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S. Hrg. 111–982 

COUNTERNARCOTICS CONTRACTS IN LATIN 

AMERICA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING 

OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 20, 2010 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JON TESTER, Montana 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MARGARET DAUM, Staff Director 

ALAN KAHN, Counsel 

BILL WRIGHT, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 

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C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 1 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 4 

Senator McCain ................................................................................................ 17 

Prepared statements: 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 37 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 39 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 42 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, MAY 20, 2010 

Hon. David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........................................ 4 

William F. Wechsler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counternarcotics and 

Global Threats, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................... 6 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Johnson, Hon. David T.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

Wechsler, Willilam F.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56 

APPENDIX 

Questions and responses submitted for the Record from: 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 75 

Mr. Wechsler ..................................................................................................... 98 

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COUNTERNARCOTICS CONTRACTS IN LATIN 

AMERICA 

THURSDAY, MAY 20, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT, OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m., in 

room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Claire 

McCaskill, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators McCaskill, Pryor, Brown, and McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. This hearing will now come to order. The 

purpose of this morning’s hearing is to examine how the U.S. Government is using contractors to fight the drug war in Latin America. 

The U.S. Government has been involved in counternarcotics activities in Latin America for more than 30 years. From 2000 to 

2008, the bulk of the counternarcotics assistance to Latin America 

was through Plan Colombia, a multi-year assistance package that 

was targeting Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. In the last 2 years, the 

Merida Initiative, which focuses on assistance to Mexico, has also 

increased in importance. Over the last decade, the U.S. taxpayers 

have spent billions of dollars on counternarcotics activities in the 

region. The President has asked for an additional $6 billion for 

international counternarcotics and drug interdiction in 2011. 

I understand that much of this money is currently being spent 

under contracts with companies like DynCorp and Lockheed Martin. Contractors have been hired to spray the drugs under cultivation. They have been hired to work in government ministries. They 

have been hired to help with intelligence for drug trafficking, help 

support the local army and police, and maintain bases where 

American troops live and work in Latin America. 

Their efforts are crucial to the success of the United States’ mission in Latin America. But there is really almost no transparency 

into what these contractors are doing or how much we are paying 

them. It appears that there has been insufficient oversight of these 

types of contracts. It is very important that contracts like this have 

sufficient oversight so that the contractors are accountable and we 

are assured that the taxpayers’ money is not being wasted. 

This oversight is particularly important right now because the 

United States is ramping up counternarcotics activities in AfghaniH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

2 

stan. The same Federal agencies and many of the same contractors 

are performing the work in both places. We need to understand 

what lessons we need to learn from Latin America so that we can 

apply them appropriately in Afghanistan. 

That is why at the beginning of this year the Subcommittee 

began an investigation into counternarcotics contracts. We wanted 

to know the answers to just a few very basic questions: What are 

we spending on the contracts? What are the contractors doing? And 

are we getting what we paid for? Do we have performance measures that are in place? And are we tracking performance measures 

as to how the contractors are performing this work and if we are 

getting any value out of the dollars that we have spent? 

We asked for this information from the State Department and 

the Defense Department more than 3 months ago. Despite our repeated requests, neither Department has been able to answer our 

questions as of the date of this hearing. 

And just so we are clear on the record, I am perfectly aware of 

the strains that hearings like this cause within an agency. I understand that it is not a day of celebration when you find out that a 

hearing like this is going to occur. It means additional work, additional effort. But because the requests here are so basic and, frankly, the notion that they would be so hard to get is part and parcel 

part of the problem. 

Let me just put on the record the basic information that we 

wanted to get. We wanted to get the contractor’s name, contract 

number, the extent of competition, the scope of the work, the contract ceiling, and the dollar amount obligated. 

Now, that is not the sun, the moon, and the stars. That is Basic 

Contracting 101. 

The second area where we requested information was evaluations that had been done of the contractors, reports concerning the 

contractors, audits that had been done of the contractors’ work, and 

evaluations of the contractors. 

The third area we asked for was some information about the 

need for the contract. Why is this something we must contract out? 

Why is this not something that we can perform as an inherently 

governmental function? The use of contractors, the scope of their 

contracts, and the duration of their contracts. 

And, finally, the last category was communication and legal analysis regarding the use of contractors. Four simple areas. We were 

not asking for an analysis of how much money you spent in 2009 

versus 2001 in real dollars and how much was attributable to—we 

did not ask for the details of any performance payments you had 

given to the contractors. This is pretty basic stuff. And none of 

these requests have been met in full. None, after 31⁄2 months of 

these requests being made. 

Instead, the Subcommittee has received information about contracts which appears to contradict the Departments’ own regular 

reports to the congressional Appropriations and Foreign Relations 

Committees. I have to congratulate the staff here because some of 

the information we got, if they had not gone on their own and double-checked other places where the Departments have to report, we 

would have not realized the extent of how inadequate the response 

to this document request was. 

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1The prepared statement of Senator Brown appears in the Appendix on page 39. 

The State Department appears to have underreported its contracts to the Subcommittee by hundreds of millions of dollars for 

Colombia alone. And the Subcommittee also learned that the Defense Department hired a contractor to handle this hearing. Are 

you kidding me? Have we gotten to that point that we have to hire 

a contractor to prepare for a Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight hearing? Does anybody else feel that you are in a hall of mirrors in a fun house? I know that we have spent $50,000 on contractors to prepare for this hearing at the Defense Department. 

What I asked for, there should be somebody in charge of contract 

oversight that could produce the documents easily in 30 days. Instead, we are hiring contractors to do it for us. 

Today, I plan to ask these basic questions that the document request reflected. I plan to listen to the testimony, and I hope that 

the witnesses will be able to help the Subcommittee conduct this 

important oversight today and in the future. 

What we learn today will inform the Subcommittee whether we 

should move to authorize subpoenas for this information. I hope 

the State Department and the Defense Department will be able to 

provide the information we need. I wish I were more optimistic. 

What we have to figure out here is: Is this basic information unavailable because the Departments are incapable of producing it or 

incompetent? Because it is only one of two answers. If you are incapable of producing it, then we have a serious issue on contracting 

oversight. And, obviously, if you are incompetent and cannot 

produce it, we have a serious problem in terms of counternarcotics 

strategy and how it is being implemented. 

I do not want to use subpoenas. This should be a cooperative exercise. But I will not hesitate, and I know that my Ranking Member feels the same way. I know Senator Brown feels the same way. 

I will not hesitate to use subpoenas because this is important, and 

it is billions and billions of dollars. And we need to get to a point 

where the appropriators say no more money until you are at least 

capable of showing us how you have spent what you got. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here, and I look forward 

to our discussion today. 

Senator Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to welcome everybody again. Madam Chairman, I want to thank you for 

holding this hearing. I will offer my opening in the form of a written statement, which I would ask be accepted, and then I would 

just as soon get on with the business.1

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Senator Pryor, thanks for joining us. Would 

you like to make any comments for the record before we begin the 

witnesses’ testimony? 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 43. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. Well, thank you. I do have an opening statement 

for the record, but I want to thank you for your leadership on this 

because we owe it to the American taxpayer to make sure that people know where their Federal tax dollars are going, and I think 

there is a pervasive problem with contracting around the Federal 

Government, and I just appreciate your leadership on this. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator 

Pryor. 

Let me introduce the witnesses today. David Johnson has served 

as the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the State Department since 

October 2007. In addition to numerous other distinguished posts 

within the Federal Government, Mr. Johnson served as Afghan Coordinator for the United States from May 2002 to July 2003. 

William Wechsler is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Counternarcotics and Global Threats. In that capacity he leads 

the Department’s counternarcotics policies and operations around 

the world. Mr. Wechsler has previously served as Special Adviser 

to the Secretary of the Treasury and on the staff of the National 

Security Council. 

It is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses 

that appear before us, so if you do not mind, I would ask you to 

stand. Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this 

Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I do. 

Mr. WECHSLER. I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. Let the record reflect 

that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. 

We would ask that you try to keep your oral testimony to around 

5 minutes, and your written testimony will obviously be printed in 

the record in its entirety. Thank you very much. Mr. Johnson. 

TESTIMONY HON. DAVID T. JOHNSON,1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Brown, and Senator Pryor, thank you for the opportunity you are 

giving us today to testify on the United States’ counternarcotics efforts in Latin America. 

Anyone looking at news south of our border knows that drug-related violence is spiraling. Drug-trafficking organizations have 

shown time and again that they have no decency or respect for the 

law or human life, and the increasing violence currently that we 

are seeing in Mexico is emblematic of these cartels’ disregard for 

anything but profit. 

It is hard to overstate the impact that this kind of violence and 

crime can have. The individual tragedies we hear about on a daily 

basis, such as innocent lives lost in cartel cross fire, rip at the fabric of families and communities. This undermines public security, 

weakens government institutions, and, if left unchecked, provides 

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5 

a breeding ground for narcotraffickers and other threats to our own 

national security. 

As the State Department’s Assistant Secretary for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), much of the work 

that I do involves foreign assistance programs to isolate and minimize drug-trafficking organizations. Each of our programs in Latin 

America is unique to the country it supports. They are built handin-hand with our partners to strengthen their own capacity for law 

enforcement and the rule of law, creating strong systems of governance that empower communities and seek to suffocate narcotics enterprises. 

While each program is unique, there are some important common 

features, including our on-the-ground contract oversight elements. 

We operate narcotics affairs sections within the U.S. embassies of 

our largest program countries, including both Colombia and Mexico. These offices, which include Foreign Service officers, civil service officers, and locally engaged staff, work with host nation representatives to develop the scope of our assistance projects and 

draft the requirements needed to achieve these goals. 

Approximately one out of every eight people who work for us in 

Central and South America directly in our offices or in the field has 

received training as a contracting officer’s representative, a knowledge set that empowers our program staff to be efficient and effective stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars dedicated to the foreign assistance programs they support. Our single largest allotment of 

contracting officer’s representatives trained staff, 43 in total, help 

to oversee INL’s Colombia programs. 

