Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1505-JT-413 | January 29, 2016 Page 1 of 24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Deidre L. Monroe

Public Defender’s Office

Gary, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

James D. Boyer

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination

of the Parent-Child Relationship

of N.A., Mother, and M.A., 

Father,1 and A.A., B.A., C.A., 

N.A., O.A., and Q.A., Children,

N.A.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

January 29, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A03-1505-JT-413

Appeal from the

Lake Superior Court

The Honorable

Thomas P. Stefaniak, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

45D06-1403-JT-75

45D06-1403-JT-76

45D06-1403-JT-77

 

1

Father does not participate in this appeal; however, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), a party of 

record in the trial court shall be a party on appeal. 
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Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

45D06-1403-JT-78

45D06-1403-JT-79

45D06-1403-JT-80

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] N.A. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights to A.A., B.A., C.A., N.A., O.A., and Q.A. (collectively “the Children”). 

She raises several issues that we consolidate and restate as: whether sufficient 

evidence was presented to support the termination of her parental rights.2

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] M.A. (“Father”) and Mother (collectively, “Parents”) are married and are the 

parents of the Children, who were born between the years 2006 and 2012.3 On 

July 20, 2012, then-two-year-old A.A. suffered serious hot water burns while at 

 

2 The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of the father of the Children, M.A., but he does not 

participate in this appeal. 

3

Parents have another child, Ne.A., born in July 2013. In January 2014, DCS removed Ne.A., and in 

February 2014, Ne.A. was adjudicated a CHINS. However, Ne.A. was not part of the termination petition 

and order that forms the basis of this appeal.
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his Gary, Indiana home, where he lived with Parents and his siblings. Parents

initially consulted with a Walgreens pharmacist and attempted to treat the 

burns on their own, but after a friend and registered nurse observed the burns 

and advised Parents of the severity, Father took A.A. to Gary Methodist 

Hospital on July 22, 2012. It was determined that A.A. had third degree burns 

on his left leg from his knee to the top of his foot and second degree burns on 

the back of his right leg. That same day, A.A. was transferred to University of 

Chicago Hospital Burn Center, and the Indiana Department of Child Services 

(“DCS”) was notified of the injuries. DCS initially agreed to leave the Children 

in the home pending further investigation.

[4] Within a day or two after learning of the incident, one or more DCS 

representatives went to the home to speak to Mother and investigate the 

incident. Mother told DCS that she was home with the Children on the 

morning of July 20, but did not witness A.A. getting burned. According to 

Mother, she received a phone call from the Social Security office and was 

sitting on the couch on the phone, when C.A. told her that B.A. had burned 

A.A. during a bath. Mother picked up A.A. and observed that the skin on the 

top of his foot was “split” or separated due to burns, but that his legs looked 

normal. Tr. at 35. She looked in the bathroom but did not see any water in the 

tub. She and Father applied ointments and powder to the burns, pursuant to a 

pharmacist’s suggestions. On July 22, a family friend who was a nurse came 

over to the home, saw A.A.’s legs and feet, and told parents that A.A. had

second and third degree burns that needed medical attention. That day, Father 
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took A.A. to Gary Methodist Hospital. When DCS thereafter came out and 

spoke to Mother at the home, they observed the condition of the house, which

included a flooded basement and visible cockroaches. 

[5] On July 24, 2012, DCS filed a child in need of services (“CHINS”) petition for 

each of the six Children.

4

 The petition alleged: A.A. suffered second and third 

degree burns on July 20 but Parents delayed seeking professional medical 

treatment for the burns until July 22; DCS was concerned for the Children’s 

safety; Parents admitted to DCS that “they smoke” marijuana; and the 

Children needed “care, treatment, or rehabilitation that is not likely to be 

provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.” DCS Ex. 

