U.S . MARINES IN VIETNAM

FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

1967

by

Major Gary L . Telfer, USMC

Lieutenant Colonel Lane Rogers, USM C

and

V. Keith Fleming, Jr.

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U .S . MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1984
Other Volumes in the Marine Corps

Vietnam Operational Histories Serie s

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964, The Advisory and Combat

Assistance Era, 197 7

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, The Landing and the Buildup, 197 8

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, An Expanding War, 198 2

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, January June 1968, now in preparation

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, July-December 1968, scheduled for preparation

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1969, now in preparation

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1970-1971, now in preparation

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1971-1973, now in preparation

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1973-1975, now in preparation

Library of Congress Card No. 77-604776

PCN 190 003090 00
Foreword

This is the fourth volume in a planned 10-volume operational and chronological serie s

covering the U .S . Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate topica l

series will complement the operational histories . This volume details the change in focu s

of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), which fought in South Vietnam 's northernmost corps area, I Corps . III MAF, faced with a continued threat in 1967 of North

Vietnamese large unit entry across the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Vietnams ,

turned over the Chu Lai enclave to the U .S . Army's Task Force Oregon and shifted the

bulk of its forces—and its attention—northward . Throughout the year, the 3d Marine

Division fought a conventional, large-unit war against the North Vietnamese Army

(NVA) near the demilitarized zone . The 1st Marine Division, concentrated in Thu a

Thien and Quang Nam provinces, continued both offensive and pacification operations .

Its enemy ranged from small groups of Viet Cong guerrillas in hamlets and villages up t o

formations as large as the 2d NVA Division . The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provided ai r

support to both divisions, as well as Army and allied units in I Corps . The Force Logistic

Command, amalgamated from all Marine logistics organizations in Vietnam, served all ,

major Marine commands .

This volume, like its predecessors, concentrates on the ground war in I Corps and III

MAF's perspective of the Vietnam War as an entity . It also covers the Marine Corps participation in the advisory effort, the operations of the two Special Landing Forces of th e

U .S. Navy's Seventh Fleet, and the services of Marines with the staff of the U .S . Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam . There are additional chapters on supporting arms an d

logistics, and a discussion of the Marine role in Vietnam in relation to the overal l

American effort.

The nature of the war facing III MAF during 1967 forced the authors to concentrate

on major operations, particularly those characterized by heavy combat . The uneve n

quality of the official reports submitted by combat units also played a role in selecting the materials presented in this volume. This is not meant to slight those whose combat service involved long, hot days on patrol, wearying hours of perimeter defense, an d

innumerable operations, named and un-named . These Marines also endured fights just

as deadly as the ones against large enemy regular units . III MAF's combat successes i n

1967 came from the efforts of all Americans in I Corps .

All three authors have been historians in the History and Museums Division . Major

Gary L. Telfer, now a retired lieutenant colonel, has a bachelor of arts degree fro m

Muskingum College, Ohio . He had two tours in Vietnam, first as an advisor with a Viet -

namese Army artillery battalion and, three years later, with the 12th Marines . Major

Telfer began this history project and produced the initial manuscript . His replacement ,

Lieutenant Colonel Lane Rogers, now also retired, expanded the materials into a secon d

draft. He is a member of the class of 1953 of the U .S . Naval Academy and was an adviso r

with the Vietnamese Marine Corps. The third author, Dr. V. Keith Fleming, Jr ., is a
iv

former Marine officer who served as a rifle company commander in Vietnam . He

prepared the comment edition and then incorporated the suggestions of the reviewers .

He has bachelor of arts and master of arts degrees from the University of Alabama and a

doctoral degree in American military history from Ohio State University .

E. H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General, U . S . Marine Corps, Retired

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
Preface

U.S. Marines in Vietnam : Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967, like its predecessors, is

largely based on the holdings of the Marine Corps Historical Center . These official file s

include the monthly unit command chronologies, after action reports, messages, units '

daily journal files, the oral history collection, comment files, and previously classifie d

studies prepared by members of the division . Especially useful in the latter category wer e

Lieutenant Colonel Ralph F . Moody and Major Thomas E . Donnelly, "Introduction of

North Vietnamese Regulars," and Lieutenant Colonel Ralph F . Moody, "A Highe r

Order of Warfare," parts IV and V of a then-projected single-volume history of the war .

The authors supplemented the above sources with research in the records of the othe r

Services and pertinent published primary and secondary sources . Although none of th e

information in this history is classified, some of the documentation on which it is base d

still has a classified designation . More than 250 reviewers, most of whom were participants in the events described in this volume, read a comment edition of th e

manuscript . Their comments, where applicable, have been incorporated into the text . A

list of all those who commented is included in the appendices . All ranks used in th e

body of the text are those held by the individuals in 1967 .

The production of this volume, like its predecessors, has been a cooperative effort . All

of the Vietnam historians, past and present, in the Histories Section, History and

Museums Division, have reviewed the draft manuscript . Mrs . Joyce Bonnett, head archivist, and her former assistant, Mrs . Linda T. Benedict, aided our access into th e

records in the Archives Section . Miss Evelyn A . Englander, head librarian, and her assistant, Mrs. Patricia E. Morgan, were very helpful in obtaining needed references . The

Reference Section, headed by Mr. Danny J . Crawford, and earlier by Mrs . Gabrielle M .

Santelli, made its voluminous files available and answered the authors' numerous questions cheerfully and professionally . Mrs . Regina Strother, formerly with the Defens e

Audio-Visual Agency, but now with the History and Museums Division, graciousl y

assisted in the photographic research . Mr . Benis M . Frank, the head of the Oral History

Section, was equally helpful in making his tapes and transcripts available .

Mr. Robert E . Struder, head of the Publications Production Section, skillfully guide d

the manuscript through the various production phases . Mr. Struder also served as th e

project officer supervising the contract with the University of Maryland's Cartographi c

Services Laboratory, which made the maps in this volume . Mrs Bonnie Kane and Ms. Le e

Ritzman Ebinger were the cartographers, under the supervision of Mrs. Sue Gibbons

and her successor, Ms . Vickie Taylor. The typesetting of the manuscript was done b y

Corporals Paul W . Gibson, Joseph J . Hynes, Mark J. Zigante, and Stanley W. Crowl.

Mrs. Catherine A . Kerns contributed significantly to the typesetting effort, and provided considerable technical expertise on typesetting procedures. Mr. William S . Hill, the

Division's graphics specialist, completed the design and layout of the book, incorporating some work completed earlier by his predecessor, Mr. Dennis W. Kirschner.

V
vi

The authors give special thanks to Brigadier General Edwin H . Simmons, the Director

of Marine Corps History and Museums, whose policies guide the Vietnam series . Four

successive Deputies for Marine Corps History—Colonel Herbert M . Hart, Colonel Joh n

E . Greenwood (now editor of the Marine Corps Gazette), Colonel Oliver M . Whipple ,

Jr., and Colonel John G . Miller—have shepherded this project to its completion . Mr .

Henry I . Shaw, Jr., the Chief Historian, aided all three authors by giving us the benefi t

of his considerable experience in writing Marine Corps History, encouragement and ad -

vice when needed, and general editorial guidance . Mr . Jack Shulimson, now the senior

Vietnam historian, provided advice to all three authors and aided research through hi s

knowledge of Vietnam-era Marine Corps records . The historians in the historical offices

of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have freely exchanged information with the authors

and assisted in locating documents needed to complete our research . We express our

gratitude to all those who reviewed the comment edition and pointed out needed corrections . They also were generous in providing personal photographs, documents, an d

the insights available to participants in events . Finally, the authors are responsible for

the contents of the text, including the opinions expressed and any errors in fact .

GARY L. TELFER LANE ROGERS V. KEITH FLEMING, JR.
Table of Contents

Page

Foreword iii

Preface v

Table of Contents VII

Maps x

PART I THE DMZ IN EARLY 1967 1

Chapter 1 The Situation at the Start of the Year 3

The Early Days 3

Command Relations 4

A Change in Strategy 6

The Plan for the Year 6

The Enemy Organization 7

Tactical Considerations 8

Chapter 2 Spring Action South of the DMZ—February-April 1967 9

Operation Prairie I Continues 9

Operation Prairie II 9

Operation Prairie III 1 6

Chapter 3 Combined US/ARVN Operations in the DMZ 2 0

Operation Prairie IV Begins 2 0

Attack on Con Thien 2 1

Into the DMZ 2 3

Operation Lam Son 54 2 5

Operation Beau Charger 2 5

Operation Hickory 2 6

Operation Prairie IV Ends 3 0

Chapter 4 The First Battle of Khe Sanh 3 1

The Early Days 3 1

Opening Moves of the Battle 3 5

Reinforcing the Hill 861 Attack 3 9

Attacking Hill 881S 4 0

The Final Objective : Hill 881N 4 2

End of the Battle 44

Operation Crockett 46

PART II SPRING FIGHTING IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 49

Chapter 5 The War in Southern I Corps 5 1

The Situation 5 1

Operation Desoto 53

vii
vii'

Deckhouse/Desoto 5 7

Desoto Continued 6 1

Operation Union 6 3

Union II 6 8

Chapter 6 Task Force Oregon 7 5

PART III CONTINUING ACTION ALONG THE DMZ 8 4

Chapter 7 The Barrier—Another Approach 8 6

Evolution of the Concept 8 6

Chapter 8 Con Thien and the Summer Battles Along the DMZ 9 5

Why Con Thien? 9 5

Operation Buffalo 9 6

PART IV FALL COMBAT, NORTH AND SOUTH 10 5

Chapter 9 Continuing Operations Against the 2d NINA Division 10 7

Raids and Rockets in Quang Nam 10 7

Operation Cochise 10 .9

Operation Swift 11 1

Chapter 10 Fall Fighting in the North 12 5

Operation Kingfisher 12 5

Medina/Bastion Hill/Lam Son 138 13 9

Adjustments within the 3d Marine Division 14 2

PART V SPECIAL EFFORTS 14 8

Chapter 11 The Special Landing Force 15 0

Doctrine Versus Expedient 15 0

Operation Deckhouse V, 6-15 January 15 1

Deckhouse VI/Desoto, 16 February-3 March 15 3

Beacon Hill I, 20 March-1 April 15 5

Beaver Cage/Union I, 28 April-12 May 15 8

Beau Charger/Belt Tight/Hickory/Prairie IV/Cimarron, 18 May-10 June 15 9

Day On, Stay On—SLF Operational Tempo Increases 16 1

Bear Bite/Colgate/Choctaw/Maryland, 2-27 June 16 2

Beacon Torch / Calhoun, 18 June-2 July, 25 June-2 July 16 2

SLF Alpha in Bear Claw/Buffalo/Hickory II, 3-16 July 163

SLF Bravo in Beaver Track/Buffalo/Hickory II, 4-16 July 164

Bear Chain/Fremont, 20-26 July 166

Beacon Guide, 21-30 July 167

Kangaroo Kick/Fremont, 1-21 August 167

Beacon Gate/ Cochise, 7-27 August 168

Belt Drive/Liberty, 27 August-5 September 169

A Change in Scenario— The 46s are Grounded 17 0

Beacon Point/Fremont/Ballistic Charge/Shelbyville, 1-28 September 17 0

Fortress Sentry/Kingfisher, 17 September-15 October 17 1

Bastion Hill/Medina/Liberty II/Fremont, 10-23 October 17 2

Formation Leader/Liberty II/Knox, 17 October-4 November 17 3

Granite/Kentucky II and III, 26 October-16 November 173
i x

Badger Hunt/Foster, 13-29 November 17 4

Fortress Ridge, 21-24 December 17 5

Badger Tooth, 26 December 1967-2 January 1968 17 6

Ballistic Arch/ Kentucky V/Osceola, 24 November-31 December 17 9

Chapter 12 Pacification 182

The Problem Defined 18 2

County Fair 18 5

Marine Grass-Roots-Level Participation 18 6

Reporting and Evaluation 194

PART VI SUPPORT AND CONCLUSION 19 7

Chapter 13 Supporting Arms 19 9

Marine Air Operations 199

Fixed-Wing Operations 201

Helicopter Operations 206

Artillery 21 2

Chapter 14 Logistics 22 4

Upgrading the Logistic System 22 4

Problems with the M-16 Rifle 22 9

Navy Support 23 1

Marine Corps Engineers 23 8

Chapter 15 Other Marine Activities 24 1

Marines with MACV 24 1

The Embassy Guard 242

The Advisors 244

I Corps Advisors 245

The Rung Sat Special Zone 246

The Marine Advisory Unit 247

Action in Binh Dinh Province 250

Action in the South 25 1

Chapter 16 The Situation at the End of the Year 255

Operational Aspects 25 5

Personnel and Logistics 257

The Outlook for Victory 257

Enemy Dispositions 25 8

The Changed Situation 259

NOTES 261

APPENDICES

A. Marine Command and Staff List, January-December 1966 27 3

B. Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 28 7

C. Chronology of Significant Events 29 3

D. Medal of Honor Citations, 1966 297

E. List of Reviewers 31 3

F. Distribution of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 31 7

G. Distribution of Personnel, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 31 9

INDEX 325
Maps

Reference Map : I Corps Tactical Zone XI

Marine Bases in Northern I CTZ, January 1967 7

Operations Hickory, Lam Son 54, Belt Tight, and Beau Charger, 19-26 May 1967 2 4

Khe Sanh Combat Base and Vicinity 1967 3 2

Area of Action, Operation Desoto, 27-30 January 1967 5 4

Duc Pho and Vicinity, Operation Desoto, January 1967 5 5

Action of 21- April 1967, Operation Union 6 4

The Battle of Hill 110 ; 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines;

Operation Union, 10 May 1967 6 6

Operation Union II, Nui Loc Son Basin, Action of 26-29 May 6 9

Operation Union II, Nui Loc Son Basin, Action of 30 May-2 June 7 1

Major MAF Operations Southern ICTZ, January June 1967 7 4

Infantry Battalion Location Prior to Arrival of Task Force Oregon 7 6

Infantry Battalion Realignments Resulting from Deployment of Task Force Orego n

as of 30 April 1967 8 0

The Plan for the Strong Point Obstacle System 9 0

Operation Buffalo Action Near Con Thien 9 7

The Fights at Dong Son (2) and Chau Lam (1), Operation Swift, 4 September 1967 11 2

Major Engagements, Operation Swift, 4-15 September 1967 11 6

Operations, Medina, Bastion Hill, and Lam Son 138, 11-15 October 1967 14 0

Operation Badger Tooth 26-28 December 1967 17 7

NVA 130mm Field Gun Threat to Marine Logistic Bases, Summer 1967 22 1

Rocket Attack Da Nang Airbase, 14 July 1967 22 3

Saigon Area 1967 243

x
XI

Reference Map

I Corps Tactical Zone

(

v\i/

OR'kP

nam
PART I

THE DMZ IN EARLY 1967

CHAPTER 1

The Situation at the Start of the Yea r

The Early Days— Command Relations— The Plan for the Year — A Change in Strateg y

The Enemy Organization — Tactical Considerations

The Early Days

The landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionar y

Brigade (MEB) at Da Nang on 8 March 1965 reaffirmed the United States' determination to assist th e

South Vietnamese government in defending itsel f

against increasing Communist military pressure fro m

Viet Cong (VC) forces and the North Vietnames e

Army (NVA) . Two Marine infantry battalions rein -

forced the Marine helicopter task unit which ha d

supported the Army of the Republic of Vietnam

(ARVN) since the spring of 1962 . Battalion Landin g

Team (BLT) 3/9 landed across the beach just north

of the Da Nang Air Base from U .S. Seventh Flee t

amphibious ships and the 1st Battalion, 3d Marine s

arrived by air from Okinawa . Additional Marin e

units, both ground and air, arrived during April an d

May, and Marine units established two more bases i n

the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) of South Vietnam

at Chu Lai and Phu Bai.

