Naval

Operations, on "Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, Calif., Public Works

Construction, Additional Funds for," April 18, 1944. Record Group 74, NA.

(NWC 2313, 18-19.)

5. Oscar A. Sandquist interview, July 6, 1966, p. 23. (NWC 2313, S-13.)

6 James A. Duncan, unpublished report, "Development of Plans for the

Liboratory at N.O.T.S., Inyokern"; Appendix A of " listory of Construction

of the Michelson Laboratory," February 1, 1948. Duncan papers. (NWC

2313, 10-54.)

7. Letter from M. George Henry, M.D., FACS, to author, rectived July 5, 1972.

(NWC 2313, 41-1.)

8. Memorandum (AD3) from J. C. Byrnes, Jr., to Re, on "Naval Ordnance Test

Station, Inyokem-Laboratory," March 23, 1944. Duncan papers. (NWC 2313,

10-11.)

9. 'bid., p. 2,

10. Early Timer Recollections, May 1968, Geneva Snyder. (NWC 2313, 47-2.)

11. Ibid., Sewell "Pop" Lofinck.

12. Unpublished manuscript history, "History of the Naval Ordnance Test

Station, Inyokern, California (to August 15, 1945)," compiled by Robert W.

Leach, Lt., USNR, October 4, 1945, p. 14. (NWC 2313, 20-30.)

13. Ibid., p. 14.

14. Ibid., p. 19.

153
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

15. Bid., pp. 30-31.

16. Unpublished transcript of recollections by Ardis M. Walker, February 1974.

(NWC 2313, CARD file.)

17. Leach unpublished history, cited in Ref. 12 above, pp. 23-24.

18. Frank H. Habicht interview, May 1967, p. 45. (NWC 2313, S-44.)

19. Leach unpublished history, cited in Ref. 12 above, n. 32.

20. Christman, up. cit., p. 129.

21. Unpublished report, "Status of th,- China Lake Pilot Plant, CIT," July 1944,

p. 40. (NWC 2313, !220A.)

22. Ibid., p. 24.

23. John E. Burchard, ed.. Rockets, Guns and Targets, pp. 138-39.

24. Memorandum (NP36/Ad3) of a telephone conversation between Capt. S. E.

Burroughs and Capt. J. C. Byrnes Jr., February 11, 1944. (NWC 2313,

18-56.)

25. Bruce H. Sage interview, December 1966, p. 1. (NWC 2313, S-22.)

26. Unpublished report, cited in Ref. 21 above, p. 45.

27. Memorandum (NP36/AD3) of telephone conversation between Capt. J. C.

Byrnes and Cdr. J. Acree, January 17, 1944. (NWC 2313, 18-58.)

28. Letter from A. L. Pittinger to author, August 22, 1973, p. 3. (NWC 2313,

47-1.)

29. Unpublished report, cited in Ref. 21 above, pp. 29-30.

30. Log of the Petty Officer of the Watch, November 16, 1944. FRCM.

31. Norman Rumpp comments to auihor, February 12, 1973.

32. NWC Retrievable Manuscript, "Salt Wells Pilot Plant Story, 1945-1954," by

K. H. Robinson, July 1974. (NWC RM-1.)

33. Sandquist interview, July 6, 1966, p. 23. (NWC 2313, S-13.)

34. Habicht interview. May 1967, p. 45. (NWC 2313, S-44.)

35. N.O.T.S. Rocketeer, May 26. 1948.

36. John O. Richmond interview, January 1%7, p. 122. (.NWC 2313, S-33.)

37. Ibid., j. 68.

38. Memorandum for the Secretary's Committee on Public Works Projects

(originated by J. E. Rouse), June 27, 1945. Duncan Papers. (NWC 2313,

10-35.)

I.S4
BOOMTIME CONSTRUCTION

39. Sandquist interview, July 6, 1966, p. 14, (NWC 2313, S-13.)

40. Habicht interview, May 1967, p. 24. (NWC 2313, S-44.)

155
Ebb Tide of War

Wartime activitvat SOTS peaked during the closing months of

1944. Tims, a turning point had been reached for Station

constmetio/i —ranges, a hniiustrative and test facilities. Navy

housing-and also for rocket development programs such as Holy

Moses and Tiny Tim.

At this midpoint in the wartime operation of NOTS. another

kind of activity was emerging: the planning and preparation by the

Navy and CalTech to accommodate the irrevocable phaseout of the

Office of Scientific Research and Development. This effort was to

intensify during the first months of 1945 and involved decisions and

actions that would profoundly affect the future destiny of NOTS.

CONSULTANT EXTRAORDINARY

A minor change in January 1945 in a Bureau of Ordnance

contract had a major impact on the future leadership of NOTS. The

change was in a contract with Lukas-Harold—a subsidiary of the

Norden Company that provided management for the Bureau of

Ordnance's Naval Ordnance Plant, Indianapolis, ana which took its

name from the middle names of Carl Lukas Norden and Theodore

Harold Barth, the company's founders. In part the requested change

read;

It is the purpose of these ainendments to provide that the Contractor

shall furnish and be reimbursed for under (he subject contract the services of

Dr. L. I, E. Thompson in supenising the selection of civilian personnel

157
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKL-.RN

[author's italics] rcquiiod to stalT the Kescarch und Development

organization at the Naval Ordnance Test Station. Inyokcrn. California, when

and as such services arc approved by the Chid of the Bureau of Ordnance or

his authorized representative.

Although unremarkable in itself, the contract change implied a

great deal for NOTS. First, it showed that the Bureau was steadfast

in its hopes for a research and development capability at Inyokern;

second, it was a positive step in joining the career of a remarkable

ordnance scientist with the ultimate destiny of the desert Station.

In light of the highly significant implication of the Bureau of

Ordnance's January 22 action, it is fitting that we take a closer look

at the subject of the contract amendment request: Louis Ten Eyck

Thompson "Dr. Tommy" to all his military and scientific associates.

As told in detail in Volume 1 of this series, Thompson began his

career as a scientist for the Navy at the Naval Proving Ground at

Dahlgren in 1923. Besides being one of the first ballisticians in the

nation, Thompson possessed a remarkable and unique attribute: he

understood the essence of successful military-civilian relationships as

well as any man alive.

Dr. L. T. E. Thompson, first NOTS Technical Director.

158
IHK 111)1 01 WAR

As (hier Scientist at Dahlgrcn tor nineteen years, Thompson had

a iinkj'ie opportunity to sir.Jy (lie couplings ol military and civilian

thought patterns in the scientific arena of navai ordnai :e. Mis military

counterpart and close associate at Dahlgren was Commander (later

Rear Admiral) William S. "Deak" Parsons, and the two men, both in

their acts and the philosophy they mutually developed, represented

tne highest plane of military-civilian teamwork. They had served

'.ogether under both enlightened and arbitrary military leadership at

Dahlgren and had learned lessons from both.

Thompsoivs experience had another significant dimension. As

Chief Scientist he enjoyed a professional relationship with the young

officers whose sojourn at üahlgre i was an important part of their

postgraduate ordnance training: men like S. E, Burroughs, C. E.

Hangen, K. M. McLaren. M, F. Schoeffcl, F. 1. EnlwiMle. W. A. Kitts,

K, H. Noble. P. D. Stroop. W. G, Switzer, \C V. R. Viewcg, D. 13.

Young, G, F. Hussey, and J. B. Sykes. to name a few who were later

associated with NOTS.

Especially important in the "Gun Club" tratring days were the

associations the young scientist developed with Hussey. who as a

lieutcnunt had been instrument,il in the hiring of Thompson at

Dihlgren. The exchange of "Dear Tommy" and "Dear George" letters

some twenty years later testified to this friendship and was a

significant factor in resolving key problems in the postwar lransitior.

of NOTS.

Beyond friendship. Husse\ and Ehompso; shared a common

philosophy regarding science within a military framework. The essence

of this philosophy acknowk-dged that both the inilitar> officer and

civilian scientist are working for a common goal: belter weapons for

the Navy. To this end the roles of each man have a cyclic

interdependence. Dr. Thompson, the scientist, described this as

", . . interactions the feedback effects that come It m close

association [of| operations expertnes.s with sophistication in the

technology side."- Hussey. the sailor, expressed his viewpoint: "[The

naval officer) will go back to the Fleet with a scientific approach to

the solution of problems out there; he will also go out with an

understanding of what is coming. He will be in i position to interpret

to the people in the Fleet what is going on end \.h\ il is going

on."-"'

This kind of relationship, based on mutual respect, was a prime

objective of the Navy's ordnance postgraduale program. Its

achievement was manifested in the success of many ordnance

159
mi; GRAND i xi'iimiiM AI INYOKKRN

dcvclopmonts in World War 11 ami personified in the lasting, warm

associations made initially In Dr. Tominy and ins young olTicer

students. Significantly, these same young otTieers were ■■lour-stripers"'

am! leaders in ordnance at the end of World War II: some like

llussey and K. ts. iuul reached Flag rank.

Through his many years of association with the Bureau of

Ordnance, Thompson wa.v familiar wiln NOTS from its beginning.

Long before there were an\ thoughts ol a research and development

enter in the California desert, he and Deak Parsons had been

dreaming of a place where military men and scientists .ould work

together as a creative team on naval ordnance, lie had watched his

dream take form at InyoKern under "1 v" Burroughs, a man s,rough

influenced by hi th Thompson and Parsons.

in l

l

M2 Thompson left Dahlgren and went U work with tiie

Carl L Nord.m Compain in Indianapolis dcvclojiers of the historic

Norlen [lombsight. As Norden's new l);rectv)r of R'search, he \%:as

primarily responsible loi the design and buikling o! the Bureau of

Ordinance's Naval Ordnance Plant. IndianapolN, winch was under the

management oi' the Norden Company to develop and produce parts

needed for the bombsight program. 1 his sight was developed under

contract for the Bureau, with 'he Naval Proving Ground. Dahlgren.

Virginia, doing much oi the testing. Thompson already had

demonstrated some expertise in laboratory planning, having been

instrumental in the creation of the .Armor and Projectile Laboratory

at Dahlgren in 1940.

fnompsonN role in establishing Navy laboratories at Dahlgren

and Indianapolis added turther to his stature as the scientist most

knowledgeable in orgam/ing Navy research and development.

Recognition of this expertise led to IhompsonN first visit to NOTS in

February 1944 with an invitat'on to give suggestions on the ultiniaU

lotm of operation for the Station.* This vi it was followed in late

April by a return visit to Indrmapolis by James Duncan, who was

seeking from Thompson, among others, advice regarding the planned

research and development laboratory for NOTS. From these and other

early contacts it beeame apparen'i thai NOTS needed the adv'ce and

services of fhompson on a continuing basis.

' How little knnwii NO't'S was is imlicatiHl b\ tin; incidental faet ihal rKompsoii. in

iMiiu' I'ro'ii \tiuoc imm I-iiwariK Ail lorce Ua>ei [u Inyiikern, wem .1 aioiiiniis route witli

I.is vnUin .-er driver thai took tlieni soulli smne 1011 iraks to I .is Angeles and al'tei directions

In lelcr'ione from Hurruiighs, retraeed the trait north past '.lurm and then ; tu Inyokeril.

Neithei the driver. An Ureslow. a la'er emplovee ol NOTs. .101 his associ, ''~ iv-fonninj;

tests at the neiehhiirine Muroc loi [he atom-bomb pro ram had evet heard ol the

ihree-rnonth-old Naval Ordnanee lest Station.

16U
I 1)1! IHM. 01 WAR

Besides having a clear concept ol what the Navv needed in a

weapon research and dev'iopment lanoratorv, Tliompson knew wiiere

the opposition migh' come froin. An example of liis insight and form

of strategy is seen in a letter to Captain Parsons in September 1

CM4

recard.hg NOTS:

. 1 ir.i vi'is imii'ti iilrjid ;h;it i!i."-i. in I)K' liiirc who Livoi .i husif "tc^t '

station arc t;uiny.' tu luivc ion .r.u:h tc SJ\ ;ibmi! J I have irfntioiii'd I i

sever,il [>e:j|>l<: that I think tlie I'M.si waj \o strike a WM/k.m; coinnroi isc is

lo L'ue the lest people all the tests they want, with pleivy ol lacilitie , but

no pritnarj autlicnt? m runnine the place.

Fortunately, liussey, as Chief of the Bureau o Ordnance, was

among those who shared Thompson's view on the future importanc;'

of NOTS as a research and development center hike Burroughs, he

wanted Fhompson's services to he increased in scope and to be on a

more formal basis. By the end tf the year, some particularly knolt\

problems were being encountered at NOTS. The laboratory plans had

reached firm definition, but now BurroLighs and CalTech were looking

for a workable organization plan. I'hey were also facing the problem

of staffing the laboratory.

At this point liussey took action in his formal request to

Lukas-Harold for ThompsoiTs services. About the same time,

Burroughs announced to his stall that "Dr. Thompson would spend

about 5ür> of his time at Inyokern from now on.'"'1

Although the contract amendment specified "the selection of

jiviiidii nersonnel" as Thompson's sole function, he correctly

interpreted it as being "not only to recruit personnel for the staff,

but also lo assist in setting up and dnecting the operations of the

Research. Development, and Test organization, subject to the approval

of the Commanding Officer, NOTS, Inyokern, . . .""

The Bureau of Ordnance was most anxious to have a new

director on board as soon as possible. The OTice of Scientific

Research and Development was anxious too. On April 23. DM?.

Frederick Hovde, Chief, Division 3, National Defense Research

Committee, wrote to OSRD Director Vaniiev,r Bush, "Representatives

of the Bureau of Ordnance expressed tlK.r firm desire to expedite all

matters pertaining to the organization and staffing of NOTS

Inyokern, and indicated that they would make an early effort to

strengthen the administration of the NOTS experimental program

through the full time [author's italics] assignment of Dr. Thompson

to the Station as Director of Research."7

As .vill be shown later. Thompson made extensive, but

unsuccessful, efforts to interest some of the leading OSRD scientists

161
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

to take the position of Director of Research, Added to the problems

of attracting a key person to a remote desert location was that of the

salary limitations. It would be more than two years before Congress

would pass Public Law 313 that would allow the payment of

high-level scientific personnel at rates above the top civil service

grade.8

As the efforts to find a director of the technical programs

continued unsuccessfully, there was a growing conviction at NOTS

that the man iz'st suited for the job was Thompson himself.

Burroughs led the continuing campaign to get him to accept the

position. He did everything he could to keep Thompson's visits to

NOTS frequent and lengthy. He kept him deeply involved in the

management problems, and through these tactics he secured his

agreement to fill the post temporarily,

Thompson became the Acting Director of Research while still a

contractor to the Navy. As an example of the difficulties of the

arrangempnt, his travel orders hetwe."" Indianapolis and Inyokern had

to be sij. ed by both Burroughs and the Commanding Officer at the

Naval Ordnance Plant. Whether a logical arrangement or not, the

Station had a de facto head of the technical side of the organization

as the end of the war approached.

CONSTRUCTION WINDS DOWN

The tone of the new management for the construction program

was^clearly sounded when Captain Sandquist's successor. Commander

D. E. Rockwell, Civil Engineer Corps, was introduced to one of the

contractor engineers, who-in customary fashion-told Rockwell he

was pleased to see him. The commander's response was that the

contractor world not be so pleased to see him after a couple of

weeks had passed.y

According to a summary report on the principal

Architect-Engineer contract for NOTS, Rockwell immediately began "a

campaign of criticism of all plans as beug too elaborate and taking

too long to prepare." Moreover, according in the same report, specific

criticisms were not forthcoming when requested.10

Any speculation as to what had caused the apparent-and

abrupt-change of the Navy's attitude toward the contracts should

take into account the vast differences between the frtnzied

162
EBB riDE ov WAR

circumstances under which contracts were undertaken in the midwar

era and the relatively unharried circumstances of early 1945.

It was a time for reassessment, from the highest level of

government down to individual shore establishments. The success of

the Allies in meeting the threat of the "Battle of the Bulge" made it

clear to our military and scientific leadership that the war with

Germp:iy would soon be succ ssfully concluded. It was time,

therefore, to readjust weapon priorities. Production of weapons,

including rockets, was at its peak. Stockpiles were mounting. As far

as new weapons were concerned, it was concluded by the leaders of

OSRD that ^ny weapon development not close to completion should

be terminated because it was unlikely that it could be completed and

produced before the nd of hostilities.

Significantly, the consideration given to weapon development

status was not the same as it had been at the climax of World War I.

Then there had been little or no regard at the higher levels of

government as to what should be done with the weapon development

resources spawned during the war. When the war ended, virtually all

support for experimental work was abruptly severed. This

abandonment, combined with lov. military budgets and the policy of

isolation that foiiowed, had been iiOted by many junior officers who

subsequently became military leaders of World War II. As admirals

and generals, these men held onto the conviction that it would be a

certain invitation to future aggression if the weapon research and

development capabilities were allowed to erode. With the end of

World War 11 imminent, the .juestion was not whether the nation

should continue its research and development work to keep the armed

forces equipped with advanced weapons, but what form this should

take.

In Washington the question centered around who should have

cognizance of futjre weapon research and development. Could there

be a peacetime version of OSRD'.' Should there be a central

laboratory for al!the armed services? At NOTS the questions focused

on the validity of the construction plan that had evolved to date.

Should construction continue on the basis of the original plan to

make NOTS a research, development, and test center? Should

construction go forward or. the riain research and development

laboratory?

These questions were likely to influence Rockwell or anyone

directing his efforts. In the preceding construction eras of Fogg and

Sandquist, the main thrust was to get the job done. The job inhented

163
Till GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

by Rockwell was to finish the construction work at NOTS and at the

same time justify it beyond criticism, even if it meant the most

scrupulous accounting of what had hitherto been considered normal

expenditures.

Almost before the NOTS construction team had time to digest

Rockwell's new management philosophies he was relieved, and his job

of reshaping the construction effort passed to Captain (later

Commodore) Lewis N. Moeller, Civil Engineer Corps, who arrived in

February 1945 to take over as Officer in Charge of Construction. The

NOTS newspaper, the Rockeleer, described him as an "experienced

civil engineer, construction expert and man who gets things done ... a

tall man with a tall job."' '

And the job, as Moeller saw it, was to continue Rockwell's

reshaping of ! ic construction programs under which NOTS was being

built. At the urne, the Macco-McKittrick-Morrison contract listed close

to 25Q different projects of which about 72% were complete (or

nearly so), and 289? were either not started or barely under way. In

Moeller's opinion it was time to halt construction at NOTS ant'

reassess '.he Station's plans and contracting methods. Accordingly, on

April 4, 1945, the contractor combine received the word:

You drc hereby notified t'.ut conditions hsve misen which, in the

npmion . !" the C jnttacting Officer, irakc it advisable, lor the interest of the

government, lo v' J.'I/ cease work under the subject contract, and aiy and

ali change orders icued thereuiider. Therefore the subject contract, including

such change .irdcr.-. is to be deemed terminated and all work thereunder is

to cease .n Midnight May 31, 194^ ...thout prejudice however, to any

claims vv'.iivli iiic guvernmciit may have against you, jointly or severally.

Further, yon are to stop all woik on the Laboratory Building Immediately

and you u- hereby directed to do no work whatsoever on any school

building.'2

Appendix D lists the projects on the contract and their degree of

completion at the tn.ie o

r

the May 31 contract termination. The

contract was c'3% complete when closed, and the total cost was

$54,952,221.'3

But the end of the cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts and the erstwhilj

jasy-going contract relationships of the midwar era did not mean the

end of NOTS construciion. When Moeller issued his stop order, the

planning for an enlarged Station was aggressively going ahead. It was

known that when the war ended, OSRD would cease to function, vnd

the Navy would have to conduct its own research and development at

NOTS and its other laboratories. Specifically, plans were being

formulated for the transfer of CalTech activities and programs ro

NOTS. An expanded future role for the desert Station was a

certainty.

164
EBB TIDE OF WAR

Captain Lewis N. Moeller, Officer in Charge of Construction at NOTS in eany 1945.

165
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Confirmation of this expanded role came on May 10, 1945-t,wo

days after Victory Day in Europe. Admiral Hussey wrote:

Ttit const;uction, ecuipping and staffing of the Naval Ordnance Test

Station, Inyokun, California, are currently being expedited as much as

practicah'e with a view to the Station's assuming at the earliest practicable

date al' tasks of research, development, design, and testing of the Bureau's

development program on rockets, related material, and such ether similar

activitic.. . .

14

Through the efforts of the Bureau of Ordnance, arrangements

were made with an alternate contractor-Haddock Engineers, Los

Angeles (builders of the China Lake Pilot Plant)-to eventually

complete most of the projects that Moeller had summarily halted as

extensions of their current contract. Thus, by the end of hostilities

witn Japan, which concluded World War H, the NUTS facilities that

had been started during the Sandquist regime were essentially

complete.

But tl.TP was one major exception that represented the most

critical facility of all: the research and development laboratory. The

April 1945 order to stop work on the laboratory made it a near

casualty of the war.

"BUILDING NUMBER FIVE"

It was not usually referred to as the "research and development

laboratory." The planners at both Inyc .<ern and the Bureau of

Ordnance called it simply, "the Lab," a singular appellation that

stemmed from the early decision not to build separate laboratories for

each major area of research.

The workers of the firm of Macco-McKittrick-Morrison knew it

as "Building #5." This identification, as the fifth building project at

China Lake, substantiates its earliest consideration and inclusion in the

master plan for the Station. But beyond this, neither

designation-"the Lab" or "Building #5"-reflected the importance of

this particular facility to NOTS.

For until it was completed and in operation. Blandy's concept of

an integrated research, development, and test center could not be

fully realized. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the reasons why

Building No. 5 was not the fifth building to be completed at NOTS.

Rather, why it would be one of the last to be completed in the main

era of construct! jn.

The predominant reason was clearly a construction delay that

seemed implicit from the beginning. Betwefv site selection and

166
EBB TIDE OF WAR

Michelson Laboratory under construction.

clearing, which was sometime from early spring through August of

1944, no construction work had been accomplished. When considering

the astonishing rate at which oHier major facilities were "topping

out," the delay appears unusual. However, within the larger picture of

total constructu.n at Inyokem, the delay is easier to reconcile: it was

a clear-cut case of construction priorities.

From the momem the Station was established, these priorities

were clear. NOTS urgently needed facilities to support the wartime

mission of rocket development and testing: air and ground range

installations, roads, shops, warehouses, <md temporary housing. There

was to be no interference in meeting these wartime needs by the

construction of the permanent facilities that did not also have clear

application to the wartime programs. Many of the permanent facilities

like the new airfield and the pilot plants clearly riet immediate as

well as long-term needs. The case was not so strong for the

construction of pennanent housing and the laboratory. As the

laboratory was part of the long-range peacetime needs, there was no

haste on the part of its planners to rush its completion. Instead, the

time was used in an attempt to apply the most careful and detailed

planning to what Burroughs had termed "the finest laboratory of its

kind."

167
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AI INYOKERN

Di'ring the last months of 1944 the foundations had been

poured. In a telephone conversation with Captain Byrnes on October

25, Commander Richmond, tlv Executive Officer, said. "The

laboratory of course probably won't be ready until next June or

somewhere along there..."!-'' It would, in fact, be nearly three

"Junes" before the laboratory would be read1.

With the new year, 1945, construction seems to have really

gotten under way. Photographs taken between January 30 and

February 14 show foundations and steel reinforcement rods reaching

to level of the second floor in the main building. It was at (his

stag^ ...i construction that major design problems camp home to roost

and make their impact on the project in terms of further delay.

These problems were not new, as the entire design phase of the

NOTS laboratory appears to have been one of almost condnual

evaluation and reevaluation.

As each proposal was submitted by the Bureau of Yards and

Docks, it was met by a counterproposal by the Bureau of Ordnance.

A cycle of meetings took place in Washington, Pasadena. San Diego,

and Inyokern. Memorandums filled the "In" trays; long-distance

conference calls were frequent and lengthy. Representatives of the

two Bureaus and NOTS accumulated vast amounts of travel time.

Laboratory planning, including majo; rcallocations of space, was

constantly undergoing change during the final design stage. For

example, doubts of CalTech advisers as to the need for further

research in chemistry and metallurgy by the Station reportedly

influenced a decision to put these functions together in one wing

rather than m separate wings. This left one wing, which initially was

assigned to ballistics.' ^

Of course these design refinements were vitally necessary.

Although the Bureau of Ordnance had decided to go "first-cabin" on

the quality of this permanent research facility, the specter of cost

overruns was forever present. The costly hazard« of faulty initial

design were intensified by the ever-present need to design for

flexibility so thai the inevitable needs for change in the future

research programs could be met. From James Duncan's account, the

design problems are further revealed:

Since ill'- original pla i included the possibility of almost any kind of

experiments being performed in any wing, ii was necessary to provide all

facilities such as hot and cold water, compressed air, gas, vacuum, direct and

alternating current of various voltages.'7

It became increasingly obvious that to provide all of these

utilities to each laboratory room, while desirable, was quite out of

168
EBB TIDE OF WAR

the question. Instead, an alternative plan was evolved whereby a 12-

by 14-foot service tunnel would run under the central section of the

building and under the full length of each wing; this tunnel would

carry the necessary mam utility pipelines (water, gas, vacuum, and

electrical current) and enable appropriate taps to be made by any

room via smaller connecting service trenches.

But while the designers were heavily engrossed with the problem

of bringing water (among other utilities) into the laboratory rooms,

no one apparently gave a tho'ight to taking it out. Consequently,

drain lines were missing. This anomaly was discovered quite late in

the subsequent building program and required an extensive change

order to correct.

Duncan put his finger on various design inadequacies and was

ble to have them corrected; one of these, for example, concerned

electrical power for the cafeteria in the laboratory. Characteristically,

he used direct, easily understood terms to point out this particular

deficiency:

The 100 square foot kiti hen in a modei:i private home will have three

to four limes as much power as is being asked for this laboratory. A

Westinghouse Viceroy Model Electric Range is wired for 10 KVV. The 0.6 KW

(per BuDocks proposal] would nol operate the smallest hot plate on this

range except at half speed.'8

Adequate power for the laboratory meant more than lighting and

the operation of machinery and scientific apparatus; it directly

concerned a most controversial problem of fundamental design-air

conditioning. Before it was solved, this particular problem had

generated pages of correspondence, required consultation with the

nation's leading authorities on the subject, and made an

air-conditioning expert out of the already versatile Captain Byrnes of

the Bureau of Ordnance.

Apparently the most lormidable characteristic of the Mojave

Desert, the summer heat, was not precisely understood by the Bureau

of Yards and Docks when it specified a primary system of evaporaMve

cooling for the NOTS laboratory. They had considered tnat the

humidity level in the desert was constantly low, the only condition

for which evaporative cooling is effective. The people at NOTS, who

had already experienced nearly a year of living in the desert, knew

better. To qualify and quantify this experience, Duncan obtained

temperature and humidity records from the Weather Bureau in

Washington. The records revealed, in fact, that there were a great

many days in the summer when evaporative cooling could not give

the temperature and relative humidity conditions desirable for people

and laboratory equipment.

169
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Further, the data showed that not enough consideration had

been given to the heat generated by operating laboratory equipment,

Duncan tersely pinpointed the problem.

Since thf) laws of thermodynamics have nol been repealed it is obvious

that all the energy that is used for experimental purposes ii eventually

converted to heat. This heat must be removed by the air-conditioning

system.'

Duncan pressed for "a complete refrigerated air-conditioning

system" that could be readily adapted to the existing ducts. His

consultations with nationally known experts in the fields of industrial

medicine and air conditioning provided opinions supporting a strong

case for refrigerated air, not necessarily for the comfort of people,

but clearly for the equipment in a research laboratory in the desert.

On February 3, 1945, a meeting was held in Washington with

representatives of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Bureau of

Ordnance. Duncan later recalled:20

Although Captain Byrnes had never had any experience with this sort

of thing, he took my notes home one weekend and learned enough about air

conditioning so that he was able to prove to the BuY&D representat'ves that

they could not give us the temperatures that they themselvc.. nad s;:d they

were going to provide in the laboratory with evaporative coolers ... It was

amazing to me how quickly Captain Byrnes got to the meat of the story.

He really made a study of this thing, and when the Y&D people

came.,, they had to admil finally that they had nol calculated the

process, . . .

. . . While we were arguing about this air conditioning. Lieutenant Phillip:'

who was a member of the Y&D group said to Captain Byrnes, ''If you don't

make Lieutenant Commander Duncan quit holding us up with these changes,

we won't get this laboratory built before the war is over." And Captain

Byrnes said, "Young man, we're not building this laboratory for this war; we

are building it for (the next war]."

Duncan's recollections of the meeting include further evidence of

how Byrnes did business and also indicate the unshakeable resolution

of the Bureau of Ordnance to build a first-class laboratory:

. .. when we were talking about whether we'd get the air conditioning or

not, on" of the fust ihings they [BuDocks] said was, "If we put in this aii

conditioning it's going to cost a million dollars," and Captain Byrnes said, "1

didn't ask you how much it was going to cost; 1 told you we were going to

have it."

That was the end of that problem! The day of reckoning on

funds would come later. But that day was not far off for, as we have

seen, in April 1945 Captain Moeller wrote the contractors, "You are

to stop all work on the Laboratory Building immediately."2'

For nine months, the foundations and beginnings of walls for

four wings of the laboratory would stand neglected and untended, but

certainly not forgotten.

170
im! nur oi WAR

CONTROVERSY AND REASSESSMENT

Almost from the beginning of the Bureau of Ordnance's plan 'o

construct a largo permanent research laboratory, there had been

questions concerning the wisdom of choosing the Mojave Desert as ils

location, in April 1945 when all construction was summarily halted,

the questions were asked again.

There was never any challenge to the Bureau of Ordnance's

desire and need for a permanent, peacetime .''search laboratory, just

as there had been none to the establishment of a large ordnance lest

station in the desert. The questions were asked about the necessity of

having both the laboratory and the test station at the same site.

Surely, it would be better to build the laboratory close to a

metropolitan area say Pasadena. California.

The proposed alternative location for the laboratory gives a clue

as to the identity of at least some of its advocates: the NOTS

contingent of CalTech scientific personnel, who regarded Pasadena as

their permanent home. I:, the spring of 1945 these civilians were

coming to grips with personal decisions imposed by the imminent

phaseout of OSRD; namely, whether to transfei to civil service and

continue working for the Navy, or to terminate then association with

ordnance development. The building of the laboratory close to In.nie

must have been attractive to contemplate.

It seems that by far the strongest case for a Pasadena location

rested in the essential remoteness of NOTS, which was seen to be a

restricting factor in recruiting high-caliber scientists for a peacetime

operation. This factor was further compounded by the inadequacy of

Sta'aon housing and the lack of a settled, surrounding community. On

the other hand, a Pasadena location offered easier access to

established scientific libraries and other university facilities, as well as

a large, scientific community, both industrial and educational.

In sLim, the arguments for accepting losses on the poured

foundations and preliminary steel work at Inyokern and making a

fresh start in Pasadena held considerable logic. However, the

proponents of the desert location also had a strong case.

These advocates of an integrated research, development, and test

center-one that could handle all the elements of a weapons program

from initial concept to verified hardware envisioned a time when the

housing problem would be solved. They foresaw a lime, too, when

the quality of life in the viciifity of NOTS would satisfy even the

most discriminating civilian scientist and Ins family. They also felt

171
IHl: GRAND LXPERIMENT AT 1NY0K1-RN

that the remoteness and isolation of Inyokern had a positive quality

in the preservation of seeurity for sensitive weapon development

programs.

The first round of arguments had begun in August 1944, even as

the site selection and clearing process for the l?boratory was being

completed at NOTS. On the 30th of this month, E. C. Watson,

administrator of the CalTcch rocket program, drafted a proposal that

was heartily endorsed by Burroughs, calling for a new weapons

laboratory to be built in Pasadena. It was to be built and maintained

by the Navy or a "more inclusive national organization."-- As

proposed, the research staff of highly competent scientists would

work under a civilian director who had a high degree of independence

and continuity. The laboratory would take over the rocket and

underwater ordnance facilities supporting the CalTech Contract

OEMsr-418. This contract, under Lauritsen. was being considered

separately from another CalTech rocket program, under Dr. Theodore

von Karman, that formed the basis for building CalTech's Jet

Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena.

Under the August proposal, the Station in the desert would

primarily be a test facility to support the research and development

of the new Pasadena laboratory. Key arguments for a laboratory in

Pasadena included the following; it was close to the torpedo and

water entry facilities of Morris Dam; it was a metropolitan area where

it would be easier to recruit and where there were many advantageous

business and technical contacts; and it also offered the opportunity

for rotating people so the Inyokern staff could have "an occasional

tour ol duty in town."--"1

The Pasadena laboratory plan contrived by the officers and

scientists out west was not met with equal enthusiasm in the eastern

headquarters of OSRD. And without the support of OSRD leadership,

there was little chance of selling the concept to I In. top echelon of

the Navy. Frederick Hovde, who was one of V;>nnevar Bush's closest

advisors in the management of the nation's scientists, set the tone ol

the response, "We do not need new facilities for our postwar

program." He added:

At ilu moment. NOI'S, Inyokern, soems lo lie the onh Naval research

center mi the Pacilu coast likely to be matntainetl as .1 peacetime Naval

facility. It that is true, il will be the natural cenlei 101 militan research in

lhat area. The New Weapons laboratory you propose should be ,1 branch ol

NOTS, Inyokern a branch station located 111 the metropolitan area to

provide offices, etc., for the Inyokern staff, and the point of contact with all

academic and industrial facilitie

172
1 BU IHM dl WAR

in all, lloulc showed a warn; concern foi the futuiv o\' NO IS

for. among his closing thoughts to Watson, he included. 'Whatever

strength we can give to inyokern now will enable the infant to

withstand. 1 hope, the rigors of peacetime malnutrition."--

When Hovde expressed these sentiments, construction oi the

Inyokern laboratory was already under way albeit only at a site

clearing stage; a fact that was interpreted by many that the location

controversy had been settled. Eight months later, in April 1945. the

summary halting of construction triggered the controversy anew.

The laboratory location controversy nad wide implications

bearing on a problem that was already being faced regarding the

future of NOTS and the rocket program, it was already clear that i!

the momentum and skills built tip by (alleeh in ordnance were not

to be lost, serious consideration would have to be given immediately

to what form the ordnance experimental work should lake in

peacetime. Questions were being asked aboul the accomplishments to

date Where do we stand'.' Where do we go from here'.' .Answers were

needed.

As pari of the reassessmem brought to a head by the

termination of the contract, a second on site surve_\ of NOTS

construction and facilities planning was made in June 1945.-° This

was the second such survey, the first having taken place in November

1944. The findings are contained in "Memorandum for the Secretary's

Committee on Public Works Projects"" dated June 21. 1945. A strong

criticism of construction progress at NO IS is implied throughout the

document. The team chose to stress the deilcieneies ratl 'r than to

recognize real accomplishments. Particularly lacking is any reference to

the profound difficulties under which the Station had been built: the

initial lack of any comprehensive plans, and the urgency of

construction prompted by the nation's wartime needs in many eases

before plans could be developed. Nor is any mention made of

material shortages and the critical labor problems, the lack of a labor

priority, the necessity of using the Station while it was in the process

of actually being built, and a host of problems that stemmed from

the remoteness and isolation of the site.

On the positive side, the survey conclusions strongly affi. icd the

importance of NOTS, and that the original planning of the itation

was considered good. It was farther concluded that, although the

Secretary of the Navy had approved overruns of expenditures upwards

of S5.000,000 after the November 1944 on-site survey, it would now

be necessary to approve additional overrun: t J the extent of

173
Uli GRAND IXPIRIMI-NT AT l.WOKi.RN

S4,373,900 The investigators I'cit that the amount of construction

during the intervening six months nad not Justified additional

expenditures of this magnitude. They recommended that most of the

additional money he acquired: however, it was on the condition thai

"some businesslike procedure for handling the future administration of

Inyokern" be established.-7

Apart from the laboratory, the end of the war and Contract

NOy-9088 did not spell the end of all construction at NOTS. But

never again would there be progress on the same scale, nor approvals

without detailed justifications and numerous reviews.

There was still so much to be done if the Station was to fulfill

its destined role. In mid-1945 expanded technical facilities, bigger

shops, and more completely instrumented ranges were already seen as

requisites for the development of more sophisticated weapons.

One of these important necessities, the Experimental Air Center,

had already been realized.

THE AIRFIELDS

In late \la\ 1945. a little more than a year after it was officially

termed, the Naval Air facility transferred its pilots, planes, and

equipment from Harvey Field to the newly constructed landing field

near the ranges in the main Station area, fhis was the Experimental

Aii Center Area "E" on thi original plan for NOTS.

The transfer was regarded with mixed feelings. In the eighteen

months ol Nav\ occupancy and buildup, a small but well-defined

footprint ol traditi >r, had been imprinted ai the fo-mcr Inyokern

airfield. Even the humble O'ionset hüls that housed the erdisted men

had been given distinguished names such as Lexington, Hornet,

Enterprise, Essex, Saratoga, intrepid, and Wasp, Moreover, even in

1945. it guVe a man pride to say, "Yep. i was one of the first

Harvey I ield-.rs in the winter of ,43.,,

Bui there were iu:>t as many whose experiences rendered their

aviociation with the ficid less than pleasant, principally, those who

had struggled firsthand to cope with the lack of necessary fa. i'ilies to

keep aircraft (Flee! training and rocket testing) Hying To these, even

the i ame of the new facility. "Experimental Air Center," suggested a

fülle share in the exciting weapon development program.

Aside from perjonal feelings, there is much to be said about

Harvey Field and its historic relationship to NOTS as the Station's

174
1 HI) IIDI Ol \\ \K

genesis, and the Navy's means of establishing a toehold in liu' desert.

The "old Inyokern airstrip" provided a first headquarters for the

burgeoning Station staff of administrators, pilots and erews,

ordnaneemen. and a nucleus of personnel needed to operate a shore

estabüshment. It had also housed the CalTech scientific and

engineering staff. The swiftness that characteri/ed its coming into

being enabled NOTS to "open for business" immediately with

vigorous Fleet training and rocket testing programs. Essentially.

Harvey Field was the veritable platform from which the

implementation of a permanent ordnance research, development, and

test station was launched.

But it was never intended that Harvey Field should permanently

carry the entire burden of air operations. From the outset, the

Station planners had foreseen the need for a permanent, modern

airfield close to China Lake that would he a Iv.se for 'he

experimental air operations underlying the primaiy mission of NOTS.

Construction had started almost simultaneously with the rest of the

othei permanent facilities: the headquarters, community, laboratory,

and pilot plant. Now. more than a year later, the new airfield was

ready for use.

To pilot and ground crew alike, there must have been delight in

beholding the three smooth black runways. 2 miles long, with the

ultimate in modern field lighting; the gleaming white control tower

and the first of three enormous concrete hangars large enough to

house the largest airplane of the time. This was the B-2C) bomber,

built by Boeing and sometimes callet' the 'Superfortress": it could

carry a boi ib load of 111 tons,

A lot )f care had been expended to build tins field. Lieutenant

Commander Pollock and his AODÜ-1 pilots had worked \r\rd with the

designers anc contractors on some of the advanced 'eat.ires such as

ippropriate facilities for storing and loading fuel adequate

maintenance and administration facilities, and also safe amnumilion

loading areas. Curiously, for a climate that claimed little more than 3

inches of rainfall per year, there were difficulties concerning drainage;

one problem, as Pollock recahed, was "to keep the lights from

Hooding out for night iF/hig,,,"-8The desert pheivmenon of

sudden Hash Hoods, or "gulley washers," had to be provided for.

When it was done, the new field was indeed a noteworthy home

for the NOTS air facility. There were shops, storehouses, and an

armament assembly station; a gasoline storage of 200,000 gallons, and

oi! storage of 20,000 gallons. And it was all located less than 4 miles

from the new permanent headquarters and village of China Lake.

175
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN 

Ac;ial view of Armitage ricld with F7F aircraft in foreground. 

Before the runways were cleared for use, the field was named 

"Armitage Field," honoring the popu!ar young aviator who had lost 

his life while testing a Tiny Tim rocket. The name was chosen by 

Lieutenant Commander Vossler and by the consensus of his pilots. 

Commander Hayward warmly received their suggestion and relayed it 

to Burrougl1s. The Commanding Officer had no hesitation in endorsing 

the name honoring Lieutenant Armitage. 

Commencing in May 1945, NOTS boasted two airfields. While 

the future of Armitage Field was assured because it was the hub of 

experimental operations and the home of the Naval Air Facility, the 

same could not be said for Harvey Field. 

From the time he arrived until he left, Burroughs fought to 

make Harvey Field part of the Navy's permaneP,t inventory. The plan 

was to develop the field as a training air center supported primarily 

by the Bureau of Aeronautics, and ther. to build an experimentai air 

center in the main Station area where it could support the weapon 

development work that would essentially be Bureau of Ordnance 

projects. This plan still seemed reasonable when the Experimental Air 

Center went into operation at Armitage Field. At that time Harvey 

176 
EBB TIDE OF WAR 

Field was still going, as one senior officer put it, "full blast. "29 Not 

only was there Fleet training in air-t<rsurface rocket launching tactics, 

but there were also other Bureau of Aeronautics operations, including 

those of a Drone Utility Unit for providing pilotless aircraft as aerial 

targets and a small guided missile unit serving as the nucleus of a 

broader guided missile development program on Project Lark. 

Despite Burroughs' detennination, the intricacies of diverse 

intergovernmental interests thwarted his desire to make Harvey Field a 

permanent part of the Navy. 

The key problem was in obtaining ownership or a clear long-term 

lease on the 1,240 acres occupied by the airfield. The roots of the 

problem went beyond the agreements reached October 29, 1943, by 

the Interdepartmental Air Traffic Control Board, which had opened 

the way for the Navy to begin operations at the Inyokern strip and 

to develop the NOTS ranges. Following the understandings reached 

then, the lease the War Department held with Kern County was 

reassigned to the Navy. Unfortunately, the War Department lease 

granted use of the property to " only a date ending six months after 

the termination of the unlimited National Emergency."30 

In April 1944 Burroughs led a move to purchase the field for 

$6,000, the amount Kern County had invested in it. The County at 

that time was agreeable; however, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, 

which had developed the airfield in 1933, protested strongly. 

According to the CAA, purchase of the field would violate a 

long-held understanding between the CAA and upper echelons of the 

Navy : that CAA-developed airfields would be acquired only by lease, 

and that such leases limited use to six months past the end of the 

war.31 

The Navy had continued to press for purchase of the land but 

had been set back in September 1944 when the County reversed its 

position and opposed Navy acquisition. This change may have been 

influenced by considerations within the CAA that the airfield at 

Inyokern could become "an important link in airways to be 

established after the war. "32 The NOTS reaction to this is indicated 

in the response of Vossler when he read of these speculations. He had 

jotted down an impulsive " Impossible!" in the margin of the letter. If 

anything, he had sunnised, " the important link" wolild be nothing 

more than an "emergency airfield." In any event no important link 

developed in the next thirty years, and the County's change of 

position ended its main chance of obtaining a training air center 

within its borders. 

177 
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN 

Subsequent effo rts would be made by the Navy to obtain the 

field , but time was beginning to work against the probabilities of 

success. No major permanent facilities were being added because the 

lease did not adequately protect the Navy's interests, and this in turn 

lessened the chances. 

In April 1945 Burroughs again raised the question of control of 

Harvey Field. This time his concern was aroused because of the 

Army's reawakened interest in its old claims. Burroughs wanted to 

avoid "the possibility of conflicting interests," understanding as he did 

the importance of air space control when two military air facilities 

arc operated near each other. 

It appeared to those concerned in the Bureau of Ordnance that 

permanent possession could not be obtained at that time, so a lease 

transfer was requested by the Navy. The transfer became effective on 

June 15. 1945. Under the terms of this lease, the Navy agreed to 

assume all obliga tions outstanding in connection with the land, 

includ ing the obligation to restore it to its original condition at the 

end o f the lease. 3 3 

Significantly, the main operations at Harvey Field were under the 

cognizance of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As a consequence, the fate 

of the field depe nded no t only on the initiative of Burroughs at 

NOTS and concurrence of the Bureau of Ordnance but also on the 

vigor with which the Bureau of Aeronautics would support the effort 

a nd the cooperation of the two Bureaus on the Inyokern operations. 

Burro ugh , in trying to develop a one-happy-family approach to the 

problem, walked into a trap. 

The beginning of the episode is revealed in a letter to Burroughs 

dated April 5, 1945, from the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, 

Rear Admiral (later Admiral) DeWitt C. Ramsey : 

Dc:tr Burro ughs: 

The question continues to arise here abo ut the possibility of Bureau of 

Aero nautics and Bureau of Ordnance conflicting interest in the general 

administrat io n o f In yokern and its artivities. Yo u wiU recall that on t he 

occa io n of my last visit we discussed this matter bri.:Oy and you said that 

yo u would send me a personal memorandum o n the subject. Will yo u be 

!!OOd eno ugh to let me hJve this at your earliest convenience. 

With be t wishe", 

Sincerely yours. 

Ramsey :;4 

Burroughs returned a lengthy personal letter to Ramsey in which 

he advocated, amo ng other things, that the Bureaus of Aeronautics 

and Ordnance make NOTS a joint venture (with Aeronautics providi11g 

17!! 
EBB TIDE OF WAR 

an appropriate share of the funds).35 He sent a copy of the letter to 

his Chief, George Hussey. Years later, Burroughs described what 

happened: 

Hussey got this letter and boy he blasted me; got on the phone right 

away. He said, "This is an ordnance station; you report to me" - and a few 

other words! Then he foUowed up with a letter (saying) "Don't get off the 

track; this is an ordnance station," I think what he meant to say is: "When 

you get in trouble out there and you're not getting satisfactory results from 

the Bureau of Aeronautics, come to me: I'D see the Chief of the Bureau of 

Aeronautics and we'U work out something," which was the correct way, the 

Navy way of doing things. I was off-line on this letter. 36 

Although the Bureau of Ordnance retained control of NOTS and 

its ordnance programs with bulldog-like determination, the same 

cannot be said for the way in which the Bureau of Aeronautics 

asserted its interests at Inyokern. Not that the particular activities at 

Harvey Field warranted similar assertion. The Navy would face a 

massive demobilization of combat crews rather than an urgent need 

for Fleet training; . the location of the Aeronautics guided missile 

program at Inyokern was always intended to be temporary, pending 

completion of new missile testing facilities at Point Mugu, California; 

and the Drone Utility Unit could just as readily conduct their 

operation from Armitage Field. 

For the Bureau of Aeronautics, as well as the Bureau of 

Ordnance, a realization was beginning to dawn; namely, that the old 

original NOTS plan for large-scale training operation would radically 

change with the closing hostilities of World War II. The arguments on 

the importance of continuing, if not increasing, weapon research and 

development did not necessarily apply to the same extent to the 

training in the use of the new weapons. 

Although it leads us beyond the period covered by this chapter, 

we should follow this Harvey Field story to its conclusion. The NOTS 

attitudes on the subject were still stormy to the end of the war. This 

is clear from notations on a route slip: .. We should acquire this 

fieJd.-Captain Entwistle agrees ... - H [Hayward]" ; "Recommend 

we stick to our guns-C. F. Vossler"; "Agree- Sykes." Prophetically 

the slip was dated August 10, 1945, the day the Japanese cabinet 

decided to make an offer to surrender. That decision would bring 

about a marked curtailment o: training and the collapse of the main 

justification for a training au center at Inyokern. 

Looking even further into the future, we find operations at 

Harvey Field diminishing rapidly after the war, and in April 1947 the 

field would be declared '"excess to the needs of Naval aviation."37 It 

had contributed mightily to the war effort in the three and a half 

179 
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN 

years since Commander Renard and Dr. Lauritsen had landed there 

while in search for a place to test rockets, and l.auritsen had 

enthusiastically proclaimed, "I want it; this is it!"38 

PLANNING FOR PEACETIME 

The transition of NOTS from a wartime station serving the 

rocket programs of CalTech and the rocket training needs of the 

Fleet to that of a permanent center for weapon research and 

development did not occur within a narrow span of time that can be 

neatly pinpointed in a chronologically organized c'iscussion. For this 

reason, a glimpse back to the beginnings of NOTS is necessary in 

order to see where the planning began for the passing of the torch. 

That there was to be a major change in mission and structure of 

the Station at the end of the war was preordained by the quite 

different sets of wartime attitudes of naval officers and scientists 

toward peacetime weapon research. Many naval officers, particularly 

those who were members of the "Gun Club," strongly felt the need 

for the Navy to move into the postwar era with an effective research 

and development program. The CalTech scientists, although concerned 

with the future security of the nation, quite properly felt the time 

was coming for them to return to academia or other peacetime 

pursuits. 

From the time a West Coast ordnance station was frrst proposed 

to Rear Admiral Blandy, he began shaping the initially limited 

proposals into far-reaching plans for a postwar center. The reason he 

felt this was so important is seen in his words of December 9, 1943: 

Ordnance, more than other naval activities, needs this special attention 

to the research, because unlike ships, aircraft, communications, etc., it has no 

counterpart in civil life, and thus derives Httle from developments springing 

from the normal pursuits of the people in time of peace. 39 

From Captain Parsons we have anothei example of the wartime 

thinking of naval officers in ordnance: 

Research and development in military establishments is as necessary as 

industrial research. The reason is that industrial labC\ratories are necessarily 

focused in peacetime on the most urgent problems of industry- it is against 

human nature to expect industrial laboratories to conct.ntrate fust-class talent 

on the solution of a military development problem whose solution requires 

years of hard work and has no obvious industrial applications. 40 

The above examples reflect the midst-of-war attitudes of many 

naval officers, particularly those in ordnance. These attitudes 

permeated the management philosophy of NOTS. 

180 
EBB TIDE OF WAR 

As early as June 1944 Burroughs was assuring the CalTech 

scientists that the Navy meant to develop NOTS on an "ambitious 

scale," and expressed his own personal desire that the activities under 

the CalTech rocket program be physically transferred to "Inyokern as 

rapidly as possible. "41 With such a move there would be little doubt 

but that NOTS would become the prime rocket development center 

for the Navy at the end of the war. 

The CalTech group generally felt that such a transfer would have 

a disruptive effect on critical programs. It would be to the best 

interest of the war effort, they contended, for the project to maintain 

;_ts headquarters in Pasadena and for the bulk of the research and 

development to be tlone there. It was conceded, however, that the 

program would benefit by the transfer of some areas of work, 

including field testing and development of rocket launchers for 

aircraft as soon as facilities were provided. This set the stage for the 

later transfer of work in these categories. As of July 1944 it was 

estimated that only a small percentage of CalTech personnel would go 

to work for NOTS under civil service "either now or after the 

war."42 

In the same period (almost a year before the war ended), a 

guideline was issued by Vanneval Bush on the demobilization of 

OSRD. In the clear style of Bush memorandums, the first sentence 

stated, "The OSRD is a wartime ugency and will go out of existence 

at the end of the war. "43 The general plan. was to have a transition 

period starting with the end of the war with Germany and ending 

with the defeat of Japan. An orderly plan of demobilization of OSRD 

would be developed. But all actions and transfers would be arranged 

so there would be no delay or interference with projects relevant to 

the war. The obligation of th ' scientists to aid the services in the 

transition was clearly recognized. 

Difficulties were experienced when institutions like CalTech tried 

to prepare for demobilization because plans were tied to an unknown 

date, the end of hostilities with Germany. Finally an assumption was 

made, for planning purposes, that the date would be November 15, 

1944. This was a wrong assumption. In November 1944, the German 

Army, rather than being defeated, was preparing for the mighty 

counteroffensive that was to become known as the Battle of the 

Bulge. There was much deadly fighting ahead. 44 

The view of the Navy toward the demobilization of OSRD was 

expressed to Bush by Rear Admiral Julius A. Furer, Coordinator of 

Navy Research and Development, who wrote that "any abatement of 

interest and active participation ... of your organization will delay the 

181 
Uli GRAND hXl'l-RIML-NI Al INYUK1KN

linal victory over Japan, and will therefore also result in additional

ioss of life in our forces.'"'" This message was not lost on the

scientists. At CalTeeh. as elsewhere, the effort was continued through

the end of hostiliKes with a notable shift from research to these

projects with a p'asonable hope of having a tactical impact.

Besides Ine individual plans for transferring different OSRD

facilities and programs to the services, a plan was implemented to

develop a successor agency to OSRI) for planning long-range

participation by civilian scientists in militarily related research On June

22, l

t

M4. the Secretaries of War and the Navy established a

Committee on Postwar Research under the chairmanship of Charles E.

Wilson. Vice Chairman of the War Production Board/0

But il would be a long time before the actions uf the Wilson

committee would have any effect on NOTS. In the fall of 1

tH4 it

was becoming clear that the biggest problem in planning the transition

would be in gelling c ialiHcd technical people to take civil service

positions and move to tue yet untamed desert.

Among NOTS and CalTeeh personnel it was generally agreed that

the transfer of CalTeeh personnel to civil service could best be done

by groups, rather than individually or wailing until all transfers could

be made at once. Many problems were met by gelling individuals to

transfer at the lime of the transfer of the function. In general this

was done with the Linderst, nding thai the individual was not

committing himself beyond the war. Not the least of the problems in

persuading people to transfer was in convincing them of the

permanency of NOTS and relieving concerns about military

restrictions on their approach to the technical work.

Thompson's proposals for tue new research and development

organization helped dimini'Ji these concerns. By March 24, 1945, he

had pulled his findings together in a report addressed to Burroughs/'

The technical programs would be under the Director of Research.

Development, and Test, who would report directly to the

Commanding Officer. Then, would be two technical departmenis: one

covering research and development under a scientist, and one covering

field operations (testing) under a naval officer.

In presenting the plan, Thompson stressed tlv1importance of

inducing as many CalTeeh personnel as possible to transfer to civil

service to "carry over a smooth-running and effective organization."

lie added, "It is of great importance that Civil Service at 'horities

understand the special nature of the problem of transferring the

group... it is hardly in the Govcmment's interest to follow

is:
KUH TIDE Oi; WAR

interpretations o'" Civil Service regulations which would in effect deny

suitable professional or sub-professional opointments because of some

arbj-ary measure of eligibility."4^

Part of Thompson's concern centered about the necessity for

strong scientific direction of the technical programs at NOTS. He not

only pointed up the need, but proposed an appropriate candidate as

"Director of Research, Development, and Test" essentially the head

of the entire civilian scientific organization. The candidate was Dr, L.

R. Hafstad who, with Dr. M. A. Tuve, had led OSRD's highly

successful proximity fuze program sponsored by the Bureau of

Ordnance. In the March 24 report, Thompson presented .he basis for

his recommendation:4'

1

, . . 11 it should develop i!'n Dr. M. A. I'uvo, with whom Dr. Ilafsuid is now

jssu'iated, should evcnluully hecome Director of the Naval Ordnance

Lahoratory, Washinuton, or should continue lo direct the presenl litireau

Kcsearch Orpani/aiion which he heads, the distinguished research team of

luve and llalstad will then continue to serve the (uivernmenl and the nation

in perhaps tlie most elTcctivc manner possible, nanieU thai as eoopcrjiine

heads of two ';re,ii ordnance laboratories operated [:y the Navy, ['his will

inevitahh insure the close collaboration of the two laboratories in the

ordnance levelopnieni field and in the lone-ranee planning which is s.

essentiaL

As a significant afterthought. Thompson added:

If the Bureau of Ordnance and the C'ommandinj: Officer, NOTS.

Invokern, so desire, 1 shall continue spendinj; as much nine ,ii the Station as

possible in an effort to maintain the Director's office until Hafstad can eo lo

Ir.yokern on a pan or full time basis.

In recommending Hafstad to head the civilian scientific

organization. Thompson was saying that the technical effort at NOTS

should be under the direction of a scientist of stature, lie fell this

was particularly important because the prominence of the senior

scientist would he of concern to scientists ami engineers

contemplating employment at NOTS. But Hafstad did not accept the

position; instead. Thompson tilled the post temporarily until he

accepted a permanenl appointment some months later.

Thompson also knew that if NOTS was to have a first-class

civilian scientific learn, the social climate should not be iiominated by

a military system of rank. From his years at Dahlgren and his inputs

from Caffech. '' i'-,.ipson made some practical suggestions pertinent to

achieving a aarmoiJous military-civilian relationship:

1. (I .ss distinctions should be avoi'Vd if possible. To a Navy man and lo

many civilians... this point will seem over-stressed, Bui I believe the

, ; sent plan will fail in the lone run to reach anything approachinj! its

p issible success if ihe ipiestion is not dealt with in pioneci fashion (for a

183
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

military station). Most able scientists and engineers, young and old, will

dislike staying in a small community where distinctions as lo qualifications

tor quarters, club membership and social privileges are made on the basis

of rank, ll is not sufficient in dealing with this problem merely lo try to

..ne up the civilian technical group according lo some formula of rank.

While scientists do often enjoy setting up their own ranking systems, they

will not accept one which denies full recognition lo young mep (of

outstanding aiiility and achievement) merely because they arc young.

i. Where limitations are necessary i.i respect lo cl .b privileges and other

measures ol social standing, a can ful attempt should be made to find a

suitable index of eligibility ... | A group of senior civilians and officers]

should study exhaustively the problem of removing the causes of

uncomfortable feelings as they often exist in communities of officers,

civilians and enlisted men. . . .

3. Administrative officers (Navy and civilian) should agree to avoid practices

which lend to set up different administrative action covering civilian and

military privileges. Most examples of cases which could be cited would be

considered trivial but they are, as nu'ch as anything else, what leads to

bad taste and a desire lo gi.! away from a military community,...

The prescient thoughts expressed by Thompson on how to

achieve harmonious military-civilian relationships were slow to be

acted upon. After all, as he himself had pointed out, the

"difficulties . . . have been so far occasionally apparent."' And at tnis

time, in the spring of 1945, little dilficulty existed at the local level

largely because of the example of a personable Commanding Officer

who appreciated the need for harmony as much as did Thompson.

The few dilficulties that did arise were sometimes laughed away. For

example. Dr. Fowler reported to Burroughs in a staff meeting that as

a civilian he had been unable to get a haircut on the Station. In

looking at the scientist's premature sparsity of hair, the staff saw

more humor than seriousness in the situation. But it should have been

clear that the man who could not get a haircut in town was

obviously not part of the community.

The Thompson proposal on how to organi/.e N07S was unique

in its time. In contrast to the prewar organization of naval proving

grounds, it called for civilian scientific direction of the technical

programs, sought scientists of high professional stature, and recognized

the importance of avoiding class distinctions between the military and

civilians in both the work and social environments. By design, his was

a compromise solution in the sense that it blended the qualities of

military control and civilian technical direction, it was what most of

the scientists to that time, and many of today, would consider

impossible: a civilian organization that could function with scientific

freedom within the military structure.

When Bush received an information copy of Thompson's

proposal, he jotted down a note for his own immediate staff so they

184
i

;HB I IDE OF WAR

would know that his support o

r

the plan did not mean that he

necessarily thought it would succeed. But as the dean of managers of

scientists, he did not fully close any door just because of his own

personal skepticism. To Thompson he would say, "We support you."

To his staff he confided:

Quite a document! I think they may be attempting t!ic impossible, but

we eertainly will not icl'use to aid on that account. The faster they lake

over the sooner we become relieved. V.B,

President Truman's announcement on May 8, 1945, that the war

had ended in Europe signaled the beginning of the transition of

ordnance experimental work from OSRD to tlic military services.

On May 29 Admiral Hussey affirmed that The transfer of

rocket development from other activities to titis Station has already

commenced and will be accelerated as rapidly as the growth of the

Station's facilities will permit."S|

With new facilities being completed every day. the transfer was

not long in coming. As indirect and irritating testimony that the

desert Station was maturing into a showplace ordnance establishment,

Hussey complained that the constantly increasing number of visitors

to NOTS was interfering with highly important development

activities.5-

The discussions on transition culminated in a meeting on June 5,

1945, at CalTech, It was a gram! assembly of key figures from the

Navy, OSRD, and CalTech.*53 Of those present, the man with the

main power of decision was Captain F. i. Entwistle, Director of

Research ami Development for the Bureau of Ordnance. Entwistle, an

ordnance officer acting with the full authority of Hussey on the

matter, stated that the Navy had two principal concerns: (I) the

transfer of the iccket program to general Navy supervision, and (2)

adequate provision for postwar research.

* Present ul the meeting of June 5. 1945, on the transfer and termination of OSKI)

Contract OFMsMIS were the following:

Office of Scientific Research and Development: P. L. Ilovde (Chief, Div. 3, NDRC), 1).

M. Norton (Tech. Aide, Div. 3, NDRD).

Navy: Rear Admiral R. S. Holmes (Navy Depl, Liaison Officer, NDRC CalTech),

Captain S. E. Burroughs, Jr. (Commanding Officer, Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern),

Captain F, I. Er wistle (Director, .".c. Bureau of Ordnance), Captain J. L. King (Office of the

Liaisor Officer, NDRCl, Commander C. E. Hangen (Officer in Charge. Bureau o" Ordnance

Design Unit, CalTech), Lieutenant Commander 0. II. Peterson (Re, Bureau of Ordnance).

CalTeclr R. A. Millikan (Chairman of the Executive Council), J. R. Page (President of

the Board of Trustees), C. C. Launtsen (Director of Research, OSRD Contract OLMsr-418),

E. C. Watson (Official Investigator, OSRD Contract OEMsr-418), W. A. Fowler (Assistant

Director of Research, OSRD Contract OEMsr-418), VV, R. Stoti (Assistant Comptroller,

CalTech). 1. S. Bowen, T. Gardner, W. Muse, R. B. King, W. N. Lacey, T. Lauritsen, F. C.

Lindvall, M. Mason, B. H. Sage, W. R. Smythe,

185
rill-: GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

The plan that evolved set the pattern of the postwar transition.

The rocket development and test work would be transferred to

MOTS. The rocket production would be picked up under a broad

contract with the General Tire and Rubtjr Company.* The torpedo

launchii facilities at Morris Dam, along with the associated torpedo

programs and underwater studies, would become a substation of

NOTS Inyokern. The propellant work and activities at Eaton Canyon

would he decreased and eventually closed down as the work was

absorbed by the China Lake Pilot Plant,

As to the other major concern, Entwistle summarized the Navy's

general position on postwar research: "The Navy," he said, "believes

tiiat postwar research involves a two-way responsibility: the Navy's to

foster it, the colleges' and universities' to cooperate in it."

J. R. Page stated the position of the CalTech Board of Trustees.

The board had been disturbed for some time by the financial

magnitude of the work and was eager to get the Institute back to

"its normal and proper job of teaching and fundamental research."

Hovde spoke for OSRD, stressing that "Dr. Bush will not

appiove any projects involving work for the postwar period." Its

policy was to press for steady transfer of its activities to the military

services until the end of the war. It would agree to the transfer of

the rocket program during the next six months.

The following target dates for the transfer were agreed to:

July 15, 1945: Transfer of rocket p;odiiction activities to General Tire

and Rubber Company

September 1, 1945: Transfer to NOTS of Morris Dam and its activities

October 1, 1945; Target date for closing of Eaton Canyon facilities

December 1, 1945: Transfer to NOTS of the China Lake Pilot Plant and

associated activities

December 31, 1945: Termination of CalTech's experimental work on

propellants and interior ballistics

December 3!, 1945: Target date of OSRD for the termination of all its

experimental activities related to NOTS with the

understanding a review should be made in November to

sec if some specific projects should be continued into

1946

Thus, the main framework for the transfer was set. It was a plan

that paved the way for NOTS to become the leading ordnance

research and development laboratory on tl.e West Coast, if not the

nation. The professors wanted out; the Navy wanted ordnance

* The General Tire and Rubber Company also picked up another OSRD/CalTech

activity. This was the JATO program-development of rocket units for "jet-assisted take-off'

of aircraft-that was beit.g done by CalTech's Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory

(GALCIT). The Institute's small contractor, Aerojet, was purchased by GT&R and later became

on. of the nation's largest postwar aerospace industries for rocket engines.

1 86
EBB TIDE OF WAR

experimental work to continue under its direct leadership. In the

process, NOTS got the key facilities. But it would take more than

faciiities to attain an effective research and development center, it

would take qualified people and leadership, too.

CalTech was the most obvious source for the new NOTS to

recruit scientists, engineers, and technicians with ordnance experience.

Many of the candidates had the choice either of seeking employment

in new fields or of moving to Inyokem and working for a new

employer, the U.S. Civil Service. In the main, the people involved had

extremely strong feelings regarding both.

The first choice is not hard to understand as it represented the

clear-cut difference in life styles between Pasadena and the remote

desert. But joining civil service had other ramifications.

The limitations of the civil service system of that time in

meeting the needs of a technologically advanced society were not

localized at NOTS. On the contrary, it was a problem that surfoced

simultaneously throughout the entire spectrum of the technical and

scientific staffs working for the military.

As the struggle widened and intensified, Di. Hafstad and

subsequently the entire scientific fraternity of the American Physical

Society joined the fray. It was only after the establishment of the

Office of Naval Research in 1946 and the Atomic Energy Commission

in 1947 that sufficient leverage could be brought to bear on a

reasonable lesolution of the civil service classification problem.

Basically the problem stemmed from an obsolescent civil service

classification system that was not applicable to a modem technical

establishment. Classification standards did not exist for many of tne

professional and technical positions. Classifiers were required to follow

hard and fast rules. Final classification authority was held by persons

remote to the laboratories. The local position descriptions had to

match the inadequate classification standards in order to determine

the civil service ratings that in turn would determine what salary

would be paid. Although the system had worked for artificers and

artisans, it was woefully inadequate for scientific and technical people.

The classification problem proved to be a particularly obstinate

one for NOTS when it took over the technical leadership of ordnance

programs from CalTech. Up i:o this time the Station had few civil

service employees, and these did not include many senior scientists

and top-level supervisors. The problem became obvious when the

attempt was made to influence senior CalTech people to transfer to

NOTS and civil service. Not only were they concerned with what

187
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN 

they perceived as the immediate humbug of wrestling with position 

descriptions to obtam the proper grade and salary levrl, but more 

important, they were apprehensive as to whether civil service 

bureaucracy coupled with military command would restrict their 

approach to the technical work. Accordingly, most of the professional 

staff declined offers of civil service careers at Inyokern. 

However, the Station was fortunate that a nucleus of CalTech 

personnel did sign up, thus ensuring some continuum of civilian 

technical personnel with experience in rocket and torpedo work. 