After more than 10 years supporting Colombians in their quest 

to provide greater security in their country, the Government of Colombia has taken steps to self-administer the counternarcotics 

eradication and alternative development programs that the United 

States helped to introduce. Colombia President Uribe’s consolidation plan is to nationalize our joint programs, and that is now Colombian Government and U.S. Government policy. 

As a result, our programs in Colombia have been able to reduce 

their footprint considerably, scaling back our contract personnel 

implementers on the ground from 1,200 in 2006 to fewer than 600 

in 2010. 

We see similar program cooperation from our Mexican counterparts who are equally engaged in leading the Merida Initiative 

planning and implementation process. In fact, bilateral meetings 

are held on a monthly basis to discuss progress on each of the 46 

Merida projects which are extensively negotiated each fiscal year. 

In order effectively to oversee this program, INL has enlarged our 

officer in Mexico from 21 people in 2008 to 77 slots this year, more 

than 60 of which are already filled. Twenty-eight of the personnel 

currently in Mexico have received contracting officer’s representative training. We have taken the additional step of assigning three 

full-time contracting officer’s representatives to the staffing pattern 

in Mexico City, in addition to the 28 personnel trained in contract 

management. 

Our business approach toward implementation of assistance programs throughout Latin America is to seek the most effective and 

efficient implementer to achieve our program goals. As a matter of 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Wechsler appears in the Appendix on page 56. 

practice, we choose implementation vehicles after conducting analysis of the program type, past performance, cost, availability, and 

the political and security environment in which we operate. The 

implementing mechanisms include contracts with companies of all 

sizes, program agreements with interagency partners, grants to 

nongovernmental organizations and educational institutions, and 

contribution letters to multilateral organizations. 

Our approach to management allows the Department to plan for 

effective transitions and build-up and drawdown program management and oversight staff as circumstances dictate. Procurements to 

support our programs are made by the embassies’ contracting officers, the Department’s Regional Procurement Support Office in 

Fort Lauderdale and the Department’s Office of Acquisition, or directly by INL. 

Factors such as the complexity, type of acquisition, scope of work, 

the involvement of other agencies or requirements such required 

sources of supply and whether other agencies have existing contract vehicles are considered as factors in the analysis of the procurement. Once procured, a variety of management controls are essential to monitor and oversee these programs. 

All government-procured commodities and construction are subject to INL’s end-use monitoring and reporting to track their use 

and consistency with agreed foreign assistance use. 

The Department remains committed to building and maintaining 

the necessary capacity to address citizen safety, rule of law, and 

transnational crime in Latin America for two compelling reasons: 

First, to assist our international partners; and, second, to diminish 

the impact transnational crime has on America’s own citizens. 

Madam Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to illustrate 

some of our counternarcotics assistance programs and our contracting vehicles. I will do my best to answer your questions. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. Mr. Wechsler. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. WECHSLER,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL 

THREATS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. WECHSLER. Thank you very much, Chairman McCaskill, 

Senator Brown, and Senator Pryor. Thank you for the opportunity 

to discuss the Department of Defense’s use and oversight of counternarcotics contracts in the Western Hemisphere. Before describing what I consider to be a significant return on our investments 

over the years in counternarcotics funds, I would like to start by 

addressing some of the specific concerns that you raised in your 

most recent letter and in your opening statement. 

The Counternarcotics and Global Threats Office that I lead was 

established by Congress some decades ago to be the single focal 

point for all of DOD’s counternarcotics activities and to ensure a 

focused counternarcotics program with clear priorities and measured results. You can be sure that this Administration recognizes 

the importance of the counter-drug mission to our national security 

and the Department’s critical role in this effort. 

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When I came into this office just about a year ago, I recognized 

that we need to do a better job in evaluating our programs and 

using performance data to maximize return on dollars that we invest in counternarcotics. This is an especially important subject for 

me. In between the time that you mentioned previously where I 

was in the government, I was a management consultant working 

on these issues in the private sector. This has been one of my top 

priorities since I have been on this job. 

To that end, both the Counternarcotics Technology Program Office (CNTPO) and Southern Command have taken other positive 

steps to improve contract oversight, and I have initiated an internal management review that will be well underway by the early 

summer. I would be happy to discuss these measures in greater detail in the question-and-answer session. 

At the Department level, in December 2009, the Defense Science 

Board launched a task force on improving DOD acquisition and 

procurement policies and practices. Just on May 10 of this year, 

Under Secretary Carter issued department-wide instructions to collect and report on all services contracts as required in the authorization bill. The common reporting requirement will help provide 

the greater transparency and will help the Department make more 

informed decisions about whether to contract out certain functions. 

We very much welcome the Subcommittee’s interest in our oversight efforts. You noted that you felt that we perceived your oversight as a strain on us. I want to assure you that it is not a strain 

at all on us. It is your appropriate function, and we very much welcome it and appreciate it because we are driving towards the exact 

same end. 

We understand our data submission thus far has been incomplete. Please rest assured that we will continue to work to provide 

all the information that you requested. I expect that we will be able 

to complete this effort by the end of July. 

My staff and I will continue to work with the Subcommittee after 

that point as it continues to analyze the enormous amount of information we have already provided and we will be continuing to provide. This was, of course, an especially large and extensive request 

going back across touching three different Administrations, across 

almost an entire hemisphere, but that is not an excuse. We need 

to be able to get this information better and faster than we have. 

It shows the challenges inherent in overseeing a $1 billion global 

program implemented by numerous services, combatant commands, 

and agencies in the Department of Defense. 

For instance, in compiling the requested information, we found 

inconsistent records management among the various contracting 

entities, that the volume of procurement actions overwhelms staff 

capacity in some instances, that many of the acquisition steps are 

manual processes that are both time-consuming and error prone. 

Also, because the Combatant Command (COCOMS) define and 

drive the mission support requirements, but the services provide 

the acquisition vehicles, contract performance monitoring has at 

times often been ambiguous and inconsistent, especially as we look 

back over the years, over the decades. I look forward to a continuing dialogue on these and other issues. 

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Ensuring proper oversight and contract management is absolutely essential to achieving our strategic counternarcotics objectives. The transnational illicit drug trade is a multi-faceted national security concern for the United States, which my colleague 

David Johnson has just talked about. It weakens the rule of law. 

It reduces government’s ability to address other transnational 

threats such as terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, weapons 

and human trafficking, money laundering, and piracy. 

Many of us here recall the drug trafficking and lawlessness of 

the 1980s that made ‘‘Miami Vice’’ a hit television series during 

that time, going through the Caribbean into Florida. The counternarcotics mission at that time was not a principal mission of the 

Department of Defense, but the Congress recognized that DOD’s 

surveillance capabilities and command and control structure was 

unique suited for the detection and monitoring of illicit drug shipments bound for the United States. DOD programs primarily implemented by U.S. Southern Command and its Joint Interagency 

Task Force-South (JIATF) have made a tremendous impact on the 

drug flow directly into Florida and to the mainland. The problem 

is different today as a result. 

The counternarcotics mission was once slow to be embraced by 

some of our defense policymakers, it is true, but today the Department is widely recognized as a critical component of the National 

Drug Control Strategy, and JIATF-South is viewed as really the 

model for regional engagement and interagency coordination. 

During the late 1990s, the Department of Defense played a vital 

role in the development and implementation of Plan Colombia. The 

State Department’s lead by providing equipment, information sharing, and capacity building to the Colombian armed forces. These 

programs, again coordinated very closely with the Department of 

State’s leadership, with DEA, and USAID, has helped the Government of Colombia increase its presence throughout the country, reduce levels of violence, disrupt drug production and trafficking, and 

dismantle drug-trafficking organizations. These achievements have 

contributed to the reductions we have seen in cocaine purity and 

availability in the United States. 

In Mexico, our programs are supporting President Calderon’s 

continuing campaign to confront rising violence fueled by drug trafficking and other organized crime. Our support to Mexico is implemented primarily through Northern Command and includes training, equipment, and information sharing as well as indirect support. 

While outside the scope of the Merida Initiative that you mentioned, the foreign assistance funding, our support complements 

Merida and is closely coordinated with our interagency partners at 

post and in Washington. 

As the Department continues to confront extraordinarily complex 

counternarcotics challenges around the world, very much particularly in Afghanistan, it is important—it is, in fact, critical that we 

apply all of the lessons that we have learned from the efforts in the 

Western Hemisphere to the work that we are doing now in our 

major war effort abroad. 

Afghanistan presents unique challenges that are different from 

what we have seen in many respects from Colombia and elsewhere, 

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but there are many lessons, including the appropriate use and 

oversight of contractors, that must be taken into consideration. 

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to speak today, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Wechsler. 

What we are going to do, if we would go ahead and let us just 

do 7-minute rounds, if we could put the clock to 7 minutes, that 

would be great, because I want to make sure that everybody gets 

a chance to offer questions, and we can do as many rounds as people would like. 

Let me just start with a few basics. Do you know, Mr. Johnson, 

how much the State Department spent on counternarcotics contracts last year? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The data that I have gathered in front of me is 

for the period from 2000 to 2009, but we cannot disaggregate it by 

year. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, do you have a figure for what you 

have spent over the last 10 years? 

Mr. JOHNSON. By the principal countries in question, yes. Bolivia, $770 million; Colombia, $4.2 billion; Peru, $900 million; Ecuador, $191 million; Guatemala, $23 million; Mexico, $727 million; 

Dominican Republic, $6.9 million; Haiti, $10.7 million. Those are 

appropriated funds amounts. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And how much of that has been spent 

on contracts? 

Mr. JOHNSON. In the case of Colombia, $3.89 billion; Bolivia, 

$726 million; Peru, $831 million. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Let me stop you here. Is there a reason 

that you have this information today and that you could not 

produce it for the Subcommittee so we could prepare for the hearing? 

Mr. JOHNSON. In the course of the work that we have done with 

your staff, we initially reached out for documents that we could 

provide, supporting documentation for—that was name retrievable, 

and we have built up since then additional numerals, and we are 

seeking the supporting document for that as well. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So you have the numbers that you are 

confident are correct for how much the State Department has spent 

on counternarcotics contracts for an aggregate over 10 years, and 

you could easily extrapolate an annual number out of each one of 

those? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I would not extrapolate it, but I would 

disaggregate it down to that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK, sorry. Wrong term. And I am wondering why you did not talk about that in your opening statement 

instead of—I mean, we got to page 11 of your opening statement 

before you mentioned the word ‘‘contract.’’ 