On 7 May 1965 the 9th MEB disbanded when th e

III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) absorbed it s

mission . First under the command of Major Genera l

William R . Collins and then Lieutenant Genera l

Lewis W. Walt, III MAF initially consisted of the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing, and the 3d Marine Division .

In August, the Commanding General, III MAF ,

became senior advisor to the Vietnamese I Corp s

commanding general and, as such, assumed responsibility for the Corps advisory effort . He directed all

U .S. ground operations in I CTZ, as well as the

security of all U.S. bases in the Corps area . By the

end of March 1966, III MAF's combat power in -

creased following the arrival of the 1st Marine Division.

The first large-scale encounter between III MAF

Marines and an enemy main force unit took place i n

August 1965, when the 7th Marines successfull y

defeated the 1st VC Regiment south of Chu Lai during Operation Statlite . This battle was followed by

battalion- and regimental-size combat operation s

against VC and NVA units throughout I CTZ . In addition, the Special Landing Force (SLF) of the

Seventh Fleet conducted amphibious operation s

against enemy forces in I CTZ and other areas o f

South Vietnam.

Behind the shield provided by these operations ,

smaller Marine units conducted patrols, ambushes ,

and sweeps to destroy local Communist forces and t o

secure the Vietnamese countryside . Once the

Marines established security, they initiated civic action programs to aid the Vietnamese government' s

Revolutionary Development Program . By mid-1966 ,

these tactics were forcing the guerrillas out of traditional strongholds, denying them sources of suppl y

and manpower, and most importantly, seriousl y

eroding the enemy's hold over the people .

In July the Communists reacted to III MAF's expanding control over the heavily populated, rice-ric h

coastal areas by thrusting the North Vietnames e

324B Division across the demilitarized zone (DMZ)

into the comparatively unpopulated province o f

Quang Tri in northern I CTZ. Although the

Marines' Operation Hastings soundly defeated thi s

invasion attempt, the enemy tried again in

September, this time with elements of two divisions .

Again the Marines repulsed the invaders by conducting Operation Prairie, an effort that continue d

through the end of the year . While both of the major NVA efforts suffered

defeat as did all others throughout I CTZ, the Communists did succeed in relieving some of the pressure

on the hard-pressed guerrilla forces in the coasta l

areas to the south . All signs indicated that most o f

the Communist forces had withdrawn across th e

DMZ, but Marine troop dispositions remained

oriented northward in the face of the enemy's apparent willingness to invade this northern area .

As 1966 ended, III MAF's Marines found

themselves fighting essentially two separate but in3
4 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

terrelated "wars." The 3d Marine Division conducted

basically a conventional war along the DMZ against

regular NVA formations . At the same time, the 1st

Marine Division continued its combination of large

unit and counterguerrilla operations south of the

Hai Van Pass.

Command Relations

As the commander of III MAF, General Walt

operated under a complicated web of command relations that put him virtually under two masters.

Operational control of all United States forces i n

South Vietnam rested with General William C . Westmoreland, whose Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was a unified comman d

under Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, the Commande r

in Chief, Pacific Command (CinCPac) . On the other

hand, Lieutenant General Victor H . Krulak, wh o

headed Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), retained command of III MAF in the areas of administra •

tion and logistics . Further, the air war in most of

North Vietnam, in which some III MAF aircraft participated, remained under the personal control of

Admiral Sharp . Finally, General Walt, as the senior

American officer in I Corps, served as the senior ad -

visor to the South Vietnamese forces in the corp s

area . His burden would have been heavier had he

not relinquished in 1966 his responsibilities as Nava l

Component Commander for all American naval

forces in Vietnam.

At the beginning of 1967, the 18 infantry battalions of III MAF occupied bases throughout the I

CTZ. I Corps, the name commonly given to I CTZ ,

which consisted of the five northernmost province s

of South Vietnam, stretched 225 miles from th e

DMZ in the north to the northern border of II CTZ

in the south . Twenty-one fixed-wing and helicopter

squadrons of the 1st MAW supported the allie d

ground forces . These units and the numerous sup -

porting organizations gave General Walt a total o f

more than 70,000 troops in I CTZ .

The enemy's two major thrusts across the DM Z

during the summer and fall of 1966 resulted in the

shifting of some 10,000 Marines north to meet thes e

threats. The prolonged commitment of substantial

Marine forces in the north forced a realignment o f

operational commands within III MAF . On 10 October 1966 Major General Wood B . Kyle of the 3 d

Marine Division assumed control of all U .S . force s

committed to Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces .

Brigadier General Lowell E . English established a

forward command post at Dong Ha, in Quang Tri

Province . At the same time, the main 3d Division

command post moved from Da Nang to Phu Bai ,

Senior Marine commanders pose at Da Nang with MajGen Bruno A. Hochmuth upon

his arrival to assume command of 3d Marine Division . They are, from left, MajGen

Louis B. Robertshaw (1st MAW), MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr . (1st MarDiv), LtGen

Louis W. Walt (III MAP), Gen Hochmuth, and MajGen Wood B. Kyle (3d MarDiv) .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19456
THE SITUATION AT THE START OF THE YEAR

north of the Hai Van Mountains which separate th e

two northern provinces from the rest of I CTZ . At

the turn of the year, III MAF had committed 7 of it s

18 battalions in this northern area .

5

With the 3d Division's move, the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Major General Herman Nicker -

son, Jr., shifted its headquarters north from Chu La i

to Da Nang, but General Nickerson left Brigadie r

General William A . Stiles' Task Force X-Ray, a

brigade-size force of four battalions, at Chu Lai. The

X-Ray force stretched between two provinces ; two

battalions operated in Quang Tin Province and two

in Quang Ngai Province . Additionally, three battalions of Korean Marines, commanded by Brigadie r

General Yun Sang Kim, were in Quang Ngai Province . The command relationship with the Korea n

Marines was one of cooperation and coordination .

Because of the fluid, nonlinear type of warfare

peculiar to the Vietnam conflict, the individual infantry battalion became the key maneuver element .

Under the system of operational control, or "opcon, "

a battalion might operate under a task force head -

quarters, or even as part of a regiment other than it s

parent unit. For example a battalion of the 7th

Marines might be attached to the 4th Marines whil e

a battalion of the 4th Marines was a part of anothe r

command . This command situation became furthe r

confused in August of 1966 when Fleet Marin e

Fbrce, Pacific (FMFPac) reestablished the intratheater unit rotation program between Marine battalions in Vietnam and Regimental Landing Team

26 (RLT-26) located on Okinawa.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A36991 2

BGen William A . Stiles (right) of Task Force X-Ray

greets LtGen Victor H. Krulak at Chu Lai on 9 March

during one of the latter's frequent visits to South

Vietnam. Krulak, as commander of FMFPac, had administrative control over Marine units in III MAP.

The Special Landing Force (SLF) of the Seventh

Fleet complemented the strength of III MAF and al l

allied forces in Vietnam. Consisting of a SLF head -

quarters, a Marine battalion landing team, and a

Marine helicopter squadron, the SLF operated fro m

ships of the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Ready Grou p

(ARG) . The SLF could land either as an independen t

force or in conjunction with other units withdrawn

from combat and temporarily embarked on othe r

amphibious ships .

*RLT-26 was an element of the 5th Marine Division which activated at Camp Pendleton, California, on 1 June 1966 . The rotation system permitted units to withdraw from South Vietnam and

go to Okinawa for a 1- or 2-month refitting and retraining cycle .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18902 7

BGen Yun Sang Kim commanded the 2d Republic

of Korea Marine Brigade in Quang Ngai Province .

The Korean Marines were independent of III MAF

but both Marine commands cooperated and coordinated their efforts against the common enemy .
6 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The posture of the regular ARVN forces at the

start of the year was as follows:

I Corps headquarters was at Da Nang .

The 1st Division headquarters was in the city of Hue . Its

area of operation was the two northern provinces, Quan g

Tri and Thua Thien .

The 2d Division's headquarters was in Quang Ngai City .

Its tactical area included the two southern provinces o f

Quang Tin and Quang Ngai .

The 51st Regiment, an independent unit located in th e

central province of Quang Nam, had the mission of

pacification security .

A Ranger Group of three battalions was the corps reserv e

and moved throughout the I Corps area .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18901 1

LtGen Hoang Xuam Lam, as the South Vietnamese

commander of I Corps, had administrative and tactical control of the country's five northern provinces.

To support the ground elements, Major General

Louis B . Robertshaw's 1st MAW deployed to five

principal airfields. Wing headquarters was at D a

Nang, fixed-wing squadrons were at Da Nang an d

Chu Lai, and helicopter squadrons were at Phu Bai ,

Marble Mountain east of Da Nang, and Ky Ha near

Chu Lai. Additional helicopter detachments were at

Dong Ha and Khe Sanh.

The ARVN I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant

General Hoang Xuan Lam, shared its tactical zone of

action with III MAF . At the beginning of 1967, this

ARVN force consisted of the 1st and 2d Army Divisions, a Ranger group, and three temporarily assigned battalions of Vietnamese Marines, a total of 34 infantry battalions. Regional and Popular Forces, added to the ARVN regulars, brought the South Vietnamese troop total to 77,000 in the five provinces o f

I CTZ.

*Regional Forces (RF) companies recruited their personnel

within their respective provinces, to be used within the boundaries of the province, while Popular Forces (PF) platoons obtained their men locally for employment only as security forces at thei r

home villages or hamlets .

Although III MAF and ARVN I Corps were coequal commands, their respective commander s

recognized the need for close operational coordination in an agreement which stipulated that, whil e

neither force would serve under the control of the

other, elements of either force could be temporaril y

placed under the tactical direction of the other fo r

specific operations.

The Plan for the Year

The objectives assigned these two commands b y

the Vietnamese Joint General Staff and MACV i n

the Combined Campaign Plan for 1967 wer e

threefold:

To counter rapidly any threat of invasion across the I

Corps borders;

To destroy Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army units at -

tempting to disrupt the government 's expanding control

over the populated areas; and ,

To ensure the security of the base areas and lines of communication that were enabling the government to expan d

its control .

A Change in Strategy

The major change in strategy from 1966, a s

outlined in the 1967 Combined Campaign Plan, was

the assignment of the Vietnamese armed forces t o

the primary role of pacification. To free the Sout h

Vietnamese Army units for pacification, American

forces assumed the tactical tasks hitherto pursued b y

the South Vietnamese, at the same time carrying th e

bulk of the offensive effort against the Viet Con g

and North Vietnamese .

The American focus on the enemy's forces,

however, was not to be at the expense of U .S.
Marine Bases in South

Northern I CTZ / ,. China

— Sea January 1967 - •GoLinh \

0 5 ¶0 ¶5 k,IomMere - .3 57O

D E UCon rh

— - C — M.. - Dq S

RockpiIe • Can, Lo H,

•Canip Carroll

Quarig Tn t UCaLu

Khe \ Sanhu \ r

THE SITUATION AT THE START OF THE YEAR

pacification efforts. General Westmoreland, addressing a joint session of Congress in April 1967

said, "The only strategy which can defeat such an

organization is one of unrelenting but discriminating military, political, and psychological

pressure on his whole structure—at all levels."l

Ironically, just when allied strategy placed increased emphasis on pacification, the Marines found

themselves hard-pressed to pursue their own pacification program, initiated as early as 1965.

Spread throughout the five provinces, III MAF forces

simultaneously faced large-scale attacks by NVA and

VC units throughout I Corps. There was a substantial increase in the tempo of guerrilla warfare, as well

as the threat of a major invasion in. the DMZ area by

an enemy force of possibly three divisions. At the

same time, III MAF's mission still included the

defense of the three large base areas which contained

the five principal I CTZ airfields.

The 3d Marine Division's area, along the DMZ,

caused the greatest Marine concern. III MAF headquarters expected the enemy to exploit his shorter

supply lines. U.S. policy, well known in North Vietnam, prohibited the pursuit of Communists into the

DMZ. Strong enemy pressure south of the DMZ

possibly could gain a prestige victory, perhaps even

the conquest of the two northern provinces, Quang

Tn and Thua Thien. Such pressure would also divert

the Marines from the pacification program which

was beginning to fragment the guerrilla infrastructure further south.

The Enemy Organization

The Marines of III MAF faced a hierarchy of

enemy units ranging from local, part-time guerrillas

to conventional North Vietnamese Army divisions.

At each level, an appropriate political headquarters

controlled various subordinate units' operations. The

village Communist Party chapters supervised their

own squads of guerrillas. Viet Cong local force companies and battalions came under the Party committees of the province or district. Main force Viet Cong

or North Vietnamese units received their orders from

the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) or

other major headquarters which, theoretically, were

subordinate to COSVN. In practice, however, these

headquarters usually took their orders directly from

Hanoi.
8 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Military Region 5 (MR-S), commanded by a Nort h

Vietnamese general officer, controlled enemy unit s

in the northern part of South Vietnam. Two subregional headquarters shared the command responsibilities for this large area . The B-3 Front commanded Communist units in Darlac, Kontum, and Pleik u

provinces. South of the DMZ, the important Quang

Tri and Thua Thien provinces operated under th e

Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region, which, for all practical purposes, was subordinate to North Vietnam' s

Military Region 4.

MR-S commanded two infantry divisions that

threatened the Marines in southern I Corps. The 2d

NVA Division, also known as the 620th, and composed of two NVA regiments and the 1st Viet Cong

Regiment, operated in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin

provinces. The 3d NVA Division, also made up o f

two NVA and one VC regiments, worked further to

the south in Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and Kontu m

provinces.

North of the DMZ were four NVA divisions, th e

304th, the 320th, the 324B, and the 325C, all under

the command of North Vietnam's Military Region 4.

The 324E suffered heavy casualties in combat with

the 3d Marine Division in July and August 1966 an d

withdrew back across the DMZ to refit . The 325C

served as the strategic reserve for MR-4.

Tactical Considerations

As 1967 began, III MAF could not attack the NVA

divisions in and north of the DMZ ; American policy

prohibited such action . Many Marines disagree d

with the policy, including the commander of the 9th

Marine Amphibious Brigade on Okinawa, Brigadier

General Louis Metzger, who later became the assistant commander of the 3d Division, General Metzger recently commented :

It has long been my belief that the most significant

aspect of operations along the DMZ was the publicly ate d

United States policy that U .S . forces would not enter

North Vietnam. This allowed the enemy to deploy his

forces across the DMZ at the time and place of his choosing, and to withdraw to a sanctuary when it suited his convenience ; to utilize his artillery against U .S. positions and

bases while at the same time denying the Marines the most

effective means of destroying the enemy weapons, i .e ., to

overrun them; [and] to free his infantry elements from

guarding his artillery so that they could be employed

against U .S. forces and positions south of the DMZ . 3

In response to the enemy challenge in the DM Z

area, MACV began working on two sets of contingency plans in the latter part of 1966 . First, if

necessary, General Westmoreland would shift U .S .

Army units north to reinforce III MAF . In addition ,

he planned, at the urging of the Secretary of

Defense, to build an elaborate anti-infiltration barrier system south of- the DMZ to seal off the are a

from North Vietnamese incursions . Both actions

would have a profound effect upon III MAF's operations in 1967 as it struggled to fight both a

counterinsurgency war against the VC infrastructur e

and a conventional war against regular NVA infantry

divisions.