Burchard points up one group in particular: 

••• most of the 200 member~ of the Inyokern Range Operations 

Group • . • under Dr. Ellis, accepted Navy Ovil Service appointments. This 

group was transferred, not only for the purpose of operating the test ranges 

on the Station, but also to serve as a nucleus for the growth of the Resctrch 

and Development Department .•• 54 

The reaction of Duane Mack, who like Ellis had come on board 

with the first NOTS test, provides insight as to why persons who 

were deeply involved at the NOTS site were more likely to stay on 

under the new structure than others: 

WeU, I was extremely interested in the aircraft ranges. It was 

fascinating because I'd been out here from the very begiMing and they were 

building up and they had developed to quite an extent. We were getting new 

facilities and new instrumentation and it was an extremely interesting area to 

work and I was anxious to see it finished and this was reaDy why I wanted 

to stay.55 

But Mack and Ellis represented the minority. Most of the 

technical staff and the scientific leaders of the CalTech rocket 

program were preparing to leave the ship as soon as they heard the 

victory sirens of V-J Day. 

Leadership was a key factor needed to assure that the facilities 

and programs inherited by NOTS would allow it to become an 

effective postwar research and development laboratory. Here too there 

were potential problems. We have seen the difficulty in obtaining a 

permanent civilian director for the technical effort. Warnings of a 

further problem had emerged as early as September 1944. At that 

time Thompson had written to his old friend Parsons as follows: 

188 

Captain Burroughs was here (NOP Indianapolis) for a day last week 

and I talked with hlm about some of his problems. I think he is making 

exceDent progress and he had some very good ideas if they ·.:an just be 

crystallized in such a form [that) they will not be dropped when he leaves. 

He is already talking about wanting to get back to sea. There are now about 

7,000 men working on the buDding program. It is going to be a magnificent 

plant, the sort of place we always dreamed about but never expected to see. 

I think the most important point right now is to see that the right successor 

to Captain Burroughs is selected. 56 
EBB TIDE OF WAR 

Burroughs, too, was concerned about " the right successor." 

Perhaps he more than anyone in CalTech or the Bureau of Ordnance 

was keenly aware of the rather special qualifications required of any 

man at the NOTS helm. After all, Burroughs not only was the 

helmsman but had also been one of the prir.cipal architects of the desert 

ship and knew well her sailing characteristics. As the time to rejoin 

the Fleet drew closer, Burroughs wrote regarding the opening at 

NOTS to a friend, Captain David B. Young, who occupied the desk 

for Aviation Ordnance in the Bureau of Ordnance, Burroughs' desk 

before he took over command of NOTS. Young replied: 

Dear Evvie: 

Suppose you think I have been ungrateful fe r your otTer relative to 

Inyokern. Let me assure you that I appreciate y<1ur considering me. Had it 

been six months or a year ago, I should have fought for it because it h 

exactly the kind of work I have always w.mted to do. Had understood that 

Admiral H. [Vice Admiral G. F. Hussey, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance) 

had given a down on your proposaL However. a few days later Admiral K. 

[Rear Admiral W. A. Kitts, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance I 

asked me if I should like to relieve you. Told him I W.ls flattered by the 

offer but felt that I was in a bad position on sea duty nne\ should prefer a 

sea command if I could get away. I asked for a day or two to consider. On 

Windy's (Captain (later Rear Admiral) Wendell G. Switzer) advice, I saw 

Rev. Mead ~ [Captain H. L Meadows, Detail Officer for the Bureau of 

Aeronautics), who litteraUy [sic) ••hit the roof." He said I needed the sea 

dut y and, besides, I was too junior for the job. Said he would oppose my 

getting it. He could promise me no CVE command. So you sec, I was pretty 

much in the middle. I have told BuOrd I want to go to sea so they have 

OK'd getting in a relief for me. Again let me thank you for recommending 

me for this job as you did for the original AAU. Hope that some day we 

can .. click. " 57 

Burroughs wrote to others whom he thought would be in tune 

with the NOTS concept, but in the end he had no influence on the 

selection of his successor. 

In the meantime Burroughs was being urged by his associates to 

reconsider. Particularly vociferous in these attempts were CalTech 

leaders Lauritsen, Fowler, and Ellis. His naval comrades in the persons 

of Hayward, Pollock, Duncan, and Richmond also asked him to 

reconsider, but as naval officers they would understand the 

ex planation he later gave. 

My tum had come up to get command of a ship •. I wanted to get 

back into the war, a little more closely into the war. My orders were 

issued- ! guess-about April of 1945 to go out and command a ship. When 

there is a war going on I guess probably every man who has made a career 

of the military wants to be out there to fight the war .... 58 

Although the reasoning was understandable, the common point 

of view at NOTS was that the impending departure of the popular 

189 
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN 

and able Commanding Officer was untimely. It became increasingly 

clear Burroughs would be leaving just as the problems of transition 

from a wartime station to a peacetime research and development 

center under Navy management would come to a peak. 

Despite the long planning for the transition to peace, the end of 

the war would find NOTS facing dilemmas in recruiting a qualified 

professional staff, in obtaining a leader of stature for the technical 

programs, and in losing its Commanding Officer at a critical hour of 

need. 

INYOKERN: THE WAR CONTRIBUTION 

It is logical to expect that the history of NOTS during World 

War II include a summary t0 show the direct contribution of the 

Station to the war effort: a sort of balance sheet o f accomplishments 

to validate the terms of the charter, " research, development, and 

t esting of weapons.·· Such a balance sheet is difficult to construct and 

even harder to interpret. For example, how does one assess the 

contribution of the early Fleet training achieved at Inyokern? 

Proficiency in the combat use of rocket weapons surely must be as 

important as the weapons themselves. Yet, it is the hardware that is 

most often associated with the NOTS wartime effort : Holy Moses, 

Tiny Tim, spinners, fuzes, warheads, launchers, and rocket sights. 

The retrospective story of how these weapons went to war shares 

equal significance with that of their actual deployment in the combat 

theaters of Europe and the Pacific, as it strongly points up the fact 

that ordnance problems do not necessa rily end with the completion 

of development ; rather, they extend deeply into the phase of 

introduction ·into service. There is irony, too. in the story in that 

Holy Moses- a o~ket developed fo r the Navy- was first used in 

combat by the U.S. Army Air Corps. 

Retributive justice would have been served indeed if the 

launching sites of the new German secret weapon, the V-I tlying 

bomb, known as the buzz bomb, could have been demolished by this 

newest of the U.S. rockets, the 5-inch HVAR, Holy' Moses. This was 

the objective in the summer of 1944 when a special mission was set 

up for equipping and training an Army Air Corps squadron with Holy 

Moses rockets. 

190 
F. IJIJ TllJE O F WAR 

Courtesy National Archives 

The 5·inctl HVA R for the r:lcct be ing loaded on zero-leng th wing launcher o f f-6F 

fighter aircra ft. 

By co ntra st with the fumbling efforts that sometimes 

characterized the inLoduction of new weapons into service use. this 

effort was capably handled. An experienced group of military o fficers 

and scientists went to a base in England to indoctrinate the 5 13th 

Fighter Squadron, 406th Fighter Group, Ninth Air Force, in the use 

of these rockets that as yet had not been baptized in battle. The 

mission included Lieutenant Colonel Harry F. Donicht, head of the 

Aircraft Section of the AAF Material Command, other military and 

technical representatives from Wright and Eglin Fields, Royal Air 

Force Group Captain H. W. " Dixie" Dean, and one of the leading 

CalTech scientists, Dr. Carl D. Anderson. Dr. Lauritsen was also 

officially on the mission, but a V-2 rocket had crashed in Sweden 

just as he arrived in Europe so he went there to take advantage of 

the unique opportunity to gain first-hand technical knowledge of this 

large German rocket. 

191 
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN 

According to Ha ywar d, it was Lauritsen who really interested the 

Ninth Air Force in CaiTech rockets. To this end, Lauritsen employed 

his personal friendship with Generals Vandenburg and Arnold , as 

described by Hayward, " .. . Charlie LAuritsen could go any place, and 

people would talk to him ... he knew all the chiefs and he alsu knew 

aU the Indians." According to Hayward, Lauritsen, while enthusiastic 

about a weapon to hit the V-bomb sites, was also convinced that the 

Navy rockets could kill tanks, railway rolling stock, and road 

transport vehicles; ultimately he was similarly able to convince the Air 

Corps general sta ff. In this he was aided by a general disenchantment 

by the Air Corps with their own 4.5-inch aircraft rocket.59 

The introductio n of ~· Moses into service was so closely 

phased with the ftrst productio n of the rocket that I 00 rounds a day, 

man ufactured under CaiTech direction, were ferried daily by air from 

California to England until I ,400 of them were delivered. 60 Dr. 

Thomas La uritsen, Charlie Lauritsen's son. was at Pasadena to see that 

the shipments went as scheduled. 

This effo rt did not pay off where origi nally ex pected, but 

elsewhere. By the time t he launcher installation and the training of 

the 5 1 3th pilots were under way, the Germans had changed their 

tactics o f ftring the V-1 bombs from permanent sites and were using 

mobile pads that were frequently moved to make detection a nd 

attack mo re difficult. 6 I 

Altho ugh Dr. Anderson recalled tha t the change of mission was 

due to the German adoption of the mobile V-1 launch pad, Burchard 

states that there was •· [doubt I whether the rockets would be able to 

do any significant damage to the launching ::,ites; as these proved to 

be so sturdily built of reinfo rced concrete that they could withstand 

even heavy bomb hits. "6 2 Tllis reasoning wo uld explain the high 

British interest in Tiny Tim in June 1944. More probably, the shift 

was due to mission prio rity: British antiair.::raft gunners with t he new 

proximity-fuzed shells were proving that they could cope with the 

V-1 threat ; there was an urgent need to stimulate the stalled 

momentum of the No rmandy invasion. 

Consequently, the squadron's mission was shifted away from the 

V -1 sites to help the stalled Allies push out of the Normandy 

beachhead. On July 15, 1944, the squadron, flying P-47 Thunderbo lts 

from England, struck targets in the Saint-L6 area. 

The pilots were o perating under two handicaps. Their training 

was limited, particularly in actual ftring o f the precious rockets, and 

the Thunderbolts h ad only fo ur launchers instead o f the eight 

192 

\ 
I liH liOl (ii H \K

normally installed on Navy planes. Despite these limitations, ilie\

made the introduction of Holy Moses into battle an occasion not to

he forgotten by the enemy.

Reports ol the results varied as to details, but all agreed ll il i

large number of targets were damaged by the rockets. Anderson's

notes made from interviews with pilots returning from thirteen

missions indicated 13 tanks destroyed, 2 probably destroyed, and 10

others hit; I pillbox hit, and 5 trucks and . armored cars destroyed.

In these actions two aircraft and one pilot were lost. The official

Bureau of Ordnance administrative history reports that the 513tlTs

mam action was in support of General Pafton's lank columns in their

famous breakthrough at Constances in the Binumy Peninsula. July 26

to 2

(

'. 1

1

'44. And the squadron played a key role in hailing a heavy

German counterattack on August 9 from Vire and Morlams toward

the sea.'1 ;

.Aside from the tactical results, it appeared initially that the

experience of this one squadron .vould have a great impact on the

Air Corps' future plans for rockets. Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz,

Commanding General of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in lurope.

wrote, "The success of the equipment has resulted in a requirement

from the Ninth Air Force to equip all of their P-47 fighter aircraft

with rockets."'1"

4 Major General F. K. Quesada, Commander of the

Ninth Air Force (in requesting thousands of the rockets by TWX),

reportedly dictated. "We want CalTech rockets, repeal, we want

Call cell rockets, not Army Ordnance.,"

<0

Also characteristic of the

reaction was the statement by Major Genera! B. E. Meyers of the Air

Technical Service Command, who described the Hol\ Moses as the

"best anl'-tank weapon of the war."'6"

With aircraft rockets in the spotlight at the sun of the push

across the continent towaru Berlin, it could be expe. icd that the

demand and use would be accelerated, as in the Paulu. But si. h was

not the case. Several explanations have been given. The success of one

combat fighter squadron's minimal training had given rise to a belief

that there was no critical need for training in the use of this quite

different type of weapon. Overlooked was the fact that the 5l3th

was an exceptional squadron. Th; method of supply for the 5l3th

was also exceptional. The follow-up squadrons did not have the

personal attention of a Tom Lauritsen in the States, In the upgrading

of rockets and launchers, the rockets for one type of launcher often

went to squadrons equipped with other launchers. There were no

scientists like ( arl Anderson or technically knowledgeable officers like

193
Till GRAND EXPERIMENT Al INYOKERN

Harry Donicht around to give technical direction when needed. And

there were no well-prepared operational manuals. These shortcomings

gradually led to a growing body of disappointment in the use of

rockets by the air forces in Europe. The Holy Moses rockets fired by

P-47s helped break a German counteroffensive in August 1944, but

otherwise these and other rockei. played only minor, sporadic roles in

the final rollback of the German army."7

'( was quite a different story in the Pacific. There, the war was

essentially a naval war. The naval officers and the scientists associated

with the Navy-sponsored rocket projects could carry their message to

every level in the con,bat theaters, from the Commander it, Chief, to

the logistical support groups, and the sailors and marines loading the

launchers. Once rockets had proven lhem:,elves in battle, the contacts

between the operating forces in the Pacific and the CalTech scientists

became a firm and fast relationship.

When W. A. Fowler toured the Pacific coin iat arenas in the

soring of 1944, rockets were last becoming major weapons of war. By

the enu of hostilities their use was extensive. The Army was

procuring rockets to the tune of $150,000,000 a year. The Navy had

1.200 war plants in a program for turning out rockets at eight times

this amount."* The Navy's expenditure for rocket weapons in 1945

was SIOO.OOO.OGO per month.^ From the standp/int of production

and the rapid refinement of combat doctrine, it can be concluded

that if Japan had been invaded, the rocket power released would have

been phenomenal.

Following its introduction to the Fleet in December 1944, Holy

Moses served (as had its predecessors, the 3.5- and 5-irch ARs) by

inflicting death blows to Japanese transports, knocking out

artiaircraft-gun emplacements, and b'asting away heavy defensive

'.ortifications. Only a few months earlier. Fowler had been aware of

the promises offered by the aircraft rocket in combat. And these

promises ,vere fulfilled. Zero-length launchers, improved fuzes,

efficient rocket sights-all had helped to bring even the earlier

weapon.-» closer to their full potential. Holy Moses was a quantum

leap forward in exploiting this potential where it counted helping to

break the back of .nemvresistance to our massive offensive hy land,

sea, and air.

Tiny Tim barely made it into combat, the late coming being

typical of the fortunes of war. Like Holy Moses, it had been initially

planned for use against the launching sites of the German V-weapons

194
EliB TIDE 0

i WAR

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§

i o

^ c

c u

^d

U T3 C c

Ä

3/, aij

.5 C

0

c i^ * !/)

^ OJ n

OJ

c

O M

< 5

Q 5
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT A'l INYOKERN

in occupied France. Accordingly, for a short time, Tim enjoyed a

ma.xamim priority.

But again, like Holy Moses, the reason for its not being used as

planned was the same; the need lo destroy the launching sites

diminished as wartime conditions changed. Antiaircraft fire, enhanced

by the SCR-5S4 radar, the M-9 director, and the proximity fuze, was

able to count:!- the airborne V-l bomb, and the timely capture of

launchine sites in the European coastal areas decreased both the V-l

and V-2 threats. Hence, the priority for Tiny Tim was downgiaded.

Meanwhile, the iauncher problems (detailed earlier) were taking their

toll in los! time.

In the spring of 1945. F4U squadrons equipped with Tiny Tims

were sent out on the carriers Franklin and Intrepid-pari of Task

Force 58 commanded by Admiral Mitscher. On March 18, while

cruising in Japanese waters some 40 miles offshore, the Franklin

became a target lor air attack. A twin-engine Mitsubishi bomber

unloaded two 500-pound armor-piercing bombs that penetrated the

carrier's flight deck and exploded against the hangar deck. On that

deck the r4U aircraft were loaded with fuel and Tiny Tims with

high-explosive warheads; 14 Tiny Tims were set off by the flames,

adding horribly to the holocaust.

Tiny Tims from the aircraft of the Intrepid were used in the

battle of Okinawa in April 1945. but it was difficult to make any

useful evaluation of their effectiveness because of the overwhelming

bombardment from a wide variety of ordnance. But Tim made it to

the war. Had the war not ended before it became necessary to invade

the Japanese home islands. Tiny Tim would have been ready, not

only for Navy use, but also for the Army Air Forces, which in late

1944 were preparing planes and pilots for deploying "the really big

rocket." In his work. Rockets, duns and Targets, Burchard includes a

significant footnote: "The war ended before the most formidable

rocket plane got into action. This was the F4U equipped to tarry

eight 5-inch HVARs and two Tiny Tims-a total of 3800 pounds of

potential destruction." In yet another footnote, he mentioned that

there were more than a million HVARs stockpiled at the close of

hostilities.70

Thus, a weapon with the Inyokern stamp was scheduled for mass

delivery to the homeland of the enemy. But the course of events

dictated otherwise. Another new weapon of war that CalTech and

NOTS had been involved with, the "really big" one—the atom

bomb-brought the war to an end without the need for an invasion.

196
1 BH TIDE 01 WAR

REFIZRENCLS

WU iili'iuificaunM IUIIIIIH'IA aro those iimk'r which copies of Ui>i.'Uiiw!nt.s arc filed in llic

lochniaii Inlormaiion l>cparlmcnt, Naval Weapons Center. The rolluwint; abbreviations arc

used in i.lcniil> iccnrd collecliün.i where tlocuments were Ibund:

I III Papers ni' I.I. I. rimmpson, Scarsdale, New Yi.rk

\ A National Archives, Washi ipion, D.C.

()\ Operational Archives, Washington, D.C'.

CIA Lihrarj Division, Archives, Calilomia liisiiiule of liclinology

i R; H Naval Wcap ms Center records stored at I ederal Records (enter. Bell,

i alit'oni«

1. Hxhibii "A," Change Leitet No. 10, (oninict NOrd-3070, Lllif, (NWC

2313, 1-1 I'M

2. George F. Hussey interview, Apri' l%6, p, 40. (NWC 2313. S-5.)

3. fhid.. p. 104.

4. Letiet from L. T, !

:

. Tliompson to Capt. W. S. Parsons, September 18, 1

(M4.

(NWC 2313, 4-23.)

5. Minutes ot NOTS-CIT Advisory Committee Inyokern Meeting, January 1

CM5,

p. 4. Record Croup 227, NA, (NWC 2313. 17-13.)

6. Memorandum ,1.111. Rc4d-25) iVom L. T. 1'. Thompson for Capt. S, E,

Burroughs, Jr.. USN, on "Preliminary Report. Organi/.atioti tmd Operation of

Research, Development and lest Work at NOTS, Inyokern, California," March

24, 1945, p. 1, OA. (NWC 2313, 15-10.!

7. Letter from Frederick L. Hovde lo Vannevar Bush, April 23, 1945. CTA.

(NWC 2313, 34-16,)

.X. Hussey interview, April 1966, p, 107. (NWC 2313, S-5.)

9. Description of Work Performed Under Contract N'Oy 91)4« (circa 1945).

(NWC 2313. 47-9.)

10. Ibid

11. N.O.T.S. Rocketeer, May 10, 1945.

12. Unpublished manuscript history, "History of lite Naval Ordnance Test

Station, Inyokern, California (to August 15, 1945)," compiled by Robert W.

Leach, Lt., USNR, October 4, 1945. pF. 32-33. (NWC 2313, 20-30.)

13. Ibid., p. 41.

14. Bureau of Ordnance Order No. 22-45, "Naval Ordnance Test Station,

Administration of," May 10, 1945. Record Group 227, NA. (NWC 2313,

17-15.)

197
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

15. Memorandum o,' telephone coirersation beiween Capl. J. C. Byrnes, Jr.

(Bu .'I Ordnance) and C'dr J. Richmond (Naval Ordnance Teui Station,

Inyou in Calif.), on "Annual Estimates for 1946 under 0 & OS," October

"5, IW4. Record Group 74, OA. (NWC 2313, 18-40.)

16. Ju.iies A. Duncan, unpubl.shed report, "De\ lopment of Plans for the

Laboratory at N.O.T.S., Imokern"; Appendix A of "History of Construction

of the Miciielson Laboratory," February '., 1

0

48. Duncan Papers. fNWC

2.1;.v 10-54.)

17. Ibid., p. 4.

18. Memorandum from Laboratory Officer, NOTS, to Commanding Officer,

NOTS, on "Laboratory Building and Facilities," (January 1945]. Duncan

Papers. (NWC 2313, 10-47.)

19. Ibid.. p. 4.

20. James Du lean interview, April 26, 1966, pp. 21, 23. (NWC 2313, S-9.)

21. Leach unpublished history, cited in Ref. 12 above, p. 33.

22. Memorandum from E. C. Watson to Frederick L. Hovde, on "Postwar Naval

Ordnance Research on the Pacific Coast," August 21, 1944, p. 2. CIA.

(NWC 2.) 13, 34-12.)

23. Ibid,, p. 3.

24. Memorandum from Frederick L. Hovde, Chief, Division 3, NDRC, to

Professor E. C. Watson, Official Investigator, OEMsr-418, C1T, on "Post War

Naval Ordnance Research on the Pacific Coast," August 30, 1944. Millikan

MSS, Box 119, CIA. (NWC 2313, 30-31.)

25. [bid

26. Memorandum for the Secretary's Committee on Public Works Projects

(originated by J. E. Rouse), June 27, 1945. Duncan Papers. (NWC 2313,

10-35.)

27. Ibid.

28. Thomas F. Pollock ;. ped review comments, July 1973. (NWC 2313, S-45A.)

29. Curtis F. Vossler interview, April 1972, p. 25. (NWC 2313, S-85.)

30. Letter (NP45/ND1 1-37, Serial 177/37) from Commandant, Eleventh Naval

District to Commanding Officer, Naval Ordnance Test Station, on "Naval Air

Facility, Inyokern (Harvey Field), War Department Lease No.

W2972-eng-l 129, Presently on Assignment to Navy Department. Proposals

Covering Future Use by Navy and County of Kern," March 4, 1947. FRCB.

(NWC 2313, 43-91.)

198
EBB TIDE OF WAR

31. Leiter [(SC)NP45/A 1 • 1, Serial 0127] from Chief, Bureau of Yards and Docks

lo Chief of Naval Operations, on "Naval Ordnanc' Test Station, inyokern,

Calif.; Request for Acquisition of Inyokern Airport," August 10, 1^45,

FRCB. (NWC 2313, 43-81.)

32. Ibid.

33. Unpublished narrative histories, U.S. Na\ ii Administration in World War 11,

Cominandant, Eleventh Naval District, 1943-1945, Chapter VII, "Naval

Ordnance Test Station," p. 221. »NWC 2313, 12-5.)

34. Letter from RAdm. DeWitt C. Ramsey to Capt. S. L. Burroughs, Jr., April 5,

1945. FRCB. (NWC 2313, 22-9.)

35. Letter from Capt. S. E. Burroughs to RAdm. DeWitt C. Ramsey, April 14,

1945. FRCB. (NWC 2313. 22-3.)

36. Sherman E. Burroughs interview, November 4, 1966. (NWC 2313, S-20,)

37. Letter (OP-56D12) from Chief of Naval Operations to Chief, Bureau Yards

and Docks, on "Naval Air Facility, Inyokern (Harvey

Field).. . Recommendations Concenv .g," April 18, 1947. FRCB. (NWC

2313, 22-77.)

38. A. B. Christman, History of the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake,

California, Vol. 1. Sailors, Scientists, and Roeke'.s. p. 1 /0.

39. Letter from Chief, Bureau of Ordnance to secretary of the Navy, on "Final

Report of Present Chief of Bureau of Oranance," Deceinber 9, 1943, p. 20.

(NWC 2313, 20-33.)

40. Unpublished report, "Comments on Planning for Army and Navy Research

Difficulties in Peacetime," by W, S. Paisons, July 8, 1944, Papers of RAdm,

William S. Parsons. (NWC 2313, 20-11.)

41. Minutes of inyokern Advisory Committee, June 3, 1944, p. I. (NWC 2313,

14-5.)

42. Letter from Official Investigator, OSRD Contract OEMsr-418, California

Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, to Commanding Officer, Naval

Ordnance Test Station, inyokern, California, on "Transfer of OEMsr-418

Research and Development Activities to NOTS," July 10, 1944, Technical

Library, NWC. (NWC 2313, 14-10,)

43. Memorandum from Vannevar Bush to Office of the Director, and others, on

"Plans for the Demobilization of the OSRD," [August 1944]. Miscellaneous

Early Correspondence, Captain Sykes. FRCB. (NWC 2313, 22-74.)

44. irvin Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War, p. 303.

45. Ibid., p. 304.

199
W

c

"' \ND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

46. Ihid., p. 319.

47. Memorandum (LHL Re4d-25) from L. T. E. Thompson for Captain S. li.

Burroughs, '-.. USN, on "Preliminary report, Organization and Operation of

Research, Development and Test Work at NOTS, invrkcin, California," March

24, m.S. p. 1. OA. (NWC 2313, 15-10.1

48. [bid., pp. 3-4.

44. Ibid.. pp. 6-7.

50. Ibid (Office memorandum attached to NWC 2313, 15-10.)

51. Letter (NP36/Red) from Chief, Bureau of Ordnance to Commander in Chief,

US. Fleet, and others, on "Naval Ordnance lest Station, Inyokern,

California Administration of," May 19, 1945. Miscellaneous Early

Correspondence, Captain Sykes. FRCB. (NWC 2313, 22-34.)

52. Ibid.

53. Summary of meeting at CalTech ot Navy, OSRD, and CalTech representatives

regarding future activities, June ^ 1945, p. 1. CTA. FRCB. (NWC 2313,

34-18.)

54. John E. Burchard, ed.. Rockets, Guns and Targets, p. 175.

55. Duane W. Mack interview, January 1969, p. 36. (NWC 2313, S-60,)

56. L. T. E. Thompson interview, November 6-7, 1965, p, 23, (NWC 2313, S-i.)

57. Letter from Capl. David B. Young to Capt. S. E. Burroughs, June 19, 1945,

FRCB, C5338. (NWC 2313, 22-20.)

58. Burroughs interview, Novenner 4, 1966, p. 46. (NWC 2313, S-20.)

59. John T. Hayward taped review comments, July 26, 1973, p. -

:6. (NWC 2313,

S-86.)

60. Burchard, op. cit.. p. 169.

61. Carl D. Anderson interview, October 5, 1970, p. 4. (NWC 2313, S-73.)

62. Burchard, op. cit., p. 169.

63. Unpublished narrative history, "U.S. Naval Administration in World War 11,"

Office of Naval Research, Washington, D.C. (NWC 2313, 12-4.)

64. Burchard, «p. cit., p. 170.

65. Anderson interview, October 5, 1970. p. 6. (NWC 2313, S-73.)

66. Burchard, op. cit., p. 170.

67. Ibid.

200
EBB TIDE or- WAR

68. Ibid., p. 5.

69. Sumivan Technical Report of Division 3, Natbnel Defense Research

Commitlee, p. ! ! 5.

70. D'irchard, op. dt., pp. 175-176.

291
6 

CAMEL and Salt Wellf. 

S.?me activities of artime N OTS stood apart from the primary 

role o_( developing aircraft rockets. The most significant of these 

activities was an in volvem ent with the nation's supersecret atomic 

bomb program. 

During the spring and early summer of 1945, a new facility was 

built at Inyokern- a pilot production facility that fabricated 

nonnuclear explosive components for the new weapon. 

The Sa/1 Wells Pilot Plant was swept into existence by a surge of 

efj'ort to bring the war in the Pacif ic to a close and so to forestall 

the costly necessity of invading the Japanese hom eland. >' et. it was 

the long-range permanence built into this plant thar helped to flesh 

out postwar ordnance research and development during the dijjlcult 

years of peacetime adjustment. 

PROLOGUE TO VICTORY 

Captain William S. Parsons arrived at Inyoke rn on Wednesday . 

July 18, 1945, for a brief visit with Lauritsen and Burroughs. The 

calmness he showed in discussing the NOTS work ?nd in reporting 

the first A-bomb test, at Alamogordo two days earlier was typical of 

Parsons. It is a matter of speculation as to whether he told these two 

close associates that he was on his way to a very select Pacific island 

and that he had been chosen to be the weaponeer in charge of the 

tactical delivery of the first atom bomb. 

203 
I IM ;,!< \\l> I XU :<l\|l \ I \ I INM)KI K\

('-iiiriru I in \I,IIHIJ.\ I ühi:rii!i>r\

Ken \clmir.il Williaiii S l'.ii.uii^. Miihunu I'MUUHM .m.l >l.iiiiuli liifi.J nl NO 1S,

21M
CA ~I EL AND SALT WELLS 

Parsons was o ne of the last of the team to arrive at Tinian. 

approxima\ ely 1.450 miles from To kyo. Work had begun the re in 

February 1945 to constnu.: t the supe rsecret base. It was now the 

middle of July . and the B-29 bombers and men o f the 509th Gro up 

had arrived. The gun typl.! nuc lea r bomb ( Little Boy)- as yet an 

untried weapon- a rrived on July 26 aboard the cruiser U.S.S. 

Indianapolis. 

Captain Parson . whose responsibilities a t Los Alamos, New 

Mexico. had been to make the bomb a deliverable weapon, was 

personall y assigned by Major General Leslie R. Groves. USA. top man 

in the Manhattan Project. to be in charge o f th e bomb o n the 

epoch-making flight of the t:no/a Gay. In these wo rd Pa r ons 

descriued thl.! impact of •he fir t a tom bomb, which was dropped on 

the cit y of Hiroshima o n August 6: 

It wa< a terrific , pectadc. The hu ~c dust cloud covered thm~. 

The ba c o t the lower pJrl o f the mu>hroom. a mas~ of purplish·gray du' t 

ab, u 1 three mile in Ji3me tl!r. wa> all b<>iling- th•· entire area was boiling. A 

hu)!C white clo ud got <epara tcd from the top of the mush room and went 

upward. Then a second white d <Jud rose in to the air and started chasing th e 

tirst one ... . The purple d <Jull< and flames were whirling around. It ;cemed 

as thou)!h the who le town ~ot pulver11.:d. 

If the Japs .ay .1 meteor hit them. we can tell them we have more 

where this one came fro m. I 

Whik p reparations fo r deploying a second bomb were undl..!r way. 

millions o f lea flets we re dropped over Japan. The t ex t was direct : 

TO TilE J.\PA 'ESE PEOPLE 

America a<ks tiM! you 1.1k.: unmcdi.uc heed of what we say o n thi< 

leaflet. 

We arl! 111 '-~C<, n o f the mo<t dcqruc tivc cxplostve ever dcvtscd br 

man. A single o ne of our newly developed ato mtc bombs is actually the 

.:quivalcnt in cxplostvc puw.·r to wh.tl 2.000 o f o ur giant R·29's can carry <> n 

a single mis<ion. This awful fa ct i' one for yuu to po nder and we solemnly 

as<u rc you it is grimly accu ra te. 

We have just begun tu u>C this weapon ag.lin<t your homeland. If you 

still have any doubt . make inquiry a> to what happened to Hiroshima whe n 

ju <t o ne atomic bomb feU on that c ity. 

Before u sing this bomb to destroy every resource o f the military by 

which they arc prolo nging this usch:ss war. WI! ask that you no w petition the 

l:.mpcror to end the war. Ou r President ha s outlined for you the thirteen 

consequences o f an hono rable surrender. We ur~c that yo u accept these 

cunscquences and begin the work o f building a new. bcucr, and pcacc-lc •ing 

hpan. 

You should take 'tcps now to cca>c military rc>istancc. Otherwise, we 

shall resolutely employ th is bomb and a ll o ur o ther upcrior weapon> t o 

promptly and force fully end the war. 2 

205 
I III i,K \M> I M'l KINIl \l Al I \V)KI KN

Olli.' more hoinb was "rcsolutoh niiptoycd"" auam.sl llu1Jajiancso

idwn ol Nagasaki on AIPJIISI ' ', l

lM5. .As with ihc Hiroshima attack,

the uc<i piHU'cr aboard (he B-2') aircralt was a naval

olTiccr (ominaiuk'r ilatcr ^

,

l^l

, Atliniral) Krodcrick I.. Asiuvortli.*

I Ins homh uas the implosion type (1'ai Man), inn its tivmemlous

power lor destruction was the same as had heen ilemonslraled by the

first: ' is was enoudi lo cause Japan to surrender. On Augusl 14, the

allied lerms o| capitulation were accepted, thus ending one ol the

bloodiest wars in human IIISIOIA

As in a report on one ol the musl uiuisiuil missions a naval

ofticer ever had, Parsons summed up the deliver operations ol the

bombs vvilh ibis simple obsenation. "Once in many centuries you

can't shake oil the Midas touch, lhai's what harpened lo us,"

Nmong the questions (»roves was asked a' the end ol the war,

one had pariicul.ii siiznillcance lo NOIS: fiow many bombs were

available to back up the "waniing to the Japanese people'"' His

answer was always, 'd nouuh.' Altliough in lerms ol immediate

availability there were probabh fewer than a hall dozen. Groves'

single-word answer had much wider implications. Los .Alamos was still

geared to a high degree ol operational readiness, ami the brand-new

plants at Hanford. Washington, and Oak Ridge. I'ennessee, were

staffed and equipped to produce nuclear materials in quantity. And at

Inyokern, California, the paint was hardh dr\ on a permanent facility

vailed the Salt Wells Pilot Plant. On July 25, the first trgh-explosive

blocks had heen melted, poured, and cast. Mad the pressures of

continued wai been maintai a'd, volume production ol these vital

components for atomic bombs could shorth have iieen available and

flown unmedialeK to a selected assembly point, ["hus. in the not too

distant future, there would have been a steady and levaslating supph

ol the new weapons to underscore tiieir most sn luiieant aspect the

most piweriul deterrent force against future wars ever held by a

nation.

1 he total picture ol the nation's A-bomb production resources

poised in readiness, some of them .is yet untapped, makes n easier to

understand that the wa.nmg to the Japanese | eople had not been a

precarious gamble based on the immediate availability ol two bombs.

It also helps us to comprehend the story of the Salt Wells Pilot

Plant at NO IS; its existence. Us purpose, and Us role in the future.

tliis ofticer hus j >|uvi.il pl.ia1in mn liistori ,n he serveil us ('omniaiiUer, N.ivji

Ordmincc IV.sl StaliDn, (Inn,, l..iki', fniiti 1955 (o 1957, IK- wus bmh .in ordnaiKf

pnstiiiaJuate und .i naval .ivi.a.ir

20(i
(AMI I. AND SAI I Wl I : S

For although the plain was concciwd and bmli lor war. its greater

purpose would he achieved in peacetime In helping to proviJe the

nuclear delerrenl power of tlie nation in the postwar period. To this

end. activities at alt Wells continued to flourish under the stimulu.s

ol pritviics and funding initially from the special project set up

under the purposeK misleading title of Manhattan Project, then

eventually from the Atomic Energy Commission.

In addition to producing explosive components for nuclear

weapons, the desert faciiiU exercised to the fullest its pilot plain

function, providing the "know how" necessary lor soiling up

industrial production plants and pointing the wa\ to more efficient

production hy these plants.

In these ways the Salt Wells Pilot Plant of NOTS helped assure

in the years to come that when the question of sufficiency in the

A-bomb inventory arose, there would be no doubt about the

substance of the word. "Hnouuhl"

THt LOS ALAMOS CONN LCI ION

When the histories ol certain wartime research and development

centers are arrayed side In side, one is often immediateh impressed

In the similarity; almost as il a master scenarist had devised the same

scenario for each. ' nis is particularh suggested In the early histories

ol NOTS and the atomic research laboratory, then known as the

Manhattan Project, at Los Alamos. New Mexico.

Although Los Alamos was started exactly a year before NO IS

tat the end ol l'M2) and despite the differences in their products

iNOTS. the aircraft rocket: Los .Alamos, the atom bomb), then

lespective stones have identical elements: selection of a remote site,

incredible construction achievements in a short-tune framework: the

overwhelming difficulties caused by the earl . near-primitive living and

working conditions; the problems of a military-civilian coinnumity, the

desperate urgency of the program imposed by the nation's mihlan

needs: and a shortage of labor and material:;. These latter problems

were more than mere relL'etions ol those of Los Alamos; they were

largely caused by the draining of the labor pool by tie highest-level

priorities of the New Mexico facility. Similarly, when building

materials and special-purpose scientific inslrumcnts were not available

for NOTS, there was a strong chance that Los Alamos had gotten

them first.

207
I III (,K\Nli I XIM KIM1 Nl \ I IN'tOKI KN

Bui ;ISKU' fiuni ilk- similar elciiuvnts n llicir early hislorios.

N'OTS and Ins Alanids were closch relaUvl in other ways. Despile

ihe l.iei tlial (lie militan iurisdielion m each ease was i|iiile dilTerent.

ihe de\elonni'nI prosirams loi ihe main prodnels imolved al I'oih

laeiliiies were muier the manajiemenl ol ei ilian universities, Jus! as

Call ceil was ihe seientitie overseer ol ihe roekel programs eoiulueted

ai M) IS. so \\;i- ihe University '.'I Calilornia lor Ihe weapon project

al los Al.linos. Ihe resp^clne sv'icnt.sts ol these sister aeadenik

msiiltiitons (hoiii based in Califoinia) shared common interests and

were well knoun to each othei Some had even lauuhl al hoth

sehooN |)i J Robert Oppenhemiei was one ol these, l

;

or twelve

years, lung helore he heeame Direeloi ol the ins Alamos laboratory.

lie served as assistant [irolessor, altematint; between Calleeh and the

rni\eisii\ ol Calilornia al Bu"kele\, '"Oppy" and "Charlie'" Laurilsen

were lomier colleagues. In the lall ol .

1

'44 Oppenheimer eontacled

has old t'lieiid and asked him to help '.inn mil al los Alamos

[aunisen had been approachevi Iprobabh ihrough James Conanl

( haiiman ol Ihe \aiional Research and Development Committee

some two years earh.T when los Alamos was being started, and ,

general reeruiimenl ol seientisis was under way. Al thai lime

houever. L.auntsen and Calleeh were deeph embroiled in the new

roekel program. In October 1'Md llungs had changed. Ihe rocket

program was in lull swing al Inyokern; I aunisen could consider

pari-iune work with los Alamos m a much more favorable light.

Ihe Adioiub developers needed a lol ol' help in their program,

Ihe most complex and challenging in ihe history ol science and

ordnance Although the Ircmendous potential release ol energ)

through the splitting ol the atom was real in Ihe minds of ihe

iheorists in the prewar years, its practical accomplishment in the form

ol a deliverable weapon was a long wa\ off. flic gulf between theory

and hardware had never been so wide

Reduced to basic fundamentals, the lirsl method of achieving

nuclear fission was by using a gun to fire one subcnlieal mass of

fissionable material (uranium 235) into another in order to form a

critical nuclear mass thai would explode instantai.eously. Ihere were a

host of major technical problems, but ihe mosl formidable one by far

centered about the U'235 nuclear malenal itself. Due to the slow.

painstaking process o| sepaialmg this malenal. liiere would be enough

lo make only a lew bombs An ilternative material, plutoniuin. could

not be used with ihe gun mel.iod. However, it could be used In

employing ihe inij aon melhod, in which a sphere was made of high

2i)H
( AMI I. \M) SAI I Wl l.l.S

explosive. When detonated at the periphery, the blocks oi high

explosive foeused their shoek waves inwaai onto a core ol mielear

material, causini: il to reaeli the critical density Linder the nevv

pressure condition.

Indecision as to whether to use the uun or the implosion method

readied crisis proportions durint; the Manhattan Project's development

program. Later on it was decided to develop hombs nsini; holh

methods. Because ol its unsurpassed leadership in the field ot imns

aiui prtijecliles. the Bureau ol Ordnance assumed a major role in the

design of the ven special "L'UH" rcc|uireil for the A-homh,

De\elo|iment nl the homhs by the implosion method was to invohe

l.auritsen and his associates because ol their expertise on two of the

desiun problems,

flic first problem stemmed from difficult;, in fmdinii a reliable

detonator with an a. linn that was fast enough a fraction of a

millionth of a second, lach bomb required a detonator to initiate

each geometricalh shaped, high-explosive block surroundinsj a nuclear

core. 1 his action had to be wilhin microseconds as nearh

simultaneous as possible. I'lmnigh the efl'orts ol ('. C. Laurilsen and

his (all ech scientific staff, approjiriate detonators were designed.

laurilsen's close association with \() I S paid oil as cquipmenl.

lacilitics. and securitv were a\'ailable at huokern for the de\elopinenl

testiny ol these deloiialors. which were known as "sockets."

Development and lestinü ol ihe sockets were under the Llireclion ol

William fowler and 1 liomas l.auritsen. and while the program was nol

stricth within Bruce Sage's principal area ol responsibility. China

fake Pilol I'lan! facilities were used to load and test-lire the

detonators, winch were made in Pasadena

The other problem was infinitely more complicated and

eoncuned the intricate high explosive blocks themselves: Mien process.

manufacture, and test.

flic scientists and technicians ol Los Alamos pioneered the initial

process, flic explosive was cast to a uniform density in specially

designed molds, and then the cast blocks were caielully machined

into the required shapes. Machininü explosives was virtually a new

technique, and the military and civilian machinists, lor the most pan.

had to teach themselves. 1 he fact that they mastered Ihe art in such

an incredibly short lime is almost beyond comprehension. Bui their

deadline to have the firsl bomb ready was immulable. Ihe fate ol

nations was al slake.

In late 1944 the conditions al los AL nos for making precise

2oy
Uli CKAM) 1 \H KIMl M Al 1NY0KERN

high-uxplosive components were anything hut ideal. General Groves

descrihed them in a later interview:

Wc hj\c Inuli ji Ins Akiinos wlui was called llu' S-l", n nia\ have

IH'I'II "S", .in r\ploMU' plain. |li was 'S-Siii-." named lot a •iavvmill llval

fnrnu'rh simul theu'.j \i any rate, this w.is a mosi Uangwous plant. Ii was

like one oi ihese fireerjeker plants thai > on read uf h'iwine up ever\ once

in ,1 while We oiih had Iwo people out there whe knew ainihinu about the

m.inul.K lure ni esphiMves, One iVas a foreman that we em Iroiii Arni\

OidiutKe. and he was .i etaekeijaek: he knew that ever\ ihine there was niusl

li.i/.ndous. I he othei one «as an enlisted man. a chemist who had. 1 think,

heen with Hercules Powder in the produetion end. He was absolutely

hoiiilied when he saw how we were operating, 1 knew i|iiiie a hit about H

heeause I had been huildme ordnaliee plants and knew ivhat precautions

should he taken 4

(iroves shared his concerns ahout S-Sile with the quiet-spoken

N.iw eajitain who headed up the Ordnance Division at Los Alamos,

\V, S Parsons. According to Gtoves, it was "Deak" Par.ons who

suggested the need for another high-explosive plant, ll was also

Parsons who involved NOTS in the Manhattan Project in the first

place. a

-

'il who laier drew the Bureau oi Ordnance into the new Held

ol nucleai weaponry.

Parsons did more than merely suggest the need for another

high-explosive plant. Me also passed along some thoughts as to where

such .i pi,ml might he located namely, the Naval Ordnanci Test

Siation, Inyokern, California. The NOTS site was remote and

relaliveh .MSN to secure: and security was an abiding passio l with

(ienerai Groves. Also. C'allech was inseparably linked to NOTS and il

was the Institute's expert! • that was essentially solving the thorny

problem of high-explusive lens design. Moreover. C'alTeeh had

considerable experience in building and operating ordnance plants: for

example, ialon Canyon and the China Lake Pilot Plan'.

droves seemed to have had some mixed feelings ahout having the

plant under Navy command. The Navy's views on safely were

considered In Groves to be too stringent in what were termed "the

normai ammunition lines." In his eyes, his progiam was anything but

normal and should not be inhibited by "the conventional lines of

safely." As he stated in a later interview. "I ignored most of |lhe

et nenlional tines] deliberate y. It wasn't a case of not knowing any better

or aeing i vkless. or anyth ng like that. It was just a cold-cut decision

that it was worth taking a chance on . . . remember, time was all

important to us."5

Misgivings notwithstanding. Groves made another characteristically

cold-cut decision on January I. 1945, On this day, he and Parsons

Hew to Pasadena to meet with Lauritsen and Sage. At the end of Die

!1(!
CAM! I, AND SAM WKLLS

mocting. I ulTodi :ind NO IS had acquired anothoi heavy, albeit highly

iineresting, hurdcii: the 'inldmu and later the operation of a pilot

plant for tlu nonnuclear esplosive iMinponeniN of atom hombs

A NEW PILOT PLANT

Ai first glance the bustle oi construction activity in February

194^ seemed like an Lincanny repla\ of the events that had taken

place almost exactly a year earlier when the China Lake Pilot Plain

was built: an anm of bulklo/ers and earth-moving vehicles gouging

the rocky, sloping side of the Argus Mountains, spreading from tile

foothills down to the floor of the Salt Wells Valley an expanse of

white alkali comprising the bed of an ancient lake. Here would be

built the new pilot plant needed for the Manhattan Project; it would

be named for the Valley.

Adjacent to this new site and barely discernible through the

clouds of dust hanging in the cool air of the Mojave spring was the

China lake Pilot Plain. Although tins particular facility was started

more than a year before, it was still far from complete. Use ol the

12-inch press line for the produc'ion of rocket propellant had just

bareh begun.

I'he principals in the new venture were the same: Callech and

the bureau of Ordnance. Iven the same people were involved: ' >'.

Bruce Sage and Dr. William Lacey of CalTech; Palmer Sabin and the

Institute's engineering design group. The Haddock bngi.iecrs

const uction crew worked according to the plans and specifications of

the Holmes and Narver architects and engineers.

On the Nav\ side, the cast of leading actors had changed

somewhat. Captain Moellcr had replaced Captain Sandquist as the

Bureau of Yards and Docks' man on 'he job. In the Bureau of

Ordnance, Captain Byrnes, the nulomilaule watchdog of shore

establishments, still maintained a wary eye on the construction

activity; however, the responsibilities were progressively being shifted

to the shoulders of a much younger ye' almost as aggressive officer.

Lieutenant Commander Dexter Billiard.

But the commonality of the China Lake Pilot Plant and the new

pilot plant ends with a similarity of the early construction scene. The

Salt Wells story was going to be entirely different. For, despite the

fact that virtually the same people were involved in planning the new

pilot plant, their attitudes had dramatically changed. From the onset.

211
Till; ÜRANU EXPERIMENT Al 1NY0KERN

both CalTcch and the Navy ajiproached the project with a certain

"once bitten, twice shy" wanness. Harsh lessons, such as the need to

determine safety requirements betöre pouring foundatiors, had been

learned.

As builder and ruler of the China Lake Pilot Plant empire. Sage

was ,i natural candidate lor the job of planning the new plant at Salt

Wells. And he approached the task with Jiaraneristic gusto. Although

he received the word from Laurilsen only a scant 24 hours before

Geiicrai Groves and Captain Parsons arrived in Pasadena on January 1,

r'45, by the time of that historic meeting Sage was able to put a

tangible plai down on the table for all to study.

In spiti of the deadline and a minimum amount of information,

Sage hai produced a proposal for the new plant. He estimated that

the plant and equipment would cost S13,000,000. Two major factors

had to be taken into consideration I irst, many of the processes and

equipment were technically unique and untried. As it later turned

out, even while the plant construction was under way, some of the

manufacturing techniques were not yet definitely established. The

second factoi was one that would not only significantly affect the

cost but als. tax 'wen the seemingly inexhaustible energies of Bruce

Sage, 1 he plant was to be constructed and in operation 100 days

alter groundbreaking!

Within this period, the building and equipping of the Salt Wells

Pilot Plant would have been a remarkable accomplishment if it had

been only a moderately sized plant of temporary -onstruction for a

well-establisheJ manufacturing process. But the plant was extensive;

moreover, 52 out ol its SO buildings were of permanent construction.

Alter the January 1 meeting, activity immediateb went into high

gear; this was imperative if the 100-day schedule was to be met.

There was a sound reason for the early July deadline. The entire

A-bomb development was in lockstep with the nation's war policy.

Everything was geared to the first test of the new weapon being

developed at Los Alamos: a vitally important test, results of which

would directly affect the posture of the United States at the planned

"Big Three" (United States, Russia, and Great Britain) conference to

be held in the late summer. (It was at first expected that the

outcome of that conference would determine the circumstances of

nuclear weapon deployment against the Japanese.) it had been

estimated that a sufficient number of high-explosive components could

be produced at Los Alamos for one or two implosion weapons that

were needed immediately. If more bombs were required later, it was

212
CAMEL AND SALT WELLS

doubtful whether the S-Site at Los Alamos would be able to produce

the explosive components. Groves, who had much experience with

ordnance plants, feared the specter of a disastrous explosion at Los

Alamos that might wipe out even the limited capability of producing

the high-explosive components. In that eventuality there could b° no

nuclear weapons on hand or in reserve.

It is perhaps unfair to speculate that without the past experience

of the China Lake Pilot Plant, Salt Wells could not have gotten off to

such a prompt start so smoothly. But the experience certainly helped.

This lime, all the intricate elements were dovetailed into a perfect fit:

the Bureau's requirements in terms of construction standards and

safe':v site suitability ar.u location; and a clear understanding of wl at

was required by CalTech planners and their chosen architects and

engineers, the firm of Holmes and Narvcr. This understanding, in turn,

was clearly transmitted to the construction contractor. Haddock

Engineers.

Even the funding of the project had been firmly established from

the beginning. The first funds from the Manhattan people were

received within two weeks after Sage's sketchy plan was approved.

There were some problems, of course. A goodly number of these

predictably stemmed from the fact that some of the manufacturing

processes for which the plant was being built were not yet

determined. For example, in February Los Alamos could not be sure

whether the casting or pressing me'hod was better for fabricating the

high-explosive blocks. Up to a certain point, basic facility design

could have accommodated either process. In fact, K. H. Robinson

recalls that Detroit built a special die for p/essing (to be used on

CLPP's 18-inch press) against the possibility that pressing might be

the ultimate process.6However, meeting the deadline hinged

precariously on a much-needed decision. By mid-April it was apparent

that precious time was slipping away. Lauritsen confronted the powers

at Los Alamos and bluntly insisted that a decision be made at once.

It was, and construction was promptly geared for the melt and cast

method.

Because the designers had to stay one jump ahead of the

vigorous building contractors, who worked on a three-shift, no-holiday

schedule, the design group under Willis Jaynes in Pasadena worked at

a killing pace. Such were the working hours that a former member of

the design group recalls walking out of his office and idly, wondering

why the sun was setting in the east; he had worked throughout the

night without realizing it and was observing the dawn.7

213
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

In direct charge of all equipment, specifications, and plantflow

decisions. Sage had placed Paul A. Longwell, a brilliant young

chemical engineer from CalTech who had performed the same

function for the Eaton Canyon plant. As quickly as Longwell's group

would set the specifications for a unit of processing equipment, the

design group would consider the problems, complete the drawings, go

back for appro/al, and then place the item out for fabrication.

Characteristically, the capable arm of the Bureau of Yards and

Docks was present to add its strength. Lewis Moeller, described by a

former Pilot Plant officer as "a very senior captain and a very

brilliant man."spe*. eived early that miracles were going to be needed

to meet the schedule. Accordingly, he assigned his best subordinates

to the job. One of these. Lieutenant Lou Asbury, Civil Engineer

Corps, worked tirelessly on the problems of planning and equipment.

Several items presented unique engineering problems. For

example, the jacketed molds surrounded by water-cooling coils proved

exceedingly difficult to fabricate and operate. Actually, the molds

went through several scries of designs, and actual production

processing had begun before a satisfactory treatment finally evolved.

Althcugn not apparent in early designs, severe problems were also

imposed by having to learn how to cast nonporous aluminum.

The melting /ettks presented unique challenges. As each kettle

contained enough high explosive to level the entire building, they

were designed for remote operation and control. Accordingly, the

mixing olades. kettle contours, cooling jackets, and tilting supports-all

of stainless steel-had to be fabricated to a specific but new design.

Initially, such elaborate kettles were impossible to find. As a

temporary expedient, commercial candy kettles of 30- to 50-gallon

capacity were modified for Salt Wells use. It is reported that these

nevei presented any serious problems during their short service;

however, their melting capability was too slow to handle the desired

production. As safety considerations were paramount, a complete

periscope-type optical system was devised and built that enabled the

control-room operator to machine blocks of high explosive to close

tolerances even though separated from his work by two heavy

concrete walls. Since precise measurement of the product was critical,

all buildings were designed to hold the temperature to a tolerance of

plus or minus 2°F.

Another complex requirement for the new, untried production

process was to determine that no fissures or cracks were present in

the finished explosive blocks. Dr. Jacob ("Joe") Bujes, a

214
CAMEL AND SALT WELLS

Hungarian-born scientist of CaiTech, was brought in to develop special

radiography techniques for inspection and to supervise this hazardous

operation.

The design group's headaches were not limited to facility

construction alone; they had to contend with problems of equipping

the new plant. They were constantly asked to prepare bills of

materials and to specify the precise day on which the items would be

required. Min.culously, trucks would subsequently roll up to the Salt

Wells security gate on the specified day to deliver the needed motors,

valves, controllers, switches, and regulators. Lieutenant A. L. Pittinger

later recalled that two of the; e trucks contained Cleaver Brooks

boilers needed for the plant's steam supply. Apparently Lieutenants

Pittinger and Asbury had searched "all over the West Coajc" for

suitabi > boilers, finding nothing but used ones that Sage flatly refused

to acctpt. finally, some new boilers were spotted "sitting on the

ground at another ordnance i -ant." Pittinger added, "We managed to

spirit them away before anyone caught up with us "

9

Thousands of

items were unobtainable to other agencies. However, CalTech's careful

and precise definition of their needs, plus the authoritative magic of

the Manhattan Project priority, appeared to be a winning

combination; as such, it made procurement history. Much later, these

unbelievable shipments were explained by a Manhattan Project Army

officer who stated that, in many cases, his representatives were

waiting at production plants for the uems to come off the lines.

When finished, these items then received an Inyokern tag. That a

shroud of secrecy cloaked the entire procurement operation makes it,

;

ii retrospect, even more remarkable.

The whole aspect of security for Salt V ells is somewhat unusual

because the secrecy was preserved intact for so long. The entire

principle of the security program was "compartmentalization of

knowledge"; each person was entitled to know only a limited detailed

part of the Salt Wells operation. All were specifically enjoined against

speculating on the entire program, as the project required the utmost

secrecy. Thus, even though many hundreds of workers, including

construction men, designers, procurement and supply officers, clerks,

engineers, and scientists had been motivated to extraordinary J.Torts

to complete the plan'., only a handful knew its purpose. Security

approached unprecedented dimensions for one girl whose job required

her to account for hundreds of component parts, the end use of

which she never knew! A subsequent Commanding Officer recalled

that "when visiting admirals came around, there was never an

215
rnii GRAND EXPERIMENT AT !NYOKERN

explanation given of the Salt Wells Pilot Plant other than That's our

secret area.'"10

Side by side with security was the salient characteristic of safety.

A'id while the former delighted the heart of General Groves, it

appeared to him that there might be overconcern with safety. He was

apprehensive that the meticulous attention to such refinements as

rein forced-concrete structures, barricades, blast doors, electiical

shielding, and sensitive deluge systems might be overdone and would

cost him and his project time, which would delay the completion of

Salt Wells.

History records that the deadline for plar.t completion was

missed by !5 Jays. Pittingcr made a final comment on the missed

deadline: "When you consider how long it takes today to get a dog

house built, it is nothing short of a miracle that Salt Wells was

melting explosive [within] 115 days."11

On July 25, 1945, the first high explosives were melted, i ixed,

and poured at Salt Wells. This was nine days after the successful test

of the world's first nuclear weapon (code-named "Trinity") at a

remote site near Alamogordo, New Mexico. It was an implosion

Salt Wells Pilot Plant under construction, July 1945.

216
I A MM AND SAL I HI-1.1

w.'.ipdii roalurmu llic same kiml nl h.iuh-cxplosnf i imponciiis ihai

wmKI sliorth IH' produced in quaniit\ In tlio hn nd-tievv .irdnancL'

pilol pi,ml In l'iicl. niii-' d i\ s alter rriintN proval l.i.il lltr impiiisimi

prnuipii' w.uild work ihc plaiii at NO IS was hciiinnint; lo

manutacluro ilk' crilical hiuii-i \plosive .oinponciits.

PROJLCl CAMLL

C);k- ol iik' üiLjiis In wliuh work lor IIK- Manhattan 1'roji.vl was

sati'.euardOvi al \()IS was iho UM O| a ^vnriu nanio: Projoct

( Will I IKMV is no ollkaa! explanation ol how Project ( Will izot

its namo Onv vvrsion attriikik's n to ihc rcir.ark nkuk' hv an

unknown los \lamos scionlisi on learning: thai (alloch was uonij; lo

Ik- nnoKod m (.ortain aspects ol t.hc nuclear weaj">ons pro^r.;in "You

know what happens when a camel i:elk Us nose undei the llap' ol a

lent!" Howe\er the name itsell has no importance. Hi/anv and

ir.vslenous cod, names were eomnion in World War 11, especiallv

(hose used to mask a highK elassit'ied ai'tivite.

Ilk project name id ('Will was used lo desenhe all the

lechnica, work pei'ormed In ( all cell for the Manhattan Project:

delonatoi lestinu, llu Sail Wells Pilot PI,ml processiiiü and tesl vvork.

the an drops nl bomb shapes from Anns H-2l)bombers, and eheekmy

nil ,s|iiipmeni procedures to be used in the tactical deliven ol the

atom bomb.

I he drop tests with the H-J^s occurred in the 'pruki and early

summer months o| I "-Is I'hese bombers were almost tl'.e Urst aircral'l

lo use the bareK completed \imila;je lield. Manhattan Hinds luivitiü

been provided In lensithen the runways by LOGO feel for the 13-2%.

1 Ins pari o| (AMIl nuisi have been quite mysterious to a lot ol

people who worked al the Station. Altei all. it was well known thai

the thrust id the work at N'OIS was aimed at the development and

lest of aerial rockets. And although rocket launchers were being

devised for a wide assortment ol Nav;, and Army aircraft large ami

small there could sureh be no plan lo equip the enormous homheis

with such installations Ihere was certainh no external evidence that

such was the ease. Despite the harmonious relationship that existed

between the Na\\ and the bo\ - m the olive-drub uniforms who

maintained, serviced, and Hew the B-29s, when it came to diseussmg

their mission, they were exceedingly elose-nioulhed.

It it could have been divulged, the purpose of the 13-29.1 would

217
I 111 (,K ,Mi 1 \l'l KIMi SI \ I l\'H IKI KN

lunc IH'CII uicar. llK'\ wcri- IHMII;' n-» il In ...nuliul .VICIMüIM! U'NI> In

ik'lcniiiiK' liK- oplimmn acroih ii.niihs nl ilu' jloin hnmh ,iiul In U'xl

ilk I'llIU lidtimsJ nl lu/L's.

A^liuilK, air-drop u^i-> Inr llic V-lnun'1'TojoU weif IAUMIMM.'

,iiul \\'.'i\ i.'Diuliu'U'd al sc\oial In^alions Ihroii.uhmil the LOUIIIIA'. lail\

U'si> pnii^ip.ilK Inr ilu' \i\/\' 'k'wlopiiK'iil pi'ouram wviv hcKl al ilk'

Naval rpniiiL' Ciiouiui. Daliltuvn, XIILMIK; Snhs, i|ik'nlh , iiilk'! s.n|H'

U'siuiL' imni'd In U'CIUIIHCI An Base, llali Iwhcri ilu' H-J'' a\'\\-. Im

ilu1 cNciitual Japaner.' iiiiNsinn vs crc iraincd). and in Murni/. Sallon

Soa. and linokcni.

Il IIK'I. was an unpiwcdcnU'd sticntitu Jialk-iiL'c In Iranslalc

iiik'lcar llu'niA niln drnimisl rank- lact. tlu'ix' v.as alsn a ^l;.Mll iKaiil

U'vlmkal clialk'HiZL' in civincrlui;! an untried niuk'ai ik'ViCC mln an

L'IKVIIW air-di.'livv't'i.'d weapon. I In-- was ilu1 mam lask nl C'aplain

Parsons' OrdnaiKe Divisinn al los \lainos I he prohiems were

Iniinidahle. and lhe\ were e\perieneed in holh eonrignralioiis heine

eonsulereil i al Man wilh a Liiilli nl 5 tVei. and hllle Boy llial was

more than IH leet Iniiu. Mthongh the hoinhs" dimensions were

expressK scleeted loi H-.n) appiieation. Iioth eonliyuratnins reipnred

mndilieaimn ol [he aetual homl1ha> s and tlie desninmu of luus lor

seeunny the Liimamh vwapmis

AerodynamiealK, the eaii> rnmh i.-onriunrations were patenth

meapable ol aeeurate llight. i he centers ol iiravitx wee impmperK

located and the llrst dumnn iimnhs tumbled erralicalU and

d.niiieruiish. One naval otilcei wlin was ileepl\ in\ol\ed in the

pirojzram enmmeiUed in an mtemew. "ihis was a i/t/n homh. Il was

Iniilt ah'out like a streamlined hnck, and to iiet | il | In ll\ reasmeilK

well hallisticalK was quite a chore."" I he inunn ret|Uiivd hundreds

ol dinp tests and experiments with d'tlerenl luis and weiehl

distribution helore these problenr, could l\ solved; tests that enuld \\-

observed and recorded In s<))iluslicated instrumcntalion cameras,

[he Inynkcin ranges were w-ll instrumeiUeil for aerial rocket

tests. Al.n ii NOIS n would he possible to nb'ain the specialized

help nl the instrument shop stall ol CalTeeh's Dr. Gerald Kron in

devising and npcraiini' special-purpose instruments for the tests. Hiese

are probably the reasons that the NOTS site was selected tor the

(AMI I project.

I he need Inr a range when, bombs enuld be recovered after

pcn.tiatiiiü into the grouiKl may also have inriuenced the selection. In

a conversation with the bomb recovery crews during the early dass ol

testing at Wendover, Commander i lav ward was tnkl nl recovers

:IH
WIM \Mi MM U M I ',

lirobk'iits ili.ii roil mied Lliugmj: in liicrodibk' dcpl!1^ m ilk' soli saiul

ol ili.ii .nc.i. I l,i\ w.iiil i> rrpukil in hau' sai'J. "Il ycni ilrcppeJ Ilk'

liombs on mil NOIS i nnvv I uuaraiKcs.' you wouldn't haw in dM

nii'i'i.' lii.in six K\'i." Ha\ uard apjiarcnll} uiuiMvsiimalod ihc

iiK'rcdiiMi.' i:rouiul-pMK'!ralion Lapabilii\ ot ilu Inmib uii.'ti dfo1,,H

,

il

ln'in .'5.00(1 MM. IIM IHM duiunn bomb droppcil .11 InN'oki-Tii

ponMrated ilk dosM"! llooi NO deeplx' that il look d /s loi a Uain ol

nk'ii \MIII carlh-rMiimal equipment to ivacli 11 Wikn ilk' bomb wa.s

llnalh iwowivJ. HunoiiL'lis ivmarkeii lliai the hole n left would have

aeeommodaled "a len-slor\ bmldniLi'"'' '

Whaiever the eireumstances I'kil brouizlil the air-drop tests lor

[he Vbonib projeet lo NOIS. il is logieal lo assume that most ol the

\()IS inxoKement resulted from decisions by Parsons. Ihrouuihoul

the de\elopmenl ol the \-boinb, ['"arsons led the design elTort on ilie

pun I\ pe. littk Ho\. When the critical aspect ol air-drop tesliny came

up. he predictabls turned to the \a\\ lor support. In addition to

seniiu.' ,:s tlu' head ol the Ordnance Division at los Alamos and as

one ol |)i Oppenlieimer's deinilies. Parsons was CUMIIU'IK put in

eharue ol all work concerned wilh the llnal preparation and deliven

ol com'cil bombs, lbs remarkable background in ordnance made him

skeptical MI untried papei studies. I his skepticism was largely

Milcenii.il in bnnginLi aboul the extensive test program using actual

bomb shapes at W'endover. Muroc, Sallon Sea. and NOIS

i'he selection ol test sites was nol random, and each location

u I-. puked loi a special reason. Salton Sea. loi example, is below sea

IM d In i'Me this was iiigids signilicanl because the new ii--1'

bombers had dilliuiltx m reaching and maintaining high altitudes due

lo the lendeiiM ol their engines to overheat On the oilier hand,

WendouT. I'lah. although seu'ral ihousaiul led highe; than Salton

Sea, was in ideal air Kisi- lor the secret lormaiioii and iraining ol the

bombei crews who would drop the bomb in combat All were

isolated sites.'"'

Il was undoiibiedK the Parsons penchant lor advance testing that

brought in NO IS earh in t'M.s a strange mass n\' materials and

equipment with the olTieial description ol "One Kit. Bomb

Assembly." I he "Kit"' was a creation ol Parsons' deputy at l.os

Alamos, Dr. Norman Ramsey, who later described its genesis:

I lud tt.llkt'll With lllr \ii Mfi,' kl i UMl III WaslllllLMnn .mil knew lull

well ih.ii, iin in.iiiL-i MIJI uuii pi :\ i. mi inuKInt üL'I llunus mil « ith.nii

.1 l.il'lc ol I'lj.iiii/.iiinii .in.; .i i.ailv HI equipmunl I ihink mu' ol ihr

Ji'wri'si hiiN .it rca l.ipi- I c'.ii PMMIIKISI wit', liiveiiunti mu' iioni ul

njMipiiieni tlui w.i, kn.i\Mi js "Om- Kil. liomh Assi-mbly " \ou know, n

21')
1 111 (IK WD I \,'l HIMl M \ I INIOKf HS

v.iiluli\l in r. .,, 11 ura! MllMiii'li. ■■ 1 .ippimi-J .r- p.ul . ! Ilu I,it>Ii A

i\jiiipinfni ;.M ihi- ^""'ili ; ; 'iip. Niniltin.' ur luvtk'd lium ili.il piHru "ii w.is

.ilu.ns pill .ts pn' i.i ilu' "Ml. Hoinh \sMiiii>l\' I hh hirtiuii'il .ibnui li.ill ,i

Jn/rn i]U.i|iscl lulls .iil.l IU'.. ,il ihrsr 4ll SO l.uu .ii.h sli'i'l iihhrd

situ. tun"-. ,iii,l ,in , ,.iuli!i,.mil:- i'i|iiipnu'iii. all ilu-. in ilu 'Ku, li.iinh

\"riiih|\ " V.nt .r, inu', «.' .luin'l :\-\ .iu.i\ unli il,.- IUNI h\ . k-wi ,I,-\K.'.