Mr. JOHNSON. I sought to put in some context the policy objectives that we are pursuing. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, let me remind you, we are here on 

contracting oversight. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I understand. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We are not here to argue about whether or 

not it is a good thing or a bad thing, although I am trying to figure 

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10 

out why it is so—why we have two, and how much—I mean, that 

is not the job of this Subcommittee. This Subcommittee is about 

contracting oversight. 

Now, do you know how many contractors you now have currently 

working in Colombia? Do you know what the size of your contracting—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. It is 598. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you know the total number of contractors you have working for State in counternarcotics? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I could get that figure for you by country, but I 

do not have it at my fingertips right now. I happen to know the 

Colombia figure because it is our most mature program, it is the 

one we worked hardest on to reformulate and to nationalize with 

our Colombian partners, and part of that nationalization is reducing the contractor footprint on the ground and turning over as 

much as possible, as much as appropriate, to the Colombians in a 

coordinated fashion. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And since now for the first time we are 

getting real numbers from you as to an annual contracting amount 

and how many contractors, do you have any contractor evaluations 

that you can share with us today? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not have any at my fingertips here, but we 

are gathering that data for you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And why is it so hard to gather it? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, as you pointed out in your opening statement, this requires time, and we have put in time to gather the 

documents and to clear the documents that we provided you at the 

end of last week, some several thousand pages that backed up the 

initial dollar amount, which was a relatively small percentage of 

this, I recognize that. But we were striving to provide you data 

that we could back up with paper, and we are moving to the second 

phase of that, bringing in, as you recognized in the letter that you 

sent me, the global programs, particularly those that are administered by our air wing at Patrick Air Force Base. And we will endeavor to gather in all of the information that is in many different 

places at our embassies abroad as well as here in order to back up 

the efforts that we have underway. We feel like we have done a 

good job. We know we could do a better job, and we look forward 

to your helping us do that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, the bottom line is that it does not appear—are you confident that you have evaluations on all these contractors and that there are audits that have been done on any of 

the contractors? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I am confident that we have evaluations. I am not 

going to tell you that we have audits because I do not know that 

off the top of my head. I would be speculative there, and I do not 

want to do that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Who is the person that is at the top of the 

food chain on contracts that you all are doing? Or is the problem 

that you—is each individual embassy entitled to contract and there 

is nobody that is looking at all these contracts to see if we are getting the performance out of these contractors that we would hope 

with this kind of expenditure of Federal funds? 

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11 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the buck stops with me, but we do authorize 

our embassies to engage in contracting for varying amounts, and 

we have other officials that are responsible for the implementation 

of the contracts that are in locations outside of Washington that 

manage their contracts not on a state-by-state basis but in a global 

or regional support context. And so gathering the data, as you have 

requested it, is a process that takes some time. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, it does not—I guess the thing that is 

worrisome to me is a request for contractor name, contract number, 

extent of competition, scope of work, which should be a pretty easy 

document to get because every contract should have a scope of 

work. 

Mr. JOHNSON. They do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It is not a contract if you do not have a 

scope of work. The contract ceiling and the dollar amount obligated. We have six spread sheets—no, excuse me. We have one 

spread sheet with a tab for each of the last 10 fiscal years. We did 

not get the right number, and we were not even told that it was 

an incomplete number when it was given to us. We had to point 

out to you that it was an incomplete number based on other research we had done. In fact, the number we got, somebody on my 

staff could have gotten in an hour in a Google data search. Any 

member of the public could have gotten it. 

So, I guess what I am most concerned about is that no one appears to be worried about value as it relates to these contractors. 

It appears that these have been siloed and no one has taken responsibility to say, hey, how are the contractors doing? Should we 

be renewing these contracts? You do not have that many. How 

many contractors do you have, by and large, that are doing the 

bulk of the work? Isn’t it like four or five? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The bulk of the work is done by, yes, four or five. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So, if you would have come to us and 

said, hey, here is the bulk of the work done by four or five contractors, it is going to take more time and may not be as efficient as 

we would want it to be to get you every single small contract for 

some kind of logistic support or whatever, but for the five big ones, 

should it be this hard to get this information? 

Mr. JOHNSON. While there are five big contractors, as you pointed out, there are individual statements of work and task orders 

that execute the individual efforts that we have in different countries at different times. So it is not a matter of going to one single 

contractor and gathering all the data for every single task order 

and every single statement of work. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Well, my time is up, but I have more 

questions, and I just think, with all due respect, for you to come 

and give an opening statement that is all about the policy of counternarcotics strategy and even mentions Haiti—which has nothing 

to do with what we are talking about today. We are talking about 

contracting and whether or not somebody is minding the store on 

contracting. And we are going to continue to bore down until we 

get the answers on contracting, because I have an uneasy feeling 

that if we get all the information, there is going to be a lot more 

work that needs to be done on contracting oversight at the State 

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12 

Department. And, Mr. Wechsler, I have questions for you on the 

next round. 

Senator Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

It is interesting, Madam Chairman, when I first heard that I was 

going to be on this Subcommittee, I said, ‘‘Oh, gosh, contracting. 

That is pretty boring.’’ But with all due respect, it is getting more 

and more interesting because of the things that we have been 

learning about the money that is being spent and how it is being 

spent and why it is being spent and how much money is owed or 

we owe various contracting entities. So I am actually very excited 

to be on this Subcommittee. 

I am wondering, Mr. Johnson, are there any overpayments of 

contracts that are outstanding with any of the four or five major 

groups? Do we owe them any monies or do they owe us any monies 

from any overpayments or anything like that? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I know that outside of this region there are 

overpayments that we have in the provisional payment program 

that we have in Afghanistan, for example. I am unaware of any 

overpayments that we have calculated that are currently outstanding. I am certain that there are bills that are pending that 

we are—— 

Senator BROWN. In the ordinary course? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Senator BROWN. And how about any breaches of contracts from 

any of these four or five entities? Are they performing all the terms 

of their contracts, to the best of your knowledge? 

Mr. JOHNSON. To the best of my knowledge, yes. 

Senator BROWN. And are there any outstanding terms that you 

are aware of, any performance issues that we need to be concerned 

about with these contracts? 

Mr. JOHNSON. There is constant oversight of these contracts, and 

there is constant work with the contractors to address issues on a 

daily basis. So I am sure that there are some things that are being 

done every day, but—— 

Senator BROWN. Nothing major that would warrant us learning 

more about it? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I am sure that some of these would be of interest, 

but they are at the individual embassy level. 

Senator BROWN. OK. One of my concerns is I just want to make 

sure we are spending our money properly, that it is properly accounted for, etc. And I know in our April 15 hearing on the Afghan 

National Police, that contract administered by the State Department which you just referenced a little bit, we inquired into the 

lack of oversight made possible by the inadequate number of Incountry Contracting Officer Representatives the (ICOR) who are responsible for monitoring and inspecting the contractors’ performance on the ground. Can you reassure this Subcommittee that the 

problems in contract administration are not occurring in other regions like Latin America and in the Caribbean? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The contracting work that we are doing in Latin 

America is much more mature, and it operates in a much more benign environment than we have had in Iraq and Afghanistan. So 

we have been able to build in contracting oversight as we built up 

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13 

these programs. We have a number of our people who are trained 

that are administering the contracting contract oversight as well as 

quality assurance managers that are individually assigned to the 

major countries, for example, six in Colombia, three in Bolivia. We 

have two Contracting Officer Representatives (COR) in Mexico and 

one contracting officer in order to provide direct oversight there. 

Senator BROWN. And are you able to delineate for the Subcommittee the number of ICORs or personnel on the ground incountry responsible for contract surveillance, for example, in Colombia and in Mexico? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. The individual—the numerals that I just 

cited for you, that is their responsibility. 

Senator BROWN. OK, great. The Administration’s fiscal year 2011 

budget request includes $36 billion less for contractors, which, as 

you noted, is a 5-percent decline for the current year. Based on this 

reduction, is the Department of State and DOD realigning the 

strategies or are you going to be able to fit within that framework? 

Mr. JOHNSON. In certain of the programs for which I am responsible, for example, Colombia, which has had a large dollar amount 

dedicated to contracting over time, the appropriation itself is declining as Colombia has engaged in a nationalization program with 

us. So within that, we are able to reduce. 

Likewise, in Mexico, the appropriations which have been provided over the last three appropriation cycles have been dedicated 

in significant measure to large acquisitions for aircraft, data processing equipment, things of that nature; whereas, as we look into 

the out-years, we are looking more at capacity-building efforts 

which will not require the same sums of money and in significant 

measure will be implemented through interagency agreements by 

our partners who are providing direct training. 

Senator BROWN. Great. And this is obviously for you, Mr. Wechsler, this next question. What is the status of the transition of the 

U.S. support programs to the Colombian Government? And, in 

turn, I would like maybe both of you to comment, and then I will 

turn it over to the next Senator to speak. And what lessons learned 

have we learned, what lessons learned have we gained through our 

experience in Colombia and with transitioning a U.S. function to 

the host country that may be applied to our new situation in Afghanistan? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Thank you very much. It is an exceedingly important question. There are a great number of functions that are 

being transferred, that have been transferred to the Government of 

Colombia and are being transferred to the Government of Colombia 

and still some capacity that the Government of Colombia needs to 

build in and of itself. But the fascinating thing for me compared 

to the last time I was in government at the end of the Clinton Administration when Plan Colombia was beginning—this statistic will 

always stick in my mind—is that two-thirds of the Colombian people at the time thought that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) was going to take Bogota. Now the FARC is a shadow of what it was. The effort is not over. But the end result is that 

Colombia is now an exporter of security and helps us regionally 

and even outside the region to export security based on the capacH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

14 

ities that they have built in part with our assistance and that we 

have transferred to them. 

Amongst the lessons that are critical to learn from a policy perspective is that this takes a long period of time. We cannot think 

in terms of years. We cannot think in terms of certainly news cycles. But we have to think in terms of a decade, quite often, to have 

this kind of impact for the full range of transition of the services 

from building them in the beginning to them being an exporter of 

security, which means we need steady, consistent efforts in these 

areas. 