B. Parents admitted the petition’s allegations, and the juvenile court 

adjudicated the Children to be CHINS. The detention order, issued that date,

found that it was in the Children’s best interests to be removed from the home 

environment and that remaining in the home would be contrary to the welfare 

of the Children because “the home environment is unable to meet the basic 

needs of the [Children], and/or the home environment poses a danger to the 

safety of the [C]hildren.” Appellant’s App. at 8. The order required the 

following services: drug/alcohol evaluation and treatment, if recommended; 

parenting assessment; psychological clinical assessment of Mother; and random 

drug screens for Parents. The juvenile court ordered Parents to secure suitable 

 

4 The only CHINS petition included in the Appendix is that naming A.A. as a child in need of services. 
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housing, and it granted Parents supervised visitation with the Children. Id. at 7-

9; DCS Ex. C. 

[6] On August 3, 2012, DCS, by Family Case Manager Glendora Walker (“FCM 

Walker”) and her DCS supervisor, submitted a Predispositional Report 

(“Report”) to the juvenile court, explaining DCS’s involvement and status. The 

Report stated that DCS removed the Children “due to medical neglect, a 

back[ed]-up sewer line, lack of air conditioning, and deplorable home 

condition.” DCS Ex. D. The Report noted that B.A., N.A., O.A., and Q.A. 

had a genetic condition called neurofibromatosis, which is known to cause 

growth of tumors in the nervous system. Id. The Report reflected the following 

recommendations: Parents complete drug and alcohol evaluation; Parents 

participate in random drug screens; Parents complete a parenting assessment; 

Mother complete a clinical assessment to determine the need for psychological 

evaluation; Parents have supervised visitations with the Children; A.A. 

continue to receive necessary medical treatment; and Parents secure appropriate 

housing. DCS recommended to the juvenile court, among other things, that 

Parents contact the FCM every week to allow her to monitor compliance, 

permit the FCM to make announced or unannounced visits to the home, obtain 

and maintain “suitable, safe and stable housing with adequate bedding, 

functional utilities, adequate supplies of food,” and “keep the family residence 

in a manner that is structurally sound, sanitary, clean, free from clutter and safe 

for the [C]hildren.” DCS Ex. D. The case plan goal was reunification. On 

August 22, 2012, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing, adopting the 
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Report as findings. The juvenile court ordered Parents to fully participate in the 

recommended services, and reunification was identified as the permanency 

plan. 

[7] Two months later, DCS, through FCM Walker and her DCS supervisor, 

submitted a progress report to the juvenile court, advising of the condition of 

the Children and explaining what “reasonable efforts” that DCS had provided 

to facilitate the permanency plan. Those included: a home-based case manager 

to assist Parents in finding employment, housing, and transportation to 

assessments. DCS reported that Parents maintain that they are self-employed 

and that “DCS should provide the financial assistance needed” for a deposit 

and first month’s rent for a home; however, DCS “could not assist the [Parents] 

. . . because either [F]ather or [M]other received a regular monthly income 

sufficient [] to pay the rent and support the family.” DCS Ex. F. DCS also 

reported that one service provider, Nu-Source, stated that Parents “are not 

interested in following through with employment and finding [] appropriate 

housing.” Id. The matter came for a review hearing in December 2012. The 

juvenile court ordered that the Children were to remain in their current foster 

placement, Father was to have a psychological evaluation and cooperate with 

random drug screens, and Mother was to have a psychiatric evaluation. 

[8] In early March 2013, DCS, through FCM Walker and her DCS supervisor, 

submitted a progress report to the juvenile court, updating the juvenile court 

with information about the Children’s psychological and physical conditions. 

The report advised that the Children had not returned home due to Parents’ 
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inability to find appropriate housing and employment. A review hearing 

occurred several weeks later. The following individuals attended the hearing: 

Mother, Father, the DCS attorney, the court appointed special advocate 

(“CASA”), FCM Walker, several caseworkers from at least three service 

providers, and the foster father. The ensuing order indicated that the plan 

continued to be reunification, but did not identify other progress or status 

regarding services. However, a DCS progress report submitted to the juvenile 

court on June 10, 2013, stated, among other things, that Parents had acquired 

housing in April 2013, that FCM Walker reviewed the home and observed that 

Parents needed additional mattresses and a working refrigerator and stove, as at 

that time the home only had a microwave for cooking. In September 2013, 

following a review hearing, the juvenile court suspended the supervised visits 

occurring at the home, due to the home’s condition. The juvenile court also 

ordered Parents to continue with counseling and marital counseling. A 

September 20, 2013 progress report stated that Mother had given birth in July 

2013 to another child and that Parents had the required necessities for her. 