111.' |V..pl. urn' ijiHI.' pu-p.iu'd. Ii.ul Lr.-n u.uih'.l, Ilu' Insi inn. ilu\

.1-1.', l.'.l ,i! 111. I'.'ll 1.1 I I'lhjl k,ilh'li I'jlv.ns :r-,p,.lKi. .1 «Uli MlllKK'HI

»i.-.ii ill.ti il.'in lii.il p..,:11 .m ilirv uvir mllin.' i,. l,ikt ,III\ linn.' «. ,nki'.l

, l , I <

K,iM!--^\ also u L\IIK\I in,ii Idiii o| [lie kils I's.soiiliaih

soil .OIII,niu'J b.'iiii' jsM'inl^K huihucs wcw IIKII.1I.', I he OIK' ihal was

iisnl lo assi'iiil'k- ilu1iluiishinia ami Xauasaki hninhs, tunclhri wiih a

spare. \\a soiii to I iniaii, a small atoll in tlk' I'acilu;; oiu' uas hckl

(il is IvIk'U'ill ai W null i\i.'i ,,s a iVM-'ne. aiul Ihc olhcr was mslallal

a I I M\ . »kein

Mi.' luo asscinhlv iMiil.iinus an.i a 'Aaivhousc in Ilk' Inyokern ku

\\i'!\' UivU'd ahoul a \\\\\c l" Ilk' easi nl A11 n 11 a ize lichl, In oik' ol

tlk'so hui.MiiiL's lin.irx I His and Hnrnliani l)a\is asseinhlcd ilk' hrsl

l,'si hiuiih (wiilmiil liie nikk'.u eoix'l thai .u'lualh used liiui!-c\|1losi\i'

hhk'ks.

I'oi I Ihs ,iiui |)a\ is ,I1SM the enlnv N.i\\ ('alleeh eo ipleinenl at

Invokern the line ineanm!.' ol then lahois heeame statkl) ..lear on

AIILMISI M. |'i..is Op ||||S .i.iic, tile name I!in>shima"" heeame

synoin mons \\iili the dawn ol a new era in weapon leelmolos.'N .

Alon;' with newspaper reports ol the homhinu. a leleiiram horn

the I nderseeietaiA ol War was U'la\ ed lo "All the men and women

emploud on the (AMI I Projeet"'

11 III A'i I III Wlldl I UOKI 1> KNOWS Mil SI i Kl I V. Mil II M M || \\|

UM "IP Is Kill' I ol< \I Wi MOM IIS I Wl IM I \Si 0 Mi 'il Mil I

10 \I-H 1 II \ I I III U \K I OKI is i U I \l' \\ \( 1U KM i\\ I I S I I I I ( I s

HI MM.: 1 VI N IMW U I Ol'K.SI 1 N'l S 1111 \IO\ll( HOMH UHUII

M il II \\ I 111 I I'l 11 I i i hi \ i i nl' Ut 111 IIK.II Dl \ I H h i\ In

i'\i Rioiii urn is i m MOSI HI \' \SI A I IM. \III II \K> UI XKON

I 11 \ I \\> < I M \ i in II \S I \ ( K Ifl I \ \H1 I 1(1 I t K\ M. \I\M I I s

I \i .vn \o (iM m 'ml II AS WORK I 11 ON I 111 I \1 11:1 I'Knll . I

OK KNOWN I III U 11(11 I 'i iir. 1 \( II 111 Vill II \s lidsl Ills OW \

ion \NI) Kll'l Ills , \\\ SI OKI I. \N1) SO Kill A"! 1 S"l \K I OR \

OKAIII t I N \ I ION Will N I s x-i ( ONdK.AI I'l .AIIO.VS \N|i I It.ANK

"i ol \l 1 . 1 HOl'l Y(;l UM I ( ON I INM U) Kl I I' III! SI ( RIIS VOI

11 Wl Kl I'l SO Will. 1 111 MIM I OR SI ( I Kl n NNH I OK

( ON 1 IN 11 11 IIIOK1 IS I l'| n \s OR1\l NOW \s II ! VI R WAS

wi \KI I'Korn oi i vi m oNi oi vo' .

KOHI K, I' I'M 1 1 KSON

Signifieantl], ihe end of World Wai II did no', as in the World

War I armisiiee of I'M.S, signal the demise of weapon research and

:JII
I AM I I \ M i S \ i ! V, M I S

dcvclopiiiCiit. Rather, IIUIU militaiA Icailcrs in all the MTVICCN look ii

,IN liu' starting uun lor crvslalli/inj; plans and moving forward. Ainonr

those most inHucntial in dowlopini; the Navy's pos'war rcsearcli and

di'selopinont [iroiirams \<iHild ho Parsons who, hy Ins tccliiiical

leadership in the Maniiattati Project and in his kev role in the t'inai

days of the war, had heeonie llie aeknowledtictl expert of the Na\\

on ordnaiue research and devetopnienl, particularly on nucleai

matters Despite a natural modest)', he lulh recoimi/ed his was a

nnu|iie [nvsition and respoiisihilit\ On Seplemhei" 2. I

(M5, Parsons.

In then pioii.oied ;o the rank ol Cotnniodore. wrote to fhompson

I Ir.ll 1 nl'l'm ,

SuiKiuIr; u i - MiMusI ■■.a,i\. I Ins . wnin- lukM' Ki'si-' i'Iliksl hoi

I'livtik.'si wiih .i i|iKit,iiii'ii Irmn M.ii"! IHMILT I toklni:' llhui: aiul ilic

pi,•■■MIII llu'n -.uim-.' ntlu :lu Mik.i.i.e \ vu niori' IIJNS n, ilns {••vc I-.M-.I

.HUl We'll Is .ll'll hi si.Ill IhMIU' , ,

So.m .illri . i-n h.uk I ho|H' In :\,[ 'if Mlu.ill.,n in muni h\ linAuU'

iit'i ilk' v.iri.ius MI,-, ii , likhn,' S'OIS .ml ilu-n I'll LM I,, l\il Im ihr niosi

l.i'L.il i

1

'.-,i, riiiik- sriup j'.,[ Vi\\ ^iMp-'ii ri'M-Mr^h .iiul ik'vi'hvpnii.'ni | I tnni

lu-n' n M-.IUV ih.ii -..ipu- hh'li p.'Ui-roJ mli'iiik-ihaU' .iiul IMIIU I.UUS' pl.aiiiiiU'

i- in t'uWi i '"

Hul at NO I S the lime had already arrived, for the desert Station

had entered a period in winch prohlems to do with the transition

from w.ii lo peace had alreadv heiitm lo appeal.
1111 GRAND IXI'i KIM1M Al INVOKIRN

REFERENCES

NW'C Kk'iiiilh .ilion miiiii>ri^ .in' fhosc inuli'l wliiih i ipics nl dm unu'nis ,11c lilnl in live

Inhnit.il luliu in.iiinn l)op;irlnu'ni. N.n.il WWIHHIS Cfiilor.

1. William I. I.auroncc. Dann Ovi-r Zcn>. pp. 21l'-2().

2. ibid.. p. :::.

,\ l.L'itor fiuni Conni. W. S. i

J

ai.sons ui L. T. \. ['luimpsoii. Sepicmbci 2. I

,M:

(NWC 2313. 1-143.1

1. Leslie R. (irovos mu'ivicw. Mas DdV. p, I

1

'. (NWC 2313. S-42.)

\ /A;./,, p. 20.

(i. K. II. Rohnison final roviov. coninionis. i

:

chruar_\ l

l,

74.

7. N'oiman Runipp comincnls in authoi, lehniaiN 12. I

(

'73.

(

v

-. A. 1. Piitina'i review einninenis. Augusi 22. l

t

)73. (NWC 2313 47-1.)

", Ibid.

10. James Syke.i interview, Sepiemher 11. I

l|

73. p. 2. (NWC 2313. S-41A.)

11. I'nniiüoi comments. Aueusi 22. l

t

)73. p. 7. (NWC 2313. 47-1.)

12. I.I, \sli\voiili mieivieu. Apiil ''ID. C'0('. p. '>. (NW( 2313. S-ol.)

13. Piuinjzei eommenis. \ugusi 22. I

l|

"

;

3. (NWC 2313. 47-|.)

14. Noiman Ram.se\ interview Ma\ 3. I'KK., p. 13. i NW( 2313. .S-7.)

15. Ibid.. pp. 12-13.

In, Parsun.s letiei. eileJ in Kel. 3 ahuve.
7

Peace and Transition

.1 heightened awareness that the Second World War was about to

end began for XO'fS on August 10. 1945. On that partieular Friday,

the Experimental Ofjieer witnessed an emergeney landing of a TBF.

The log states "Tire and (rash erews were not alert. Commander

Ihiyward said it was tlie sorriosl showing he has ever seen.'"

I Emphasis in original. I

Maybe it was something sensed by all. and not alone by the

lethargic fire and (rash erew. possibly some radio news fash heard by

soineoiu1. or an editorial t omment in the fasl-unfoldir.g news story of

lliros.ima and Xagasaki. It mighi even haw been the same source of

inlormu'-on that ((impelled the Duty Officer to write in the log at

1)620: "The war appears to be over'1'" Four days later, on August

14. another Duty Ofjieer made the eryptie entr in his log. "1600

(ATI'ROX) WAR OVER 17." Fifteen mmntes later, he added.

SEOi'RE FIELD 4S HOURS."

As the jubilant liberty parlies went "over the side." bound for

Los Angeles and then to their homes, undoubtedly those whose

service was "for the duration only" had but one thought in mind. It

was over' First celebrate victory in the time-honoi.'d Navy fashion:

then look forward to a speedy return to civilian life. O'hers, however,

must have had more sober thoughts. To them, it was time to pause

and contemplate the future of NOTS as a significant page of the

Station's history was being turned. The winds of change had already

been blowing for many months: it was correeth sensed that they

would soon acquire gale force.

223
1111 GKANU iATI KIMIM AI INVÜKKKN

A NEW COMMANDING OFFICER

In April 1945 when liurroughs' oixlcrs were issued to .issumc

comnuind of u linuul-new escort carrier (U.S.S, Cape Gluttccstcr). one

with a particularly sensitive nose might have detected the nuance of a

changing hree/.e. But neither Burroughs nor anyone at NOTS could

have forecast the major squall that began to pick up force

coincidentally with his departure. I he exact time is recorded in the

Duly Officer's log of .August 18, 1945:

1(155: ( .ipl.iiii S. I. Hurnuiflis, Captain J. H. S\ ki's, .mil ( umnandoi

KKIUIMIKI .imu- Aiinii.ii^c i-tckl. Captain liiirriuiiihs piped over IIK' Mile,

lld^ Captain HurrniiL'lu departs I'm S.iri Diegu in .IRU«44661. ai-conipami'.l

In I R'uU'n.inl ( iinnnandoi Xos".'. .

The war had been over for only lour days, yet at NOTS

Inyokcrn, the subject of the new Commanding Officer must have

ratet.! as much discussion as the recent sudden capitulation of Japan.

What kind of man? What background war record? Mow would he

affect the Station? The Navy people were well aware of the influence

on their destinies that a ship's captain could exert. The civilians were

equally aware that the military-civilian relationship at NOTS. although

at the highest level of cordiality and cooperation during the war. had

nevertheless shown exposed nerves from time to time. How would the

"new Skipper" handle these in the future? It was only natural that

perfunc'ory comparisons were being made between the new

Commanding Officer. Captain (later Rear Admiral) James Bennett

Sykes.and his predecessor, Sherman Everett Burroughs, Jr.

According to what was su icrficially known, the two men seemed

to share much in common in terms of background and experience.

Both were Easterners Burroughs born and raised in New Hampshire:

Sykes' early childhood had Ixen spent on the Atlantic coast in

Newport News. Virginia. Even n physical appearance, there was a

certain similarity: each man bore the unmistakable erect carriage so

characteristic of the Annapolis graduate and wore a clipped military

mustache. There were many common elements in Navy background,

too: ordnance postgraduate, naval aviator, and distinguished service

with the Fleet and at the Bureau of Ordnance. The only apparent

salient differences between Sykes and Burroughs appeared to be 'hat

Sykes was some eight years older and wore on his tunic, in addition

to Ids gold naval aviator's wings, the prized dolphin emblem of a

qualibed submariner. But those who made the early, hasty

comparisons would shortly learn that the individuals who wore

essentially similar tunics, were, in fact, remarkably dissimilar.

JM
PKACt AND 1RANSITIÜN

—»a"

Captain James Bennett Sykes. the Static, s first peacetime Commanding Officer.

225
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYÜKERN

Sykes, called "Jimmy" by those close to him, was a firm man.

Even at an early age he demonstrated he could make and stand on

his own decisions. As a young boy in the Navy town of Newport

Mews and the son of a Navy chaplain, he first felt the strong call of

i ie sea. While he was in high school, an ambition to enter the Naval

Academy became firmly rooted. After two years of pre-med, he

approached his congressman personally, and only after he had received

his appointment did Sykes' parents become aware of his initiative.

Throughout his naval career, Jimmy Sykes prided himself on his

ability to quickly weigh probabilities and lake action accordingly. His

personal viewpoint in an interview years later was, "After 1 have

decided what I am going to do, 1 am all for it." This credo was

dramatically illustrated when he was in command of the attack

'Trier, the U.S.S. Bennington. Two badly damaged aircraft were

coming in for a landing: a fighter followed by a torpedo plane with a

badly injured pilot at the controls, who, it was evident to all. had

but a single chance to attempt a landing. The fighter landed and

immediately caught fire. In a split second, the Captain made a

decision: push the burning aircraft with the pilot still in the cockpit

over the side. To Sykes the probabilities were instantly clear. The

strongest of these was that the pilot of the fighter would escipe from

the jettisoned aircraft and float, and that three lives in the torpedo

plane outweighed a single life in the eventuality that the fighter pilot

might founder. As it happened, all four lives were saved.

Sykes proudly regarded his command of the Bennington as a

high point of his naval career. In a later interview he said, "Out of

3.600 men, during the eleven months I was in command, no one was

lost other than tin pilots when they had gon off to combat from

the ship."2 He added that out of eleven carriers, they saw six hit and

burned. It was the Benningt,n's aircraft that Hew protective cover for

the stricken Franklin.

Although Sykes was aware that his oru nance postgraduate

training bestowed a certain aimunt of recognition and prestige upon

him and made him a member of "Spike Blandy's Gun Club," he saw

little personal benefit from the training. He later commented, "It did

not serve my purpose; on the whole, it was a waste of time."-5 He

felt that there was too much emphasis on, for example, the design of

a generator and that the most the students would get was only a

superficial understanding of the design work. His viewpoint is

remarkable in that U was in contrast to the pnise generally received

from officers who went ihrough the program. Most saw the "Gun

226
PEACE AND TRANSITION

Club" training as a valuable opportunity to broaden their experience

in ordnance and science, while benefiting at sea from their

understanding of weapons systems introduced into the Fleet.

When the new Skipper assumed command of NOTS, he did not

regard himself as a stranger. On the contrary, he felt he had been

instrumental in starting the Station in the first place. As the Aviation

Assistant in the Planning and Progress Division in the Bureau of

Ordnance, he had successfully handled several money requests from

Burroughs in the early days. His reaction when he first reported to

NOTS was, "I was surprised to find what a bi^ place I had helped to

get started."4

BEGINNING OF A CRUCIAL ERA

When the new Commanding Officer of NOTS assumed command,

NOTS faced immense problems of transition from war to peace that

characterized (he period for military commands across the nation.

After the initial jubilation of victory, the morale of those

remaining at the Station generally plunged. The war had ended, and

the attrition of key military and civilian personnel was beginning to

pinch. There was a sudden loss of motivation with the loss of the

spirit of "let's pull together and win this war." Uncertainty filled the

void; uncertainty as to the changing pattern of Navy research and

development, and how talent in the technical fields could be fitted

into the peacetime military organization.

From the beginning Sykes was confronted by a host of problems

that took on new dimensions in the switch from war to peace:

administration, housing, messing, transportation, security, and supply.

More than twenty years later Sykes expressed the feeling that his

briefing by Burroughs prior to assuming command left a lot to be

desired. Their discussions were brief and centered around the Salt

Wells operation and the Manhattan Project. Sykes recalled ". . . a little

trip out on the mesa in a jeep to talk about this because of the

security problem of the lime." Burroughs had "offluuuledly"

explained, "Well, you have some facilities in Pasadena; you have some

at Morris Dam." These facilities were pointed out on a map, but

Sykes had to find out for himself "what these places did." He said,

"I took a trip to find out how far my authority extended; 1 never

did find out."'

227
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

The Sykes reaction may well have been a reflection of the

uncertainties due to the transition from war to peace, and other

changes such as the transfer of facilities and programs from the

civilian scientific organizai. "m of OSRD to Navy management.

If Burroughs did not tell him, Sykes soon learned that

commanding a new research and development facility was very

different from sea duty. And Sykes soon learned that being in

command of this remote desert Station also implied being the mayor

of an entire city that comprised a bank, stores, beauty parlor,

bowling alley, schools, churches, and residences-and several thousand

civilians. Moreover, much of this "city" was still under construction,

and so he also inherited a multimillion dollar construction contract.

To compound matters, money was now tight, and such contracts were

beginning to get the full focus of the bureaucratic review. Work on

the new laboratory had ground to a halt some three months earlier,

pending, among other things, a total renegotiation of the contract.

Labor disputes were occasionally nnring up, and Station

management-together with the E.'eventh Naval District, the

Department of the Interior, and various 'ongressmen at the state and

federal government levels-was heavily iimlved with land-acquisition

wrangling. Perhaps it is not to be wonoored at that Mrs. Sykes

recalled many occasions when her husband came home and said he

would " ather fight the Japs any day."^

THE PASADENA COMPLICATION

Sykes had been critical about his predecessor's briefing,

particularly with regard to "some facilities in Pasadena . . . some at

Morris Dam." Yet in view of the fluid and complex situation

attendant to Inyokern's new acquisitions, it is doubtful whether any

briefing could have conveyed a clear picture as to what was

happening there during the immediate postwar months.

In the context of a larger picture, the problem seemed simple

enough. OSRD was to transfer its major CalTech programs-rocket,

underwater, and CAMEL~to the Bureau of Ordnance. Included in the

transfer were related facilities and equipment, and those CalTech

personnel who wished to continue working for the U.S. Government.

All were slated for gradual absorption by the Bureau of Oidnance's

Naval Ordnance Test Station with its headquarters at Inyokem.

Unfortunately, at the end of the war when these plans were to

take effect, NOTS was not adequately staffed or equipped to handle

228

;
PEACE AND TRANSITION

the entire transfer paekage; nor would it be for some considerable

time. Interim measures and expedients were necessary, and from them

stemmed a large bulk of the NOTS Pasadena problems. A case in

point was Contract NOrd-9286, let on August 1, 1945, by the Bureau

of Ordnance to the General Tire and Rubber Company (GT&R).

It was a substantial contract for its day, averaging more than

S207,000 per month.7The Bureau hoped that GT&R, in providing

materials and services, would ease the burden of running the show in

Pasadena until the Navy could completely take over. At the time, a

period of one year was tho ight to be sufficient. This particular

.'-iresight proved to be in error; the contract would run for three

yea.r

In sum, the GT&R contract was more than an asset. It was a

necessity. And while the company's contribution was remarkable in

fulfilling the needs of the transition period, it generated formidable

organizational complexities-principally, for the Commanding Officer,

NOTS Inyokem.

For a start, GT&R dealt directly with its contract holder, the

Bureau of Ordnance, through the Bureau's on-site representative, the

Naval Ordnance Officer, whose organizational relationship with NOTS

was defined as merely to "maintain a close liaison with the

Commanding Officer."8This meant that only a tenuous control, if

any, could be exercised over a major operation that contractually

f rnished "experimental material and services ... research and

development activifies for Underwater Ordnance."^

The GT&R contract impinged directly on the operations at

Inyokern as it was to provide "experimental material and

services. . . research and development activities required for Project

CAMEL."10In actual fact, the "services" at Inyokern were minimal.

But at Pasadena they were considerable and far-ranging, including such

items as administration, payroll, personnel, and facility building and

maintenance. The company also took over the operation of more than

100 vehicles, including lift trucks and portable cranes. As a further

indication of the contract's scope, GT&R also administered 487 active

subcontracts in the metropolitan area of Los Angeles.' '

Compounding the organizational problem was the heterogeneous

mix of the nearly 500 people who worked in the huge,

60,000-square-foot Foothill Plant operated by GT&R. It was a

universal understanding that all these employees would ultimately

acquire civil service status. But foi a considerable period of time,

"NOTS Foothill," as it was called, housed GT&R personnel, CalTech

employees waiting to transfer to civil service, and those who had

229
THE »"RAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

already made the transfer; in addition, there was a category of

workers hired by the contractor (and on the payroll) with the

understanding that their transfer to civil service was imminent.

This anomalous situation was recognized by the Bureau in

October 1945, when Hussey cautioned:

Successful operation of the [Foothill| plant with both contract and Civil

Service employees will require tact and cooperation between the

administrative agencies involved-the Naval Ordnance Officer, the

Commanding Officer, Naval Ordnance Test Station and representatives, and

the contractor.

Yet another command aspect of the NOTS Pasadena operation

that caused Sykes some concern was described in a CalTech planning

chart as the "Morris Dem Station." The Dam was one of the first of

CalTech's activities to be transfened to the Navy (July 1945), and it

had promptly been assigned an Officer-in-Charge by the Bureau of

Ordnance. Evidence shows that Commander W. H. Keighley had

firmly taken command. It also seems that Keighley was an outspoken,

"no-nonsense" type of skipper who strongly espoused the

responsibilities and prerogatives of command.

Keighley was predisposed to dealing with the Bureau of

Ordnance directly on occasion, eschewing the established chain of

command through NOTS. He might have been encouraged in this tc a

certain extent by those with whom he interfaced in the Bureau who

put large store in the high-priority torpedo development and testing

program at the Dam. Moreover, the Metropolitan Water District of

Southern California leased the usage rights of Morris Dam directly to

the Bureau of Ordnance rather than to the Naval Ordnance Test

Station. This agreement for the use of Morris Dam was for a ten-year

period with option for renewal for an additional ten years.

In a letter dated January 10, 1946, to the Bureau of Ordnance

regarding the clarification of the status of Morris Dam, Sykes

complained taat he was not the direct addressee of requests for

certain tests and cited a reference to the effect that "all personnel

employed at Morris Dam and in the Pasadena Area are attached to

either a division or department whose head is at Inyokern."13

The record shows that Sykes went to great pains to determine

and clarify his command responsibilities in Pasadena. In so doing, he

probably contributed toward an overall solution to the Pasadena

problem, which, after all, resulted essentially from the transitional,

fragmented character of the Pasadena operation. But as he initially

regarded "NOTS Foothill," "Morris Dam Station," "NOTS Green

Street," and a hodgepodge of equipment, people, and activities, he

perceived mainly organizational disarray. It was understandably

230
I'l U'l WD I RAN'SIl lu\

ilitTicutl to sco heyond this disarray what was the inirpose o! il all:

the programs o!" CalTcch iimnincntly dcsiiiu'd in hecome those ol

NOTS Inyokcrn robust and d\iiamic progia'1. whose essential health

enabled them to eontinuc and llvUirish lliroughoul the dillleull

transition period.

The situation in Pasadena was probabij at its worst when Sykes

as-limed eonimand. Hut it would improve with eaeh passing day.

Irrevocably, the OSRD-Navy plans would be realized as all the

scattered program elements were unifiei into a well-integrated.

elTicient NOTS operation. Additionally, personnel relations with the

parent Station at Inyokern became belter established in Pasadena.

largely through the efforts of William Henry Savior, former CalTcch

engineer, who was recommended by L. T. \:. Thompson to be

Technical Coordinator* (as well as Head, Underwater Ordnance

Section).

One small aspect of the Pasadena problem was what to call the

new, burgeoning operation. At first it was termed variously, "Pasadena

.Area." "Pa .adena Activities," or more truly, "NOTS Pasadena." But

sometime in 1946 it icquired a special name "The Pasadena Annex."

Special, first, in ;hat it was an unofhcial name thai became official

through usage: and second, because it eventually gave rise to much

controversv.

••L.IKL: A BATTLESHIP . , ."

While history acknowledges a nosl ol difficult probiVn.s at NOTS

dunm.' the postwai period, at the same time it reveals a certain

inharmonious relationship between the military and civilians as being

potentially the most threatening to the future of NOTS.

As Dr. Emory Ellis recalled, there were relatively lew differences

at the working level between Navy personnel and civilians. It was Ins

feeling tint all people were commonly affected by red tape and the

inflexible operation of Public Works, Supply, and Transportation.'^ It

was plainly red tape tnat provided the catalyst for bringing two

different deeply undenying philosophies to a boiling point. The chief

* SayKi' receivva Ins U.S. degree in civil .mJ mechanical enphicenni; Irotii CalTcch .it

the age ol 23. He was the Head of the Dam and War Design Section in the U.S. Kngineers

Department, California, from 193« in 194 2. in 1943 he became Assistant to the Sectiun

Supervisor at CalTech until !945. He then became Head of Underwater Ordnance Division.

NOTS Pasadena, until 1947 when he was transferred to the job of Assistant Head of the

i xperimemal Operations Department.14
Uli GRAN') 1 xl'IKIMI \l Vi INVlKI K\

protagonist lor one pliilosuphy was Dr. Walhac 1^. Broilo, .1 scicntisl

vviili L'\ircnul\ stronj.' views on how science ' iu)uk! he ajipl'ed lo

militan problems. And for Ihe other (here was Captain Sykes.

Brode, Head of Hie Science Department, arrived at NOTS on1

da\ hetbre Sykes assumed command. I luis, he was present al the

Change of Command ceremony. What he subsequenlly witncs-.ed

completely reatTirmed his deepest concerns about being a part of ,1

military operation:

Ilk- iU'\v ( oriin.imiiiii' Ollin'i (in his liisi .l.i\ liad ,111 inspiMtion ,iiul

liiusl up .ill hi-., sh.ili MI s.i\. limiU'il miinbi'i .'I Irmips. wluiii'vi'i ynu ull

llu'lll mil I'n'IO. M'.lPU'll "11 |1K' p.II,.ill.- :',|nilluK Im .1 I.illll.il iKinsk'I 11I

1 11111111.1111I. Niul In ;'iil .ill ihr -.i ii-nn-.!-. •ml Ion HUI IIIKSI llinii m .1 rnw.

\iul lie ri.ulr .1 spi'i'i-h in ilu- siienliMs. Ii ivas .1 slim! sp.H'di. nul 11 ».r. in

[iu- L't'i-ii th.it 1 mnni.iiuiiih- .1 u'MMrch l.ihnr.itni \ w.i^ iin dilk'icnt limii

1 iiiiiiii.iiulin:: .1 Killk'sliip. Ik' pnuvi'ikxl llii'll to isMir .1 -nuip ol onk'is. I il.r

.1 I'.'M lo-lup wo Ui'ro m ilu- mhlilli' nl m isol.iU'il .nr.i 111 thi' ilcsi-n .nul ur

I1.11I In li.iii' HUI piiipii si.pph. Ik- vv.is I'mn-- In h.i\r imiii nl ilns INK kill:-

i-'l lo I'.IMili'll.l CVcn il.i\ In I'l'l .1 neu pu'i-c n| tilm 01 .1 t.ulio illiU- ill

.niiii'ilnih' that luinu-.l mil, U r >'rii- to ik'ltTimm' vOl.il ue nrrikil tot -.ii

iiinnilis and order 11. and IIU-T U.IMI I üoine In he ,iii\ •-' ihi'- i|iiii k nrdei-iiu'

ol tnalenal'i. We had to lleure «llal we iieeiled lot rcsearcli PM .I\ inmiik

in advaiKe .nul oidei it |usi .is .1 halllesliip has to he stovked nul ir.uh to

in 10 sea mi si\ iiiniillis ,n .1 lime.

\iul 11 is :li.n s.,fi ,,| plnlosophv ulu. h .Tiiuls the Mii-riino. u 1 lull

•',\ jiikkH. l! isn't the siine as iniinim: .1 battleship.

btiulc's ilisnuiN al the Sykes pronouncement thai lie was üoing

to nti NO i S "like .1 battleship' was shared by m.im ol ihose who

assembled on lhal showen' liui.n morning. Ihe Ibrmei ' nmmandinsj

Ollicer had ne\er dis|ihi\ed lhat hraiul ol authorilan.i'iism. ,\,i\v,

personnel intuilix'eh braced for ihe impending rigors ol oid-lime.

"light-ship'" command. Scientists like Brode saw ahead il;, d.ineci ol

a restricti\e environment lor iheir luliire researcti work, Sueii an

einironment would olTsel what lew blandishmenls ihe desert ship

ollered. lints, lo a few at least, ihe concepl ol ,1 pcrinanenl Nav\

research and development center seemed lo be suddenK nnpenlcd'

b.arly in '.he Sykes adminisir 'ion. ,1 new n.moi IVIMII lo

circulate, l-.ven aller lliirt\ years the runun persisls Sykes s\as

opcralmg under a sei of ■■secret"" instruc; mis lo "lick Ihe place mlo

shape." 'I'liere is no stibsianliatum ol ihis rumor. In a later mlcr\ie\\.

Sykes said thai he had nol been given any special insiniclions. lie

declared lhal ihe only guidelines lie had were, "Vou take command.

1 le adiied. "So I look conimaiul.""' ' More immdane than Ihe see'rcl uislruclions lheoi\. petiiaps. au

Sykes' own words describing Ins earlier operating philosopln

I lu'\ sau! ill,ii , uili,in-, should run the Station. M\ ilimii'ln w 1- A-,

I ,1111 here to pruvkle e ervtlllii; Noll need .nul tell \ nil uh.ii \

1

..- wain, nul
11 SCI \NI) I KANSIl ION

.ill you ii'.Vtl lo Jn. is ..'n ii i h.nl llu1' III-MIIK,\ uic.i ill .1 \,iv\ .uiii'ii . . . ,i

ship lianslorroil M l'v hculi UIILMC me i ,.pi.ii;i inns L'vor) thmi;." '

x

Tilt? dtiermin-jtion ol Sykcs 'n ""rim cvciylhing" quickly hroughl

him fiKC-to-facc with sevcial slr'Mig-niiiKled men al NOTS. The Urs:

of these was Ihe Hxperiineiital Ofllcer. CommauJer "Chick" Hayvvard.

As is generally the case, il was a relatively trivial issue thai

iriggered nearly two years of continuing bad feeling between the two

officers. As Hay ward recalled, the first of main' confrontations look

;ilace almost as soon as S\ kes assumed command. Apparently Ihc

passeuger manilesl for one of Haywani's tlights inchitled the name of

,i lern,ilc civilian 'an employee o| CalTech) who had regularly been

making trips between Inyokern and Pasadena. Sykes contendeil thai

such use o| Nav, aircraft was illegal. Shortly Ihereafter. he similarls

forbade ihe use o| Nav\ buses to transport workers '.o the China

I ake Pilot Plant.

I i,i\ "Ajid recounted, "'I s.-.d 'Aye. Aye. Sir.' ami made the

necessary plum calls lo HuOrd to let them know thai the Pilot Plant

had sluu u.'wn and the reason why."''1

I loin Ihe beginning of Iheir difficull relalionship. Sykes seems |o

considered lla\\sard as being "on the side ol Ihe scientists." .As

he pul il. ""11 lvas .ore knowledge iblc on lechnicai things than 1

was but lu was noi concerned with orderliness or with

icgulaiions."-" In llu same interview. Sykes commented. "Our

ililfcrences were 'iManl in I base a high regard for him. Usually.

lie would lell me MnnelhinL' after he had done il

\ coniMsied wun his ivlationships with Hrodi. and Ilayward.

the new Comm.mdme (illteer >. NOFS had a harmonious relationship

,ii ihe ^!arl wrh on. ui iln. Si.uion's most slroiig-mindeJ men Bruce

Sage. 1-oss oi i

!

> niloi pi,mis. Sykes accepted the separate,

autonomous status oi MK pilot plant.-, as neing ellicicnl and onlerly.

and not requmni' ins personal intervention. Moreover, in many

respects die pi mis wen "tenant" facilities the China lake Pilot

Plant an.weimg i th. Hni\a!i ol Ordnance, and llu Sail Wells Piloi

Plant to 'ire VI.nd .iit.m Pmiecl

llowe\ i tin rilaiiwly harmonious relationship was destined lo

be short-lived. In e.irh I'Mh. a new Officer in Charge ol Construction

woukl anr.i i" ihe person of Captain Howard I. Mathews. .As one

fellow oüii nui ii, "Mathews was gasolim on the lire."-'

Mathews he more than usually slrotig-minded regarding his

lonstriKl loe.ilive.s "on ihe hill"' in Sage's domain.

( onsequeiitb. ,i itlei lend de.eloped between Sage and Mathews.

one Ih,n itu.ih loialh embroiled Sykes.
I 111 r.R WH I M'l RIMI \1 \l IWi iKI KN

' '

1|"-"" i

'

,lm U

"^' ll..ju..ta. \()IS 1 M.r,inK.m;il OltKrr, 194-1 I i-i '

?..u
I'l Ul WH I l< \\M I ION

One more IKIIUC must be given prominence in the slory ol the

NO IS postwar personal relationships ami the men thai uave llicm

eharacter: Commamler (later Captain) Alcorn (i. Beekmaim.

Often a new Commanding Ol't'ieei uses uilliieiKv lo lirini; .1

personally selected hxeculive Officer on hoard. Sykcs had i'.ol done

this, prel'errinj: instead to continue with the e:;istinü "Number Ore."

John Richmoml. Richmoiul, whose principal personal assets were

ability and tact, was highly reuarded by everyone, militan and civilian

alike. I h.us. he was able to apply oil to troubled waters at the ousel

of what was patently a biewmu storm. But Richmond was overdue

for retirement from active duly, and this occurred at the end ol June

I'Mh.

Sykc: selected Beckmann lo be his Kxecutive OlTicu on ihe

basis of a former Nav\ relationship: tile latter had been b'irsl

I iL'iilenant md Damage Control Officer aboard Ihe U.S.S. Bciuun^inn.

riiere was a mulual admiralion. Beckmann regarded his former

Commandint! Officer as "a smart skipper ... and a good handler of

men."'-' lie was parlicularh impressed In the way Sykcs had

eommaruled the Bcmiington and was inortinatelv proud of the

carrier's distinguished combat record. Simikrly, on the basis o|

previous experience. Sykes saw in Beckmann a man he Ihoughl he

needed "an old-style Navy man whom he could depend upon lo mi1

a lighl ship...a hard-boiled ship administrator."--'' Beckmann was all

ol these, and shared with his Captain an abiding concern lor

reeillations, and the necessity of doing things "In the boi>k.

Ihe hiN'okirn assignment was net a popular one lo Beckmann

lie was (old by the Detail Officer that he had been rct|uested bv

name, a request endorsed by the (hier of the Bureau ol Ordnance,

lot diil\ at "a secret naval base in (he deseri." Beckmann replied. "I

don't have any idea what's going on there, and I don't wani lo

know." He amplified tins by affirming. "I'm a bachelor and I've spent

Ihe whole war al sea. and I'm due for shore duty; and 1 want sonii

place where I here's a little wine, women, and dancing, wilii singing

thrown in."

Ik got in touch with Sykes immediately and was told that Ins

orders were already being cut. Sykes added, 'del your hands on .1

copy of NCP1 Navy Civilian Personnel Inslrnclions and s'arl burning

Ihe midnight oil and boning up on it. because you'tx. going lo be

mayor of a cil\ with three fire departments, elemental 'nul high

school. e|C.""J
Uli- (IRANI) 1 XPIRIMIM VI INYOKi RN

Bul ii vuuikl take more tlum [lie NCI'I and the "midnighl oil"

to engender a keen untlcrslanding of the curious and unique

eircumstances at NOTS.

In reviewing personal relationships in (lie tensity ot the postwar

reatljustments, il is imporlanl to recognize that the only clearly

defined schism was between authoritarianism and scientific freedom.

In such a spül Beckmann and Brode represented the outside extremes.

However, it was not a simple split with all the military on one side

of the issue and all the civilians on the other: Hayward, for example.

as a naval officer was clearly on the side of broad scientific freedom,

and Sage as a civilian scienlisl was an authoritarian.

Sykes. at the storm center ol the gale, later recalled how his

new l:\eciilive Officer was "immediately at loggerheads with the

scientists," bul he was quick to point out, "I backed him up."--1

In a historical narrative of the Station, written in October l

cM(i

Sykes appraiied the caliber of his command both for "Service" and

" Civilian" pi rsonncl. About the former he wrote:

In ,in clTorl i" m.nni.im the rwiiiiied '"imlvi ot" men on the Station.

j l.iiiic numhn ol "Miorl Itnu'rs" witli from one il.i\ 10 two nionlli^ to do

were ouleral lo IllC Sumon. I'llcsc men «ere s'.ener.ilh dlsurunileil.

troulilevome. and ol vor) hide value to ihe Saition. I lie aetions of sorviee

peiAonnel Jnnne Jernohili/.ation served lo prealh lower ihe respeei of

enilians toward Miviee men both socially and profcssianally.

Snue Jltlv', the "an hoard" eompleinent had increased lo S05 on I

Octoher l'*4fi. Ihe increase had been l.ireelv in (TO and non-rated croups,

ineludine manv ex-prisoners of «ar.

Ihe averaue tiuality ol personnel is well belott pre-wai standards ("his

is due priinanh to lack ol experience in the petu officer ratines Livina in

ehise proximity lo eivilians, nineli nuire liighly paid lor similar work, !'iu-s

lire men a dissatisfied outlook, I lie servicenien are fre(|lien n called on for

work outside of workinit hour'- to take care of emerjtencies instead ol usin^

Civil Service IVrsorinel because ol limitations on overtime work."''

Sykes" evaluation of the NOTS civilian employees was similarly

low .

I here is a tendency lor som1; employees lo pet form work in a

perfuncton manner wittioul producii,;! reasonably expected results tor .1

day's work. Supervision in jieneral is poor, especialh' 111 the subordinate

brackets, lailess ihe individual responsible, on a Ineh level, activeh lakes

charee ol an operation, the work will lac. I lie process of oblainuu' and

traininj; a satisfactory superviscry proup is proceedim; slowly.

Bul Sykes' evaluation ol personnel was measurably higher than

thai of his Executive Officer, who stated years later that only 309f of

the civilians were dedicated and trained people. The remaining 70''

were a "collection of no-good drifters or people running away from

something." But it ,night be said his evaluation, whether extreme or

not, was evenhanded, for he slated, "We had just as many

236
l'IACl AND rRANSJTION

iioocl-lor-iioihint; klunkers in the military as we had in Ih technical

staff."-«

The overall quality of both the military and civilian staff in the

postwar transition period is dcbatabK Certainly it did not compare

with the combined CalTeeh-NU iT. ockcl team of the war. But

whatever the status, negative attitude; directed at the whole team did

not help make I he Station a more desirable place for those who were

trained and dedicated, whether the number was 70 or 309?,

At first glance, many of the postwar problems appear to I v

merely a list of petty grievances and complaints, which md'vidually

seem to be absurdly trivial in some cases, ludicrous. But to the

people concerned at the time, the situation was without humor.

Rather, the incidents eolleetiveK acquired an abrasive quality that

tended, as Brode put it, to ""grind the scientists to a halt"-1' If the

situation had not been corrected it could have done irreparable

damage to the Station by making it more difficult to recruit a higher

caliber staff. At the heart of the problem was the fact that the Navy

could not, to paraphrase a statement attributed to Dr. Albert

Michelson. expect to keep first-rate physicists (or engineers, or

administrators, or technicians) if it did not treat them as first-rate

physicists.-1"

Main of the individual complaints that added to the low morale

stemmed from the inability and reluctance of avilians to adapt their

lives to Navy regulations, and when an appeal was made at the

command level, the judgment was generally made according to tlu

book.

Unfortunately, Navy regulations often proved to be entirely

inappropriate to guide the activities of a remote desert community

populated largeh by civilians. For example. Navy vehicles, specifically

designated for the use of authorized personnel, provided nearly all

transportation at NO IS. This was subject to different interpretations.

A former employee recalled a typical incident:

It u.is .ill rii:hi l'oi ulluris u? allisled porsonnül in luivc olTicwl un1.

lu ai lo ihr l'\ or anyphia.' else. Inn run I'm civilian.', Ami mnul you wv

won' .n .m isolau'd Hasc, Wo ol'ten h.ul now empluycos comr on tho Huso.

In nno c.iso whiio ihr man was boinj.' Inirloil in or (JOiv-,. Ihruudi socnriU

oloarances, ihr wife and small baby were sii'lnt! in ilio outer offico. MUI ihr

lioiisino clerk was very sympallielic and said, "Can'l I lake you over lo llio

I'M arid on some milk for the baby and lake you on to youi now house so

you ran rot some rest?" It's a little drive io pel there from anywhere. I'his

was .lone |Usi once. The oirl drove the onl) rar they had; of course il was a

Nav rar. I'liry wonl ovor to the I'X, and she ool clobbered hy the Navy loi

iisinr a Navy car lor civilian purposes, h's that unsympalliolir. alniosl cruel

administration thai ot'tcn moved people off the Base.-"

237
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KLRN

Similar experiences have been reported Ihroughout a wide

spectrum of life at NOTS. Many complaints concerned Public Works:

. . . They'ie iloinp something good Tor your neighbor in the other half

of (he duplex, who is ;i Navy person, but you can't gel them to repair a

broken pipe on your side of the house... if there was an extra freezer it

would go into one half of the duplex thai was occupied by a Navy Chief

and the civilian side wouldn't gel a look at it. You'd get a piece of

furniture... [only] aller all the Navy people were satisfied.'3

liven after a bending of the rules permitted civilians to use the

"quasi-official activities" (commissary, ship's service, etc.), it was

required that two separate lines be formed: one for the officer's wife,

another for the scientist's wife.3-

3

As time progressed, the volume of complaints burgeoned, and, in

retrospect, a certain sympathy seems appropriate to the NOTS

Commanding Officer and his equally harassed Executive Officer who

were attempting to solve the problem by the book.

After the first rumblings of discontent. Captain Sykes announced

an open-door policy: a fair hearing to anyone who had a problem. In

time, he found himself overwhelmed by a barrage of

problems technical, administrative, and social. The open-door policy

was in time terminated, perhaps as the result of the incident when an

irate housewife deposited on his desk a spoiled chicken she had just

purchased from the commissary.j4

Solution of the minoi problems skirted around the principal issue

from which they stemmed: the military-civilian relationship at the

highest echelon of the Station, and how it affected the mission of

NOTS, The philosophy of running a research and development

organization "just like a battleship" implied ultimate disaster to many.

The very conduct of the new programs appeared to be in jeopardy.

The ablest and most qualified of the Station's top scientists and

engineers were threatening to leave, and the recruitment program for

new talent was suffering severe setbacks.-^5The basic question was

repeatedly asked, "For what purpose is NOTS being run-research and

development, or test services in the tradition of the old naval proving

grounds?" If the essential spirit of the Knox establishing order was to

be preserved, who could best direct the technical activities of

NOTS the military officers or the civilian scientists? And was there

an effective compromise (such as envisioned by Thompson) wherein a

large measure of independence could allow the civilian staff to work

comfortably within the overall framework of the Navy?

As previously stated, conflicts among the strong-minded 'caders

of early Inyokern cannot be simply characterized as military versus

civilian. Nothing illustrates this more clearly than the deep-seated

238
PEACE AND TRANSITION

controversy between Captain Sykes and Commander Hayward.

Hayward, who was essentially in charge of the technical programs,

watched with concern the lowering of morale on the Station and the

subsequent diminishing quality of the technical effort. He was aware

that valuable people were leaving and that it was difficuii to replace

them. As he saw it, this pervasive erosion was Station-wide, affecting

both military and civilian personnel, and presaged the ultimate loss of

the original dream of a permanent research and development center

for ordnance. To Hayward's way of thinking, such a loss to the Navy

and the nation was unconscionable.-^

Yet, despite the many manifestations of troubled times, there

was hope. For nearly two years of wartime operation, NOTS and

CalTech had conclusively demonstrated that good military-scientific

relations were possible and highly productive. In the immediate

postwar period, the CalTech heritage of independent thinking was still

strong at NOTS; moreover, although Burroughs had left, many of the

original Navy team members who had worked in the enlightened

wartime environment were still on board (Hayward, Richmond,

Vossler, and Pittinger, to name a few). Here, at Inyokern, there was

still an opportunity to extend a tradition of harmonious

military-civilian n ationship into the Navy's postwar research and

development effort.

239
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

REFERENCES

NWT identification inimbers are those under which copies of documents are filed in the

Tcehnical Information Department, Naval Weapons Center. The following abbrc>ialion is used

lo identify the record collection where one document was found:

IIU'M Naval Weapons Center records stored al federal Records Center,

Medianicsburg, Pennsylvania

1. Duly Officer's Log. August 18. 1945. FRCM. (NWC 2313, 1117.)

2. James Sykes inlerview, April 27, 1967. p. 10. (NWC 2313, S-41.)

3. Ibid., p. 7.

4. IHd.. p. 2.

5. Ibid., pp. 24 and 25.

6. Ibid., p. 12.

7. General Tire and Rubber Co. Report, "An Analysis of the GT&R Co. of

California Organi/alior on Navy Work," March 21, 1946. (NWC 2313, 14-1.)

8. Leiter from Geo.ge Mussey, Chief, Bureau of Ordnance, lo Naval Liaison

Officer, CalTech, October 2, 1945. (NWC 2313, 9-15.)

l

). Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. CiT Planning Chart.

12. llussey letter, cited in Ref. 8 above.

13. Leiter from J. B. Sykes to Chief. Bmcau of Ordnance, on Morris Dam.

January 10, 1946. (NWC 2313, 19-38.)

14. American Men of Science. 9th ed.. Vol. 1 (1955), p. 1689.

15. Emory L. and Marion Ellis interview, February 23, 1971, pp. 70-74. (NWC

2313,5-77.)

16. Wallace R. Brode interview. May 1969, p. 1. (NWC 2313, S-66.)

17. Sykes interview, April 27. 1967, p. 3. (NWC 2313, S-41.)

18. Ibid.

19. John T. Hayward interview. May 4, 1973, p. 2. (NWC 2313, S-6.)

20. Sykes interview, April 27, 1967, p. 22. (NWC 2313, S-41.)

21. John T. Hayward interview, July 26, 1973, p. 50. (NWC 2313, S-86.)

22. A. G. Beckmann interview. May 1968, p. 2. (NWC 2313, S-53.)

240
PEACi AND TRANSITION

23. Sykes interview, April 27, 1967, pp. 20-21. (NWC 2313, S-41.)

24. Beckmann interview. May 1968, p. 21. (NWC 2313, S-53.)

25. Sykes interview, April 27, 1967, pp. 20-21. (NWC 2313, S-41.)

26. Unpublished report, "Historical Narrative of the U.S. Naval Ordnance Test

Station, Inyokern, California, for the Period 1 September 1945 to 1 October

1946," pp. 2-3. (NWC 2313, 1-20.)

27. Ibid., p. 3.

28. Beckmann interview, pp. 3, 4. and 33. (NWC 2313, S-53.)

29. Brode interview. May 1969, p. 1. (NWC 2313, S-66.)

30. Robert A. Millikan, "Albert Abraham Michelson," National Academy

Biographical Memoirs, Vol. XIX, Washington, D.C., Nations Academy of

Sciences, 1938, p. 123.

31. Brode interview. May 1969, p. 13. (NWC 2313, S-66.)

32. Ellis interview, February 23, 1971, p. 70. (NWC 2313, S-77.)

33. Brode interview. May 1969, p. 7 (NWC 2313, S-66.)

34. Sykes interview, April 27, 1967, p. 12. (NWC 2313, S-41.)

35. Brode interview. May 1969, p. 6. (NWC 2313, S-66.)

36. Hayward interview, July 26, 1973, p. 48. (NWC 2313, S-86.)

241
8

Problems of the Postwar Watch

The difficult period of peacetime adjustment was not exclusive

to NOTS alone. OSRD had not retreated from its firm determination

to go out of business when hostilities ended. Consequently, despite

months of advance notice, the armed services were generally

ill-prepared to absorb their part of the massive scientific program built

up under OSRD.

The severest problem was a lack of qualified, competent

scientific personnel—compounded at NOTS by the aspect of living

conditions in a remote desert environment. But there was another

major impediment to successful recruiting of top-flight people: a

distaste for the restrictions implied by the traditional military

framework. Efforts to discover a new formula for a productive

militarv-eivilian relationship constantly stimulated the minds of the

leaders at Invokern during the immediate postwar years.

SEARCH FOR A DIRECTOR

For his first four months as NOTS Commanding Officer, Sykes

did not have a full time Director of Research since Thompson, who

was acting in that position, was dividing his time between Inyokem

and Indianapolis. Thompson was still trying to influence Hussey in

favor of nominating Lawrence Hafstad for the permanent position of

Director of Research.

In a "Dear George" letter to Admiral Hussey on October 24,

1945, Thompson injected a note of quiet desperation regarding the

availability of the new Director:

... I understand Hafstad has been willing to come if the Uureau would say

the word, and 1 believe siill is.

243
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

It is now not so much a question whether Hafstad can du more

elTective work this year or next in Washington on a specific project. The

present question is a bigger one-whether the Bureau's investment in what

can be an outstanding research and development center at NOTS is to get

off to a start which will insure a high level of success, or to a mediocre start

from which it may never recover. .. .'

Hussey's "Dear Tommy" letter received in reply did not lessen

Thompson's concern:

While 1 concur with you fully, that top-flight research men are necessary for

the Naval Ordnance Test Station, it is equally as true for the Applied Physics

Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University. Haf'.tad is Tuve's right hand man,

and with our BumbLbee research program in its present status 1 am afraid it

would not be advisable or in the Bureau's best interests for Hafstad to

transfer to the Naval Ordnance Test Station at the present time.2

Hussey's reasoning was sound. The Bumblebee Project v as vitally

important to the Navy and the Bu.-eau of Ordnance, encompassing as

it did, the entire ship antiaircraft guided missile research and

development effort for which the Applied Physics Laboratory of

Johns Hopkins University acted as the Bureau's government-owned,

contractor-operated laboratory.

This effort was a brightly burning segment of the OSRD torch

(formerly T-Oivision) that had been passed to the Bureau of

Ordnance. The developmental jet-propel ed, beam-riding antiaircraft

weapons were considered to be essential in defending ships against air

attacks. The harsh lessons of World War II had been hammered home

in the form of the devastating Japanese kamikazi attacks. Not only

were aircraft and their weapons going to improve, but the kamikazis

had given a foretaste of the problems that would bo faced when

antiship guided missiles became more soplüsticated.

Despite Thompson's strong recommendation to the Bureau of

Ordnance, it would be erroneous to conclude that Hafstad was the

sole qualified cand/dat- for the Director of Research post at NOTS.

As a result of '.ae war, there were more scientists with ordnance

experience than ever before, but the number of top flight scientists

who would consider government employment for the military services

was small. It is perhaos appropr/ate to examine the basic reason: salary.

George Hussey appreciated this and e'/entually would be a key

figure in helping to solve the problem.* But at the time a Director

was being sought for NOTS, all Hussey could do was deplore the fact

Hussey later worked with the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Ships and Aeronautics in getting

the Chairman of the House Committee on Post Office and Labor to introduce Public Law 313.

This was signed by the President on August 1, 1947. Under its terms, 30 scientific and technical

positions, including that of the chief scientist at NOTS, would be established above the top civil

service grade (then $16,000 per annum).3By its action Congress would finally remove one of

the oldest blocks to a viable research program at NOTS and other government laboratories.

244
PROBLEMS OF THE POSTWAR WATCH

that the top senior civil service salaiy was around $10,000 per

annum, a remuneration not sufficient in itself to attract the desired

caliber of scientist with commensurate management experience.

Compounding the problem was a condition described by Irvin

Stewart (OSRD's historian) as the "demobilization bandwagon"-a

condition that affected most of the nation's leading scientists. Stewart

summarized it as follows:

OSRD was created to do an important but temporary job. The

organization wan built on a temporary basis, drawing upon the best available

men for relatively short periods of time without disturbing their regular

academic or industrial connections in most ' ises. This was possible largely

bccai se of the pressure of impending and actual Wdi which madn men

available whose services could not have been obtained < n any comparable

scale in normal times. The leaders of OSRD were always keenly conscious of

this fact, which, howt , complete y escaped many people on the outside

who, seeing the success of OSRD, called for its retention into peacetime.

There was never any chance that this could be Jone. Cnce the pressure of

war .Hfted, the 1 ay men upon whom its success depended responded to the

more urgent calli of their regular activities and not all thj king's horse;, nor

all the king's men could l

-

old the group together.-1

Thompson's wartime association with NOTS as a consultant and

organization specialist had endowed him with an extraordinary insight

as to the unique circumstances inherent to the desert Station. . ow,

with the replacement of the easy-going Burroughs by a less flexible

Commanding Officer, Thompson was acutely aware that another

dimension had been ;idded to Inyokem's already complex management

picture. Very special qualifications would be required of the NOTS

Director of Research-beyond prestigious scientific stature and normal

management ability. In Thompson's view, H;.fstad was still the best

candidate. But when he realized that Hafstad could not be spared for

the NOTS position, this appears to have turned the scales in favor of

taking the job himself; and by so doing, acceding to the long-standing

combined pressures from the Bureau of Ordnance and "Ev"

Burroughs.

Thompson's assumption of his nev post was in the nature of a

gradual phase-in over several weeks, beginning in October 1945. On

December 4, 1945, his name and permanent title were printed on the

Station s new organizational chart. NOTS now had c full-time Direcior

of Research.

THE LABORATORY: HOPE RENEWED

"Construction Work Is Started on Five Million Dollar

Laboratory." So read the headline in the Station newspaper, the

2-15
Mil GKAND rXPtRIMtNI Al INYOKtRN

M.O.T.S. Ri>( ki-iicr: Hie duii' \wis January 2H. 1946. fhe lead article

read in part. "Construction of he new laboratory a! NOTS is now

ntTicially under way wit.) the awardinu of a 55,060,000 contract to

John.ion. Drake, and Piper ol Mil sankee. . . . Actual construction will

he in lull swin^z hy the middle of March."""'

liiere were mane whose hearts were uladdened hy llie news, i-dr

nine months smnmer. lall, and winter el' 1945 construction of the

ialMiraim \ had stood fro/en ai a lO'V completion stale, which

di-miayed many who viewed ilail\ the lo'indation and rust) tangle of

steel rods. Others were still eii.'wing the implication of the meager

structure as a sin mi hope lor a fresh start and a new laboratory in

Pasadena.

When the decision ti "o ahead with 'he permanent laboratory

was made in January l''-4(), a i/e litrfo research and development

aetivit\ was alirad_\ in existence at NOTS. In addition to the

temporan electronics laboratoiy, there were many other laboraton

functions in Ouonsel huts and lemporan facilities pemling completion

ol ihe mam lutikling. riiese included research in theoretical and

nuclear Hiysics, organu and inorganii chemistry, metallury. ceramics.

ordnance, aeronautics, and meteorology. A report on the Station by

Captain Sykes to the Bureau of Ordnance on Dccembei N. 1^45,

akes refeivnce to ihe fact that "temporary laboratory space in use

at \()I,S is about 40.000 -i|iiare feet.'"'' In a report to the Boaid to

Suncy the ("ontinental Na al Shor" bstablishments. Hussev wrote on

Mac .i I

(

)4(>

Ilk- ik'« Lil'or.ildrv oiru'iuK uiuii'i Loiislrm linn .11 In.Hkrm is ,111

jpi'litil ri'M'.mli jiul tk'Vt'lopnn'ni 'ypv Lit ualor) LIUU aned »Uli siudyiiii;

jinl ,;!i.il>/ln!J Ihr lnpa.iiik'nl.il Mii'iililk pruuiplfs . ailli ilirn ' .,rmrn in;'

.,, phi ,I;;IIIK, \ppro\li l.Uel) S5 ' nl Ihr ^ irnlilii .iml .ipfnilllii |H-iv.innfl

.rxicuieil with llic l.il'or.ii.M , .110 omemh uurkmi' .il layokoni in

vmponirj ii'Jarters

B\ this time construction was in full swing. Ihe contractor's

work force ol nearly lour hundred had started with an energy that

seemed to promise that all the months of inactivity would be offset

by an extra effort. In another letter to the Assistant Secretary of the

Navy on April 24, llusscy had commented:

\i ilu' prcsonl Miur ouisiiik Hun ,i| ilk' liihoialun 's ,ippii.\iiii nrh

ij eumplelL', Miirui 'rs i,\ ihr m.iU'r,.ils roiiuired lor ilic ri'immdi'i ul ilk'

cnnslruciion arc eillifi (in luikl ,11 ilk- stalion, 111 ,1 aiipinoii slatus. ai h.iu'

Ik'i'Il irdlTLkl . , .

fhe purpose of Hiisscy's letter was to obtain priorities for the

remaining 5'V of necessary materials: as llusscy put it. "without which

2-1 (.
I'ROBLI Mh Ol 1 III I'O.Sl WAR W AlCII

construclkm ol ihc labunilon \vi;i lie delayed." Clearly, everybody

from the Cliiel ol the Bureau ol' Ordnance down was anxioib to get

the job finished.

The Lirgeney to oeeupy and use the new faeility was witlely iell

at Inyokern and seemed to grow as did lue walls ol the new

laboratory.

As they watched the new six-wint: building lake shape, the

employees a; NOTS periodically exercised a traditional ""sidewalk

superintendent" role. In this eapaeii\ they observed with inieresl all

ol the special features that were being built into the laboratory; lor

example, earlnquake resistance, in that the wings, shop building, and

mam corridor were isolated I'rom each other and connected by

accordion copper Hashing; also, there were extra reinlorcemenl.s in llu

concrete structure, earned in the corners and junctions between

outside walN. floors, and roof.

An additional feature of interest was the use ol room partitions

that were of a removable sheet steel type, built up in panels, i'liese

panels could be easil\ shifted to alte; tue si/.c and shape of rooms |o

meet changes in activitx and organi/ation. Moreover, the two-la\ei

sheet steel panels, separated b\ ' ini.'hes ol dead-air space, were

coaled with soun l-deadening material for good acoustic and thermal

msulalion.

Part u ularl\ impressive \vas the air-conditioning system a

combination of l4.0Ü(Mon l-'reon mechanical refrigeration and

evajioratiw cooling systems lhal reiareulated nearh 1.500.000 cubu

feel ol air pei" minute.

riiese and a hosl of other remarkablr leatures thai charaeteri/ed

Ihe new NOTS laboratory impressed Ihe obscners at Inyokern and

were brought to the attention of the building construction mdusln

through an article in a trade iournal. Howevi-r. the bureau o|

Ordnance in Washington beat no big drum publicly loi their new

research facility in the desert. On the contrary, ii maintained a

matter-of-fact altitude throughout the Iwenly-seven months n look to

compleie the laboratory. This attitude is typified in (lussey s letter to

the Assistant Secretary of ihe Navy, previously cited;

llu' u-H-.iri h. aovt'liipuiL'nl. .niJ IOM projiH'l^ wlu.'li ii.iM-' IHUI LISMLWK'II

In ilu- N.iv.il Oiiln.iiur I i-si Sl.iU'Mi. Inyokcni .in' p.irl ol il- \.i\s\

.ipprovod pnigram lor pusl wai i .rani, and dcvelcipuiL'Ml. I IM lai'illlK's

vvhicli .in- .ilri'iuh Liinslniclcil o! .m UIUKM .nnsiniclinn .n llu' |iri'seiil nn'r

art llic iiuniiMuii) |aulluiri/ed| iri|Liar,: iu i.uo mil this program.

But, despite this outward conservative attitude. Ihe liureau's

determinalion to have a llrst-class research laboratory at Invokern

M"
111! GKAND I XI'MUMl Nl \ I INVUKI KN

r-,^e0^^

,***&

\ \ ) ' • ' I; .Hrn- .i \lu|u'K,.n 1 ,iKir.iini>. Juh I

l)J ".

i. ii uiuliniin^hcil. I hh 'Aas OSKU'IKXHI nul onl\ hy Iho locision

.ihcui ^iin \\x l.uilil)' conslruclion pnigr;ini. Init In an

'\\\:: li' ,iv qmu' llu ifijiiisilo L'quipnU'llt.

1)1 \( AN HI VS 1 giill'Ml.N I

I'lnanviiK'nl "i . i|iii|iiiicnl Inr I'IC laboriilcry had liltk'

ii'iiship in liu1 >.'Misii ,:Uiiin pnijax'ss. ll had started hL-lbiv ilic

. M' piUlli'd aild uMll jlliK'd L'VOll lIlOLIgll illCri1 Was 111)

in:' Ii) hDusc ilu prodigious uinoimt id equipniont

i iial ,i. ' . ma- i'd.

oiisi.'i I'atk in l')4l. James Duncan sliouldcn-'d luos! oi

lak'i mlerviow Ik- recalled his initiation into this

ip.i ii\ . "NO IS I ahoralory Officer":

iKI L'n pd Hiil)ril| .irul ni.ik.- up li>.l\ ol i-i|uipiiu-nl :iiul

.,ii uv wunU'il, IN- iliitii1ili,ii ,il\\,iys .miuscil im- very nn.ili VAIS

i,mi Hvnu's lnlil inr in 1:11 .iliuul ,ii)cl si.ill Inniiiji ecjuipnient. I

'inu 1 1 tu ,IIMIII Ulis,'" \iul IIL- said, ")* • !! yuu IIISI lake Uns

,i|H-i nul slhiM. 11 I11 pi-i.plr ,iriHiiiil lion" ui Ilk- ik-p.ii linrnl

MIII-" HI warn sonu'lhini; and Ulis is your iccount." and In- wrolc V'.iuls

,

1

-4S
I'KOHI I \lS Ul I ill I'l i J W AK \\ Ml II

.nul D.Kks nuinlHT sn ,iiul MI mU' ,iiul ,1 lull million itollars. Ho »ml "Whcii

yoii'vi' spnii Hut. sec my sci'ni.irs .nul she'll civv you some niore.' \nil s-i

uv SI.N loil lo buy rquipmenl. '

I he assiircmcc ol .such .1 largess of lunds was ,1 gooil hcgimiiiii!.

and Duncan plnngcJ inln his task with uivai encruy. BcforL" lie was

through, that llrsi SI.500,000 would he spent almost three times

over. Ironically, the ready supply ol lunds did not automatically solve

all of Dune,1!,"s purchasing problems. Some of the needed equipment

simply was not available at any price, flic industrial firms that

manufactured it were producing to capacity on the basis of

long-standing pnorities. It took (he application of considerable

pressure from the Bureaus of Ordnance and of Yards and Docks to

get the needs ol the permanenl postwar laboraton at Invokern put

high on the list.

.Additionally. Duncan and others involved with procuring the

equipment had the problem of adjusting their thinking in terms ol

quantity. Duncan's narrative illustrates this:

. . . Wc wore setlme up .m eloeirnmes Uhoratoo 111 .1 e'uonsel Inn on Ihe

h.ise U'llhoiil u.iilinr loi .on ol llio perm.inonl lunUlnu's .nul I eol .1I10KI ol

,1 i.otui.!' lotlow n.inu'il I nke Hihernum. I gave linn Hie .isMgnmenl ol Imyine

t'teelioniev ei|uiprnenl to eel st.uled vetlli. .nul I leineniiHT one llnne I lokl

linn u.is thai I «.niled .1 iiuinbej ol ostittocraphv li u.is ahnosl

meoiuvivahle to I uke that .mAhoih uonia buy more 1I1.01 one oseittojitaph. I

soni hnn itoun to Dahinten nul lot him see tliroe oseilto^raphs sei up on on«

, spennuni so ihen he v\.is uilltne lo o-.r, ,1 hall .1 ilo/en. \iul I loUl him lo

bin slo.ooo worth il small parts ami ihe. he ilul. I ho was the start ol ihe

iloelronii .nu k. lour helore « li.ul the lab.' '

But by comparison with the probiems that were yet to surface

the initial procurement ol equipment appeared to he relatively blessed

by' eass success.

Ih" harbinger ol the greater problems ippeared in cuiy 1

1M5

when it seemed that the war was being brought to 1 sticec ssful

conclusion. Concurrently, the llosv of mone\ was redved lo a trickle

as a wan line budgd was pinched down for a peacetiim one.

As an. expedient, the Bureau of Ordnance c' iu:eived a plan

whereby surplus equipment could be obtained from factories and

plants that were closing as war production wound do,*

,

ii. Basically, it

was a good idea. Unfortunately, the gull betwe'!, idea and

implementation in this case proved lo be wade, hoi many, including

the NO IS Laboratory OITicer. pmcurng suiplus equipmc'ai

represented an ordeal in patience and tenacity. Duncan has "ii us a

trip report that covers ten busy 'hsys in May DMd. It descriia's nis

activities concerning the surplus plant equipment from the Basic

.M')
I ill CRAM.) I MM KIMI M Al INVÜKI l<.\

-• '-:!--■■■.• , ,

::.'-<

; ' ;:','' "rir: ll-'^rir^^^S^'61,7' -''

.,-

( ntirlru l/n. .ltlUlv\ /);,;,

' ''I'''11" ' ""^ \- Dun..111. \()IS I jtinrulorsf> (ini.n, n-l-t io hM":

J5(l
l'KOIU ! MS o: I III I'. ISTWAR \\ \ I ( II

Magiiosium I'rdjov.'!, Hoiuicrson, Nevada, and ot'icr mi.SL'L'Ilancous

surplus otiuipincnt. An excoriif iron) tlic report illusfratcs how Duncan

naviyatod tiirough llio lahyrinlli of hua'aucracy:

M.iv I I rcporu'il in MuOnl ;il l':JU a.m. and miMiedtalol) procvalcil lo

I'ont.u'l R.l .( | Kvi .'iisii in iiui lin.nui.il Corpora lion | lo p'lr.'.'.r liasi«

Mai'tu-Mtini I'l.ini ro NolS. I |v|ionotl \li I raiA Koh.in C'liiol' ol ConU'il

I 01 iiiin.iiion Stvtion R.l .('. Vlr. Ron.in \\\;\ onl .mi I -.p^l.c lo his .issistan , Mi, llaiiK's. I niaik' .m ,ip|ioinln'ii'nl lo sec hitn and Wfiil lo ihr R.i-.C HlUi:.

\lici disiMiv-nii: ihv niallfi wnli .vlr. Ilainos, i w.is rclerrcd :< Mr. ' allaliu ..

Loinrail .uionu'j In ihc li,:sii Conlraci. I spoke lo Mr. (allaiian and learned

lliai the i'l.ini ».is noi declared surplus .0 yel l-m Hi . nediaie aelion

«011I1I he siarled lo L'CI ihe iieees.s;ir> paperwork liroiii;h. I ihen ..eni lo ,ee

Mi. I 1.mk Davis m the annex ol R.I-.C. and lie nionnsed to eqiciliie the

deilaralioiis and su;".'esii-,l I see M'. Carton al R.i 1. I made .111 appointment

utlh Mi. Carlon toi the I'ollouin.i' day. R.h.t. nolilied me thai al'loi

pel mission »as inven on .111 Sh-s deelaraiion »huh is .1 declaration to declare

lite entire plain and properU 'iiipliis. ,1 SI'-I uoiild h;o o to he processed to

lelease imitvidual items Irom the plain. Mien tlre.se decfaratjons would he

loruaidid lo W.n Assets «hi. is the ics,de ,i;;eiu\. I co.Mac'ed (letiital

(lieeory, Chiel ol the Wat \s.sels and was lecoinmeticleil lo Mr. Gumhlc wlio

'A.is luiullni.' ilu li.isi! piojci I tried in cotllacl Mi. i.innldc hill lie uas al

.1 iiuvtin ' ami was nol .nailahle.