Some principal figures in the war in I Corps discuss the situation on 3 May 1967 . Those

present include, from left, an unidentified Marine colonel; BGen John R. Chaisson, th e

senior Marine on the MACVstaff,• Col Archelaus L . Hamblen, USA, who commanded

the Army Advisory I Corps Headquarters; Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, th e

MACV commander; BGen Ngo Quang Truong, commander of the 1st ARVN Division ;

MajGen Hoang Xuan Lam, the I Corps commander ; LtGen Lewis W. Walt, the III

MAF commander; MajGen Bruno A . Hochmuth of the 3d Marine Division ; and an

unidentified Vietnamese colonel wearing the shoulder patch of the 1st AR VN Division .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC)801029
CHAPTER 2

Spring Action South of the DMZ—February-April 196 7

Operation Prairie I Continues—Operation Prairie II— Operation Prairie III

Operation Prairie I Continue s

As 1967 began, the 3d Marine Division was

fighting two wars: a conventional one along the

DMZ, where division confronted division, and a

counterguerrilla war in the rest of Quang Tri an d

Thua Thien provinces. Although committed to bot h

campaigns, the situation forced the division to give

priority to the DMZ .

During January, the enemy avoided major ground

contact with ARVN and Marine units in the DMZ

area, but the NVA did maintain energetic screenin g

and reconnaissance efforts south of the DMZ . Morta r

and rocket attacks on friendly positions increase d

sharply, particularly during the period 8-28 January ,

and there was a noticeable increase in local and mai n

force guerrilla activity throughout the month .

In January Marine units were still conductin g

Operation Prairie along the DMZ. Three battalions

of Colonel John P. Lanigan's 3d Marines and the 3 d

Battalion, 4th Marines were operating from comba t

bases along Highway 9 .* The largest of the comba t

bases, the nerve center for the entire area, was at

Dong Ha, the command post (CP) of the 3d Marin e

Division (Forward), the controlling headquarters for

the operation .

The intermediate position at Cam Lo was seve n

miles west . Four miles further west, Camp J. J. Carroll was occupied by artillery units of the 12th

Marines, reinforced by U.S . Army 175mm selfpropelled guns . An additional artillery position, th e

Rockpile, was near the base of a jagged mountain si x

miles west of Camp Carroll . The last and most

westerly of the combat bases was Khe Sanh, only a

*Route 9 was a two-lane, east-west toad which ran from the

Laotian border to the city of Dong Ha . Only the eastern portion of

the highway was paved in 1967 .

few miles from the Laotian border. In addition to

these major positions along Highway 9, Marine s

were establishing two strongpoints just south of th e

DMZ at Con Thien and Gio Linh.

One feature of Operation Prairie was the provision

of a specific "package" of aircraft for support . of the

3d Marine Division . In this manner the wing in -

creased its efficiency and decreased response time fo r

missions within the DMZ region . The "package "

contained a variety of helicopters, such as UH- lEs ,

CH-46s, CH-37s, and fixed-wing observation aircraft. A total of 40 helicopters and 8 0-1 observatio n

aircraft supported the division daily . Marine air support radars (TPQ-10) provided the capability of con -

ducting radar-controlled bombing missions durin g

bad weather and at night.

Operation Prairie I ended on 31 January . At its

height the operation involved six Marine infantry

battalions . It accounted for the largest number o f

enemy casualties in a single Marine operation to that

date : 1,397 killed and 27 captured . Marine casualties

for the same period were 239 killed and 1,21 4

wounded.

Operation Prairie II

The mission assigned to the Marines for Operatio n

Prairie II was essentially the same as that for Prairie I :

to conduct operations in conjunction with ARVN

forces, to seek out and destroy enemy forces, and t o

defend the area against attack . To accomplish this,

Brigadier General Michael P . Ryan, assigned as

Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (For -

ward) and Assistant Division Commander, 3 d

Marine Division, since February 1967, controlled a

force of three infantry battalions, two reconnaissanc e

companies, and supporting units.

The concept of operations during Operatio n

Prairie II called for patrols and sweeps by units of

various sizes, including infantry battalions. Normally, 3d Marine Division (Forward) kept one infantry

9
10 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

battalion at a time involved in mobile operation s

while the remainder of its units defended the combat bases . Meeting the latter responsibility require d

the frequent shifting of rifle companies and thei r

operational control . Rifle companies, as a result ,

often found themselves under the operational control of other battalions or even directly under th e

commander of the 3d Marines.

To expand artillery coverage, the 12th Marine s

shifted some units . The February artillery distribution was:

Khe Sanh : two 4 .2-inch mortars, two 155mm, and six

105mm howitzers

Rockpile : two 175mm guns, two 155mm guns, six

105mm howitzers

Ba Long : six 105mm howitzers

Ca Lu : six 105mm howitzers

Camp Carroll: six 175mm guns, four 155mm, and si x

105mm howitzer s

Cam Lo : two 155mm howitzers

Cua Viet : six 105mm howitzers (LVTH-6 )

Gio Linh : four 175mm guns and six 105mm howitzers

The 12th Marines' firing fans covered almost all of

Quang Tri Province, and stretched well north of the

DMZ and several miles into Laos .

Except for mortar attacks, enemy activity during

the first week of Operation Prairie II was confined t o

reconnaissance and screening actions, similar to activity during the last two months of Prairie I . With

the bombing halt during the Tet Nguyen Dan truce

period, 0700 8 February - 0700 12 February, enemy

movement dramatically increased, both north an d

south of the Ben Hai River .* Of special significanc e

was the activity immediately north of the DMZ .

Aerial observation and photographic readouts

revealed heavy truck and boat traffic throughout th e

area . There was little doubt that the NVA had take n

advantage of the truce to accomplish resupply and

personnel replacement .

As a result of the detection of a large concentration of enemy troops and material north of the Be n

Hai River, the Marines on 25 February asked for an d

received permission to fire into and north of th e

DMZ against purely military targets .** The North

*Ter Nguyen Dan, or festival of the lunar new year, usuall y

called "Tet," is the most important holiday of the Vietnames e

year.

**The code name for these artillery attacks against targets i n

and north of the DMZ was Operation Highrise .

Vietnamese could no longer consider the DMZ are a

as a safe haven; staging and support areas and artillery positions now could be interdicted on a

24-hour basis.

The Communists reacted quickly to the sudde n

vulnerability of their previously safe positions . On

the 27th of February, heavy enemy mortar, rocket ,

and artillery fire struck Con Thien and Gio Linh .

The composite artillery battalion at Gio Linh bore

the brunt of these attacks; on the 28th more tha n

400 rounds landed on the battalion's position in a

17-minute period .

The morning of the 27th, the same day the NV A

began the artillery attacks, a Marine reconnaissanc e

team 5,000 meters northwest of Cam Lo attempted

to ambush what appeared to be only two enemy

soldiers. The team actually engaged an enemy company which proved to be the lead element of the

812th Regiment, 324B Division . By 1045, the reconnaissance team reported that it was surrounded by at

least 100 North Vietnamese . The closest friendly

force was Captain Alan H . Hartney 's Company L, 3 d

Battalion, 4th Marines which, minus one rifle platoon but reinforced with a platoon of tanks, was

patrolling north of Cam Lo . Colonel Lanigan immediately ordered Captain Hartney's force to go t o

the reconnaissance team's relief. Captain Hartney

reported slow progress ; brush 4-12 feet high blocked

his route.

With the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines already involved in an operation near the Rockpile, Colone l

Lanigan had few reserve forces. He turned to Lieu -

tenant Colonel Victor Ohanesian's 2d Battalion, 3 d

Marines, located at Camp Carroll . Most of this battalion was already on board ships prior to sailing fo r

Okinawa after being relieved by the 3d Battalion ,

9th Marines . Now, however, Company G, the onl y

intact company still ashore, would have to go to th e

aid of the endangered reconnaissance team .

Ironically, only a few hours previously the commanding officer of Company G, Captain Carl E .

Bockewitz, had been assured by Major Robert F.

Sheridan, the battalion S-3 officer, that there wer e

no plans to send the company on an operation . The

latter officer recalled :

The morning before his unit was committed . . . Captain Bockewitz, who was on an extension of his tour, cam e

to see me in the S-3 bunker and asked if there was an y

chance we would be going north of the Cam Lo River . As

over half of our battalion was already on ships ready to go
SPRING ACTION SOUTH OF THE DMZ—FEBRUARY-APRIL 1967 1 1

to Okinawa and our in-place relief was almost completed, I

told him there was no way we were going north . Onl y

Company G, Company F (-), and a token command grou p

were left in country . Captain Bockewitz was visibly relieved as he stated, "That's good . Last night I had a dream tha t

if I went north of the Cam Lo I would die ." '

Despite his forebodings, Captain Bockewitz led

his company from Camp Carroll and began to mov e

overland to link up with the reconnaissance team .

Bockewitz, as had Captain Hartney, also found

tough going and did not reach the reconnaissanc e

team until 2342 that night . Captain Bockewitz

established a defensive position and stayed there fo r

the night .

About the same time that Company G was leavin g

Camp Carroll, Captain Hartney's company, whil e

trying to cross a stream, came under fire from a larg e

enemy force . After a heavy firefight in which th e

tanks played a decisive role, the company was able to

break contact and began to move toward the recon -

A Marine of Company L, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines

helps a casualty to a medevac helicopter during

Operation Prairie 's heavy fighting on 28 February .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A188455

naissance team. The tanks now proved to be a handicap ; one of them threw a track. Company G coul d

not leave it . Captain Hartney reported his dilemm a

and was ordered to establish a night position an d

evacuate his wounded .

To exploit the two enemy contacts, Colonel

Lanigan decided to commit the remaining availabl e

elements of Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian's 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, which consisted of a small command group and part of Company F. On the morning of the 28th, Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian, who

had operational control of all units in this action ,

planned to move his group overland to link up wit h

Company G . Then the united force was to swee p

east to Cam Lo . Company L was to act as a blocking

force and then move back to its original position a t

Cam Lo after linkup . That was the plan ; the Nort h

Vietnamese had other ideas .

At 0630 a vicious mortar and infantry attack

stunned Company L . More than 150 82mm mortar

rounds hit the company's position and NVA force s

struck from three sides with heavy automatic

weapons, small arms, and antitank (RPG) fire . *

RPG rounds hit two tanks; one caught fire, but both

tanks continued to support the company with thei r

turret-mounted .50-caliber machine guns. By 0900

the Marines had repulsed three enemy attacks . During the attack, Captain Hartney and his artillery

observer had called in artillery fire to within 3 0

meters of the company position .

Because of this heavy attack, Colonel Laniga n

ordered,Ohanesian to link up with Company L instead of Company G as originally planned . Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian's small force left Camp Carroll by truck, disembarked at Cam Lo, and forde d

the river . By 1030, it had reached Company L, guided at the end by the sound of enemy mortar explosions. Captain Hartney's Company L had four dead

and 34 wounded .

Major Sheridan remembered that, upon arrival,

the force " . . . attacked and secured the high groun d

in the area, encountering large numbers of wellequipped NVA troops. In my year in Vietnam, I had

never seen this number of NVA troops in the open .

*The Soviet RPG is a 40mm recoilless, antitank grenade launcher, in many respects similar to the German World War II

Panzerfaust. The later model RPG-7 can penetrate 9 .4 inches of

armor.
12 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

After securing the high ground, a [helicopter landing zone] was established to evacuate the dead an d

wounded . . . ." 2

At the same time that the regiment ordered

Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian's force to Company

L's relief, Company G and the reconnaissance team

received orders to move north to Hill 124 to establish

blocking positions.* At approximately 1035 on the

28th, as Company G began moving up the hill, i t

came under fire from well-concealed positions o n

both flanks. The fighting was heavy, casualties

mounted on both sides. Among the Marine dea d

was Company G's commander, Captain Bockewitz .

Second Lieutenant Richard C . Mellon, Jr ., the

company executive officer, assumed command whil e

the heavy fighting continued . Company G was no t

able to recover its dead until late that afternoon .

When the fight ended the Marines had suffered 7

more killed and 18 wounded .

To relieve the pressure on Company G, Colone l

Lanigan decided to place another company unde r

the operational control of Lieutenant Colone l

Ohanesian and to commit it north of Hill 124 . He

designated Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines

as the unit to move by helicopter to Hill 162 immediately north of Company G's position . Company

M completed the lift by 1430 and began to move

south toward Company G . Company M encountere d

only light contact during the move .

By early afternoon, the remaining platoon o f

Company L and a section of tanks reinforced Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian's position . At 1430, Ohanesian's command group and Company F began t o

move toward Company G, leaving Company L an d

the serviceable tanks to guard the disabled tanks.

First Lieutenant Richard D . Koehler, Jr .'s Company

F led, followed by the command group . Major

Sheridan later wrote :

We were ordered to proceed . . . knowing full well we

were walking into a hornet's nest. Based on the number of

enemy forces we had already encountered and the vast

amounts of equipment, new weapons, and ammunition ,

we knew we were outmanned and outgunned . . . . We left

the perimeter . . . and within 200 yards we came upon a

very large radio complex . The trail was narrow and we

could not disperse our troops. One could almost smell the

enemy forces. ,

*Hill 124 was about 2,000 meters due west of Company L's

position which was approximately the same distance northwest of

Cam Lo . The hill was the commanding terrain feature along th e

enemy's probable route of withdrawal .

Marine Corps Historical Collectio n

A Marine of the 3d Platoon, Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines throws a hand grenade toward

North Vietnamese positions in close fighting on 1

March during Operation Prairie II north of Cam Lo .

As the last man left Company L's original position, the lead elements of the column came under

automatic weapons and mortar fire. The Marines

had stepped into an ambush . Company F's lead

elements took cover from the growing volume of fire

from the front and both flanks; enemy mortar fire

walked down the length of the column . Heavy brush

hid the enemy and the Marines could not establish

fire superiority . At 1510, Lieutenant Colonel

Ohanesian ordered a withdrawal .* Sheridan described the move :

. . . all radios had been hit and casualties continued to

mount . Moving the dead and wounded out of the killing

zone required feats ofbravery beyond comprehension. Th e

NVA were everywhere . Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian was

carrying the last of the wounded Marines towards th e

perimeter when an explosion mortally wounded him ,

*For his actions during the closely fought engagement Privat e

First Class James Anderson, Jr., received the Medal of Honor,

posthumously . When the fight began, the thick brush beside the

trail prevented the Marines from deploying . When a grenade

landed in the midst of the Marines, Anderson reached out, pulled

the grenade to his chest, and curled around it as it went off. See

Appendix D for complete citation .
SPRING ACTION SOUTH OF THE DMZ—FEBRUARY-APRIL 1967 1 3

[plus] three other Marines, and myself. None of us could

walk and Marines had to leave the relative safety of thei r

holes to come get us'

Although painfully wounded, Sheridan assumed

command and directed the rest of the withdrawal t o

Company L's position and the consolidation of th e

perimeter. He requested emergency evacuation fo r

the more than 100 casualties. While the Marines

organized their defensive perimeter, the enem y

closed to within 20 meters and attacked with smal l

arms and grenades. The Marine tank crewmen an d

infantrymen returned the fire and forced the enem y

to withdraw . At this time the helicopters arrived to

pick up the wounded, but they were unable to land

because of heavy fire in the landing zone . At 1830 ,

the position was still being hit by intermittent mortar shelling, which by now had lasted more than

three hours. Sheridan recalled :

The enemy continued to alternately shell and [attemp t

to] overrun our small position the remainder of the night .

