UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-12

CERRON THOMAS HOOKS, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

 v. 

GERALD J. BRANKER, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr., 

Chief District Judge. (1:05-cv-01127-JAB-PTS) 

Argued: September 25, 2009 Decided: October 23, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Michael and Judge King joined. 

ARGUED: Marilyn G. Ozer, MASSENGALE & OZER, Chapel Hill, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan Porter Babb, Sr., NORTH 

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: William F. W. Massengale, MASSENGALE & 

OZER, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Roy Cooper, 

Attorney General of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: 

 Challenging his death sentence for first-degree murder, 

imposed in North Carolina state court, Cerron Hooks filed this 

habeas corpus petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 During a quarrel at a pool party in Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina on September 5, 1998, Hooks shot and killed Mike 

Miller. Lisa McRae and Sabrina Porter, attendees at the party, 

testified that after Hooks shot Miller, Hooks kicked him in the 

face and taunted him before fleeing the scene. The state court 

jury convicted Hooks of first-degree murder and, finding that 

the crime was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e)(9), recommended that he be sentenced to 

death. The state court imposed the death penalty, and, on 

direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed. 

State v. Hooks, 548 S.E.2d 501 (N.C. 2001). The U.S. Supreme 

Court denied Hooks’ petition for a writ of certiorari. Hooks v. 

North Carolina, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002). 

 Hooks later filed a motion for appropriate relief in state 

court -– the North Carolina mechanism for post-conviction 

relief -– claiming, among other things, that a newly available 

affidavit from Lisa McRae rendered him ineligible for the death 

penalty. He also asserted that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing adequately to cross-examine McRae and 

2 
Porter. The court denied Hooks’ motion, and the North Carolina 

Supreme Court denied certiorari. 

 Having exhausted his state remedies, Hooks filed this 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court 

denied. We issued a certificate of appealability with respect 

to three issues, and on those three issues we now affirm, 

finding that the North Carolina courts made no decision that was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, as determined by the United States 

Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

I 

 On the evening of September 5, 1998, Mike Miller hosted a 

party at the pool of his apartment complex, and Cerron Hooks 

attended, having been invited by a mutual friend. Around 9:30 

p.m., Miller invited guests back to his second-floor apartment 

to continue the party, and Hooks was also among those attending 

at the apartment. 

 After he left the party, Hooks returned to look for a shirt 

he had taken off earlier. Miller told him that he had not seen 

the shirt but would look for it and return it to a mutual friend 

if he found it. Hooks departed but again returned to search the 

apartment himself. When he attempted to enter Miller’s bedroom, 

Miller prevented him from doing so, and a heated argument 

3 
ensued. Later testimony indicated that tension had also 

developed between the two over the romantic attentions of Lisa 

McRae, another attendee of the party. But the argument between 

Hooks and Miller mainly concerned the shirt. 

Miller told Hooks that he could not disrespect his house 

and that he had to leave. Although Hooks complied, the argument 

continued outside of the apartment, first on the second-story 

breezeway and then down the stairway onto the ground floor. As 

the two argued face to face, Hooks threatened to “f--k [Miller] 

up.” Hooks then pulled out a gun and pointed it at Miller’s 

face, to which Miller responded, “Oh, you’re going to shoot me 

now.” After a pause, Hooks shot Miller four times. Miller fell 

to the ground, gravely wounded but conscious. Hooks then kicked 

and pistol-whipped Miller in the face, taunting him by saying, 

“You thought I was playing, you thought I was playing.” He then 

fled the scene. Bystanders administered first aid to Miller, 

who remained conscious for about 15 minutes. He died 12 hours 

later at the hospital. 

Lisa McRae and Sabrina Porter were interviewed by police 

officers at the scene, and the officers made cursory notes, but 

both gave fuller recorded statements to the police on the 

following day, September 6, 1998. In her recorded statement, 

McRae stated that she witnessed the shooting from nearby on the 

ground floor and saw Hooks kick Miller and taunt him, saying, 

4 
“You thought I was playing; you thought I was playing.” In her 

recorded statement, Porter stated that she did not actually see 

the shooting, but she heard the gunshots from Miller’s apartment 

and went out to look over the balcony at the scene below. She 

stated that she saw Hooks kick and pistol-whip Miller. The 

cursory handwritten notes of police officers written at the 

scene did not contain any references to Hooks’ kicking, pistolwhipping, or taunting Miller. 

Later, at the pretrial hearing, McRae and Porter made 

statements substantially similar to those that they had given to 

police in their recorded statements. 