I'his wa.s only the llrsl da\ of ihc trip for the indoniitablo

Duncan. 1 he nc\i two days in Washington continued with more ol

Ihe same. Help was soughl Irom the liu'vau of Ordnance lo clear

,i\v,i\ the roadblocks; in particular, the Assistant Chiei' lor Research

Caplain (later Rear .Admiral) Kenneth II. Mohle.* But holh Nohle and

Duncan found the administrative complexity of Ihe War Assets

Vs-'eivy lo he lievoni' their efforts Ic. untangle. All Duncur could tlo

was lo leave lists of NO IS reqiiirenients with ihe Agency. Despite

Duncan's persistence, comparatively little equipinent was ohiamed

'loin surplus.

In all. over S4.ODO.()()() was spent for ecjuipmenl that would be

used m "the llnesl laboratory of us kind in the world." As Duncan

pul it. "We had all kinds of things like vray machines, testing

machines, spedrographs ... oscillographs. We had everything you need

lo get a pretty good-si/.e lainwalorv going."'-

.And allhough ihe producis of his arduous procurement efforts

were still crated and stored in California warehouses, Duncan's

optimism was markedly uplifted in early 1946 when il seemed thai a

Una! and permanent home for the seientific equipment and machine

looks might si be realized.

' Hiiini;' llie V..11, the tttie ol the head ol the Hiiie.ui ol Ordnance's Research and

IXnelopment Division was Directoi. In lanuan I'l-Ui this title was chaiie-d lo "Assist.mi

( Inrl lor Rescaisll."'•N

Is I
III! GRAND IXPIHIMINI \l INYOKIKN

Bui building and equipping a lahoratory was one thing; staffing

il was another, tven as the eompletion work pressed forward. Hie

NOTS-Bureau of Ortinance leaders were encountering a chronic

recruiting prohlem. Recognizing the causes of the problem was easy;

solving il was rather more complex.

•WL NEVtR HAI) INOU.ll IIOISI S"

Personnel lurno\er in the postwai yeai was ai a crijipling rale

Mih over 2.out) lerminati<ins iv|iorted in I'M7, when ihe personnel

• eilmg w.i^ onl\ 3.(i5(.).'''

Main wen- the reasons for ihe high lurnoser. including llie

morale problems associated with ihe shift Ui a more authoritarian

nianagemeni, bul the must damaging cause foi the exodus was

inadeijuate housing \n Office ol Industrial Surve\ reporl foi the year

l')-r' assessed ilk' effect

I I,i' unp^Il.llUr "I hinlMIl: ' • ;In' S'llhill i.Hinnl hi' i.MT

rnil'll.lsl.'ra I; Is piwKiMr lll.il [UHMVt'l tnM- ,!u.- In Ib'tlsill;' .liltllC i.lll

S'vll.tKMI III UollM-U.lllU'K .|I sSlHI.IIM [HI (K'lMUrJ h'! I'M", pill-. KUn' lll.ll

inu. h in U'ims "I qiuhu >' iii'is.-tim") .n.nlahk' lanu^ci .tniniii:

pi'!-., niu'l ,ia<'i|ujU'h limiMsl is prol'.il'h IOUIT llun llu ii.r n.il ,1 vci.ti;t' Il

is hi-livvi'd ih.ii Iinusiiu' |s l.ii IIIIIK' imp.'il.illl .1 i U't riuntiriil l.i.I'U ill,in

rtlljl ll.is been inllsulfu'sl In hi' lil'.nsr ..111.'11 l.ll.'!. lA.l'pl I,'I .1 ll'U

. .lU'LSTU's nl piivk'sshill.ll p.' llhllls. Is tt Lnllslsli II! I\ .n.ill.lI'U' vOhll

h.iusiii*' is .['. i !.ihU'

1: is IH-IICUSI Ih.ii llic .iiii.iimi spcnl mi v.iJi hmisi' unuKI irimn In

iin- 11. wrniiu'nl vvilliin ]\\v UMIS m it'diuca iivoi.ill .utmniisn.itnt' ...'.; itul

I'lipln'.isl piT'^IIIMlKl \llisl II, pnM.ilU. .idcilli.'P.' Iii-Msin. llnlllil pl.u i' llir

S'.lUnll in ,i ..,.,1 pnslllnn In l.iln si; ill;' HUMsllU's I. IHipinM 'i, ,|ll.lllM il

IHTsnlVllfl 111 .ill . .iK'UnlK-s '

Ihe housing problems, in fact, had existed smee ihe lnsi lew

Quonsel huts were erected al Harve\ held in ihe winter ol l'M.':

Almost without exception, ewn ""early-tinici hvmg today can

describe some unusual conditions under which he was housed or

under which he commuted in the earh days. As John Ku hmond pm

it. "We never had enough houses.""'

>

A housing and communilv problem was the pnee the Navy had

to pa\ for locating in a virtually uninhabited desert area where i

1

Lovkl haw ihe space needed for weapon testing. 1 his meant that ihe

N'av\ had to provide shelter for sailors, marines. Waves, eivilian

scientists, engineers, and technicians plus dependents. Initial plans also

had to include a sizable construction camp fur contractors.

I'he complexities of the problem become apparent when the

question is asked. Why were there never enough houses'.' Part of the

251
PROBUiMS OF Mil K;STW\R WATCH

cmswer was in early failure to visualize the size of the Station relative

to the planned lechniodl work and to comprehend the magnitue'e of

the housing and community needed. In 1943 Burroughs foresaw an

"estimated ultimate population of about 1,000";'^ two years later,

this figure was seven times as great. If the early population estimates

had heen more realistic, it is likely that significantly larger funding

for the community would have been forthcoming. This would have

been possible because of the high-level support the new desert Station

had and because of the gieater mid-war flexibility in funding. At the

war's end, new housing was a hard item to sell to a [government with

surplus buildings in other locations throughoiit the nation.

During the wartime years, the housing problem had seemed to be

less severe. There were barracks and dormitory buildings albeit often

overcrowded, deficient in cooling and heating, and representing the

stark austerity of wartime temporary construction. The ubiquitous

Ouonset served an mUnite variety of purposes: from sleeping quarters

to chapel, from offices to schoolrooms. Even so, the demand for

shelter always outweighed its availability. The lists of people awaiting

housing were invariably long. Durim: the waiting period, husband and

wife were often separated and compelled to dwell in segregateu

dormitories; more often than not, their children lived "with

Grandnia" at a far distance from the parents. Other families more

accustomed to the peripatetic life in wartime .America stayed

together, surviving the rugged climate of the Mojave Deser' in trailers,

or such "shanty" type of accommodations that they could construct

or that might happen to be available.

But it was wartime. Family separations and rough living were to

be expected; they were accepted phenomena of the era.

Almost overnight social values changed, and after V-J Day,

former standards became unacceptable. Now, a return to the more

conventional and comfortable way of life superseded personal goals i f

patriotic duty. If such a way of life was unavailable at NOTS. it was

time to leave. As time went by. the newly emerging aerospace

industn started to offer some attractive alternatives to a continuation

ol wartime living conditions in the desert. This accounts, in great

part, for the huge personnel turnover in 1947.

1 he Navv's housing problem would have been significantly

reduced if the private sector of the economy and oJier government

agencies had realized that the Station was indeed what the Bureau of

Ordnance 'ai'. it would be. namely, pcnnaneit!.

Throughout the .laoon military bases were being closed, and lew

developers distinguished between NOTS as a new research.

253
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

development, and test center and wartime military training and

operational bases. The few who did inquire raised the question, "What

guarantee does the Navy offer that the Station will be permanent?" It

fell upon the NOTS Commanding Officer to serve as Navy spokesman

to those who questioned. A typical case is shown by a letter to the

Ridgecrest Development Company on July 8, 1946:

This is to inlbrin you iliul the Naval Ordnance Test Station Inyokern,

California, is a pcnnaneiu activity [emphasis in original] of the Naval

Estaolishmenl representing an investment approaching the order of

$100,000,000. Its primary function of research, development, and testing of

weapons is expected to be continued at the present scale. Enlargement in

some fields of research is foreseen rather than reduction in any field, and

research activities are expected to increase greatly with the completion of

current laboratory ami other building operations which involve expenditures

of the order of SI 2.1)0(1,000.

Very sincerely yours.

J. H. Sykes

Captain, USN

Commanding.

Only a few developers were convinced, and their limited

investments in Ridgecrest houses and businesses were of relatively

small consequence in solving the Station's problem. Nevertheless, they

were important beginnings in the long-term conversion of Ridgecrest

from a village to a city.

One of the early developments was of 100 homes financed

through the Federal National Mortgage Association, familiarly known

as "Fannie Mae."-' However, these were poorly built, and it is

reported that a large number were foreclosed at the expense of the

investors. As a result, this increased the skepticism of other potential

investors und the Federal Mousing Administration on the wisdom of

investing in Ridgecrest. It would be decades before it was generally

accepted that the Navy was not merely paying lip service to their

avowal that NOTS was to be a "permanent activity of the Naval

Establishment."

A remarkable degree of effort and cooperation was exerted by

NOTS and the Bureau of Ordnance in trying to solve the housing

problem. One effort was recalled by Richmond:

One day Captain Byrnes called me from the Bureau and said, "Well

you fellows are always yelling for more housing, I'll give you two hundred

trailers or two hundred pre-l'abs, what do you want?" And I said, "Well I

don't like trailers. Captain; however. I'll check with Captain

Burroughs." . . .

22

Burroughs agreed but immediately began planning how to

minimize the negative effects of the cheap prefabi icated house. As

Richmond recalled:

254
PROBLEMS OF Till POSTWAR WATCH

. . . He [Burroughs] didn't like the idea of a bunch of pre-l'abs on a

permanent Station so finally he got hold of Sandquist and said, "All right,

we got 200 pre-fabs coming here, but 1 want them built as far away from

the community as possible, so that sooner or later-in a couple of years or

so-we'll tear them down and throw them away and have more permanent

housing on the Station.*

Burroughs was particu'irly energetic in his efforts to mitigate the

acute housing shortage. One day, while visiting the town of Bishop

some 100 miles north of the Station, he became aware of many

empty dwellings that had formerly been part of the Vanadium Mining

Company. He promptly called the Bureau of Ordnance and arranged

the relocation of these houses. As Richmond remembered:

We brought them down on flat-bed trucks in sections and rebuilt

them. They were slightly better, maybe, than the pre-fabs, hut not an awful

lot.24

These houses were henceforth known as the "Bishops."

The Bishops would be joined by other houses with special

names, such as Duplex. LeTourneau, Normac, Wherry, and "Pink

Brick." Each had its own story and represented a small individual

victory in the larger buieaucratic battle to build the China Lake

community; moreover, each played its own role in helping NOTS to

acquire and sustain its staff. But after the addition of each new

increment, the supply so lagged behind the need that Richmond's

statement still held, at least until the early 1970s, "We never had

enough houses."

ORGANIZATION: A KEY PROBLEM

Organizational changes were such a common part of NOTS early

history that it was even suggested that the Station's initials stood for

"Naval Organization Test Station." There was then nothing

particularly unusual about a call for reorganization in December 1945

other than the fact that it had been only nine months since March

1945, when Thompson introduced the organization designed for

NOTS postwar operations. But those were months of great change:

the end of the war in Europe had set in motion the massive transfer

of OSRD to the military forces; this transfer was accelerated with the

end of the war on all fronts in August; locally the job of recruiting

and building a civilian staff was moving at full pace; and a new

Commanding Officer took the helm.

* As testimony to the long-term problem of NOTS hou.nng, it is to be noted that

"temporary" prefabs remained in service until early 1962.

255
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Another of the changes was the establishment on August 4,

1945, of a Research Board through the initiative of Thompson and

with the approval of Burroughs just prior to his departure. The Board

was to have the "general responsibility for the establishment and

direction of research and development programs at this Station . . ."25

Thompson wanted the Board in order to solidify the posture of

the NOTS scientific and engineering staff and to give them a loud

voice regarding research and development technical matters that

needed command attention.26

The role of the Research Board was accepted by Sykes, and

there is little doubt that in certain ways he appreciated the advantage

of the civilian scientists' expertise in technical matters. But at the

same time it was clear that the Research Board's responsibility for

"the establishment and direction of research and development

programs at this Stadon" was unusually broad.

The vigor and strength of the Research Board during the early

postwar years are easily understood when its original membership is

considered: Wallace Brode, Bruce Sage, J. T. Hayward, and L. T. E.

Thompson, Chairman of the Board.

A remarkable degree of harmony appears to have characterized

the convocation of strong-minded men that comprised the first NOTS

Research Board, although it is recalled that a spirit of candor often

sparked their weekly meetings. The prime ingredient for success as a

cooperative and highly effective team was the special kind of

leadership and control exercised by its chairman. As a former

Research Board member later recalled, "Thompson was so completely

awarj of the weaknesses of these . . . guys and of their strengths, and

so dedicated that he was going to get them to work together, that he

spent the time necessary to do it."27

All the members of the Research Board were in the middle of

the action at the end of 1945 to reorganize the Station, whereas the

original organization for the postwar era had been fashioned by

Thompson alone aided by occasional discussions with Burroughs.

As with the earlier organization, the Station was to comprise two

major areas: Station administration on the one hand, under the

Executive Officer; and research, development and test (RD&T)

controlled by the Director of Research, Development and Test. Both

the Executive Officer and the Director reported to the Commanding

Officer (see Appendix E).

RD&T was to consist of five major departments: Science (Dr. W.

R. Brode), Ordnance (Dr. R. A. Sawyer), Explosives (Dr. B. H. Sage),

256
PROBLEMS OF FHE POSTWAR WATCH

Experimental Operations (Commander J. T. Hayward), and Navy

Liaison (Commander J. A. Duncan).

Among changes from Thompson's March 1945 chart were the

elimination of the Associate Director's office and the incorporation of

the Field Operations Department (now Experimental Operations).

Consideration of the changes in detail is of doubtful value. The

special key to the reorganization's effectiveness depended on its being

administered in the spirit of military-civilian cooperation outlined by

Thompson in presenting the earlier organization. The aim was the

same-to have a civilian technic-l organization operating with broad

scientific freedom within the military structure. But this subtle

balance required a special kind of mutual understanding that would

frequently not be present in the months followng the December

1945 reorganization.

In fact, mutual understanding diminished. The result was the

need for dialogue to arrive at a workable system. At the rime, the

primary vehicle for discussion was the Re".arch Board, whose

composition other than the commander was the civilian scientists. In

addition to those previously mentioned. Dr. Arthur Howard Warner

from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology joined the Board in

March 1946. Warner became head of the Experimental Operations

Department, formerly headed by Hayward, and he also became

another advocate of civilian direction of the technical effort.

There was a need for a policy board that went beyond the

technical efforts. In a memorandum of March 5, 1946, Sykes created

the Administrative Board. Members initially included Maintenance,

Experimental Operations, Executive, Medical, Personnel,

Communications, Security, and Supply Officers; CO Naval Barracks;

CO Marine Barracks; Senior Chaplain; and the Director of Research

and Development.

It is interesting to note that the fi^t members of this Board

were predominantly military, since the only civilians were the Director

of Research and the Civilian Personnel Officer.

The purpose of the Administrative Board was to advise and make

recommendations in matters concerning basic policy for the Station.

But since a great many administrative acticv. vitally affected the

technical programs and could not be decided v.'ithout knowledge of

the programs, Sykes was forced to add technicd managers to the

Board. Consequently, membership changed considerably. Several na/a!

officers (Commanding Officers of the Naval and Marine Barracks,

Security Officer, Chaplain, Communications Officer) were dropped

257
THE GKAND EXPERIMENT ^T INYOKERN

from the list, and their places were taken by the civilians in charge of

the five major departments. Now in essence, the Research and

Administrative Boards shared almost a common membership, and the

latter eventually withered as a decisive body. But during the middle

of 1946, when both Boards were active and meeting regularly, it was

quite difficult to separate the topics into "adininistrative" and

"technical" categories. Moreover, the problems often had the same

roots: housing, personnel, transnortation, and budget. All these topics

recun-ed many times in the official minutes of each Board meeting,

particularly housing. But it was the topic of "organization" that

prompted an early confrontation between the Commanding Officer

and his staff.

It was August 26, 1946. The first postwar organization chart haJ

been in effect for about nine months. Progressively during that time

it had been woefully apparent that the NOTS problems, far from

diminishing, were growing and multiplying. Hayward, Thompson, and

Brode on the occasion of this particular Administrative Board meeting

were quick to stimulate a discussion about new organizational plans

that were in the offing.

Both NOTS and the Naval Ordnance Laboratory (NOL) had been

asked by the Bureau of Ordnance to revise their organizational plans.

At this time, the new plans were in a tentative state and undergoing

local review. The NOTS Administrative Board was highly interested in

a copy of the NOL plan that showed that the Technical Director (a

civilian scientist; enjoyed an unusually high degree of authority and

control. The civilian was the distinguished scientist. Dr. Ralph

Bennett. The NOTS Administrative Board apparently thought that the

proposed NOL organization implied some kind of precedent that

could be applied to Inyokern. The minutes indicate that Sykes did

not agree.

Giptain Sykes suggested that some time in the future the Station might be

set up as a JiiTerent type ot Naval Station ' an any that exists now. At

some future date the Station may be set up with a civilian director who

would have a commission to take chatte, but ii is not that way nov.. . . Dr.

Brode stated that the Navy Department is apparently trying to set up certain

research and test facilities under organizational systems which have been used

by similar agencies, such as the Bureau of Standards, N.A.C.A., and the

Naval Ordnance Laboratory.28

The Board members then turned their attention vo the new

organizational plan proposed for NOTS that was patently a replay of

the previous one; a command structure that failed to specify the

scor.e of authority and responsibility of its !• ;y element. R'.;'uctantly,

the Board recommended approval of the plan, but further

258
PROBLEMS OF THE POSTWAR WATCH

recommended that its submittal to the Bureau of Ordnance be

withheld until Dr. Thompson returned to the Station.

Thompson's trip to Washington in August 1946 was propitious in

more ways tiian merely providing a delaying action on the new

organizational plan. During his visit, he had the opportunity for

lengthy chats with his old frieir' George Husscy and another old

friend from the Dahlgren days, Malcolm Schoeffel-now a Rear

Admiral and recently appointed Deputy Chief of the Bureau of

Ordnance. Thompson convinced both officers that MOTS needed a

"charter" to attract and hold scientific min " of the same high level

that had worked for OSRD during World vVar I!.29Thompson was

asked to draft such a charter.

At this particular time, Hussey was highly receptive . such

ideas, as NOL was about to move to its new location at White Oak.

He was giving a lot of thought to both NOL and NOTS and was

considering the manner in which both laboratories would best fit into

the total defense picture. Hussey's own wishes, according to Schoeffel,

were to organize both establishments so that the technical people did

the thinking and work, and the military personnel gave the

administrative support.^0 Hussey was interested not only in giving

joint responsibility to the Technical Directors and Commanding

Officers of NOTS and NOL, but also in giving the laboratories a lar^e

voice in directing their own work. He saw the emergence of NOTS

and NOL in their new postwar roies as a means of getting the

weapon designing out of the Bureau's Washington headquarters and

into the laboratories. While establishing his position, Hussey was

listening patiently and equally to the proponents of different

philosophies within his Bureau of Ordnance. When he asked

Thompson to draft a charter, he asked Ralph Bennett of NOL to do

the same.

The responses were quite different. Schoeffel later reported with

a smile that the statement from Iny^kern was "something like the

Declaration of Independence" as it vvas in broad, general terms, but

the NOL draft was much more opecific, more like the bylaws of an

organization.3'

The "Declaration of !ndependenre"-like its worthy and historic

namesake-was a simple document in straigiitforward terms. Yet its

very simplicity has enabled it, and the subsequent revisions, to

provide clear guidelines under whic'.i NOTS, and later the Naval

Weapons Center, would be managed. While its authorship is no<

precisely certain, it can be assumed that contributors included Dr>.

259
ifll (.KAM) I Xl'l KIMI \1 A I IMnKi KN

Warner, .Sa;\\ lirodc. und lohn Shcnk, ami Commander Haywartl

working uiuler the leadership of Dr. Thompson, its title was

■■pin 'iples "I' Ope, ition." Haywanl later stated, "il was all in blue

ink . . . hut it sluHilu have heen in red beeause par! til il was my

hlooti, an a lot of n was Dr. Tliompson's blood.""^-

The full text of the Prineiples is given in .Appendix F. What we

should note here is that the definition ol tiie auliiorits DI the

("ommandini! Offieer recognized that the mission, eivilian population,

and isolated loeation of the Station resulted in complex and unusual

administrative problems, l-'or that reason certain boards and positions

were established "to which the Commanding Offieer will delegate the

retpiiMie responsibility and commensurate authority." Of special

importance in this respect was the description of the position of the

i echmcal Director, who. according to the document, "shall be

deli ted control of the research, development, and training activities,

including methods of coiuluctin . research." The Principles were

written to meet the Iomz-term' eeds for a managemert philosophy

assuring technical direction by the technically qualified. However,

there was no doubt by the authors that the Principles were also

pointed toward the solution of immediate problems.

Sykes, too. knew that they were pointed at limiting his

command prerogatives. He reviewed the first draft some time in late

September 1946; his rather strained but urgent letter to Hussey was

dated Septembei 30. The letter appears to be in the soiril of

cornproinse. In it Sykes states his policy for NOTS. "technical

personnel (to| work under the freest conditions .technical

supervision |lo be) restricted to general guidance ... Station

administration |to he] within the framework of Navy regulations,

Public Law. and existing directives . . ."' But he ended with the

thought that the proposed organization did not need to be legalized,

"but rather that the standard principles of naval organization as now

applied should be continued and 'his application perfected, so that

the technical personnel can give the maximum of their time to their

techi ical work."- '

Hussey reviewed this letter and the proposed charter submitted

by Thompson, although it was not yet signed by .Sykes. On October

21, 1946. he approved the Principles of Operation without

amendment or change, it was a historic ''ecision in the relations

between science and the military, for this was a revolutionary

compromise designed to allow a strong measure of scicntifc freedom

and initiative within the overall framework of Navv alminis.ralion. It

26(1
I'KUKI i M- i i| 1 ü h ,M i> \i. A \ h !l

vvuiiKI IHM onl_\ jM'.iluiiiiuK iiK'd ih > li ir.o i , 'I N() I S lull H

wmilvi ilsn uilimaich innikMin.' llic [ilnliisopln n| .iiu'i.i'i ! "lii i

iniliiar\ n.-sc;n\ii aiul Jcu'lopmoni cvnicr.s I'hc l.ui llui li.v i'muipks

wore sliapci.1 ID MU\ I enlii.-,il. cxiNliny iiKiiiaui.'iiu'nI iirnbk'ins ami

lorgcil in llif Ival ol controvcr^N maJc llicin all !lir IIIOIT rlKtlivo as

roalistu inikidiiK's li>r t!u' I'M arc,

AlU'l MUIlini! Ilk1iloCUl Cllt. Illlsv-, liM ilk'J M In \()|S willl

I'IC K'ijik'st thai M also h- siuiu'il In llic ( oir.maiuliuii OIIILCI ihis

was Jone In Sykc-' in liif spini lalci U'sciibcJ In llawvard ■■|ik

1

.-

(he' pood sailor he was, lie ai.\-|Meil il

UiiuMiihtOili;. Ilussey hail hecn MIIMIVU'II lo mam piessiiies In

ivopk' IriMii w.ihin and outsuk' thi' Hureaii iM OainaiKe; nui IIK- Icasi

ol whom wa ;b okl hiL'nil I )I "kMiuiu II was poslulatt'i1thai

llhMiipson ii.ni stPHii: support liom the triants ol the seientille

^oanmunilN llavwanl lalv-i eoiniii.nleJ in rclrospeel. "I m sure

I :iim\ mustered evcrvh and Im. hrolhei ineludui;' llatslad and

I Ae Iti lalk i" 1 lusse\ on ' i^ " '"'

But at linokei'i in tin lall of I'M,. win- ,,..,[ wheretores

.I llusse\"s vleeiMon wei d relativeh tit; loiieern \ttieh moi

important, die Pmuiple^ i)peralion ha- heen appnw I he \"() I S

seienlilh .nil I hi the Mamia < aria'

Wi- \| HI K Mill SIORMY Ol I I OÜK r MR

A sahen, ;leii- , of Capiain S\ I- 'uusi he ' Miirined

was iiiiek to appiaisi a situation iead| Ins thinki '

aecordinuly, \s a lorn;,! NOfs -,ientia leealled

If.- ajs ,i u-!> i,i.i iiniiMaa.ii .i uia luiii uiiii

prulitL'in in' nui inill ,iiis \ni:\ lu'- Il hr H.IIIA,! In''I II-M wni. Iie'u VA

Hm ii kVoiiK; he r neet t .(- .[• ii,,e ,, the tune he signed

the I'niu ipl-" ol Operation u. considered he aad he ai A ronsi or thai

an\ hut procedural chanues should he in,hie on his p,,ii II. pronipih

took the ncccssan aetums to promul.iialc the new roles |oi ihe

lechmcal Dircctoi the Avinnnislralivc Board, and the Res'arch Board

lie gave no siun >\ ain suiisilivitv to the fact that Cioorge llussey s

pen hau' diminished his direct conirol of the technical programs

It could he debated whether 111." next round ol difficulties was

precipitated because Sykes balked iusl shorl of the goal or becau.se

riiompson pressed his success loo lar, Ihe key point at issue was the

desire of the technical staff to have the Technical Direct u or the

261
III! i.K \M) i M'l ki.MI Nl Al INVüKhRN

Koso..! BiKin.1 (of "/hich ihc I ccimicai Director was c'iaiinian) sec

k-u oulors, rc;.uilalioiis. ami administralivc pmccilurci hel'orc llie\

vvca' issued hy the command. Tins philosophy was claboratcu in .1

Idler In Ihc bureau of Ordnance, prepared hy ihc Rcsca'ch Board

members on Seplemlvr 2C. hul it had not accompanied tlie i

:

rinciples

ol Operation when these were submitted to the Bureau.''

rhompson Celt that the Idler elTectively fleshed oul the bare

bones of the Principles aiu, helped to clarils the spirit ol cooperation

nece,s.sar\ for the plan to work udl: therefore. 11 should be

lorwarded. ilhch. ex P.-'V kuin. Sykes did not agree; the Idler was

not sent, and a Hurry of correspondence started between him and

I hornpMiii o\ cr tlie issue.

In the mcahlimc, there appeared on the NO i S scene on October

2^ no less a person than the Seerdary of the Navy James V.

I oncstal who would aid m establishinu the spirit of cooperation

iidienmt in the Brincipl ol Operation. Some people, including

\.:miral Ilussc\ who accompanied the Secretary, fell thai iiiis

p.ulicular visit ^as unusualK si^nificint. in fact. IIusse> called il a

owlinc sin. i ess.

Ihc h'dipoint wa.s no; in the formal lour o| the Station or tlie

review : proen.im. i.iilier n ocvurred at a recejition lick! in f.'aptain

Syk's ,|i,,. tcrs In ikis social atmosphere the Seerdan had the

oppor;.init\ '' evehanjzes al a personal level wilh bolh Ik' seniormilit.ir\ in! u\u:an stall of NO IS, And il was an opnortimitN lor

thos of \f) I -. ,.. jirescnt problems and philosophies to Ike highesi

k\cl oi ihc '

v

^) Most important, the tliornv mailer ol

iiilitary-ci\ ih in idati.msliips \\a openh and fiankK discussed,

riirouuhoii; ihc c\cnim: ihere was an obvious rapport between the

scientists and ihc Seerdan. I his and his interest in NOTS programs

Icstitlod to ;li' Sccretar\'s appreciation ol the need !or iiie kind ol

military-civilian tc.m n\;sioned in Ihc recently signed Principles ol

Operation, l-'orres.ak suiport jirobably helped to gel Sykes to

embrace the P'inciples ol (hicraiion in spirit as well as in fact. Hul

that was not ,.n immcdia'c result, for willen a few days ol the

Seerdan's visit, the Svkcs-1 hompson areument o\\ r the unsent Idler

v\as conluiucik

On November S, in answer to a strong 11 u lorandum from

riirmpson who was still prcssmy for submilta! ol the Research Board

Idler. Sykes pointed out that tin Frinciples of Operation had al cads

been approved, and that the Ic'ter "is unncccsary for the purpose of

estanlishinu iiiic BoardNi rocommedatif ns.'" lie added. "If, Iv.nvev'-r

26:
i'KOIil ' MS ÜI I 111 I'DSl WAR WAIi 11

il is still desired tiuil the letter lie forwarde'.'. 1 will dn so with

nonconcurrence . . ."-'^ l-'rom Sykes' standpoint, this appeared to be

the hotiom line!

Thompson seemed to reeognize the impasse. Four dayj later, he

again look up his pen. In iiis tvpieal style, he pressed the point in

two ways: first, in a formal letter to the Commanding Officer, and

second, in a ""Dear Jimmy" i ilonnal covering letter. In the former lie

wrote:

i In' puinl is 11 ii thai ruli's .mil rcjailations anil Jisciplimirj action .m'

unnecossarv, hut r.nlici ih.ii lough military leiliniques in promulgation arc

iim aivoptabk1to Ihe type ol people on w'mii the siatiun is depemlent loi

siK-ri'sstii! operation.

In the lali.'r he spoke from Ihe heart, "We luve the Principles,

as yon say. and presumably the organization. All that is left in

cmnpleting the Charier for the kind of developmenl center NOTS is

Mip|iosed to be is lo insure an understanding of the spirit in which

Ihe Prin aples nuisl work.'" In urging this cooperation he wrote, '.And

I think you will see the day when you will be as proud of the

contribution as of any you have ever made. For this is a grand

experiiiK nl al Inyokern."""''

1 he letters to Sykes were written on November \ 1. i'Md, a day

ol unburdening for I hompson. On the same day he wrote to Admiral

Hu.ssey request hm thai his resignalion as Tixlmical Director be

accepted. -

fhe icLison.s tor Ihe reiiuest were not, according lo the letter, the

restili oi problems, hul rather "in pan bee.nisi.' ol evidence ol an

un.saiisfaeion physical condition," Bui people who dail\ saw the

exul v-raiKc with which Ihompson t iced life and vvork discounted ihe

explanation ol poor health, al Cast ins own. fhere wee other

possible explanatr ns. I-'oi one. it was generalh belie\ec thai his wile.

Margo 1 liompsoii, Aas noi fond ol the di'serl and prvferreil to live in

ihe hast. Also, as menlioned earlier, it was clear .it NOTS and oilier

government labor,nones thai the uvil service pa> for senior scienti'.ts

al that time was inadequate. Ami despite rhompson's statements to

the contrary, there was the likelihood thai the continuous skirmishes

with the command over the organization and Principles had had .m

eltect. He ma\ have fell thai the main struggle had been won anil

that a successor could just as capably lead any tollow-up skirmish

action especially if Ins own resignation would help call the Bureaifs

ittention to ihe critical nature of military-Chilian relationships in Ihe

"urand expenmenl."

26 a
I HI i,KAM) I \l'l K1MI M \| INVOKI KN

ir"'''"Ti ""T"" i ^ i " "'—"

- •qiäilkliitaixi—

■■■•>■■-" ^..-^-i

. _>t^- 1 /*">:--

h>' |".rin.iiu-n: \diniiU'st:. ii.ni Innli nu-. Uai-tnlH-i |V46.

I!ussc\''s rcplN in the ivijucsU-il [vsiiiir.ition wa.1- prcilictahli.'

VIIUMIIV I .mi n-^riMlul .il '.Mm ilciiMni in icsun lumi ilu1 nn-,iihMi

'I li'. iiiiK.il lliKii.'i. tin illM' I krl ,i- I k'll \\tw<\ I unr.l v.'ii h' .un'pl

'li'-' pusaion. ilnl \'iiir l>.i> ki'i. iiml jiiil vom LHU' (liiln.uU'. cvpciu'iuv vvcic

'iniijiic i|u.iliiiwiii.'ns I ..in .ii'prcu.iv, nl OUIIM-, ili.il ymi .iro OMIIIOI) .i lur

.i!-'''ill Jiul wlulc. ..ihr J.JJII!, I shall u'i'ui vom KMMM'.'. i skill not. ul

uuirsc. in Ihc Ir.isi si.nul m yuili «,jv. .nul I u KII ion .,1; sui.i

Willi llu- hope ili.i; I sh.ill soi' \.iii .I".,IIII hcloi.- vo'.i lih.ilK l.ikf ilk'

''ii'P, I .mi. with iiiiuh ..ppu'u.iii.in loi .ill ilui M,II h.ivc ili.iu' !"• ilie

HIIIC.I;I,

Siiin'ii'K Vours

U-Ol.'!'4-'

But Ihc final -,tcp woiikl no! yd he l.ikcn: Ilk' destinies of

N

'

(

-.

)

' S .nul 1.1 1 Thompson as feeiiiik-ai Director would remain

in'.erloeked (bi another five years.

I'I reason tor his ehange of heart has never hee.i ascertained,

hut the fact that Thompson did win the eiglU-wcck-lony "Battle of

the Septemher 20 feiler" was probably a factor. On November 21,

1946. Sykes endorse! the letter and lorwarded il to the Bureau.

MOTS not only had its Principles of Operuti'm hut also the letter

clarifying the spirit of cooperation necessary to make them work and

2'J4
l'ROHl.l MS DI I 111 I'OSIVVAR WAIC1I

the role ol' ilk' Director ol' Researcli who was io be the embodiment

of thai spirit.

OLD PROBLEMS RESOLVED

Whii'. the new cliarter lor NOTS rep., "senteii a first major step in

solving a host of administrative problems for the desert Station, there

was nothing in the "Principles of Operation" that touched even

remotely upon a couple of ancient problems thai had the perennial

knack of resurfacing. One of these concerned the unfinished business

of legally acquiring the land on which a greater part of NOTS had

been built; the oilier stemmed from the still unresolved issue of who

was to control the NOTS Air Facility, the Bureau of Ordnance or the

Bureau of .Aeronautics.

As the temporary-use permit issued by the Department of the

interior for lands in public domain had specified that the lease was

"to expire six months after the termination of the declared national

emergency," a Hock of contested claims came to roost at Inyokeni in

the early part of I

(

'4h from cattle ranchers, homesteaders, and

miners. In a wartime emergency, all of these could be docketed and

buried in a "pending action" file, but now each case had to be

painstakingh reviewed.

One viewpoint on how some ol these cases were settled is that

expressed by Duane Mack who was asked to accompany a bus load

of jury members charged with deciding settlements to the various

ranchers. His later report of this experience offers the following

poignant commentary:

I he ik'MTi lakes uvei so i|ukkl\ thai Iho att'atl'a fields wen' gone; ihc

winds had leveled tliem yon know, the weeds had lyown up and the

buildings were down. And n w.is preity dil'ficull lo It'll ihe iur\, aid I

didn't feel the jury was really very interested, frankly, ol how these people

had lived and how they had strived to build up what little they had.

In October 1947 ;i congressional hearing was held by the

Committee on Public Lands regarding the NOTS real estate. NOTS

played a small part in these proceedings, largely because the key

issues concerned tlu Department of Interior and also because the

NOTS representative Captain J. 11. Mean, played a passive role. Mean.

the first U.S. naval officer to successfully lire air-launched rockets,

was better known for his Hying skills than legal acumen. Mean

reported:

Many witnesses testified on behalt of I heir claims against the

government relative to (a) undervaluation of their condemned property and

J65
I 111 i IK \M> I \l'l Ki\!l \ I Al INVUKI KN

mi l.uluu < ilii' p.HI ' UK' üII'. IM »nient In vi'Ml,' Mini i l.iiins lliis

ir-.jmom w..- iinu'd .11 lik I K'p.n mu'ii, nl UK' in.-ir i.inih ; u llicn

ilK'i'c.l ilol.iv in lAl.iblisliinsj llic i.iiiil nl . Linn,, .uul. ii .1 Icsvci i-\h'ni

.iiuiinM ihr N.iv;, Deparliiionl .111.1 Ihr Jii'-lui' lli'ji.ir'nim! Ini illciv.l ,lol.i\ <

sfltlins; v.ilnl 1 i.iiin ..^ 5

So snuill \v;is ihf NOTS mvolvcmenl in the issuo H IIIM iissinn ilial

Ilk' clkiiriiKin ;i|)pnn\'i.i llt.in's icdiiosl lo \\i! :klr;i\\. '"

On Dca-inlH-r I

1

'. 1

(

)47, Public land Order 4M uiMiitcil ihc

Nav\ i'K\ir litlc in Statinn lands loiaiuaK in Ihc piililu domain. By

this • iiic. NO IS was vvoll csUiblishod as a majoi rcscarOi ami

dovi K"i! ccnlei of Ilk' postwar Navv. legal ownorslnp ol' the land

represented the eap^tone ol the eomplex oditiee so painstakingly

eonsinieled dnrins: Hie wartime years: it was a lurther imarantee ol

permaneney lor N() IS.

Another of tlk Station's land problems was ronicaih solved

lliroLig.li 111,K lion r.itbei than by an_\ legal struggle, This concerned the

real estate ol llar\e\ bield. As with the public domain lands ol 'In

Station proper, the old Inyokern airli Id was on loasi to NO 1 S for

the period o| wartime em rgenc\ pins si\ months. However, in liiis

case, the pressing ilesire ol the ( ivil Aeronau'ic1 Administration :n gel

llicir Held back i\,^ not matclied by in\ len;uil\ of the Bureau oj

Aeronautics to retain it lo; their hmited postwar puip'oses (F-leet

traiiiint and target drone operaii.u'is) ["here was virtually no contest,

and in .April I

lMo ill issue was dead. In a Rnckclci'r article headed

"HARVHV llll.l) t I.OSlVr i i,Helmed NOTS, Aprd U). I'MMthe

turning of a significant hisiorical page was sadlv noletl as follows:

Kini'MU' anun ill, . main mi .1 22-m.irali ,,iirri 11,im" 1 icia u.rs

sinppisl nl Us uin.iiiiiiii l.niliiu"-' .iml 'i i-d HI uiii'i nm IL'III

i'pcT.iii'in.il st.ilU'- l.i >! likl.e Ihr irin.iiiiiih- ini'll I'loveil In I hina

l.iki' I riil.iy, iiul IMIV MTOIT w.is disi'" 'nuusl In Ihr ai'sor' ,111 stalloii.

Before llaney l-'icki wa closed 'here were those who sincerely

fell that main- of the problem pencn.ed by the Naval Air Factliiy

stemmed from the dual air operations at Armi age field and llarwv

I'ieiJ' that once the Air bacilily was comfortably settled at Annilagc

field and the Harvey bieid situation resolved, (he Naval Air facility's

problems would disappear. Unfortnnately. such was not the case.

Organizational problems eonlinucd to surface and bedevil Ihe NOTS

administration.

On April 9, I'M?. Sykes wrote a personal letter 'o his old

Academy classmate. Schoei'fel; the letter is worthy of presentation in

* I hr "huge, riuiiKlshnuUlereil" ICodiak hanjsii silll survives, and a; rl Iroin some

desiilimy fiviiiulalions, liiere is Imle other evidence ol the Navy's I'omiei oceupancy.

266
I'RÜHLI M.S 01 llil POSTWAR WATCH

full because a quick scan reveals the complexity of the NAI

problems. He wrote:

Dear Mulcülnr

I'he prosem command status ul the local Naval Air hidliiy, Armilagc

I n'lil, gives me eonsidcrable concern, and I should like to apprise you of the

ciruimsiances and request advice as to procedure.

SecNav letter 44-524, serial 134813 ol 1(1 May 1444 established the

Air I'acilitj a! this Station as an activity under an OITiccr-in-C'haree, under

the Commanding Officer, N.O.T.S., Inyokern. Accordingly, all aviation

officers, except lour, have been ordered to report to Commanding Officer,

N.O.T.S. Two pilots and two non-l'lyine officers have been ordered to the

Naval Air facility, reporting to Cotntleven but not to Commanding Officer,

N.O.T.S. Some enlisted personnel are ordered to the Naval Barracks,

N.O.T.S., some to the Air facility without reference to N.O.T.S.

Gencrai Order 245 of 26 November 1946. which 1 received on 10

March l

lM7. places the Air [-'acuity under the military command of

Commander Naval Air Bases, Ileventh Naval District.

My letter serial 904 ol II March 1947 to OpNav via BuOrd requested

return ol the Air facility under the military command of Commanding

Officer, N.O.T.S.

A previous letter, my serial 5SI of 19 februarj 1947 to CN.O. via

BuOrd, subject "Naval Aii facility. In; okern", requested establishmenl of the

Air facility as a comma-.d ur.der Commanding Officer, N.O.T.S.

ihe Secretary's letter 4-47-227 ()p24 Serial 59P24 ol 3 March 1947

places the Air facility, Inyokern, under the manaeemeni control ol BuOid.

Ihe present silua'ion is this:

(a l I have management .onirol of the Air facility,

lb) I do not have military command or coordination control of the

Air facility.

(c) Military command ol the Air facility should be being exercised \>\

Commander Naval Air Bases, lleveulh Naval District.

(d) My military control of Air facility is only ihr.igh the

Coiimandanl to ( onimandei Naval '\ir Bases | Rear Admiral (laid

Vice Admiral) Calvin I. Durgin], Ileventh Naval District, and

through him to the Air facility.

(el Officers and men assigned to the Air facilitj Inn not to N.O.T.S,

are not under my military command.

(f) Ml officers but lour are assigned to N.O.'l.S. and eiven duty at

the Air facility only by virtue cf my management authority,

(g) jurisdiction in matters ol summary courts is gravely in doi'Lit,

(h) 1 did and still do exercise military control over the Air facility as

if 1 were unuer the Commander Naval Air liases. Eleventh Naval

District, which as Commanding Officer, N.O.T.S., I am not.

The whole matter can he completely resolved and legalized In

approval of Ihe request in my letter, serial 5H1 of 19 febrmry 1947,

referred to above, which requested that Ihe Air facility he established under

Commanding Officei, N.O.'l.S.. as it wa:. before. The dale of Ihis action

should be that of General Order 245, 27 November 1946. Otherwise, the An

facilit, will continue to exist as ;• separate unit surrounded and supported

by Ihis Station but not under lie Station's military control; orders for Air

facility personnel both Officers and men will all have to be changed and the

complexities of administration and operation will be enormous and

unnecessary.

267
THE GRAND EXPERtMENl A') INYOKERN

The mailer needs to be resolved as soon as possible. Commander Naval

Air Bases, Eleventh Naval District, is very sensitive on matters of bis military

prerogatives, and liavin;; already been reproved by him for diseussi'tg direet

with the Bureau a ma'ter concerning military command of the Air facility I

hesitate to write further official letters in the matter without your advice as

how to proceed in the best interests of linOrd without irritating Commander

Naval Air Bases.

Wiih best wishes.

Sincerely,

J. B. Sykes48

This Lttcr was effective in portraying the absurdity of the

complex command relationships tor the Naval Air Facility and in

bringing about a long-term solution. The channel by which the

message went from SchoelTel is not known, but the result is clearly

shown in a Secretary of the Navy directive of April 28, 1947:

llns activity | f'.S. Naval Air facility. Naval Ordnance Test Siation|

nndei a Commanding Officer, is und.er the military command and

coordination control of the commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Ordnance Test

Station, Inyokern, California, and under the inatmgemenl control of the

liureau oj Ordnance [author's italics]. It is exempted from the Naval Air

liases Command, Eleventh Naval District. ...

NOTS accepted this solution of a najor problem with

characteristic aplomb. On May 5 a brief ceremony took place in

Hangar 1 at Armitage Field ami Mic directive was read to the

assembled crew by Captain Sykes. Commander J. M. Flliott then read

his orders as Commanding Officer and placed the Naval Air Facility

in commission.^ Henceforth, NOTS and its Naval Air Facility would

work together in a very special relationship rooted in the unique

mission of the Station itself: research, development, and testing of

weapons.

1947: PERSPECTPE

The winds of change that had assailed the desert ship throughout

1946 continued almost unabated in 19'd7. The same winds also blew

over Washington. D.C.; over the entire command structure of which

NOTS was a part. In September James Forrcstal became Secretary of

Defense, and his former post ol Secretary of the Navy was filled by

John L. Sullivan. In July George Hussey retired, and the Bureau of

Ordnance, the de facto parent of NOTS, came under the new

leadership of Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) Albert G. Noble.

The year 1947 saw few changes among leaders at Inyokern. Key

figures like Thompson, Sage, Ellis, Warner, Richmond, and others who

had served as NOTS standard bearers remained; thus, the unique

268
PROBLEMS OF THE POSTWrt? WATCH

essence and fhivor of the Stalion and its operating philosophy were

preserved and perpetuated. But tiie NOTS Research Board would miss

the vigor and sometimes tempestuous drive of Wallace Brode, who was

destined to accept a special assignment in Washington.-''1

The organization chart changed again in August 1947. some ten

months after the Principles of Operation were put into effect It was

more streamlined: one that showed four departments instead of five.

The former Ordnance Department was absorbed by the Experimental

Operations Department, and Dr. Warner became the head of EOD,

which now included divisions for Underwater Ordnance, Aviation

Ordnance, Measurements, and Guided Missiles. Similarly, the Science

Department was expanded to now include Laboratory and Technical

Services, Applied Sciences, Ballistics, and Chemistry and Physical

Sciences. First Dr. John Shenk, then Dr. C. T. Elvey assumed

leadership of this department when Brode left.

The Explosives Department, still headed by Sage, experienced

little change other than acquiring a fourth division called "Test and

Service." However, changes were very much in the wind for the

fourth department of NOTS, which was initially identified as "GT&R

(General Tire and Rubber) Contract." This "department" essentially

administered a contract for test engineering and manufacturing services

performed for NOTS by GT&R at the Foothill Plant in Pasadena. By

mid-1948, the line machine shop in the new MOTS laboratory would

be virtually complete. From now on NOTS could begin to phase its

own engineering and production functions from Pasadena to Inyokern.

Accordingly, in July 1948, the GT&R contract would be closed out,

and the department -which had formerly merely overseen -would have

full cognizance as the Design and Production Department under Mr.

D. C. Webster as the first department head.

The year 1947 also witnessed many turnovers among the military

personnel at NOTS. In June, almost exactly a year after first

reporting for duty. Commander Beckmann, the NOTS Executive

Officer, was relieved by J. A. Priichard, who significantly had the

rank of captain. There was also a new Experimental Officer when

Hayward was relieved by Mean.

But possibly the most significant change was apparent when it

was announced in the Rocketeer on August 6, 1947, that Captain J.

B. Sykes would leave NOTS; his replacement was io be Rear Admiral

Wendell G. Switzer. The announcement came almost exactly two

years to the day after "Jir. my" Sykes had first arrived to assume

command of NOTS; however, he would not actually be relieved by

Admiral Switzer for another three months.

269
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

The years 1945-1947 were turbulent, critical years for NOTS.

They were the formative years of the Station as a permanent

research, development, and test center as opposed to its earlier years

as a vvartime test station and support organization for CalTech. They

were the years of contention between a management philosophy based

on military tradition and one seeking a larger measure of scientific

freedom. They were the years in which dedicated and veracious men

on two sides of the management issue fought forcefully, and in the

main tactfully, for what they believed.

And each, in his way, helped to shape and give substance to the

grand experiment at Inyokern.

270
PROBLEMS 01- THE POSTWAR WATCH

REFERENCES

NWC identification numbers arc those under which copies of documents arc tiled in

the Technical Information Department, Naval Weapons Center. The following abbreviations

are used to identify record collections where documents were found:

LTET Papers of L. T. E. Thompson, Scarsdale, New York

FRCB Naval Weapons Center records stored at Federal Records Center, Bell,

Gilifornia

1. Letter from L. T. E. Thompson to RAdm. G. F. Hussey, Jr., October 24,

1945. LTET. (NWC 2313, 2-3la.)

2. Letter from G. F. Hussey, Jr., to Dr. L. T. E. Thompson, November 16,

1945. LTET. (NWC 2313, 2-3lb.)

3. George F. Hussey interview, April 1966, p. 107. (NWC 2313, S-5.)

4. Irwin Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War, p. 320.

5. N.O.T.S. Rocketeer, hmmy 28, 1946.

6. Letter from J. B. Sykes to the Chief, Bureau of Ordnance, on "Organuation,

Facilities and Work Program of Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern ....'"

December 8, 1945. C5338, A3-l(a), FRCB. (NWC 2313, 8-2.)

7. Letter from G. F. Hussey, Chief, Bureau of Ordnance, to Senior members.

Board to Survey the Continental Naval Shore Establishments, on "Possibility

of Amalgamating the Functions of Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern;

Naval Air Station, Mojave; and Naval Air Special Missiles Center, Point

Mugu," May 3, 1946. C5338, A3-l(a), FRCB. (NWC 2313. 22-10.)

8. Letter from G. F. Hussey to Assistant secretary of the Navy, on "Naval

Ordnance Test Station Inyokern Main Laboratory Building, Priority ol

Materials for," April 24, 1946. Duncan Papers. (NWC 2313. 10-7.)

9. A. E. Niederhoff. "Naval Testing Lab in Desert," Western Construction News,

September 1946, pp. 89-91.

10. Hussey letter, cited in Ref. 8 above.

11. James Duncan interview, April 26, 1966, p. 19. (NWC 2313, S-9.)

12. Ibid., p. 51.

13. "Report on trip to Washington, D.C " by Capt. J. A. L ican. May 11,

1946. Duncan papers. (NWC 2313, 10-51.)

14. Narrative of the Bureau of Ordnance, 1 September 1945 to 1 October 1946,

Section I IB, p. 6.

15. Duncan interview, April 26, 1966, p. 53.

271
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

16. Unpublished report, "Survey of Industrial Activities by the Office of

Industrial Survey, 15-20 September 1948 and Comments of Naval Ordnance

Tes( Station," p. 12. (NWC 2313, 19-55.)

17. Ibid.

1«. John Richmond interview, January 1967, p. 45. (NWC 2313, S-33.)

19. Unpublished report, "Proposed Layout of Facilities for Naval Ordnance Test

Station, Inyokern, California," November 12, 1943 (NWC 2313, 14-19.)

20. Letter from Capt. J. B. Sykes to Mr. D. J. Miller, July 8, 1946. FRCB.

(NWC 2313, 22-108.)

21. Richmond interview, January 1967, p. 46. (NWC 2313, S-33.)

Ihid., p. 25.

/hid.

24 Ibul.. p. 27.

25 Memorandum from L T. .:. Thompson, Acting Director of Research &

Development, to Heads of Departments, Divisions, and Sections, August 4,

1945. McLean papers. (NWC 2313. 6-15.)

26. K. 11. Robinson final review comments, February 1974.

27. Hugh Hunter interview, May 30, 1975. p. 6. (NWC 2313, S-95.)

28. Minutes ol Administrative hoard Meeting, August 26, 1946, p. 2. (NWC

2313 47-3.;

:

i

>, Malcolm F. Schoeffel interview, April 21. 1966, p. 1. (NWC 2313, S-8.)

30. Itü.. p. 2.

31. Ibid.

32. Unpublished transcription of speech by J. T. Hayward, VAdm., USN (Ret.),

at the NWC 25th Anniversary Dinner. November 9, 1968, p. 15. (NWC 2313,

S-58.)

33. Letter from J. B. Syk^s to *he C'liief, Bureau of )rdnance, Septen ber 30,

1946. NWC Mail, File & Records. (NWC 2313, 19-2.'.)

34. John T. Hayward interview, July 26, 1973, p. 50. (NWC 2313, S-86.)

35. Ibid.

36. Emory L. and Marion Ellis interview, February 23, 1971, p. 50. (NWC 2313,

S-77.)

272
PROBLEMS OF TUE POSTWAR WATCH

37. Letter (NP45/A3-I) from the Research Board, Naval Ordnance fest Station,

Inyokern, to the Chief, Bureau of Ordnance via Commanding Officer, NOTS,

September 20, 1946. LTET. (NWC 2313, 1-89.)

38. Hussey interview, April 1966, p. 9. (NWC 2313, S-5.)

39. Memorandum from J. B. Sykes to Technical Director, November 8, 1946.

(NWC 2313, l-79d.)

40. Attachment to letter from L. T. E. Thompson to Capt. J. B. Sykes,

November 12, 1946, on "Operation and Organizaiion; Outline of Topics for

Review," November 12. 1946. LTET. (NWC 2313, l-79b.)

41. Letter from L. T. E. Thompson to Capt. J. B. Sykes, November 12, 1946.

LTET. (NWC 2313, l-79a.)

42. Letter from L. T. E. Thompson to VAdm. George F. Hussey Jr., November

12, 1946. LTET. (NWC 2313, l-92a.)

43. Letter from G. F. Hussey. Jr., to Dr. L. 1. E. Thompson, November 21,

1946. LTET. (NWC 2313, l-92b.)

44. Duane Mack interview, January 1969, pp. 27-28. (NWC 2313, S-60.)

45. Memorandum from Capt. J. H. Hean to ComNOTS on "Committee on PublicLands, House of Representatives, Hearing on 1.'aval Ordnance Test Station,

Inyokern, California," October 2, 1947. FRCB. (NWC 2313, 22-75.)

46. Ibid.

47. N.O.T.S. Rocketeer, April 30, 1946.

48. Letter from Capt. J. B. Sykes V, RAdm. M. F. Schocffel, April 9, 1947.

FRCB. (NWC 2313, 43-23.)

49. Unpublished manuscript history, "U.S. Naval Air Facility," by Administration

Cffice, NAF, China Lake, May 23, 1967, p. 4. (NWC 23 ij, 15-12.)

50. IbiJ.

51. Letter from L. T. E. Thompson to Dean Ralph A. Sawyer, University of

Michigan, September 25, 1947. LTET. (NWC 2313, 2-42.)

273
9

Headway in the Missile Era

Since the peacetime period following cessatioi. of World War I

hostilities some twenty-five years earlier, the nation had learned its

lesion well. The World War II development of atom bomb, radar,

sonar, advanced fire control systems, and rockets, among other items,

demonstrated that the nation's security depends on continuing

research and development programs to keep the armed forces in pace

technologically.

As part of the postwar research and development effort, the

rocket program continued to flourish at Inyokern. There was much to

be done to refine the rockets hastily developed in wartime: the 5-inch

HVAR, "Tiny Tim," and the aircraft spinners. In addition there was a

long docket of minor ordnance projects outstanding that concerned

the more conventional weapons—bombs, fuzes, explosives, und guns.

Bur the greatest challenges were to emerge from some brand-new

weapon programs that NOTS fell heir to: advanced weapons for

undersea warfare, aircraft rockets for air-to-air combat, and an entirely

new ordnance discipline encompassing guided missiles.

CRITERIA FOR WEAPON PLANNING

One of the most important postwar questions was directly rooted

in the dramatic events at Hiroshima and Nagasaki: had the ultimate

weapon been achieved? If so, and the possibility appeared very real,

would conventional weapons now become obsolete/ The answer to

this question was not only vital in the long range to national security

but was of immediate importance to the future of Inyokern.

275
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

The answer, however, was not immediately at hand, nor would it

be for a long time.

The problem was to evaluate the new weapon with regard to

different kinds of threats and the extent of its power as a deterrent.

Wise men recognized clearly that much more needed to be learned

about nuclear weapons before scrapping fleets and army divisions,

pilot plants, and laboratories. In particular, the Navy was anxious n

evaluate the effects of an atom bomb against its ship and other naval

targets in general. Operation Crossroads, under the command of Vice

Admiral Blancly, conducted at Bikini atoll in the Pacific on July 1

1946, provided an opportunity.

What the Navy sought to refute at Bikini was a statement

beloved of certain strategists that the atom bomb had rendered navies

obsolete; a somewhat similar argument to that posed by Major

General "Billy" Mitchell in 1921, regarding the efficacy of "iron"

bombs. Specifically, the goal of Operation Crossroads was to

determine weapon effects so that dispositions, tactics, and ship

defensive measures could be devised to minimize destruction and

demobilization.1

Although Operation Crossroads provi led a much-needed volume

of technical data for the Navy to apply to a long-range planning

program, it failed to support any conviction that navies were obsolete.

And although Navy interest was stimulated, it is not correct to imply

that interest in nuclear weapons did not exist prior to the Bikini atoll

tests. On the contrary, Navy interest, especially that of the Bureau of

Ordnance, had been stimulated early during the atom-bomb

development phase and had been maintained through the crucial

postwar nuclear tests. Of special importance was the leadership given

in the postwar period by Admiral Parsons who, as the Navy's

outstanding expert on the subject, had pressed hard for an aggressive

Navy nuclear program. Tangible evidence of this interest could be

seen in the brand-new pilot plant at Salt Wells-a viable adjunct of

NOTS.

But if the Navy's interest in nuclear weapons was high in the

early postwar years, it was tempered by a more pragmatic concern for

the immediate needs of the Fleet in terms of advanced

"conventional" weapons. This philosophy is aptly paraphrased by

James Phinney Baxter III in his book, Scientists Against Time, written

in 1946: "Until the world creates an international organization strong

enough to control the genie who escaped from his bottle at

Alamogordo, we must keep our powder dry."

276
HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

This philosophy was generally ascribed to by military and

political leaders in the postwar period. As a result there was not an

abrupt cutting off of research and development funding after V rid

War 11 as there had been after World War I. After V-J Day at NU IS

Inyokem, "keeping the powder dry" co'.ld be more appropriately

translated into "business as usual." Forward-fired aircraft rockets

continued to be tl'; mainstay of the Station's business. However,

within the conf'n'Jig research context of rockets and their potential

for weapon applicatif n, people were thinking more and more about a

relatively new kind oi weapon: the guided missile.

In a future time in the Center's history-some years beyond the

scope of this volume-the name "NOTS" would become as strongly

associated with guided missiles as it had been with aircraft rockets in

World War 11. But while the Staf!on's leadership in aerial rocketry was

implied almost from its founding, such was not the case in the field

of guided missiles.

It had been inherent in the thinking of Navy leadership in

November 1943 that the NOTS mission statement should not be

limited to any specific type of weapon, although an emphasis on

aircraft rockets was implied. Nevertheless, strong forces developed to

block guided missile developmert at Inyokem.

Accordingly, the efforts at NOTS to earn and acquire a future

stake in this new and challenging field of weaponry constitute an

important part of the Station's story.

STRUGGLE FOR COGNIZANCE

Tnroughout its early history. Inyokem appeared destined to serve

as an arena for skirm'shes between the two powerful and competitive

Bureaus—Ordnance a:td Aeronaitics; for example, the struggle for

control of the Naval Air Facilib during the war years. Similar clashes

continued to be e\.u„nt in the immediate peacetime years, too, and

probably the most significant was over cognizance for guided missiles,

a controversy that started long before there was a NOTS.

The Bureau of Ordnance had been the first to enter the new

field during World War i, when, in April 1917, an appropriation of

$50,000 was made for experimental work on "aerial torpedoes in the

form of automatically controlled aeroplanes or aerial machines

carrying high explosives."^ Interestingly, the Bureau of Ordnance

termed its pilotless aircraft a "flying bomb," although the names

277
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

"aerial torpedo," "explosive carrier," and "controllable bomb" were

also used.

In January 1921 the Secretary of the Navv approved the

development of radio-controlled aircraft by the Bureau of Ordnance

and the Bureau of Engineering. Eight months later, however, the

Bureau of Aeronautics was established. Its charter contained all that

was necessary to claim cognizance of all aircraft, piloted nr unpiloted;

specifically, it called for "all that relates to designing, building, fitting

out, and repairing Naval and Marine Corps aircraft."^

During the years between the wars, the challenges were rather

desultory, principally confined to some strongly worded expressions of

discontent by a few Bureau of Aeronautics officers. The Bureau of

Ordnance carried on with its pilotless aircraft development programs

and the Bureau of Aeronautics started its own program for a flying

aerial target-a pilotless "drone" that could be remotely controlled by

radio by an operator in a "mother" aircraft.

Shortly after the outbreak of World War II, the issue of

cognizance heated up considerably as the scope anc' character of

weapon development in the two Bureaus appeared to approach

commonality. For example, in 1941 the Bureau of Aeronau+ics

initiated the development of GLOMB (glider-bomb), a glider that

could be towed long distances by a powered aircraft, released ever

the target, and guided by radio control in its attack. A little more

than a year later, the Bureau of Ordnance had two similar

developments under way: Pelican and Bat. Both were glide bombs,

but with a significant added feature: radar control. Whereas

Pelican—intended for antisubmarine use-failed to prove itself in

operational testing, the Bat, designed for air strikes against land and

ship targets, saw superb test scores and was rushed into comu:it.

Because of Bat's late arrival, there were few first-class naval

targets left for it to destroy, but smaller ships merely offered a more

severe test for the missile. One Japanese destroyer was sent to the

bottom, followed by many tons of cargo shipping. Buc Bat was

unique in history. It was the first fully automatic missile produced by

any of the combatants. The Bureau of Ordnance estimated that the

weapon represented "1,000 man-years of research and developmental

effort."4

Interestingly, the term guided missile figured significantly in the

cognizance battle between the Bureaus of Ordnance and Aeronautics

that started to reach high peaks as the wartime development of these

278
HEADWAY !N THE MISSILE ERA

weapons intensified, both Bureaus felt that a more precise definition

of terms might help the cognizance issue and agreed on the following:

A guided missile is an unmanned vehicle travelling above the surface of the

earth, which is guided from the launching ooint to the target by comj.iand

signals outside the vehicle, or by sensing ' .[uipment within the vehicle, or by

a combination of these systems.5

If the new definition helped at all, it was the Bureau of

Ordnance's cause that benefited most directly. In a conference on

May 4, 1943, it was supposedly decided that "By an agreement with

the Bureau of Aeronautics, the Bureau of Ordnance has cogniz ;nce

over all Navy Guided Missiles [italics added] with the exceptio: of

drones."^ The reaction to this decision was predictably vitriolic.

The Bureau of Ordnance embraced the thesis that all weapons

were the inalienable province of the "weapons" B"reau. The Bureau

of Aeronautics doggedly held onto the contention tl:at all winded

'thicles were the special province of the "alrciaft" Bureau as

determined by iis original charter; moreover, it counterclaimed thai

no bureau had complete control over any branch of science or

technology.

As Rear Admiral D. S. Fahrney, USN (Ret.), commented in his

unpublished manuscript on the subject, ". . . the fires of jealousy

s.noldered along all echelons in the bureaus and at times broke out in

spectacular denunciations of the lack of consideration for the rights

of one or the other."7

Despite all efforts, even at the Chief of Naval Operations level,

to reconcile the guided missile cognizance issue, it was largely

unresolved at the end of the war in 1945. In the meantime, the

Bureaus of Ordnance and Aeronautics had essentially forged ahead

with their own particular programs, regardless of category or whetner

the vehicles were "winged" or otherwise

Thus, at the war's end, guided missiles under development by the

Bureau of Aeronautics included Gargoyle, an air-to-surface

rocket-propelled missile; Lark, a surface-to-air subsonic missile

propelled by a liquid rocket; and the Gorgon IIA missile, an air-to-air

missile using liquid rocket propulsion.

Missiles under development by the Bureau of Ordnance included

Dove, a high-angle heat-homing bomb; Kingfisher, a series of

jet-propelled air-launched missiles; and the Bumblebee series of

surface-to-air missiles, also planned for jet propulsion.

From the above list, two missiles are of special significance to

this account because much of their testing was assigned to the Naval

279
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKEPN

Ordnance 7est Station, Inyokern. These were the B-reau of

Aeronautics' Lark and Bureau of Ordnance's Bumblebee. Bot,, missiles

were in the surfact-tc-air category-evidence tlvt the cognizance

c

.truggle was stil' unresolved.

In November 1947 high-level decisions were made that were

inten 'ed to settle the missile controversy once and for all. Rear

Adn iral Daniel V. Gallery, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Guided

Missiles), conferred with the Chiefs of the two Bureaus and suggested

that a natural division lay in the air-launched and ship-launched

categories of missiles. As a startet to accomplish this plausible

division, Gallery further suggested that the Bureau of Aeronautics turn

o' er all development of surface-to-air missiles after completion of the

Lark to the Bureau of Ordnance who, in return, vas to give up

"forever" any concerns with, or development of, air-to-air

missiles-including Meteor, which had just gotten under way.

Despite the usual protests by the respective Bureau OiTicers,

Gallery's suggestion was accepted by the concerned Chiefs. It >vas a

binding agreement that would last for some three >ears. During this

time, the Bureau of Ordnance fulfilled the spirit of the agreement by

enjoining its test station at Inyokern against any involvement in

air-launched missile development.

If many officers of either Bureau failed to understand and accept

this latest determination of guided missile cognizance, this lack of

understanding was shared by many of the military and scientific

civilian leaders at NOTS.

Having inherited the Navy's technical leadership in the

development of rockets, the NOTS staff saw guided missiles as rockets

with "intelligence," and as developers of aviation ordnance, they

recognized guided missiles as the great promise in air-to-air warfare.

In 1945 the nation's principal expertise in rockets as weapons

v/as centered at Inyokern. This embraced the total knowledge

acquired by the CalTech group under Lauritsen when the torch was

passed to NOTS at the end of the war.* In a very large sense, the

capability of designing and developing flight controls and guidance

systems was well represented by the able nucleus of scientists and

engineers then on board. If this capability was d\ that was necessary

* CalTech had two rocket programs during the war. At the end of the war the

Lauritsen program for military rockets went to NOTS and the von Karman-Malina

rocket-research program became the basis for establishing the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of

CalTech.

280
HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

to translate an aerial rocket into a guided missile, then NOTS should

have been one logical place to do it.

However, the NOTS bid for guided missile work was not a bid

for cognizance, but quite the contrary. The NOTS philosophy was

against artificial barriers that would obstruct new approaches tj

problems of nMiopal defense. This philosophy was parallel to that

expressed later by Parsons, by then a Rear Admiral:

The words "cognizance" and "primary responsibility" sound attractive

to those who measure achievement by neat looking organization charts and

slrongly-ooordinatcd production and procurement programs. In lir >controlIed

military and industrial organizations assignment of cognizance means that

some individual or group has fell that it could "see around" the problem

and therefore set boundaries and define (limit) the effort. The degree tu

which this can be done is in my opinion inversely proportional to the rate

of development of the field in question. No one argues about cognizance of

marlinspikes or saddles. But in important, partially exploited fields,

cognizance can be synonymous with "paralysis" or "stranglehold."8

On October 20, 1946, Dr. Thompson had written a

memorandum on the subject, "Task Group for Guided Missiles,"

which included B. H. Sage, W. R. Brode, C. T. Elvey, E. L. Ellis, W.