Lieutenant Colonel Ohanesian died around midnight as it

was impossible to secure a landing zone . Sergeant Major

Wayne N . Hayes died about the same time of wounds suffered in hand-to-hand combat and grenade and mortar

blasts. Constant artillery, night air strikes within 50 meters

of our position and the courage of the Marines on th e

ground finally took their toll and the NVA withdrew . '

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189092

LtCol Victor Ohanesian, the commanding officer of

the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, shown here in Operation Allegheny in August 1966, died early on 1

March 1967 from shrapnel wounds suffered the

previous afternoon as he carried a casualty to safety .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19392 2

Members of Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marine s

who had finished Operation Chinook II, rest while

waiting for the helicopters that will transport the m

to Cam Lo Province to participate in Operatio n

Prairie II just south of the Demilitarized Zone .

Earlier, upon learning that Lieutenant Colone l

Ohanesian had been wounded, Colonel Laniga n

ordered his executive officer, Lieutenant Colone l

Earl R. "Pappy" Delong to take command of the 2 d

Battalion, 3d Marines . In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Delong received operational control of Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines which, fortuitously, was at Dong Ha after serving as escort for a

"Roughrider" vehicle convoy from the south . Company F went by truck to Cam Lo where it woul d

begin moving overland to reinforce the hard-presse d

2d Battalion, 3d Marines. Lieutenant Colone l

Delong attempted to reach his new command b y

helicopter but enemy fire prevented a landing . He

ordered the helicopter to Cam Lo where he joine d

Company F for the overland march . At 0340 on 1

March, Delong arrived at the battalion 's position

and begari reorganization and preparation for th e

evacuation of casualties .

The 2d Battalion remained in position the entir e

day. About noon it was joined by Companies G an d

M . The Marines searched the surrounding area an d

recovered a large amount of enemy equipment .

Company M made several contacts with small enem y

groups, but the NVA force was withdrawing . The 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines could continue its interrupted

embarkation for Okinawa .
14 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Two additional battalions were brought into the

area on 1 March, Major James L . Day's 1st Battalion,

9th Marines and Lieutenant Colonel Gary Wilder's

3d Battalion, 3d Marines. Major Day's battalion

moved by helicopters to Hill 162, Company M' s

former location, and began to sweep north .

Meanwhile, Wilder's battalion attacked northwest

from a position north of Cam Lo to try to squeez e

the withdrawing enemy against the 1st Battalion ,

9th Marines. This maneuver restricted the Communists' escape route, thereby concentrating targets

for Marine supporting arms. On 3 March, an air

observer sighted three large enemy groups movin g

northwest toward the DMZ, carrying bodies . Massiv e

artillery and air strikes were ordered . A followup

sweep of the area by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines

revealed that the North Vietnamese had used the

bomb and shell craters as mass graves for their dead ;

more than 200 NVA bodies were found .

All enemy forces had not withdrawn . On the morning of 7 March, the enemy made three separat e

mortar and rocket attacks on Camp Carroll . Betwee n

420 and 485 rounds hit the camp, including 20 9

spin-stabilized 122mm rockets.

The remainder of the Prairie II operation consiste d

of a series of battalion sweeps between Cam Lo an d

Con Thien . The Marines located several mass graves ;

the discovery of many abandoned bodies emphasized the disorganized state of the enemy . Numerous

artillery and air strikes hit the scattered enemy forces

trying to avoid contact . During the last week of th e

operation ARVN airborne units caught up with th e

NVA east and southeast of Con Thien . The enemy

force, estimated to have been three battalions, brok e

contact after losing more than 250 killed .

At 2400 on 18 March Operation Prairie II ended .

Prairie II cost the NVA 694 killed and 20 captured ;

Marine casualties were 93 killed, 483 wounded, and ,

of these, approximately one-third of the Marine s

killed and two-thirds of the wounded were victims of

mortar fire.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18908 5

Maj James L. Day (right), commanding the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, briefs BGen Michael P . Ryan on

3 March on the progress ofPrairie II, as Company A's

commander, Capt Donald Festa (left), checks a map .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18846 3

Marines of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines pause on 3

March in their sweep of an area used by the North

Vietnamese to bury more than 200 soldiers killed by

supporting arms during Operation Prairie II.

*This was the first use of this weapon in the DMZ area . The

Chinese Communist 122mm rocket is similar to the obsolete U .S.

4 .5-inch rocket used during World War II. It has a range of 5,00 0

meters.

Marine Corps Historical Collectio n

2dLt Jerry D. Garner of Company A, 1st Battalion ,

9th Marines orders his platoon forward during the

pursuit of NVA units north of Cam Lo on 3 March .
SPRING ACTION SOUTH OF THE DMZ— FEBRUARY-APRIL 1967 1 5

The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines encountered a wide

variety of terrain conditions and enemy activity during Operation Prairie II. Excellent observation in an

area of elephant grass permitted 2dLt Jerry D.

Garner of Company A (above photo, left) to observe

the effectiveness of an airstrike on a distant NVA

unit. The following day, 3 March, an NVA soldie r

surrendered to the company. The final day of the

operation, 18 March, found Company C movin g

through a bombed-out forest in hills near Cam Lo .

Marine Corps Historical Collection

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 18846 4

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A188525
16 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Operation Prairie III

Increased enemy use of supporting arms became a

constant concern for the Marines during Prairie III ,

which started immediately after Prairie II . At the

start of the operation, enemy activity centered on th e

Cam Lo and Gio Linh districts. Contact was

moderate, generally limited to small enemy groups .

Prairie II had blunted earlier NVA intentions in th e

area, but all indications were that the enemy's determination to challenge the Marines' presence had no t

diminished in .spite of heavy casualties.

Anticipating renewed NVA efforts, III MAF hel d

five infantry battalions and four artillery battalion s

in the area . Battalions at Dong Ha served under th e

operational control of the 3d Division's forwar d

headquarters, while those at Camp Carroll and the

Rockpile came under the control of the 3d Marines .

Additional company-strength outposts were at th e

Cua Viet port facility, Gio Linh, Mai Loc, Ba Long ,

and Ca Lu ; a two-company outpost was at Khe Sanh .

The Marines conducted energetic reconnaissance

throughout the area .

The increased operational tempo in the DMZ area Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A188524

placed a heavy strain on Dong Ha logistic facilities. The start of Operation Prairie III found Company C,

Supplies for the Prairie area of operation arrived at 1st Battalion, 9th Marines moving through heavy

either the Dong Ha airfield, which had been extend- elephant grass as the battalion searched the mouned to handle C-130 transports, or they came north tains north of Cam Lo for North Vietnamese units.

Trucks of the 9th Motor Transport Battalion move over Highway 9 from Dong Ha to

Khe Sanh on 28 March. The 11th Engineer Battalion had opened the road on the 19t h

after months of effort that involved coping with adverse weather and enemy attacks .

Marine Corps Historical Collection
SPRING ACTION SOUTH OF THE DMZ—FEBRUARY-APRIL 1967 1 7

from Da Nang by LCUs (landing craft, utility) u p

the Cua Viet River to Dong Ha . On 18 March, a major step in easing the logistic burden occurred whe n

an LST (landing ship, tank) ramp opened at Cu a

Viet . These LSTs could discharge their cargo for transhipment up the river by LCUs and LCMs (landin g

craft, medium) . The Cua Viet facility more than

tripled the daily tonnage that could be brought in b y

ships.

A second significant logistic event occurred on the

19th . Route 9 opened from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh ,

thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Ross L. Mulford's 11th

Engineer Battalion . Mulford's engineers had worke d

on the road for months, hindered by terrible weathe r

conditions, mines, and the NVA . The military

significance of their effort was considerable, since i t

reduced the requirement to commit aircraft fo r

logistic support of the Khe Sanh outpost until lat e

summer, when enemy activity closed the road .

When Operation Prairie III started, it appeare d

that Marine forces continued to face elements of th e

324B and the 341st NVA Divisions north of the Ben

Hai River. Battalion-size elements of both enem y

divisions were in Quang Tri Province, conducting extensive screening and reconnaissance missions, a s

well as attempting to disrupt the Revolutionar y

Development Program. Additionally, ARVN unit s

reported that the 808th VC and 814th NVA Battalions were east and south of Quang Tri City .

On 20 March Lieutenant Colonel William H .

Rice 's Composite Artillery Battalion at Gio Lin h

came under attack by mortars, rockets, and artillery .

The attack demonstrated the enemy's ability t o

employ artillery from positions north of the Ben Ha i

River . Although the bombardment on the 20th was

the heaviest, both Gio Linh and Con Thien receive d

almost daily attacks during the next two weeks .

Further evidence of increased enemy activity i n

the area occurred on 21 March . At 0200 an enemy

force ambushed an ammunition resupply convoy only 300 meters south of Gio Linh . As the convoy approached the artillery position, the enemy struck

with heavy small arms and mortar fire, destroyin g

eight trucks and damaging six others. Fortunately,

friendly casualties totaled only eight wounde d

because of the rapid reaction of both the convo y

guard and the Gio Linh security company, Compan y

I, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. When Prairie III began, the 3d Battalion, 3 d

Marines and the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines were conducting a mission in the mountains west of Cam Lo

approximately 6,000 meters north of Camp Carroll.

The seven-day operation ended on the 21st havin g

made little contact with the enemy, but discovere d

numerous mortar positions and rocket launching

sites, which probably were the positions used in the

attack against Camp Carroll on 7 March . A search of

the area uncovered 125 large rockets and 3 rocke t

launchers. Both battalions received orders to sweep

north from Cam Lo in support of Operation Beaco n

Hill being conducted to the east by Seventh Fleet 's

SLF.

For some time General Walt had been troubled b y

growing enemy activity in the region northeast o f

Dong Ha . His greatest concern was the possibility of

an NVA attempt to overrun the Gio Linh artillery

base . Its 175mm guns were capable of firing at positions deep in North Vietnam. To counter this threat ,

General Walt asked the commander of U .S. Military

Assistance Command Vietnam (ComUSMACV) to

have the SLF committed to this area .* CinCPac approved the request on 15 March . Operation Beaco n

Hill moved into the planning phase, with 19 Marc h

set as D-Day .

Bad weather postponed the scheduled landin g

from ships of the Seventh Fleet's Amphibious Ready

Group until the early afternoon of the 20th . Initial

operations were unopposed, but BLT 1/4 elements

near Gio Linh received fire from enemy supportin g

arms that night. Company B made contact on the

21st, and the BLT engaged well-entrenched enem y

units through the 26th. On 28 March, BLT 1/4 passed to the operational control of the 3d Marines . On 1

April Beacon Hill ended, and III MAF released th e

BLT to SLF control .

The contribution of Beacon Hill to the Prairie II I

operation, going on 10 miles to the west, can b e

measured, in part, by casualty figures . During 1 2

operational days, BLT 1/4 killed 334 NVA soldier s

who otherwise would have been available for us e

against the battalions involved in Prairie III. Beacon

Hill tied up a substantial enemy force . Marine

casualties totaled 29 SLF Marines killed and 23 0

wounded.* *

*General Westmoreland, as ComUSMACV, could no t

authorize the landing of the SLF ; CinCPac was the authorizin g

command .

**Chapter 11 contains the detailed account of SLF participatio n

in Beacon Hill/Prairie III.
18 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18858 3

Members of Company K, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines cross a stream on 19 March as th e

battalion conducted a seven-day search west of Cam Lo early in Operation Prairie III.

To the west of Beacon Hill, other Marines involved in Operation Prairie III experienced similar ligh t

contact during the opening phases. The two battalions under command of the 3d Marines— the 3 d

Battalion, 3d Marines and 1st Battalion, 9t h

Marines—had moved from the Dong Ha/Dong M a

Mountain complex to Cam Lo on 21 March i n

preparation for a sweep north to Con Thien . The

next morning both battalions jumped off at first

light; Lieutenant Colonel Wilder's 3d Battalion, 3 d

Marines was on the left and Major Day's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was on the right . They encountered light contact during the first two days, bu t

on 24 March Day's battalion found an NVA battalion southeast of Con Thien . The enemy was i n

well-prepared defensive positions consisting o f

mutually supporting bunkers. After two hours o f

heavy fighting, which included concentrated air an d

artillery strikes, the enemy withdrew, leaving 3 3

bodies . *

While Major Day's 1st Battalion attacked th e

*During this action Sergeant Walter K. Singleton of Company

A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, assaulted the key enemy strong

point with a machine gun . Though mortally wounded, he drov e

the enemy from the position . Sergeant Singleton was awarded th e

Medal of Honor posthumously . See Appendix D for complete

citation .

Communist bunker complex, Lieutenant Colone l

Wilder's battalion, on the left, engaged an NVA

company. This unit was also well entrenched, i n

camouflaged, reinforced bunkers . The enemy's ligh t

mortars were dug in below ground level, making

them even more difficult to locate . Artillery, followed up by an assault by Company I, cracked the position. The NVA broke contact and withdrew, leavin g

behind 28 bodies, including two uniformed women .

The enemy attempted to delay the Marine advance with harassing mortar and sniper fire for the

next two days. By the evening of 26 March the Communist force had broken contact and withdrawn int o

the DMZ.

On the 28th, the 3d Marines pulled both battalions out of the area and replaced them wit h

Lieutenant Colonel James S . Wilson's 3d Battalion ,

9th Marines . Wilson's mission was to conduct night

ambushes in the area immediately north of Cam Lo .

There was very little contact for the first two days,

but on the 30th, as Company I complete d

establishing platoon ambush positions, the NVA attacked the company command post and the 2d platoon's position . Company I's positions were approximately six miles northwest of Cam Lo . The Communists walked mortar fire over the position twice ,

then followed with a ground assault in company
SPRING ACTION SOUTH OF THE DMZ—FEBRUARY-APRIL 1967 1 9

strength . The first assault failed when the compan y

commander, Captain Michael P . Getlin, called in

supporting arms . As the first attack started, both the

1st and 3d Platoons tried to help the command

group and the 2d Platoon, but the enemy stopped

the Marines with a cross-fire of automatic weapons .

The NVA assaulted a second time . This time they

overran the position.

With the help of UH-1E gunships, the compan y

managed to drive off the enemy. The NVA lost 6 7

killed and 2 captured in both attacks, and a search o f

the area the following morning turned up a heav y

machine gun and 12 automatic weapons. Company

I's losses were heavy. Sixteen Marines died, including '

the company commander, executive officer, and the

weapons platoon commander ; 47 more were wounded, including the company first sergeant . *

Enemy activity around Quang Tri City increase d

during the first week of April . The NVA launched a

series of mortar and ground attacks against ARVN

positions in the area . On 6 April a Viet Cong unit

broke into the Quang Tri provincial jail, freeing

more than 200 prisoners.