However, at the last Child and Family Team Meeting (“Team Meeting”), it 

was recognized that the home had become infested with cockroaches. The next 

progress report of December 2013 stated that “the [P]arents have been actively 

participating in services[,]” but that “case plan goals have not yet been 

completed[.]” DCS Ex. P. The report reflected that a psychiatrist had 

prescribed Seroquel, a psychotropic drug, to Mother; however, Mother failed 

two specialized drug screens because she was not taking the medication as 

prescribed. Parents’ visitations with the Children remained suspended.
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[9] In January 2014, the juvenile court held a permanency review hearing, and in 

attendance were Mother, Father, CASA, DCS attorney and then-FCM Delpha 

Roberts (“FCM Roberts”), the foster mother, and representatives from three 

service providers. The juvenile court issued an order changing the permanency 

plan from reunification to termination,5 and in March 2014, DCS filed a 

petition for termination of Parents’ parental rights. 

[10] In August 2014, DCS, by FCM Roberts and her supervisor, filed another 

progress report in the CHINS proceedings, advising, among other things, that 

Mother was not compliant with taking the medications prescribed by her 

psychiatrist, Parents had not been able to provide stable and suitable housing 

for the Children, Parents were “several months behind in their rent, leading to 

eviction,” and the home had a “recurring cockroach problem.” DCS Ex. T. 

The August progress report also stated: Mother had not seen her psychiatrist for 

four or five months and that she was “a no show” for the last three 

appointments; she refused to take one medication at the recommended level 

and she refused to take another one at all; she had not seen her family or 

individual therapist for two months, and she “does not comply” with 

recommendations for home-based case work. Id. The report stated, “DCS and 

the service provider[s] have made every effort to accommodate the [Parents], 

yet they remain non-compliant.” Id. For instance, DCS arranged the

 

5 The juvenile court also removed Ne.A. from the home “[d]ue to concerns of the newborn’s health and 

safety,” and it directed DCS to bring the matter for a CHINS detention hearing. DCS Ex. R. 
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appointments for provided services to Mondays as requested by Parents, 

Regional Mental Health provided a walker and a wheelchair to help Mother in 

ambulating, and Mother “refuses to take her medication or see her 

psychiatrist[.]” Id. FCM Roberts had been to Parents’ home several times to 

do a drug screen on Mother, but “was not able to gain entry to the home,” 

noting, “When [Mother] is home alone she does not answer the door.” Id. At 

the end of July 2014, Father had told FCM Roberts that he and Mother were 

moving to a new address during the first week of August, but when FCM 

Roberts went to that address on August 12, 2014, it was boarded up and 

uninhabitable. A February 2015 progress report stated that Mother had moved 

to East Chicago, with her parents, but in February 2015, returned to the home, 

which “still has a problem” with cockroaches and also bed bugs. DCS Ex. X. 

[11] On April 14, 2015, the juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing on the 

termination of parental rights petition, and the testimony presented included the 

following. Mother testified about A.A. being burned by water at home on July 

20, 2012, describing that C.A. told her that B.A. had burned then-two-year-old 

A.A. in the bathtub. Mother stated that, before Father left for work, he bathed 

some of the Children and told Mother to finish getting them dressed and that he 

was leaving for work. Upon DCS’s inquiry, Mother testified that she looked in 

the bathroom and she “didn’t see [any] water in the tub[,]” so she did not know 

exactly how it happened. Mother described that, at first, A.A.’s leg looked 

“normal” or “natural,” but that the skin on the top of his foot was “separated” 