B. McLean, W. N. Arnquist, and H. G. Cooper. The memorandum

expressed Thompson's desi/e for NOTS to take a closer look at

guided missile technology; first, to survey all of the nation's

significant work on missiles, then to establish contacts with other

guided missile developers "for the purpose of laying out a general

program covering work in prospect at NOTS during the next six to

twelve months."

Although not directly stated, the formation of the Guided Missile

Task Group was implicit: to get "a foot in the door" of missile

development. It is noteworthy that Thompson took pains to offer a

logical and legal justification for founding the Group: ostensibly, to

"provide an effective basis for continuing work at this station on

certain components of guided missile systems." NOTS was already

doing missile work of a different kind: testing. As a test station at

the war's end, its ranges ;md facilities had already been destined lor

heavy usage in support of the Navy's primary guided missile

programs: Bumblebee and Lark.

POSTWAR NAVY MISSILE PROGRAMS

Despite the advantageous posture enjoyed by NOTS as a test

station "in being"-with an excellent potential to handle guided

281
THE GRAND EXPERi ,.£NT AT INVOKF.RN

missiles-it was by no means the only one during the early postwar

period. In January 1946 the Burr u of Ordnance established the

Xaval Air Ordnance Test Station at Chincoteague, off the Virginia

coast, with a stated mission "to perform tests and modifications as

necessary to develop aviation ordnance and guided missiles";9the

establishing order also provided for the transfer of all Bureau of

Ordnance guided mirsile test facilities and staff from the Naval

Material Center, Johnsville, Pennsylvania, to the new Station. Upon

hearing the news, some at Inyokem ironically noted that the "Naval

Air Ordnance Test Station" name was the very one that had been

advocated for NOTS some two years earlier.

In 1946 the Bureau of Aeronautics, too, reaffirmed its unshaken

resolution to retain leadership in the guided missile field by

establishing the Naval Air M^sile Test Center at Point Mugu on the

California coast to "conduct tests and evaluation of guided missiles

and components . . ."^

Prior to the establishment of the Naval Air Missile Test Center in

October 1946, a Pilotless Aircraft Unit was organized to handle one

of the Bureau of Aeronautics' majcr missile projects—the Loon, an

American version of the German V-i "buzz bomb." The Unit was

stationed at the Marine Corps Air Station, Mojave, California, from

November 6, 1945, until October 1, 1946, when it moved to Point

Mugu and was absorbed by the new test Center.

The establishment of the test facilities at Chincoteague and Point

Mugu reflected the high degree of interest in guided missile

development on the part of the Navy and recognition of a need for

test stations to support their development. Unfortunately, while the

testing of missiles appeared to have been provided for in the

immediate postwar years, their research and development were not.

Most of the Navy's missile programs were started during the war

under the management of OSRD. When that Office was dissolved, the

status of these programs was extremely tenuous.

To put Bumblebee and Lark guided missile development on a

sounder basir, the Chief of Naval Operations undertook a complete

reorientation and consolidation of Navy guided missile development in

early 1946 hr. a consequence, many programs were discontinued.

Others such JS Gorgon II-A and 111-A, were limited to test and

research vehicles, as was Loon. However, it was decreed that

Bumblebee and h?.rk would continue as high priority ship-to-air

missile developments.

It i; understandable why this priority was assigned to ship-to-air

282
HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

missiles. The heaviest losses borne by the Navy during the war-from

Pearl Harbor to the kamikazi operations-had been caused by aerial

attack. Also, with the defeat of the German and Japanese navies, no

major surface fleet of a potential enemy was in sight.

Bumblebee on launcher.

The Bumblebee and Lark programs each represented a different

means for the Navy to continue its aggressive missile development

effort: direct contract with a university-associated laboratory (the

Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) of Johns Hopkins University for

Bumblebee); or one of a growing number of aircraft manufacturers

involved in such R&D projects (Consolidated Vultee and Fairchild for

Lark). Among this latter group, which would eventually be known as

the "aerospace industry," there was already strong competition for

government development work. And this competition grew as more

large industries threw their hats in the ring. Not all of these

companies were aircraft manufacturers. Some (such as Eastman

283
THE GRAND r

XPERIMENl AT INYOKERN

Kodak, Westinghouse, and General Tire and Rubber) had built up

facilities and technical staff during the course of wartime contracts

with OSRD and had acquired a taste for government ordnance work.

As originally conceived by the OSRD Section T scientists, the

Bumblebee concept was unique and innovative: a jet-propelled

antiaircraft weapon, rocket-launched from shipboard, and guided to its

aerial target along a radar beam. From the first, the program was

assigned top priority by the Bureau of Ordnance, even going to the

lengths of withdrawing APL from the highly important proximity-fuze

program to take over the development of Bumblebee. Among the

many new technologies APL had to master was the development of a

ramjet engine; that is, one that would obtiin its oxygen from the

airstream rather than an oxidizer. This was accomplished within six

months.

Lark (KAQ-l) ready for firing on 450-foot ramp; Big Richard is used as booster.

The successful flight test of this first ramjet engine,

demonstrating thrust at supersonic speed, was made on June 13,

284
T • ^

HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

1945, al Island Beach, New Jersey. The historic engine that powered

this flight was only 6 inches in diameter and was reportedly

constructed from the exhaust tubing of a P-47 (Thunderbolt) fighter

aircraft.

From the .iset of the Bumblebee development program early in

1945, it was manifestly clear to the developers and the Navy that a

lot of unobstructed testing space would be required for the many

rocket test vehicles to prove out the guidance and propulsion systems

for the program and for the missiles that would evolve. Several

possible sites were looked at on the East Coast, including the one at

Island Beach, but the overall range distance at each site was

determined to be insufficient; moreover, none had the sophisticated

range instrumentation necessary for the planned supersonic testing

phase. Conveniently, the Bureau of Ordnance had such an area at

Inyokern. Conseauently, the test program for Bumblebee was

transferred to NOTS in August 1945.

The many obstacles to guided missile development at NOTS did

not apply to testing. In fact, a major effort of the postwar period

was in developing and instrumenting a major range for

surface-launched guided missiles.

The first guided missile test range at Inyokern was G Range

("G" designating "ground"), one of the largest of the NOTS test

ranges: a 10-mile-wide pie-shaped wedge of open desert extending as

far as the Station's northernmost boundary -some 37 miles. The pie

wedge was bisected down tne middle, the western piece, designated

G-l, was for ground testing of live rocket ammunition; the eastern

piece, G-2, was for inert ammunition. By mid-1944 the ground ranges

were only sketchily laid out. The first rockets had been fired on

March 30 from G-2, and in April temporary wooden towers were

built along the range boundaries to plot the rocket impacts.1'

As with all of the NOTS facilities, the master plan for the lest

ranges was to establish temporary facilities for immediate use, and

then eventually replace them with permanent ones. However, as the

war drew to a close, the abundance of construction funds

correspondingly dwindled.

Although within ten year? G-l was destined to become one of

the world's finest and most fully instrumented guided missile ranges,

it was certainly not so in August 1945 when the first testing for a

guided missile program began at NOTS where a modified old

searchlight yoke was used for a launcher.

285
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INVOKERN

At fiTEt, the Station effort was strictly limited 10 assisting the

APL development personnel in the performance of their field tasks.

Understandably, the NOTS testing staff knew very little about the

missiles themselves; in particular, ramjet propulsion was a brand-new

technology. However, they knew a lot about the use of ranges, how

to track rockets in flight, and how to gather accurate instrumented

landiine and telemetry data. The modem concept of sophisticated,

fully instrumented ranges had already dawned at Inyokern under Dr.

Bowen, and it was apparent that the newly emerging test philosophies

and equipment were as readily applicable to guided missiles as they

were to rockets.

The Bumblebee program became progressively more complex.

Development of a practical propulsion system was but one of many

problems that had to be solved to realize an effective tactical guided

missile. The ranges and velocities obtainable with even the best of

propulsion systems would have little meaning if accurate guidance and

control were lacking. Since available knowledge of the aerodynamic

characteristics of a missile at supersonic speeds was, for all practical

purposes, nonexistent, early flight-control studies utilized subsonic

flight test vehicles. These vehicles kept flights i.' the lower velocity

ranges where aerodynamic characteristics of the various designs could

be evaluated more accurately, and the problems of recording and

assessing flight performance were simplified.

Free-flight testing of control test vehicles for Bumblebee began in

January 1946. Almost a year later the first successful subsonic

beam-riding flight was made at the Station when a ;-oil-stabiIized

control test vehicle followed a fixed radar beam for 16 secinds. By

1948 a half dozen successful beam riders had been launch ;d, and

several beam-following runs (with beam movement at the rate of 5

mils per second) had been made.

A historic milestone in guided missile development was passed in

March 1948 when two successful supersonic beam-riding flights were

conducted at NOTS. As far as can be determined, these were the

world's first successful beam-riding flights at supersonic velocities.12

The Bureau of Aeronautics' Lark was a pencil-shaped missile 14

feel long and 17 inches in diameter. It had four wings and four tail

surfaces and an overall span of 6 feet, forming two crosses set at 45

degrees to each other, it was powered by a liquid propellant locket

engine and was initially designed to be launched by two strap-on,

1,000-pound-thrust, jet-assisted-takeoff units. As an antiaircraft defense

weapon. Lark was designed to be shipboard-launched; it would then

286
HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

be radio-controlled ro intercept an enemy aircraft flying at 350 knots

up to altitudes of 30,000 feet, anywhere within a radius of 40 miles.

Despite their different respective Bureau ownerships, Lark and

Bumblebee had much in common. They had begun almost together,

shared similar opeiational purposes (shipboard antiaircraft), and had

emerged at the close of hostilities' as priority development programs.

More significant to our story, the test programs for them constituted

the early beginning of a brand-new career for NOTS.

In August 1945, when Bumblebee operations started at NOTS,

the Bureau of Aeronautics decided '.o take up the Bureau of

Ordnance's gratuitous offer of the previo «s year to "make Inyokern

available to the Bureau of Aeronautics foi [certain] ... tests."1^ The

Lark missile, like Bumblebee, required development testing and needed

the favorable environment that so uniquely characterized the desert

Station: weather conditions suitable for uninterrupted testing; terrain

that facilitated recovery of missiles so that components that failed

might be found and recovered; and a location having a minimum of

firing restrictions, such as proximity of the flight line to shipping

lanes, towns, or other populated areas.14

The Bureau of Aeronautics had contracts with two companies to

develop separate but similar versions of Lark. One, designated KAY-1,

was made by Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation; the other,

KAQ-1, was undertaken by the Fairchild Engine and Airplane

Corporation. The primary development test objectives for both missile

versions at NOTS new "to determine stability and control

characteristics. . . correet any obvious faults in flight and control

characteristics, and provide data for missile evaluation in respect to

tactical capabilities."15

The program priority was high, and everybody concerned—the

Bureau of Aeronautics, NOTS, and the two prime contractors-was

anxious to start as soon as possible. Nevertheless, it would be nine

months before the first Lark ,fissile would be fired at NOTS. The

delay was quite und. -tandable. This was a new technology, and there

was a wide gulf between relative accomplishments in the laboratory

and in the field. In the perspective of hindsight, this literal inability

to get off the ground represented, in 1945, a potent argument for

establishing a research, development, and test center, with close ties

among all phases of the work.

In early 1948 the Bureau of Aeronautics took action for the

e/tatual shifting of all Lark testing to the Naval Air Missile Tesi

Cnter at F^oint Mugu. Of'.icially, the major factors influencing ihis

287
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

move were completion of instrumentation at the short, sea range at

NAMTC, and the advantage of conducting test operations at a facility

under management control of the sponsoring bureau.'^

Lark began its phaseout during the last two years of its four-year

stay at Inyokern. In 1948 only 14 missiles were fired as compared to

34 and 28 for the years 1946 and 1947, respectively. As the program

phased out, the Bureau of Ordnance had several new guided missile

test programs waiting to take its place: Dove, Meteor, and Kingfisher.

However, the individual stories of these missile programs are

chronologically beyond the scope of this volume.

Bumblebee remained the key guided missile program at NOTS

and the one that would do the most in financing the development nf

the NOTS ranges with their extensive instrumentation. But at the

time, the great future success of this program and its distinguished

descendants, Talos, Terrier, and Tartar, stayed largely unforeseen.

NOTS AIR MISSILE

NOTS scientists in the postwar period saw with increasing clarity

that, unless they took the initiative, the new guided missile work for

MOTS would be patentl> more of the same-essentially testing the

results of other people's research and development effort. More

important, it was becoming increasingly obvious to the scientists that

guided missiles offered the most likely solutions to many of the most

important tactical requirements they were trying to meet with their

rocket and fire control projects. It was the traditional case of having

to fight with one arm tied.

As the scientists took stock of their growing resources,

introspectively regarding the realm of shops, laboratories, ranges, test

facilities, a settled community, and their own growth as a research

team, impatience to exercise their full research and development

potential began to show. The first major initiative was taken by

Thompson's Guided M.ssile Task Group.

During the initial ten months of its existence, the Group

undertook a comprehensive study of guided missiles: their pi.st

history, current development by government and industry, and their

potential as weapons of the future. From this study, the Task Group

team members (now under the leadership of Dr. Andrew Vazsonyi)

concluded that a most effective role of guided missiles would be that

of an air-to-air weapon. They went further: they formulated the

288
HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

broad technical specifications for such a weapon. In the independent

spirit of early NOTS, the team members were nou inhibited by the

interbureau struggle for guided missile cognizance.

On August 30, 1946, Captain Sykes forwarded the Station's first

proposal to the Bureau of Ordnance for a guided missile that was to

be 11 inches long, 8 inches in diameter, and to weigh 200 pounds,

Under "guidance," the proposal called for "straight-line path,

non-beam riding, coupled with a homing device to lake effect at a

range approximately 1000 yards from the target."17The proposal

began:

1. The Naval Ordnance Test Station believes it desiublc to consider the

development of an air-to-air missile capable of being launched at ranges from

5000 to 10,000 yards and carrying a sufficient charge to be lethal to aircraft

when detonated within a sphere of inlluence of existing proximity fuzes.18

It was estimated that it would take approximately two years to

develop the missile. To meet this schedule, about $170,000 would be

requiied for development of the rocket motor and the "control jets

for stabilization"—plus the services of some 24 employees.19

The Bureau of Ordnance's reaction was lukewarm. In this period

it was being deluged by guided missile proposals of all kinds-notably

from the higl.ly competitive private industnal firms that constituted

the emerging aerospace industry. And there was also a mounting

offensive by the Bureau of Aeronautics against the Bureau of

Ordnance's alleged preemption in the missile field.

No action was taken on the historic NOTS proposal for more

than six months, when, on March 28, 1947, the Bureau of Ordnance

approved a program for an air-to-ah guided missile. It was a thin

authorization, however, as it stated that "no additional personnel and

no additional funds would be provided at that time, but that it was

expected that work in existing projects and funds already provided

would cover the immediate needs of the program."20

And so the first missile development program for the Station

limped into being. It was called "NOTS AM" (for air missile), and

the project had an nndistinguished lifetime of approximately twelve

months.

EARLY BLUEPRINT FOR A WONDER MISSILE

A müd-mannered physicist in his early thirties, Dr. William B.

McLean of the Fire Control Section, Ordnance Department, watched

the activities of the NOTS Guided Missile Task Group with interest

289
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

and read their studies with what he recalled later as "considerable

disgust."

Although he had been named a member of the original group in

October 19^5 shortly after he arrived at NOTS, McLean was not an

active member of the team. Primarily, he believed a wrong approach

was being taken in the detailed study of other existing guided missile

programs; also, he felt that the group's missile was becoming "too

complicated."21From the beginning, McLean had ideas of his own.

McLean's career at the desert Station was destined to be quite

remarkable. In 1954, after nine years on boarc, he would become

Technical Director and serve in that capacity for thirteen years. But

in the annals of the Station's history and in the wider ones of naval

ordnance and the aerial weaponry of the free world, Bill McLean was

earmarked for distinction through a singular accomplishment that

would bring considerable fame upon him and his parent station. This

was an air-to-air guided missile called Sidewinder.

McLean was keenly interested in guided missiles long before he

arrived at Inyokem. During his preceding five-year wartime career as a

physicist at the Bureau of Standards, he worked hard on the Bat

glide bomb, devising gyroscope systems for stabilizing the missile. He

recalled in a later interview, "Bat was a pretty good missile . . . ii

could either have a radar or. . . [a] television looking forward, and it

would stay on the target . . ."22

McLean's views in 1945 were t'.at guided missiles should be

considered as ordnance rather than aircraft in determining which

Bureau (Ordnance or Aeronautics) was to have cognisance. Years later

he asserted, "I think most of our delays in getting good guided

missiles, and a lot of the expense in the guided missiles that we have

now, came about because they were treated as aircraft rather than as

ordnance."2-^ But he also had an optimistic personal philosophy in

that "what is right will eventually come about."24

In the early postwar years there were problems aplenty at NOTS

to challenge him and occupy his time. These problems were germane

to the flourishing aircraft rocket program that had been inherited

from CalTech.

Through exhaustive analysis of rocket flights on the NOTS

ranges, McLean's Fire Control Section found many things that caused

errors, such as windscreen deflection due '.o the flexure of the aircraft

structure. The team also found that even with a fire control syscem

assumed to be perfect, there was no way for the system to

accommodate the largest error of them all—one caused by movement

of the target after the rocket had been air-launched. It became

290
HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

obvious to him there would be no solution to the real fire control

problem by anything that could be put in the aircraft.

In McLean's mind there was but one solution: find a means by

which the rocket could correct its own flight trajectory. This spelled

out some kind of integrated guidance system to provide control

intelligence for the rocket-right up to target impact. And McLean set

out to find a way to make the necessary additions to the rocket to

enable if to fulfill its ordnance requirements. Thus, this early missile

guidance exploration at NOTS was done within the purview of rocket

fire control development.

In analyzing the problem, McLean visited various places where

they were working on both fire control and missiles. He asked about

problems being encountered and about possible design solutions to

these problems.

McLean perceived that most of the problems encountered at the

other missile activities appeared to fall into three major areas. The

first concerned conventional missile design whereby the electronics

and control systems were variously located throughout the missile.

Since ordnance regulations precluded storing and shipping the missile

fully assembled, the hydraulic and electrical connections between the

parts of the missile could easily become damaged or corroded, or get

dirty-thus leading to very poor reliability.

The second problem area identified by McLean was rooted in the

fact '.nat the dynamic range of the airframe control systems was

universally very difficult to achieve. Because the missiles had to work

at altitudes from sea level to 50,000 feet, and at airspeeds from a

few hundred to many thousand feet per second, the airframe control

surfaces had to be deflected over a very wide angular range with great

precision.

The third general problem area reflected the difficulty of

mechanically isolating the target tracker, or seeker, from the rest of

the missile. As a consequence, any large missile maneuver disturbed

the seeker and the nussile guidance became highly erratic; this was

particularly true of missile roll rate.

In seeking to solve these problems, McLean designed a heat

homing missile with an infrared seeker incorporating new design

concepts. Essentially, the electronic power source, seeker, and control

system were to be confined within a single package that could be

mechanically attached—much like a fuze—so that there would be no

need for electrical connections. The result was that the fuze,

propulsion, and warhead units could be stored separately, making it

possible to assemble the missile just like a normal rocket.

291
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Other brand-new design features were worked out by McLean,

expressly aimed at solving specific problems identified earlier. Included

was a control surface mechanism—the "torque-balance servo"—that

automatically deflected the control fins to whatever angle (or

deflection) was appropriate for the missile's speed or altitude. This

was done without needing to measure the fin deflection value.

There was also a new seeker tracker that was, itself, inherently a

gyroscope, which made it imperturbable by mechanical forces resulting

from its attachment to the missile. Moreover, the new seeker tracker

control mechanism that caused the seeker to track in a coordinate

system unrelated to the missile's axes enabled the seeker tracker to

remain "ignorant" of (and therefore unaffected by) airframe actions

such as snap rolls.

Yet another remarkable aspect of McLean's new missile was a

compact, high-power propellant gas generator that supplied all the

energy for both the control surface mechanism and the electrical

components.

As McLean came to grips with the NOTS fire control problems,

he and his team became increasingly aware that the effectiveness of

air-to-air ordnance (bullets and missiles) would eventually diminish as

aircraft speeds became greater; to a point where there could be no

solution by fire control improvement alone. His early concept of a

completely self-contained guided rocket missile became ever more

strongly reinforced in his mind.

The problem-solving design concepts had provided some useful

terms in a formula for such a weapon (compactness, refined servos,

gyros, etc.). The big unknown factors, suitable tracking and homing,

were soon to be resolved. And from the completed formula would

emerge a true air-launched guided missile—an air-to-air weapon that

would eventually revolutionize aerial combat on a worldwide basis. It

would take its name from an ancient resident of t.ie Mojave

Desert-the Sidewinder rattlesnake.

It is a story that extends beyond the scope of this history, and

one that will be fully chronicled in a subsequent volume. But during

the years 1945-1948, the significant fundamental concept of

Sidewinder took form. Although this early Sidewinder work was done

in a period of restriction on guided missile programs at NOTS,

McLean did not have any financial prob'ems uith the project. It was

supported enthusiastically by Thompson, who transferred experimental

funds to i^ for the initial efforts.2^ This work led to the formal

proposal for Sidewinder made by NOTS in 1949. From that time

292

i

.. , .
HEADWAY IN THE VflSSILE ERA

forward, the Station would become as well known for guided missiles

as it was for aircraft rockets.

PEACETIME ROCKET DEVELOPMENT

In the spring of 1946 some 20% of the Station's activity was

concemed with guided missiles, this effort being about evenly divided

between Bureau of Ordnance and Bureau of Aeronautics projects.^

Approximately 40% of the Station's work in the early postwar years

can be attributed to tiie China Lake and Salt Wells Pilot F..ints. Most

of the remaining effort was in aerial rocket development, an active

continuum of the busy war years at Inyokern, although the urgency

that had underscored the wartime program was now greatly

diminished.

The main rocket effort of the Navy was centerjd at NOTS. And

unlike the missile effort, most of the actual development cognizance

was also placed with NOTS.

The reason for the Station's preeminence in the field of rocketry

is easy to understand: the major rocket programs had been handed

over intact by CalTech to the Navy at the end of the war. The

Bureau of Ordnance apparently maintained a high 'evel of confidence

in the management at Inyokern to crry on where CalTech had left

off. The rocket programs that were to continue in the immediate

postwar period had already reached an advanced state of development.

For example. Holy Moses and Tiny Tim had been employed in

combat, but the speed of their wartime development had precluded

some badly needed refinements. Now there was time to accomplish

these refinements. Other rockets like the aircraft spinner rocket

,>inch GASR) were in advanced development.

Thus, immediately after the war, the newly inherited

developmi-.it task for NOTS was to put the necessary finishing

touches on a number of rockets whose development was essentially

complete. Or so it seemed at first glance! As it later proved, there

was infinitely more to the task.

As one way cf improving the rockets, NOTS pursued a program

started by CalTech to make the rockets lighter. Originally, the motor

tube, which was exposed to the hot gas during the entire burning

period, had to be constructed of steel to withstand the gases. So

CalTech devised the internal burning propellant grain in which all the

flow of gas down the rocket motor to the nozzle was through a

293
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

central perforation. Now the propellant itself served to insulate ana

protect the case from heating; thus, aluminum cases rather than steel

ones were feasible. But, in turn, the significant weight change altered

the aerodynamic flight characteristics of the rocket. As a result,

thousands of ground- and air-launched test firings were required to

revise the established flight data.

Similarly, the design of warheads and fuzes needed reappraisal

and improvement. In particular the proximity fuze offered a

tremendous added capability to the effectiveness of aerial rockets;

however, its adaption proved to be a formidable task. NOTS

initially undertook a lion's share of the Bureau of Ordnance's fuze

development program, and once more the plate and target ranges were

busy, as were the personnel of the target irone unit, operating out of

the old Harvey Field. Although of high intensity, this effort was

short-lived; in February 1947, the Bureau trariferred all fuze work to

the Naval Ordnance Laboratory.

It soon became obvious to NOTS and the Bureau of Ordnance

leadership that improvements to existing rocket weapons were not

enough; new rockets were needed to keep pace with the dramatic

advances made in the aircraft that carried them-the high-performance

jet fighters.

Wartime fin-stabilized rockets were carried externally under the

wings with various types of launchers. On the Lockheed P-80A

Shooting Mir (the firs' U.S. jet-propelled combat aircraft) such

externally mounted rockois resulted in a corresponding loss of

airspeed from 100 to 125 miles per hour at altitudes between 30,000

and 40,000 feet.27Accordinj-'Jy, the demand was for intem?lly carried

stores: tubes contained eithe» in the wings or airframe. Tube-launched

spinner rockets, therefore, received a full focus of attention and a

nigh priority.

The spinners contim^c to pose formidable problems to

aerodynamicist and ballistj'di n alike. A NOTS physicist, Dv. William

Reed Haseltine,* explainci.' some of the problems to conference

members of the Aeronautics Committee of the Joint Research and

Development Board.

The basis of the trouble with spinners is that they depend for initial

as well as later flight stability on their spin. In grol)'",launching,

translational velocity through air and spin velocity are roughly proportional

throughout the flight. But in air launching-from the initial moment of

Haseltine, formerly of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Wisconsin,

and Or .ance Department, U.S. Army, arrived at NOTS in 1946 and was a leading physicist

at the Center until his retirement in 1976.28

294
HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

launching-thc spin is low but velocity through air is high; so the rocket is in

an unstable condition lor a short time interval after launching, which permits

large yaws. We have observed yaws as large as 60°, after which the rocket

settled down.29

Other design trails were also being blazed that hopefully would

lead to an optimum of storage and stability. One of these was a

design feature that had been used earlier in the Army's 4.5-inch M8

aircraft rocket. Tiie designers of this rocket had originally responded

to the Army reciuirement that their aerial rockets be launched from

tubes mounted on the aircraft. Accordingly, they had devised folding

fins, a system in which hinged, spring-loaded fins fold in behind the

body of a round and spring open when the body leaves the launcher

tube.

The .dea was a good one. Unfortunately, the spring-actuation

mechanism posed some problems. For a start, the mechanism was

bulky and occupied too much space in the tube to allow for an

optimum-size nozzle. Moreover, the mechanism—located about the

nozzle—could hardly withstand the extremely high temperatures within

the launching tube; this caused erosion and "s'izing" of the

folding-fin mechanism.

NOTS scientists and engineers took the basic idea of folding fins

and applied dramatic improvements. Instead of a spring-loaded

mechanism to open the fins, an internal piston arrangement was

designed that was actuated by pressure generated by the burning

rocket motor.* In the latter part of 1946, preliminary design studies

confirmed the feasibility of the new folding-fin concept.

Clearly, the Bureau of Ordnance was highly impressed by the

idea of folding-fin rockets. Sh )rtly after the feasibility demonstration

by NOTS, an applied research program on folding-fin rockets was

established at the Station, and in March 1947, the Bureau of

Ordnance requested development of a folding-fin version of the

3.25-inch fin-stabilized aircraft rocket (FSAR). Dr. Ellis later recalled

details of the early development:

Initial work was at the 3.25-inch size because we had that size tubing

and could quickly make experimental rockets. It takes months to tool up to

make a new size tube, and none of the aluminum companies (Alcoa and

Reynolds) could make tubes which met the needed tight specs for

Credit for this idea and the patent holdings belong ti A. S. Gould, a pioneer in

rucket engineering who had hitherto performed significant design work for CalTech as a

member of the Launcher Section of the Rocket Group.

295
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

stiaighlness, ovality, and uniform wall thickness. We worked witli them

(especially Reynolds) to help them get us useable tubing. The size (2.75)

which was eventually adopted resulted from a study which determined the

explosive charge needed to destroy the target, and the size rocket needed to

carry that charge to the target with the needed ballistic properties. The wall

thickness and other characteristics of the warhead were determined by the

penetration charactei sties specified by BuOrd. The fuze was entirely a NOTS

development and has been adapted to many other uses since its original

use . . .

30

But in 1947 this was just the beginning of a brand-new rocket

development program for NOTS; one that would result in the

addition of another name to the distinguished roster of Inyokem's

aircraft rockets: Mighty Mouse, a fin-stabilized rocket that could be

launched with rapid and deadly effect by a fast jet fighter. Originally

developed for air-to-air use, Mighty Mouse evolved as one of the

primary weapons for air-to-ground attacks.

Mighty Mouse was a small-caliber rocket only 2 3/4 inches in

diameter and 4 feet long. Its official name was "2.75-hch FFAR

(Folding Fin Aircraft Rocket)." The Bureau of Ordnance gave as

desirable characteristics for the rocket (which was intended for firing

in salvos of 25 rounds or more from tubular launchers) a minimum

burn velocity of 2,000 feet per second and a payload of 1.5 pounds

of high explosive detonated by a contact fuze equipped with a short

delay.3' Active development of Mighty Mouse was begun with high

priority in the spring of 1948.

It is interesting to note that the success of the initial exploratory

development of Mighty Mouse in 1948 prompted three major U.S.

airframe contractors during the same year to develop aircraft that

would be armed with the new folding-fin rockets. By 1973, some

fifty million of these rockets had been produced for the armed

forces.32

One of the most useful facilities for the development of the new

rocket turned out to be the 1,500-foot track at K-2 Ground Range.

On this track, which consists of two cold-rolled steel rails mounted

on a continuous concrete foundation, the complete rocket and

launch-tube assembly could be strapped to a sled and accelerated

along the track by a booster rocket to the same speeds of a

high-performance jet fighter in flight. At such speeds, the

developmental rocket was then fired from its tube, and its behavior

recorded on film by an array of special purpose cameras.

In addition to the folding fins for Mighty Mouse, there were

numerous technological advances applied to other NOTS rockets.

These included lightweight metals for rocket components, internally

burning propellant grains, and improved propellants and warheads.

296
HEADWAY IN THC MISSILE ERA

This lasjt item 'vas particularly significant. Gone was the wartime

prai of adap'.ing conventional shells and bombs as rocket warheads

ffor example, holy Moses and Tiny Tim). Now warheads were being

.;iloi-made b> NOTS as part of the overall rocket design. They were

constructed o new materials and designed for a variety of new fuzes

and explosives

These improvements often transformed old designs into virtually

new weapons. The 5-inch HVAR (Holy Moses), for example, acquired

a velocity of 2,300 feet per second (over its original 1,350 value) and

had its intended tactical use enlarged from air-to-ground attack to

antisubmarine work. Eventually the Bureau of Ordnance would

request that a follow-on version of this racket be developed with

folding fins, which resulted in the multiple-purpose, air-launched Zuni.

Throughout the NOTS aircraft rocket program, both in wartime

and in the postwar years, a notable diversity was evident in the size

of the weapons: 2.75-, 3.5-, 5.0-inch, and the "really big rocket," the

11.75-inch Tiny Tim. But Tiny Tim was by no means the largest

aircraft rocket in the NOTS catalog. Immediately following its

successful development, work was started on an even bigger one. This

14-inch rocket, called Big Richard, was an extension of the Tiny Tim

design principles. The first models were built in the spring of 1945,

but this rocket had not been air-fired by the end of tlie war.-5-^

Development of Big Richard continued at a low priority for

about eighteen months after the war, and by January 1947 was

reported as completed. Although Big Richard never made it to the

Fleet, a number of developmental rounds were relegated to useful, if

unspectacular, service as rocket boosters for Lark testing, and for the

1,500-foot test track at K-2 Range. Thus, it aided in the development

and test of its more noteworthy family members.

In the postwar years, Inyokern's role as the Navy's center ol

rocketry was never abrogated. It was the center of a revolution in

ordnance that was quietly taking place as rocket propelled weapons

were replacing guns as the primary armament of the Navy. The NOTS

role in this revolution did not escape public attention. The hitherto

secreted Station became the subject of a spate of feature articles in

the popular press. A typical article appearing in the Saturday Evening

Post, June 29, 1946, was written by Frank J. Taylor and titled "The

Navy's Land of Oz." Life magazine also featured NOTS in a lead

article, "Rocket Town," in February 1948. That the Bureau of

Ordnance saw NOTS as its center for rocketry is evident from the

infinite variety of rocket-associated tasks that it allocated to the

Station. Out of a total of 172 projects listed in a June 1946 status

297
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

report of the Bureau o\ Ordnance, 108 directly relate tc rocket

development. The rocket ventures at Inyokern in the postwar years

testified to a salutary fact: NOTS iiad quickly and surely arsumed the

mantle of leadership in military rocketry-for the nation and the free

world. The grand experiment at Inyokern was succeeding.

And one of the dimensions of the experiment had to do with a

field that appeared to be far removed from aircraft rockets.

UNDERWATER ORDNANCE

At first glance it seemed improbable and hard to reconcile;

namely, that a major program of the Naval Ordnance Test Station,

with its headquarters in the fastness of the Mojave Desert, should

concern itself with underwater weapons! Moreover, the principal

weapon of the program was a torpedo.

But those who found the situation anomalous were perhaps not

aware that certain significant facilities possessed by NOTS were those

self-same ones that had played such a large developmental role for

Mousetrap, Minnie Mouse, and the MAD/reiro system. These facilities

were tailor-made for undersea ordnance work and, together with many

of the former CalTech personnel who originally designed and built

them, were now a vital part of the NOTS Pasadena Annex.

Thus, NOTS was firmly established in the underwater ordnance

field from the outset and was remarkably well equipped to handle the

development of antisubmarine weapons. The legacy from CalTech had

assured this capability. But the same legacy embraced more than

people and facilities; it included programs as well.

One of the most important of these was the torpedo program.

Like the aircraft rocket program, the torpedo program was

handed over to NOTS intact for what is considered to be Phase II of

the torpedo program (CalTech work from 1942 to 1945 is Phase 1),

and the Station was off to a good start in terms of qualified people

and facilities already in existence.

The Bureau of Ordnance was vitally concerned about torpedo

development. Widespread failures of air-launched torpedoes early in

the war had left their indelible mark. The Navy's wartime

development of torpedoes, including the CalTech work, had resulted

in enormous improvement of torpedo reliability and performance. But

at the end of the war, airplanes and submarines were much faster,

and the increased launch speed meant stronger and lighter torpedoes.

Ship-target speeds, too, were greater. Accordingly, torpedoes needed

298
IltADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

■■.t,,,' propulsion systems to make them run faster.

In regard to the need for improved propulsion, the lessons of the

war had been learned well. Rarely was a ship hit that moved at more

than half the speed of the torpedo launched against it; that is, a

torpedo traveling at 40 knots toward a ship moving at 20 knots was

usually wasted. The obv'jus answer to faster ships was even faster

torpedoes, and in December 1945 the Bureau of Ordnance requested

NUTS to instiiute studies toward that end.

In July 1946 the Bureau, using these studies as i criterion,

requested NOTS to develop a 1,000-pound, high-speed,

straight-running torpedo capable of being launched at 600 knots from

a height of 10,000 feet. In addition, the new torpedo was to carry an

explosive charge of 300 pounds at a speed of 120 knots over a range

of 1,500 yards.34

It was clearly an impossible order to fill and obviously far

beyond the technology of the time. But the request served two useful

purposes: it indicated that the Bureau of Ordnance was thinking far

enough ahead toward future weapon development; and it helped the

design and development team at the Pasadena Annex to set their

sights accordingly. Even if what appeared to be the ultimate torpedo

never materialized, at least the attempts to achieve it would greatly

advance the state of the art.

There is evidence that scientists at NOTS had an equally distant

aiming point regarding the weapons of the future.'" W. H. Saylor,

Head of the Underwater Ordnance Section in Pasadena, revealed some

of this advanced thinking in a later high-level conference:

. . . Taken together, the guided missile work and undenvatd ordnance work,

there is much that is very similar. The weapon of the future will have to fly

through air and go into the water, and so we have prepared a plan for the

Bureau concerning this. To achieve optimum effectiveness we ire proposing

the same propulsion components. Lithium makes this possible, Ve think this

particular viewpoint of not having separate missiles for air and water, but

just one that travels through the air and then goes into the \\_ter is one

which if going to be of peculiar significance.36

The single word "lithium" mentioned by Saylor had a significant

connotation at NOTS during the first three years of Phase 11 torpedo

development; it described a revolutionary new propulsion system-a jet

propulsion system—powered by a propellant combination of lithium

and free water. Like aircraft, the new torpedoes were to be powered

by jet power!

According to the earlier NOTS studies, speeds up to 120 knots

were entirely feasible using the propulsion with water-reactive fuels.

Also, fuel economy of the lithium system was ascertained in later

299
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

l

c

»47. But while tliere was never doubt as to (lie validity of

water-reactive propelhuits for torpedoes, it became increasingly clear

that lithium was not the best. It reacted so violently and

unpredictably that it was realized that considerable research was

necessary with combustion chambers and other components before a

complete system would 'K. operational. However, the first significant

steps had been taken.

Long betöre NCTS engineers considered the potentially

devastating water impact imposed by the launch of the Bureau of

Ordnance's "dream" torpedo from a height of 10,000 feet at 600

knots, they were aware of CalTech's original problem of torpedo

breakup even from a launch altitude of a mere 15 feet. The

fixed-angle launcher (FAL) at Morns Dam had helped solve that

particular problem, and just before the war ended, plans had been

drawn up for a refinement of this useful development tool. It was

designated the variable-angle launcher (VAL) and was specifically

designed to further explore the effects of torpedo water entry.

The variable-angle launolier at Morris Dam, Pasadena, California.

300
HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

Budget limitations follcwing the i;nd of hostilities put

construction of the VAL "on tiie back burner" for many months.

Eventually the Bureau of Ordnance realized the piessing need for the

facility and construction was resumed.

The VAL facility was unique and, in many respects, quite

remarkable. While its intended purpose could be simply stated, "[a

facility] to simulate aerial launching of torpedoes at controllable

velocities up to 1Ü0 feet per second at any angle between 0 and

40°,"•*7its realization was rather more complex.

For a start, there were problems with the site itself. Although

extensive surveys of reservoirs and dams all over Southern California

by CalTech showed Morris Dam to be the optimum site, the

peninsula in the Lke was badly fractured from earthquake faulting.

James H. Jennison, principal NOTS engineer for the VAL project,

recalled thai 40,000 sacks of cement were necessary "to cement

together all those loose rooks."-38 This was done •hrough diamond

drill holes that went deep into the rock—sometLnes as far as 150

feet.

The principal feature of the VAL was to be a 300-foot-long

all-welded steel launching bridge that housed a full-length launching

tube 22.5 inches in diameter. Test torpedoes would be launched down

this tube into the water, propelled by compressed air from a

500-ciibic-foot tank. The variable angle of water entry was to be

accomplished by pivoting one end of the launching bridge on a

crosspiece connecting two floating barges (each displacing a thousand

tons ol vva^er). A counterweight car attache i to the other end of the

bridge moved Lit bridge up or down an inclined concrete ramp.

The initial cost estimates for the VAL came close to two million

dollars, but this was trimmed down to equal the amount of

'unexpended construction funds remaining in an old General Tire and

Rubber Company contract-one million dollars. GT&R was accordingly

directed by the Bureau of Ordnance io expend these funds and let

subcontracts with other companies for construction of the VAL. One

of these (United Concrete Pipe Company, a successful wartime builder

of ships) was tu fabricate all the steel structures.

The launcher designers and builders considered themselves

fortunate in that fully half of their structural steel needs were

provided, at no charge, by the Coiumbia Steel Company. The resident

naval officer at Columbia, responsible for disposal of war surplus

material, had kindly first approached his counterpart at the NOTS

Pasadena Annex. Although the VAL was still in the design stage at

301
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

the time, the offer was promptly takL.n up. Jennison recalled that the

decision to accept the steel was the right one "because, a few months

later. . . steel was in such a short supply that we actually cut up steel

plates and welded strips together to make some sections we needed

and couldn't buy."39

During construction of the VAL, the constraints of time, tight

budget, and shortages of materials were keenly felt, but these -Aere to

be expected in most military construction projects durin? the

immediate postwar period. NOTS engineers worked hard to stay

within the constraints, and often exhibited a remarkable degree of

ingenuity. For example, the 600-ton counterweight car, described as

being "much like a railroad gondola car," was first designed to be

constructed entirely of steel and filled with pig iron. Jennison

undertook to redesign the car, using concrete as a major consti action

material. Since the time for letting contracts wa^ rapidly approaching,

he set up his living room as a drafting office and worked at home in

the evenings. As he later put it, "We went out with both designs

competitively and got bids. The concrete car was $20,000 cheaper

am we built it that way."40 Notwithstanding numerous battles with

deadlines and dollars, the VAL took some thirty months to build at a

tolil cost that came close to the very first estimate—two million

dollars.

It was money and effort well-spent. NOTS had the best available

fac'üty for research and advanced development of air-launched

torpedoes in particular and underwater missiles in general. Into this

latter category came Weapon A, called by some "the flying milk

bottle," understandably, because it resembled one.

Weapon A was designed to meet a long recognized need for a

method of firing depth charges against a submarine within a

reasonable range from a ship. Its 12.75-inch warhead contained 250

pounds of high explosive, and a rocket motor capable of propelling it

to a maximum range of 800 yards. A notable feature of the weapon

was that the casing for its warhead was made of plastic, used because

the fuzing mechanism required essentially nonmagnetic construction

throughout. The Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Maryland,

was responsible for developing the magnetic influence fuze.

Remarkably, this plastic warhead could withstand underwater pressures

down to a depth of 1,000 feet. As many as 22 rounds could be fired

from a turret on the deck of a destroyer without reloading.

There were several logical reasons why the Bureau of Ordnance

selected NOTS, with its combined facilities at Inyokem and Pasadena,

for Weapon A work. Not the least of these was the fact tha\ the

302
f-EADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

Station had the expertise in both rocketry and underwater ordnance

and some unique facilities for such a development program.

Regarding the facilities for such an endeavor as Weapon A,

NOTS was indeed well endowed. In addition to a rocket-propellant

pilot plant at China Lake, the Station boasted a w^de assortment of

test facilities and ranges, including a test track whereon the crosswind

launching conditions experienced by a destroyer at full speed on the

high seas could be simulated.

Development work on Weapon A began at NOTS in mid-1946

and lasted for some three and a half years. While the ultimate story

of this interesting weapon extends beyond the scope of this volume,

it is appropriate to briefly note its future success. After introduction

in 1951, Weapon A remained in the Fleet weapon inventory for

eighteen years when it was replaced by another NOTS product-the

ASr..OC (antisubmarine rocket).

'

1

■■.*

--

— .. .

- v

»

ate

Weapon A.

303
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

THOMPSON ASSESSES THE PROGRAMS

On December 14, 1947, Thompson forwarded a lengthy letter to

the Bureau of Ordnance that was essentially a "state-of-the-union"

synopsis of the Station's entire research and development effort. It is

a significant document as it assesses the postwar programs in the

context of their major problems. Moreover, Thompson went beyond

just reporting current status by indicating direction of progress in the

future.

For the purposes of this history, it is appropriate that we use

Thompson's own words in large part to shew his assessment of the

postwar accomplishments of NOTS.41 He b';gan the report by stating

that

. . . the zones of work al NOTS are principally concerned with aircraft fire

control, rockets and propellants, guided missiles, underwater ordnance

(including research in the mechanics of water entry), and aerodynamic and

evaluation research. . . .

Regarding aircraft fire control, he wrote:

A great deal of work is in progress on air-to-ground fire control

systems, and some of these are of considerable promise. However, a major

emphasis has been placed on applications involving short ranges. It appears

doubtful that the ranges of future air-to-ground combat will be in the zones

in which this equipment would be considered effective. It seems, therefore,

that there' is a need now to emphasize programs of appl'id research

[emphasis in original] from which fundamental improvements can be hoped

for in this field. The equipment that comes from this work should be

competent to handle air-to-ground firing at much longer ranges. In solving

these problems, it will be necessary to develop sy^ems which provide

compensation for relative wind, variation r,f angle of attack and skid. The

prospective development cf ground-to-air missiles which will be effective at

quite long ranges, and the prospective performance of ground-to-air fire

control, make it imperative, we believe, ;hat the air to-ground fire control

systems be improved radically. . . .

Interestingly, Thompson did not mention one of the most

exciting aspects of fire control development—Bill McLean's extension

of the conventional concept of fire control into that of guided

missiles. However, in view of the cognizan "e issue and because the

report was intended to give the Bureau of Ordnance a summary of its

funded projects, the exclusion is understandable. Thompson was not

one to "rock the boat."

Predictably, a lot was said in the report about the Station's

rocket programs, which Thompson categorized as short-term programs

for the Navy's current needs and long-term programs for future

applications. About the former he wrote:

304
HKADWAY IK THE MISSILE ERA

The present rocket program . . . has as its present emphasis the

adaption of one or more of three types of rockets for air-to-air use and the

imprcvemer" of rockets for air-to-ground use. The three types which now

appear to je available choices for air-to-air work in planes traveling at

current high speeds are

(a) The low-velocity spinner (about 5 inches diameter, equipped with

proximity fuze)

(b) The small (high-velocity) fin-stabilized rocket, equipped with

contact fuze

(c) A larger fin-stabilized rocket having considerably higher velocity

than the spinner (also equipped with the proximity fuze).

Apparently, the earlier problems with spinners had been solved

satisfactorily as Thompson stated that "the spin-stabilized rocket in its

present form is now practically finished [and] could be put into

production in a fairly short time." However, the report indicated that

low velocity still represented a chief disadvantage of spinners.

Thompson endorsed the enthusiasm of the Bureau of Ordnance for

folding-fin rockets as an alternative and went on to say that "we are

pushing the development of folding fin assemblies very hard . . ."

The NOTS Technical Director concluded his assessment of the

current program by commenting briefly on the status of the high

performance air/ground rocket (and its air/water variants) as "going

ahead through the study of a combination of available units." He

similarly reported the Weapon A program as being "well along."

An assessment of "Guided missile projects" in the report placed

a definite emphasis on future work rather than on the current

programs at NOTS. Although Bumblebee and Lark were reported as

"major programs... [involving] an extensive set of facilities for

operation and for the assessment analysis of test results," Thompson

quickly turned the spotlight on the Station's own budding

development programs by stating that "NOTS is now working on the

development of an air-to-air missile."

If a single conclusion can be drawn from Thompson's assessment

of the weapons development programs, it might be this: despite the

administrative turmoil of the first two years of peacetime operation,

NOTS was productive and healthy. Also, contrary to the fears of

some, was the significant fact that the fundamental concept upon

which the Station was founded had not been lost or eroded.

While there was no doubt at the end of 1947 that NOTS was

truly accomplishing the "development and testing of weapons,"

Thompson and others at NOTS recognized that the research aspect of

the mission had not yet fully been realized-especially, fundamental

research. On that subject, Thompson wrote:

305
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

It is considered of great importance that a certain amount of

t'undamenlal research which offers promise of support for development

programs of the future, be sponsored at this station. The proportion of time

devoted by the station to this work would be necessarily only a small

fraction of the total effort. On the other hand, the benefits to be derived

from close association with work of this kind are very great from the

standpoint of the stimulation of the applied research and development

programs. It is believed that the prefeni emphasis, as measured by the ONR

support of contemplated programs in the ihysics of the upper atmosphere, in

micro-time physics, in some aspßcts of the ballistics program, and in the

fundamental chemistry and physKs of potential components for fuel and

warhead systems, provides a nearly optimum effort for this station.

Thompson's acknowledgment that applied research was being well

supported by the Bureau did not diminish his feeling, shared by many

scientists at Inyokem, that much more suppport was necessary. As he

put it:

Our own views on a well-balanced pn gram are that we must carry on

concurrently all phases of a development and research program; that we

cannot afford to wail for the results of applied research before engaging in

primary development programs; that the whole cycle should be regarded as a

continuous one with proper balance all along the line.42

THE SALT WELLS PROGRAM

In the summary program report o

1 December 1947, there was no

mention whatever of any activities at the NOTS Salt Wells Pilot Plant.

However, omitting this subject wai standard practice as reports of

such activities were specifically enjoined by the Manhattan Project.

And even if a mention could have been made, it would have been

stamped "SECRET, Restricted Data (Atomic Energy Act 1946),

Specific Restricted Data Clearance Required."

But if a report on the Salt Wells Pilot Plant had been made at

the end of 1947, it would have shown that the program at this

unusual facility was vigorous, well-staffed, well-funded, and enjoyed an

unmatched level of high priority.

There were problems of course; chiefy of the same type that

beset the parent Station in the transitional years; for example, the

civil service classification anomalies and the difficulty in coaxing the

CalTech employees, many with unique specialties, to accept federal

employment.

An action by Dr. Bruce Sage greatly helped the civil service

transfer problem and many others in the bargain. On August 6, 1945,

the same day that the first atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima,

he had written to Captain Burroughs that in his opinion the China

306

■■ -:.
HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

Lake and Salt Wells Pilot Plants should be operated as a single

administrative unit. Sage had a likely candidate in mind for the job

of running the two pilot plants as "a single administrative unit"; there

really was only one—himself. And so it came about; the original

feudal barony (China Lake Pilot Plant) was augmented by another

(Salt Wells Pilot Plant), and Sage reigned supreme. Quite obviously

the arrangement had the full blessing of the Manhattan Project and

the Bureau of Ordnance.

The decision to integrate the two pilot plants under

administrative control of the man who had essentially been their

master architect was a wise one. In Sage, supported by several of his

key CalTech staff who chose to join him, the Navy had a manager of

proven capability. The Manhattan Project, too, was satisfied that the

technical control was the best available. And the Manhattan Project

opinion was quite important, as they were the prime customer for the

Salt Wells product; they were also paying the bills for the pilot plant

and its operations.

The end of the war brought no surcease in the tempo of these

operations at Salt Wells. Rather, those who had struggled against

inconceivable circumstances to beat an arduous deadline found that

they were still required to "turn night into day." The first explosive

blocks that had been melted, mixed, and poured at the new plant on

July 25, 1945, while representing a pioneer achievement, in no way

reflected the full potential of a sophisticated production line for the

atom bomb components-a goal still to be reached.

First, the pilot plant itself had to be completed. During the

wartime rush to get into operation, priorities had been given to only

wie bare essential facilities-a minimum number of buildings for

melting, casting, mold cleaning, machining, and radiography; a

laboratory; and a boiler plant. If the demanded monthly production

was to be met, four more machining buildings originally planned, but

set aside by other priorities, would be needed, as well as the

advance-type magazines, change houses, and access roads required to

support the operation. Also, more homes and community support

would be necessary for an enlarged work force.

In January 1946 construction of Salt Wells was finally completed

according to the original plan, despite delays due to renegotiation of

existing CalTech subcontracts for equipment designs and procurement.

By May 1946 equipment was installed, and Salt Wells was ready to

go full speed ahead.

Initially, however, the sailing was far from smooth. There was an

307
HE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

unacceptable number of rejects due to cracking of the explosive

blocks. The difficulties stemmed in part from the fact that the casting

technique developed at Los Alamos could not be transferred to other

facilities without modification to accommodate the design differences

of another plant. Captain Joseph T. Ware, USA, Manhattan Project

Liaison Officer at NOTS, later wrote, "The difficulties in transferring

the technique to a plant of fundamentally different size were, mildly

speaking, tremendous."

The complexities of producing the high-explosive blocks to very

close dimensional and chemical tolerances had been underestimated.

For many months the Salt Wells staff of engineers somewhat

reluctantly had to admit the fabrication of acceptable blocks was as

much an art as a demonstrable, reproducible technique.4-^

For example, one set of blocks for a spherical unit contained

only a single type of explosive, Composition B. Another set of blocks

in the unit had two explosive components, each with quite different

propagal. ..: velocities. Yet all of the blocks required the most

exacting uniformity of composition and exceedingly tight dimensional

tolerances. For materials behaving much like plastics, this represented

a considerable challenge.

The moment of truth would come in the final test—a pro^f test

involving the actual detonation of a batch sample. To be acce )table,

the emergent wave from the entire face of a detonating block had to

be measured in fractions o." a microsecond. Such instrumentation did

not exist until CalTech's master problem solver. Dr. Bowen, had

devised a reliable instrument that expanded the detonation flash into

significant and measurable lengths on a timed piece of film. The year

1946 was notable for the solution of this and a /lost of similar

problems that at first stood in the way of peak output for the pilot

plant.

AJso, 1946 was the year in which legislatio.: was passed to form

the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission that, among other things,

replaced the Manhattan Project. It also formally established the Los

Alamos Scientific Laboratory. This reorganization implied a formidable

change of policies, regulaticns, and managers, and a strong effort on

the part of Salt Wells to accommodate these charges at the operating

level. However, the most important change (in the fall of 1946) to

have an impact on Salt Wells and NOTS was the high-level decision to

step up the production of atomic weapons and their components.

Almost immediately the pilot plant was operating on a 48-hoi r

work week, with occasional 51- and 54-hoL,r weeks for critical

308

-, ■■■ .■■■ .
HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

operations.44But longer hours were not trie answer; more production

facilities were needed, and more people to work them.

Permanent structures of Salt Wells Pilot Plant, August 1946.

At this point, the problems of Salt Wells began to impinge

heavilv upon the parent Station, NOTS. Additional employees

requited housing and community support services, and these

commodities were already in critical short supply at Inyokern in early

1947. To help offset the dilemma, the Atomic Energy Commission

funded 380 sets of family quarters, a seven-room school addition

(named Groves School), and extra commissary space, as well as

utilities including power, water, sewage, and streets. The cost of the

community additions was $3,252,000.45

Actually, the Commission had no options other than the original

facility at Los Alamos. Salt Wells was a single source for

high-explosive components of the fission-type bomb; no other such

facility had been built anywhere. Therefore, if additional output was

a prime necessity, the quickest and the cheapest solution was to add

309
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

whatever facilities were required at NOTS, community as well as

production.

The additional facilities were completed in late 1947, and during

the following year Salt Wells had increased its output to three times

that of 1946. Shipment of the product, initially by rail, was

problematical at first because of an extraordinarily high security

classification and the constant need for armed guards. Eventually the

Air Force established an air transport service from Fairfield-Suisun Air

Force Base (now Travis AFB), California. This

service-Fairfield/lnyokem/Albuquerque, locally designated the

"milk-run "—proved to be remarkably steady and reliable as it was

conducted for over five years with only 19 members of the transport

team.46

But there was new handwriting on the wall for Salt Wells in

1948, although perhaps not perceived locally. Notwithstanding an

efficient plant and expert staff and an acceptable product being

shipped in significant quantity, the career of the desert pilot plant

was seen as finite.

Clearly, the single-source nature of Salt Wells was untenable for

the long term, and planners in the Defense Department and the

Atomic Energy Commission began to consider other sources.

Moreover, the product itself was undergoing significant changes in

design and configuration; changes that would require new tooling,

equipment, procedures, and perhaps, even new major structures.

Captain (later Vice Admiral) Edwin B. Hooper, who was with

the Division of Military Applications, Atomic Energy Commission,

from 1946 to 1949, later summarized the pilot plant status as

follows:

By (he time I left the Atomie Energy Commission in the summer of

'49 it was clear that the days of the Salt Wells Pilot Plant were numbered.

In other words, the number of weapons... to be produced was such that

one needed larger facilities. You could design them as efficient production

facilities and didn't need to put [them] out on the desert. The decision was

made, and 1 think too, a sensible one, to build the major production

facilities elsewhere; .t could be done at less cost. Whereas Inyokern was an

ideal location, and had great talents to do some kinds jf things, when you

made a production plant this was not the best location.'''7

From the time the decision was made "to build the major

production facilities elsewhere," Salt Wells continued to support the

nation's program for nuclear deterrent until 1954. While the story of

the remaining years of operation of the pilot plant-and its ultimate

further career as a research adjunct of NOTS—is historically interesting

and important, it appropriately belongs in a later volume of this

published series.

?10

-.l->VV.^T«^-i
HEADWAY IN THE MISSILE ERA

REFERENCES

NWC identification numbers are those under which copies of documents are filed in the

Technical Information Department, Naval Weapons Center. The following abbreviations arc

used to identify record collections where documents were found:

CARD Collection of Archival and Reference Documents at the Naval Weapons

Center

FRCB Naval Weapons Center records stored at Federal Records Center, Bell,

California

LTET Papers of L. T. E. Thompson, Scarsdale, New York

1. Edwin B. Hoopti comments to author, February 1974.

2. Umtcd States Naval Aviation, 1910-1970, NAVA1R 00-80P-1, 1970, p. 25.

3. Ibid., p. 48.

4. Buford Rowland, LCdr., and William B. Boyd, Lt., U.S. Navy Bureau of

Ordnance in World War 11. pp. 342-344.

5. Unpublished manuscript history, "The History of Pilotless Aircraft and

Guided Missiles," p. 309, compiled by RAdm. D. S. Fahrney, USN (Ret.),

[n.d.] (NWC 2313, CARD file.)

6. Ibid., p. 1101.

7. Ibid.

8. Memorandum from W. S. Parsons for Dr. Cotipton, February 20, 1949.

(NWC 2313, 474.)

9. NAVA1R 00-80P-!, cited in Ref. 2 above, p. 159.

10. Ibid., p. 161.

11. "history of U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station China Lake, California, August

1945-December 1958," prepared by Central Staff. OPNAV Report 5750-5, p.

58. (NWC 2313, Command files.)

12. "Technical History of the U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station 1943-1',53, Final

Manuscript," compiled by Starnes Co. and Technical Information Dcpaitment,

October 1968, p. 163. (NWC RM-3.)

13. Letter from C. F. Hussey, Jr., to the Commanding Officer, Naval Ordnance

Test Station, Inyokern, on the "Naval Ordnance Test Station-Bfasic

Functions," March 30, 1944. FRCB. (NWC 2313, 22-8.)

14. "Early Guided-Missile Testing at NOTS (1945-1951)," compiled by A. B.

Christman, July 30, 1954, p. 2. (NOTS TM 1782.)

15. Ibid., p. 35.

16. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

311
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

17. Letter (NP45/A1-1, Serial 0825) from J. B. Sykes to the Chief, Bureau of

Ordaance, on "Air-to-Air Guided Missile," August 30, 1946. FRCB. (NWC

z313, 43-7.)

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Letter (NP45/A1-1, Serial 0588) from J. B. Sykes to the Chief, Bureau of

Ordnance, on "Air-to-Air Guided Missile, Development Program for,"

November 4, 1947. FRCB. (NWC 2313, 43-8.)

21. William B. Mclvan final review comments, March 1974. (NWC 2313, 47-5.)

22. William D. McLean interview, "Recollections of the Sidewinder and Walleye

Missile Programs," November 16, 1973, o. 8. (NWC 2313, S-88.)

23. Ibid., p. 19.

24. McLean comments, cited in Ref. 21 above.

25. William B. McLean interview, "Early NOTS History and Management of Navy

Reseaich and Development Programs," July, 1975, p. 10. (NWC 2313, S-97.)

26. NOTS TM 1/82, cited in Ref. 14 above, p. 2.

27. Transcript of the Cdiference with Aeronautics Committee of the R.D.B.

[Joint Research and Development Board] at NOTS, February 1. 1949, pp.

15-16. LTE1 NWC 2313, 1-135.)

28. American Men of Science, 9th ed.. Vol. 1 (1955), p. 809.

29. Transcript of Conference, cited in Ref. 27 above, p. 9.

30. Emory L. Ellis review comments to author, October 8, 1973 (NWC 2313.

47-6.)

31. NWC RM-3, cued in Ref. 12 above, p. 47,

S2. Ibid.

33. Unpublished manuscript history "History of the Naval Ordnance Test

Station, Inyokeni, California (to August 15, 1945)," compiled by Robert W.

Leach, Lt., USNR, October 4, 1945, p. 75. (NWC 2313, 20-30.)

34. Letter (NP36/Re6a) from G. F. Hussey, Jr., to the Commanding Officer,

NOTS, July 10, 1946. FRCB. (NWC 2313, 43-11.)

35. Transcript of Conference, cited in Ref. 27 above.

36. Ibid., p. 6.

37. OPNAV Report 5750-5, cited in Ref. 11 above, p. 91.

38. James H. Jennison interview, October 23, 1975, p. 10. (NWC 2313, S-99.)

312
HEADWAY IN THE MISSlLE ERA

39. Ibid., p. 12.

40. fbid., p. 14.

41. Letter from L. T. E. Thompson to Capt. J. B. Sykes, USN, Bureau of

Ordnance, December 14. 1947, pp. 2-4. LTET. (NWC 2313, 1-136.)

42. [bid., p. 6.

43. NWC Retrievable Manuscript, "Salt Wells Pilot Plant Story, 1945-1954," p.

13, by K. H. Robinson, July 1974. (NWC RM-1.)

44. Ibid., p. 14.

45. Robinson manuscript, cited in Ref. 43 above, p. 15.

46. fbid. p. 18.

47. Edwin L. Hooper interview, February 1971, p. 18. (NWC 2313, S-78.)

3i3
10

NOTS: Flag Command

Despite its remote and isolated location, the Naval Ordnance Test

Station was far from being "out of sight, out of mind." On the

contrary, the Navy's activities 'n the Mojave Desert were watcheü

with interest.

Other branches of the armed services, government agencies,

defense industries, and the scientific community were intrigued by

what had become known as "the Inyokern Operation"—the technical

and scientific programs, a new look into military-civilian relation'nips,

and . i unusual community that was flourishing as an integral ^art of

the Station. In all of these it was correctly sensed that the

experimental formula for advancing science for military needs was

working, and working, well.

The Station had come a long way in four years; many aspects

had dramatically changed. One of these changes was almost symbolic:

in November 1947 a blue flag with two stars now flew over the

Administration Building.

A NEW STYLE OF MANAGEMENT

Before he assumed command of NOTS on 5 November l947,

Rear Admiral Wendell G. Switzer had been Chief of Staff to

Commander of "Air Forces, Pacific Fleet; his duty station was Ford

island in Pearl Harbor. One can only imagine the impact of the

geographical contrast between Hawaii and the Mojave Desert on the

315
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0K.ERN

Rear Admiral Wendell G. Switzer, NOTS Commander, 194'' to 1949.

316
NOTS: FLAG COMMAND

new Commanding Officer,* his wife and their 15-year-old daughter.

The Admiral's sons were not with him. The elder son, John T.

Switzer, had graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in the class of

'47 and was serving on board the U.S.S. Hanson. Seventeen-year-old

Wendell Switzer, Jr., was at school in Virginia.t

From 1942 to 1943 Switzer commanded the seaplane tender,

U.S.S. Tangier, in the Solomon Islands campaign, and in 1944 he

participated in the battle of the Atlantic, serving as Commanding

Officer of the escort carrier, U.S.S. Tripoli. During the last year of

the war his duties took him into operation against the Japanese

homeland. On this tour of duty as Commanding Officer of the fast

carrier, U.S.S. Wasp, he was awarded the Combat Legio.i of Merit.1

"Wendy" Switzer perpetuated many aspects of the personal

qualification precedent set by the two former Commanding Officers

of NOTS: U.S. Naval Academy, naval aviator, and ordnance

postgraduate. Additionally, his many tours of duty with the Bureau

of Ordnance ably qualified him as a charter member of the exclusive

coterie of naval officers who had helped bring the desert Station into

being. His Academy classmates of 1921 had included K. H. Noble, D.

V. Gallery, J. A. Snackenberg, and F. I. Entwistle, all notables in

naval ordnance. His career path had crossed that of Burroughs more

than once. And in coming to NOTS, Switzer was following Sykes for

the third time in their respective careers.

Switzer and Dr. Thompson had known each other since the

prewar Dahlgren days. Now, as Commander and Technical Director,

respectively, they worked harmoniously to constitute a close team

relationship at the top echelon of the Station's command.

Although the respective personalities of Burroughs and Sykes are

clearly discernible in the records they left behind them, the same

cannot be said for Switzer. His was a more subtle management style

characterized by a calmness in his approach to problems and a high

degree of smooth diplomacy. But if accomplishment is a measure of

leadership, it soon became apparent that NOTo had acquired a

particdarly effective branc' of leadership at the helm. Moreover,

Switzer was liked and respected by civilian and military alike. One of

the Station's senior scientists later recalled:

* During Switzer's tenure at NOTS the title of the position was changed from

Commanding Officer to Commander.

f Each of Switzer's sons was destined to become a naval aviator like his father.

However, in what must be an exceptionally profound family tragedy, both boys were

subsequently killed in flying accidents in 1955, less than two months apart.

317
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

I think if he wanted to accomplish something, he would do it in such

a nice and delicate way that he would accomplish what he wanted and

nobody would even realize it.

A similar point of view is expanded in the recollections of a

naval officer:

Let me say he understood the problems of this place. He was not a

technical man, out Wendy was a very thorough person. rt he would listen

to all sides of a case. He wasn't on that went off half-cocked. . .. And so

he wa< a vny human person.3

Switzer's personal traits undoubtedly contributed largely to his

success at NOTS, and his apparent proclivity for a behind-the-scenes

operating philosophy in no way diminished the fact that NOTS

flourished in a very real sense under the aegis of his command. It is a

matter of record that he attended only four of the 47 meetings of

the Research Board during 1948. Yet, that year was particularly

notable because the NOTS technical programs started to gather

dramatic impetus toward an across-the-board involvement in rockets,

missiles, fuzes, fire control, and torpedoes. Other achievements

wrought under Switzer's leadership included a meanin^ful refinement

of the Station's organizational structure and the activation of a

brand-new multimillion-dollar research laboratory. And, most

important, by not adding fuel to old fires, he made it possible for

the community to come together again as a cohesive whole.

But the reasons for Switzer's success extended beyond those of

being "a very human person," and a key to these is discerned in the

same previously cited recollections—namely, "he understood the

problems of this place."4

Also, Switzer had been well briefed by people whose judgment

he valued highly. One of these was the former Experimental Officer,

"Chick" Hayward, who aside from being a warm personal friend, was

also related by marriage. Hayward later recalled the circumstances of

the briefing:

I talked at great i?ngth with '.lim [Switzer] and "Deak" Parsons did

before, when 1 knew he was coming to take Sykes' place. And I told him-I

gave him the whole "ball-of-wax." And Wendy knew the argument had been

closely associated with the [scientific community] - and what was going on

in Washington and the Research and Development Board; al! of the problems.

He came out with the intention as he said, "Well, 1 want a solution, 1 don't

want to become the problem." And ... he was an admiral and had stature,

and could get right into the top all the time ... he had the prestige that he

could do this.

Many agree with Hayward that Switzer's flag rank was a strong

and vital factor in his achievement of an effective command. A

former department head at NOTS offered a typical endorsement of

this viewpoint:

318
NOTS: FLAG COMMAND

The Commander could go back to the Bureau of Ordrwnce with a lot

more "clout" than had been previously the case. And Switzer did a lot for

the Station in using that clout in the East... to me, this looks like

personnel planning, skillfully done. You get the Station grown, you get it

made into something that's got som; procedures and regulations, and then

you nail it down with a guy that's got some clout in Washington.6

In contrast, Vice Admiral Frederick L. Ashworth, who formerly

commanded NOTS as a captain, did not agree that having an admiral

at the helm offered an advantage.