Another thing that I would suggest where we have had the most 

success is where we have a whole-of-government effort on our side, 

and Colombia is probably one of our better examples of that wholeof-government approach to these issues. 

And then I think that there are also, again, back to the purpose 

of this Subcommittee especially—and, again, I am more than 

happy, in fact, very eager to talk about matters of policy, but I 

know that this Subcommittee is talking about contracting. I do believe that there are lessons to be learned from contracting during 

this whole effort from this era as we look back. And, again, as we 

have begun looking back even before this Subcommittee hearing, 

but especially in conjunction with the task required for this Subcommittee and our work that I look forward to doing and continuing with this Subcommittee, there are lessons to be learned, 

lessons to be drawn about the requirement for very clear and concise requirements give by the COCOMs and oversight by the services, by the contracting offices, providing the necessary oversight 

that is required. In some cases, this worked well. In some cases, 

this did not seem to work as well as it should. And what we want 

to do is make sure that we have those lessons and we apply them 

to Afghanistan where we are doing the reviews of these programs 

as well there, and we find also some things are working very well, 

some things are not, and we want to make sure that the things 

that are not working well are working better. And I am happy to 

talk to you about some of the things that we have done in that area 

as well. 

I hope I have answered your question. 

[Pause.] 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Johnson, I am going to put you back in the hot seat here for 

just a minute. Could you give the Subcommittee just a very brief, 

30-second overview of what we are talking about in the contracting 

world? What do you contract for? And who do you contract with? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We contract significantly for civilian police services, a global contract, which is a delivery indefinite, quantity contract. 

Senator PRYOR. Is that a private security firm you are talking 

about? 

Mr. JOHNSON. There are three current qualified bidders under 

this for task orders under this contract: Civilian Police International, a division of L3; Pacific Architects and Engineers, which 

was acquired, I believe, about a year ago by Lockheed Martin, was 

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15 

formerly an independent company; and DynCorp International. We 

have other contracting relationships as well. That is by far the 

largest dollar amount because, in addition to that, DynCorp is a 

successful bidder on our global aviation contract. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. You mentioned before that there are maybe 

four or five companies that do the bulk of the work. Are these competitive bids? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The Civilian Police contract that I mentioned is a 

competitive bid. That contract has been extended several times, but 

there is an request for proposal (RFP) on the street right now. Bids 

are due June 1. It is my hope and it has been my ambition since 

I took this job to broaden the pool of contractors that we could 

work with. I think that three is too few, if you will, and would like 

to enhance our ability to compete them against one another. 

Senator PRYOR. You mentioned three companies. What are the 

other one or two or three that also do the bulk of the work? 

Mr. JOHNSON. A small amount of the work but an important 

amount is done by an Alaska Native company that provides some 

individual services for us, and Lockheed Martin has provided some 

services as well. 

In addition, one of the more successful efforts we have had during the period of time we are talking about is currently using the 

contracting capability of the Department of the Army and reaching 

to its eight contractors, I think, that it can work with on our behalf 

for some acquisition of goods. 

Senator PRYOR. And, Mr. Wechsler, is it true with the contracting you do that you usually work with four or five or six contractors? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes. We work with a great number, but there is 

a group that receives the majority of the resources. 

Senator PRYOR. Is it the same group that the State Department 

uses? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Well, for instance, in South and Central America, looking back at this period over the last decade, according to 

the data that we have collected thus far—and I always want to 

stress that because, as I said in my opening statement, we are continuing to work on this. We have collected an awful lot of the data, 

but there is more for us to collect. But according to the data that 

we have collected thus far, the top ones are DynCorp, Lockheed 

Martin, Northrop Grumman, ITT, and King Aerospace. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. We have seen problems in Latin America 

with corruption in government—in fact, we are, unfortunately, 

starting to see corruption even in our government with border security personnel because of the Mexican drug cartels, which is very 

disturbing. But how do you know that these contractors are not 

corrupted? Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The way that we have worked with them in order 

to guard against that is to have an active conversation with them 

about their own internal control procedures, and as we discover 

challenges to that, to bring them to their attention and to seek improvements. All three of the ones that we are working with currently are public companies so that they are required to have the 

accounting procedures under Sarbanes-Oxley, which is a safeguard 

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that we think is important. And it is a constant effort to work with 

them on this issue. 

I think that the use of contractors that are this size gives us 

some internal controls that are important, but this is not something that you fire and forget, if you will. I work actively and have 

an ongoing conversation with senior management with these companies whenever any problem is drawn to my attention. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me just say this on behalf of the Subcommittee. I do not want to speak for any individual, but I think 

there is an institutional concern here, and that is, Senator 

McCaskill talked about how you have not been forthcoming with a 

lot of documentation, and apparently the Chairman has been determined to try to get as much information from you as possible, and 

that has not really been forthcoming. And what that does, at least 

in my mind, is it raises a question about how on top of this you 

really are. 

You talk about how you have these procedures in place and this, 

that, and the other, but if you cannot provide us with the documentation and the numbers and the details of some of the contracts and some of the requests that the Subcommittee has made, 

it raises a question, in my mind, about how much you really are 

overseeing these contracts. So that is another reason why I hope 

you will get us the documentation very quickly. 

I also want to follow up on Senator Brown’s question about 

whether these companies are fulfilling their contracts. Your testimony a few moments ago was that they are fulfilling the terms of 

the contract, they are not breaching the contracts? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not have any evidence that they are breaching 

the terms of the contract, but we work with them constantly to 

make sure that they are fulfilling the requirements of the individual task orders under these contracts. I think that is where my 

attention goes. 

Senator PRYOR. I know that one of the things that Senator 

McCain has spent a lot of his time on since he has been in the Senate is contracting and making sure that the terms of the contracts 

are fulfilled. In his work on the Armed Services Committee and 

through other places we have learned that there are many examples of government contracts where the low bidder wins, but then 

once you get into the contract, they either cannot comply with all 

the terms or they seek more money or a longer amount of time to 

do the work that they originally bargained for. 

Do you find that is occurring in these contracts as well? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I know of instances where under individual task 

orders we have not been, shall we say, completely satisfied that the 

company has provided the individuals that we needed to perform 

in a training mission, but that is something that we address with 

them as aggressively as we possibly can. 

Senator PRYOR. And I know that one of the things—again, not 

to take Senator McCain’s thunder because he has been a leader on 

this for a long time, but just the overall cost overruns of contracts 

are a great concern to us, where you may get into some sort of military procurement of a weapons system or whatever it may be, and 

you think you are going to spend X, and by the end of the contract, 

you are really spending maybe double or triple that. 

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17 

Do you see those large cost overruns in these contracts? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that we face, if you will, a slightly different 

kind of problem because we do not tend to be buying equipment 

which is in the new design phase, right at the cutting edge, where 

there is more of an opportunity and a challenge on that. 

Where we do have a problem is having allocated funds for a particular service, does it really achieve the objective we are trying to 

achieve? And that is where I think we can be properly attentive to 

knowing whether the way the program is designed, the people that 

have been brought on board are actually doing what we need to 

have done. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Pryor. Senator McCain, 

welcome. We are glad to see you here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you 

for holding this hearing and for your continued zealous work on behalf of the taxpayers of this country. I am very grateful. 

Mr. Wechsler, I was struck by a comment that you made in your 

written statement. I think it really authenticates the reasoning for 

this hearing. You said in your written statement, ‘‘In compiling the 

information requested by the Subcommittee for this hearing, my office found inconsistent records management among the various contracting entities, found that the volume of procurement actions 

overwhelms staff capacity in some instances, and found that many 

of the acquisition steps are manual processes that are both timeconsuming and error prone.’’ 

What would have happened if we had not called for this hearing? 

Would those practices have simply continued? 

Mr. WECHSLER. The answer is no, Senator. This hearing, as I 

said in my opening oral statement, is quite timely and quite helpful 

because it dovetails completely with efforts that I have made since 

I came into office over the last year. These things that we have discovered in the course of this review have mirrored things that we 

have discovered in the course of our own reviews that have been 

going on, again, since I took office. 

We have discovered a number of areas in which processes can be 

improved, a number of times where things have worked exactly the 

way you want them to work, but there have been far too many 

times when information that I want I have not been able to receive 

as rapidly as I need to receive it; when I look into the contracts, 

I do not get the clarity that I need to see or I do not get the After 

Action Report that I need to see; and I do not want to be one of 

these appointees that only looks at things from their moment on, 

but I want to look at what happened before me so that I can get 

the lessons that are learned for what we are doing now. 

I will give just one example, sir, one that I know is very dear to 

your heart. My first trip abroad when I took this job was to Afghanistan, of course. One of the things that we do there is a significant amount of work with the Drug Enforcement Administration to 

train up the Afghans, special vetted units of the Afghan counternarcotics police in order to work alongside the U.S. military in the 

campaigns that we are doing today. And those programs, by the 

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18 

way, do involve a number of U.S. Government personnel, but also 

involve some contracting personnel, and those programs are working quite well, by and large. However, when I turn to the contracts 

and the efforts that were done to train the wider counternarcotics 

police, these were not nearly as effective. 

And I would say, Senator Pryor, with your question earlier, when 

you were asking about do contractors execute what is asked of 

them, I think that is an excellent question. Of course, there are lot 

of laws and processes that are designed to get that, but that is not 

the only question about did they check the boxes and do everything. Are they effective at the end of the day? And the efforts to 

train the counternarcotics police, the wider counternarcotics police, 

were not nearly as effective. 

One of the things that I discover when I was there was that 

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) did 

not have an individual development cell designed for the counternarcotics police, which is a different effort, of course, than the 

wider police. 

I talked with the leadership there. Now they have a cell. We relooked at the program, including the contracting program, changed 

some elements of it. I was just out there a few weeks ago, and I 

was impressed at the path that they are on. 

So that is the kind of approach that I am taking both in conjunction with the efforts driven by this Subcommittee, but also outside 

of that, preceding that, and continuing after this. 