and she knew he had been “scalded.” Id. at 35, 92. Mother stated that A.A.
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“wasn’t crying” at the time. Id. at 41. Mother acknowledged that she knew 

that A.A. needed to be seen by a doctor, but she did not want to call 911 

because she was the only adult in the house and thus she would not be able to 

accompany A.A. in the ambulance, so she called Walgreens and talked to a 

pharmacist about treatment of water burns. Mother then called Father, telling 

him to bring home Neosporin, but he did not. When Father got home, he

snapped a picture of A.A. and walked to the Walgreens pharmacy and showed 

the pharmacist. Thereafter, Parents treated the burns with Neosporin, powder, 

and gave A.A. Tylenol and ibuprofen. The skin on his legs “got extremely 

worse,” and Mother described that, the next day, A.A.’s leg looked “totally 

burnt,” like “a struck match.” Id. at 42-43. 

[12] As to the home’s condition, Mother testified that the home “was falling 

completely apart,” as the basement was flooded up to the bottom step, and the 

bathroom sink “had fell down.” Id. at 36. She agreed that the home had a 

“bad infestation” of cockroaches. Id. at 47. Mother and Father looked for 

different housing and eventually moved out of the flooded house a month or 

two after the Children were removed. They lived in two or more motels as they 

looked for a residence. In April 2013, they found a three-bedroom home to 

rent, also in Gary. Mother stated that that home was free of cockroaches when 

she and Father moved in, but later had some cockroaches and bed bugs. 

[13] Mother testified that she and Father had marital issues. She referred to Father 

as having an anger management problem, and she said Father brought another 

woman and her child into the home for a period of time. When asked whether 
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the home’s condition was suitable for the Children, Mother maintained, “[M]y 

husband is the issue. The home is not the issue.” Id. at 86.

[14] As to substance abuse, Mother acknowledged that she and Father had used 

marijuana in the past. Id. at 50. As to Mother’s mental health, Mother testified 

that she “was dealing with psychiatrists” before having children, and that on 

one or more occasions, she had been hospitalized by her parents and siblings. 

Id. at 55. She testified to being diagnosed with bipolar disorder “and a little bit 

of OCDC [sic].” Id. She acknowledged that in the past she sometimes suffered 

from hallucinations. Mother explained that she was not willing to take the 

prescribed dose of Seroquel because it made her sleep too much. Mother is a 

licensed cosmetologist, but stated that she had not been able to work since April 

2014 due to health issues, including peripheral neuropathy. 

[15] Karen Sheets (“Sheets”), a home-based caseworker from Regional Mental 

Health (“Regional”), also testified. She explained that her job was to provide 

home-based case work services intended to assist Parents with maintaining a 

stable residence, employment, and family relationships. She also assisted with 

arranging transportation. She met weekly with Parents, beginning in March 

2013. With regard to Mother’s mental health issues, she stated that Dr. Ilyas 

with Regional prescribed three medications, but Mother admitted that she was 

not taking the medications as prescribed, believing that the Seroquel dose, 

prescribed for sleep, was too strong, and she refused to take Invega, for 

hallucinations, at all. Mother did not see her psychiatrist from February 2014 

to January 2015. As for the condition of the home and visitations with the 
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Children, in August 2013, DCS allowed the supervised visits to occur in the 

home because Mother recently had given birth to Ne.A. However, the in-home

visitations were suspended in September 2013 because of the home’s condition. 

In July 2014, Parents were evicted from their residence because they were 

behind in rent. They moved to another home, but it too eventually had 

cockroaches and bed bugs. Sheets explained that Mother suffers from some

health issues, including diabetes, and that Mother was not medically compliant. 

Sheets made an appointment for Mother with a nutritionist, but when Sheets 

arrived to take her to the appointment, Mother would not get out of bed. 