I'm inclined to say that you probably have better luck dealing with

the Bureau as a captain than you would as a flag officer. I just don't know,

! have a feeling you might be able to deal on a more direct and cooperative

basis with the guys that you had to deal with in the Bureau on a

man-to-man kind of a level probably in a more effective fashion than if you

v/ere dealing with the same guy and you were a flag officer and he was a

captain and he was essentially saying, "Aye, aye, sir," to everything. I'm not

sure that maybe in the long run you wouldn't get a better result by the

more or less equal confronta^on and letting tilings stand on their own virtue

and not be forced through by the fact of a superior rank guy saying, "Look,

tliis is the way 1 want it done," and the other guy saying, "Yes, sir."7

In all probability, the prestige of a flag station was felt more

keenly by the people who lived and worked at NOTS. To them, the

survival of the "desert experiment" was doubly important in the face

of two turbulent years, replete with a host of problems experienced

firsthand at the living and working level. It was as though the efforts

of all in coping with these problems had been somehow recognized

and rewarded; the blue flag with two stars must have had the same

significance as a wartime "E" pennant.

The older hands at NOTS did not delude themselves into

thinking that there would be no more problems. On the contrary,

some of the old problems were still around that affected both home

and job. Housing and civil service classifications continued to be areas

of principal concern. Housing was still too often identified with not

even having a home in the first place, and solutions regarding civil

service classifications were all too slow in coming.

Ironically, one of the first problems looked at by the new

Commander had neither the epic stature of the housing dilemma nor

the pervasive quality of the job classification struggle. This centered

around what the Navy's newest ordnance installation in the Mojave

Desert ought to be more properly, and appropriately, designated.

"WHAT'S IN A NAMF?"

The NOTS name is a story in itself. Beginning with Captain

Burroughs, practically each successive NOTS Commanding Officer (or

319
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Commander) made a personal bid to have the name changed;

everyone was unsuccessful. Behind the story are major themes: rivalry

between powerful Navy bureaus, and also between the Navy and its

sister services; and challenges and counterchallenges concerning

leadership in major weapon development programs.

One of the earliest discussions about a name for the Station

occurred in the brief period between the acquisition of the land and

the official establishing date of NOTS in November 1943. It took

place in a telphone call between Captain (later Admiral) James S.

Russell, who headed the Aviation Ordnance "Desk" at the Bureau of

Aeronautics, and Commander Jack Renard, whom we have already

met as Mitscher's "man on the job" for rocket development on the

West Coast.

In a later interview, Renard recalled the essence of the

conversation:

After we had acquired this land ... I got a call from Jim Russell, arid

he said, "Hey, we got to call this something you've got out there." And he

said, "What do you tliir k? How do you like Naval Aviation Ordnance Test

Center?" I said, "It sounds marvelous." He said, "We've got to call it

something; we can't call it-'Hey, you guys out there'-we've got to name

you so when we write you a letter we know who the heck we are talking

to, in what area we are talking, a name for what you are doing." Well, that

didn't last long because the Bureau of Ordnance look a dim view of calling

it aviation Test Center.8

Clearly, the Bureau of Ordnance had no intention of changing

the brand it had put on Inyokern. There were subsequent bids to

have the word "aviation" added to the Station's name, most notably

by Burroughs, but their lack of success only seems to emphasize that

the original brand of ownership was deeply seared into Inyokern's

hide. It was, as Admiral Kitts subsequently proclaimed, "an ordnance

test station" and to the Bureau of Ordnance, the exclusion of the

word "aviation" from the name would preserve its status. After the

war there was more justification tc keep "aviation" out of the

Station'r- name: much of the work o.i board was not associated with

aircraft weaponry (e.g., ship-launched torpedoes and Weapon A).

At the beginning nobody apparently saw any inconsistency in

naming a station "Naval Ordnance Test Station" and then proclaiming

its mission to be research, development, and test. The reason has been

explored in an earlier chapter: in essence, for the first two years of

its existence, testing of CalTech's weapons was the Station's principal

function.

To many it was a matter of semantics. A proving ground

automatically implied a certain amount of applied research and

320
NOTS; FLAG COMMAND

development work. Burroughs was one who felt this way, recalling, no

doubt, the way it had been at the Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren.

Burroughs had another defense for the use of the term "Test

Station":

.. . there's a little cover in this name. [It] gave a little screen on what was

going on, as far as people on the outside reading this. We were just firing

"stuff" out here-just banging them out. Somebody else does the work-we

bang them out.9

In the same vein. Burroughs added that "there was no sense in

advertising this [NOTS] as the world's greatest research and

development place."^

At the war's end a considerable reputation had been acquired by

NOTS for its testing prowess. Unfortunately, good reputations, like

bad ones, are hard to live down. The reputation of NOTS served to

strengthen the bond between name and mission. Thus the transition

from a purely testing function to fulfilling the destiny of a primary

research and development center was a slow, frustrating process in the

immediate peacetime years.

In the postwar period there were people in Washington saying,

"That is a test station; look at the name." This connotation had little

effect on development work, but it did have a negative effect on

other forms of research and development. As has been shown, the

Station's role in a vital new weaponry field, guided missiles, hung in

the balance, and the concept of NOTS as a test station was on the

wrong side of the scale.

Despite the fact that NOTS had no association with the small

desert town of Inyokem by 1948, the Station continued to be known

as NOTS Inyokern. While the original nucleus of NOTS had been at

Inyokern's Harvey Field during the war. the focal point of the

Station's air activity had positively shifted to China Lake with the

commissioning of Armitage Field. Now the old Inyokern airfield had

been stripped and given back to Kern County. Similarly, the

community of Inyokem had reverted once more to a size that fitted

its own new description, "a nice Mttle desert town." Conversely, the

relatively large Navy t^ vn of China Lake some 10 miles away from

Inyokern now boasted a population of 10,000 souls and vas the

largest community in the whole of the northern Mojave Desert.

Burroughs might have foreseen this growth back in April 1944

when he petitioned the Bureau of Ordnance to have the (then)

budding community officially named "Lauritsen, California." But

Hussey did not agree. As he put it, "The Chief of the

Bureau. . . feels that a name more intimately related to the Navy and

naval history is to be preferred."1'

321
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Some felt that the Station might somehow be locked into the

official post office designation. Accordingly, in August 1945

Lieutenant Commander Vossler recommended to his new Commanding

Officer, Captain Sykes:

Change the post office address of the station as soon as possible.

"Inyokern" is a queer name at best Most Naval personnel associate it with

"Indio" and cross it off their list Most potential Civil Service personnel

think it sounds silly. Anything would be better, such as "NOTS-lndian Wells

Valley, California", or "NOTS-China Lake, California", or "NOTSRidgecrest, California". It is only the matter of establishing a new post office

which would certainly bo warranted.12

In the beginning (December 1943), the United States Post Office

decreed that the Navy-operated branch of the post office at Mojave, a

small railroad town some 60 miles south of NOTS, should handle the

Station's mail; this undoubtedly because Mojave happened to be the

location of the U.S. Marine Air Station. Burroughs successfully fought

this decree, but did not win until after a massive volume of Station

envelopes and letterheads had been printed for "NOTS, Mojave."

However, instead of the NOTS mail being processed through the

inconveniently located Mojave post office, it was now handled by the

fourth-class post office at Inyokern, located in the general store

operated by Clarence Ives, who also was the postmaster. The tiny

village post office at Inyokern continued to serve NOTS for nearly

four years.

In the meantime NOTS headquarters had geographically been

i located, and pressures to get an independent post office for the

Cnina Lake community mounted. In December 1947 shortly after he

took command. Admiral Switzer wrote to ths Chief of the Bureau of

Ordnance pointing out that "informal advice had been received that

an independent, second-class post office will be established on station

property on or about 16 January 1947 [should read 1948]. This post

office will be named China Lake'." He went on to recommend that

the Station be redesignated "the Naval Ordnance Test Station, China

Lake, California."13

Switzer's ploy to use the name of the new post office as the

thin edge of the wedge to get the Station name changed was as

unsuccessful as the efforts of others had been. His "clout back East"

was no match for the greater clout of Admiral Noble. As far as

Noble and other Bureau of Ordnance officers were concerned,

Inyokern was Inyokern just as a "rose is a rose." Noble responded to

Switzer's recommendations with a terse letter whose essential brevity

underscored the Bureau's rocklike intransigence:

322
NOTS: FLAG COMMAND

1. The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance desires thai the name "Naval

Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California" be retained without change.

2. The post office name "China Lake" is acceptable to the Bureau.

A. G. Noble14

And so it would remain "MOTS Inyokern." Fur another seven

years visitors to the Station arriving by road would continue to be

initially bewildered, and the residents of Inyokern would still be

compelled to give directions as to the actual whereabouts of NOTS.

At the same time, these patient citizens would be required to fumian

an explanation—ad nauseam—as to the name anomaly. This would go

on until 1955 when the Secretary of the Navy officially changed

"U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California" to "U.S.

Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California."1^

But on the whole, the problem of the name remained at a

superficial level; if it could not be changed, that was the way it

would have to be. Ironically, on February 16, 1948, the name

"Inyokern" became even more irrevocably bound to NOTS, and at

BB

^

f::^m^r

Courtesy Life Magazine

NOTS and its community, February 1948.

323
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

the same time acquired national recognition. On this date, the feature

article of Life magazine was entitled "Rocket Town." The edition's

center-spread photograph taken from an aerial vantage point showed

the housing and business center of China Lake, NOTS headquarters,

and the nearly completed Michelson Laboratory. The caption began,

"In a desert basin sheltered by the high Sierras, the town of Inyokcm

[author's italics] spreads out in an orderly array . . ."16

Perhaps a clue to the tenacious retention of the Station's name

exists in this comment by highly placed officers, "What does it

matter what the Station is called as long as it is understood what the

Station does?" The trouble was that this understanding was often

considerably less than universal.

ACQUIRING LABORATORY STATUS

By late 1947 NOTS was growing e/er closer to fulfilling the

original concept of an integrated resoorch, development, and test

center. Moreover, the function of research strongly implied a role as a

Navy laboratory as contrasted to that of a proving ground.

Physically, in late 1947, there was much tangible evidence of de

facto laboratory work at NOT'v Research activity and equipment that

had been scattered around the Station—housed in Quonset^ and

makeshift temporary buildings-were being progressively centralized

and relocated in more permanent structures. Principal of these was

the huge, new six-wing Michelson Laboratory that was partially

occupied by mid-1947, but which would not be formally dedicated

until May 1948.

But somehow to many, the brick-and-mortar evidence of the

NOTS laboratory role was not enough to justify the appellation

"Navy laboratory," and the reasons why are worth examining as they

reflect the nationwide posture regarding postwar military and scientific

effort in general—and the role of Navy laboratories in particular.

If anyone could be ocpected to question calling the Naval

Ordnance Test Station a "laboratory," it would have been the

scientists and naval officers at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL),

Washington, D.C. This venerable organization held title as one of the

first Navy laboratories, having been established in 1923. From the

time it was established, > L built an enviable reputation in the

sciences pertinent to possibi naval applications, notably in radio- ard

underwater-sound detection and radar, laying claim to the fact that

324

,,-. .. ,_;,• ;Si"'.\—r'U'.-^tU "
NOTS: I-LAG COMMAND

"American radar was conceived and born at the Naval Research

Laboratory."17

The following description illustrates the tough competition facing

a Johnny-come-lately contender for the title of Navy laboratory:

The laboratory [NRL] emerged from World War II in an enviable

position: It was big, it was affluent, it had a preeminent reputation among

government laboratories. Above all, it was riding high on a wave of

unprecedented public faith in scientific research. The most technical of all

wars, with its Wagnerian climax at Hiroshima-Nagasaki, had been won largely

because America was able to keep a technical stride ahead of its enemies.

Now Congress was willing to bear the cost of extensive military research.

Thus the Naval Research Laboratory was not cut ba',K. While ships were

being placed in mothballs by the thousands, researc'.i was maintained on a

near-wartime footing. New equipment was acquired almost for the asking,

and manpower was limited only by the competitive market for trained

scientists . . .

18

On August 1, 1946, an event occurred that was highly significant

for NRL and for Navy research. On this date an Act of Congress

established the Office of Naval Research (ONR). The significance to

NRL, of course, was that this new relationship assumed the

sponsorship of what was essentially an office with bureau status, and

funds appropriated specifically by Congress. After more than twenty

years of being shuttled back and forth between the Bureaus and the

control of the Secretary of the Navy, NRL had now found a

permanent guardian.

The larger significance of the establishment of ONR was that it

represented a giant step toward filling the void left by the dissolution

of the National Defense Research Committee and the Office of

Scientific Research and Development. That such a void would exist

was clearly recognized by the scientists and officers concerned over

long-term defense. As early as April 1944, while the war with

Germany still raged, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the

Navy had jointly appoir.ed a committee to explore the conduct of

defense research in the postwar era. Chaired bv Charles E. Wilson, the

president of General Electr'c, the membership included eight

high-ranking Army and Navy officers, and four civilian scientists.

While the Committee on Postwar Research was generally

unanimous in its recommendation for the establishment of a

permanent body to be called the Research Doard for National

Security (RBNS), it was sharply divided as to how the Board should

be organized: as an independent federal agency (by congressional

action), or as an agency under the National Academy of Sciences (by

executive order). A bitter struggle ensued G'/er an essential issue:

namely, who WiS to control postwar defense research, military or

325
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

civilian?1^

1 While the Board was organized under the Academy

proposal in mid-February 1945, it never became effective. E.'iu^uy oi,:

year later, the Secretaries of War and Navy acted to administer the

coup de grace to the RBNS.

During the immediate postwar years, while the nation was

floundering in its attempts to formulate a policy for peacetime

military research, the Navy took the initiative in respect to Navy

interests by lighting its own research torch from the NDRC-OSRD

embers.

A clear guideline was inherent to the founding of ONR: that it

"must not take over the research and development work of the

Bureaus associated with their cognizance responsibilities."-^ Thus,

although ONR symbolized the Navy's determination to conduct its

own research through contracts, grants, and its own laboratories, the

Office exercised control over only a single laboratory-NRL. The

individual Bureaus could freely operate their own. Two major

laboratories were under the Bureau of Ordnance: NOTS and the Naval

Ordnance Laboratory (NOL), White Oak, Maryland.

During the immediate postwar years, the destinies of these two

installations became curiously linked even though their early histories

were quite dissimilar.

Unlike the World War II genesis of NOTS, the early beginnings

of NOL reached back more than two decades to 1918, the year the

Bureau of Ordnance established a mine research development facility

vithin the Naval Gun Factory at the Washington Navy Yard. This was

the original nucleus of NOL, White Oak. A short time later the

Experimental Ammunition Unit was established and occupied part of

the same building, the Mine Building at the Naval Gun Factory.

In 1929 the Mine Unit and the Experimental Ammunition Unit

were consolidated and renamed the Naval Ordnance Laboratory; its

mission was broadened to cover the entire spectrum of naval

ordnance.

As the war approached in 1940, the Laboratory began to expand

as a high priority effort was initiated to develop countcrmeasures

against the new German magnetic mines. By 1942, the fundamental

problems of the magnetic mine and countermeasures against it were

essentially solved, and the Laboratory began to work extensively in

other areas such as depth charges, bombs, fuzes, and torpedo

exploders. Toward the end of the war (in late 1944), NOL's

personnel had grown to 1,800, and these were housed in ten buildings

at the Navy Yard. This forced dispersal of personnel greatly inhibited

326
NOTS: PLAG COMMAND

work coordination. Moreover, the available buildings usually lacked

some of the necessary facilities and equipment. It was apparent that

only relocation could solve the problems. Accordingly, late in 1944, a

tract of S78 acres vas purchased at White Oak for the Laboratory.

Work progressed rapidly and on August 15, 1946, the corneistone of

the main building was laid by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal.

By mid-1948 the new Laboratory was in operation, although formal

dedication did not take place until January 31, 1949.

Despite the fact that NOL was in reality one of the Navy's first

and therefore oldest laboratories, it was generally thought of as a new

laboratory because of its relocation, brand-new facilities, and increased

scope of operations. Thus, it was categorized in much the same way

as was the new laboratory at Inyokern. NOTS and NOL were

regarded as sister laboratories and seemed to epitomize the Bareau of

Ordnance's grand geographic plan for postwar research - a major

laboratory on the East Coast and one on the West Coast. At the end

of the war, they were the main centers for ordnance research and

development.*

Both NOL and NOTS developel Principles of Operations based

on military-civilian partnership. Both t njoyed a comfortable degree of

funding support by the Bureau of Ordi ance, although some at NOTS

concurred with Thompson's feeling that »he Station was not enjoying

the "ample and continuou' backing nr basic research"^2that

chara ;terized ONR's support of its own Naval Research Laboratory.

On t le other hand, applied research at NOTS was well supported, as

evidenced by the fiscal year 1948 million-dollar budget for applied

research.

NOTS and NOL shared many common problems, among them a

Navywide tightening of travel budgets and restrictions on long-distance

telephone use. In the early part of 1948, the freeze on travel and

communications was still officially in effect. But strong efforts were

being made at the Bureau of Ordnance level to ameliorate the

situation. On March 3, 1948, Admiral Noble wrote jointly to the

Technical Directors of NOTS and NOL;

In addition to NOTS Inyokern, and NOL, Washington, D.C., the major ordnance

facilities of the Bureau of Ordnance for the wartime period were Naval Proving Ground,

Dahlgren, Virginia; Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, Rhode Islanc"; Naval Powder Factory,

Indian Head, Maryland; Naval Mine Depot, Yorktown, Virginia; Naval Mine Warfare Test

Station, Solomons, Maryland (operated jointly by the Bureaus of Ordnanci- and of Ships);

Bureau of Ordnance Test Unit, Dam Neck, Virginia; Explosives Investig;!' >n Laboratory,

Stump Neck, Maryland; and Explosives Investigation Laboratory, Port Townsend,

Washington.21

327
THE GRAND EXPEK.MENT AT 1NY0KERN

.. . Until we arc able to influence the personal views ol certain very

important members of the Congress, I feel that we must continue to handle

travel and cemmunications within the present limitation of funds. Through

closer personal management and sympathetic trtatment I am confident that

the situation may be somewhat alleviated and it is my intent to emphasize

this feature in attempting to achieve at least some partial relief through

better administration.

But quite apart from showing the Bureau Chiefs concern about

travel and communications, Noble's joint letter also summarized the

Bureau of Ordnance's philosophy for the sister laboratories:

1 think that both of you mi now aware that the Bureau is exerting

every effort to make availab's material facilities of the highest quality and

that some ot these facilities ^re ncv in the process of becoming available at

both of your stations and that lurther additional facilities will be made

available in the future. Also the Bureau is continuing its efforts to fully

outfit both stations so that the facilities available will be of the highest order

of quality and adequate as to size for the fulfillment of your missions.

1 am heartilj in agreement with you regarding fie necessity of creating

and maintaining a technical staff of outstanding quality. I appreciate the

difficulties which must be overcome, as well as the necessity for combating

the efforts of other agencies who would recruit our best people. 1 will

heartily support all efforts in seeking and obtaining exceptionally

well-qualified people and will bitterly oppose any effort of other agencies to

recruit your personnel.

For Thompson at NOTS and Ralph Bennett at NOL, the

following paragraph might have conveyed a very special meaning:

Although I do not consider it necessary to do so, I wish to make it a

matter of record that 1, as the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, and also

the officers and cwilian personnel of the Bureau of Ordnance, fully

appreciate the necessity for the establishment and maintenance of a strong,

important, and virile research program; and that in their '•espeetive fields

Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, and Naval Ordnance Test Station,

Inyokern, are not only invaluable, but are the principal source of

authoritative competence in the Navy, if not in the entire United States.

A. G. Noble24

If there had hitherto been any doubts as to how NOTS and

NOL were measuring up in the first postwar years, they surely must

have been dispelled by this gratuitous vote of confidence by the Chief

of the Bureau of Ordnance.

Admiral Noble's declared intention "to provide adequate

operational funds on a continuing basis" possibly implied that he was

seriously studying a proposal that had recently been made by NOTS.

It concerned the important matter of funding for research that was

not necessarily related to any weapon development program or task.

The action taken, and the reason for it, is clearly described in

the minutes of a NOTS Research Board meeting on November 14,

1947; the item was headed, "Funds for Applied Research or Special

328

. . :
NOTS: FLAG COMMAND

Equipment to be Administered at the Discretion of the Station." The

item read:

Dr. Shenk will prepare a draft of a letter for the Bureau of Ordnance

to be forwarded to Dr. Thompson in Washington, D.C. for discussion. This

letter will make a specific proposal to the Bureau rf Ordnance for funds

(eitlici a certain percentage from project orders or a special allotment of

funds) which will be under complete control of the Station to be used for

needed experiments in applied research, special equipment, or to fill in a gap

when necessary. These funds are to be expended on requirements of the

Station which have not been specific-.lly directed by the Bureau of

Ordnance.25

Both Hussey and Thompson felt that such funds were absolutely

necessary. Hussey, commenting in a later interview, cited an earlier

precedent for providing "a five percent application of funds to basic

research on contracts with the universities, which solved our problem

of giving people enough elbow room to do the job on their own."

The former Bureau Chief further commented that it wa» important

because "it insures that the collateral thinking that scientists do can

be brought to focus on ordnance problems . . . the work that they do

in pure research keeps their hand in and sharpens their wits and their

appreciation."-6

The NOTS application for discretionary funds was not formally

approved by the Bureau of Ordnance right away. However, it appears

that sometime in 1948 an informal arrangement occurred between the

Bureau and the Technical Directors of NOTS and NOL whereby

funded projects would include a percentage allowance for

discretionary research.^7 At first, the fund was called "technical

overhead," and represented some 3% of each Station project.

Eventually, a separate budget line item was established by the Bureau

that was designated "Exploratory and Foundational," or more

familiarly, "E&F," anc the amount was raised to 5%.

The result of available E&F money in 1948 was seen in a

positive stimulation of new-approiich exploratory work at NOTS and

at NOL. Thompson later commented, "In my opinion, this provision

meant as much as anything ever done to attract and hold good R&D

people'" [Thompson's emphasis] .

28

RANGES: A QUESTION OF INVOLVEMENT

Anyone coming back to NOTS in early 1948 after an absence of

two or more years invariably reacted, "I can't believe how much the

place has grown!"

329
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Of course there was the obvious and tangible evidence of growth

everywhere: the buildings—both administrative and technical—the

ranges, the residences, and the community facilities in genera!. But

the place had also grown up in the more important sense of maturity.

There was a sense of increased confidence discernible in the

Station employees, military and civilian, and radiations of optimism

that gave clues to a widespread high morale. There were still bickerings

about the commissary. Public Works, and housing, but they were far

softer-gentle reminders of the past period of turbulence and

administrative problems.

The Station had moved from introspective concern with its own

problems to broad involvement in studying and meeting the many

weapon needs of the Fleet and in representing the Navy on matters

of ordnance and science.

More and more distinguished visitors were coming to the desert

these days to get acquainted with the grand experiment at Inyokern;

not only members of the Bureau of Ordnance family, but cabinet

officials and high-ranking officers in the other Department of Defense

Admiral Nimitz inspects NOTS, October 2.5, 1947.

330
NOTS: FLAG COMMAND

agencies. Distinguished men of science were also coming to visit their

fellow scientists on the Station staff, and leaders of the newlv

emerging aerospace industries were also visiting in increasing numbers.

Sometimes the visitors arrived en masse to attend conferences and

seminars that were being held at NOTS with ever-growing frequency.

And the word started to be passed around by those who arrived by

automobile that Inyokern was actually a miniscule desert hamlet some

8 miles removed from the Naval Ordnance Test Station at China

Lake.

Other kinds of words were also being passed around; words to

the effect that the desert scientists and engineers were unusually

proficient in their fields of propellants, aerodynamics, and explosives,

physics, and chemistry. And these individuals were being asked to

present papers for professional societies throughout the free world.

Many were requested by name to serve as consultants to industry and

government agency alike; for example. Aerojet and the National

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA, the forerunner of what

was to become NASA).

As part of the Station's newfound maturity, a free interchange

of iüeas with other laboratories was nurtured. In addition to

increp.äing involvement in research and development on a national

scale, NOTS held a position of leadership in weapon testing.

Throughout the postwar period it was among those in the nation's

ordnance community who were asking such questions as, "What kind

of ranges are needed? How many? Where? Who will use them?" These

questions were first raised at the end of World War II as part of the

planning of the weapons for the nation's postwar arsenal. In particular

they were aimed at meeting the testing needs for short-range guided

missiles and for the long- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles

whose development was initially sparged by the German V-2.

In the postwar period plans were formulated for new missile

ranges on the East Coast at the Banana River Air Station, Florida,*

and on the West Coast at the Naval Air Missile Test Center, Point

Mugu, California. But the need for instrumented ranges was

immediate. Much of this need was met by the Army's new proving

ground at White Sands, New Mexico, and by NOTS.

* Eventually, this test range incorporated Patrick Air Force Base and became the

world-famous Atlantic Missile Hange (Cape Canaveral), noted for early space-flight programs.

331
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

By any contemporary standards, the NOTS ranges were first class

with instrumentation for detailed coverage of launchings and of shortand mid-range missile trajectories unequaled elsewhere. And the

Station possessed the expertise for range operations that came as part

of its CalTech heritage.

The big problem for NOTS management was how to achieve a

workable balance between the test support for NOTS research and

development programs and the outside requests for testing, which

were generally of a more routine nature. As Captain Burroughs had

cautioned when the Station was first conceived, there would be

dangers if proof and routine testing diluted the Station's primary

work of weapon development. His postwar successors remained alert

to that threat.

NOTS felt it had a specific and well-defined need for its ranges;

namely, 10 support an overall integrated RDT&E facility, where as

one scientist put it, "You could generate an idea in the laboratory

and immediately take it out and see if it worked." Understandably,

NOTS was not particularly anxious to open its ranges to all comers if

such an involvement meant that the Station's programs might suffer.

But like it or not, such involvement was imminent.

This reluctance to get involved was brief—cut short by a new

entente cordiale that was joined by the Army and the Navy. This

harmony began in October 1945 when the Army invited the Navy

Department to conduc' tests of Navy guided missiles and pilotless

aircraft at the White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico. The

Navy's response to thl", invitation "expiessed the appreciation of the

Bureaus of Ordnance and Aeronautics . . , and their concurrence with

the views of the Chief of Ordnance with regard to the cooperative

use of this range by Army and Navy facilities."29 And the Navy in

turn invited the Army Ordnance Department to make use of Navy

guided missile facilities in carrying out Army projects.

And so it all began, clearly indicating NOTS involvement in the

interservice use of the nation's ranges. When the Committee on

Standardization of Range Facilities was established, NOTS played a

major role.30

There were no negative consequences of range involvement, and

the Station's research and development mission was not diminished by

such involvement. Rather, there were benefits. Through the "Range

Committee," NOTS now had a firm channel for dialogue with all the

established and newly emerging ranges and proving ground agencies in

the country.

332
NOTS: FLAG COMMAND

THE PROBLEM OF PRODUCTION ENGINEERING

While some involvements were sought by NOTS and others

shunned, there was one that was viewed with a certain degree of

ambivalence: the production of hardware.

The issue of whether NOTS should have a limited iroduction

capability was a thorny one with equally strong pros and cons. Some

took the viewpoint that no true laboratory produced hardware; that

the laboratory did the research and designed and developed the item,

and then handed over the drawings to industry for mass production.

Others did not concur. Thompson was one of these, and he expressed

his desire for some limited or pilot production at the laboratory level:

Many good weapons systems fai] because the development work and

the design work haven't been done with a sufficient regard for. .. what it

takes to produce in quantity. We know that we have to have most of our

things in great quantities. If they can't be produced, then that's a serious

handicap in comparison with some other weapon systems which can;... the

other point... has to do with reliability of the equipment, the choices that

can be made to get dependable equipment. So many times, we have

equipment that works in the laboratory or just outside the laboratory, but

get it out in the front lines and something goes wrong. . . and die operating

people get discouraged and they say, "Take this stuff out; I don't want

it."31

There were sound reasons why Thompson, and a few others, felt

it mandatory to get into production engineering. One of these was a

need to f:ill in line with a new concept in weapon development: a

philosophy known as "concurrency," where the whole development

cycle, from initial design to Fleet delivery, could be considerably

shortened by overlapping ail the steps in the development train. Thus,

producibility was considered even while the item was still on the

drawing board, and limited production was called for concurrently

with development testing. Even after the item was delivered to the

Fleet, there was provision for feedback improvements to be made in

the full-scale production stage. Patently, NOTS needed to be involved

with production to some degree. The question remained, to what

degree?

There was at Inyokern a strong, long-established precedent for

production at the China Lake and Salt Wells Pilot Plants. The

proponents of a production capability for the Station cited this

precedent and argued that pilot production of hardware was all that

was necessary. In other v/ords, fabricate enough to verify that the

item can be produced satisfactorily before handing it over to private

industry. Yet, even this logic was lost on the adversaries of

333
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

production who claimed that such was not implicit in the Station's

mission.

The problem, of course, went far beyond the fact that

production engineering (sometimes referred to as "development

engineering") was not even mentioned, let alone implied, in the

original founding order (research, development, and testing of

weapons). From the Bureau of Ordnance's standpoint it involved

money; funding for production facilities and machines and assembly

lines; billets for engineers and machinists. Also, at the Bureau level, in

those days as it is now, there was a sensitivity toward any suspicion

that the government was in competition with private industry.

The position of Admiral Noble, Chief of the Bureau of

Ordnance, was that the Station should carry design of a new weapon

no further than "general arrangements," leaving the development of

production drawings to other agencies either within or outside the

Navy. Schoeffel, Noble's Deputy Chief, took up the case for NOTS

by advancing the thought that "there wJl be times when it may be

necessary for Inyokem to make up complete production drawings."

Having thus opened the question with the Chief, Schoeffel then

encouraged talks on the subject between NOTS and Philip H.

Girouavd, Chief Engineer of the Bureau's Research and Development

Division. A key point was whether or not the Station should develop

a production engineering capability. In setting up these talks,

Schoeffel also suggested what in later months was adopted as the

plan; namely, that a NOTS production engineering department be set

up as one of the units of the Pasadena Annex. This location was

proposed so the "group may be in closer touch with the production

thinking" than it would be at the isolated desert location. In

attempting to open the way for production engineering at NOTS,

Schoeffel was implementing his basic position in regard to NOTS as

stated to Thompson:

... I wish to reiterate that I shall always attempt to see that the

Bureau does not interfere with your proper prerogatives of determining the

organization for and the "how" of gettu.g things done at Inyokem.32

It would not be until January 1949 that the Design and

Production Department was added to the NOTS organization as part

of the Pasadena Annex. But the eventual move was triggered by these

earlier actions by Thompson and Schoeffel. In the meantime, the new

laboratory complex nearing completion at NOTS Inyokem included a

remarkable machine shop replete with a wide variety of machinery of

334

-. .
NOTS: l-LAG COMMAND

Rear Admiral Malcolm F. Schoeffel, Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, 1947 to

1950 (later became Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance).

335
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

the latest type. The portents were clear; i limited production

engineering capability was in the cards for NOTS.

THE ADVISORY BOARD

With the end of the Office of Scientific Research and

Development and the severance of formal ties with ^alTech, the

Station lost ready access to many of the scientific and industrial

leaders outside the Navy. Personal contacts on an individual basis

continued tj be made; for example, former OSRD leaders appear to

have given advice when the Principles of Operation were under

discussion. But there was no recognized formal arrangement through

which the Station could seek the advice of scientific and industrial

leaders.

This was particularly apparent to Thompson when he sought

answers to such questions as how to evaluate the efficiency of the

Station, and who could honestly gauge the caliber of the technical

and scientific effort and offer fresh viewpoints and guidance for

improvement.

Inspection teams, of which there were many from various parts

of the government, just didn't work. While these teams capably

analyzed administrative operations, the teams sent out usually did not

have the technical and scientific competence in the many diverse

disciplines to make sound judgments. Moreover, a broad-brush

inspection visit, usually for only a few days, could do little more

than absorb a general level of briefing. As Thompson put it, "People

who are going to appraise a program have to know something about

it."33

Others besides Thompson had been concerned about the Station's

need for "sophisticated evaluation of the technical programs."34 Even

before Thompson came on board in 1945, a proposal was made "to

establish an Advisory Committee which will be effectively available to

the Research and Development Department in an advisory capacity,

with particular reference to generfJ questions of research and

development objectives and to the promotion of most advantageous

contacts with other institutions."35

No formal action appears to have been taken at that time to

establish such a committee, and the first evidence of its existence

shows up in the minutes of the Research 3oard meeting on August 3,

1946. Buried in a long "List of Committees and Task Groups" is the

336
NOTS: FLAG COMMAND

"NOTS Advisory Board."^ But while this was an organization in

name only at this time, Thompson was studiously analyzing its

possible role and potential.

.

Drs. C. C. Lauritsen and L. R. Hafstad, members of the first NOTS Advisory Board.

* Management by committee was apparently popular at NOTG in the postwar years.

The list included the lolloving: Research Board, Pr"jects Assignments Committee, Section

Committee, Projectile Committee, Air Launched Rocket Task Force, Committee on Rockets

for Under-Water Use, Propellant Task Group, Blast Committee, Shaped Charge Committee,

F7F GASR Committee, Foreign Rocket Task Group, Cafeteria Committee, Committee on

Stockrooms, Warehouses, etc., Magazine Storage Committee, Committee on Procurement,

Committee on Fuze Facilities at Morris Dam, NOTS Advisory Board, Committee on Range

Meteorology, Military Requirements Committee, Ordnance Materials Inventory Committee,

Committee on Classification of Documents and Drawings, Station Development Board,

Committee for Laboratory Opening, General Tire and Rubber Company Contract Committee,

and P.DT&E Housing Committee. Strangely, two items seem tu have been omitted: the NOTS

Administrative Board and the Guided Missile Task Group,

337
Tilt; GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Thompson saw t'-e need for a group "who are experts in dealing

with some phase of the work which is part of the primary work for

tiiis Station ... expert in the, field of physics or chemistry, or

engineering work [with] broad foundations ... or administrative

experience in handling work of this sort ... or have some combination

of these qualities in operating industrial laboratories or other

Government laboratories."^^

Most of the planning, organizing, and recruiting for the Advisory

Board was done in 1947 and 1948 even though the first meeting did

not occur until August 1949-a period beyond the scope of this

volume. It is relevant to the present story, however, to note the

efforts taken in the postwar period to keep NOTS in tune with the

nationwide advances in technology.

LATENT IDENTITY CRISIS

No more Pasadena-related problems! A wishful thought that

might have been held by many in the early spring of 1948. Yet,

there was much evidence on the surface to support such an optimistic

hypothesis.

Since head-on confrontation with the problems of OSRD-Navy

transition in the turbulent early months of the postwar era, the

combined efforts of the Bureau of Ordnance, CalTech, and those of

the men of Inyokern and Pasadena had paid off: the earlier disarray

of facilities, personnel, policies, and procedures had been pulled

together into a cohesivfc administrative whole. Organizational channels

were now clear; missions, tasks, assignments, responsibilities, and lines

of authority clearly drawn. The Pasadena Annex was ostensibly an

integrated aid meaningful part of the Naval Ordnance Test Statior

There was further evidence, too, that all was going well in

Pasadena. The Bureau was continuing to put a high priority on the

torpedo development program, and accordingly was generous in the

allocation of funding. The expensive variable-angle launcher facility at

Morris Dam was progressing favorably-assured of its completion and

planned formal dedication in early May 1948.

Moreover, in some ways, the Annex was better off than its

parent station. For example, the critical housing situation at Inyokern

338
NOTS: KLAG COMMAND

had no counterpart in the huge metropolitan area of Los Angeles that

adjoined Pasadena. Neither v/ere the other morale-eroding

inconveniences associated with the remote character of the upper

Mojave Desert—cultural deprivation and extreme climate, to name only

a couple.

On the surface, the Inyokern-Pasadena relationship seemed

tranquil. However, in lower depths stirred the beginnings of a shifting

current that presaged destructive waves unless a liberal application of

soothing oil could be applied. But it was an elusive problem that was

difficult to identify; which is not hard to understand as it concerned

what people thought and felt, rather than what they did or said.

Importantly, although the personal relationship problem was

barely discernible in the 1948 context, its root causes were already

present and growing. What were these causes? Ironically, they

stemmed from the identical source of strength and vigor that had

carried the budding Annex through a difficult birth and enabled it to

grow into a lusty, healthy youngster. Now, maturing fast, Pasadena

was beginning to question the term "Annex"-which had for some the

unfortunate connotation of "something tacked on"-and seek an

identity all its own. Exactly what this identity should be was

uncertain, but it could no longer be that of an alleged "stepchild of

Inyokem."37

On the other side of the growing controversy, many at Inyokern

felt that Pasadena was "getting too big for its breeches."38 While this

assertion was probably valid, it still cast Inyokern in a familiar but

unenviable role; namely, as the adoptive parent of an obstreperous

offspring who was unusually talented and quite as mature as the

parent.

STRIVING FOR AN INTEGRATED COMMUNITY

Thanks to the perspicacity of the NOTS planners (in Washington

and on the local scene), most of the earlier problems associated with

building a firs* cldss community integrated with the Station were well

on their way to being solved by mid-1946. While budget difficulties

and a severe housing shortage still persisted-giving rise, in turn, to

some formidable administrative headaches-the Navy town of China

339
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Lake was shaping up nicely after the first year of peacetime. But in

the private sector "outside the gate," the community, especially the

adjoining town of Ridgecrest, was ancountering a situation of lesser

stability. This principally stemmed from uncertainties regarding the

future.

Basically, people who were not part of NOTS generally remained

unimpressed by the Navy's repeated pronouncements that it was a

permanent facility. This was evident in the sustained reluctance of the

Federal Housing Administration to set up shop in the Indian Wells

Valley, and the refusal of real estate brokers and investors to consider

any large-scale development projects in the area. Consequently, in this

period, most of the initiatives for community p

r

ogress came from the

Navy and were carried out at China Lake. There was relatively little

private capital invested in Ridgecrest largely because of lack of

confidence in the Navy's repeated statement that it was building a

permanent station.

One of the few instances where private investment was not

inhibited was seen in the establishment of a hospital in Ridgecrest

(later the Ridgecrest Community Hospital). Dr. Thomas A.

Drummond, a personable young surgeon, had operated an eight-bed

hospital in the mining town of Red Mountain (some 25 miles from

NOTS) until it burned down in 1944. Deciding to rebuild, he did so

in Ridgecrest using his own funds. John Richmond later recalled the

importance of Drummond's venture in terms of its relationship with

the Navy's medical services:

When we first opened the [NOTS] Dispensary, it was open to both

the military and civilian personnel. By regulation, we had to take care of the

military personnel but [it) was quite a departure to send civilians over to a

naval hospital and [it) caused some troubles, particularly after the war was

39 over.

Richmond pointed out that the only other civilian hospitals were

located at Mojave, Bakersfield, or Trona. He summarised Drummond's

important role:

In the very early days when we didn't have the facilities, and the

Navy was breathing down our necks about sending people to the Navy

Dispensary ... he really helped us out. . . when we needed help.40

The fear of impermanency was not shared by the residents of

China Lake. On the contrary, for most China Lakers the maturing

process and a progressively uplifted morale had engendered an unusual

optimism. After having seen the miraculous growth of Station and

community-veritably, from the sagebrush and raw desert—how could

it do anything but go forward?

340

>. mufjawa^rt*.>»•>■■■« —
i

NOTS: FLAG COMMAND

At the top echelon of local management there was justification

for optimism as the Bureau of Ordnance was constant in its assurance

that NOTS was here to stay. It was more than just an implication,

too. Not even the change of Bureau leadership in mid-1947 had made

any difference. In fact, the new Chief had expressed his wishes for a

"strong, important, and virile research program" at Inyokern and at

White Oak.41

Although they were not privy to the Bureau of Ordnance's

viewpoint, the rank and file shardd an optimism that is just as easy

to understand. After al', they had daily opportunity to contemplate

the visible evidence for permanency: a multimillion-dollar laboratory

building for which dedication plans were being made; the continuing

work program to replace the temporary buildings with permanent

ones; and the new construction programs for the t^st ranges,

concomitant with a huge investment in sophisticated instrumentation

facilities.

And there was still another prima facie item of evidence for

permanency to NOTS residents. It surrounded them 24 hours a day.

This was, of course, the community in which they lived: the

hometown of 10,000 citizens designated "China Lake, California." In

the minds of these citizens, the Navy community represented the

bedrock foundation of a permanent station.

But in the judgment of the NOTS postwar management, the

general optimism that pervaded at China Lake was not enough. They

recognized that an operating community of good design and character

would necessarily have to include the young, adjoining town of

Ridgecrest; and indeed all of the civilian community elements in the

Indian Wells Valley: schools, churches, and social organizations.

Accordingly, Station personnel-both military and civilian—were

encouraged to participate fully in community activities "outside the

fence," and they responded with enthusiasm. As a prime example, a

president of the Indian Wells Valley's Parent-Teacher's.Association was

none other than the Station's dynamic Experimental Officer, "Chick"

Hayward. Other naval officers served with equal distinction as Board

Directors of the Concert Series and Orchestra—both combined

community organizations.

Any success that might have resulted from the large-scale efforts

to integrate the total community must be ascribed in great part to a

man whom we have already met several times in this history:

Commander John 0. Richmond, the Station's first permanent

Executive Officer.

341
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

— y.. •

John 0. Richmond, the Station's fust Execuiive Officer and Community Manager.

342
MOTS: l-LAG COMMAND

V/hen it was learned that Richmond's distinguished Navy career

was to be closed out on June 30, 1946, upon his transfer back to

the retired list,* it was quickly sensed that the loss would have a

double impact upon NOTS. Richmond had skillfully managed to

fulfill two functions simultaneously—that of expert Navy administrator

as well as the principal architect and manager of a sizeable

miiifary-civilian community.

Thompson and Hayward could not countenance the loss and

joined forces in do'ug something about it. They persuaded Captain

Sykes (and the Bureau of Ordnance) that the special problems of a

burgeoning community required the special .alents of a community

manager; an individual, as RicKnond later recalled, who could be "the

liaison between the . ilitary and civilian side of the family."42

The timing of 'he recommendation couldn't have been better; it

was the high season for "military-civilian relationship" issues at NOTS.

The civilian po.t of Community Manager was promptly established,

and "Mr.'' Richmond oecame its first incumbent.

Richmond's continued service at NOTS, allhough in a civilian

capacity, had a profound and lasting e feet on the Navy ^wn of

China Lake. During his tenure as Community Manager, school teachers

and young scientists were encouraged to join the Officers' Club, and

civilians were permitted to shop at a modified Navy commissary.

While many of these bonus privileges were retracted later, their

granting in the first place was testimony to the efforts of men like

Richmond to inculcate military-civilian harmony at the desert Station.

Richmond's goals for an integrated community reached far

beyond the main gate at NOTS. In fact, the «ate itself seemed to

epitomize his drive: he recommended that it be removed to allow

freer access for the Ridgecrest children attending the China Lake

schools. But, as Richmond later recalled, ". . . Admiral Hussey

wouldn't stand fc- it."43

The NOTS Community Manager's relationship with local leaders

and influential citizens became one of fast friendship. Nor was it

confined to only the Indian Wells Valley, for R.'chmond's wide circle

of friends included judges and lawmakers of Kern, Inyo, and San

Bernardino counties. As a result, a lot of people got to know more

about a relatively new aesert Navy community called China Lake

* It should be noted that this wus Richmond's second retirement. His first rctirci.ienl,

due to ill health, ended twenty-three years of active service in 19?6. In 1941 ho was recalled

to duty for the duration and assigned to Hawthorne because it had a dry climate that would

not aggravate a chronic sinusitis condition.

343
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

This invites speculaticri as to how outsiders might have regarded

the NOTS community circa 1947-1948.

The question. What was China Lake really like in those days?

can elicit an infinite number of responses when posed to "early

timers" today. It would seem that a composite picture lies somewhere

between "a desert paradise" (a phrase beloved of some NOTS

recruiting brochures) and a "desolate hellhole " A balanced picture

might be one contained in an article tha« appeared in the Station

newspaper, the Rrcketeer, on October 22, 1947, titled "Inside

NOTS." Since it was written by a Station employee, A. E.

Niederhoff, for an exclusive readership of other employees', we can

assume that the article is reasonably close to the mark.

Niederhoff wrote enthusiastically about the community as being

"stable, contented, and imbued with a |community] spirit that is

reflected in the various social clubs, churches, lodges, and service

organizations . . ." He was equally enthusiastic about the Station's two

schools. Burroughs High School and the China Lake Elementary

First NOTS Chapel, formerly "the old n:ovie hut," October 1947,

344
NOTS: FLAG COMMAND

School, which now had a total enrollment of 1,100 pupils. Shops,

stores, and recreational facilities (such as the theater, bowling alleys,

and swimming pools) also received feature billing in the article.44

But in his word picture of the NOTS community, one pauses to

wonder whether there was just a tinge of rose color in the writer's

glasses. Although many salutary attempts had been made by the

residents to realize "beautiful, grassy spaces surrounding the

homes . . . vines, hedges, flowers, and young trees. . . walled patios,"

the community was by no means picturesque. In fact, the casual

visitoi might have been somewhat less than impressed by the

amorphous array of austere buildings that dotted the raw desert

landscape; all the same color-an uninspiring gray, intermixed with

structures of raw cement.

But, like Niederhoff, the majority of China Lakers inherently

possessed the vision to perceive the community's potential; looking

forward to a time in the futuie when the trees would grow tall and

the essential rawness of the new buildings would mellow.

In time, too, the citizens of the outside communities would

come to ngard the Naval Ordnance Test Station as a permanent

entity. With this acceptance would come a more pronounced

confidence in the future and a willingness to ally the destiny of their

respective communities with that of the desert Station.

A TRADITION CONTINUES

One of the strongest believers in the permanency of NOTS was

its first Commanding Officer, Captain S. E. Burroughs. A measure of

his belief is seen in the early establishment of a tradition whereby the

Station's history is commemorated in the names of its streets and

avenues; Burroughs' philosophy was that eventuai'y the total history

of NOTS should be represented by street names that call to mind the

significant people, places, and ships that have helped to shape or even

lightly touch the destiny of the Station. Long after Burroughs'

departure the tradition was perpetuated.

Among the first names chosen were those of famous Fleet

Admirals: Nimitz, King, and Halsey. These were followed by Cniefs

and Deputies of the Bureau of Ordnance: Hussey, Blandy, and

345
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Parsons and other prominent Bureau names such as Byrnes, Kitts,

Tyler, and Entwistle.*

Civilians who played a prominent part in the NOTS story are

remembered: Knox Road and Forrestal Street for two Secretaries of

the Navy and Bard Street for Ralph Bard, Undersecretary of the

Navy, and Thompson Streel for the first Technical Director. The

memories of CalTech men who helped plan and build the Station are

also preserved: Fowler, Ellis, Bowen, Sage, and, of course, Lauritsen.

In the distinguished chronology of names, each Commanding

Officer is honored. However, in 1948, only one name had been used:

Burroughs High School. Eventually Sykes Circle and Switzer Circle

would emerge from the period of history covered by this particular

volume. The first Experimental Officer, Chick Hayward. and the first

permaiient Executive Officer, John Richmond, would similarly have

streets named after them (Richmond would also give his name to an

elementary school).

Not only are the men honored, but also their famous

ships—Hornet, Wasp, franklin, Intrepid, Saratoga, Kearsarge,

Lexington, Essex—mA Jimmy Sykes' own Bennington and Card. There

is Navy tradition reflected, too, in the streets named after tie famous

combat arenas in which these ships did battle: Midway, Leyte, and

( oral Sea.

Thus a tour around the Naval Weapons Center today is a

ventable guidebook through its history, with each signpost providing a

fleeting nudge of memory to recall its prominent historical principals.

One name, in particular, is most siyiificant—the name given to

the brand-new research laboratory. While it was an eminently

distinguished name in the annals of science and nava' ordnance, the

individual so honored had no association whatever with NOTS

Inyokern.

I he name was Michelson.

* Ar am ising story, although beyond the period of this volume (eirca 1950), finds

Bureau Admuuls Snackenber;; and Schoeffel good-humoredly discussing the fact that their

names had been overlooked at China Lake. They sent a mock formal message to the (then)

Commander, Captain Vieweg, pointing out that a short a.'ey on the Station was still without

a name. I he admirals suggested that it be called "Snackenberg-and-Schoeffel Strc t" with the

idea that the name would appear longer than the street.

Vieweg went one better. He named the Station's large, new athletic area "Schoeffel

Field"; a humorous irony that recalled to the many Navy and Bureau of Ordnance comrades

of Admiral Schoeffel that of all his Academy class he had been the least known for his

athletic prowess!

346
NOTS: FLAG COMMAND

REFERENCES

NWC identification numbers are those under which copies of documents are filed in the

Technical Information Department, Naval Weapons Center. The following abbreviations are

used to identify record collections where documents were found:

CARD Collections of Archival and Reference Documents at the Naval Weapons

Center

FRCB Naval Weapons Center records stored at Federal Records Center, Bell,

California

NA National Archives, Washington, D.C.

LTET Papers of L. T. E. Thompson, Scarsdale, New York

1. N.O.T.S. Rocketeer, October 22, 1947.

2. Emory L. and Marion Ellis interview, November 1972, p. 21. (NWC 2313,

S-84.)

3. John T. Hayward interview, July 26, 1973. (NWC 2313, S-86.)

4. Ibid.

5. [bid.

6. Ellis interview, cited in Ref. 2 above, pp. 21-22. (NWC 2313, S-84.)

7. F. L. Ashworth interview, April 9-10, 1969, p. 97. (NWC 2313, S-61.)

8. Jack C. Renard interview. May 21, 1969, p. 19. (NWC 2313, S-64.)

9. Sherman E. Burroughs interview, November 4, 1966, p. 25. (NWC 2313,

S-20.)

10. Sherman E. Burroughs interview, April 1966, p. 10. (NWC 2313, S-2.)

! 1. Letter from Capt. Sherman E. Burroughs to Chief, Bureau of Ordnance,

reading change of Station name, April 16, l

c

)44. (NWC 231 J, ;8-2A.)

12. Memorandum from Lieutenant Commander C. F. Visier to Commanding

Officer, Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, CalifomL, on "Report on

Condition of Naval Air Facility, Inyokern, California," August 14. 1945, p.

1. Vossler papers. (NWC 2313, CARD file.)

13. Letter from W. G. SvuUer to the Cliief, Bureau of O-dnance, on "Naval

Ordnance Test Station, inyokern, r.-lifornia-Change in Name of," December

23, 1947. FRCB. (NWC 2313, 22-52.)

14. Letter from A. G. Noble, Chief, Bureau of Ordnance, to the Commanding

Officer, Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California, on "Naval

Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern. California-Change in Name of," December

31, 1947. FRCB. (NWC 2313, 22-48.)

34"
THE GR ;ND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

15. SecNav Note 5450, "U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, China

Lake, California; Established Status and Redesignation of," February 4, 1955.

(NWC 2313, 42-1.)

16. "Rocket Town," Life, Vol. 24, Nu. 7 (February 16, 1948), pp. 104-05.

17. U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, Four Decades at NRL, p. 11. (NWC 2313,

33-1.)

18. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

19. Daniel J. Kevles. "Scientists, the Military, and the Control of Postwar

Defense Research; the Case of the Research Board for National Security,

1944-46," Technolog}'and Culture, Vol. 16 (January 1975). pp. 20-47.

20. Julius Augustus Purer, RAdm., USN. Administration of the Navy Department

in World War 11, p. 804. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office,

1959.

21. Unpublished history, "Narrative of the Bureau of Ordnance, 1 September

'945 to 1 October 1946," Chapter V, p. 171. NA.

22. U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, Four Decades at NRL. p. 15. (NWC 2313.

33-1.)

23. Letter from A. G. Noble to the Technical Director. NOTS, and (he Technical

Director, NOL, on "Action Urgently Needed in Support of the Bureau of

Ordnance Research and Development Centers." March 3, 1948, p. 2. LTET.

(NWC 2313, 3-38.)

24. Ibid.

25. Minutes of the NOTS Research Board Meeting, November 14, 1947. (NWC

2313, 47-7.)

26. George F. Hussey and L. T. E. Thompson joint interview, April 1966, p.

106. (NWC 2313, S-5.)

27. William B. McLean interview, July 1975, p. 12. (NWC 2313, S-97,)

28. Hussey and Thompson joint interview, April 1966, o, 106. (NWC 2313, S-5.)

29. Letter from J. B. Sykes to the Chief, Bureau of Ordnance, on "Training of

Army Personnel at the Naval Ordnance Test Station," March 22, 1946.

FRCB. (NWC 2313, 43-13.)

30. Letter from W. H. Martin, 1st Lt., Air Corps, for th- Commander, Wendover

Field, Utah, to the Commanding Officer, NOTJ, on "Committee on

Standardization of Facilities of Ranges," March 27, 1946. FRCB. (NWC

2313, 43-15.)

348
NOTS. FLAG COMMAND

31. "Remarks on the Organization and Operation of NOTS, 1943-1951," speech

by Dr. L. T. E, Thompson before Senior Personnel Conierence, NOTS,

August 7, 1951, p. 10. (NWC 2313, 20-3.1.)

32. Letter from M. F. Schoeffel lo Dr. L. T. E. Thompson, Decemher 19, 1947.

LTET. (NWC 2313, 1-21.)

33. Speech by Dr. L. T. E. Thompson, cited in Ref. ?' above, p. 23.

34. Ibid.

35. "History of U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, August

1945-December 1958," prepared by Central Staff. OPNAV Report 5750-5. p.

16. (NWC 2313, Command files.)

36. Speech by Dr. L. T. E. Thompson, cited in Ref. 31 above, p. 24.

3','. Nickerson, McLean, Christensen, and Asiociates, "A Study of Administrative

Problems at U.S. Naval Oidnance Test Station, Inyokern, California," by

Harvard Study Group. Summer 1951. p. 66. (NWC 2313.)

38. Ibid., p. 65.

39. John Richmond interview, January 1967. p. 70. (NWC 2313, S-33.)

40. Ibid., p. 71.

41. Noble letter, cited in Ref. 23 above.

42. Richmond interview, January 1967, p. 42. (NWC 2313, S-33.;

43. Ibid., p. 61.

44. N.O.T.S. Rocketeer, October 22, 1947.

349
11

Landfall: Michelson Laboratory

May S, 1948, was a significant day for NOTS. For one thing, it

marked the third anniversary of Germany's defeat in World War II; in

another three months, the Station would be embarking on its third

year of peacetime operation.

It had been four and a half years since NOTS was established in

crisis, to be embroiled immediately in the war and its mounting

demands for new rocket weapons. Victory had not realized an

abatement of turbulent times; indeed, conflict had continued to

characterize the desert Stations entire existence throughout the first

uneasy years of peace. At stake was the survival of NOTS as

envisioned in the original concept for an integrated naval ordnance

research and development center.

But now, in the spring of I94S, there was strong evidence that

the concept had been preserved. The epitome of such evidence was

figuratively-and literally-concrete; the NOTS research laboratory.

DEDICATION

Beautiful days are characteristic of the Mojave Desert in late

spring; some NOTS early-timers of good memory recall that Saturday,

May 8, 1948, was just such a day. The occasion was one of the

major milestones of the total NOTS story. It was the day that the

Michelson Laboratory was formally dedicated.

351
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

The 3,800 civilians and 1,000 military personnel of NOTS at this

time also recognized the importance and significance of the dedication

ceremony. A memorial coin had been designed and struck,

accomplished entirely at the Station, duplicating methods used by the

U.S. Mint for the manufacture of coins. A quiet, tasteful

commemorative booklet published on Ihe anniversary of the

dedication a year later described the new faciJiiy:

Michelson Laboratory is regardid as one of Cie most complete research

facilities of its kind in the world. Bjilt at a cost of $7,000,000, it contains

more than 9 1/2 acres of floor space. The structure is made up of 16

monolithic concrete units, joined in such a way as to prevent possible

earthquake damage. Its long horizontal lines parallel the planes of the desert.

Concrete louvers, projecting from the outside walls, diffuse the intense

sunlight, and the laboratory is air-conditioned throughout. Designed to

accommodate a staff of aoout 600, it is equipped for basic and applied

research in physics, chemistry, aerophysics, metallurgy and ballistics, and for

development work on propu'sion, fin-control, and guidance systems for

rockets and other missiles. Among its service facilities are a technical library,

a large and versatile machine shop, a foundry, and standards of measurement,

materials testing,, heat-treating, and electroplating shops. Testing roo ns in

which it will be possible to simulate any kind of weather, from the blistering

heat of the tropics to the deadening cold of the poles, are being completed.1

The NOTS leadership and distinguished guests who were to

participate in the ceremony were also keenly aware of the

achievement represented by the impressive new research and

development laboratory. These included Rear Admiral W. G. Switzer,

NOTS Commander; Dr. L. T. E. Thompson, Technical Director; Rear

Admiral A. G. Noble, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance; the

Honorable John Nicholas Brown, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for

Air; and Dr. C. C. Lauritsen of CalTech.

The dedication ceremony also served to honor the man for

whom the laboratory was named: Albert Abraham Michelson,

distinguished naval officer and physicist, and the first American

recipient of the Nobel Prize in science. Present at the dedication were

three daughters of Professor Michelson: Mrs. Festus Foster, Waterford,

Virginia: Mrs. William D. Stevens, New York City; and Mrs. Nevile

Gardiner, Washington, D.C. Nobel Prize winner Dr. Robert A.

Millikan, Professor of Physics Emeritus and chairman of the Executive

Council at the California Institute of Technology and for twenty-five

years an intimate associate cf Professor Michelson, was to deliver a

m Miorial address.

At the opening of the ceremony, the U.S. Marine Corps Band

from San Diego played wi(.h spirit, their instruments catching and

reflecting the bright desert sunlight. It was a joyous occasion calling

for the presence of everyone who had dreamed of a permanent Navy

352
LANDFALL: MICHELSON LABORATORY

ordnance research and development center and who deserved credit

for his part in fulfilling this dream. Unfortunately, this was not the

case. Old photographs reveal that the specially constructed bleachers

in front of the new laboratory were not filled. Arrangements with the

Southern Pacific Railroad for special Pullman service from Los

Angeles to NOTS never materialized because of failure to meet a

minimum guarantee as to the passenger volume.2

The proposed invitation list (nearly 1,000) comprised some 15

categories of visitors headed by "President of the United States and

Cabinet Members." Others included senators, governors, university

presidents, deans of science schools, and industrial contractors.-^

Perhaps the Station organizers of the dedication ceremony were

secretly relieved that there was no great influx of visitors. There were

as yet virtually no hotel accommodations in the surrounding

community, and the housing shortage on the Station was still critical.

As one old-timer recalled, "If everyone who was invited had shown

up, we wouldn't have known where to put them."

Among the Bureau of Ordnance notables who were not present

were two remarkable naval officers who had been largely instrumental

in bringing NOTS, as well as the Michelson Laboratory, into being.

The first of these was Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, who, as a

former Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, had been the most visionary

prophet of a permanent, postwar Navy ordnance research center.

"Spike" Blandy was now Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.

The other was Captain James C. Byrnes, Jr., the former watchdog

of the Bureau of Ordnance's shore establishment. This extraordinary

officer had been more than a visionary; he was a man of action. As the

recognized spokesman for the Bureau Chief in the first months of the

Station's history, Byrnes' voice had loudly and clearly been heard in

congressional appropriations offices, Bureau of Yards and Docks design

and drafting rooms, and over the busy telephone lines linking

Washington and Inyokern. His administrative wisdom had done much to

make Michelson Laboratory a reality. "Doc" Byrnes would be

remembered in absentia on this bright day in May 1948.*

* The fact that Byrnes did not receive an invitation was a matter of regret for

Richmond, and perhaps others, for years to come. It appears that the invitation was

mistakenly sent to a Captain J. F. Byrne who, by a stratige quirk of irony, was on duty at

the Bureau of Ordnance. Hence this officer probably received the invitation and .ieclined tc

come. At !lüs time (1948) James C. Byrnes, Jr., had been on the retired list for three years.

While it is satisfying to set the historical record straight, it is particularly poignant that the

reason for the "missing invitation" was not learned by "Doc" Byrnes befor1his death in

1967.

353
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

But most of the principals in planning and making the laboratory

a reality were present. Vice Admiral George F. Hussey (Ret.),

Blandy's successor as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and another

principal architect of the NOTS dream, arrived by air on the same

airplane as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air J. N. Brown, Rear

Admirals A. G. r-oble, F. E. Beatty, and Turner Joy, and Captain S.

E. Burroughs, first Commanding Officer of NOTS,

For some of the participants, notably Admiral Switzer, Dr.

Thompson, and some senior staff members, this was a second day of

continuing celebration for NOTS: Friday, May 7, had been the

occasion of formally dedicating the variable-angle launcher (VAL) at

Pasadena's Morris Dam facility.

By comparison, the scope of the previous day's activity was

modest with a tone set by the keynote speaker, Dr. W. V. Houston,

distinguished president of Rice Institute, Texas, and CalTech alumnus.

He spoke at length about the role of research and the application of

science to the national defense, saying, "In a race the prize goes to

him who runs the fastest." The military defense of the United States,

he declared, ''requires that the state of science and technology

throughout the whole country be pushed forward." He concluded,

'And to this end, I am sure that this new Morris Dam installation

will make a magnificent contribution."4

Then it was time to demonstrate the VAL. To the great relief of

those who had witnessed a startling premature launching on the

previous day's rehearsal, the demonstration torpedo launched

perfectly. The NOTS dedication ceremonies were off to a fine start!

On May 8, 1948, NOTS Inyokern had been in existence for

exactly 1,642 days. But of all those days, this one was exceptional-a

day to remember for those of NOTS who attended the ceremony.

Some of these men and women had been a part of the Station

almost since its inception four and a half years earlier. Perhaps their

thoughts touched on less happy days, in wartime and the equally

difficult time of peace that followed hard upon it, when the struggle

to keep the NOTS concept alive had been particularly intense.

But any such serious retrospection would have been fleeting on

this sunny Saturday afternoon. Rather, this was a time to consider

achievement and the future significance of the new laboratory to the

continuing needs of national defense in a technologically complex

world.

354
LANDFALL: MICHELSON LABORATORY

Michelson Laboratory at tlie time of its dedication, May 1948.

The color guard completed their opening ceremonies and Rear

Admiral W. G. Switzer, NOTS Commander, gave this address of

welcome:

The Laboratory itself is a symbol of permanence and security;

permanence of homes and employment, and the security which it insures. It

is evidence of the faith of the Navy and the nation in the ability of the

individual who will work here to meet their responsibilities toward the

Navy's efforts to provide security for the nation and thereby promote a

lasting pjace.5

NOT5 was the Bureau of Ordnance's baby. It was appropriate

therefore that the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance be a principal

speaker. Rear Admiral Albert G. Noble was the third Bureau Chief

who had nurtured and protected the infant and ensured that it

would, in Fred Hovde's words, "withstand the rigors of peacetime

malnutrition." He spoke for Blandy and Hussey, and, also for the

dedicated men and women in the Bureau who would always be aware

that a significant part of their lives was irrevocably linked with this

corner of California's Mojave Desert.

355
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Noble reminded his audience that in the absence of potential

enemy surface forces, the Bureau was concentrating its efforts in

three major fields of ordnance development-the aircraft program, ihe

antiaircraft program, and the antisubmarine program. He concluded;

It is significant that today we are present to dedicate this laboratory

at an ordnance station in which important portions of all three of the

research programs are being effectively undertaken. The adequacy of the

facilities and the technical competence of the staff give cause for full

assurance of the satisfactory solution of the problems assigned here.6

Mrs. Nevile Gardiner, Michelson's daur;hter, then addressed the

assembly. She spoke briely in acknowledgment of fie honcr paid

her father's memory, expressing on behalf of her sisters and herself a

gratitude at being able to share in the dedication of the laboratory.

She said her father would indeed have felt nroud could he have been

present, and concluded by stating, "I know that this new research

laboratory has my father's blessing. It has our most confident and

heartfelt wishes for success."7

The wonder of NOTS, both in its '.olution and its concept for

future operations, could be seen in the smooth intermixing of

speakers with gold braid and multicolored military ribbons and those

in business suits and fine dresses. Leading the list of distinguished

speakers in civilian attire was the Honorable John Nicholas Brown,

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air. The Secretary adaressed his

remarks largely to the NOTS scientists, using as his theme.

"Integration of Scientific and Military Effort in Weapons Research."

The Seci' tarv deplored the idea that war was inevitable, but

called attention to existing circumstances resembling those that led to

past wars. He therefore felt it would be "rash and foolhardy" not to

prepare actively for the nation's defense. In this context, he said:

If there is to be another war, the shape of it fust will be visualized

here at China Lake. Each time I come here 1 have an impression that I am

being given a look into the future. Here many of t' weapons of the next

war will have taken shape lüst in the ninds of some of you now present.

Here men in pursuit of elusive truths will find themselves diverted by their

own discoveries down new and unsuspected paths to fresh fields hiMerto

unknown. Having evolved in men's minds, new weapons will be devised in

the magnificent laboratory we are dedicating today. They will essay their

first flights in the reaches of the desert which surrounds us. Here they will

be tested, studied, altered and perfected bel..ri other people in other places

take up their manufacture and send them o.' to the armed services for

use. . . .

8

If today was a proud day for NOTS, it was equally so for the

unassuming man in a blue serge suit who now took his place by the

side of the Assistant Secretary on the speaker's rostrum-Dr. Charles

C. Lauritsen of CalTech. To John Nicholas Brown fell the honor of

356
LANDFALL: MICHELSON LADORATORY

presenting Lauritsen witli the Medal for Merit. The citation, signed by

President Truman, read in part, "for exceptionally meritorious

conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the United

States from July 1940, to June 1946"; it went on to catalog a list of

accomplishments, which, according to the citation, "did much to

shorten the war and saved the lives of many of our fighting men."

Both the nation and the Navy were grateful to the desk-pounding

scientist who led the way in making rockets a vital weapon for the

armed forces of the United States.

Then it was time to honor the man for whom the new

laboratory had been named: Dr. Albert Abraham Michelson

(1852-1931).

There was never any question as to the appropriateness of the

name—ever since it had first been suggested for the new NOTS

laboraiory. James Duncan, who had been a "tudent of physics under

Piofessor Michelson at the University of Chicago in 1919, is credited

by Thompson for suggesting the name. In a later interview, Duncan

said, "When I went to the Naval Academy ... I began to think it was

a shame that the Navy didn't have any laboratory or building named

for Michelson. ... I even suggested it there, but they we-en't in a

position to do anything about it at that time. ... So when I became

associated with the plans for the laboratory at NOTS, of course, this

was the first thing I thought of... here's a chance to gel it named

for M chelson."9It was a good choice, for not only had Michelson

been a naval officer, but he was also one of the nation's most

distinguished scientists.