Senator MCCAIN. All right. Well, let me just say that in your 

written statement, Contract Oversight Issues/Way Forward, you 

highlighted many of the problems that you have found, but there 

is very little, frankly, in your written statement as to what actions 

you have taken to cure these problems. Could you submit for the 

record the steps that you have taken to cure these problems, because I think you have correctly identified them, but I do not see 

specific steps that are being taken. Perhaps I missed them. But 

maybe you could provide them in a succinct fashion for the benefit 

of the Subcommittee. 

Mr. Wechsler, in your written testimony, you made an interesting statement that many people may not fully comprehend or 

may not be as aware of as they should be, ‘‘Terrorists associated 

with Islamic Radical Groups (IRGs) . . . as well as narcoterrorist 

groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(FARC), operate sophisticated networks designed to move not only 

weapons, drugs, and other materials, but people as well. A wealth 

of intelligence reporting has linked many IRG members to both 

drug trafficking and alien smuggling. . . . Such trafficking, in 

which terrorists with transnational reach commonly engage, is a 

present and growing danger to the security of the United States, 

our forces abroad, and our allies.’’ 

That is a very strong statement, Mr. Wechsler. Do you believe 

that the IRG or FARC are working with the Mexican drug cartels 

or foreign governments such as Venezuela? 

Mr. WECHSLER. It is an excellent question. The first thing that 

I would state is that there is far too much for my level of comfort 

that we do not know about all these questions. 

The second thing I would say is that what we—— 

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19 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Wechsler, I do not have a lot of time. I 

would like a direct answer. Do you believe that IRG or FARC are 

working with the Mexican drug cartels or foreign governments 

such as Venezuela? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Just yesterday, I believe, in Spain, there was a 

judge that produced information that was quite fascinating about 

Venezuela’s role—— 

Senator MCCAIN. With ETA, yes. 

Mr. WECHSLER. Exactly. The connections between these entities 

are often quite larger than we appreciate. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Wechsler, for the third time, I am going to 

ask you, do you believe—I would like a yes or no answer and then 

you may elaborate, OK? 

Mr. WECHSLER. The answer is no to your entire question because 

you said Mexico. I do not see the connection between the IRGs and 

Mexico. 

Senator MCCAIN. I said Mexican drug cartels or foreign governments. 

Mr. WECHSLER. Or foreign governments, yes. Venezuela, as I just 

referenced—it was the Mexican one that I do not have the evidence 

in front of me at present. 

Senator MCCAIN. And that means that Islamic radical groups 

could be coming across our southern border if the drug cartels and 

human smugglers are working with them? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Again, there is a lot that we do not know about 

these problems, but you are absolutely right to be asking these 

questions because there is an awful lot that we do not know about 

these issues. I have not seen, again, the connections between the 

Islamic terrorists and the IRGC and the Mexican drug cartels. 

That is the area that I have not seen evidence for. But it does not 

mean that it does not exist. It means that we need to investigate 

it. 

Senator MCCAIN. And if you say that it is a ‘‘present and growing 

danger to the security of the United States’’—I am quoting from 

your statement—does that influence your opinion as to whether the 

National Guard should be deployed to secure the border? 

Mr. WECHSLER. What we do on the border—it does influence my 

opinion. It does influence my opinion about what needs to be done 

on the border. Whether the National Guard is the right tool to be 

used is a question that comes from—that is a separate question. 

But it does indeed influence the decision about how we need to approach our border, indeed. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Wechsler, I have been around here a long 

time, and I would like straight answers. In other words, do you believe that we need the National Guard on the border or not in light 

of a present and growing danger? 

Mr. WECHSLER. I personally think that the National Guard is not 

the right tool for a lot of reasons on the border. I think that there 

are elements of the National Guard that play an especially important role in what we do on the border that my office funds. My office funds an awful lot of the deployments of the National Guard 

to the border. Those elements of the border, of what we do on the 

border, I support wholeheartedly. There are other proposals for 

what the National Guard might do on the border that I think 

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would be not the appropriate use of the National Guard on the border. 

Senator MCCAIN. If I may interpret your answer, some elements 

of the National Guard on the border would be helpful. 

Mr. WECHSLER. We already do that. Yes, sir. I pay for it out of 

my budget. There are deployments that we go down to do that on 

a regular basis, and those are quite valuable, indeed. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Do you believe that the UAVs have 

been beneficial and perhaps more use of them would help in our 

effectiveness? 

Mr. WECHSLER. I think we cannot get enough UAVs around the 

world, indeed. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you think that the Mexican Government in 

its struggle with the drug cartels—and I realize this one is a tough 

question—is winning or losing that struggle? 

Mr. WECHSLER. It is a tough question. I believe that it is—and, 

again, I know you more than others appreciate how challenging 

that question is. And I do not mean to be evasive on this. 

Senator MCCAIN. I understand this is a tough question. 

Mr. WECHSLER. But I do want to say that when I look at whether 

you are winning or losing, the first question that I ask is: Do they 

have the right policy and approach? The next questions is: Do they 

have the right structure? Do they have the right people? Do they 

have the right resources? But the first question is: Do they have 

the right policy and approach? And President Calderon has the 

right policy and approach. He has brought the fight to the drugtrafficking organizations in a way that we have not seen before in 

Mexico. And he has brought some tools to this fight in a way that 

we have never seen before in Mexico. 

Senator MCCAIN. And we have increased the Plan Merida and all 

of those things. 

Mr. WECHSLER. Right. 

Senator MCCAIN. What do you think the outcome has been so 

far? 

Mr. WECHSLER. So far we have not seen an outcome yet. We 

have seen some tactical evidence of success from time to time, but 

it is not the case that they have solved this problem or are even 

in a place where we see it in the immediate horizon. I compare this 

much more closely to the earlier stages of Plan Colombia, and I 

think that—and perhaps this is where you are going with this, and 

I had mentioned this a little bit in my opening statement. One of 

the challenges for the United States more generally is that we have 

very short time horizons for problem sets that have very long time 

horizons. This is a problem set that has a long time horizon and 

requires as much longer time horizon that, in fact, I think we have 

given it previously. And it requires consistent—and only at the end 

of that long horizon are we going to be able to say that we have 

won. 

Senator MCCAIN. I am way over time and I apologize, Madam 

Chairman, but let me just say that if you gauge success or lack of 

success in the number of Mexican citizens killed in this struggle 

with the drug cartels, you can certainly reach the conclusion that 

they are not winning. Would you agree with that? 

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Mr. WECHSLER. By that judgment, there is absolutely no question. You are correct, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Mr. Wechsler, in the 10-year period, you say, between 1999 and 2009, the Defense Department spent $5.3 billion in counternarcotics programs, and then, I am quoting, ‘‘. . . it is estimated 

that 18 percent . . . was expended towards contractor support.’’ I 

am concerned that you have to estimate that figure. 

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I am even more concerned that you had 

to hire a contractor to help you estimate that figure. 

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So, first, I want to point out that we do not 

know for sure because you are estimating. That needs to go to the 

top of the list problem. And walk me through the decisionmaking 

process. You get a notice from this Subcommittee that we are going 

to look into contracting in counternarcotics work in this hemisphere, and walk me through the process where somebody says, 

‘‘Hire a contractor to do it.’’ Is this common? Does the Defense Department hire contractors to prepare them for hearings all the 

time? 

I think you understand the line of questioning. The reason this 

hearing is important is because, as you candidly admitted in your 

testimony, as Senator McCain pointed out—and I admire you for 

your candor—in fact, this hearing helped you realize that you have 

a problem. 

Now, if in fact, people at the Pentagon are hiring contractors to 

take care of hearings, how do we ever get through to that maze of 

a bureaucracy that they have a management problem? Should we 

pass something in the defense authorization this year that says you 

cannot hire contractors to help you prepare for oversight hearings? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Thank you. Thank you very much. Let me get to 

all your questions because your questions are, of course, critically 

important to us. 

It is an estimate, first and foremost, and the reason why it is an 

estimate—and I want to be clear about what we have done for you 

and what we have not done for you yet—is we have not received 

all of the information. There are some elements—again, we are 

going back 10 years, 15 acquisition and contracting components, 

Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS), COCOMs, services, defense agencies, National Guard Bureaus, all their contracting offices, we have done over 2,000 independent actions thus 

far going across, again, three Administrations. This is in no way to 

excuse this situation. This is merely an explanation of the scope 

and what we are doing. 

As you know, we went back immediately, when we got your letter, to seek some clarity about narrowing or focusing or trying to 

understand how we could best help it. You said you wanted the entire thing. We said, great, we will do it. We then went through the 

process and tried to figure out how we could best go forward and 

provide this information to you. And, frankly, this gets to your next 

question. And just from a personal perspective, the last time I was 

in the Department of Defense was in 1995 when I served directly 

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22 

for General Shalikashvili. When I came back into the Department 

of Defense, there were a lot of things that were different, and a lot 

of things for the better. But, frankly, one of the things that struck 

me immediately was the increased reliance on contractors compared to what I had seen personally from my previous experience, 

including in my own office as it was presented to me. 

One thing that was presented to me, just for example, was that 

the person who was responsible for legislative affairs in my office 

was a contractor. This I thought was entirely inappropriate. That 

person is no longer with my office. But it is important to understand where we have been and where we are going. 

When I arrived over a year ago—and I want to get immediately 

to your question, but this is—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do it quickly. 

Mr. WECHSLER. We recognized the need for a more permanent 

workforce. What had happened under previous leadership, under 

the last Administration, and, frankly, under the first half to 6 

years of the last Administration, whenever a vacancy had occurred 

in my office that does oversight over contracts and budgets, the billet was almost always taken and reallocated to other organizations. 

It was backfilled by detailees and some contractors. This is not an 

appropriate way to be overseeing these kinds of efforts, and my office has shrunk as a result. 

As I said before, we are conducting an oversight review. I have 

already gotten approval from Under Secretary Flournoy, who 

shares completely my concerns about this area, about a new process to, as rapidly as possible, build out my office, focusing it first 

and foremost on my budget program and evaluation area, where 

the evaluation side of this, as I look back in history, was not done 

nearly as effectively as I would like, and to build out that staff. 