Sheets shared that she made “numerous attempts” to get Parents to make 

“better life choices” but they would not participate. Id. at 101. She said Parents

blamed each other, neither would take responsibility, and she had observed 

fighting between them. Sheets concluded that while Parents were “always [] 

cooperative,” they had not made the changes needed. Id. at 96. “They’re 

always trying; it’s just that they don’t ever accomplish the task.” Id. at 98. She 

described this as a “consistent pattern.” Id. at 112. Sheets concluded that she 

did not believe that Mother was “physically or mentally able to take care of the 

Children.” Id. at 114.

[16] FCM Roberts, who assumed responsibility over the case in November 2013,

also testified at the termination hearing. She testified primarily as to the 

services offered to Parents and their compliance with them. FCM Roberts 

explained that a “myriad” of services had been offered with the goal of 

reunification, including family therapy, individual therapy, psychological 
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therapy, and home-based services, and transportation services. Id. at 118. DCS 

more than once changed providers to accommodate the family’s issues, and 

DCS arranged for services to occur on Mondays as Parents requested. DCS 

also implemented having a monthly Team Meeting in an effort to increase 

Parents’ compliance and accomplish the goals of the case plan. FCM Roberts 

stated that, in general, Parents completed the various recommended 

assessments, but thereafter failed to complete the recommended services. She 

testified that the juvenile court suspended the supervised visitations at least in 

part because Mother was not compliant with taking the medications that the 

psychiatrist prescribed, one of which was for hallucinations. “[T]he concern 

with the medication was safety for the children.” Id. at 122. FCM Roberts 

testified that “in the past three months” Parents had been “better” about 

compliance with service providers, but that “[n]one of the goals have been 

reached.” Id. at 126. FCM Roberts also testified,

The issues have not changed. Since the onset of the case, no 

matter how many things we try[.] . . . [E]very other month we 

come together as a team to help them move forward. We’ve 

done every service that we could put in place, including with the 

wheelchair and the [] dietician. You know, they can’t take care 

of themselves[.] . . . So DCS does not believe . . . that they can 

care for the six or seven [] children.”

Id. at 127. FCM Roberts opined that there was a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that led to the Children’s removal would not be remedied and that 

the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children’s 
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well-being. She also testified that it was in the Children’s best interests for 

Parents’ parental rights to be terminated. 

[17] On April 16, 2015, the juvenile court issued its findings of fact, conclusions, and 

order terminating Parents’ parental rights to the Children. Mother now 

appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[18] As our Supreme Court has recently reiterated, “Decisions to terminate parental 

rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. 

They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great 

deference to the trial courts[.]” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). 

When reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 

149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence and 

reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, 

in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will 

set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is 

clearly erroneous. Id. at 148-49.

[19] Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children, the juvenile court 

entered specific findings and conclusions. When a trial court’s judgment 

contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered 

standard of review. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. 

denied. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and 
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second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. A 

finding is clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts or inferences 

drawn therefrom that support it. Id. If the evidence and inferences support the 

trial court’s decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 

N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. 

[20] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. 

at 1155. These parental interests, however, are not absolute and must be 

subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the proper disposition of 

a petition to terminate parental rights. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 149. In 

addition, although the right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated 

solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may 

be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental 

responsibilities. In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

[21] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is 

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.
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(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services; 

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State’s burden of proof for establishing these 

allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In 

re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 149. Moreover, if the court finds that the allegations in a 

petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate 

the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added). 

[22] Mother asserts that “even though [she] was in total compliance with her case 

plan,” DCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights. Appellant’s Br. at 

2. She urges us to reverse the juvenile court’s termination, claiming that DCS 

failed to prove the required elements for termination by sufficient evidence.