At trial, McRae’s testimony was again substantially similar 

to her previous statements given to the police and at the 

preliminary hearing. She testified that she witnessed the 

shooting and that after Miller fell, Hooks kicked him in the 

face and said, “You thought I was playing.” Defense counsel 

cross-examined her as to why her initial statement to the police 

on September 5 did not mention anything about kicking or 

taunting, but McRae insisted, “Well, that’s what he did. . . . 

I saw the kicking.” 

Porter’s trial testimony was likewise consistent. She 

testified that she had heard the shots but did not see the 

shooting and that afterwards she saw the kicking, pistolwhipping, and taunts from the second floor balcony. Defense 

5 
counsel did not cross-examine Porter about whether she told 

police about the kicking, pistol-whipping, and taunting on the 

evening of the shooting or why references to that were not 

contained in the police officer’s notes. 

At trial, three other witnesses testified to seeing the 

shooting but made no statements about any kicking, pistolwhipping, or taunting. 

The medical examiner testified at trial that Miller had 

died approximately 12 hours after the shooting as a result of 

gunshot wounds. On cross-examination, he stated that there was 

no evidence of bruising or swelling on Miller’s face or scalp. 

The examiner stated that given the amount of time that elapsed 

between the shooting and Miller’s death, bruising or swelling 

likely would have appeared if Miller had sustained a blunt force 

trauma, such as kicking or pistol-whipping. 

The jury found Hooks guilty of first-degree murder, and in 

view of the evidence presented at trial, the judge permitted the 

jury to decide whether Hooks’ crime was “especially heinous, 

atrocious, or cruel” as to justify the death penalty under North 

Carolina law. The trial judge also submitted for the jury’s 

decision a number of possible mitigating circumstances. On the 

aggravating circumstance issue, the judge instructed the jury: 

Under the evidence in this case, there is one possible 

aggravating circumstance which may be considered. . 

6 
. . Was this murder especially heinous, atrocious or 

cruel? 

Now in this context, heinous means extremely wicked or 

shockingly evil. Atrocious means outrageously wicked 

and vile; and cruel means designed to inflict a high 

degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even 

enjoyment of, the suffering of others. 

However, it is not enough that this murder be heinous, 

atrocious or cruel, as these terms have just been 

defined. This murder must have been especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel and not every murder is 

especially so. 

For this murder to have been especially heinous, 

atrocious or cruel, any brutality which was involved 

in it must have exceeded that which is normally 

present in any killing, or this murder must have been 

a conscienceless or pitiless crime which was 

unnecessarily torturous to the victim. 

The jury found unanimously that this aggravating circumstance 

was present and was not outweighed by any mitigating factors. 

It accordingly recommended that Hooks be sentenced to death, and 

the trial judge imposed the death penalty. 

 The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction 

and sentence, rejecting Hooks’ challenges, which included claims 

that the aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague and 

that Hooks’ death sentence was disproportionate relative to 

other cases in which capital punishment was not imposed in North 

Carolina. See Hooks, 548 S.E.2d 501, 511-13 (N.C. 2001). 

 In his motion for appropriate relief challenging his 

conviction and sentence, Hooks raised a number of claims, 

including two that are presented here. First, Hooks argued that 

7 
a recent affidavit from McRae, which he attached to his motion 

for appropriate relief, constituted newly discovered evidence 

that rendered him ineligible for the death penalty. In the 

affidavit, McRae stated the following about the events on 

September 5, 1998: 

I followed Mike [Miller] out into the breezeway and 

was a witness to the shooting. The shooting happened 

very much as I testified at trial. After Mr. Hooks 

shot Mike, he put his foot in Mike’s face; I cannot be 

certain whether he kicked him or not. 

In the affidavit, McRae also conceded that she had been drinking 

alcoholic beverages during the party, but was “not impaired and 

the alcohol did not affect my ability to recall events of the 

day.” This testimony was contrary to her trial testimony, in 

which she denied having been drinking at the party. 

 Also in his motion for appropriate relief, Hooks argued 

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to crossexamine and impeach McRae and Porter about certain purported 

discrepancies in their testimony. The state court rejected each 

of Hooks’ claims, and the North Carolina Supreme Court denied 

certiorari. 

 Hooks then filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

in federal court, claiming 11 grounds for relief -– all of which 

the district court rejected. Hooks sought to appeal three of 

his claims, and with respect to those, we granted a certificate 

of appealability. 