Quite frankly, we are not there yet. I saw when Secretary Gates 

publicly complained that it took so many four-star reviews before 

he could send a small team out to somebody. I am on the other side 

of that, and it takes an awful lot through the Pentagon bureaucracy for me to build out the staff that I need. 

But we are pushing as rapidly as possible in doing that and to 

build up the staff, and I have a new legislative affairs person, and 

we are working quickly to convert people from contractors to permanent government staff in that regard. 

But when we started this in February, we simply did not have 

the staff. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. 

Mr. WECHSLER. And so that is why we went the direction that 

we did. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Answer this question, if you can. Believe 

me, we now know you have been there—you were there in 1995— 

you have to try to not talk quite so long because I have got a lot 

of questions. You are going to be here a long time if you keep talking so long. 

Mr. WECHSLER. Sure, OK. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It is just going to prolong the pain, because 

I am not going anywhere until I get all these questions answered. 

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I am here as long as you want me to 

be. 

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23 

Senator MCCASKILL. We do not need to hear again that you were 

there in 1995 and you are back and things have changed. You can 

just try to hone in. Let me hone in on the question here. 

Is it common—and I have a feeling you are the kind of guy that 

knows this, and I am asking you for your impression. Is it common 

for people in the Pentagon to hire contractors to help them prepare 

for oversight hearings? Is that common? 

Mr. WECHSLER. I have never hired a contractor to prepare for 

oversight hearings before. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Are you aware of others that are hiring contractors to—— 

Mr. WECHSLER. I am not aware myself of anybody doing it, but 

probably legislative affairs would be helpful for you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. I am going to try to do one more 

question before I turn it over to Senator Brown. 

Let me ask you about the Alaska Native Corporation (ANC). As 

you may or may not know, I am focused on ANCs and the ridiculous stature they have in contracting in the Federal Government, 

the notion they can be as big as they want, they do not have to 

compete, and they can front is offensive to me. I know that an ANC 

received over $16 million in contracts from the State Department 

2005 to 2008. Olgoonik, an ANC. Let me ask you first—and I think 

I know the answer to it. I am willing to bet these contracts were 

not competed. 

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And why would it be necessary to not 

compete these contracts? Were they not competed because you do 

not have to because they are ANCs or because there was a legitimate reason for them not to be competed? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We were looking rapidly for the service to be provided, and we consulted with our acquisitions personnel, and they 

advised us that this would be an appropriate way to pursue rapidly 

to acquire these services. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And this is the ironic part about this. Last 

month, the State Department officials told the Subcommittee staff 

that the Department paid Olgoonik, the Alaska Native corporation, 

to provide local Colombian employees to various Colombian ministries. So we are hiring an Alaska Native corporation to go to Colombia to identify Colombian employees for the Colombian Government to hire, and for that reason we do not need to compete a contract? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We were looking for something that we could rapidly deploy, and this was—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. What would happen if ANCs did not have 

this vaunted status of not ever having to compete for a contract? 

Could you have legitimized this as a sole-source were it not for 

the fact that an ANC got the contract? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not know. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would like to know the answer to that 

question. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I will give you an answer to that. I do not want 

to speculate. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Because I am determined to ferret out every 

opportunity I can to point out that ANCs are getting non-compete 

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contracts across the Federal Government for no good reason, and 

the vast majority of those or the vast majority of people doing the 

work have nothing to do with the Alaska Native corporation. And 

so I would appreciate a followup on that. 

Senator Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

When you say rapidly deploy, what is the time frame we are 

talking about? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, I would need to get you that data, but in 

order to carry out a full, fair, and open competition, it is a multimonth process, and we were looking to, I am told, address an issue 

where we were unable appropriately and rapidly to bring these 

services on board locally, and this was a vehicle through which we 

could do it. 

Senator BROWN. Right, because I am sharing the Chairman’s 

concern, the failure to compete, and everything is always in a rush 

around here. We have got to rush, rush, rush. Everyone is an emergency. And then you say, well, you had to rapidly deploy in order 

to deal with the concern. Well, what is rapidly deploy? Is it a 

month? Is it 6 months? Is it a year? So I would like to have an idea 

of what typical scenarios would be about rapid deployment, because 

it seems that if it is a rapid deployment situation, then we need 

to go this way versus another way. So if you could zero in on that 

and get back to us. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I shall. 

Senator BROWN. And this is for both of you. Beginning in 2000, 

Congress placed ceilings, as you know, on military and U.S. citizen 

contractors who can be in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia. 

I was wondering, does this cap on those contractors in Colombia 

hinder the performance to achieve your mission objectives, or did 

it hinder your performance objectives? Flip a coin. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Since I have already pressed the button, I will 

take the coin and be brief. 

It is possible. I do not know whether that had an impact in the 

early period of time, but I know now we are working quickly to nationalize those programs, particularly with the Colombian military, 

and not with the objective of staying under that ceiling. It has had 

the collateral benefit of that, but in order to take account of the 

fact that Colombia has made extraordinary strides and that the 

continuing level of support that we have provided in the early part 

of Plan Colombia for the Colombian military is not really needed 

or appropriate now, and we need to turn those items and those responsibilities over to the Colombians. 

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes, I am going to have to defer. I am happy to 

look into the tactical questions about in 2001 and 2002, whether 

there was an impact on a tactical basis. I can say from my own personal perspective, from a strategic level, the limits that the Congress put in working with then Under Secretary Tom Pickering collaboratively on our efforts in Colombia I personally think worked 

out for the better and helped focus the strategic thinking at the initial stages of Plan Colombia. That was the part that I am personally familiar with. I thought it was a positive effort. 

Senator BROWN. Do you think the caps will have any effect on 

the ability to accomplish the objectives in Afghanistan? Either one. 

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25 

Mr. JOHNSON. It has not affected the work that I am responsible 

for doing at this point. 

Senator BROWN. OK. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think anything into the future is really speculative as the situation there evolves. 

Senator BROWN. Yes. As you know, I just got back, and I wanted 

to see if putting a ceiling would have an effect on that mission. 

Let me just shift gears for a minute. As the Chairman mentioned 

in her opening statement, I was wondering, there is a fundamental 

question that must be asked by our program managers prior to any 

decision to initiate a procurement action, is identifying the objectives of the acquisition and the program in determining how to successfully measure the progress towards that objective. I am wondering, what are some key patent reform measures that we in Congress can track towards determining if counternarcotic strategies 

are being successful? That would be for both of you. 

Mr. JOHNSON. For my part, I think it is important to look at the 

objectives beyond the contract itself. For example, in Colombia, for 

reasons which I am sure made a great deal of sense at the time, 

the original objective was focused on the amount of coca under production and cocaine exiting Colombia. Strides have been made in 

that area, but the original objective which was set, which was cutting it by 50 percent by a year certain, was not met. 

On the other hand, if you look at the strategic objective that we 

had of changing Colombia from a state under threat to one which 

is an exporter of security, we have done extremely well there. And 

I think that by any measure the efforts that have been made 

through these contracting mechanisms have made a fundamental 

contribution to that, particularly by providing the ability of the Colombian state to reach into areas which it was previously not able 

to and were ungoverned. 

Senator BROWN. Do you have a comment on that at all? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes, this is a topic very near to my heart. As 

Ambassador Johnson said, there are strategic-level approaches to 

this, but on each and every contract and each and every program, 

we need to have specific program metrics that do not just measure 

inputs but measure outputs. In some cases these exist, but in many 

cases these do not. 

We have just recently issued standard operating procedures for 

our new CN performance metric system to our COCOMs, and we 

are working with each and every COCOM to develop individual 

metrics, some of which will be global in nature because of their nature, but many of which will be specifically designed for a given 

program or even for a given country. 

Just last week, I had my Program Objectives Memorandum 

(POM) reviews for the fiscal year 2012 budget process where I 

worked with every one of the combat-and-commands, and we had 

a special session exactly on these metrics and how we were going 

to develop them for each program going forward. So this is a critical question that you raise. 

Senator BROWN. Thanks. Did you really spend $50,000 to get 

ready for this hearing? 

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26 

Mr. WECHSLER. I want to be clear about this. It is not to get 

ready for this hearing. It is to get the information that you asked 

for. 

Senator BROWN. To get ready for the hearing. 

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes. I mean, my staff can brief me for the hearing, but to pull over 10 years of data from 15 different Department 

of Defense agencies across three Administrations with thousands 

and thousands of different contracts, given the state of the offices 

I described, we absolutely—I did not have two extra people that 

could work on this. I had to bring in two extra people. I cannot hire 

them immediately, so all I could do is hire them in as contractors. 

Senator BROWN. So basically 25 grand for a month, so somebody 

made 25 grand for the month to do this? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Two and a half people did. 

Senator BROWN. Two and a half people. If I may just ask one 

more question? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Sure. 

Senator BROWN. Thanks. Contracting and budgeting as it comes 

to eradication—in Colombia, there was a lot of work, time, and 

money spent to help eradicate drugs, cocaine, and everything in Colombia. Is there a plan, a contracting or budgeting plan, Mr. Johnson, regarding the eradication of poppies in Afghanistan? Because 

I can tell you, I was there, and from here to the Russell Building 

outside the Forward Operating Base (FOB) there were poppy fields 

in full bloom. Is there a contracting or budgeting plan for that you 

are aware of? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The critical distinction is that the Colombians welcomed and asked for and facilitated our work to provide an eradication effort, and they thought and continue to think it plays a significant role in their ability to extend the governance over their 

country. 

For historical reasons, we do not have any support in Afghanistan for the use of herbicides delivered in any way, shape, or form, 

and so we are working toward dealing with this problem through 

other means, principally through providing alternative livelihoods 

for individuals who might be there, as well as having a massive 

interdiction program. The Drug Enforcement Administration has 

its largest contingent of people anywhere abroad now in Afghanistan. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Senator Brown. 

Let me follow up a little bit on the metrics, and let me follow up 

with some of the things that you just said, Mr. Johnson, about Colombia. You indicated that the original performance metric of decreasing production by 50 percent at a time certain was not accomplished. In fact, I think that in October 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that from 2000 to 2006, Colombian 

cultivation of coca actually increased during that period of time, 

and that cocaine production also increased. And I understand that. 