Specifically, she contends that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence that the 

conditions that resulted in the Children being removed or the reasons for their 

placement outside the home would not be remedied. Mother also argues that 

DCS failed to present sufficient evidence that the continuation of the parentchild relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-being. In addition, she 

asserts that DCS did not present sufficient evidence that the termination was in 

the Children’s best interests or that there was a satisfactory plan in place for the 

Children.
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Remediation of Conditions

[23] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

led to a child’s removal and continued placement outside the home would not

be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, we must ascertain what 

conditions led to the child’s placement and retention in foster care, and second, 

we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions 

will not be remedied. Id. In the second step, the trial court must judge a 

parent’s fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into 

consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent’s recent 

improvements against “‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether 

there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’” In re E.M., 4 

N.E.3d at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). Pursuant to this rule, 

“trial courts have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal 

history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, 

and lack of adequate housing and employment.” A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of 

Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. In 

addition, DCS need not provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; 

rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent’s

behavior will not change. In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App.

2007). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion 

to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly 

before termination.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. Although trial courts are 
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required to give due regard to changed conditions, this does not preclude them 

from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of their future 

behavior. Id.

[24] Here, the Children were removed from the home on July 24, 2012, after

learning that A.A. had suffered serious burns to his legs and feet caused by hot 

water. Mother did not witness the incident, but stated that C.A. told her that 

B.A. burned his brother A.A. in the bathtub. Although Mother knew that A.A. 

was “scalded,” she did not seek immediate medical care. Tr. at 35, 92. Rather, 

she and Father treated what was determined to be second and third-degree 

burns by giving A.A. ibuprofen and Tylenol and applying Neosporin and 

powder to the burns. Parents took A.A. for medical attention on July 22, and 

the child was transferred to the University of Chicago Hospital. Upon learning 

of the situation, DCS went to the home, which was in “deplorable” condition, 

including having a basement flooded to the bottom step and being infested with 

cockroaches. DCS Ex. D.

[25] After the Children were found to be CHINS and were removed from the home, 

Parents were ordered to find suitable housing and employment, undergo 

various assessments, and complete recommended services. Throughout the 

course of the proceedings, DCS offered Mother and Father many services, 

assessments, and opportunities. With regard to Mother, although she 

completed assessments, she did not follow through with completion of 

recommended services. She did not see her psychiatrist regularly, at one point 

going almost a year without an appointment, and she did not take the 
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medications as prescribed by the psychiatrist. At times, Mother would not get 

out of bed or even answer the door when a family case manager arrived to take 

her to an appointment. Parents moved to several residences, but each time the 

home at some point would be found to have cockroaches or other infestation. 

Parents were evicted from one residence for delinquent rent. Mother stated 

that, due to her physical ailments, she could not be employed, but she also 

failed to attend to her medical needs. Although FCM Roberts testified that 

Parents had been “better” about compliance with services in the few months 

preceding the termination hearing, they had a consistent pattern of failing to 

“accomplish the task.” Id. at 98, 126. FCM Roberts testified that in her 

opinion there was a reasonable probability that the problems that led to removal 

would not be remedied. Tr. at 127.

[26] As we have recognized, “Even assuming that [the parent] will eventually 

develop into a suitable parent, we must ask how much longer [the child] should 

have to wait to enjoy the permanency that is essential to her development and 

overall well-being.” Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 

375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Here, based on the evidence presented, 

we cannot say that the juvenile court clearly erred in concluding that there is a 

reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s 

placement outside the home will not be remedied. 

Threat to Well-Being

[27] Mother also contends that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 
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parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the Children. 

However, we need not address such argument. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B) is written such that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental 

rights, the juvenile court need only find that one of the three requirements of 

subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. 

A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1156. Therefore, as we have already determined that 

sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that the conditions that resulted in 

the removal of the Children would not be remedied, it is not necessary for us to 

address any argument as to whether sufficient evidence supported the 

conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat 

to the well-being of the Children.