In spite of this surge of enemy activity to th e

south, the Marines' main concerns in the Prairie area

continued to be blocking major invasion attempts b y

the NVA and clearing an anti-infiltration trace between Gio Linh and Con Thien . The second task, in -

*Second Lieutenant John P . Bobo, the weapons platoon commander, later received a posthumous Medal of Honor for his actions during the encounter. See Appendix D for the complete

citation .

cluded in the development of a strongpoint system ,

was intended to stop large-scale infiltration in th e

critical area along the eastern DMZ . *

On 12 April, Major General Bruno A . Hochmuth,

a lanky Texan who had assumed command of the 3 d

Marine Division from Major General Kyle th e

previous month, established a task force aroun d

Lieutenant Colonel Theodore J. Willis' 1st Battalion,

4th Marines.** Its mission was to provide security for

Company C, 11th Engineer Battalion . The engineer

company was to clear a 200-meter-wide strip from

Gio Linh to Con Thien, a distance of 10,600 meters . Willis' task force was reinforced with a platoon o f

tanks, an armored amphibian tractor (LVTH-6) platoon, a platoon of M-42 track-mounted dual 40m m

guns of the 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery, USA, and

some ARVN forces. From the onset the clearin g

operation proceeded under constant harassment b y

enemy artillery, mortars, mines, recoilless rifles, an d

small arms. Despite enemy activity, the Marines ha d

completed approximately half of the strip by 1 9

April when Operation Prairie III ended .

Prairie III cost the enemy 252 killed, 4 captured ,

and 128 weapons seized . Marine losses were 56 killed

and 530 wounded. The Prairie series was far from

over; Prairie IV began the next day in the same place

and with the same forces.

*The trace or strong point system will be covered more fully i n

Chapter 8 .

**At the conclusion of Operation Beacon Hill, 1 April 1967 ,

BLT 1/4 transferred from the SLF to the 3d Marine Division .
CHAPTER 3

Combined US / ARVN Operations in the DM Z

Operation Prairie IV Begins—Attack on Con Thien —Into the DMZ— Operation Lam Son 5 4

Operation Beau Charger— Operation Hickory — Operation Priarie IV Ends

Operation Prairie IV Begins

Enemy concentrations of troops and artillery i n

the DMZ area dictated the reinforcement of the 3 d

Marine Division. Responding to the demands of the

situation, MACV deployed Army Task Force Orego n

to the southern two provinces of I Corps in April to

allow Marine units to reinforce the northern thre e

provinces.* As a result of the northward shift o f

Marine forces, Colonel Robert M . Jenkins' 9th

Marines headquarters moved from Da Nang to Dong

Ha during 12-16 April . At the same time, III MAF

shifted the 2d Battalions of the 4th and 26th Marine s

from the 1st Marine Division area to the vicinity o f

Phu Bai.

The introduction of a second regimental head -

quarters into Quang Tri Province permitted the closing of the 3d Division's forward command post a t

Dong Ha after the conclusion of Operation Prairie

III. Units operating from Dong Ha reverted to the

operational control of the 9th Marines, while the 3 d

Marines controlled those operating from Camp Car -

roll.

Operation Prairie IV started on 20 April as a two -

regiment search and destroy operation, covering th e

same area as Prairie III. The concept of employment

placed the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines and the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines in the northwest portion of the

area of operations . The 9th Marines, using the 1st

Battalions of the 4th and 9th Marines, was to cove r

the vital piedmont area in and around Quang Tr i

City. The boundary between the two units was just

west of the Cam Lo-Con Thien axis .

Initially, the operation confined all units to

relatively fixed positions. Lieutenant Colonel

*The deployment of Task Force Oregon into the Chu Lai area i s

covered in detail in Chapter 6 .

Wilson's 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was charged with

the security of Camp Carroll and the outpost at Mai

Loc . Wilder's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines held th e

Rockpile and placed companies at Ca Lu and B a

Long. The latter battalion was also responsible for

providing security for the 11th Engineers, who kep t

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18864 5

A UH-34D from Marine Medium Helicopter

Squadron 163 uses a newly constructed helicopter

pad on top of the Rockpile to resupply members of

the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. Helicopters previously

performed this mission by hovering with one whee l

on a tiny wooden ramp . (See photograph on page

183 of the volume U .S . Marines in Vietnam, 1966 .)

20
COMBINED US/ARVN OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ 2 1

Route 9 open into Khe Sanh. In the 9th Marines'

area of operation, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine s

defended the Dong Ha combat base and provide d

one company for security of the Cua Viet petroleum ,

oil, and lubricants (POL) facility . The 1st Battalion ,

4th Marines protected the engineers clearing th e

trace between Gio Linh and Con Thien, referred t o

as "Ryan's Road " because of Brigadier General

Michael P. Ryan's frequent visits and interest in th e

project. The battalion also continued to provide a

company for security for the Gio Linh Composite Ar -

tillery Battalion .

Although contact with enemy infantry was light a t

the beginning of the operation, reconnaissanc e

reports indicated an NVA buildup northwest of the

Rockpile . Mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks continued against the Marines clearing "Ryan's Road, "

as well as against the Con Thien and Gio Linh out -

posts. Attacks on these two positions and against

Lieutenant Colonel Willis' 1st Battalion, 4th Marines

and the engineers became almost daily affairs, an d

included not only mortar and rocket fire from the

southern half of the DMZ, but also medium and

heavy artillery fire from a growing number of fortifications north of the Ben Hai River .

On 24 April a major battle broke out in th e

western DMZ near Khe Sanh, the beginning of

heavy fighting which continued throughout the

summer all along the demarcation line .* In conjunction with the battle being fought in the west, the

enemy stepped up activity in the east. Enemy forces

cut Route 9 between Cam Lo and Khe San h

repeatedly in an effort to isolate the Marines in that

area. In consort with this effort, the NVA attacke d

the Marine installations at Gio Linh, Camp Carroll ,

and Dong Ha with mortars, rockets, and artillery.

The period 27-28 April was particularly savage. Approximately 850 rounds of artillery, plus 200 mortar

rounds blasted Gio Linh, while more than 5 0

140mm rockets hit Dong Ha.

Attack on Con Thie n

On 8 May, the 13th anniversary of the fall of Die n

Bien Phu, the NVA tried to overrun the Marine position at Con Thien. The outpost, less than two mile s

from the southern boundary of the DMZ, was on a

hill only 158 meters high in the middle of a red mud

plain . It afforded the best observation in the area ,

overlooking the DMZ to the north and west, as wel l

as the Marine base at Dong Ha to the southeast . As a

strategic terrain feature, Con Thien was important to

the .Communists; before the summer was over, i t

achieved an additional symbolic importance .

At the time of the attack, the outpost contained a

small command group of the 1st Battalion, 4th

Marines, reinforced companies A and D of the battalion, and a civilian irregular defense group (CIDG )

unit. The Marines were there to provide security fo r

the engineers, who, having completed the trace on 1

May, were busy clearing a 500-meter-wide strip

around the perimeter of the outpost . At 0255, the

morning of 8 May, a green flare lit the sky south o f

the hill, followed immediately by a savag e

300-round mortar and artillery attack . Concurrently ,

Camp Carroll, Gio Linh, and Dong Ha also came

under fire .

At Con Thien, enemy units maneuvering unde r

cover of the barrage breached the defensive wire wit h

bangalore torpedoes, and small elements moved in -

side . At approximately 0400, two NVA battalions,

armed with flamethrowers, RPGs, and automati c

weapons, attacked through the breach in the wire .

The brunt of this assault fell on the right flank of

Company D . The Marines engaged the enemy force

in bitter hand-to-hand fighting . An engineer platoon moved to reinforce Company D . The situation

became serious when the Marines ran out of 81mm

mortar illumination rounds ; artillery illumination

from the nearest artillery at Gio Linh could not reac h

Con Thien .* A flare plane finally arrived and provided much-needed illumination until daylight.

Meanwhile, Company A sent a platoon to hel p

Company D, as well as to protect an ammunitio n

resupply convoy composed of an attached Army M4 2

"Duster," two LVTHs, and two 1/4-ton trucks. As

these elements moved up to support the hardpressed Marines of Company D, the relief vehicle s

came under enemy fire . The Army M42, which was

the lead vehicle, stopped and burst into flames afte r

being hit by an enemy RPG antitank projectile . A

satchel charge exploded under the following LVTH .

It began to burn but its crew managed to get out .

The trailing LVTH, trying to get around the burning

vehicles, which now included the 1/4-ton trucks,

*For a detailed account of the action at Khe Sanh see Chapter *There is no illumination round for the 175mm gun .
22 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A193904

An amphibian tractor (LVTP-5) hit by North Vietnamese mortars on the night of 8 Ma y

at Gio Linh still burns the next morning . The other vehicle is an Army M-42 "Duster "

equipped with twin 40mm automatic cannon and often used in a ground support role .

became entangled by barbed wire around its left rea r

sprocket . The tractor was stuck . Despite their losses,

the reinforcing Marines continued to Company D's

position. With these reinforcements, Company D

halted the enemy penetration and sealed off th e

break in the wire just before daylight . By 0900, th e

enemy soldiers still within the perimeter were eithe r

dead or captured . '

The recently completed brush clearance around

the perimeter paid early dividends. It permitted the

Marines to catch the retreating North Vietnamese i n

the open as they crossed the cleared strip . Tanks and

LVTHs firing both conventional and "beehive" antipersonnel ammunition were particularly effective . *

Supporting fires of the Composite Artillery Battalio n

at Gio Linh ripped into the enemy as it withdrew

north to the DMZ .

The defending Marines lost 44 killed and 11 0

wounded, as well as two LVTHs and one 1/4-ton

truck destroyed, but the hard and bloody battle cost

*See Chapter 13 for discussion of " beehive ammunition ."

the enemy 197 killed and 8 captured . The Communists left behind 72 weapons, including 19 antitank weapons, 3 light machine guns, and 3

flamethrowers. *

The 8 May attack on Con Thien had been carefully

rehearsed, but the enemy displayed an inherent in -

ability to alter plans. The NVA attacked th e

strongest point of the defensive perimeter and continued to press the attack at this point, even when it

was clear that it had encountered heavier resistanc e

than anticipated. The enemy planners were no t

aware of the arrival of the two Marine companies .

Company D had replaced an ARVN unit only a few

days before the attack.

Following this battle, enemy activity intensifie d

throughout the "Leatherneck Square" area .** The

number and volume of artillery attacks increased

greatly. More than 4,200 mortar, rocket, and artillery rounds were fired at Marine positions durin g

the month . The enemy revealed the degree and

*This was the first instance of NVA use of flarnethrowers

against the Marines.

** " Leatherneck Square" was the quadrilateral between Co n

Thien, Gio Linh, Dong Ha, and Cam Lo .
COMBINED US/ ARVN OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ 2 3

Marine Corps Historical Collection

Maj Edward H. Boyd, the executive officer of the 1s t

Battalion, 4th Marines, shows one of the three captured flame throwers used by NVA units that attacked the base at Con Thien in the early hours of 8 May .

sophistication of its buildup in the area on 10 May

by the destruction of a Douglas A-4E Skyhawk flyin g

a radar-controlled mission near the southern boundary of the DMZ. As the plane approached its

target, Marines on the ground witnessed the firing o f

three surface-to-air missiles (SAM) from positions

north of the Ben Hai River . One of the missiles hit

the A-4E ; the aircraft disappeared from the controlling radar screen at Dong Ha . This was the first

reported use of Communist SAMs over South Vietnam.

Into the DMZ

Enemy ground action increased. During the

period 13-16 May, while clearing Route 561 fro m

Cam Lo to Con Thien, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine s

made heavy contact with a large NVA force in well

prepared positions just south of Con Thien. The

enemy fought well and retired north of the DMZ

boundary only after extreme pressure .

Once again the enemy used the unusual advantage conferred by the de facto access to the DMZ ,

and thus to all of South Vietnam . Marine forces still

were forbidden by U .S . policy to move beyond the

southern edge of the DMZ. For some time much o f

the shelling, particularly that by shorter-range d

weapons, mortars, and rockets, came from the

region south of the Ben Hai River. It was equally

clear that the enemy was using the southern DMZ a s

a sanctuary from which to launch ground attacks ,

such as the one against Con Thien .

On 8 May, after the Con Thien attack ,

Washington changed the DMZ policy . MACV the n

authorized III MAF to conduct ground operations i n

the southern half of the DMZ, and III MAF, in con -

junction with the South Vietnamese, quickly drew

up plans for combined USMC/ARVN ground, amphibious, and heliborne operations in the easter n

portion of the area. The basic concept called fo r

ground attacks by the 3d Marine Division and 1st

ARVN Division along parallel routes, as far north a s

the Ben Hai River.

Combined with the ground attack, the newl y

formed Special Landing Force Alpha was to conduc t

an amphibious landing in the southern portion of

the DMZ along the coast to secure the area as fa r

north as the south bank of the Ben Hai River* . On

reaching the Ben Hai, all units were to turn aroun d

and attack south on a broad front, sweeping as far a s

Route 9, destroying all enemy units, installations ,

and supplies encountered . In addition, the plan included the development of a freefire zone which involved the evacuation by South Vietnamese National

Police of some 12,000 noncombatants living within

the buffer zone . Operational code names wer e

Hickory for the 3d Marine Division units, Bea u

Charger and Belt Tight for the SLFs, and Lam So n

54** for the ARVN forces . The ARVN force for this

operation was composed of three battalions of airborne troops and two battalions of the 1st ARV N

Division . The combined operation was to start on 1 8

May . More fire support was allocated for this operation than for any previous operation in the 3d Division's operating area .

The available fire support included artillery,

augmented by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, two

cruisers, and seven destroyers (six U .S . and one

Australian), as well as by aircraft from the Seventh

*At ComUSMACV's request, CinCPac committed a second SL F

to the area on 15 April . The two SLFs were identified as Alph a

and Bravo . (See Chapter 11).

**Lam Son was an ancient Vietnamese cultural hero for whom

all the 1st ARVN Division operations were named . LtGen Loui s

Metzger, comments on draft MS, [1981] .
24 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Operations Hickory, Lam Son 54,

Belt Tight, and Beau Charge r

19-26 May 1967

0

kilometers I

See Reference Map, Sections 2,3.6 .7

Hickory

Sout h

China

Sea

Gio

Lin h

n

Con

nThien

x x

®

ARV N

Rockpile

n

Camp

Carrol l

Air Force and the Seventh Fleet . The majority of the

support focused on enemy concentrations and gu n

positions in the northern portion of the DMZ an d

the adjacent area to the immediate north, and, if required, as counterbattery fire against North Vietnamese shore batteries.

A buildup of Marine forces in the Prairie area pre -

ceded the operation. Lieutenant Colonel Charles R .

Figard's 2d Battalion, 26th Marines arrived from

Phong Dien on 15 May ; the 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colone l

Wendell N . Vest, came in from Okinawa on the

15th ; and the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Peeler, arrived

from Phu Bai on the 16th .* At the beginning of th e

operation three battalions, the 1st Battalion, 4th

Marines and the 1st and 3d Battalions, 9th Marine s

provided augmentation from Operation Prairie I V

*At the request of ComUSMACV, CinCPac directed the

deployment of BLT 3/4, the last element of the Pacific Comman d

reserve, to I Corps. In a massive 42-plane Air Force and Marine

airlift the BLT moved directly from Okinawa to Dong Ha . The entire lift of the 1,233-man force took exactly 31 hours .

forces. In addition, SLF Bravo was to act as 3d Division Reserve . The same day Colonel Edward E . Hammerbeck, the new regimental commander, deploye d

the 9th Marines command post to a position just

north of Cam Lo .

During the night of 17-18 May the NVA directe d

heavy mortar, rocket, and artillery attacks against all

Marine positions along the DMZ . Gio Linh and

Dong Ha suffered the most . From 2350 on the 17t h

until 0401 on the 18th, over 300 rounds hit Gio

Linh, killing 1 Marine and wounding 12 others .