8 
II 

 Hooks contends first that the new McRae affidavit, stating 

that she was uncertain whether she saw Hooks kick Miller after 

shooting him, amounts to a recantation that renders him innocent 

of the death penalty. In support of his argument, he cites 

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), for the proposition that 

newly discovered evidence can render a habeas petitioner 

innocent of the death penalty. He reasons that the trial judge 

was willing to submit the “especially heinous, atrocious, or 

cruel” aggravating factor to the jury only because of the 

evidence of kicking and taunting, and when evidence that he did 

not kick and taunt Miller is presented, it renders him 

ineligible for capital punishment. He maintains that McRae’s 

affidavit, when combined with the medical examiner’s testimony 

regarding the lack of swelling or bruising, casts substantial 

doubt not only on McRae’s trial testimony, but also on Porter’s 

similar testimony. 

 As the state court considered and rejected Hooks’ claim, 

denying his motion for appropriate relief, we now consider the 

claim under the deferential standard stated in 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(1) to determine only whether the state court decision 

was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States.” 

9 
 We conclude that Hooks’ claim fails as a matter of both law 

and fact. First, the decisions in Sawyer and the similar cases 

cited by Hooks are inapposite. Those cases stand for the 

proposition that a defendant may, by a showing of actual 

innocence, excuse the procedural barriers of a successive, 

abusive, or defaulted habeas claim in order to reach the merits 

of a constitutional claim. In Sawyer, the defendant’s new 

evidence of innocence was presented to allow the court to 

consider a defaulted and therefore unavailable constitutional 

claim. See, e.g., Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336 (“[T]o show ‘actual 

innocence’ one must show by clear and convincing evidence that, 

but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have 

found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the 

applicable state law”) (emphasis added). But Hooks does not 

advance evidence of innocence to reach a defaulted 

constitutional claim. He seeks simply to assert, by new 

evidence, that he is innocent. 

 Beyond Sawyer, Hooks provides no support for a claim of 

actual innocence independent of any constitutional violation, 

and the Supreme Court has never recognized such a claim as a 

meritorious ground for habeas corpus. The Court has suggested 

that such a claim could be made, but the showing required “would 

necessarily be extraordinarily high.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 

U.S. 390, 417 (1993). Neither the Supreme Court nor this court 

10 
has ever found facts sufficiently compelling to grant the writ 

for a claim of innocence without the claim of an underlying 

constitutional violation. See Buckner v. Polk, 453 F.3d 195, 

199 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[C]laims of actual innocence are not 

grounds for habeas relief even in a capital case”) (quoting 

Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 

(citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 405)). 

In this case, McRae’s purported recantation falls well 

short of meeting the “extraordinarily high” showing needed to 

raise a colorable freestanding innocence claim. Hooks argues 

that because McRae omitted facts indicating that she lied at 

trial when she testified that she had not been drinking and 

because she was willing to recharacterize her kicking testimony, 

her trial testimony could be found to be incredible. When taken 

on its face, however, the affidavit does not amount to a 

recantation. It expresses some reservation about how to 

characterize what happened, but the affidavit states, “The 

shooting happened very much as I testified at trial.” (Emphasis 

added). It then recharacterizes the kicking as putting a foot 

in the victim’s face: “After Mr. Hooks shot Mike, he put his 

foot in Mike’s face; I cannot be certain whether he kicked him 

or not.” McRae does not explain whether Hooks’ putting his foot 

in Miller’s face is materially different from kicking his face. 

Regardless of the obvious difference, however, McRae’s 

11 
testimony, even with the affidavit, remains that Hooks’ foot 

engaged Miller’s face while he was on the ground and that Hooks 

taunted him. But more importantly, McRae’s affidavit does 

nothing to disturb Porter’s trial testimony that she witnessed 

kicking. 

Hooks’ challenge amounts to an attempt to use the McRae 

affidavit as an invitation to relitigate the facts of his case. 

But that is not our role on habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding instituted by an application for 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue 

made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The 

applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of 

correctness by clear and convincing evidence”). We conclude 

that McRae’s affidavit does not carry Hooks’ heavy burden. 

Finally, Hooks calls our attention to the Supreme Court’s 

recent order in In re Davis, __ S. Ct. __, 2009 WL 2486475 

(2009) (mem.). Davis, however, has no bearing on the proper 

disposition of this case. In Davis, the Supreme Court took the 

extraordinary step of ordering a district court to hold an 

evidentiary hearing for a determination of whether a petitioner 

had made a showing that clearly established his innocence of the 

crime for which he was convicted by demonstrating that seven of 

the State’s witnesses against Davis recanted their trial 

12 
testimony, and several implicated the State’s principal witness 

as the shooter. See id. at *1 (Stevens, J., concurring). 