[28] That said, DCS presented evidence that the Children had MRSA and scabies 

when they arrived in foster care. They also exhibited “trauma issues,” and at 

the time of the termination hearing were still receiving play therapy through a 

service provider to address those issues. Tr. at 131. It was noted at the 

termination hearing that several of the Children have medical needs “that 

require them to go to Indianapolis periodically” for treatment, and FCM 

Roberts expressed concern about Parents’ ability to provide the necessary 

medical care for the Children, given Parents’ inability to care for their own 

medical issues. Tr. at 129. In addition, Mother acknowledged that she has, at 

times, experienced hallucinations, and Father testified to having called the 

police during one or more of her episodes; yet, Mother refuses to take the 

prescribed medication. FCM Roberts testified that, since being in foster care, 
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the Children “have made tremendous progress” and “are thriving” with the 

foster family. Id. at 129-30. Their medical and psychological needs are met, 

and, “There’s always food. The [C]hildren are always neat and clean. The 

home is always clean[.]” Id. at 130. We have recognized, “[A] trial court need 

not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that 

her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before 

terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re A.F., 762 N.E.2d at 1253. 

Here, Mother has not demonstrated that the juvenile court’s conclusion that 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children’s 

well-being is clearly erroneous. 

Best Interests

[29] Mother next argues that insufficient evidence was presented to prove that 

termination is in the best interests of the Children. In determining what is in 

the best interests of the child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of 

the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re 

D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. 

In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those 

of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper 

where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing 

In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). The trial 

court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her 

physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before 

terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child’s need for 
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permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a 

child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. 

Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). 

[30] Mother asserts that “DCS failed to possibly come close” to proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that the termination was in the Children’s best interests. 

Appellant’s Br. at 10. We disagree. As discussed above, the Children were 

removed after DCS learned that one of six children at the home suffered second 

and third-degree burns, and Parents delayed obtaining medical treatment for 

two days. The home was infested, flooded, and was not suitable for the family. 

Parents never were able to remedy the situation. They never obtained suitable 

housing or employment. Mother failed to complete services and refused to take 

medicines as prescribed by the psychiatrist and also did not attend to her 

medical needs or disabilities. Sheets opined that Mother was not “physically or 

mentally able to take care of the Children.” Tr. at 114. FCM Roberts testified 

that she believed that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in the 

Children’s best interest. Mother argues that the juvenile court “failed to address 

the pain and suffering that the [C]hildren will have to suffer when they realize 

that they will not have any further contact with their mother.” Appellant’s Br. at 

10. However, this is a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot 

do. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 149. We conclude that sufficient evidence was 

presented to prove that termination was in the best interest of the Children.
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Satisfactory Plan

[31] Mother also asserts that DCS failed to establish that there is a satisfactory plan 

for the care and treatment of the Children. For a plan to be “satisfactory,” for 

purposes of the statute, it “need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general 

sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child 

relationship is terminated.” In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 268. Here, the juvenile 

court concluded that DCS “has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the [C]hildren which is Adoption by the foster parent[.]” Appellant’s App. at 5.

[32] Although conceding that “possibly DCS has a plan” for the Children, Mother 

nevertheless argues that DCS failed to prove that it had a satisfactory plan for 

the Children. Appellant’s Br. at 5. We reject that claim. FCM Roberts testified

that the current foster home, where all of Mother’s children were placed, 

provided for the medical, physical, and emotional needs of the Children, and 

she stated that the Children were bonded to their foster mother. When asked if 

the foster parent was willing “to adopt the six [C]hildren that are the subject of 

today’s case,” FCM Roberts replied, “Yes, she is.” Tr. at 131. Mother 

highlights that the foster parent did not testify at the termination hearing, 

arguing “therefore, we can only assume from the testimony of the Case 

Manager that [the foster parent] intends to adopt the [C]hildren.” Appellant’s 

Br. at 10. To the extent that Mother’s argument is that DCS’s plan needed to be 

more specific or identify more specific commitment on the part of the foster 

home, we reject that claim. We have held, 
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A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find 

suitable parents to adopt the children. In other words, there need 

not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only 

that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent. 

Accordingly, a plan is not unsatisfactory if DCS has not 

identified a specific family to adopt the children.

In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (internal 

citations omitted).

[33] We will reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a showing of “clear 

error” – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made. In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Based 

on the record before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to the Children was clearly erroneous. We, therefore,

affirm the juvenile court’s judgment. 

[34] Affirmed.

[35] Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.