During the attack on Dong Ha, at 0315, 150 140mm

rockets killed 11 and wounded 91 . One rocket score d

a direct hit on the roof of the 3d Marine Division

Combat Operations Center (COC), but there wer e

no casualties. The rocket detonated prematurel y

upon hitting a tin roof the division recently had

built a few feet above the original sandbagged bu t

leaky roof. 2 Next door, the ARVN COC had no

sandbag protection and suffered numerous

casualties . The rockets also damaged considerabl e

amounts of equipment, including minor fragmen t

damage to several helicopters of Major Marvin E.
COMBINED US/ ARVN OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ 2 5

Marine Corps Historical Collectio n

North Vietnamese soldiers captured in Operations Hickory and Lam Son 54 stand blind -

folded outside the 9th Marines' headquarters at the Dong Ha combat base on 25 May .

Day's Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 . *

The Communist artillery attacks, nevertheless, wer e

fortuitous for they allowed the allied forces to bombard the NVA positions in and north of the DMZ,

under the guise of counterbattery fire, thereby maintaining tactical surprise for the forthcoming operation.

Operation Lam Son 54

Hickory/Lam Son 54 started on schedule . The 1st

ARVN Division elements jumped off at 0500, moving in column up Route 1, into the DMZ . Surprise

was complete; the ARVN units encountered n o

resistance as they moved to the Ben Hai and wheele d

south. The two 1st ARVN Division battalions started

their sweep south on the east side of Route 1, while

the three airborne battalions, supported by tanks ,

*While the damage to the helicopters was minor, this and

subsequent attacks disrupted helicopter operations by preventin g

normal maintenance . This caused the rotation of squadrons in July and the subsequent abandonment in the fall of Dong Ha as a

permanent helicopter base in favor of Quang Tri . LtCol Horace A .

Bruce, Comments on draft ms, 14Ju181, (Comment File, MCHC ,

Washington, D.C.).

turned to the west and then southward abreast th e

advance of the 1st Division units east of th e

highway.

On the 19th, the airborne battalions engage d

elements of the 31st and 812th NVA Regiments.

From then until the 27th, when Lam Son 54 ended ,

ARVN units were in constant contact with th e

enemy . Their casualties were 22 killed and 12 2

wounded . The enemy suffered more substantial

losses: 342 killed, 30 captured, and 51 weapons seized. Most of the casualties occurred in the area known

as the "rocket belt" north of Dong Ha.

Operation Beau Charger

East of the Lam Son 54 operational area, Operation Beau Charger began at the scheduled L-hou r

and H-hour of 0800, 18 May . Just before and durin g

the launching of the assault, a duel started betwee n

Navy fire support ships and NVA shore batteries.

Although the NVA batteries hit no ships, 10 salvos

bracketed the USS Point Defiance (LSD 31) . After

return fire silenced the shore batteries, the surface

landing proceeded without further incident ; there

was no opposition .
26 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

The Beau Charger heliborne force experienced a

different reception . Landing Zone Goose was a "hot"

zone, and only one platoon of Company A, the

assault company, managed to land. The Communists closed in and the situation was very much in

doubt. At 1100 elements of Company D and the rest

of Company A, reinforced with tanks, succeeded in

joining up with the isolated assault platoon . The

Communists withdrew only after air strikes began t o

hammer their positions.

On the 18th, NVA gunners ranged in on supporting Marine SLF artillery positions, knocking out two

guns . Ships of the Seventh Fleet returned fire,

silencing the North Vietnamese batteries . The

Marines relocated their remaining guns at positions

5,800 meters further south .

Action during the rest of Beau Charger consiste d

of light contact and continuing artillery harassment

until the operation ended on 26 May .* West of the

Beau Charger operational area the 3d Marine Division was faced with a much different situation .

There, the enemy had come to fight .

Operation Hickory

Adjacent to the Lam Son 54/Beau Charger operational area, 3d Marine Division units launche d

Operation Hickory on the morning of 18 May .

Lieutenant Colonel Figard's 2d Battalion, 26th

Marines and Lieutenant Colonel Peeler's 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, supported by tanks and Ontos ,

advanced northward from positions near Co n

Thien .** Concurrently, Lieutenant Colonel Vest' s

3d Battalion, 4th Marines moved by helicopters int o

a landing zone (LZ) within the DMZ near the Ben

Hai River, northwest of Con Thien . The heliborne

battalion was to act as a blocking force to prevent the

enemy from escaping to the north, or to stop th e

movement of reinforcements into the area from the

north.

Shortly after 1100 the lead element of Figard's 2 d

Battalion, 26th Marines made contact with a forc e

which intelligence officers later determined to hav e

been two battalions. All elements of the Marine battalion quickly became engaged in the battle ; the

*See Chapter 11 for the detailed operation of SLF involvemen t

during Operation Beau Charger.

**The Ontos, or M50A1, was a lightly armored, tracked vehicle

which mounted six 106mm recoilless rifles . Originally intended a s

an antitank vehicle, the Ontos, because of its mobility, became a n

all-purpose infantry support weapons system in Vietnam .

enemy defended from well prepared bunkers an d

trenches . As the battalion moved against the NVA

positions, the right flank came under vicious

automatic weapons and mortar fire . Casualties were

heavy . Among them were Lieutenant Colonel Figar d

and his S-3, both of whom required evacuation .

Despite the heavy enemy fire, the Navy hospital

corpsmen continued their treatment of the wounded. 3 By 1600, Peeler's 2d Battalion, 9th Marines had

moved up on the right of the 2d Battalion, 26th

Marines and was also in close contact . Fighting continued until nightfall when the Marines broke con -

tact and pulled back to evacuate casualties . During

the day, enemy fire killed 5 Marines and wounded

142 ; 31 enemy soldiers were known to have been

killed.

The 3d Marine Division already had replaced th e

wounded Lieutenant Colonel Figard with a new battalion commander. As soon as it learned of Figard's

condition, the division immediately ordered Lieu -

tenant Colonel William J . Masterpool, who had just

joined the division staff after command of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, to assume command of the 2d

Battalion, 26th Marines.

That night, 75 radar-controlled air strikes hit the

NVA positions in front of the two Marine battalions .

At 0500 on 19 May, heavy artillery fire fell on the

enemy defenses and both battalions jumped off in

the attack at 0700. During the "prep" fires several

short rounds landed on Company F, 2d Battalion ,

9th Marines, killing 3 and wounding 2 Marines.

Within minutes, the 2d Battalion, 26th Marine s

again checked its advance because of savage fire fro m

its front and right, while Peeler's battalion en -

countered only light small arms fire and pushe d

rapidly ahead to relieve the pressure on Masterpool' s

flank . By 1030 the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines ha d

overrun the enemy bunker complex, accounting for

34 North Vietnamese killed and 9 wounded .

As the 3d Marine Division begins Operation Hickory

on 18 May, CH-46A Sea Knight helicopters commence lifting the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines to a

blocking position within the DMZ near the Ben Ha i

River, northwest of the important Con Thien base .

Marine Corps Historical Collection
COMBINED US/ARVN OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ 2 7

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A80128 7

This log and dirt bunker, part ofan unoccupied enemy fortified complex found by the

3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 18 May during Operation Hickory, illustrates the type o f

well constructed and camouflaged North Vietnamese Army fortifications often encountered by the 3d Marine Division in the battles in and below the Demilitarized Zone .

During the rest of the morning both battalion s

continued to advance against negligible resistance .

At 1330, Captain Robert J . Thompson 's Company

H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, on the easternmost

flank of the advance, met heavy automatic weapo n

and mortar fire from the east . The company returned fire, but then received additional enemy fir e

from a tree line 60 meters to the front . Again the

Marines returned fire and a tank moved up in sup -

port. It silenced the enemy with cannister fire . A

squad sent forward to check out the area also came

under heavy automatic weapons fire . The tank, moving to support the squad, halted after being hit by

RPG rounds and began to burn . A second tan k

maneuvered forward to help ; RPGs disabled it also .

Captain Thompson, unable to use other supportin g

arms because of wounded Marines to his front ,

moved the entire company forward to retrieve the

dead and wounded . After moving the wounded t o

the rear, the company pulled back and called in sup -

porting arms fire on the evacuated area . The action

cost the Marines 7 killed and 12 wounded ; enemy

casualties were unknown.

In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Vest's 3d

Battalion, 4th Marines, after the heavy action involving the 2d Battalions, 26th and 9th Marines, swep t

to the southeast to block the NVA withdrawal . On

18' May the battalion made little contact, but

discovered a large, abandoned, fortified position ,

well stocked with food and equipment. For the next

two days Vest's battalion maneuvered toward th e

other Marine battalions which were moving north .

Contact was light, but the battalion encountered intermittent mortar and artillery fire. The battalio n

continued to uncover large caches of rice and ammunition—over 30 tons of rice and 10 tons of ammunition—but due to the heat and distance to th e

landing zones much of the rice could not be move d

and had to be destroyed . *

*High temperatures reduce helicopter lift capability, hence the

inability to evacuate the large quantities of rice without diversio n

of additional helicopters from other missions .
28 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

To the southwest, Lieutenant Colonel Wilson's 3d

Battalion, 9th Marines, screening the western or left

flank of the operation, saw little action during th e

first two days . Then, on 20 May, Company K, poin t

for the battalion, made contact with what it initiall y

estimated to be an enemy platoon deployed in

mutually supporting bunkers in a draw . The enemy,

at least a company, took Company K under fire . To

relieve pressure on Company K, Company L

maneuvered to the flank of the enemy position, bu t

was unable to link up with Company K because o f

heavy enemy fire . Both companies spent the night

on opposite sides of the draw with the enemy forc e

between them, while supporting arms pounded the

enemy position all night.

On the 21st, Company M moved forward an d

joined with K and L and the three companies wer e

able to clear the area . The clearing operation was

costly : 26 Marines were killed and 59 wounded . The

Marines counted only 36 enemy bodies, but th e

lingering smell in the draw indicated that many

others were in the destroyed fortifications .

Meanwhile, the division reserve, SLF Bravo's BLT

2/3, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel DeLong ,

and HMM-164, commanded by Lieutenant Colone l

Rodney D. McKitrick, joined Operation Hickory o n

the 20th . The employment of SLF Bravo involved a

unique departure from the norm for amphibiou s

operations in that the heliborne force passed to th e

control of the 3d Marine Division as it crossed the

high water mark . This procedure ensured positiv e

control of all supporting arms covering the

battalion's approach to its inland tactical area o f

reponsibility (TAOR). *

The squadron helilifted the battalion into the

DMZ northwest of Gio Linh to block possibl e

withdrawal routes of NVA units then engaged wit h

ARVN airborne formations to the east . By noon all

elements of the battalion were ashore and sweepin g

north toward the DMZ. The Marines of BLT 2/3 encountered only light resistance from small NVA

units, apparently security elements for several larg e

ordnance caches and bunker complexes. One of the

bunkers was exceptionally sophisticated, constructe d

of steel overhead and walls. The Marines capture d

*The battalion's movement from the SLF shipping to its inlan d

TAOR was called Operation Belt Tight . See Chapter 8 for a more

detailed account of SLF participation in Belt Tight .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A188700

Capt Troy T. Shirley, commanding Company L, 3 d

Battalion, 9th Marines, talks to some ,of his me n

after the company sustained heavy casualties durin g

Operation Hickory close to the Demilitarized Zone.

more than 1,000 60mm mortar rounds, as well a s

large quantities of small arms ammunition and

medical supplies in the same complex .

After sweeping the southern bank of the Ben Ha i

River, De Long's battalion wheeled south and began

a deliberate search in that direction . Although the

battalion met no resistance, it did uncover and

destroy two extensive subterranean bunker complexes filled with supplies and ordnance . On the 23 d

the advance halted temporarily because of th e

declaration of a cease-fire to be observed throughou t

Vietnam in honor of Buddha's birthday .

After the brief "stand down," two battalions, th e

3d Battalion, 4th Marines and the 2d Battalion, 26t h

Marines, began sweeping the DMZ to the southwest

toward the mountains west of Con Thien . The 3d

Battalion, 9th Marines continued to move northwest

as the other two battalions moved south . To the east ,

the remaining Hickory battalions resumed searc h

and destroy operations in the southern half of th e

DMZ and "Leatherneck Square ."
COMBINED US/ARVN OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ 2 9

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18869 9

PFC R. L. Crumrine, serving with the 9th Marines i n

Operation Hickory, bows his head in anguish afte r

learning one of his closest friends had died fighting

the North Vietnamese near the Demilitarized Zone.

Early on the morning of 25 May, Captain John J .

Rozman's Company H, 26th Marines made contac t

with a large NVA company in a mutually supportin g

bunker complex near Hill 117, three miles west of

Con Thien. The action was extremely close an d

lasted for more than an hour before Rozman' s

Marines managed to gain fire superiority and

disengaged to evacuate their casualties . Air and artillery then hit the enemy positions . When relieve d

of its casualties, Company H maneuvered north o f

the hill mass where it met Captain John H .

Flathman's Company K, 3d Battalion, 4th Marine s

at 1345 . Both companies moved against the hill. At

1500 savage fighting developed ; the Marines

estimated the enemy force holding the position to b e

at least several companies.

When the Marines could not break through the

strongly fortified position, Lieutenant Colone l

Masterpool ordered them to disengage so that sup -

porting arms could again attack the enemy

positions .* The two Marine companies again attacked but broke off the action at 1730 and

established night positions north and west of the

hill. Results of the day's fighting were 14 Marines

killed and 92 wounded ; the Marines counted 4 1

NVA bodies .

Marine air and artillery pounded the hill all night

in preparation for the next attack, scheduled for the

next day . At 0915 on the 26th, enemy automati c

weapons fire forced down a UH-1E helicopter on a

reconnaissance flight over the area . Among the

wounded in the helicopter were Lieutenant Colonel

Masterpool, his executive officer, and the commanders of Companies H and K ; Lieutenant Colonel

Masterpool and Captain Flathman had to be

evacuated. Consequently, the battalion delayed the

attack for another day to allow time for further bombardment of the hill and command adjustments . On

the 27th, Companies E and F, 2d Battalion, 26th

Marines, under the control of Lieutenant Colone l

Vest's 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, moved against the

objective behind covering artillery fire . They met n o

resistance and secured the hill by 1600 . The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines then passed through Companies

E and F and consolidated on the ridges leading up to

the higher ground west of Hill 117 . In the meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Duncan D . Chaplin III

arrived by helicopter to assume command of the 2 d

Battalion, 26th Marines, temporarily under its executive officer, Major James H . Landers. 4

During the night, Colonel James R . Stockman ,

the commander of the 3d Marines, initiated heav y

artillery fires from Con Thien and Gio Linh and using the 175mm guns of the Army's 2d Battalion ,

94th Artillery to "literally change the face of th e

earth" on the enemy-held high ground . The following morning, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines continued its westward movement onto the high groun d

without opposition . Lieutenant Colonel Vest's me n

encountered only the extensive destruction of

numerous fortified positions, apparently abandone d

by the NVA early in the artillery attack . Colonel

Stockman then ordered the battalion to move

toward Con Thien . '

With the exception of the Hill 117 battle, contac t

diminished during the last days of Operation

*Operational control of Company K had passed to Colone l

Masterpool's 2d Battalion, 26th Marines at 1645 on the 25th .
30 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Hickory and the artillery operations to the east .