After graduation from the United States Naval Academy in 1873,

and an ensuing tour of two years at sea, Ensign Albert Michelson was

ordered back to Annapolis as an instructor in physics and chemistry.

After twelve years in the Ncy, Michelson became, as he

described himself to the press many years later, "a sailor who

degenerated into a college professor because it thrilled him to match

wits with inanimate objects."1^

In 1907 he became the first American scientist to be awarded

the Nobel Prize in Physics. This was "for his precision optical

instruments and the spectroscopic and metrologicai investigations

conducted therewith."1' He became known as "the man who taught

i world to measure"; his experimental values for the velocity of light

were accepted as the most accurate fo' nearly tvv,> generations; and

he was the first to measure the diarr.;ter of a star, as well as to

determine the length of the standard meter in wavelengths of light-?,

natural and reproducible phenomenon.

357
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

In his rise to w-irid eminence as a scientist, Michelson's loyalty

to the Navy did not diminish; nor did his interest in the application

of suence to the defense of the nation. Five of his patents are for

optical range finders (designed for the Bureau of Ordnance between

1891 and 1919) and a sixth (wifa John Gordon Wilson) is for a

device to protect the ear diai-hragm from the noise of gunfire.

During Wcrld War I, he again donned a Navy uniform to serve

on active duty as scientific consultant tc th? Bureau of Ordnance. In

this capacity he continued his work on range finders, represented the

Bureau in technical commissions, pe. Jtmed development work on

such diverse items as binoculars for night observation and instruments

for plotting aircraft courses, and provided scientific leadership in

solving critical problems in the development of a domestic source for

optical glass in the United States.'^

And so, the name chosen for the new laboratory at NOTS was a

fitting symbol of the close cooperation between naval personnel and

civilian scientists, so vital to the success of the young desert Station.

And this spirit was much in evidence on the bright Saturday in May

1948 when Dr. Millikan rose to make the keynote address of the

dedication ceremony.

MilliHin bore his 80 years with dignity and evident pride. It was

pride deserved. Me was one of the first scientists to ans'ver ins

country's call in both World Wars I and II. And in the years between,

when few of his colleagues felt an obligation or the need to aid in

the nation's defense, he worked to develop couplings between the

scientific and military communities. So on this spring day OP the

desert he could be especially proud of his close scientific association

and long personal friendship with Michelson that went back to th3

1890. when he undertook an assistantship under Michelson at ,.e

University of Chicago.

Millikan's testimony to his o'.ii teacher, associate, and personal

friend was spoken from the heart,

I am quite certain that f-.d last thing Professor Michelson would have

desired would be to have tKi memoii made merely a eulogy. I am therefore

endeavoring to give ... as correct a picture as I can of the man as I knew

him througl mere than twenty-five years of intimate association.

Millikan then spoke of a man whose outstanding characteristic

was honesty; also, of one whose other notable characteristics were

"singleness, simplicity, and clarity of his objective—an objective from

which he let nothing divert him, however great the pressure.'

Michelson the scientist was described by Millikan as ? pure

experimentalist, designer of instruments, and a refiner of teclnic,ues.

358
LANDFALL: M1CHELS0N LABORATORY

He Mves, Millikan declared, "because in the field of optics he drove

the refinement of measurement to its limits and by so doing showed

a skeptic ^i world what far-reaching consequences can follow . . . and

what new vistas of knowledge can be opened up by it. It was a

lesson the world had to learn."13

At the close of his address, Millikan unveiled a handsome oil

portrait of Michelson that was earmarked for permanent display in

the lobby of the new laboratory.

While this was the time to be proud, to reflect, and to pay

tribute, it was also a time to try to grasp the meaning of NOTS

within the broad perspective of national defense. What was the

significance in all of this-the new laboratory; a flourishing research,

de lopment, and test program; a community thriving in the desert;

ana the unique but tangible bond between the military and civilians

who sat there side by side?

Nobody present ai Uie medication ceremony, or in the entire

Held of naval ordnance for that matter, was more qualified to give

voice to this meaning than the Technical Director of NOTS, Dr. L. T.

E. Thompson. To him the new Michelson Laboratory in the backdrop

of the speaker's platform was the culmination of a dream come true.

It had been twenty-f've years since he had become the first

Chief Seientist at the Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren, Virginia, and

during the quarter century no other scientist had striven harder to

improve the means by which the Navy could develop advanced

weapon systems. Thompson had been among the tirst in the

post-World War I period to recognize the need for an ordnance

laboratory within the Navy. He knew also the vital importance of

civilian scientists working directly with the military to produce

weaponry.

Now, as Technical Director, he was the scientific leader of an

integr^teü organization where the whole process of weapon

de/elopment could be accomplished—from initial idea through all the

steps to Fleet introduction. Through his own foresight and untiring

efforts he had led in the shaping of +iiis organizational concept and in

getting it accepted and implemented

Thompson spoke first of the requisites for effective national

preparedness and posed the questions: 'What constitutes adequate

strength, ?nd by what allocations of our national effort and of our

available facilities for cultivating preparedness will best results be

had?" Inyokern, he said, was one link in the national facilities for

dealing with the complex problem of combat analysis.

359
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Thompson then delivered what he termed "a sort of report on

the state of the Station In respect to those questions which have

seemed for three years [to be] of greatest Importance to successful

operation." He pointed out the principal differences that set NOTS

apart from other centers: namely, the provision in one location of

research laboratories shops, pilot plants, ranges, and a self-contained

community comr.ising homes, stores, hospital, and recreational

facilities. All the advantages of such an Integration, he concluded,

''justified the decision to build one technical center and town out

here in the Mojave Desert."

The Principles of Operation and their significance to the grand

exp'-riment at Inyokern were particularly stressed by Thompson, who

said:

Possibly the most significant experiment so far conducted at this

Station is the one to establish a new type of organization and operation for

a research comer staffed by a mixed group of civilian scientists, engineers,

and naval personnel, operated within the framework of Navy administration.

... In it there is clear acceptance of the principle lint directional control of

a development program is a job for civilian technical personnel. The Navy

has recognized that there must be maintained in this center an environment

for work and for community life more like that of an industrial or university

laboratory than of a military regime. It has fully recognized that the chance

for opp.ration on a levnl comparable with the levels aitained by the highly

successful OSRD groups dining the war rests entirely on our ability to

attract and hold a technical staff of high qualifications. At the same lime,

we believe that close collaboration by the operations experts of the armed

services and the development staff at China Lake is essential in providing the

guide lines '' a successful weapons development program. ...

1

'

,

Thompson did not skirt operational problems still facing NOTS;

for example, "difficulties in adapting civil service employment

precedents and government procurement procedures to the needs of a

research and development center, and inadequate appropriations for

travel and telephone communications." But while he gave visibility to

the problems, Fhompson was quick to stress that "progress is being

tiade toward [theirJ solution."

As he articulated his thoughts on the future role of the Station,

it was perceived by all that the origma! vision of a weapons

development center still burned brightly for the NOTS Technical

Director. 'The Navy." he said, "recognizes that fundamental science

must furnish the stimulation and the foundation for development

work." He added, ". . . it has established at this Michelson Laboratory

an already strong department for basic and applied research."

Thompson affirmed his belief that a weapon development

center's job stretched beyond producing compc" :nts for weapons to

360

. .
LANDFALL: MICHELSON LABORATORY

sharing a responsibility for training young people in the various

technical fields, and further ". . . to collaborate n the conduct of

basic research on which technical progress and much of our economic

progress must eventually depend." In this regard, he pointed out that

a contribution to the scientific foundation for a weapons program

would likely be a contribution to the scientific foundation for a

whole zone of industrial development.

In conclusion Thompson summarized his credo as follows:

We believe such a station has a degree o. responsibility in helping

with the program to build, in proper balance, ail components of national

trength . .. adequate progress toward the preve. tion of war through properly

balanced strengths will be found also to have produced that kind of national

strength necessary for highest levels of peaceful living.'5

SOME MONDAY MORNING THOUGHTS

The ceremony was over; the new laboratory at NOTS was truly

Ur.'icated. Transportation by road and air was replayed, this time

bearing the distinguished visitors back from whence they had come to

take pa,* in the May 8, 1948, proceedings. The bleachers were taken

dov/n. ai.J for the employees it was a relatively normal Monday

morning lhat they faced.

But for the majoiity of these uniformed and Chilian workers,

there was now a subtle change in their regard for the Station. A new,

provocative flsvoj had been infused into the NOTS brew, which was

now already on its way to acquiring a vintage character. The many

tributes and good words that had been voiced from the speaker's

rostrum two Jays earlier embraced a quality that went far beyond the

nature of an inspirational pep talk; there was fact, logic, reason, and

nope in the various addresses by the nation's representative military

and seien, fie leaders. In sum, these leaders were reaffirming that the

orifinal concept had not been lost-that NOTS would fulfill its

destiny as a center for the "research, development, and testing of

weapons" described in the original founding order writien exactly

four and a half years earlier.

There was now a difference. The concept had surv ved the

transition from idea to reality; from war to peace; from a barren

desert site to large complexes of .ichnical facilities near the

Navy-built community of Cnina Lake and near Pasadena- from a

center for rocketry to one for a broad spectrum of weaponry; from a

military organization to a unique military-civilian team; and from a

361
THE GRAND EX.*-- RIMENT AT INYOKERN

test station and experimental production facility to a research,

development, and test center. The grand experiment at Inyokern had

been judged successful.

362
LANDFALL; MICHELSON LABORATORY

REFERENCES

NWC identification numbers are those under which copies of documents are filed in

the Technical Information Department, Naval Weapons Center.

1. Booklet, Commemorating Michelson Laboratory Dedication, May Seventh and

Eighth, Nineteen Forty-Eight. U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake,

Califom.a, NOTS, May 1949. (NWC 2313, 8-6.)

2. Letter from W. G. Switzer to the Chief, Bureau of Ordnance, on "Dedication

of the Michelson Laboratory .. .," February 11, 1948. (NWC 2313, 10-6.)

3. Ibid.

4. Booklet, Commemorating Michelson Laboratoy Dedication cited in Ref. 1

above, p. 36.

5. Ibid., p. xi.

6. Ibid., p. 12.

7. Ibid., p. 4.

8. Ibid., pp. f-S.

9. James Duncan interview, April 26, 1966, p. 2. (NWC 2313, S-9.)

10. Naval Weapons Center. Albert A. Michelson: The Man ]\'':o Taught a World

To Measure, Publications of the Michelson Museum No. 3, NWC, May 1970.

11. Ibid.

12. A. B. Christman, History' of the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake,

California, Vol. 1, Sailors, Scientists, and Rockets, p. 32.

13. Booklet, Commemoruting Michelson Laboratory Dedication, cited in Ref. 1

above, pp. 17-18.

14. Ibid., p. 11.

15. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

363
NOTS Chronology

June 1943 to June 1948

Selected events are listed that led directly to the establishment of the Naval Ordnance

Test Station and continued to represent significant milestones during World War II and the

critical postwar period that followed.

1943

June 7 Directive from the Commander in Chief to the U.S. Fleet calls

for large aircraft rocket program at CalTech that was to provide

basis for expansion of West Coast rocket facilities, including test

ranges.

July 14 First air launch of a forward-firing rocket, using British rounds,

as part of the CalTech rocket program.

Aug. Dr. Charles C. Lauritsen and Commander Jack C. Renard, during

flight over Mojave Desert, are impressed with Inyokern area and

dry China Lake as site for proving ground.

Aug. 20 First air launch of CalTech-developed forward-firing rockets, the

"CIT Type High velocity 3A12."

Oct. 19 Vice Chief of Naval Operations orders 6,000 airplanes to be

equipped with the new forward-firing rockets and launchers by

Juni 1, 1944, with 4,500 earmarked for the Pacific Fleet.

Oct. 28 Vice Chief of Naval Operations gives verbal approval to start

construction of temporary facilities at Inyokern.

Oct. 28 First funds for temporary facilities made available for

NOTS-$ 160,000 for "expedition of the rocket program."

Oct. 29 Agreement reached among government agencies whereby Navy

obtains use of Inyokern airfield.

365
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Wov. Captain A. K. Fogg, first Officer in Charge of Construction

(Acting) for NOT.', expedites temporary building program and

paves the way for planning and constructing permanent facilities.

Quonset huts arrive by rail at Inyokern.

Contract let to Macco Constriction Co. for work on temporary

facilities at NOTS.

Construction started on first NOTS aircraft and ground ranges:

C-l, G-l, and G-2.

Nov. 8 NOTS officially established by the Secretary of the Navy.

Nov. 9-16 Facilities plan for NOTS prepared by naval ofi'icers and CalTech

scientists under the leadership of Commander K. M. McLaren.

Dec. 3 First test on NOTS ranges, air launching of 3.5-mch rockets

against ground targets (to study fuze iunctioning), marks "the

beginning of operations at NOTS."

Dec. 7 U.S. spinner rockets test-tired at Goldstone Lake.

Dec. 10 Rear Admiral George F. Hussey relieves Rear Admiral W. H. P.

Blandy as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.

Mid Dec. First ground firings of "Holy Moses." 5-inch high velocity

aircraft rocket (HVAR), at Goldstone Range.

Dec. 21 Captain Shernrnn E. Burroughs, Jr., arrives at Inyokern and

assumes command of NOTS.

Aviation Ordnance Development Unit No. 1 (AODU-1)

commissioned at the Naval Air Station, San Diego.

Dec. 31 Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal requests Department of

Interior to acquire desert land for exclusive Navy use.

1944

Early Jan. Fleet pilot training program in use of rockets begins at NOTS.

Jan. 2 First ccntingem of AODU-1 a:rives at Inyokern.

Jan. 11 First confirmed "kill" of enemy submarine made with the "CIT

Type High Velocity 3A12" rocket.

Jan. 12 Site plans and schematic drawings of NOTS facilities completed.

Jan. 15 Captain Oscar A. Sandquist, Officer in Charge of Construct:on,

takes charge of NOTS building program for its year of greatest

expinsion.

Jan. 17 Bureau of Ordnance approval for 20 Quonset huts and two Stran

Steel buildings to be constructed at China Lake rather than

Inyokern confirms new location for NOTS headquarters.

Jan. 22 Plans developed to locate a new pilot plan< for the production

of rocket prope'lants at NOTS and to name it the China Lake

Pilot Plant.

366

.■■- ;.-... .-.:'• :- .
NOTS CHRONOLOGY

Feb. Ground firings of rockets begin on NOTS ranges.

Feb. 1 Secretary of the Navy releases the $9,500,000 approved by

Congress for the construction of NOTS.

Feb. 15 The Bureau of Ordnance releases $1,500,000 for construction of

the Chinti Lake Pilot Plani; additional funds for equipment.

First U.S. aircraft rockets used in combat in the Pacific Theater.

Carrier Aircraft Service Unit No. 53 (CASU-53) commissioned at

NOTS by the Chief of Naval Operations to service and maintain

aircraft of training squadrons at inyokern.

Feb. 24 A letter of intent issued for the main construction contract for

NOTS.

Mar. 16 Permission obtained for NOTS to use Haiwee Reservoir as a

range to study underwater trajectories of rockets.

Mar. 30 First rockets fired from G-2 ground range.

First air firing of Holy Moses successfully conducted at NOTS.

Apr. NOTS command moves to China Lake from the Inyokern

airfield.

Commander John O. Richmond reports for duty as Executive

Officer at NOTS, replacing Lieutenant Commander J. T. Acree.

"Tiny Tim" (11.75-inch aircraft rocket) successfully launched

from NOTS ground ranges.

May Construction of China Lake Pilot Plant begins.

Air facility at Harvey Field, Inyokern, designated U.S Navy Air

Facility, Inyokern, placed under NOTS Commanding Otticer.

June Decision is made to build large nev air facility (subsequently

named Armitage Field) on the Station proper for the testing of

experimental weapons.

AODU-1 officially transfers to NOTS Inyokern.

First air firing of Tiny Tim at NOTS. . The Inyokern airfield is officially dedicated as Harvey Field in

honor of lieutenant Commander Warren W. Harvey.

Holy Moses is ready for combat use; establishes new leadership

for the United States in aviation ordnance.

Holy Moses first used in battle (against targets in the Saint-Lo

area).

Commander John T. Hayward becomes first Experimental Officer

at NOTS.

Lieutenant John M. Armitage killed while test firing a Tiny Ti:

at NOTS.

367

June 5

June 22

June 28

July

July 15

Aug. 4

Aug 21
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Aug. 23 Seagoing tests of the 5-inch high velocity spinner rocket (HVSR)

are successful.

Oct. Twelve-inch propellant press line completed at China Lake Pilot

Plant.

Fall Foundations poured for NOTS research laboratory.

Oct. 7 First forward-firing aircraft spinner rockets ground-tested at

Inyokern.

Nov. Lieutenant Commander Curtis F. Vossler relieves Lieutenant

Commander Thomas F. Pollock as Officer in Charge of Harvey

Field and AODU-1.

Nov. 16 First grain of ballistite propellant extruded from 12-inch press at

China I.ake Pilot Plant.

Dec. Holy Moses introduced to the Fleet.

1945

Jan. 1 initial planning meuting (Major General Leslie R. Groves of Los

Alamos, Captain W. S. Parsons, Dr. Charles Lauritsen, and Dr.

Bruce Sage) for the building of a pilo' plant Hater named Salt

Wells Pilot Plant) for "nonnuclear explosive components of atom

bombs."

Jan. 22 Contract arrangements made for services of Dr. L. T. E.

Thompson in planning for the peacetime research and

dtt'tlopment organization of NOTS.

Mar. 7 Secretary of Navy approves NOTS acquisiiion of 241,000 acres

as an extension of its northern boundaries.

Mar. 24 Dr. L. T. E. Thompson proposal: for the new research and

development organization at NOTS are completed. He assumes

post of Acting Director of Research.

Spring Te-chnical work by CalTech for 'lie Manhattan Project begins;

known as Project CAMEL (nonnuclear explosive components of

atom bombs and including air drops of bomb shapes).

May 8 World War II ends in Europe; V-E Day.

Late May NOTS Naval Air Facility transfers its pilots, planes, and

equipment from Harvey Field to Armitage Field.

May 29 CalTech Type 2 rocket sights go into combat on aircraft aboard

the carrier U.S.S. Gilbert Islands.

May 31 Work halted on all construction at NOTS.

June 5 Meeting at CalTech on transfer of rocket program to Navy

control and termination of OSRD Contract OEMsr-418.

July Transfer of rocket production activities from CalTech to General

Tire and Rubber Company.

368
NOTS CHRONOLOGY

July 25 First high explosives for use in atomic bombs are cast at Salt

Wells Pilot Plant.

Aug. Test program for Bumblebee guided missile transferred to NOTS.

Guided missile testing begins at NOTS on G-Ranges.

Aug. 4 Research Board established at NOTS.

Aug. 6 Atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

Aug. 9 Atom bomb dropped on Nagasaki.

Aug. 14 World War II ends; V-J Day

Aug. 15 The transition of NOTS from wartime to peacetime operation

begi-.is.

Aug. 18 Captain Burroughs leaves NOTS; Captain James B. Sykes assumes

command.

Sept. 1 Transfer to NOTS of underwater ordnance test facilities at Morris

Darn.

Oct. 20 Guided Missile Task Group organized at NOTS by Dr.

Thompson.

Dec. Reorganization of NOTS is first to reflect NOTS peacetime

mission of research, development, and testing of weapons. Dr. L.

T. E. Thompson becomes permanent Director of Research.

Dec. 1 Target date for transfer to NOTS of ihe China Lake Pilot Plant

and associated activities.

Dec. 31 Target date for termination of all Office of Scientific Research

and Development experimental activities related to NOTS.

Target date for termination of CalTech's experimental work on

propellants and interior ballistics.

1946

Jan. $5,000,000 contract awarded for completion of the research

laboratory at NOTS (later named Michelson Laboratory).

Construction of Salt Wells Pilot Plant completed.

NOTS Administrative Board established.

Harvey Field closes.

Commander John O. Richmond retires from the Navy and

becomes the first Community Manager at NOTS. Commander

Alcorn G. Beckmann replaces him as Executive Officer.

Bureau of Ordnance requests NOTS to develop a 1,000-pound

high-speed, : traight-iunning torpedo.

Principles of Operation for NOTS approved by Vice Admiral G.

F. Hussey, Chiorof the Bureau of Ordnance,

369

Mar. 5

Apr.

June 30

July

Oct. 21
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

1947

Mar. Bureau of Ordnance requests development of a folding-fin version

of the 3.25-inch fm-stabilized aircraft rocket (FSAR); this led to

development of the 2.75-inch FFAR, the Mighty Mouse.

Mar. 28 Bureau of Ordnance approves first missile development program

for NOTS.

Apr. 28 Secretary of the Navy directive places the Naval Air Facility

under the military command and coordination control of the

NOTS Commanding Officer.

Nov. 5 Rear Admiral Wendell G. Switzer assumes command of NOTS.

Dec. NOTS reorganization for peacetime mission of research,

development, and testing of weapons is accomplished.

Dec. 19 Public Land Order 431 grants the Navy clear title to Station

lands formerly under public domain.

1948 (to June)

Jan. 26 China Lake post office established.

Mar. Two successful supersonic beam-riding flights conducted at NOTS

establish historic milestone in guided missile development.

Spring Active development of Mighty Mouse 2.75-inch aircraft rocket

begins.

May 7 Variable-angle launcher (VAL) 't Morris Pam formally dedicated.

May 8 Michelson Laboratory formally dedicated.

370
Appendix A

List of Planned Facilities

and Construction

for NOTS (January 1944)
APPENDIX A

AREA "A", TRAINING AIR CENTER

Estimated

ProjC! t

Cost

A- 1 Administration Building

A- 2 School

A- 3 Dispensaiy

A- 4 UOQ (200) Officers (5)

A- 5 Officers Mess and Rec.

A- 6 B-l-B Barracks (1000) (4)

A- 7 Men's Mess hall and galley

A- 8 Men's Recreation and Ship Service

A 9 Wave Officers Dormitory (20)

A-IÜ Wave Barracks (200)

\-\\ Wave Recreation and Sh.;'. Stores

u-\2 Wave Mess hMl and galley

A-13 Fire House

A-14 Brig

A-15 ijymiiasmni

A-16 F'ublit Works Shops

A-17 Trnnsmittei B.;:!Hing

A-18 Stcr;iiouse (with platform) |i'

)

A-I9 Stoiehouse (no platinrm) \4)

A-20 Paim and Oii St »raee

A-21 Gatehouse

A-22 Incinerator (5-ton trash)

A-23 Nose type hangars (2)

A-24 Hangar (Koc'iak type)

A-25 Shop unit

A-26 Heads in Hangar Area (2)

A-27 Ready Ammunition Lockers (3)

A-28 Wind fetrahedron

A-29 Course balls and lights

A-30 Ready storage shelter '2)

A-31 Motor assembly and ready motor storage

A-32 Moor insertion and final assembly

A-33 Fuie insertion

A-34 Gasoline storage (5)

A-35 Fuel Oil Storage

A-36 Lube oil storage and kerosene storage (2)

A-37 Water supply and distiibutjon

65,000

54,500

61,000

193,500

63,500

240,000

114,000

78,000

25,000

85,000

26,500

32,000

7,500

25,000

35,000

26,500

5,000

120,000

62,000

2,000

500

10,000

70,000

72,200

25,000

z,000

1,200

1,200

1,000

3,000

6,000

2,000

2,000

100,000

30,000

10,000

223,000

373
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

A-38 Sewer collection and disposal 72.000

A-39 Electrical distribution 90,250

\A0 Field lighting 75,000

A41 Telephone 14,250

A42 lire and crash alarm 6,000

A-4 3 Drainage 92,000

A-44 General Grading 30,000

A-45 R. R. Spur 112,000

A46 Roads and Walks 88,000

A^i1Adaition to runways and taxiways 325,0Üo

A48 Plane anchorage and warmup platform 385,000

TOTAL $3,169,600

AREA "B" PRIMARY TRAINING (AIR)

AREA "C" - LIVE AIR (EXPERIMENTAL)

AREA "D" - INERT AJR (EXPERIMENTAL)

B, C, D - 1 Targets $ 4,000

B, C, D - 2 Roads 4,000

I!, C, I) - .". Camera Tower and Bee. Control 131,000

TOTAL SI 39,000

AREA "E", EXPERIMENTAL AIR CENTER

Estimated

Project

Cost

E- 1 Hangar (Dahlgren) $ 300,000

E- 2 Shops 18,000

E- 3 Radio Shop 4,800

E- 4 Storehouse 16,500

E- 5 Photographic Equipment Building 3,500

E- 6 lir- truck and crash alarm building 5,000

E- 7 Control tower and aerolog equipment 25,000

E- 8 Armament assembly station 20,000

1- 9 Subassembly station 1.500

E-10 Ready room 4,000

E-ll 11. E. head storage 10,000

E-12 Fuse storage 7,500

E-n Motor storage 10,000

F.-H Ready storage I.14,500

E-15 Pore sight range 4,500

E-I6 Garage (4 truck storage) + gas pumps and equiDment 6,250

E-17 Imrt storage 1,000

E4 8 Gasdine storage (200,000 gals.) 100,000

E-19 Lut oil storage (20,000 gals.) 10,000

E-20 Water supply and distribution 117,000

F.-21 Sewage colleclion and disposal le^O

374
APPENDIX A

Estimated

Project

Cost

E-22 Electrical distribution 107,000

E-23 Meld lighting 75,000

E-24 Telephon" 8,250

E-25 Eire and crash alarm 3,500

E-26 Drainage 52,000

E-27 General Grading 32,000

E-28 Roads and parking areas 111,000

E-29 Runways and taxiways 1,775,000

E-30 Plane anchorage and warmup platform 552,000

E-31 Dust control (considered to be impracticable,

no estimate)

TOTAL $3,400,800

AREA "G", LIVE AND INERT GROUND FIRING

Estimated

Project

Cost

G- 1 Launcher platform (2) S 1,200

G- 2 Firing bay (2) 1,500

G- 3 Assembly and loading station (2) 5,000

G- 4 Office and computing building 5,000

G- 5 Shops 5,000

G- 6 Garage 9,000

G- 7 Standard Temperature Building (4) 8,400

G- 8 Refrigerator and oven building (2) 5,400

G- 9 Magazines (4) 12,000

G-U) Radio station 3,000

G-l 1 Water supply and distribution 93,000

G-12 Sewer collection and disp. 13,000

G-l 3 Electrical distribution 67,000

G-l 4 Telephone 6,000

G-l 5 Drainage 4,000

C.-16 General grading I8,00o

G-l 8 Roads and parking areas 1 6,300

G-19 Grading and dust control (considered to be impracticable,

no estimate)

TOTAL $372,800

AREA "K", GROUND PLATE

K-l Launcher platform $ 600

K-2 Roads 22,000

$22,000

375
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

AREA "F-H" - VILLAGE AND HEADQUARTERS AREA

Estimated

Project

Cost

1TIFHMIFHFHFHIT1-

FH1'HFH-10a

n i-i ob

FH-10c

ITl-lOd

IT1-11

Fri-12

I 11-13

i:i-)4

FH-15

1T1-I6a

FH-lfcb

l-H-17

FH-lfi

FH-19

FH-20

FH-21

FH-22

FH-23

l-H-24

FH-25

FH-26

FH-27a

FH-27b

Fll-27c

FH-28

FH-29

IT 1-30

FH-31

FH-32a

FH-32b

Adni'^istration Building

Aviation Ordnance School

Electrical and Electronics Lab.

Precision Instrument, Bombsiglit, Optical Repair, Plioio Lab.

Physical Test, Heat Treating (Future)

Ordnance Machine Shop

Chemical and Explosives Lab.

Controlled Temp, and Pressure Lab.

Operations Bldg. (Range OlTice)

Commanding OITiceis Quarters

Executive Officers Quarters

Senior Officers Quarters (10)

Jr. Officers Quarters (10 Duplexes) (101

BOQ (150-Off., 60-OSRD, IGO-Engr., 50 Trans.) (9)

Officers Messhall and Recreation

Waves Dormitory (Officers)

Waves Dormitory (Enlisted and CPO's)

Waves Mess hall (Olli ers and Enlisted)

B-l-B Barracks (175 Student Officers)

B-l-B Barracks (600 Enlisted and CPO's) (3)

Mess Hall

Recreation and Ship Service

Dispensary (Including Boiler Plant)

Public Works Shops

Motor Repair Building

Service Garage

Garage Storage (10 cars and trucks) (2)

Laundry Building

Dry Cleaning Building

Supply Office (Receiving and Shipping)

Storehouses (with platform) (3)

Storehouses (no platforms) (5)

Loading Dock

Cold Storage Building

Fire House

Brig

Incinerator

Gate House

Gate House

210,000

123,200

120,000

120,000

71,000

120,000

60,000

16,500

10,000

9,600

86,000

175,000

360,000

77,000

24,000

85,000

35,000

60,000

180,000

115,000

25,000

185,000

25,000

20,000

14,000

11,000

100,000

15,000

10,000

72,000

77,000

4,000

95,000

11,000

20,000

15,000

1,500

400

L. C. HOUSING

FH-33a No Bedrooms (40 Units) (5)

FH-33b One Bed Room (24 units) (6)

FH-33c Two Bed Room (24 units) (6)

FH-33d Three Bed Room (12 units) (6)

FH-J4 Dormitories (100 civilian men) (4)

72,000

70,000

80,000

57,000

70,000

376
AREA "M", MAGAZINES

GENERAL ITEMS - Ai.L AREAS

APPENDIX A

Estimated

Project

Cost

FH-35 Dormitories (100 civilian women) (4)

FH-36 Commercial Center and Post Office

FH-37 Community House and Theater

FH-38 Commissary and Ship Stores

FH-39 Swimming Pool

FH40 School Group (100 Grad and 75 High)

FH-4 I Dispensary Building (Er.is ed)

F1-M2 Fuel Oil Storage (2-50,000 j;rl. fuel storage)

FH43 Water Supply and Distribu 'jn

FH44 Sewage Collection and Distribution

FH-45 Electrical distribution

FH-46 Telephone

FH-47 Fire Alarm

FH-48 General Grading

FH49 Roaas and Parking Areas and Walks

FH-50 Misc. Recreational Facilities

FH-5 1 Spur Track

TOTAL

70,000

23,000

75,000

20,000

175,000

70,000

13,000

50,000

517,000

115,000

212,000

85,000

23,000

33,000

269,000

13,000

470,000

$5,346,200

M-l f-agazines (20)

M-2 Roads

M-3 Office and Guard House

M4 Water Supply

M-5 Sewage disposal

M-6 Electrical Distribution

M-7 Telephone

Estimated

Project

Cost

$470,000

139,000

4,600

12,000

1,J00

1,200

1,600

$629,400

Fences and Markers

Miscellaneous access roads

Miscellaneous targets, observing towers,

bench marks, camera piers, rake stauons,

revetments, dugouts, barricades.

TOTAL OF ABOVE ITEMS

Engineering and Administration, 6%

Contingent, 20%

GRAND TOTAL

$165,000

$13,245,400

780,000

2,600,000

$16,625,400

377
Appendix B

California Institute of Technology

Scientist and Supervisory

Personnel (Winter 1944-1945)
APPENDIX B

PERSONNEL CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE

OF TECHNOLOGY

C.

c.

c,

M.

M.

J.

G. G.

R. H.

P. H.

A.

H.

L

J.

R.

Section I-Design i 'd Development

W, A. Fowlet, Supervisor

Projectile Group

T. Lauritsen, Supervisor

W. Snyder, Ass't Group Supervisor

H. Weinland, Ass't Group Supervisor

S. Cox, Research Staff

B. Gcntrv, Research Staff

I. LeBow, Research Staff

W. McConnell, Resear.'li Staff

Mostelier, Research Staff

Neil, Research Staff

Taylor, Research Staff

Keast, Research Assistant

M. Greene, R.-search Assistant

, H. Mahony, Research Assistant

N. McClelland, Research Assistant

R. Hargrove, Research Assistant

Interdepartmental Order Group

M. L. Green, Supervisor

H. T. Walstaff, Research Staff

Fuze Group

R. B. King, Supervisor

D. E. Brink, Research Staff

H. 1:. Tracker, Research Staff

J. B. Hatcher, Research Staff

D. L. Kraus, Research Staff

R. E. Martin, Research Staff

J. W. Petty, Research Staff

V. K. Rasmussen, Research Staff

Land and Amphibious luuncfter Group

L. A. Richards, Supervisor

J. D. Bascom, Research Staff

P. E. Lloyd, Research Staff

H. Meneghelli, Research Staff

R. E. Sears, Research Staff

E. C. Walker, Research Staff

T. Lofgren, Technical Assistant

R. D. Ridgway, Technical Assistant

Special Launcher Group

A. S. Gould, Supervisor

Ballistics Research Grcup

F. E. Roi-.ch, Supervisor

C. T. Elvey, Associate Group Supervisor

B. N. Locanthi, Research Staff

D. D. Locanthi, Research Staff

N. U. Mayall, Research Staff

J. N. Schmidt, Research Staff

C. D. Swanson, Rcsearcn Staff

Theoretical Research Group

L, Davis, Jr., Supervisor

L. Blitzei, Assistant Group Supervisor

.'. W. Follin, Researcn Staff

''. H. Pi, Research Staff

P. W. Stoner, Research Staff

J. G. Waugh, Research Staff

L. 1. Epstein, Research Assistant

W. D. Hayes, Research Assistant

Hjue-Shen Tsien, Research Assistant

Drafting Staff

V. F. Ehrgott, Superintendent

Mechanical Staff

S. A. Macillister, Superintendent

Section 11-Aucraft and Ballistics

C. D. Anderson, Supervisor

A. L. Mclzian, Assistant Supervisor

C. H. Wilts, Assistant Supervisor

P. E. Edelman, Research Staff

J. L. Kavanau, Research Staff

F. W. Thiele, Research Staff

R. B. Leighton, Research Staff

381
THE GR''ND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

U. C, Briggs, Research Staff

G. .V4 Safonov, Rcsearci Staff

G. is-r-'all, Design Drai'tsr.jn

R. C. roolman, Technical Aide

i.. H. Gu.i. rson, Technical Aide

Fire Control ( 'Otip

H. \\'. Bab ock, Supervisor

J. I. Bujes, Researcli Staff

0. D. Frampeon, .'lesearcli Staff

J. L. Fuller, Reswch Staff

A. M. Shapiro, Restirch Staff

R. E. White, Research Staff

C. E. Weaver, Reocarch Staff

Section III -Photographic Measurements

and Exterior Ballistics

J. S. Bowcn, Supervisor

A. H. Andrew, Research Staff

D. P. Barrett, Research Staff

C. C. Baum, Research Staff

F, Crardell, Research Staff

E Floyd, Research Staff

J B. Irwin, Research Staff

J. J. Johnson, Research Staff

J. Titus, Research Staff

L. W. Reeder, Research Assistant

G. M. Reger, Research Assistant

L. Ware, Research Assistant

Section ll'~ Underwater Properties of

Projectiles

M. Mason, Section Supervisor

L. B. Slichter, Section Supervisor

B. Hill, Group Supervisor

B. H. Rule, Group Supervisor

N. Hasl.ell, Research Staff

W. P. Kuntley, Research Staff

P. M. Hurley, Research Staff

0. C. Johnson, Research Staff

H. G. Taylor, Research Staff

L. Abrams, Research Assistant

A. V. Bunker, Research Assistant

P. Y. Chow, Research Assislait

J. S. Fassero, Research Assistant

R. Fleisher, Research Assistant

B. Gale, Research Assistant

R. Harrington, Research Assistant

R. C. Jackson, R search Assistant

G. A. Spassky Research Assistant

J. G. Wendel, Research Assistant

M. Zimmernan, Research Assistant

F. Frederick, Mechanical Designer

J. H. Hutti, Mechanical Designer

C. A. Mattson, Mechanical Desioei

Section V-Propellants and Imerior

Ballistics

B. H. Sage, Section Supervisor

D. S. Clark, S

p

''tion Supervisor

W. N. Lacey, Section Supervisor

Research and Development

P. A. Longwell, Research i

;

' pervisor

J. H. Strrdivant, Research Supervisor

R. N. Wiinpress, Research Supervisor

C. Allen. Research Staff

R. Bersom, Research Staff

A. BiUmeyer, Research Staff

D. Botkin, Research Staff

T. Bright, Research Staff

W. Colburn. Research Staff

W. Corcora.i, Researcli Staff

W. Eisner, Research Staff

Q. Elliott, Research Staff

H. F'erris, Research Staff

H. Frantz, Research Staff

W. Hansen, Research Staff

A. Hopmans, Research Staff

D. Lcmair, Research Staff

R. Olds, Research Staff

II. Vinock, Research Staff

A. Williams, Research Staff

S. Altschuler, Research Assistant

M. Blatt, Research Assistant

J. Brown, Research Assistant

G. Gordon, Research Assistant

L. Green, Research Assistant

K. Korpi, Reicarch Assistant

B. Levedahl, Research Assistant

E. Mead, Research Assistant

E. Miller, Research Assistant

J. Miller, Research Assistant

Technical Control

J 1. Gates, Group Supervisor

Operations

C. L Horiije, Group Supervisor

Experimental Production and Shipping

E. T. Price, Jr., Group Supervisor

L. J. Pollard, Group Supervisor

Inspection

I. Beadle, Grou; Supervisor

Static Firing

J. H. Sturdivant, Group Supervisor

H. A. Baird, Group Supervisor

Magazine

J. Bancroft, Group Supervisor

Service Operations

Safety

A. D. Ayers, Group Supervisor

Engineering

382
APPENDIX B

P. Sabin, Group Supervisor

R. Alcock, Group Supervisor

F. Eaton, Group Supervisor

R. Gor^chalki, Group Supervisor

0. Graybeal, Group Supervisor

E. Olson, Group Sup«r-'läc>i

Installation and Maintenance

J. Meskell, Group Supervisor

Inventory Records

A L. Carleton, Group Supervisor

D. Taggart, Group Supervisor

Material Control and Stores

H. Bree, Group Supervisor

Payroll

H. Meredith, Group Supervisor

Timekeeping

J. N. Walker, Group Supervisor

Service Group

A. Ford, Group Supervisor

A ccoiinting

R. Bretzius, Group Supervisor

Accounts Payable

L. Ainsworth, Group Supervisor

Procuremenl

W. Grundy, Group Supervisor

Shop Procuremenl

K. Robinson, Group Supervisor

Personnel

A. D. Ayers, Group Supervisor

l'irsl Aid

F. M. Bogan, M.D., Group Supervisor

Reports and Editorial

S. Bradshaw, Group Supervisor

D. McAllister, Group Supervisor

Section W-fNOTS Inyokern)

Operations

R. C. Stone, Group Supervisor

Technical Control

L. S. Sinclair, Jr., Group Supervisor

Experimental Production and Control

E. T. Price, Group Supervisor

Inspection

1. Beadle, Group Supervisor

Safety

A. D. Ayers, Group Super/isor

D. L. Dewing, Group Supervisor

Personnel

A. D. Ayers, Group Supervisor

D. L. Dewing, Group Supervisor

Payroll and Accounting

H. T. Jones, Group Supervisor

Material Control and Stores

H. Bree, Group Supervisor

H. T. Jones, Group Supervisor

Engineering

E. P. Burke, Group Supervisor

J. W. Wähler, Group Supervisor

Maintenance

F. Wood, Group Supervisor

Section VII-Torpedo Launching

F. C. Lindvall, Section Supervisor

Research

R. W. Ager, Research

H. N. Bane, Research

J. E. Carr, Research

W. H. Christie, Research

E. D. Cornelison, Research

G. Downs, Research

D. E. Hudson, Research

A. S. King, Research

R. Skeeters, Research

R. B. Moran, Jr., Research

R. R. Stokes, Research

F. R. Watson, Research

J. H. Wayland, Research

0. C. Wilson, Research

U. E. Younger, Research

Engineering

S. Baker, Enuineer

J. Bowen, Engineer

T. Curtis, Engineer

A. Ekman, Engineer

1. French, Engineer

R. W. Haussler, Engineer

R. L. Jaiics, Engineer

J. H. Jcnnison, Engineer

D. A. Kunz, Engineer

W. Lcmin, Engineer

0. Terrell, Engineer

W. Saylor, Engineer

Section Vlll-Special Ballistis

W. R. Smythe, Supervisor

W. B. Dayton, Research Staff

C. F. Robinson, Research Staff

Section A Project Personnel

V. E. Wilson, Supervisor

Applicant Department

D. M. Slaybaugh, Group Supervisor

Employee Clearance and Records Dtpartmen:

1. J. Miller, Group Supervisor

Medical Department

F. M. Bogan, M.D., Group Supervisor

A. E. Martin, M.D., Group Supervisor

Selective Service Department

383
THE GRAWO EXPERIMEKf AT 1NYÜKERN

T. \V. Nobles, Group Supervisor

Inyok'-i.t Department

R. VV. Seibert, Group Supervisor

Section B-Developmental

Engineering Department

T. Gardner, Supervisor

li. P. Hollywood-Assistant to Sectio i Supv.

L. M. Kiplitiger, Assistant to Section Supv.

Produc'ion Services Division

Purchasing, i riorities. Material ControlA. E. Acker, Group Supervisor

D, S. Hammacl., Priorities Officer

Contract Service and Transportation

E. P. Tuttle, Group Supervisor

W K. Tullcr, Jr., Asst. to Group Supv.

Contract Service

J. T. Hoffman, Contract Co-ordinator

Transportation, Shipping and Receiving

V. C. Jones, Manager

Production Division

Stanley Guclson, Production Manager

R. T. Stevens, Chief Engineer

J. Trigg, Plant Superinlcndent

i'jduction Control

P. Clark, Group Supervisor

Salvage and Machine Shop

VV. J. McNally, Group Supervisor

Pilot Production

B. Johnson, Group Supervisor

Stenographic

D. E. Harris, G'.iup Supervisor

Section D-Project

Comptroller

H. Ewart, Supervisor

R. J. Abshire, Assistant Supervisor

Accounts Payable Department

J. D. Pirie, Group Supervisor

Auditing and Accountability Dept.

G. C. Kelsch, Group Supervisor

Cashier and Government Accounting Dept.

C. K. Parks, Group Supervisor

Cost Department

P. Green, Group Superviscr

Payroll Department

R. A. Felnaglo, Group Supervisor

Section E-lnyokern Range

Operations

E. L. Ellis, Supervisor

G. E. Kron, Assistant Supervisor

P. A. Agnew, Assistant Supervisor

Research Group

G. E. Kron, Group Supervisor

ii. U. Davis, Test Co-ordinator

A. H. Ramsay, Staff

L. Stellman, Staff

A. L. Sorem, Safety Co-ordinator

C. A. Wirtancn, Group Supervisor,

External Ballistics

J. E. Thomas, Group Supervisor,

Terminal Ballistics

R. V. Adams, Group Supervisor,

Aircraft Ballistics

Section C-Field and Research

Operations

W. N. Arnquist, Supervisor

I-'. W. Pierce, Assistant Supervisor

Range Supervisors

R. H. Cox, Goldstone

D. R. Procter, Muroc

H. L. Prindiville, Camp Pe.idlcton

R. Bogart, \V:'verly D-jve (Pasadena

depot for ranges)

Section F- Construction and

Maintenance

W. Hertenstein, Supervisor

Section R Editorial Staff

J. loladare, Supervisor

R. L. Eby, Research Staff

E. L, Wheatfill, Research Staff

R. Winger, Research Stall

384
Appendix C

Organization of NOTS

Experimental Department

(September 1944)
THE GRAND l-XPERIMENT AT INYOKF.RN

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387
Appendix D

Summary of NOTS

Construction Progress

(May 31, 1945)
APPENDIX D

TABLE OF WORK PERFORMED UNDER CONTRACT NOy-9088

Project

No. Description ',sable*

Completion

Physical*

Completion

A-20 Paint and Oil Storage 6-20-44 6-2044

A-24 Kodiak Type Hangar 10-144 10-144

A-34 Gasoline Storage (5 tanks) 1-1045 3-1545

A-37 Water Supply and Distribution 6-145 99%

A-38 Sewage Disposal 2-145 99%

A-39 Hlectrical Distribution 2-1545 3-15-45

A42 Telephone 2-1545 3-15-45

A43 Drainage 2-1545 3-1545

AA4 Grading 2-145 5-1545

A-46 Roads and Walks 11-144 3-15-45

A47 Addition to Runways and Taxiways 9-3044 2-2045

A48 Plane Anchorage and Warmup Platform 7-144 7-144

A48A Magazines for Air Field (2) 12-2044 3-1545

Area B Primary Training (Air) 5-3144 5-31-44

Area C Live Air (Experimental) 0%

Targets 0%

Roads 9-144 9-144

Camera Tower and lilectrical Control 12-3044 99%

I--1 Hangar (Dahlgren Type) 4-2545 99%

E-2 Shops 4-2545 99%

E-3 Radio Shop 4-2545 99%

l>4 Storehouse 1-2645 99%

E-5 Photographic Equipment Building 4-2545 99%

E-6 Eire Truck and Crash Alarr, 4-2545 99%

E-7 Control Tower & Aerolog, Equipment 4-2545 99%

E-8 Armament Assembly Station 4-1C45 99%

E-9 Sub-Assembly Station 3-2045 4-1045

E-10 Ready Room 1.-1545 4-1045

E-U H.E Head Stoi .ge 2-1545 5-2545

E-I2 Fuse Storage 2-1545 3-2045

E-13 Motor Storage 4-1545 99%

E-14 Re.dy Storage (2) 3-1545 3-2045

E-15 Bcrc-dte Range 0%

391 4
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Project

No. Description

Usable*

Completion

"hysical*

Completion

E-16 Garage, Gas Pumps & Equipment

E-17 Inert Storage

E-18 Gasoline Storage (200,000 Gals.)

E-19 Lub OU Storage (20,000 Gals.)

E-20 Water Supply and Distribution

E-21 Sewage Collection and Disposal

E-22 Electrical Distribution

E-23 Field Lighting

E-23A Tetrahedron

E-24 Telephone

E-25 Fire and Crash Alarm

E-26 Drainage

E-27 General Grading

E-28 Roads and Parking Areas

E-29 Runways and Taxiways (1 Runway and Parking)

E-30A Plane Anchorage & Warrcup Platform

F-32 Add. Services for heating plant

G-l Launcher Platform (2)

G-2 Firing Bay (2)

G-3 Assembly and Loading Station (2)

G4 Office and Computing Building

G-5 Shop

G-6 Garage

G-7 Standard Temperature Building (4)

G-8 Refrigerator and Oven Building (2)

G-9 Magazines (4)

G-IC Radio Station

Gil Water Supply and Distri'-ution

G-l2 Sewage Collection and Disposal

G-I3 Electrical Distribution

G-l 4 Telephone

G-l 5 Drainage

G-16 General Grading

G-18 Roads and Parking Areas

K-l Launcher Platform

K-2 Roads

4-145

3-745

4-145

3-1045

4-1-45

3-1545

4-145

3-545

4-25-45

2-1-45

3-545

3-545

3-545

3-545

5-1545

10%

3-I4S

4-145

3-2045

4-145

3-2045

99%

4-1045

90%

4-1045

0%

35%

99%

3-545

5-145

4-1045

4-1045

4-1045

95%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

25%

70%

0%

0%

50%

95%

2%

FH-1 Administration Building

FH-2 Aviation Ordnance School

FH4 Precision Imi., Bombsight, Optical Rep. & Pho'.o.

Lab.

FH-9 Operations Building (Range Office)

FH-10A CO. Quarters

FH-10B Executive's Quarters

FH-10C Senior Officers & Scientists Quarters (18)

FH-10D Jr. Officers & Eng. Quarters (18)

FH-10E Guest and Transient Accommodations for Scientists,

Engineers & Officers

90%

5445 98%

8%

90%

11-1744 5-1545

12-944 5-1545

5-145 98%

4-2545 98%

12-944 5-1545

39^
APPENDIX D

Project

No. Description Usable*

C'omp'ction

PhysicU*

Completion

FH-11 Bachelor Officers Quarters (150 Officers, 60 SRD -

100 Engs. - 50 Trans.) (3)

FH-11A Bachelor Officers Quarters (1)

FH-12 Officers Mess and Recreation

FH-14 Waves D' -mitory (EnUsted and CPO-220) (2)

FH-16A BIB Barracks (175 Student Offs.)

FH-I61: BIB Barracks (906 Enlisted) (4)

FH-16C Marine Barracks

FH-n Mess Hall

FH-I8 Rec. and Ships Services

FH-19 Dispensary 5-145

FH-20 Public Works Shops

FH-21 Motor Repair Building

FH-22 Service Garage

FH-23 Garage Storage

FH-24 Laundr" Building

FH-25 Dry Cleaning

FH-26 Supply Office

FH-27A Storehouses (with Platforms) (3)

FH-27B Storehouses (w) Platforms) (5)

FH-27D Storehouses - 2 for reclamation

FH-28-Cn Loading Docks

FH-28 Cold Storage Build) ig & Ice Plant

l'H-29 Firehouse

FH-30 Brig

FH-31 Incinerator

FH-32A Gate House

FH-32B Gate House

FH-33B One Bedroom Units 48 (12)

FH-33C Two Bedroom Units 48 (12)

FH-33D Three Bedroom Units 24 (12)

FH-53 Two Bedroom Units 200 (100)

FH-54 LCH from Bishop, California (UNA)

FH-34 Dormitories (100 civilian men) (4)

r'H-35 Dormitories (100 civilian women) (4;

FH-36 Commercial Center and Post Office

FH-37 Community H.use and Theatre

FH-38 Commissary and Ships Store

FH-39 Swimming Pool and Recreation (village area)

FH-39A Swimming Pool and Recreation (Bachelor Officers

Quarters Area)

FH40 School Group (100 grade - 75 high)

FH-42 Fuel Oil Storage (2/50,000 gal.)

FH43 Water Supply and Distribution

FH44 Sewage Collection and Disposal

FH45 Electrical

FH46 Telephone

FH47 Fiie Alarm

FH48 General Grading

FH49 Roads, Parking Areas and Walks

1-2045 5-1545

1-20-45 5-1545

10-1644 3-1545

2-1545 3-1545

0%

2-2645 99%

4-15-45 99%

11-1544 5-1544

4-145 99%

5-145 99%

5-1545 95%

5-1545 98%

5-1545 90%

5-1-45 98%

10-1644 3-2745

11-1544 12-1144

10-2044 5-1545

10-2044 5-1545

10-2044 5-15-45

10-2044 5-1545

10-2044 5-1545

10-2044 4-24-45

11-544 4-2445

5-1445 99%

2-145 2-2745

2-2445 3-2045

0%

1-1545 4-1545

1-1545 4-15-45

1-1545 4-15-45

5-145 98%

11-1544 12-1144

8-2844 11-2144

8-1644 11-2144

P.-20 44 4-2445

5-1545 99%

12-2544 4-1745

85%

0%

0%

3-1545 95%

2-1545 95%

2-1545 98%

3-1545 90%

40%

35%

75%

5-1545 88%

393
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Project

No.

Description

Usable*

Completion

Physical*

Completion

FH-SO Miscellaneous Recreation Facilities 0%

FH-5 1 Spur Track 9-1545 98%

FH-S2 Heating Plant No. 1

3-1545 95%

M-l Magazines (20-10 in Inc. No. 1 and 10 in Inc. No.

01

10-1544 12-2644

M-2

2)

Roads 9-1-44 2-2045

M-3 Office and Guard House 3-545 3-13-45

M-4 Water Supply 3-545 3-1345

M-5 Sewage 1-1-45 2-1845

U-6 Electrical Distribution 3-145 3-1345

M-7 Telephone 3-545 3-2045

GENERAL FACILITIES

Steam Distribution all Area 1

Hi-tens Distribution & Substation

Fencing (A, E, FH, G and M)

Railroad Main Line

Connecting Roads

Miscällaneot'.s Items

Exterior Water Distribution

Misccllaneou:. Targets, Obs.,

Piers, Rake Stations,

Barricades

75%

Towers, BMS, Camera

Revetments, Dugouts,

10-144 99%

5-2044 5-2645

2-1545 5-1545

5-2645 5-2645

3-145 99%

5-3145 99%

CHINA LAKE PILOT PLANT

101 Office Building

102 Gate House and Garage

103 Change House

104 Auto Repair and Grease Rack

105 Machine Shop

106 Shops Lavatory

107 Maintenance Shop

108 Carpenter Shop

109 Warehouse

110 Warehouse with Office

111 Firestation and Marine Barracks

112 Solvent Shed Group

113 Lunch Room

114 Laundry

115 Battery

116 Automatic Telephone Exchange

1 Press Banicade

3 Flaking

4 Annealing

5 Processing

6 Processing

7 Inspection •

8 Lunch Room and Toilet

2-145 5-1545

1-1045 5-1545

2-1045 5-1545

2-1545 5-1545

2-145 5-1545

2-1545 5-1545

2-145 1-1545

2-145 5-1545

2-145 4-1545

2-1-45 5-1545

2,-145 5-1545

2-145 5-1545

99%

0%

0%

2-145 5-1545

11-1044 5-1545

11-1044 5-1545

1-1045 5-1545

1-1045 5-1545

1-1045 5-1545

1-1045 5-1545

394

..
APPENDIX U

Project

No. Description

9 Inhibiting

10 Curing

11 Lunch and Toilet

17 Grain Boxing

4144 Rest Houses

12 Grain Grinding

14 Motoi Loading

15 Paint & Inspection

16 Motor Parts

18 Motor Boxing

19 Igniter Magazine

51 Press Barricade

52 Sorting and Blending

5 3 Control House

54 Flaking

55 Annealing

56 Processing (Small)

57 Processing (Large)

58 Lunch Room and Toilet

59 Inspection

60 Inhibiting

61 Curing

62 Lunch Room and Toilet

63 Grain Boxing

64 Inhibiting (Small)

69 Combined Motor Loading

81-84 Re0. Houses

70 Magazette

201 Grain Ret

202 Motor Rest

203 Igniter Magazine

204 Rest Room and Boiler House

205 Warehouse

206 Experimental Loading

210 Vertical Oven

213 Horizontal Oven

214 Static Firing

214A Control House

301 3" Press Barricade

302 Grain Storage

303 Future Grain Storage

304 Physical Properties

305 Grain Storage

306 Radio graphic

307 Future Storage

308 Experimental Igniter Production

309 Black Powder Storage

310 Igniter Production

311 Finished Igniter Storage

346 Experimental Processing

347 Experimental Processing

Usable* Physical*

Completion Completion

4-145 5-1545

4-145 5-15-45

0%

4-145 5-15-45

1-1045 99%

4-1545 5-1545

4-1545 5-1545

4-1545 5-1545

4-1545 5-1545

4-1545 5-1545

4-1545 5-15-45

95%

90%

97%

93%

97%

90%

85%

0%

0%

85%

97%

0%

90%

80%

85%

5-26-45 5-26-45

99%

3-15-45 4-15-45

3-1545 5-15-45

3-1545 5-15-45

4-1545 99%

3-1545 5-15-45

0%

3-1545 4-15-45

3-1545 4-1545

3-15-45 5-1545

3-15-45 99%

0% 0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

4-1545 5-2645

4-1545 5-2645

395
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Project

No. Description Usable*Completion

Physical*

Completion

ROADS AND UTILITIES

1 Sewers

2 Electrical Distribution

3 Water

4 Roads and Drainage

5 Fence

6 Telephone

7 Fire Alarm

8 Loud Speaker-Public Address

IX Labor Recruiting

3X 200 LCH Bldgs., two bedroom duplex type

4X Electrical Distribution and Service

5X Water, Sewer and Heating Distribution

6X Roads, Sidewalks and Paving

7X Transfer 5 Buildings LCDF houses from Bishop and

reconstruct at Inyckern

8X High School

9X Elementary School

10X Aaministration Building

ilX Cafeteria for School

12X Industrial Arts Building

I3X Connecting arcades and walks

14X Collateral for High School, Elementary Schools,

Administration Building, Cafeteria and Industrial

Arts Building

15X Irrigation, grading and 'andscaping

2X Installation of extrusion ^.nd experimental

production equipment in the China Lake Pilot

Plant

P-8 Repairs

P-12 40 MM Mounts and other work

P4-A54 Additions to Galley and scullery

P-7-4 Heavy Concrete Wall Targets

P-9)7C Inert Storehouse

P9-18C Inert Storehouse

P9-63C Inert Storehouse

P9-69C Inirt Storehouse

16X Area "CT"

17X Area "ER"

18X Temporary Housing Units for 200 Families

3-1-45 5-15-45

11-5-45 5-26-45

11-5-44 5-15-45

1-1-45 5-15-45

1-1-45 5-15-45

5-1-45 5-26-45

5-1-45 5-26-45

5-1-45 5-26-45

100%

80%

80%

80%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

22%

100%

5-15-45 5-15-45

9-1-44 9-1-44

8-21-44 9-: 44

4-1-45 5-1-45

4-15-45 5-1-45

5-31-45 5-31-45

95%

4-15-45 5-15-45

3-3-45 4-1545

90%

* Where any project was not completed under this contract the percentage completed as

of the termination date of 31 May 1945 is given.

396
Appendix E

First Postwar Organization for

Research, Development, and Test

(December 1945)
APPENDIX E

s

a

x

a:

<

399
Appendix F

NOTS Principles of Operation

as Approved by the

Bureau of Ordnance

(October 21, 1946)
APPENDIX T

PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION

PREAMBLE

The mission of the Naval Ordnance Test Station was defined in a letter by the

Secretary of the Navy, Opl3C-je, Serial 232213, dated 8 November 1943, as that

of "a station having for its primary function the research, development and

testing of weapons, and having additional function of furnishing primary training

in the use of such weapons." The Bureau of Ordnance in a letter to the

Commanding Officer, NOTS (A) NP36 dated 30 March 1944, placed speci; I

emphasis on the development of rocket weapons, guided missiles, and aviation

ordnance, as well as the training operations necessary lor proper use of new

weapons.

It is the intention of this station that its facilities will be so organized and

operated as to insure the successful conduct of its research, development, and test

program with effectiveness fully equivalent to that attained during the war by the

OSRD groups working in the corresponding fields..

In order to accomplish the stated mission, it is necessary to attract and hold a

technical staff of the highest caliber. To attract and hold such individuals, it is

necessary to provide a working environment and encouragement of outside

contacts comparable to those found in major academic and industrial research and

development centers.

CONSTITUTION OF AUTHORITIES

1. COMMANDING OFFICER

The Commanding Officer is the head of the Naval Ordnance Test Station, subject

in the performance of his duties to the Navy Regulations and existing competent

directives. In view of (I) the primary function of this station as a research and

development establishment, (2) the high percentage of civilian population, and (3)

the isolated location requiring residence on the station of practically all

403

■■
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

employees, the administrative problems are complex and unusual, in order to

assist the C 'nding Officer, the following boards and positions are established

to which the Commanding Officer will delegate the requisite responsibility and

commer 'irate iuthority. Action under such authority is subject to review by the

Commam' i^ Officer.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD

The Administrative Board shall consist of the Commanding Officer as chairman,

the Technical Director as Vice-Chairman, the Research Board, and such other

persons as may be designated by the Commanding Officer or by the

Administrative Board with the approval of the Commanding Officer and the

Technical Director. The Administrative Board shall propose administrative policy

and procedures for the operation of the station.

3. TECHNICAL DIRECTOR

The Technical Director of the Research and Development Organization shall be

delegated control of the research, development, and training activities, including

methods of conducting research. The Technical Director will propose distribution

of personnel an^ facilities assigned to the station and conduct projects in

accordance with the priority set up by directives from the Bureau of Ordnance.

4. RESEARCH BOARD

The Research Board shall consist of the Technical Director as chairman, the

Experimental Officer, and the department heads of the research and development

departments or such other members as the Technical Director may designate. The

Research Board reviews technical programs and advises the Technical Director

with regard to their establishment and conduct.

Is! JAMES B. SYKES

Captain, U S.N., Commanding

Approved:

Isl G. F. HUSSEY, JR.

Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance

Date 21 October 1946

SN/231

404

r
Sources

A GENERAL NOTE ON METHODS AND SOURCES

The research for Volume I of this seiies provided a sound

bedrock for this follow-on work, which covers a significant five-year

segment of the history of the Naval Weapons Center.

But beyond the hard currency of documented information, the

value of the Volume I legacy was remarkable in other ways: for

example, in the establishment of research trails and in the personal

contacts with individuals and organizations whose interest in our

second volume continued undiminished, as did their unstinting support

of our endeavors. Most notable among these is the Naval History

Division and its Operational Archives Branch. Their extensive

collections of documents and unpublished narrative histories enabled

us to reconcile our Center's local history with the larger ones of the

U.S. Navy and the Bureau of Ordnance, and thus enlarge its

dimensions.

From the Federal Records Center, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania,

we obtained the long-term loan of early log books of the Naval

Ordnance Test Station. These were most helpful in verifying events

and their dates and times with great precision, as well as stimulating a

special awareness of the routine day-to-day life at the young desert

Station.

From the Federal Records Center, Bell, California, we recovered

the entire set of Commander, NOTS (ComNOTS) records of the Naval

Weapons Center (circa 1943-47).

As our history developed from World War II into the postwar

period, we found that ehe informational resources at NWC weie

adequate to meet our needs for historical research. The Center's early

405
rilli GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

correspondence folders are extensive, and a primary source for much

'hat appears in this volume. In particular, we were aided by the ready

availability of key documents on file in the Records Management

Group of the Center's Office of Finance and Management.

In the preparation of this second volume of NWC's history,

people iiave continued tu represent a most prized informational

icsource. Because of this recognition, we have continued our

comprehensive oral history program. Most of the principals had

already been interviewed during the preparation of Volume 1, and the

scope of the follow-on interviews was largely designed to include their

role in the postwar period. Sometimes interviewees were selected as

part of the overall historical research thrust in a particular area:

certain interviews with former NOTS Pasadena employees and early

Research Department scientists fall into this category.

Many of the published works that subscribed to Volume 1

continued to serve us for this successor volume; notably. Rockets,

Guns and Targets, by John E. Burchard. However, the list of

published works was considerably enlarged to include such reference

works as Organizing Scientific Research for War, by Irvin Stewart, and

U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II, by Buford Rowland

and William B. Boyd. In addition, much valuable information on naval

aviation was derived from NAVA1R Report 00-80P-1, United States

Naval Aviation, 1910-1970.

The unpublished manuscript has played a vital part in the

compilation of this history. Usually written close to or at the time of

the events covered, the unuublished narrative is generally a factual

treasure house. This was found to be true regarding mo:t such works

used in Volume 2. Of special significance have been the vastly

comprehensive Narrative of the Bureau of Ordnance, and D. S.

Fahmey's History of Pilotless Aircraft and Guided Missiles; both of

these useful documents are held by Operational Archres, Naval

History Division.

Sources are given in this section under the headings Interviews

and Bibliography.

INTERVIEWS

An extensive series of interviews was held by the authors to

provide information for both the published history of the Naval

406
SOURCES

Weapons Center and for a planned biography of Rear Admiral W. S.

Farsons. The dual purpose of the interview program accounts for both

subjects frequently being treated in the sam? interview.

In most cases the interviews were tape-recorded anrJ copies of

the transcript were sent ^o the interviewee for corrections and

additions. Transcripts of most of the interviews are available for

scholarly research in the Technical Information Department, Naval

Weapons Center, China Lake, California, and in the Operational

Archives, Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.

Those interviews that had a direct bearing on this volume of the

NWC history are listed below.

Anderson, Carl D. "Aircraft Rocket Program of CalTach in World War II."

October 5, 1970. NWC 2313, S-73. Tape transcription, 14 pp.

Appleton, Robert A., and James D. DeSanto. 'Early Rocket Work of World War

II and of the Wartime Naval Ordnance Test Station." April 15, 1969. NWC

2313, S-63. Tape transcription, 33 pp.

Ashworth, Frederick L, VAdm., USN (Ret.). "Admiral Parsons and General

Reflections re Navy R&D." April 9-10, 196". NWC 2313, S-61. Tape

transcription, 98 pp.

Beckmann, Alcorn G., Capt., USN (Ret.). "Exec- live Officer, NOTS, June

1946-June 1947." May 1968. NWC 2313. S-53. Tape trar scription, 38 pp.

Bowen, Ira S. "Early Rocket Program of CalTech ami Rra^ instrumentation."

October 5, 1970. NWC 2313, S-72. Tape transcriphon, 33 pp.

Breslow, Arthur. "Ecrly A-Bomb Work." October 19(6. MWC 2313, S-17. Tape

transcription, 68 pp.

Brode, Wallace R. "Early NOTS." May 1969. NWC 2313. S-66. Tape

transcription, 35 pp.

Burroughs, Mrs. Sherman E. "Personal Packground and Farly Recollections."

November 1972. NWC 2313, S-83. Tape transcription, 18 pp.

Burroughs, Sherman E., RAdm., USN (Ret.). "Early Hiflory of NOTS and

Comments on Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons." April 1966. NWC 2313, S-2.

Tape transcriptio:i, 22 pp407

.
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Burroughs, Sherman E., RAdm., USN (Ret.). "Early D::ys at NOTS and Otter

Subjects, Such as Military-Civilian Relationships." November 4, 1966. NWC

-M3, S-20. Tape transcription, 51 pp.

Bush, Vannevar. "Notes on Science and Naval Weapon Research." January 26.

1971. NWC 2313, S-74. Interview notes, 8 pp.

Byrnes, Ja:nei> C, Capi., USN (Ret.). "Early Bureau oT Ordnance Support of the

Work at the Naval Ordnance Test Station." May 1967. NWC 2313, S 43.

Tape transcription, 31 pp.

Ellis, Emory L "CalTech Rocket Program and Early NOfS." May 1968. NWC

2313, S-5:I. Tape transcription, 43 pp.

Ejlis. Emorv L., and Marion E.'lis. "CalTech Rocket Progiam and Early NOTS."

February 23, 1971. NWC 2313, S-77. Tape transcription, 74 pp.

Ellis, Emory L, and Marion Ellis. 'Early NOTS." November 1972. NWC 2313,

S-84. Tape transcription, 31 pp.

Entwistle, F. !., RAdm., USN (Ret.). "Admiral W. S, Parsons and the Early

Period oi' NOTS History." March 1967. NWC 2313, S-39. Tape

transcription, 48 pp.

Foladare, Toseph A. "Wartime Rocket Program of thp California Institute of

Techni/logy." February 20 1970. NWC 2313, S VU. Tape transcription, 2z

pp.

Fowler, William A. "Ca'""ech Rocket Program of World War II and the Naval

Ordnance Test Station.'' Januaiy 1969. NWC 2313, S-39. Tape Jianscription,

45 pp.

Groves, Leslie R., LGen., USA (Ret.). "RAdm. W. S. Parsons' Role in the

Manhattan Project." May 1967. NWC 2313, S-42. Tape transcription, 54 pp.