Hooks’ showing in this case pales in comparison. 

In short, we conclude that Hooks has failed to satisfy the 

burdens imposed on him by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and 

2254(e)(1). 

III 

Hooks next contends that his trial counsel was 

constitutionally ineffective for failing to cross-examine McRae 

and Porter on specific matters. He notes that because McRae and 

Porter were the only two witnesses to testify about Hooks 

kicking and taunting Miller, their testimony provided the only 

basis for the death penalty. Consequently, he argues, effective 

impeachment of McRae and Porter would have prevented his death 

sentence. The state court considered this ineffectiveness claim 

on Hooks’ post-conviction motion and rejected it, finding that 

counsel’s trial conduct was not deficient and that, in any 

event, Hooks was not prejudiced. 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Hooks must satisfy the two prong test in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, he must demonstrate 

that his counsel performed below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Id. at 687-89. Second, he must show that this 

13 
poor performance prejudiced him. Id. at 687. Prejudice is a 

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different -– here, that the 

jury would not have found Hooks eligible for the death penalty. 

Id. at 694-95. 

Hooks focuses first on the inconsistency between the 

statement that McRae gave to police officers at the scene on 

September 5 and the statement that she gave to police the next 

day on September 6 -- that she apparently denied on September 5 

seeing the shooting and that in every statement thereafter she 

claimed that she witnessed the shooting. 

Counsel did indeed fail to question McRae about this 

apparent discrepancy. The September 5 statement, however, was 

recorded by the police officer at the scene in three handwritten 

sentences. The very next day, McRae gave a full recorded 

statement in which she stated that she had witnessed the 

shooting. Moreover, she maintained this position thereafter, 

including in her recently submitted affidavit on which Hooks has 

heavily relied, where she stated that she “was a witness to the 

shooting.” Cross-examination on this discrepancy would not have 

changed the fact that Hooks shot Miller, an essentially 

uncontested fact. Cross-examination would only have produced 

speculation to bridge the apparent inconsistency, such as the 

officer did not hear correctly or he transcribed what he heard 

14 
incorrectly. But little else could have been obtained by crossexamination because McRae described the shooting in terms 

similar to every other eyewitness, and cross-examination would 

not likely have been fruitful. Certainly the outcome of the 

trial would not have been changed. 

Hooks also faults trial counsel for failing to impeach 

McRae with the fact that her initial statement on September 5 

did not mention kicking, and her full recorded statement given 

the next day did. This claim, however, is meritless because 

counsel did in fact impeach McRae with this inconsistency and 

did so repeatedly. For example: 

Q. You said in your testimony on direct that Cerron, 

after he shot him, kicked him and stomped on his 

face? 

 A. Yes. 

Q. You gave a statement to the officers and didn’t 

say anything about stomping on his face. Is that 

something you remembered since you gave that 

statement? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And you gave a statement to Detective Spillman as 

well and you didn’t say anything about it then? 

 A. Well, that’s what he did. 

 Q. Who saw the kicking? 

 A. Whatcha you mean? I saw the kicking. 

* * * 

Q. Who else would have been in a position to see the 

kicking? 

15 
A. I’m not sure cause after Mike had got shot, to me 

everybody was gone. I didn’t see nobody. 

 Q. So you were the only one that saw it? 

 A. As far as I know of. 

 Hooks also faults his trial counsel for failing to impeach 

Porter with the fact that her initial statement given on 

September 5 at the scene of the murder made no mention of 

kicking, pistol-whipping, or taunting, even though the full 

recorded statement that she gave the next day did. But the 

discrepancy can hardly be momentous or material in view of the 

fact that the police officer taking notes at the scene devoted 

only one sentence to his interview of Porter: “A Sabrina Porter 

only heard the shots and ran to give first aid to the victim.” 

This single statement, which is the full report of her statement 

on September 5, was not inconsistent with what Porter maintained 

thereafter; it simply did not contain any further details. 

Beginning with her full, recorded statement on September 6, 

Porter consistently stated that she saw kicking and pistolwhipping. Cross-examining her about her statements might only 

have emphasized the consistency of her account and probably 

would not have made her back down from that detail. We can 

hardly conclude that the failure to attempt to exploit this 

discrepancy, with its potential for mixed results, was deficient 

or would have made a difference. 