Nevertheless, the Marines found and destroye d

numerous well-fortified areas before the operatio n

terminated on 28 May . In addition, they captured o r

destroyed more than 50 tons of rice and 10 tons o f

ordnance. Total enemy casualties for the combine d

Marine/ ARVN operation were 789 killed (the

equivalent of two NVA battalions), 37 captured,

and 187 weapons taken. Of this total 447 were killed

by Marines (85 in Beau Charger, 58 in Belt

Tight/Hickory, and 304 in Hickory) . Allied losses

for the operation were by no means small ; the

Marines lost 142 killed and 896 wounded, whil e

ARVN losses were 22 killed and 122 wounded .

The first large-scale allied entry into the souther n

half of the DMZ signified that the rules ha d

changed. The area was no longer a guaranteed Communist sanctuary from which they could launch at -

tacks. More immediately, the operation had upset ,

at least temporarily, the NVA organizational structure in the DMZ. The Marines realized that this initial search and destroy operation would not permanently deny the enemy's use of the area . Nevertheless, while total friendly control had not bee n

established over the region, the removal of th e

civilian population from the area, some 11,000 people, now permitted the Marines complete freedo m

of use of supporting arms.

Operation Prairie IV Ends

At the end of Operation Hickory, all participatin g

forces joined Operation Prairie IV and continue d

sweeps of "Leatherneck Square" and the area

southwest of Con Thien . On 28 May, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines made heavy contact on Hill 174 ,

approximately four miles southwest of Con Thien .

The NVA were in bunkers, similar to the complex

encountered on Hill 117 . Two Companes, M and L,

attacked late in the afternoon, only to be "blown off

174" 6 by a heavy volume of fire from enemy small

arms, automatic weapons, 57mm recoilless rifles,

and 82mm mortars . Accounting for all personnel

took much of the night . Results of this initia l

engagement were 2 Marines killed and 21 wounded .

Known enemy casualties were 4 dead; with another 4

probably killed.

The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines called in artiller y

throughout the night ; the North Vietnamese

responded with 82mm mortars . The following day ,

the 29th, Companies M and I, the latter led b y

Lieutenant Walter E . Deese's 1st Platoon, attacke d

up the hill. Despite being hit by friendly 60m m

mortars, the Marines made contact with the NV A

defenders around 1600. Enemy resistance remaine d

firm; 5 more Marines died, 33 suffered wounds . This

time, however, the Marines managed to hold positions on the western and northern slopes of Hill 174 .

The crest remained in enemy hands .

On 30 May, I and M Companies attacked again .

Despite heavy supporting arms fire and the Marines'

use of flame throwers and 3 .5-inch rocket launchers,

the enemy retained control of the hill . Another

Marine died ; 45 were wounded . There were seve n

confirmed enemy dead . The North Vietnamese,

however, decided to give up the contest . Company

M reached the crest of Hill 174 on 31 May, meeting

no resistance . ?

Operation Prairie IV, the last of the Prairie series

of operations was over. It, like its predecessors, hurt

the enemy: 505 died, 8 captured, and 150 weapon s

seized . Friendly losses were 164 killed and 1,240

wounded.

On 1 June, Operation Cimarron began in th e

same area and with the same formations . The operation lasted through 2 July, producing only light contact . The Marines discovered and destroyed severa l

large, abandoned, fortified positions in the are a

southwest of Con Thien and unit sweeps locate d

numerous enemy graves and several supply caches . While Cimarron progressed, the land clearin g

project from Con Thien through Gio Linh to th e

high water mark on the coast reached completion b y

1 July. The Marine engineers widened the previousl y

cleared area to 600 meters for the entire 13 . 5

kilometers of its length. The 11th Engineer Battalio n

contributed more than 10,000 man hours and 4,500

tractor hours to this hazardous effort .

During the last days of Cimarron a sharp increase

in enemy artillery activity, coupled with several smal l

but intense engagements between patrols and dugin NVA units around Con Thien, indicated that th e

enemy was preparing for renewed offensive operations in the area . There was to be much hole diggin g

and sandbag filling before the summer ended .
CHAPTER 4

The First Battle of Khe Sanh

The Early Days—Opening Moves of the Battle—Hill 861—Reinforcing the Hill 861 Attack

Attacking Hill 881S—The Final Objective: Hill 881N—End of the Battle— Operation Crockett

The Early Days

The war in the northwestern portion of the 3 d

Marine Division's area of operations intensified early

in 1967 . During the spring the NVA gradually in -

creased its forces around the Marine base at Kh e

Sanh . As the Marines maneuvered to determine th e

enemy's intentions, they became engaged in one o f

the bloodiest battles of the war .

The Khe Sanh area in western Quang Tri Provinc e

had been a major inflitration route into South Vietnam for as long as the Vietnamese had been at war .

That slight but definite plateau, rising abruptl y

from the foothills bordering Laos and Vietnam, i s

dotted with hills and low mountains, providing a

natural route into the two northern provinces of I

Corps . The majority of the trails in the more mountainous area are concealed by tree canopies up to 60

feet in height, while those on the lower heights ar e

hidden by dense elephant grass and bambo o

thickets . Concealment from aerial observation wa s

good and the dense undergrowth limited groun d

observation in most places to no more than fiv e

meters. Dong Tri Mountain is 1,015 meters high ,

the highest peak in the region . With Hills 861, 88 1

North and 881 South, it dominates the three main

avenues of approach . Two trails enter from th e

northwest . One crosses the Laos-Vietnam border and

winds southeast along the streams and valleys tha t

join the Rao Quan River. The second approach from

the northwest is a ridgeline that crosses the border t o

merge with Hills 881N, 881S, and 861 . The third

approach is Route 9 from the Laotian border through

the village of Lang Vei to Khe Sanh .

American troops first arrived in the area in Augus t

1962, when a U .S. Army Special Forces detachmen t

established a CIDG camp at the small airfield just

northeast of the village of Khe Sanh . These troops

engaged in border surveillance and clandestine

operations to detect and thwart infiltration.

During the fall of 1966 intelligence reports noted

increased enemy movement on an east-west trail net -

work which ran into the region from Laos . As a

result, III MAF ordered a battalion to be deployed to

Khe Sanh as part of Operation Prairie I. Its missio n

was to prevent Communist occupation, as well as to

provide security for a detachment from U .S. Naval

Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabee) 10 whic h

was improving the Khe Sanh airfield .

On the 29th of September, Lieutenant Colone l

Peter A . Wickwire's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, rein -

forced by Battery B, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines,

assumed the Khe Sanh mission and flew b y

helicopters into the position . The Marines occupie d

the key terrain around the airfield and began construction of defensive positions . Reconnaissance an d

combat patrols searched out to 6,000 meters to

detect enemy buildup in the area . The battalio n

used the 6,000-meter range because it suspected th e

Communists would bring in 120mm mortars to at -

tack the complex . *

As the logistic support for the battalion began to

arrive at the airfield, the battalion command post,

the reserve company, and the artillery battery set u p

in the immediate vicinity of the camp complex an d

established a perimeter defense . The Special Forces

garrison and service support elements receive d

responsibility for portions of the perimeter while the

rifle companies continued to operate from compan y

strong points . The battalion then extended th e

patrolling effort out to 10,000 meters and beyond ,

depending upon the size of the patrol .* *

*The 120mm mortar's maximum range was 5,700 meters.

**During December 1966 January 1967 the Special Force s

Camp was 9,000 meters west near the village of Lang Vei.

31
Khe San

and V

meters

See Reference M

-800
THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH 3 3

Initially, Battery B, reinforced with two 155m m

howitzers and two 4 .2-inch mortars, provided th e

battalion's only immediate artillery support. Late in

October, additional artillery became available whe n

U.S. Army 175mm guns moved into positions at

Camp Carroll 13 miles to the east . While the fires of

the 175s augmented the base's defensive plans, the y

normally fired interdiction missions and support of

Marine reconnaissance units operating from the

base .

Air support for the battalion came from thre e

UH-34 helicopters assigned to Khe Sanh on a dail y

basis. These aircraft provided routine and emergenc y

resupply, evacuation, troop lifts, and reconnaissanc e

missions. Additional helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft were available on request . *

As 1967 began, the battalion experienced no

significant contacts. On 31 January, Operation

Prairie I ended. Wickwire's battalion could clai m

only 15 enemy killed during the four months it had

participated in Prairie. While the casualty figures for

the operation were not impressive, the battalion had

established control of the Khe Sanh Plateau, and th e

extended airstrip provided a terminus from which III

MAF could challenge the movement of enemy force s

through the area .

After Operation Prairie I, III MAF reduced operations from Khe Sanh to reconnaissance efforts. As a

result, when the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines moved t o

Okinawa on 6 February, only a single company ,

Company B, 9th Marines, augmented by a 45-ma n

security platoon and Battery I, 12th Marines, remained to defend Khe Sanh Base .** The mission o f

Captain Michael W. Sayers' company was essentiall y

the same as the 1st Battalion 's had been : To defend

the airstrip and patrol the surrounding area out to a

distance of 15,000 meters . The company also maintained a 30-man force as emergency support fo r

Marine reconnaissance patrols operating in the area .

Poor weather, primarily fog, through Februar y

hampered the activities of both Captain Sayers' com -

*The number of helicopters assigned to the Khe Sanh Bas e

increased during January to six : two CH-46s, two UH-lEs, and

two UH-34s.

**Battery I replaced Battery B/ 13 on 26 January . Two

155mm howitzers and the two 4 .2-inch mortars reinforced Battery

pany and the platoon of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion working from the base, but reconnaissanc e

contacts did indicate an increase in enemy activity .

Five reconnaissance patrols came under attack from

NVA 'units during this period and helicopters extracted them under fire . Then, on 25 February, a

sharp contact occurred only 3,000 meters from th e

airstrip ; the days of watchful waiting were over .

A squad patrol from the 2d Platoon, Company B,

led by Sergeant Donald E . Harper, Jr ., was movin g

up a small hill west of the airstrip when an NVA uni t

opened up with small arms fife, killing one Marine

and wounding another. The patrol pulled back immediately and called in artillery fire . When the artillery stopped, Harper's squad again moved against

the enemy position and this time made contact with

about 50 North Vietnamese . Once more the Marines

backed off the hill and called in artillery fire . Captain Sayers sent a second squad to reinforce Harper's

patrol . The Marines assaulted the position for the

third time and after heavy fighting were able to take

the hill. They found only nine enemy bodies on the

position, but a search of the area uncovered fire

direction center equipment, an 82mm mortar, 38 0

82mm mortar rounds, 3 mortar base plates, 2 individual weapons, some clothing, and 10 enemy

packs . Friendly losses in the action were one killed

and 11 wounded. '

Although the area remained quiet after this shar p

encounter, an unfortunate incident occurred at Lang

Vei on the evening of 2 March . Two USAF aircraft

mistakenly bombed the village, killing 112 civilians,

wounding 213, and destroying 140 buildings. The

Marines immediately sent helicopters and trucks t o

the village to help with the evacuation of casualties .

A KC-130, carrying a group of 1st Marine Aircraft

Wing personnel especially organized for such event s

and under the command of Major William F .

Morley, arrived at the airfield and flew out 53 of th e

wounded before weather closed the field . 2

The NVA took this opportunity to hit the bas e

with more than 90 82mm mortar rounds, killing two

Marines and wounding 17, while damaging two

CH-46s and two UH-lEs . Three days later, on the

5th, 14 enemy soldiers probed the airfield perimete r

from the north and west. The defending Marine s

detected and drove them off with command -

detonated claymore mines before they could do an y

damage.
34 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The 3d Marine Division responded to the increased enemy activity by reinforcing Khe Sanh with Captain William B. Terrill's Company E, 9th Marines o n

7 March . With the addition of the second company ,

the Marines increased their patrols of the surrounding area, with particular emphasis given to th e

861-881 hill complex northwest of the base . Reconnaissance teams there had made numerous sighting s

during the past few weeks. Patrols and ambushes i n

the area saw signs of enemy activity, but made no

contact; on 16 March, however, the NVA provide d

the Marines with all the contact they could handle.

At 1000 on the 16th, the 1st Platoon of Compan y

E was returning from a night ambush position on

Hill 861 . As the point squad, under Sergean t

Donald Lord, moved past some dense bambo o

bordering the trail, it came under heavy crossfir e

from both sides. The two remaining squads advanced to help the point element. After 15 minutes the y

drove the enemy away. The Marines then move d

back up the hill about 100 meters to a suitable landing zone to evacuate their casualties, one killed an d

five wounded . Nearing the zone they came under

heavy fire again ; six more Marines died, four suffered wounds, and one was missing. Another

firefight started and the Marines directed artiller y

fire against the enemy, but this time the NVA did

not withdraw.

In the meantime, two squads of Second Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell's 2d Platoon, Company B,

which had been operating about 1,500 meters east o f

Hill 861, received orders to move to help the 1st Platoon, Company E. As they moved up they came

under fire from the top of the hill . Air strikes drove

the enemy from the crest ; they left 11 bodies

behind. Both Marine units moved to the summit

and began clearing a landing zone (LZ).

By 1600 the Marines had cleared the LZ and three

CH-46s were on station to evacuate the casualties .

The first helicopter landed, and took off, but as th e

second one touched down the NVA hit the zon e

with mortar fire . The CH-46 made its pickup and

managed to get out of the zone, but the Marines o n

the ground were not as lucky . Both units' corpsme n

were killed; several other men were wounded . The

Marines called in artillery fire on suspected enem y

mortar positions, then requested the helicopter to

come in to evacuate the new casualties. As the aircraft approached the zone, the NVA struck again

with mortar fire . The helicopter broke away, but th e

exploding rounds caught the Marines who had cartied the wounded out to the LZ and they becam e

casualties themselves. Captain Terrill recalled, "Th e

platoon commander tried to move the LZ down t o

the reverse slope of the hill, but by this time ther e

were not enough able-bodied men in the platoon t o

move all the dead and wounded ." 3

At 1705, a helicopter carrying the 3d squad, 2d

Platoon, Company B attempted to set down in th e

landing zone on the reverse slope, but the CH-4 6

overshot the zone and crashed at the base of the hill.

A second helicopter picked up the squad, but it had

to return to Khe Sanh because of casualties caused by

the crash . Then Captain Terrill and the 2d Platoon ,

Company E moved by helicopter into the LZ . The

new platoon moved to the top of the hill and bega n

to bring down the wounded . By 2100, when fog

stopped helicopter operations, all but three of th e

wounded had been evacuated and by 1300 on th e

17th all the dead and the rest of the wounded ha d

been lifted out . The Marines attempted but failed

to extract the CH-46 that had crashed, forcing Captain Terrill's unit to remain at the LZ as security fo r

the aircraft. Another helicopter finally lifted th e

damaged one out by 1100 on the 18th and Terril l

and his Marines, now reinforced by 1st Platoon ,

Company B, began a two-day sweep of the are a

north and west of the hill. The search was to n o

avail; the enemy force had departed . The action on

the 16th had been costly for the Marines : they suffered 19 killed and 59 wounded, almost all of whom

were from Company E. The Marines found the body

of the missing man the next day . Enemy losses in the

engagement were only the 11 known killed.

Immediately after this contact, reconnaissanc e

teams operating northwest of the hill complex

reported several sightings of large enemy forces mov -

ing southeast. There were several exchanges of smal l

arms fire between Marine patrols and small enemy

units, but in all cases the enemy quickly broke con -

tact and withdrew.

Captain Sayers, responsible for the defense of th e

Khe Sanh perimeter, recognized the growing threa t

to the combat base . He expressed his concerns during one of the frequent visits to the base by Brigadie r

General Michael P . Ryan, the commander of 3 d

Marine Division (Forward). General Ryan agree d

and asked what Sayers needed to defend the base .

