130 Nev., Advance Opinion (04 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

ERISTEO CAMPOS-GARCIA, 

INDIVIDUALLY, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

ANN JOHNSON, INDIVIDUALLY, 

Respondent. 

No. 62578 

FILED 

AUG 0 7 2014 

TRACE K. ONDEMAN 

CL 

BY 

CHIEF DEP ID/ CLER 

Jurisdictional prescreening of an appeal from a dist ict court 

judgment and amended judgment on the jury verdict in a tort action. 

Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; James M. Bixler, Judge. 

Dismissed in part. 

Hutchison & Steffen, LLC, and Michael K. Wall, Las Vegas, 

for Appellant. 

Glen Lerner Injury Attorneys and Paul D. Powell, Las Vegas, 

for Respondent. 

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC, 

OPINION 

By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.: 

What is an appealable order? We issue this opinion to address 

an increasingly frequent practice in our district courts that, for those 

caught unaware, often results in the unintentional loss of the right to 

appeal. In particular, we emphasize that an appeal must be taken from 

an appealable order when first entered; superfluous or duplicative orders 

and judgments—those filed after an appealable order has been entered 

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that do nothing more than repeat the contents of that order—are not 

appealable and, generally, should not be rendered. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

After the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the 

tort action below, the district court entered judgment on the verdict 

against defendant/appellant Eristeo Campos-Garcia, thereby resolving all 

of the rights and liabilities of the parties before it and all of the issues in 

the case, except for attorney fees and costs. Campos-Garcia timely filed a 

notice of appeal from the judgment, and our review of the appeal with 

respect to that judgment has revealed no jurisdictional concern. Later, the 

district court entered an order awarding the plaintiff attorney fees and 

costs, but Campos-Garcia did not file a notice of appeal from that order. 

Subsequently, however, the district court signed and entered an "amended 

judgment" prepared by the plaintiffs attorney, which incorporated the 

attorney fees and costs award into the original judgment. Campos-Garcia 

then filed an amended notice of appeal identifying the amended judgment. 

Concerned that the amended judgment was not substantively 

appealable because it merely reiterated, without alteration, the terms of 

the original judgment and the attorney fees and costs award, and noting 

that Campos-Garcia had failed to timely appeal from the earlier order 

awarding attorney fees and costs, this court ordered Campos-Garcia to 

show cause why the appeal from the amended judgment should not be 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Campos-Garcia timely responded, 

explaining that all parties and the district court anticipated that the 

attorney fees and costs award would be incorporated into an amended 

judgment to make it official and executable, as is the customary practice 

in the Eighth Judicial District Court. Respondent filed a reply, arguing 

that the appeal from the attorney fees and costs order was untimely. 

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DISCUSSION 

Under NRCP 54(a), the term "Wudgment" includes "any order 

from which an appeal lies." We have consistently explained that the 

appealability of an order or judgment depends on "what the order or 

judgment actually does, not what it is called." Valley Bank of Nev. v. 

Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 445, 874 P.2d 729, 733 (1994) (emphasis omitted); 

see Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426-27, 996 P.2d 416, 417-18 (2000); 

Taylor v. Barringer, 75 Nev. 409, 344 P.2d 676 (1959). Thus, we have 

recognized that a post-judgment order awarding attorney fees and costs is 

appealable, even though not termed a "judgment" or incorporated into the 

final judgment. Lee, 116 Nev. at 426, 996 P.2d at 417 (citing the specialorder-after-final-judgment rule, now NRAP 3A(b)(8)). Such post-judgment 

orders may also be executed on, even if not labeled "judgment." NRCP 

54(a) (equating orders with judgments). When district courts, after 

entering an appealable order, go on to enter a judgment on the same issue, 

the judgment is superfluous. Lee, 116 Nev. at 427, 996 P.2d at 417-18 

(citing Taylor, 75 Nev. at 410, 344 P.2d at 676-77). Because superfluous 

judgments are unnecessary and confuse appellate jurisdiction, we 

disapprove of this practice, generally. 

In Morrell v. Edwards, we explained that an appeal is 

properly taken from an amended judgment only when the amendment 

"disturbEs] or revise[s] legal rights and obligations which the prior 

judgment had plainly and properly settled with finality." 98 Nev. 91, 92, 

640 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1982). Here, the original judgment resolved all of 

the issues in the case and thus was the final, appealable judgment. NRAP 

3A(b)(1); Lee, 116 Nev. at 426, 996 P.2d at 417. The order awarding 

attorney fees and costs was independently appealable as a special order 

after final judgment, NRAP 3A(b)(8); Lee, 116 Nev. at 426, 996 P.2d at 

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417, but appellant's amended notice of appeal was untimely as to that 

order. NRAP 4(a)(1). And the amended judgment identified in the 

amended notice of appeal did not in any way alter the legal rights and 

obligations set forth in either the original judgment or the order awarding 

attorney fees and costs; thus, the amended judgment was superfluous and 

cannot be appealed. As a result, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss this 

appeal as to the amended judgment and the related attorney fees and 

costs award, only. Briefing as to the remainder of this appeal from the 

final judgment will be reinstated in a separate order. 

, J. 

Douglas 

We conc