Habicht, Frank H. "First Tactical Use of Forward-Fireu Aircraft Rockets by the

United States and the Early Operations of the Naval Ordnance Test

Station." May 1967. NWC 2313, S-44. Tape transcription, 54 pp.

Hafstad, Lawrence R. "Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons and Navy Research and

Development." February 1, 197). NWC 23i3, S-76. Tape transcription, 25

pp.

408
SOURCES

Hayward, John T., VAdm., USN. "Early History of NOTJ and Impact of Rear

Admiral W. S. Parsons on Navy Research and De'dopment." May 1966.

NWC 2313, S-6. Tape transcription, 38 pp.

Hayward, John T., VAdm., USN (Ret.). "Volume 11 Review Comments." July 26,

1973. NWC 2313, S-86. Tape transcription, 59 pp.

Hooper, Edwin B., VAdm., USN (Ret.). "RAdm. W. S. Parsons and Naval

Ordnance Research and Development." February 1971. NWC 2313, S-78.

Tape transcription, 18 pp.

Hussey, George F., VAdm., USN (Ret.), and L. T. E. Thompson. "Early NOTS

History and Navy Research and Development." July 1966. NWC 2313, S-5.

Tape transcription, 112 pp.

Lauritsen, Charles C. "Early History of NOTS and Impact of Rear Admiral W. S.

Parsons on Navy Research and Development." April 1966. NWC 2313, S-4.

Tape transciiption, 22 pp.

Lauritsen, Thomas. "Wartime Rocket Work of the California Institute of

Technology." June 26, 1969. NWC 2313, S-68. Tape transcription 20 pp.

Loeb, Leonard B. "Background on Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons and Also

Background on Early Period of U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station." March

1967. NWC 2313, S-38. Tape transcription, 70 pp.

Mack, Duane W. "Early History of the Naval Ordnance Test Station.' January

1969. NWC 2313, S-60. Tape transcription, 58 pp.

Pollock, Thomas F., Capt., USN. "Early Rocket Test Work at Goldstone Lake

and at NOTS, Inyokern." May 1967. NWC 2313, S-45. Tape transcription,

41 pp.

Renard, Jack C, RAdm., USN (Ret.). "The Early Military Rocket Program in the

United States." May 21, 1969. NWC 2313, S-64. Tape transcription, 52 pp.

Richmond, John 0., Cdr., USN (Ret.). "Early NOTS History." January 1967.

NWC 2313, S-33. Tape transcription, 125 pp.

Sage, Bruce H. "Early NOTS-Particularly in Regard to China Lake Pilot Plant

and Salt Wells Pilot Plant." December 1966. NWC 2313, S-22. Tape

transcription, 30 pp.

409
THE GRANJ EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Sandquist, Oscar A., Capt., USN (Ret.). "Early Construction oi NOTS." July 6,

1966. NWC 2313, S-13. Tape transcription, 26 pp.

Schoeffel, Malcolm F., RAdm., USN (Ret.). "Early NOTS History ard Impact of

Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons on Navy Research and Development." April 21,

1966. NWC 2313, S-8. Interview notes, 11 pp.

Sykes, James B., RAdm., USN (Ret.). "Early NOTS." April 27, 1967. NWC

2313, S-41. Interview notes, 28 pp.

Thompson, L. T. E. "NOTS, Navy R&D, and Rear Admiral W. S. Parsons."

November 6 and 7, 1965. NWC 2313, S-l. Tape transcription, 54 pp.

Thompson, L. T. E. "Early Military Rocket Programs and NOTS History."

November 1967. NWC 2313, S-52. Tape transcription, 100 pp.

Thompson, L. T. E, "Informal CoMments on NOTS History." November 10,

1968. NWC 2313, S-55. Tape transcription, 40 pp.

Vossler, Curtis F., RAdm., USN (Ret.). "Early Days at NOTS." April 1973. NWC

2313, S-85. Tape transcription, 45 pp.

Watson, Earnest C. "World War II Rocket Program of the California institute of

Technology." February 19 and 20, 1970. NWC 2313, S-69. Tape

transcription, 68 pp.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

American Men of Science. 9th ed. New York, R. R. Bowker Co. 1955.

Baxter, James Phinney, Srd. Scientists Against Time. Boston, Little, Brown and

Company, 1948.

Bowen, Harold G., VAdm., USN (Ret.), Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks.

Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1954.

Burchard, John E., ed. Rockets, Guns and Targets. Boston, Little, Brown and

Company, 1948.

410
SOURCES

Bush, Vannevar. Pieces of the Action. New York, William Morrow and Company,

inc., 1970.

Cliristman, Albert B. History of the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake,

California. Vol. 1, Sailors, Scientists, and Rockets. Washington, D.C., Naval

History Division, Government Printing Office, 1971.

Davis, Kenneth S. Experience of War. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and

Company, Inc., 1965,

Department of the Navy. United States Naval Aviation, 1910-1970, 2nd ed., by

Adrian 0. Van Wyen, Lee M. Pearson, and Clarke Van Vleet Prepared at

the direction of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) and the

Commander, Naval Air Systems Command; Washington, D.C, Government

Printing Office, 1970. (NAVA1R-00-80P-1.)

Emme, Eugene M., ed. The History of Rocket Technology. Detroit, Wayne State

University Press, 1964.

Purer, Julius Augustus, RAdm., USN. Administration of the Navy Department in

World War 11. Washington, D.C, Government Printing Office, 1959.

Groves, Leslie R., LGen., USA (Ret.). Now It Can Be Told. The S'ory of the

Manhattan Project. New York, Harper and Row, 1962.

Gudde, Erwin G. California Place Names, 3rc. ed. Berkeley, Calif., University of

California Press, 1969.

Hewlett, Richard G., and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr. The New World, 19.19/1946.

University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962.

Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1945/6. New York, Arco Publishing Company,

Inc., 1970.

Lamont, Lansing. Day of Trinity. New York, Atheneum, 1965.

McCollum, Kenneth G., ed. Dahlgren. Dahlgren, Va., Naval Surface Weapons

Center, June 1977.

Merrill, Grayson, Capt., USN (Ret.), ed. Principles uf Guided Missile Design:

Dictionary of Guided Missiles and Space Flight. Princeton, N.J., D. Van

Nostrand Company, Inc., 1959.

411
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Millikan, Robert A. The Autobiography of Robert A. MilHkan, Second Printing.

New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., May 1950.

Noel, John V., Jr., Oapt., USN (Ret.), and Edward L. Beach, Capt., 'JSN (Ret.).

Naval Terms Dictionary, 3rd ed. Annapolis, Md., United States Naval

Institute, 1971.

Peck, Taylor. Round-Shot to Rockets, A History of the Washington Navy Yard

and U.S. Naval Gun Factory. Annapolis, United States Naval Institute,

1949.

Register of Alumni, 1845-1969, 84th ed. Annapolis, U.S. Naval Academy Alumni

Association, Inc., 1969.

Rowland, Buford, LCdr., USNR, and William B. Boyd, Lt., USNR. U.S. Navy

Bureau of Ordnance in World War II. Washington, D.C., Buieau of

Ordnance, Department of the Navy, 1953.

Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York, Simon and

Schuster, 1960.

Smith, S. E. The United States Navy in World War II. New York, William

Morrow and Company, Inc., 1966.

Stewart, Irvin. Organizing Scientific Research for War. Boston, Little, Brown and

Company, 1948.

Strauss, Lewis L. Men and Decisions. New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc.,

1962.

Turnbull, Archibald D., Capt., USNR, and Clifford L. Lord, LCdr., USNR.

History of United States Naval Aviation. New Haven, Yale University Press,

1949.

Reports and Other Publications

California Institute of Technology Contract OEMsr-418, Office of Scientific

Research and Development, National Defense Research Committee. Weekly

Progress Reports. PMC 1.1 to 1.99; 2.1 to 2.89, 26 October 1941 to 15

September 1945 (biweekly beginning 1 April 1945). Pasadena, Calif.

412
SOURCES

Holmquist, C. 0., Capt., USN, and R. S. Greenbaum. "Navyv'In-House' Research

Laboratories," US. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 88, No. 2 (February

1962), pp. 68-75.

Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy. U.S. Rocket Ordnance Development

and Use in World War II. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office,

1946.

Kevles, Daniel J. "Scientists, the Military, and the Control :>fPostwar Defense

Research; the Case of the Research Board for National Security, 194446,"

Technology and Culture, Vol. 16 (January 1975), pp. 20-47.

Millikan, Robert A. "Albert AhtzhzmyiKhzhon" National Academy Biographical

Memoirs, Vol. XIX, Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences, 1938.

Nava; History Division, Office of the Chief of Navu! Operations, Navy

Department. U.S. Naval Histor)' Sources in the Washington Area and

Suggested Research Subjects, 3rd ed., compiled by Dean C. Allard and Betty

Bern. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1970.

Naval Ordnance Test Station. Commemorating Michelson Laboratory Dedication,

May Seventh and Eighth, Nineteen Forty-Eight. China Lake, Calif., NOTS,

May 1949. 56 pp. (NWC 2313, 8-6.)

Naval Weapons Center. Albert Abraham Michelson: The Man Who Taught a World

to Measure, by D. T. McAllister. China Lake, Calif., NWC, May 1970. 30

pp. (Publications of the Michelson Museum No. 3.)

Naval Weapons Center. Salt Wells Pilot Plant Story, 1945-1954, by K. H.

Robinson. China Lake, Calif., NWC, 1974. (NWC 2313, RM-1.)

Niederhoff, A. E. "Naval Testing Lab in Desert," Western Construction News,

September 1946, pp. 89-91.

Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense Research

Committee. Summary Technical Report of Division 3, NDRC, Volume 1.

Rocket and Underwater Ordnance. Washington, D.C., 1946.

Skinner, B. F. "Pigeons in a Pelican," American Psychologist, Vol. 15 (January

1960), pp. 28-37.

413
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

United States Pacific Fleet Air Force. Forward Firing of Rockets From Aircraft,

submitted by Cdr. J. C. Renard, LCdr. T. F. Pollock, and CIT Aircraft

Launcher Group. San Diego, Naval Air Station, October 4, 1943. CIT JNC

9, Technical Library, NWC.

Unpublished Manuscript Histories

Bureau of Ordnance. United States Naval Administration in World War II. Part I.

Bureau Administration (Vol. I-Vj; Part II. The Navy's Ordnance [Vol. I-VIj.

Unpublished narrative histories in Naval History Division, Office of the

Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.

Historical Narrative of the U.S. A aval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California,

for the Period I September 1945 to 1 October 1946. (NWC 2313, 1-20.)

History of Experimental Unit Hedron Fleet Air Wing Fourteen and Aviation

Ordnance Development Unit Number One, forwarded May 21, 1945, from

Officer in Charge AODU No. 1 to Chief of Naval Operations Op-33-J-6.

(NWC 2313, 16-12.)

History of the Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California (June 7,

1943-July I, 1944), compiled by A. L. Pittinger, Lt., USNR. July 1945.

(NWC 2313, RM-5.)

History of the Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California (to August 15,

1945), compiled by Robert W. Leach, Lt., USNR. March 29, 1946, Naval

Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, California. (NWC 2313, 20-30.)

History of U.S. Carrier Aircraft Service Unit Number Fifty-Three, (ovuaided May

31, 1945, from the Commanding Officer CASU-53 to Chief of Naval

Operations Op-33-J-6. (NWC 2313, 15-49.)

History of U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, August

1945-December 1958, prepared by Central Staff. OPNAV Report 5750-5.

(NWC 2313, Command files.)

The History of Pilotless Aircraft and Guided Missiles, compiled by D. S. Fahrney,

RAdm., USN (Ret.), [n.d.]. Operational Archives, Division of Naval History,

Washington, D.C.

414
SOURCES

The History of United States Naval Research and Development in World War II.

Manuscript prepared by the University of Pittsburgh Historical Staff under

contract of the Office of Naval Research. Operational Archives, Division of

Naval History, Washington, D.C.

//; the Beginning... Indian Wells Valley Masonic History, by Mort Bergren. (NWC

2313, 1209.)

Office of Naval Research. United States Naval Administration in World War II.

Unpublished narrative histories in Naval History Division, Office of Chief of

Naval Operathns, Washington, DC.

'technical History of the U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, 1943-1953. Final

manuscript compiled by the Starnes Co. and NOTS Technical Information

Department. October 1968. (NWC RM-3.)

U.S. Naval Air Facility, Administration Office, NAF, China Lake, Calif., May 23,

1967. (NWC 2313, 15-12.)

War History of Naval Air Facility. Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern,

California, February 9, 1946. (NWC 2313, 15-11.)

415
INDEX

Military ranks in parentheses folioiving personal names are, where known, the highest

ranks that were attained. Ranks other than Navy are identified by the branch of the service.

Acree, Jim Tom, LCdr., 11, 37, 57

Administration Building, 127, 264

Administrative Board, 257-58

Advisory Board, 336-38

Aircraft

B-29, 175, 205-06, 217-19

Enola Gay, 205

fire control sys:ems, 108, 112, 290-92,

304

F4U, 103, 196

F4U-1D, 109-10

F6F, 103

F6F-3, 37

jet, 115, 118, 294

launchers, rocket, 71-75, 86, 99-104,

115-18

Messerschmitt, 115

Mitsubishi, 196

P-47, 86, 192, 285

P-80, first U.S. jet-propelled, 294

PBY, 16

rocket-equipped Fleet, 71

SB2C, 103-05

SBD, 75

servicing for Fleet, 21

servicing for training squadrons, 22-23

TBF, 16, 20, 72-75, 85, 99-100, 103

IBM, 20, 103

trim-tab fix, 106

vulnerability studies, 108

Aircraft rockets (see also Rockets)

first air firing. Holy Moses, 84-86

190,

first NOTS firing, 14

first used in Pacific Theater, 74

Holy Moses, 82-86, 190-96, 297

"acific Theater, deployment in, 74,

194-96

Tiny Tim, 97 110, 176, 192, 194-96

2.75-inch, 296

3.25-inch, 295

3.5-inch, 2, 14, 20, 73-74

3.5-inch spinner, 113

4.5-incli fin-stabilized, 113

4.5-inch M8, Army, 295

S-inch, 20, 75, 82-86, 107, 113-18, 190,

194-96, 293, 297

11.75-inch, 97-106, 192, 194-96, 297

14-inch, 297

Air Force use of CalTech rockets, 190

Air Force use of Inyokern Airfield, 24

Air operations, NOTS, 15-18

Air Technical Service Command,

Alamogordo, N. Mex., 203, 216

Allegany Ballistics Laboratory, 3

Allied Forces on the Continent,

Amos, Harry J., Jr., AMI/C, 16

Anderson, Carl D., 94, 191-93

Antisubmarine rocket (ASROC),

AODU-1 (see Aviation

Development Unit 1)

Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins

Univ., 244, 283-84, 286

Argus Range, 26

Armitage Field, 151, 175-76, 179, 266-68

193

118

303

Ordnance

417
Ti;i- GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Armilage, John M., El., 85, 104, 176

Armor and Projectile Laboratory, Dahlgren,

Va., 160

Army Air Corps, first used Holy Moses in

combat, 190-96

Army Air Force use of Inyokern airfield,

24

Arnquist, W. N., 281

Asbury, Lou, Lt., 214-15

Ashworth, Frederick L., t'dr. (VAdm.).

206. 319

ASROC (antisubmarine rocket). 303

Atom bomb {see also Bombs)

development of, 60

first explosive blocks cast at Salt Wells

Pilot Plant, 206, 216, 220, 307

unique weapon program, 1

Atomic Energy Commission, 207, 308-10

Atomic research laboratory, Los Alamos, N.

Mex., 207

Aviation Ordnance Development Unit I

(AODU-1)

Armitage Field, 1 75

commissioned at NAS, San Diego, 19

first contingent to NO IS, 19

Meet pilot training, NO IS, 19-22

insignia, lackrabbi', 4?

Inyokern airfield, ) 9

rocket flight tests, 87-88

Tiny Tim rocket tests, 104

transfer to NOTS. 91-93

Babcock, Horace W., 112

Bakersfield, Calif., 51

Ballistics, interior, 186

Ballistics, rocket, 81, 109. 116

Ballistite production, 1, 136-37, 142,

144-45

Barnes, James E., 16

Barstow, Calif., 14

Bat, 278, 290

Battle of the Bulge, 163, 181

Baxter, James Phinney, 111, 276

Beatty, F. E., 354

Beckmann, Alcorn G., Cdr. (Capt.), 235,

269

Bennett, Ralph, 258, 328

Bennington. 226, 235

Bentham, William, 53-54

B-berman, Luke, 249

Big Richard rocket, 297

"Big Three" conference, 212

Bishop housing, 255

Blandy, William H. P., RAdm. (Adm.)

Chief, BuOrd, 7, 9

concept, NOTS laboratory, 166

funds for NOTS construction, 29

"Gun Club," 226

Michelson Laboratory dedication, 353

NOTS, permanent R&D center, 43

Operation Crossroads, :.'76

postwar planning, I'WS, 7, 9, 180

temporary facilities, NOTS, 29

Bomb kit, Hiroshima, 220

Bomb kit. Nagasaki, 220

Bombs

armor-piercing Japanese, 196

assembly kils. atom bomb, 219-2J

atom bomb program, 60, 203, 206-21

Bat, 278, 290

buzz, V-l, 190

CAM1 I project, recovery problems,

218-19

drop tests, atom bomb, 217-19

explosive components, atom bomb, 203,

206-21

Fat Man, 206, 218

first atom bomb test, Alamogordo, 203

first atom test bomb assembled, 220

first explosive blocks, atom bomb, 206,

216, 220, 307

fuzes for atom bomb, 218

GLOMB, 278

high-explosive components, atom bomb,

203, 206-21

Hiroshima, atom bomb dropped on, 205

incendiary, 108

kits, bomb assembly. 219-20

Little Boy, 205, 218-19

Nagasaki, atom bomb dropped on, 206

nonnuelear components, atom oomb,

203, 206-21

nuclear. Fat Man, 206, 218

nuclear. Little Boy, 205, 218-19

One Kit, Bomb Assembly, 219-20

Pelican, 278

processing and test work, atom bomb,

217

semiarmor-piercing. 97

V-l, 110, 190, 192, 196

Bombsighl. Noiden, 160

Boomtown, Inyokern, 50-52

Bougainville, 74

Bowen, Ita S., 106, 116, 286, 308

Bowen, Oliver G., 138, 140, 142-43

Bowman, Grant, 53

418
INDEX

Breslow, Arthur, 160

Brode, Wallace R., 232, 236, 256, 260,

269, 281

Brown, Calif., 45

Brown, George, 45

Brown, John Nicholas, 352, 354, 356

"Building Number Five," 166-74

Bujes, Jacob, 214

Bullard, Dexter, LCdr., 142, 211

Bumblebee, 244, 279-88

Burchard, John E., 74, 111, 188, 192, 196

Bureau of Aeronautics

aircraft control, ??, 5J-?2

air facilly control, Inyokern, 89, ^1-92

air cperations conflict, 94

guided missile cognizance, 179, 277-81

Harvey Field cognizance, 178-79

rockets in aerial warfare, 18

Bureau of Ordnance

aircraft weapons, testing of, 9

air facility control, 89-93

air operations conflict, 94

Armitage Field management control, 268

atom bomb design, 209

CalTech programs, transfer of, 228-29

China Lake Pilot Plant, 138, 140-42,

144, 146-47

construction of NOTS, 28, 35, 125

funds, NOTS aviation ordnance. 38

funds, NOTS construction, 12/-25

guided missiles, cognizance fir, 277-81

Illuminated Sight Mark 8, rocket, ! 11

laboratories, NOL, NOTS, 326-27

laboratory air conditioning, 170

laboratory design problems, 126-28

laboratory for research, NOTS, 126-28

laboratory planning, 34-36

labor priority rating, NOTS, 133

land acquisition, NOTS, 24

launchers and rockets, procurement,

113-14

Lukas-Harold contract, 157

Naval Air Facility management control,

268

Navy laboratories, 160

NOTS-CalTech support, 78

NOTS founding, 1

nuclear weaponry, 210

ordnance development, 38

ordnance officers, 20

ordnance, shop equipment for, 91

permanent station plans, 29

propellant plant at Inyokern, 138

research and development center, plans

for, 125

research and development, peacttime, 9

rocket program transfer, 185-86

Salt Wells Pilot Plant, 21!

Bureau of Yards and Docks, 24, 28, 2i,

35, 79, 124-27. 133, 140, 169-70

Burroughs, Sherman E., Jr., Cdr. (RAdm.)

A-bomb, NOTS work, 203

Armitage Field, naming of, 176

CASU-53 personnel, 22

China Lake Pilot Plant, plans for,

140-42

Commanding Officer, first NOTS, 3-5

construction, initial, NOTS, 27, 29-33

construction mistakes, NOTS, 130

departs NOTS, 224, 239

departure of Capt. Sandquist, 147

Director of Research, campaign for, 162

first Commanding Officer, NOTS, 3-5

Fleet aircraft servicing, 22-23

founding of NOTS, 1

funds for NOTS rocket program, 124-25

Harvey Field controversy, 176-79

Harvey Field, naming of, 90-91

headquarters, China Lake, 33, 56, 69,

128

headquarters, Inyokern, 5, 11, 27

housing rroblems at NOTS, 254-55

Inyokern airfield, problems, 87-93

laboratory planning, NOTS, 34-35

land acquisition, NOTS, 26, '52

land use, NOTS. 25-26

-Lauritsen NOTS proposal, 1-2

-Lauritsen rocket program proposal, 2,

7-10

Michelson Laboratory dedication, 354

name tetention, NOTS, 319-21

Naval Air Facility, Inyokern, 90-93

Navy-built community, 56-58

NOTS command moved to China Lake,

69, 128

NOTS, leadership in building of, 36-39

ordnance development, time for, 38

permanent community, NOTS, 345

permanent faciluies, NOTS, 29, 31, 33,

123-24

permanent R&D center, NOTS, 43

pilot plants, operation of, 306

population estimate for NOTS, 253

range faculties, NOTS, 79-81

relationship v/ith L. T. E. Thompson,

159-62

419
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

rocket program, NOTS, 2, 9-10

rocket testing, NOTS, 14-15, 94-95

rocket training, r'leet squadrons, 21

social and recreational development,

NOTS, 47-49

successor, 189

-Thompson relationship, li9 62

wartime operations, NCfS, 11-13

Bush, Vannevar, 161, 172, 181, 184

Byrne, J. i-., Capt., 353

Byrnes, James C, Jr., Capt.

China Lake, NOTS headquarters, 3^

China Lake Pilot Plant, turds for,

14CM3

construction at NOTS, ^l 1

housing problems at NOTS, 254

laboratory, construction of, 168, 170

laboratory, design of, 1 27-28

laboratory, early planning, 35

land acquisition, NOTS. 62

location, NOTS, 55

Michelson Laboratory dedication, 353

permanent facilities, NOTS, 29-30, 43,

124

permanent R4.D center, NOTS, 43

range facilitie , NOTS, 78-79

California Institute of Technology

Aircraft Rocket Sight, C1T, . 12

ballistics data, 109

ballistics, interior, 186

ballistite production, 136-37, 142

Board of Trustees, 186

CAMEL project, 217-20

China Lake Pilot Plant, 136-46, 186

C1T Aircraft Rocket Sight, 112

experimental work on forward-firing

rockets, 16

facility proposals, 30

first forward-firing rocket tests, 100

Goldstone Lake, rocket tests, 14-15, 84

high-explosive lens design, 210

Manhattan Project, 217, 221

NOTS, founding of, 1

NOTS personnel, 171, 187-88

ordnance development, 38

ordnance plants, building and operating,

210

personnel, 379-84

postwar transition problems, 2'. 8-31

Project CAMEL, 217-21

projectile design group, 84

propellant plant, China Lake, 136-46

propellant plant. Salt Wells, 211-17

propellant production and technology,

1 36-42

propellants, end of work on, 186

range data, rocket. 111

ranges at NOTS, 13

requirements for WW II rockets, 124-25

rocket program, I, 7, 16, 43, 69-77, 95,

113-18, 181

scientific staff, 3, 38, 47, 379-84

sight, rocket. 112

spinner rockets, development of, 113-18

technical work, Manhattan Project, 217

Tiny Tim rocket, development of, 97

torpedo program 81, 298

transfer of programs to NOTS, 164,

185-87, 228-31

transfer of rocket production to GT&R,

186

Types 1 and 2 rocket sights, 112

CalTech (see California Institute of

Technology)

CAMEL Project, 203, 217-20

Camera, solar yaw, 116

Camp, Bill Edward, 16, 37

Ca-np Burroughs, 58

Gimp Haan test area. Army, 14

Cape Gloucester, 224

Carrier Aircraft Service Unit (CASU) 53,

22-23, 87, 91-92

Cast method, high-explosive components,

213

Caulkins, Larry, 143

Cerro Coso Community College, 55

Chief Scientist, Dahlgren, L. T. E.

Thompson, 159

China Lake

community, 339-45

construction, 33, 128

headquarters, NOTS, 33, 56, 69, 128

population in 1944, '32

China Lake, Calif., 53, 56, 65, 321

China Lake (dry), 24, 27, 56, 134

China Lake Pilot Plant

adjacent to Salt Wells Pilot Plant,

211-13

ballistite productio i and testing facility,

136-47

construction begins, 143

equipment for, 141, 143-44

first propellant grain extruded, 144

funds for construction, BuOrd, 140

420
INDEX

propellanls for rockets, 136-47

propcllant work transferred from

CalTech, 186

rocket motor loading, 146

safety, 145

transfer to NOTS, 186

China Lake post office, 322-23

CIT Aircraft Rocket Sight, 112

Civil Aeronautics Authority, Harvey Field,

177

Civil Aeronautics Authority, Inyokern

airfield, 24

Civilian personnel, evaluation of. 236-37

Civil service

CalTech personnel, 181-82, 187-88

classification problem, 187-88

employment, 187

Clark, D. S., 138

CLPP, .41 (sir also China Lake PMot

Punt)

Cody, Ardcil L, Ens., II, 48

Committee on Postwar Research, 182, 325

Committee ,n Standardization of Range

Facilities, 332

Community Manager, NOTS. 343

Conant, James, 208

Connable. Polly. 143

Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 283,

287

Constances, Brittany, 193

Construction (see also Contracts and Naval

Ordnance Test Station)

boom, Inyokern, 50-52

boom, NOTS, 123-36

China Like, Calif.. 33

costs. 123-25

funds for NOTS, 28-29, 124-25

halting at NOTS, 1945, 164-66

halting of NOTS laboratory, 164-66,

171-73

Inyokern, 50-52

labor problems, 132-36

NOTS. early, 51

NOTS, initial, 27-34

progress summary, 389-96

Contacts

architect-engineer, 33, 120, 141. 162,

213

BuOrd, L. T. E. Thompson services,

158, 161

CalTech-OSRD rockec work, 3

China Lake Pilot Plant, 138

cost-plus-fixed-fce, end of, 164

cost-plus-fixed-fec, NOTS constiuct'jn,

125

General Tire and Rubber Co., 186. 229

Haddock Engineers, 141, 166, 213

Holmes and Narver, 141, 213

Johnson, Drake, and Piper, 246

laboratory, permanent, 246

Navy with CalTech, Z

NOTS construction, 29, 33, 125-26,

134, 164-65

NOy-9048, NOTS construclicn

improvement, 125

NOy-9088, principal for NOTS

construction, 125, 134

NOy-9088, termination of, I', 3-74

OEMsr-418, CalTech, 138, 172, 185-86

OSRD-CalTech rocket work, 3

OSRD, termination of, 185-86

permanent laboratory, 246

pilot plant design and equipment, 138,

140-44

rocket development, 172

rocket production, GTiR, 186

Stafford, Davies. Gogerty, 33. 125

Thompson, L. T. E., services at NOTS,

158, 161

Cooper, II. G.. 281

Coral Sea, Battle of, 6

Coso Hot Springs, 61

Cosr- Range, 26

Cow, land acquisition problem. 25-26

Crum, Jim, 53

Crum, Robert, 53

Crumville, Calif., 53-54

Crum, Wilbur, 53

Dailey, Mark, 61

Davis, Burnham, 13, 220

Dean, H. W., Group Captain. RA1-, 191

Death Valley, Calif., 44-45

Delano, Calif., 53

Department of Interior, 24-25, 63

Desert Entry Act, 45

de Seversky, A. P., Maj., 2

Dibb, Robert A., Lt., 105, 107

Dick, F. F., 142

Director, M-9 fire-control, 196

Director of Research, 161-62, 243-45

Director of Research, Development, and

Test, 182

Donicht, Harry F., LCol., USA, 191, 194

Dove, 279

Drono Utility Unit, Armitage Field, 177

421
fHE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Drummond, I liomas A., 340

Duncan, Jat^es A., LCdr. (Capt.), 34-36,

9b, 1 i6-28, 160, 168-70, 248-51,

257, .'57

D.irgin, Ca'.vin T., RAdm. (VAdra.), 267

Eaton Gi.iyon propellanl facility, 137

Eaton Canyon testing area, 98

Edwards Air Foice Base, Calif., Ill, 160

Eleventh Naval District, 27, 48

Elliott, J. M., Cdr., 268

Ellis, Emory L, 13, 49, 106, 132, 188-89,

210, 231, 281, 295

Elvey, C. T., 269, 281

L'nola Gay, 205

Entwif'le, F. I., Capt. (RAdm.), 159, l?9,

185-86

European Theater, 118, 190-94

Ewing, John S., CWO, 47-49

Experimentil Air Center, 151, 174 176

ExperimRntal Operations Department, 92,

385

Exploratoiy and Foundational fund, 329

Explosives

atom bomb components, 203, 206-21

first nonnuclcar for atom bomb, 206,

216, 307

first test bomb assembled, 220

Facilities (see also R- es)

Armita^e Field, 1 , 175-76, 266-68

CalTech proposals, 30

China Lake Pilot Plant, 136-47, 186.

211-13

control tower, 79

Eaton Canyon, 98, 137

first temporary, 28

fixed-angle launcher, 300

Fleet squadron rocket training, 19-22

Foothill Plant, 229-30

funds for temporary, 29

Goldstom- Lake, 14-15, 84, 100

Haiwee Reservoir, 81-82

Harvey Fielo, 90-93, 151, 174-79, 266

Inyokern airfield, 19-20, 22-29, 87-93,

175

Michelson Laboratory, 36, LSI, 346,

351-61

Morris Dam, 186, 227-28, 230, 300-301,

338, 354

Naval Air Facility, 23, 89-94, 151,

174-80, 266-68

NOTS laboratory, early planning, 34-36

NOTS, planned for, 371-77

ordnance, major for BuOrd, 327

Pasadena Annex, 228-31, 298-303,

338-39

permanent, 28, 33-36, 123-26

pilot plant, China Lake, 136-47, 186,

211-17

pilot plant, Salt Wells, 203, 206-07,

211-217

Point Mugu, Calif., missile testing, 179

propellant production, 136-47

recreational, 47-49, 58

research and development laboratory,

33-34, 160-61, !63-7o

rocket training. Fleet squadron, 19-22

Salt Wells Pilot Plant, 203, 206-07,

211-17

site plans and schematic drawings

completed, 31

spotting towers, 80-81

temporary, 28-29, 123-26

testing, 77

torpedo-launching, 186

variable-angle launcher, 300-302, 338,

354

1944, NOTS, 31, 123-26, 149-50,

371-77

Fahrncy, D. S., RAdm., 279

Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp., 283,

287

Fat Man, 206, 218

Federal Housing Administration, 55, 254

Federal National Mortgage Assn., 254

Fin-stabilized aircraft rockets, 113, 294-96,

305

Fire control systems, 108, 1)2, 290-92,

304

Fixed-angle launcl er, 300

Fleet squadrons, 19-20, 87

Flight line, firs» NOTS, 13

Flight Test Pjse, Muroc, Calif., Ill

Flying milk bottle. Weapon A, 302-03

Fogg, A. K., Capt., 27-31, 126

Fokdare, Joseph, ^6

Folding-fin aircraft rockets, 295-97

Foothill Plant, Pasadena, 229-30

Forrestal, James V., 262, 268, 327

Fort Irwin, Army, 14

Foster, Fcstus, Mrs, (Beatrice Michelson),

352

Fowler, Willia-.n A., 69-72, 74-78, 83,

94-95, 116, 184, 194, 209

Fox, Joe, 53

Franklin, 196, 226

422
INDEX

Purer, Julius A., ÄAdm., 18]

Fuzes

atom bomb, 218

base, 84

contact, 305

delay, 75, 77

fast action, 75

folding-fin aircraft rocket, 296

functioning of Mk 148, 15

instantaneous nose, 14

magnetic influence, 302

Mk 148, 15

nose, 14, 84

NOTS-developed, 296

proximity, 108, 196, 294, 305

testing, 81

Gallery, Daniel V., RAdm., 280

Gardiner, Nevile. Mrs. (Madeleine

Michelson), 352, 356

Gardiner, Paul, 58

Gargoyle, 279

General Land Office, 25

General Tire and Rubber Co., 186, 229

George Washington University, 3

Germany, bnmbing in \VW II, 118

Girouard, Philip H., 334

r.LOMB, 278

Goddard, Robert H., 1

Gold, silver mining, Indian Wells Valley, 45

Goldstone Lake

first firing, forward-firing rockets, 100

first ground tiring. Holy Moses, 84

ocket test area, 14-15

Goller, John, 45

Gorgon 1IA, 279

Groves, Leslie R.. MGen., USA, 205-06,

210

Guadalcanal, 18

Guam, battle of, 118

Guided missiles

air-to-air, 289, 305

AM (air missile), 289

Bat, 278, 290

BuAer, 179

Bumblebee, 244, 279-88

cognizance for, 277-81

Dove, 279

early exploration, 289-92

first automatic, 278

first proposal approved, 289

first subsonic beam-riding flight, 286

first supersonic beam-riding flight, 286

first testing, G-Range, 285

Gargoyle, 279

Gorgon I1A, 279

G-Ramge, test, 285

Kingfisher, 279

Lark, 279, 231-33, 286-38

Loon, 282

NOTS, 277

NOTS AM (air missije), 289

project assessment, 305

ship-to-air, 282

Sidewinder, 290-92

subsonic beam-riding flight, first, 286

supersonic beam-riding flight, first, 286

Talos, 288

Tartar, 288

Task Group, 281, 288-89

Terrier, 288

"Gun Club," 5, 159, 180, 226

Habicht, trank H., Lt. (jg.), 59

Haddock Engineers contract, 141, 166, 213

Hafstad, Lawrence R., 183, 187. 243, 245

Haiwee Reservoir, underwate' tests, 81-82

Halsey, William F., VAdm. (FAdm.), 5, 71,

73

Hanson, 31 7

"Harp," 80

Harvey Field, 90-93. 151, 174-79, 266

Harvey, Warren W., LCdr., 90

Haseltine, William Reed, 294

llaskins, Caryl P., ix

Hangen, C. E. (Capt.), 159

Hayward, John Tucker, Cdr. (VAdm.)

Armitage Field, naming of, 176

bomb recovery problems, CAMEL

project, 218-19

CalTech rockets used by Air Force, 192

Experimental Officer, 93-96, 269

Experimental Operations Department

head, 257

Harvey Field, efforts to obtain for Navy,

178-79

Principles of Opera;ion, 260-61

PTA president, Indian Wells Valley, 341

-elieved as Experimental Officer, 269

Research Board member, 256

rocket program, CalTech, 95

-Sykes relationship, 233, 239

Hean, J. H., Capt., 265, 269

Hedron 14 Experimental Unit, 16-18

Henderson, Richard W., Lt., II

Henry, M. George, Cdr., 127

423
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Hewitt, Floyd, Lt., 104

Hickman, Clarence, 1

High-explosive components, atom bomb,

203, 206-21

Hill, T. B., Capt., 75

Hirohito, 39

Hiroshima, atom bomb dropped on, 205

Hiroshima bomb kit, 220

Holmes and Narver contract, 141, 213

Holtville Twentynine Palms targel range,

92

Holy Moses

combat use, 190-96

first air firing, NOTS, 84-86

first ground firing, Goldstone bike, 84

first used in combat by Army Air

Corps, 190-96

high velocity aircraft rocket, 82

improved design, 297

large-scale production, 109

Pacific Fleet, 194

solventlcss-extruded motor grain, 83

5-incli high velocity aircraft rocket,

02-86

Homesteading, Indian Wells Valley, 45, 63

Hooper, Edwin B., Capt. (VAdm.), v, ix,

310

Horse patrol, NOTS, 58-60

Housing at NOTS, postwar, 252-55

Houston, W. V., 354

Hovde, Frederick, 95, 161, 172, 186, 355

Hudson Bay Company, 44

Hussey, George F., RAdm. (VAdm.)

aircraft maintenance support, 22

charters for NOTS and NOL, 259-61

Chief, BuOrd, 10

civil service salaries, 245

Commanding Officer opening at NOTS,

189

construction, NOTS, 125

Director of Research, search for, 243-45

Executive Officer, Burroughs plea for,

57

expanded role, NOT?. 164-66

Fleet aircraft maintenance support, 22

Foothill Plant, 230

funding for research at NOTS, 329

Harvey Field cognizance controversy,

179

Michelson Lab/ratory dedication, 354

Naval Air Fa .ility control, 88, 93

ordnance v ork transferred from OSRD

to NOTS, 185

Principles of Operation approved, 260-61

priorities for NCTS laboratory materials,

246

Public Law 313, 244

retired as Chief, BuOrd, 268

-Thompson relationship, 159-61

Indianapolis, 205

Indian laborers. Navajo, 48, 51-52, 131

Indians, Mojave Desert, 44

Indian Wells Valley, 13, 25, 4347, 51-52,

65, 134, 136

Innes, Donald A., Lt., 102, 107

Instantaneous nose fuze, 14

Interdepartmental Air Traffic Control

Board, 24

Intrepid, 196

Inyokern airfield {s"e also Harvey Field)

Air Force use of, 24

Army claim, 23

Avia'ion Ordnance Development Unit I,

19

command problems, 87-93

early history, 47

first aircraft rocket tests, 29

first NOTS headquarters, 5, II, 27, 175

Fleet squadron rocket training, 19-22

Harvey Field, changed to, 90-91

headquarters, NOTS, 5, 11, 27, 175

Navy use of, 19-20, 24, 60

Officer in Charge, 48

personnel, CalTech and Navy, 47

temporary facilities, 20, 29

Inyokern, Calif., 3, 19, 29, 31, 33, 37, 46,

50-52, 65

Island Beach, N. J., 285

Ives, Clarence, 322

Iwo Jima, 114

Japan

atom bombs dropped on, 205-06

carrier power, end of, 118

Hiroshima, 205

message to, 205

Nagasaki, 206

rockets fired on transport ships, 74

su render, I 79, 206

war with, 39

Jaynes, Willis, 213

Jennison, James H., 301

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, Calif.,

172

Johnson, Drake, and Piper contract, 246

Joy, Turner, RAdm., 354

Kane, John D, H., Jr., RAdm., v, Lx

424

.."-. .Sj^rtV-^v".
INDEX

Keighley, W. H., Cdr., 230

Keller, Wilson M., 107

Keravia Bay, 74

Kern County, 24, 47, 49, 53

King, ErneM J., Adm. (FAdm.), 15-16, 83

Kingfisher, 279

King, Robert B., 77

Kitts, W. A., RAdm. (VAdm.), 79, 108,

159-60, 189

Knox, Frank, 5, 9, 88

Krön, Gerald, 218

biboralories i

"Building Number Five," 166-74

controvers> and r.assessment, 171-74

equipment procurement, 248-51

Michelson laboratory, 36, 151

Michelson Laboratory dedication, 346,

351-61

Mojavc Desert, location for R&D lab,

171-74

naming of NOTS reseatch, 346

Naval Ordnance Laboratory, beginnings

of, 326-27

Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak,

Md., 326-27

Naval Research Laboratory, Wash., D.C.,

324-25

Navy, 324

NOTS lab, construction halted, 164-66,

171-173

NOTS lab, construction renewed,

246-247

NOTS lab, foundations poured, 168

NOTS lab, machine shop, 269

NOTS. NOL, 326-27

NOTS research, proposal, 126-28

planning, 34-36

research and development, permanent,

163-74

separate buildings proposed, 126

"wheel-spoke" design, 126-27

Laccy, D. W., 138

Lacey, William N., 211

Lake, Gerald K., LCdr. (Cdr.), 78-79

Land

acquisition problems, 23-27

Navy use, SccNav request, 24-25

need for, 60-64

NOTS, 23-27

preserve, NOTS, 64

problems resolved, 265-66

temporary-use permit, 63-64

Lark, 177, 279, 281-83, 286-88

Launchers

aircraft, 71-74

Army aircraft, 110

displacement, 99-104, 110

fixed, 109

ground, lor Tiny Tim, 99

high velochy AR (Holy Moses), 86

lanyard, 100, 104, 110

Pacific Fleet squadron aircraft, 72

permanent, 81

rails, 71-75, 109, 118

spinner, 118

Tiny Tim, 99, 109

tube, 115-18

zero-length, 86, 109

70-inch, 74, 118

200-foot, 109

Lauritsen, Charles C.

A-bomb design, 208-09

A-bomb, NOTS work, 203

air support for rocket tests, 15

-Burroughs NOTS proposal, 1-2

-Burroughs rocket program proposal, 2,

7-10

CalTech Contract OEMsr-418, 172

China Lake Pilot Plant, locatin of, 138

Harvey Field, rocket test site, 180

Medal for Merit, 357

Michelson Laboratory dedication, 352,

356-57

Navy-built community, 55

rocket development for Pacific Fleet, 18

rocket program, CalTech, 94-95

rockets in European Theater, 191-93

rockets in Pacific Theater, 69-77

rocket training for Fleet squadrons, 20

Salt Wells Pilot Plant, 210, 213

Tiny Tim rocket, 97

Lauritsen, Thomas, 192-93, 209

Leach, Robert W., Lt., 134-35

LeGoube, Harry C, 16

Leliter, Calif., 45

Little Boy, 205, 218-19

Livestock, land acquisition problem, 25-26

Longwell, Paul A., 214

Loon, 282

Los Alamos, N. Mex., 205, 207-09, 218-19

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 308

Los Alamos S-Site, 210, 213

Los Angeles aqueduct, 45

Loustalot, J. E., 49

Lukas-Harold contract, 157

McKittrick Construction Co., 125

McLaren, K. M. (Capt.), 159

McLean, William B.

425
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

Bat missile, 290

fire control, 289-92

Guided Missile Task Group, 281, 289

Sidewinder missile, 290

Technical Director, NOTS, 290

Macco Construction Co., 29

Macco-Me Kit trick-Morrison-Knudsen

Construction Co., 125, 164-66

Mack, Duane, 63, 188, 265

MAD retro-rocket, 16, 115

Magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), 16

Magnolia, Calif., 46

Main, Norman F., Lt., 136

Manhattan Project, 60-61, 207, 209-11,

213, 215, 217, 221, 306-08

Manila Bay, 75

Manly, William, 44

Marine Corps Air Station, Mojave, Calif.,

22, 282

Marine Corps Squadron VMTB-134, 72

Marshall Islands, 75

Mathews, Howard L., 233

Mathieu, Calvin, 13

Meadows, H, U, Capt., 189

Meyers, B. E., MGcn., USA, 193

Michelson, Albert Abraham

biographical sketch, 357-58

instructor of J. A. Duncan, 34

laboratory named in his honor, 346,

352, 357-59

Michelson Laboratory, 36, 151, 346,

351-61

Midway, Battle of, 6

Mighty Mouse rocket, 296

Military-civilian relationships, 159-60,

183-84

Millikan, Robert A., 352, 358-59

Mining claims, 60-61

Miracle City, Ridgecrest, Calif., 52-55

Mitscher, Marc A., RAdm. (A.lm.), 18, 21,

24, 196

Moeller, Lewis N., Capt. (Como.), 164-66,

170, 214

Mojave Desert, Calif., 3, 43, 46-47, tO

Morris Dam

fixed-angle launcher, 300

operation under Navy, 230

torpedo-launching facilities, 186

torpedo tests, 81

transfer to Navy, 230

transfer to NOTS, 186

variable-angle launcher, 300-302, 338,

354

Morrison-Knudsen Construct',n Co., 125

Moses, William M., Capt., 7y, 127

Muroc, Calif., 160

Nagasaki, atom bomb dropped on, 206

Nagasaki bomb kit, 220

National Academy of Sciences, 38

National Defense Research Committee

CalTech section, 77

Division 3, 161

pilot plant facility, 138

National Recovery Act, 24, 47

Naval Air Bases Command, San Diego, 92

Naval Air Center, San Diego, 19, 88

Naval Air Facility, El Centro, Calif., 47

Naval Air Facility, NOTS, 23, 86-94, 151,

174-80, 266-68

Naval Air Missile Test Center, Point Mugu,

Calif., 282, 287

Naval Air Ordnance Test Station,

Chincoteague, Va., 282

Naval Air Station, Holtville, Calif., 23

Naval Air Station, San Diego, 19

Naval Ammunition Depot, Hawthorne,

Nev., 56

Naval Material Center, Johnsvill«, Pa., 282

Naval Ordnance Laboratory, vvhite Oak,

Md., 258, 326-27

Naval Ordnance Plant, Indianapolis, 160

Naval Ordnance Test Station {see also

Facilities, Ranges, and Rockets)

Administration Building, 127

Administrative Board, 257-58

Advisory Board, 336-38

aircraft fire control, 108, 290-92, 304

aircraft, procurement of, 89

aircraft vulnerability studies, 108

air faelliries (see Facilities)

air operations, 15, 18-19

air lesting of Tiny Tim, 97-110

AM (air missUe), 289

American Peenemilnde, 124

Armitage Field, 151, 175-76, 266-63

atom bomb program, 60, 203, 206-21

beginning of operations, 13-14

Burroughs-Lauritsen proposal for NOTS,

1-2

Burroughs-Lauritsen proposal for rocket

program, 2, 7-10

CalTech personnel, 132-33, 181-82,

187-88

CalTech rocket program, 181, 185-87

CAMEL project, 203, 217-20

426
INDEX

charter, postwar, 259-61

China Lake approved as headquarters, 33

China Lake community, 339-45

China Lake Navy Station, 56

China Lake Pilot Plant, 136-47, 211-13

chronology, 365-70

civil service personnel, 181-82, 187-88

commander, 269, 317

Commanding Officers, 3-5, 2:4-39, 269,

315-19

command moved to China Lak;, 56, 69,

128

command of, 3

command post, 128

CoTimissioned Officers' Mess (Open), 33

community, 129-30

Community Manager, 343

community structures, 149-50

construction, 27-34, 50-53, 123-32,

147-52, 162-66, 171-74, 371-77,

389-96

controversy and reassessment, 171-74

departure of Commanding Officer,

189-90

departure of master builder, 147-52

design problems, 126-28

Director of Research, 243-45

Director of Research, Development, and

Test, 182

early proposals, 55

ebb tide of \VW II, 157

established officially by SecNav, 5, 9

Experimental Air Center, 151, 174

Experimental Operations Department,

92, 385

Exploratory and Foundational fund, 329

fire control, aircraft, 108, 290-92, 304

Fire Control Section, Ordnance

Department, 289

fire control systems, test of, 108

first command, 3

firs'. Experimental Officer, Cdr.

Hayward, 93-96

first flight line, 13

first funds for temporary facilities, 28

first guided missile program, 289

first guided missile testing, 285

first postwar RD&T organization, 397

first rocket tests, 14, 84, 98, 100-102,

115, 285

first subso.iic beam-riding flight, 286

first sup'-.sonic beam-riding flight, guided

missile, 286

first temporary facilities, 28

flag command, 315

Fleet training, 19-22, I'M

Foothill Plant, 229-30

founding of, I

frontier for rocket testing, 15

funds for construction, 124-25

funds for facilities, 28-29, 38

funds for facilities, SecNav, 124

future role, 108, 119

guided missiles (see specific entry)

halting of construction, 164-66, 171-73

hardware tests, 108, 190

Harvey Field, 90-93, 151, 174-79, 266

headquarters, China Lake, 33, 56, 69,

128

headquarters, Inyokern airfield, 5, II,

27, '75

horse pa'rol, 58-60

housing, postwar, 252-55

insignia, jackrabbit, 49

Inyokern airfield (see specific entry)

laboratories (see specific entry)

labor force, 132-36

land acquisition and needs, 23-27, 60-64,

265-66

land lease, Harvey Field, 177

leadership, 157, 188

lead laboratory, end WW II, 82

letter of intent, principal construction

contract, 125

"like a battleship," 232

Manhattan Project, 60-61, 207, 209-11,

213, 215, 217, 221, 306-08

Michelson Laboratory, 36, 151, 346

Michclson Laboratory dedication, 351-61

military-civilian relationship. 231-33,

236-39

military personnel, 132

mission, 19-20, 23, 44, 55, 86, 95-96,

277

Morris Dam (see specific entry)

name retention, 319-23

Navy-built communily, 55

Navy laboratory, 324

Officers' Club 49

operations '^cgun, '.3-14

order establishing, 5, 9

ordnance development, 38

ordnance, permanent R&D center, 9

ordnance, postwar R&D center, 180

organizational changes, 255-61, 269

organization plan, 161

Pasadena, 94, 228-31

Pasadena Annex, 231, 298, 338-39

427
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOfCERN

peacetime, 180, 223

permanenl station, 23, 25, 29-30,

127-30, 253

postwar, 180, 226-28, 231-39, 304

Principles of Operation, 260-61, 360,

401

production engineering problems, 333-36

Quonset huts arrive at Inyokern, 29

railroad spur, 51-52

"Range Committee," 332

reorganization for postwar operations,

255-61

research and development center, 31, 33,

36, 43, 108, 123-25, 158, 161

research and development laboratory.

33-34, 160-61, 163-70

Research Board, 256-57, 328

Rockets (see .pecific entry)

sabotage, 136

sandstorms, 130

scientific direction, necessity for, 183

security problems, 135

site, 31

Station Dispensary, 127

supplies and sabotage, 135-36

survey, on-site, I 73

test station, 36, 108

torpedo program, 298-300

training squadrons, 19-21, 190

transition into postwar era, 180

underwater ordnance, 298-303

wartime programs, 1-2, 7, 69, 108-19,

190-96

water supplies, 1 31

Waves, 91

weapon development, assessment, 304-06

weapon planning, 44

weapon research and development,

future, 163

weapon testing, leader in, 123-24, 331

1944, construction boom, 123-32,

147-52

1945, transition into postwar era, 180

1945-1947, critical years, 243-70

1947, changes in, 268-70

Naval Powder Factory, 3

Naval Proving Ground, Dahlgren, Va., 26,

35, 157-60

Naval Research Laboratory, Wash., D.C.,

324-25

Naval Vessel Repair Fund, 29, 124, 140

Naval Weapons Center, 346

Navy-built community, 55

Navy laboratories, establishing, 160

Navy mission, NOTS air operations, 18-19

New Britain Island, 74

Niederhoff, A. E., 344-45

Nimitz, Chester W., Adm., 75

Ninth Air Force, 191, 193

Noble, Albert G., RAdm. (VAdm.), 268,

322-23, 327-28, 334, 352, 354-56

Noble, Kenneth H., Capt. (RAdm.). 159,

251

Norden bombsight, 160

Norden Company, Carl L., 157, 160

Normandy invasion, 118, 192

NOTS (see Naval Ordnance Test Station)

Noumea harbor. 74

Office of Naval Research established, 325

Office of Scientific Research and

Development (OSRU)

cessation of, 164

China Lake Pilot Plant funding, 141

demobilization, 181

NOTS director, 161-62

NOTS-related activities, end of, 186

ordnance work transferred to NOTS,

185

phaseout, 157, 171

rocket program, wartime, 1-2, 7

rocket work transferred to military, 185

Section 3, 95

Section H, 113

Section T, 284

Tiny Tim, 97

torpedo data, 81

transfer of programs to BuOrd, 228

wartime role, 245

Ogden, Peter, 44

Okinawa, 114, 196

Operation Crossroads. 276

Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 208

OSRD (see Office of Scientific Research

and Development)

Owens Lake, Calif., 45

Pacific Fleet, rockets, 2, 18, 69-77, 194-96

Pacific Fleet, squadron training, 19-21

Pacific Theater, 6, 69-77, 118, 190, 194-96

Page, J. R., 186

Parsons, William S., "Deak," Cdr. (RAdm.),

159-61, 180, 188, 203, 210, 218-21,

276, 281

Pasadena Annex

complications, 228-31

Foothill Plant, 229-30

identity crisis, 338-39

428
INDEX

name, 231

transfer to NOTS, 228-31

underwater ordnance, 298-303

Pasadena, Calif., laboratory location, 171-73

Patterson, Robert P., 220

Patton, George F., Gen., USA, 193

Pearl Harbor, 6

Pelican glide bomb, 278

Personnel

CalTech, 379-84

evaluation of, 236-37

recruitment, 64, 187

selection, 157-58

Pelroglyphs, Indian, 64

Philippine Sea, Battle of, 1 18

Pillboxes, Japanese, 77-78

Pittinger, A. Lincoln, Lt. (jg.), 39, 143-44,

215-16, 239

Point Mugu, Calif., 179

Pollock, Thomas F., LCdr. (Capt.), 16, 19,

88, 100-103, III, 115, 175

Port Hueneme, Calif., 58

Postwar research, provision for, 185

Pownall, Charles A., RAdm. (VAdm.), 15,

18

Principles of Operation, 260-61, 360, 401

Pritchard, J. A., Capt., 269

Project CAMF.L, 203, 217-20

Propellants

ballistite, I, 136-37, 142, 144-45

capacity per day at CLPP, 144

China Lake Pilot Plant, 136-42

dry-extruded, I

experimental work, end of, 186

cvtruded grain, 83, 140, 144

firs grain of ballistite extruded, 144

grain, internal burning, rocket motor,

293

grain production, 137, 140. 144-45

grain, solventless extruded, 83

multigrain motor, 98

presses, 140-44, 143-45

processing facility, NOTS, 136-47

production, 136-40

rocket motor, 83, 98, 137-40, 293-94

solid-propellant production, 136-47

solvcntless-extruded grain, 83

technology, 136-40, 142

Prospectors, 45, 61

Public Land Order 431, 266

Public Law 313, 244

Public Works Appropriation Bill, 124-25

Quesada, E. R., MGen., USA, 193

Rabaul, 73-74

Radar, SCR-584, 196

Radar, testing of, 108

Ramjet engine, development of, 284

Ramsey, DeWitt C, RAdm. (Adm.), 178

Ramsey, Norman, 219

Randecker, Harold H., LCdr., 22

Ranges

A-bomb drop tests, 218-20

aircraft, first, 13

aircraft, first rockets fired, 14, 29, 285

aircraft, marking, 13

Area L, 81

Argus, 26

C-l, 13, 79

CAMEL project tests, 217-20

Charlie, 13

Coso, 26

development of, 77

equipment, ground, 14, 109

facilities, 77-82

first aircraft ranges, 13

first ground firing of rockets, 285

first ground firing of Tiny Tim, 98

first ground ranges, 14

first NOTS test, 3.5-inch rocket, 14

first rockets fired, 14, 29, 285

G-l, 285

G-2, 80, 285

Goldstone, 14, 84, 100

ground, 14, 80, 98, 109, 285, 296

guided missile tests, 285

instrumented, 82

interservice involvement, 332

K-l, 81

K-2, 81, 296

plate, 81

postwar plans, 331-32

special-purpo"" 81

spotting towe.s, 80-81

surface-launched guided missiles, 28,3

Tiny Tim launching, 98-102

training target, 92

underwater, 81-82

Red Mountain, Calif., 52

Renard, Jack C, Cdr. (RAdm.), 15-18, 77,

180, 320

Reorganization, NOIS postwar, 255-61

Research Boa.d for Notional Security,

325-26

Research Board, NOTS, 256-57, 269, 328

Richmond, John Odonnel, Cdr., 56-57, 63,

128, 148, '68, 208, 224, 235, 239,

254-55, 340-43

Ridgecrest, Calif., 52-55, 65, 254

"Robbers Roost," 45

429
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT 1NY0KERN

Robertson, A. C, Maj., USMC, 74

Robertson, George, 53

Robinson, K. H., 213

Rockets {see also California Institute of

Technology)

Air Force use of, 190-96

air-launched, program for, 7

air support to experimental work, 19-20

air-to-air, 305

air-to-ground, 305

ASROC (antisubmarine rocket), 303

ballistics, 81, 109, 116, 186

barrage, 113

Big Richard, 297

booster, 109

Burroughs-Lauritsen proposal for rocket

program, 2, 7-10

C1T Aircraft Rocket Sight, ." 2

combat role, 69-77, 190-96

designs for peacetime, 293-98

drop tests, inert, 101

effect on war weapons, 69

European Theater, deployment in,

190-94

experimental work on forward-firing, 16

fin-stabilized, 113, 29^-96, 305

first air firing of Tiny Tim, 100-102

first air-launched, 14

first forward-firing, 14, 29

first forward firing, Goldstone Lake, 100

first forward-firing spinner, 115

first ground firing, G-2 range, 285

first ground firing. Holy Moses, 84

first grcnd firing, Tiny Tim, 98,

100-102

first in Pacific Theater, 74

first new rocket air-tested. Holy Moses,

84-86

first NOTS tests, 11, 29

first sea test of 5-inch spinner, 113

first spinner ground-tested, 115

Fleet squadrons, 19

Fleet use, 3.5- and 5-inch, 108-09

folding-fin aircraft, 295-97

forward-firing aircraft, 14, 16, 18, 29,

100, 115-18

funds, 28-29, 124-25

future of, 119

German, 2, 124, 191-92, 196

Goldstone Lake tests, 14-15, 84, 100

high velocity aircraft rocket, 82-86 {see

also Holy Moses)

high velocity spinner, 113-18

Holy Moses, 82-86, 109, 114, 190-96,

297

Illuminated Sight Mark 8, 111

improvements, peacetime, 293-98

ineffective against large targetr, 75

Japanese targets, 113

jet fighters, new rockets for, 294

launchers (see specific entry)

MAD retro-rocket, 16, 115

major war weapon. Pacific Theater,

194-96

Mighty Mouse, 296

motor design, 83-84, 293-94

motor-loading plant, 146

motor, propellant, 83, 98, 137-10,

293-94

motor tests, 84, 97-98

NOTS, future center for naval rocketry,

3

Pacific Fleet, 2, 69-77, 194-96

peacetime development at NOTS, 293-98

pilot training in firing of, 19-21

production, 75

production transferred to GT&R, 186

program assessment, 305

program expansion, 1943 Comlnch

memo, 16

propellants (see specific entry)

"pusher," 109

range data, 111-12

retro-rocket, MAD, 16, 115

retro-rocket, spinner, 115

sea test, spinner, 113-14

shipments to England, 192

sight development, CalTech. 112

sights for fire control, 111-12

spinner, 100, 113-18, 293-95, 305

"Spinner Society," 116

studies of warfare, 76

supersonic sled technique, 109

supersonic sled te;.t, 109

surface-fired spinner, 114

tests, 14-15, 82-87, 109-10

Tiny Tim, 97-110, 114, 145, 176, 192,

194-96, 297

training program, 69

training squadrons, 19-22

transfer of program from CalTech,

185-87

underwater trajectories, 81

V-2, 124, 191-92, 196

warhead design, 294

warhead for 11.75-inch, 97

430
INDEX

wartime program, 1-2, 7, 69, 108-19,

190-96

"Willie's Whirling Wocket," 116

World War II, use in, 69-77, 190-96

Zuni, 297

2.75-incli aircraft, 296

2.75-inch fin-stabilized, 296

3.25-inch aircraft, 295

3.5-inch aircraft, 2, 14, 20, 73-74,

108-09

3.5-inch spinner, 113

4.5-inch Air Corps, 192

4.5-inch barrage, 113

4.5-inch fin-stabilzed, 113

4.5-inch M8. Army, 295

5-inch aircuft, 20, 75, 82-86, 107,

113-18, 190-94, 297

5-inch barrage. 114

5-inch finned, 113

5-inch rocket motor, 84, 140

5-inch spinner, 113-18, 293

11.75-inch aircraft, 97-106, 192, 194-96,

297

14-incli aircraft, 297

Rockwell, D. E., Cdr., 162-64

Rogers, John, 44

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 24

Rumpp, Norman, 145

Russell, James S., Capt. (Adm.), 320

Sabin, Palmer, 142

Sage, Bruce Hornbrook, 138-39, 141-45,

209-12, 233. 236, 256, 260, 281,

306

Saipan, battle of, 118

Salt Wells Pilot Plant

atom bomb explosive components, 203,

206-21

CAMEL Project, 203, 217-20

construction problems, 213-17

explosive components, nuclear weapons,

203, 206-21

first explosive blocks for atom bomb,

206, 216, 307

nonnuclear explosive components, 203,

206-21

nuclear deterrent program, 306-10

pilot production facility, 203, 206-21

planning, 211-17

postwar operation, 306-10

Project CAMEL, 203, 217-20

security program, 215-16

San Clemente Island, 78

Sandquist, Oscar A., Capt., 31-34, 124-26,

128, 135, 140-42, 147-52, 162, 166

Sandquist Spa, 152

San Fernando Valley, 44

San Pedro Navy Base, Calif. 58

Saunders, David E-, LCdr., II, 48

Saylor, William Henry, 231, 299

Schoeffel, Malcolm F., Cdr. (RAdm.J, 5,

159, 259, 26b, 268, 334

Service personnel, evaluation of, 236

Shcnk, John, 260, 269

Sidewinder, 290, 292

Sierra Nevada, 44

Sights, rocket, 111-12

Skinnt,-, Molly, 26

Smith, Jedediah, 44

Smythe, W. R., 116

Snyder, Conway W., 84, 97

Snyder, F. J., 13, 29, 31

Solar yaw camera, 116

Solid propellants {see Propellants)

Solomon Islan's, 1 8

Solomons cam;, tign, 6

Spaatz, Carl, 1 jen., USA, 193

Spinner rocKus, 100, 113-18, 293-95, 305

S-Site, high-explosive components, 210, 213

Stafford, Davies, Gogerty, 33, 125

Stafjn Dispensary, 127

Stevens, William D., Mrs. (Dorothy

Michelson), 352

Stewart, Irvin, 245

Stone, R. C, 142

Stroop, P. D. (VAdm.), 159

Sullivan, John L., 268

Switner, Wendel] G., Capt. (RAdm.), 159,

189, 269, 315-19, 322, 352, 354-55

Sykes, James Bennett, Capt. (RAdm.)

Administrative Board, 257-58

Commanding Officer, second NOTS,

224-39

evaluation, of service and civilian

personnel, 236-37

guided missile proposal, 289

Harvey Field acquisition, 179

-Hayward relationship, 233, 239

"like a battleship," 232

Morris Daf operation, 230

name change, NOTS, 322

Naval Air Facility problems, 266-68

Naval Air Facility status resolved, 268

NOTS a permanent activity, 254

Principles of Operation, NOTS, 261-64

relieved of NOTS command, 269

431

,

: m.
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT AT INYOKERN

reorganization of NOTS, 258

Research Board accepted, 256

technical programs, diminished control,

260-61

-Thompson relationship, 159

Talos, :i5 8

Tangier, 317

Targets, NOTS, 77

Targets, steel-plate, 8i

Tartar, 288

Temple, H. B., Capt. (RAdm.), 15, 97

Terrier, 288

Thompson, Louis Ten Eyck

Advisory Board, NOTS, 336-38

aircraft lire control, 304

-Burroughs relationship, 159-62

charter for NOTS, 259-61

Ch.u Scientist, NPG, Dahlgren, 159

contnct for services at NOTS, 158, 161

Director of Research, 161-62, 243, 245

first visit to NOTS, 160

funding for research at NOTS, 329

Guided Missile Task Group, 281 288

guided missile technology, 281

-Hussey relationship, 159-61

laboratories, Navy, establishing, 160

laboratories, NOTS and NOL, 328

laboratory for NOTS, advice and

services, 160-61

leadership problems, NOTS, 188

Michelson Laboratory dedication, 352,

357, 359-61

organizational changes, NOTS, 255-61

Pasadena Technical Coordinator

recommended, 231

postwar assessment, NOTS, 3C4

Principles of Operation, NOTS, 260-61,

360

production engineering, NOTS, 333

research and development plan, 182-85

Research Board chairman, 256

resignation request, 263-64

successor to Capt. Burroughs, importance

of, 188-89

-Sykes relationship, 159

variable-angle launcher dedication, 354

weapons development, assessment,

304-06

Thompsoi , Margo, 263

Tinian, R-iific island, 205

Tiny Tim, 97-110, 176, 192, 194-96

Tolman, Richard C, 94

Tonopah, Nev., 62

Torpedoes

air-launched, 81

BuOrd request, 299

program, 298-300

testing facility, 81

Training air center. Inyokern, 176-77, 179

Transition from CalTech to NOTS, meeting,

185-86

Trinity, 216-17

Tripoli. 317

Trona, Calif., 31

Truman, Harry S., 185, 357

Tuve, M. A., 183

Tyler, Carroll, Capt., 34

Underwater missile. Weapon A, 302-03

Underwater ordnance, 298-303

Underwater range, 81-82

Underwater tests, 81-82

University of California, Berkeley, weapon

project at Los Alamos, 208

V-l bombs, 190, 192, 196

V-2 rockets, 124, 191-92, 196

Variable-angle launc'ier dedication, 354

Variable-angle launcher, Morris Dam,

300-302, 338, 354

Vasquez, Tiburcio, 45

Vazsonyi, Andrew, 288

Victory Day, Europe, 166

Victory, prologue to. 203

Vieweg, W. V. R. (RAdm.), 159

von Karman, Theodore, 172

Vnssler, Curtis F., Lt. (RAdm.), 57, 84,

176-77, 179, 224, 239, 322

Vossler, Francis A. L., Capt., 57

Walker, Ardis Manley, 51, 135

Walker, Joseph, 44

Walker Lake, Nev., underwater tests, 82

Waller, Joe, 141

Wnlthall, Douglas J., Lt., 107

Ware, Joseph T., Capt., USA, 308

Warner, Arthur Howard 257, 260

War Production Board, 182

Wasp, 317

Watson, E. C, 172-73

Waves stationed at NOTS, 91

Weapon A, 302-03

Weapon research and development, future,

163

Weapons (see specific weapon)

Webster, D. C. 269

Weinland, Clarence, 116

432
INDEX

Whi e Sands Proving Ground, N. Mex., 332

Wilbur, Paul A., 61

Wilson, Charles E., 182, 325

World War 11

aircraft weapons, need for, 6

ebb tide, 157

end of, Europe, 185

end of, Japan, 166, 223

NOTS contribution, 190-96

NOTS, lead laboratory, 82

rockets initiated into battles, 69-77,

190-96

weapon development status at end, 163

Young, David B., Capt., 159, 189

Young, Rodney L., Lt. (jg.), 16

Zuni, 297

433

ft H, S. GOVEHNMENT PlilNTING OFFICE : 1G7II O - 272-a85 (Vol.2)

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