What you basically said is the rule of law and the strengthening 

of the Colombia Government as it relates to rule of law has been 

a success, cocaine production and amount of cocaine production not 

so much? 

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Mr. JOHNSON. I think the amount of cocaine and the amount of 

cocaine production and the area under cultivation and the yields 

have, in fact, declined, and the decline has been significant. But it 

has not by any means been what was originally projected or sought 

as a goal. 

It has played, according to our evaluation and according to the 

Colombians, a significant role in allowing them to extend the rule 

of law and to deprive the FARC of a means of livelihood and sustenance. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. As you look at that, have there been 

ongoing attempts over the last decade since the strengthening of 

the rule of law has worked well, maybe not as well as the original 

plans to diminish the amount of production, were resources shifted 

from eradication and trafficking work to rule of law? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I would broaden it beyond ‘‘rule of law,’’ and I 

think it has to do with really the extension of the ability of the Colombian state to govern, to provide governing services, not just—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Governance and rule of law. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Including rule of law, but I think if you focus exclusively on that, you miss a big part of the issue. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I guess I am confused. You think the 

counternarcotics budget and the amount of money spent on contractors for counternarcotics in Colombia is what strengthened governance and the underlying rule of law? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it played a major role in providing the 

space for the other programs to work. I do. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. And that has worked? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We believe that it has substantially worked. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So are we going to be dramatically cutting 

back the amount of money we spend on eradication and production 

problems down there in the coming years? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We have been significantly stepping down over 

time. I think that we will be devoting more and more of our effort 

to supporting the Colombians in manual eradication programs. But 

I think if you look at the geography of Colombia and the transportation routes and the ability of the government under any conceivable scenario to extend its reach over the entire country, there is 

going to be a continuing role for aerial eradication well into the future. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In 2003, as you know, Congress passed a 

law saying that we should transfer counternarcotics contracts in 

Colombia away from contractors and to Colombia nationals. According to the reports to Congress that our staff has reviewed, the 

Department has not fully transferred any of those activities in Colombia. Is that accurate? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think I would like to have an opportunity to go 

over our documentation with your staff because I think that there 

are some places where we have, if you will, fully turned over 

things. But this is an ongoing effort, and it is not one that we 

slacked away from. We anticipate that, in terms of the support of 

the funds under my Administration, we would be looking to conclude our support significantly and eventually entirely for the Colombian military. But we look to the Colombian police as a longterm partner that we would work with well into the future. And 

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our colleagues at the Department of Defense, of course, would continue with their engagement and through the foreign military financing and sales program to continue an engagement with the Colombian military as well. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In 2004, Congress limited the number of 

contractors in Colombia. Has that limitation been helpful or has it 

been a harmful policy? And is that a way to get at this as somebody who continues to be frustrated, or what Mr. Wechsler talked 

about, that is that we have just exploded contracting without appropriate oversight or personnel to keep track of it in this government over the last decade? Should we start setting a number on 

how many contractors are allowed in-country? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, in the case of Colombia, as I mentioned earlier, we have cut that figure in half, from 1,200 to slightly under 

600. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But the law required you to do that. The 

law says that you had to limit the number of contractors allowed 

in Colombia to 600. I do not think that—I mean, I am assuming 

you did it because the law told you you had to? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we would have done it, whether we thought 

it was a great idea, because the law told us that we had to. But 

we have been engaged in that period of time in a program that we 

refer to a nationalization, which is turn these responsibilities and 

these programs over to the Colombians during the course of that 

period of time. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Do you think it would be helpful for us to 

do a number limitation on contractors in other environments 

around the world? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Speaking for myself, I think maintaining some 

flexibility in that area makes more sense than a rigidity. But I 

know that will require an active interaction with you and your staff 

to make sure that we are following the ideas that you think are 

appropriate in terms of shrinking the contractor footprint worldwide. 

We are looking at ways to do that. I read newspapers. I know 

that this has changed. We are looking at ways to engage more fully 

with our State and local authorities for the provision of police 

training, for example, where there might not be a Federal solution, 

and by so doing, we would be cutting into some things that we 

have traditionally done through only a contractor solution. 

On the other hand, as I look at that as a model, I am still thinking that I am going to certainly need significant contractor support 

for life support for these individuals in environments which might 

be quite challenging. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Don’t misunderstand the view that I hold 

about contracting. It is not the number of contractors that bothers 

me. My urgency about reducing contracting is because it has become very clear to me that we do not have adequate contracting 

oversight in government, and this is an equal opportunity sin. We 

spend a significant amount of time on Defense and State because 

you are two of the big ones. But I think Energy is next up, isn’t 

it? The Department of Energy, we will be looking to see if they hire 

contractors to help them get ready for the hearing we are going to 

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have about contractors at the Department of Energy. Homeland Security, same thing. 

So, either we are going to get the right contracting oversight in 

place, or we are going to have to reduce the contracting, one or the 

other, because the current situation I think is untenable. 

Let us go back to the metrics for a minute. Office of National 

Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), is it important? Are the metrics— 

do you all feel like that there is a coordinated effort with ONDCP 

at the top? Or do you all feel that it is still a siloed effort? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I have an active engagement with Mr. 

Kerlikowske, and I look to him to provide the type of guidance that 

I will then implement in the international programs for which I am 

responsible. The clear shift with a real focus on demand reduction, 

prevention, and treatment, as he addresses it, is something that we 

have begun a shift to. We are looking very strongly at that in all 

of our programs. You will see it in Afghanistan and Mexico and so 

forth. That is one signal. 

We also look at the price/purity statistics that he uses as a measure to gauge in some measure whether the programs that we have, 

which are aimed at eradication and interdiction, are having an effect on the streets in the United States. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And I certainly think those are both great 

additions to your repertoire, that price/purity is very important, as 

you all know, I used to know a lot more about that when I was actively prosecuting, but the purity of heroin in this country has just 

skyrocketed and it has gotten inexpensive because of it. We are 

seeing more problems in local communities from OxyContin than 

heroin only because OxyContin has gotten more expensive than 

heroin in some places. 

So getting back to ONDCP, they require agencies to submit performance reports on counternarcotics activities. In 2009, the Defense Department presented 285 performance measures for your 

counternarcotics activities. However, in a recently released preliminary report from GAO, it states that your performance measures 

were missing key attributes of successful measures in the database 

and were otherwise inadequate. 

Can you give me an example, Mr. Wechsler, of the unclassified 

performance measures used by the Defense Department? What 

would be an example of a performance measure that you all would 

be looking to to see if you are doing a good job or a bad job? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Sure. It depends on the program, but, for instance, one example is on the JIATF-South’s efforts to do the aerial 

and maritime domain awareness and to attack the air bridge system. It is the proportion overall of the tracks that are going in that 

we believe that are drug-related that were interdicted, and that is 

a top-line metric that then will have very many submetrics underneath it. But that is a very good metric to be looking at for that 

line of activity. There are other lines of activity that talk about 

building partner capacity for which there are different metrics 

about how capable the individual foreign force that we are trying 

to train is and very much akin to the way that we train military. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know that you have hired a contractor to 

help you with revising your guidelines for performance measures. 

Who is the contractor that was hired for this project? 

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Mr. WECHSLER. It is Hagerty. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Hagerty. The same contractor that is helping you with this hearing? 

Mr. WECHSLER. That is right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But there is somebody between them and 

you, isn’t there? Isn’t there somebody that you hired, then they 

sub-hired Hagerty? Isn’t it Lockheed? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Oh, yes, well, there is—and I am happy to get 

into this. We do a lot of our contracting through an office called the 

Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office, and they have five 

primes, and the primes do subprimes. And that is where not all but 

a good deal of the contracts go through, particularly when you 

want to do something quickly. I decided that I could not wait for 

the personnel system of the Department of Defense to give me the 

personnel that I needed to work on performance metrics, and we 

needed to start more rapidly. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And this is a constant theme we hear. 

Mr. WECHSLER. Absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But why do we need somebody to take a 

cut? I mean, why is Lockheed getting a cut of this contract that the 

Hagerty people did, getting data, trying to get data—I do not think 

we have successfully gotten the data yet for this hearing—and on 

the performance measures? Are they taking a cut, is Lockheed taking a cut on that, too? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Undoubtedly as a prime they would have a management responsibility, and we can get back to you on exactly what 

that is. The process is set up to provide rapid action when we need 

rapid action, and so you have the five primes that compete for their 

position as that. The alternative is to put something out for independent contractors. Of course, it would then take the same 

amount of time that it would take—or probably sometimes more 

than it would take for me to hire someone into my office. So that 

is why we are where we are. 

It is this office—and we will certainly—I should have mentioned 

earlier—get back to what Senator McCain said about all the things 

that we have done in our office, we will get you all that in writing. 

But a lot of the things that we have done in our office have been 

most directly about this office, the CNTPO, which we most have direct oversight and working with, to improve their ability to contract and to oversee contracts, and there has been a great number 

of steps that we have taken in the last year towards that end, and 

they are not finished. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It is just a weird system that has evolved, 

that you have got these big companies that essentially are providing inherently government functions by subbing out quickly to 

other people. It is almost like we created a process to make sure 

that we are hiring in a way that is fair and open-minded or that 

we are contracting in a way that is fair and open-minded, and then 

we have this huge short circuit that all you have got to do is get 

primes and do tasks. And if you get primes and do tasks, then they 

get a middleman cut. Can you imagine the amount of money we 

are spending on the middleman cut in this government? I mean, 

in the Pentagon alone, it is billions of dollars. It is so frustrating 

to me. And this would never occur in the private sector. This is 

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where so much money is being wasted, and it is all just to get 

around the process. 

It is like you said, Mr. Johnson. The ANCs are great because you 

can get around the cumbersome process that takes so long. And I 

am aware of this. I do not mean to be yelling at you guys about 

it, because it is a reality. You want the work done and you need 

it done quickly. So we have to figure out how we do a better job 

on the complexity of hiring and the time of contracting because it 

is costing us much more money than the problem we tried to solve 

by making it so complex. And we can do it because we print money. 

Mr. WECHSLER. If I could say, Senator, I completely agree with 

your assessment. I just spent the last 8 years in the private sector, 

and, of course, we did contract in the company that I worked with 

quite often. And if we wanted to contract, I just contracted something. 