16 
 Hooks also contends that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to question Porter about the fact that shortly after the 

shooting, she did not see Kenneth Hoskins, an attendee at the 

party, fall over the second-floor railing and land near the 

scene. Testimony was presented that Hoskins was descending the 

stairs when he heard the shots. In an apparent panic, he fled 

back up the stairs and fell over the railing. In her full 

statement on September 6, Porter acknowledged that others had 

said that Hoskins had fallen over the railing, but stated that 

she did not see it. Hooks argues now that Porter’s failure to 

notice this remarkable detail could well have been advanced to 

cast doubt on the credibility of her other testimony. But 

again, this is merely speculation. There may have been 

plausible reasons why Porter did not see Hoskins. For instance, 

she may not have left the apartment in time to see him fall, or 

she may have been focusing entirely on Miller, while giving him 

aid. Failure to ask Porter about Hoskins’ fall is not the sort 

of deficiency that has been recognized as ineffective assistance 

of counsel. More importantly, no prejudice could have occurred 

because there was not a “reasonable probability” that the 

outcome of the trial would have been different had she been 

cross-examined about not seeing Hoskins fall, especially when 

she acknowledged others’ testimony on the fact. 

17 
 Hooks next claims that his trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to impeach McRae and Porter with the medical 

examiner’s testimony that a lack of bruising and swelling was 

inconsistent with blunt force trauma, such as kicking. The 

North Carolina Superior Court rightly pointed out, however, that 

because counsel thoroughly cross-examined the medical examiner 

about the bruising, cross-examination of McRae and Porter would 

have been duplicative at best. More likely, because they were 

lay fact witnesses, they would not have been in a position to 

comment on or give opinions about the medical examiner’s 

testimony. 

 Finally, Hooks argues that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for not confronting McRae and Porter about “what 

motives they may have had for concocting the new story [about 

kicking and taunting]” during their time together on September 6 

before they gave their recorded statements. Again, this failure 

was not unreasonable. It is well within the range of reasonable 

trial strategy to avoid directly accusing adverse witnesses of 

conspiring to lie and lying, especially when there is no factual 

basis for the accusation. Additionally, the outcome almost 

certainly would not have turned on such cross-examination. The 

witnesses were unlikely to relent in response to such 

questioning because, as the State points out, McRae and Porter 

18 
would have had no reason to believe that these details were of 

any legal significance. 

 In sum, Hooks has failed to demonstrate that the state 

court’s determination that his trial counsel was effective was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland and 

its progeny. 

IV 

 Finally, Hooks claims that North Carolina’s “especially 

heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating factor and the jury 

instruction that the trial judge gave on it were 

unconstitutionally vague and failed to limit the jury’s 

discretion. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360-63 

(1988) (holding that Oklahoma’s “especially heinous, atrocious, 

or cruel” aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally 

vague); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) (holding 

that Georgia’s “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 

inhuman” aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague). 

The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected this claim. Hooks, 

548 S.E.2d at 511. 

 Hooks’ argument is directly foreclosed by our precedents, 

which have concluded that although standing alone this North 

Carolina aggravating factor might not pass constitutional 

muster, when given along with the pattern instruction that was 

19 
given to the jury in this case, the jury’s discretion is 

sufficiently limited. We have held that the jury instruction 

provides guidance and does not create the boundless discretion 

condemned in Maynard, Godfrey, and similar cases. See Fullwood 

v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 694 (4th Cir. 2002); Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 

897, 907-08 (4th Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 458-59 

(4th Cir. 2000). 

 Hooks makes a related argument that the killing in this 

case cannot be deemed “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” 

because the aggravating factor was unconstitutionally applied in 

this case, inasmuch as the murder Hooks committed was less 

appalling than the eight others for which the North Carolina 

Courts sentenced defendants to death during the year he was 

convicted. Each of the other eight cases involved multiple 

murders or murders during the course of felonies such as rape or 

armed robbery. Hooks also argues that compared with other North 

Carolina cases, his crime is more aptly considered second-degree 

murder. In short, he invites us to engage in a comparative 

proportionality review. 

 Although the North Carolina Supreme Court did engage in 

such review on direct appeal and rejected Hooks’ claim, see

Hooks, 548 S.E.2d at 511-13, the United States Supreme Court has 

held that comparative proportionality review is not required by 

the Eighth Amendment. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44-51 

20 
21 

(1984). Such a claim is, accordingly, not cognizable on federal 

habeas review, even as it is without merit. 

* * * 

 In sum, the North Carolina courts made no decision that was 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States 

Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, we affirm 

the judgment of the district court. 

AFFIRMED