Now, you do not want that system, of course, in government because you do not want an individual without any oversight making 

those kinds of decisions with taxpayer dollars. So there is this balancing effort that has resulted in the system that you are accurately describing, and I very much look forward to working with 

you, at least in the one area that I have a say on, and help figuring 

out how to make sure that if we are out of balance, that we can 

balance it, that we can rebalance it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In the President’s national drug control 

budget for fiscal year 2007, there is a discussion of an improvement 

underway to establish a comprehensive Performance Reporting 

System—I do not think we have used enough acronyms in this 

hearing; it is hard to get through these hearings without a lot of 

acronyms—a PRS that will track resource allocation, program effectiveness, and provide prompt feedback on the agency’s progress 

within the National Drug Control Strategy. 

Now, if you juxtaposition that up with the reality that one of the 

things we learned in the GAO report is that United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and United States Central Command 

(CENTCOM) and JIATFs, all components that have operational 

control over counternarcotics, they say that their personnel does 

not use the main counternarcotics database. Well, this is a problem. You have got the three different parts of the defense that are 

supposed to be reporting into a database so we can manage these 

contracts, and they do not use it. 

How can you do performance measures—I do not care how many 

contractors you hire. How can you do performance measures if you 

cannot get the commands to even use the database you have? And 

on top of that, guess what? We are about to create a new database. 

Mr. WECHSLER. You are exactly right. This was, again, the 

topic—this specifically was the topic of the conversation that we 

had just last week in the context of our annual POM reviews. 

In my experience, putting on my management consultant hat, 

quite often the drivers of situations like this when I have seen it 

in the past is that the performance—there is a variety of them, but 

the performance metrics themselves are not useful to manage the 

programs, and that people will use the database when they themselves find that—first and foremost, when they are told to do it, 

but also when they themselves find that it is useful for running 

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their own programs that they are responsible for. They see this as 

an additional task that is separate and devoid from their own responsibilities to manage the program. Then they are going to be lax 

at using it. And you mentioned before the weaknesses in the previously existing performance metrics system. And so I see these 

two failings as being intricately links. You get the right performance metrics that measure the right things that help you run the 

programs in the right way, and then you get the right database to 

track those particular efforts. Then the people who are running 

those programs will not only do it because they are told to do it, 

but will want to use this metric. And then we at a headquarters 

level can use the individual data and the aggregated data to do the 

kind of oversight at a policy and programmatic level that we need 

to do in order to provide the oversight that we are required by Congress. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I mean, don’t you think it is kind of problematic that we would start, whether a contractor is developing 

PRS, I assume? Do you know? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not know. I would have to consult with Mr. 

Kerlikowske. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, we will follow up with them. I bet you 

it is a contractor. What do you bet? I bet it is. And we will check 

with them about the PRS system, but we have had a hearing on 

databases, and if there is one thing that we have more of in government than contractors, it is databases. And it is databases that 

are not being utilized fully. They are not being utilized effectively. 

They are costing us a lot of money. They are not talking to one another. And at the end of the day, it is going to be like that general 

in Kuwait told me a long time ago when I was asking him about 

the complete and abject failure of contracting oversight in Iraq. He 

said, ‘‘I wanted three kinds of ice cream. I wanted it in the mess. 

I wanted it yesterday, and I did not care how much it cost.’’ 

That is out there, and it is particularly out there in your neck 

of the woods, Mr. Wechsler. 

We are buying airplanes—which one said we were buying airplanes? You were buying airplanes, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. We are in Merida, yes, and we are also acquiring 

some for both Afghanistan and for Iraq. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Are we contracting with people to buy airplanes and they are going to fly them? Or are we actually buying 

them and hiring contractors to fly them? It was my understanding 

we were contracting aviation, including the capital requirements of 

aviation. And now you tell me we are buying airplanes. Can you 

explain? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We are acquiring the air frames, and we are contracting for the flying and for maintaining them. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And have we always bought the air frames 

at the State Department, or have we contracted for someone else 

to buy the air frames and fly them? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We have in limited circumstances done leasing of 

aircraft. I personally, in the areas where we are operating, do not 

really prefer that because of the safety issues that it raises. If we 

can acquire the aircraft and have a contract over which we have 

very direct oversight provide the maintenance and provide the piH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

33 

loting for us, I am much more confident of the safety of those aircraft and the safety of the passengers on board them. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What percentage of the aircraft that you 

have in the air doing counternarcotics work are being piloted by 

contractors? 

Mr. WECHSLER. I am going to have to get you that exact number, 

of course, or as close as we can get to that exact number. I am just 

thinking, off the top of my head, the programs that I know of. I 

know of some that are like that, but, frankly, some of the more 

prominent ones and the ones that we work on like the effort to provide MI–17 helicopters to the Afghan counternarcotics police, those 

are ones where we buy the helicopters. We have U.S. personnel 

that are there. We are training up Afghans. There is some contractor assistance to help in the training and to help with the 

maintenance. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. WECHSLER. But all that is designed to provide Afghan capability. It is not a permanent thing. It is designed as a training function. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I understand. Once we get all this data— 

and let me turn to—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, could I correct something I said before? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think I was focusing on these new acquisitions 

that we had in Afghanistan and Iraq where the contracting for the 

pilots and the maintenance is going to take place. Just as Mr. 

Wechsler was mentioning about transfer of skill in Afghanistan, we 

have worked very hard, particularly in the case of Colombia, to 

transfer those training and skills. So all of the helicopters that are 

operating there, for example, are piloted by Colombian personnel, 

and much of the maintenance is also provided by them with limited 

oversight by a contractor that we provide. 

On the other hand, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the aircraft that we 

are operating there are for the most part, I think, exclusively to 

provide lift for our own personnel, and in that case, we are not engaged in trying to build capacity yet for the Afghans for that type 

of work. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, let me focus back on counternarcotics, 

because I believe you referred to buying airplanes for Merida, 

right? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, ma’am, that is correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Not Afghanistan and Iraq. The airplanes 

you bought were for counternarcotics efforts associated with Mexico. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes ma’am. We are in the process of buying helicopters as well as one fixed-wing aircraft. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Once we get all this data—do you all 

talk to each other about what kind of airplanes you are buying? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So is there not a way that we could buy 

airplanes on existing contracts? I am sure the Defense Department 

has a much better deal on these aircraft than you are ever going 

to get at the State Department. 

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34 

Mr. JOHNSON. We are buying them through the Army Command, 

and we are using their contract. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. So it is going through Army Command. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Well, good. See? We got some great 

news out of this hearing. 

OK. So we still have a problem on this data. I am going to try 

to go as many hearings as I can possibly go without subpoenas. But 

we still have a problem on the data. 

Now, we made a broad request, and we have a little bit of a 

chicken-and-egg thing going on because we have learned the hard 

way that if you make a broad request, you may get enough information you can really use. But we are more than happy to make 

a less broad request if we are actually going to get what we ask 

for. 

So what I would suggest we do is to have your staffs get with 

the staff of the Subcommittee. Now, we are not going to let you decide what data you can give us, but you know what we want to do. 

We want to get a handle on whether or not you know and can 

produce information about the contracts you have, how they were 

issued, the scope of the work they are doing, the performance 

measures that are there, and if somebody is looking over the shoulder of these contractors and seeing if we are getting a bang for our 

buck, if we are getting value. That is the data we need. And we 

need it not to take 3 months, and we need not to have a situation 

where you give us information and it is stuff we could have gotten 

easily ourselves and we have done enough work to know that what 

you gave us was not even complete, and you did not even admit 

it was complete until after we confronted you with it. And then you 

come to the hearing today, and you clearly have a lot more numbers than we have ever heard before, which makes it hard for us 

to prepare for the hearing to ask the kind of questions that I would 

like to ask. If I had all those numbers that you had indicated at 

the beginning of the hearing, Mr. Johnson, if I had that information, I could have done a much better job drilling down on contract 

oversight today than I was able to do because of the lack of data. 

So I suggest we try this one more time. I suggest we get your 

staffs with our staff, and you give us input as to how quickly you 

can get us the kind of data that both of you are smart enough to 

know that we need to do adequate contract oversight, and let us 

go from there. And we are going to try one more time, and if we 

are still frustrated at the end of this process, then we will issue 

subpoenas. Does that seem fair? 

Mr. WECHSLER. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. We are ready to proceed on that basis. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. We will try again. And we are not 

going to go away, even though we have to move on to the Department of Energy and arm wrestle them on contracting oversight. We 

want to stay with this because I do not want to move from this 

topic until everyone is aware, especially the contractor community, 

that there is no place you can be in the Federal Government that 

we are not going to be trying to look and see what is going on. And 

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35 

the people who are managing the contracts in every nook and cranny of the Federal Government are going to have to realize that 

these kinds of questions are going to be asked on an ongoing and 

consistent basis because this Subcommittee is not going anywhere. 

There is way too much work to do. It is amazing to me that there 

has not been one of these subcommittees much sooner in the process because what happened, we had an explosion of contracting, 

and everyone was so busy exploding contracting, nobody was paying attention as to whether or not there was adequate oversight, 

adequate management, and adequate data collection so we could 

keep track of whether or not they were doing a good job, to say 

nothing of the problem we have with the middleman. We have 

some people getting very rich off taxpayers that are just shuffling 

contracts, and we have to make sure that we can hopefully fix that 

problem, and that is a long-term goal of this Subcommittee and obviously a work in progress. 

I appreciate both of you being here. I appreciate the time and energy you put into preparing. We are not done, but I feel confident 

that you both understand where we need to go with this, and we 

will look forward to continuing to work with your staffs in a cooperative fashion, and hopefully in another few months we can come 

back around and tie this up and be confident that you all know 

what contracts are out there and that they are fully being managed 

and that you do not have a situation where there is a far-flung embassy that is doing contracts and you really do not have a handle 

on it, and you do not have a situation where commanders are saying one thing, the acquisition is doing something else, and nobody 

has even bothered to manage the contract, which essentially is 

what you were kind of saying in a very diplomatic way in your 

opening statement. And believe me, I am not shocked. I see it, we 

see it time and time again. 

So thank you both, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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