Sayers provided his "shopping list" and, as soon a s

the Marine engineers opened the road from Dong

Ha to Khe Sanh, General Ryan sent additional

firepower. Sayers gained a light section of Marine
THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH 3 5

tanks and a heavy section of Ontos . Each of the latter

mounted six 106mm recoilless rifles, which, with th e

proper ammunition, could be devastating antipersonnel weapons . Equally deadly were two light sections of Army truck-mounted heavy weapons . One

section had dual 40mm automatic cannon ; the other

had quad- .50 machine guns. Offsetting these gains,

however, was the loss of Company E, 9th Marines,

which, depleted by the fighting on 16 March,

returned to Dong Ha on 27 March to rebuild . 4 .

The reinforcements to the base's firepower seeme d

even more important in the early weeks of April

when agent reports indicated two NVA regiments

moving into the region northwest of Khe Sanh.

These reports and earlier sightings prompted the

Marines to intensify reconnaissance and patrolling i n

the area. In spite of these efforts, the Marines di d

not determine the full extent of the enemy's

buildup.

Allied personnel in the Khe Sanh area numbered

less than 1,000 men . Among these were the CIDG

force at Lang Vei and the Marines' Combined Actio n

Company Oscar, located between Khe Sanh Villag e

and the combat base and within mortar range of th e

latter.* The Khe Sanh combat base housed Company B, 9th Marines, reinforced by an aggregation o f

support detachments, and a Marine reconnaissanc e

platoon . Organic artillery support for these unit s

came from Captain Glen Golden's Battery F, 12t h

Marines, which replaced Battery I on 5 April . Whil e

the allied forces were too small to be a deterrent t o

major enemy incursions, they did serve as an advance

warning unit .

On 20 April, operational control of forces at Khe

Sanh passed to the 3d Marines which had just begun

Operation Prairie IV, though Khe Sanh was not included as part of the Prairie IV operational area .

Rather it was a territorial appendage, attached fo r

control purposes to the 3d Marines because that regiment was in the best position to oversee the base and

reinforce it if the need arose . The time of need was

imminent.

*III MAF created the Combined Action Program to increase th e

ability of the local Vietnamese militia units to defend their ow n

villages. These units included Marines who lived, worked, an d

conducted operations with their Vietnamese counterparts . The

company at Khe Sanh formed in February 1967 and was unique i n

that its indigenous forces were Montagnards rather than Vietnamese . A more complete coverage of the Combined Action Pro -

gram is contained in Chapter I I .

Opening Moves of the Battle

On 23 April, two of Company B 's platoons, the

1st and 3d, were operating from patrol bases nort h

and east of Hill 861 . Late that afternoon Captai n

Sayers ordered them to link up and establish a nigh t

position north of the hill in preparation for a swee p

the following morning of a cave complex located to

the northwest.

The morning of the 24th, Second Lieutenant

Thomas G. King and 30 men from his 2d Platoon ,

with an 81mm mortar section, moved from the air -

field to Hill 700, south of Hill 861 . Their mission

was to provide additional fire support for a compan y

sweep then starting to the northwest . Once the mortars were in position, First Lieutenant Phillip H .

Sauer took four men, including a forward observe r

(FO) to the top of Hill 861 to establish an observation post .* As the FO team entered a bambo o

thicket 300 meters from the crest of the hill, it stepped into an enemy ambush . When the NVA opened

fire the point man yelled, "I'm hit," and went down .

Lieutenant Sauer ordered the rest of the team to pul l

back and then stood firing at the enemy with his

pistol to cover their withdrawal. Only the forward

observer managed to escape. Although the action

lasted but a few minutes and appeared to be just

another small unit encounter, it marked the beginning of the "First Battle of Khe Sanh," one of th e

bloodiest and hardest fought battles of the Vietnam

War . '

Lieutenant King, having lost radio contact with

the forward observation team but aware of the

firefight on the hill, sent a squad to investigate. As

the squad moved forward it came upon the FO, th e

lone survivor of the ambushed team . The squad, accompanied by the FO, moved back into the area o f

contact to recover the other four members of th e

team. They saw two of the bodies but were unable t o

get to them because of heavy enemy fire . The unit

withdrew to Lieutenant King's mortar position . King

directed mortar and artillery fire at the hill and the n

took another squad and went back to the ambus h

site . The enemy had gone . The Marines recovered

*First Lieutenant Sauer was the commander of the Onto s

heavy section that had recently been attached to Captain Sayer's

Company B. He accompanied Lieutenant King's unit to assist the

forward observer.
36 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

the two bodies seen by the other squad, but after

searching the area they still could not find the othe r

two Marines .* King pulled back and threw a smoke

grenade to bring in a helicopter to evacuate the two

bodies. Just as the UH-34 's wheels touched th e

ground the whole crest of Hill 861, approximately

300 meters wide, erupted with automatic weapon s

fire . The infantrymen took cover without casualties ,

but the enemy fire hit the helicopter 35 times in a

matter of seconds. Two UH-1E gunships escorting

the UH-34 immediately strafed the hilltop . As the

enemy fire let up, King's Marines loaded the bodie s

aboard the helicopter, and after it took off King and

his men returned to the mortar position.

While the mortars on Hill 700 and the artillery a t

Khe Sanh base shelled the enemy positions, Captai n

Sayers, who had joined King after a forced march

with a security platoon, ordered his 1st and 3d Platoons to sweep southeast across Hill 861 and strike

the enemy from the rear. Sayers' Marines were

roughly 2,000 meters northwest of their new objective . When the two platoons turned toward thei r

new direction of advance, five 82mm mortar round s

hit, killing one Marine and wounding several others .

The Marines continued on and the point squad moved down the reverse slope of a small knoll until

halted by heavy fire from its right flank .

The Marines returned fire in an attempt to gai n

fire superiority . Lance Corporal Dana C . Darnell

disregarded the enemy fire and brought his 60mm

mortar into action . Unable to set up the weapon properly, he placed the base of the tube in a helmet between his legs and steadied the mortar with his

hands . The firing quickly heated the tube ; another

Marine kept Darnell's hands from being burned by

urinating on the mortar tube to cool it . Darnell kep t

firing until he exhausted his immediate supply of

ammunition. Ignoring the enemy fire, he severa l

times gathered additional rounds from nearb y

Marines to keep up his firing . 6

The enemy answered with its own mortars and the

Marines moved back over the crest of the hill to fin d

cover and call in helicopters to evacuate casualties.

During the move, Lance Corporal Darnell dragge d

two wounded Marines toward cover until temporari-

*These two bodies later were found . They had bee n

decapitated and burned . Maj Michael W. Sayers, Comments on

draft ms, 18May81 . (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC ,

Washington, D.C.).

ly blinded by dirt and rock fragments blown into his

eyes by enemy fire . Within an hour, however, he was

assisting in the care of the wounded. *

Helicopter pilots made two attempts to get the

wounded out, but each time they came in the enem y

hit the Marine position with mortars and automatic

weapons, causing more casualties . After the second

rescue attempt, the Marines received orders to mov e

to a more secure position and dig in for the night. ?

After expending all of their mortar ammunition on

Hill 861 and in support of the 1st and 3d Platoons,

the mortar section, Captain Sayers, and the securit y

platoon on Hill 700 moved back to the base just

before dark on the 24th . There, Captain Sayers, his

company command group, and the 22-man 2d Platoon prepared to join the 1st and 3d Platoons by

helicopter at first light on the 25th . Casualties for

the first day included 12 Marines killed, 17 wounded, and 2 missing . There were five known NV A

dead .

Captain Sayers' Marines had forced the North

Vietnamese into the premature revelation of their

plans to overrun Khe Sanh Combat Base . Their plan

resembled the one they used so successfully against

the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 . In both cases

the enemy buildup occurred over a period of about a

month and included the occupation of key terrain.

Before the main attack, they engaged in a prolonged

supply staging activity and, just prior to the main at -

tack, made coordinated attacks against support

facilities, particularly airfields and lines of communication .

After-the-fact reconstruction by General Walt of

the NVA plans for Khe Sanh indicated that the first

step was the buildup of troops and supplies in th e

region north of the base . Step two was to be the

isolation of the base by knocking out the transport

helicopters based near the coast and by cutting ke y

stretches of Route 9 . Next, Camp Carroll, Co n

Thien, Dong Ha, Gio Linh, and Phu Bai were to b e

hit with supporting arms, both as a diversion and t o

reduce their ability to provide fire and logistic sup -

port. A diversionary attack was to be carried ou t

against the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp to presen t

a threat from that direction . All of these efforts were

in support of the main attack from the north

through the Hill 881/861 complex by regimental -

*LCpI Darnell, killed in action two days later on the 26th,

received a posthumous Navy Cross for his actions on the 24th .
THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH 3 7

size units of the 325C NVA Division* . Fortunately,

the contact made by Lieutenant Sauer's FO party o n

the morning of the 24th and subsequent action b y

Company B alerted III MAF to enemy intentions .

Hill 861

The job of stopping the NVA fell to Colonel Joh n

P. Lanigan's 3d Marines . Although Lanigan wa s

unaware of it at the time, this assignment was to b e

similar to one 22 years before on Okinawa whic h

earned him the Silver Star Medal . Both involved

driving a determined enemy force off a hill.

Originally, Colonel Lanigan planned that Company K, 3d Marines, would relieve Captain Sayers'

Company B on 29 April, so liaison personnel were

already at Khe Sanh when the action began . On the

morning of the 25th, heavy fog at Khe Sanh delaye d

the arrival by helicopter of the remainder of Company K as well as Lieutenant Colonel Gary Wilde r

and his 3d Battalion, 3d Marines command group .

By the time they arrived, Captain Sayers and his 2 d

Platoon had already departed by helicopter to joi n

the rest of Company B.

There had been no chance for coordination between the battalion command group and Company

B. Inevitably, communications proved difficult sinc e

Company B did not have the battalion's codes an d

radio frequencies. Captain Sayers, convinced that

the enemy monitored his transmissions, relayed his

coded position reports through his company's rear

command post at Khe Sanh . This problem plague d

the two units throughout the coming fighting . 8

Shortly after landing at Khe Sanh, Lieutenan t

Colonel Wilder started his force moving north t o

assist Company B . By 1500, the lead elements were

moving up Hill 861 .

When Company K of the 3d Marines reached the

slopes of Hill 861, its commander, Captain Bayliss L.

Spivey, Jr ., ordered his platoons to move on two

axes . The 1st Platoon moved up a ridgeline, followed by the company command group . The 3d Platoo n

started up another ridgeline to the right . The 2d Platoon, understrength because one squad was still attached to another company, remained behind to

*Apparently the enemy launched all of the diversionary attack s

on schedule . On 27 and 28 April, the previously mentione d

Marine positions were hit by 1,200 rockets, mortar, and artillery

rounds . They cut Route 9 in several places. Other enemy units at -

tacked and severely battered the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp o n

4 May . The Marines detected and subsequently thwarted only th e

main effort . FMFPac Ops USMC Vn, Apr67, pp . 27-28 .

provide security for the battalion command grou p

and the 60mm mortar section .

Captain Spivey had his forces in position for his

attack by 1525 . Artillery check fire was in effect ,

however. Captain Spivey requested and received permission to continue up the hill without further artillery preparatory fires.

The 1st Platoon moved upward through the heav y

growth on the ridgeline . When the platoon was 30 0

meters from the crest, it made contact with an

enemy company . The platoon found itself under

heavy, grazing fire from well-fortified, expertly concealed bunkers, as well as from mortars sited on the

reverse slope of the hill . The vegetation mad e

locating the bunkers difficult . Countermortar and

artillery fire were relatively ineffective in silencin g

the enemy mortars ; the grazing fire from the enemy

automatic weapons and small arms continued fro m

the mutally supporting bunkers .

The 1st Platoon fought its way uphill for about

200 meters, but by 1730 only about 10 men remained effective . With darkness fast approaching, it

was imperative for the company to get more Marines

on the line . The 3d Platoon could provide no immediate assistance ; its advance up the adjacen t

ridgeline encountered no enemy opposition but th e

rugged terrain slowed its movement . Captain Spive y

had no option but to ask for the 2d Platoon . Awar e

of the gravity of the situation, the battalion

assented .

The 2d Platoon moved forward and quickl y

became engaged in heavy fighting that continued

until nightfall . Since it could not evacuate it s

casualties, the company spent the night in place ;

Captain Spivey ordered all elements to dig in . The

battalion command group and 60mm mortar section, located on a small knoll only 300 meters fro m

the hill, forced to provide its own security, also du g

in for the night . 9

Progress of Company B during the day had bee n

equally difficult; it too had no luck evacuating its

wounded . Each time a helicopter attempted to land ,

it met a screen of enemy small arms and mortar fire .

One helicopter did get into a nearby zone around

1000 when the fog lifted, bringing in Captain Sayer s

and the 22 men of the 2d Platoon, but it could pic k

up only three wounded before being driven off b y

incoming mortar rounds. Slowed by numerous litter

cases and sporadic enemy contact which required th e

seizure of each succeeding ridgeline, Company B

succeeded in moving only to a point 800 meters

northwest of Hill 861 .
38 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

As a result of the heavy resistance encountered by

both companies, Captain Jerrald E . Giles' Company

K, 9th Marines flew in from Camp Carroll. By 1800

on the 25th, the company had arrived at Khe Sanh

base ; it remained there for the night.

At about 0500 on the 26th, the 3d Battalion command post (CP) shook under more than 200 82mm

mortar rounds. At the same time, Khe Sanh bas e

was the target of 100 mortar and recoilless rifl e

rounds, most of which, thanks to fog which obscured

the enemy's aim, landed outside the perimeter . While the shelling did not cause any damage, it di d

confirm that the NVA were on Hill 881S . The

Marines replied by hitting suspected enemy positions with artillery and air strikes; the NVA fire

quickly ceased .

Captain Sayers later recalled :

. . . B-1/9 was close enough to the NVA recoilless rifles

to see and hear their backblast in the fog . They were on the

eastern slope of 8815 . We directed artillery on the

recoilless rifles and silenced them . We could hear the

82mm mortars but couldn' t see the muzzle flashes. We

drected artillery by sound i . By [ 105mm artillery illumination rounds] and holes in the fog, we confirmed destruction of the recoilless rifles . (The fog was in layers—the hill

masses were covered and the valleys were clear .)10 .

At 0800 on the 26th, Captain Giles' company

moved out from the airfield toward Lieutenant

Colonel Wilder's position, using the rear elements o f

Company B as guides. The company arrived at the

battalion command post shortly after noon . Spivey's

Company K had been heavily engaged on Hill 86 1

all morning . The enemy unit, fighting from a

strongly fortified position, repulsed a second Marine

attempt to take the hill, this time by the 3d Platoon .

All efforts to break off contact and withdraw faile d

because of numerous casualties . Lieutenant Colonel

Wilder ordered Captain Giles to send two platoons

up the hill to help Spivey disengage and evacuat e

the dead and wounded . By 1400, the two companies

linked up, but, despite the effective use of

helicopter gunships in a close support role to suppress enemy fire, it was not until 1900 that the last

Marine elements got off the hill.

In the meantime, Company B's advance also stopped. The company had been moving southwesterly

to skirt Hill 861 and link up with the battalion . As

the Marines turned south, they met fierce enem y

resistance . The NVA troops, well-concealed in the

thick underbrush, allowed the Marines to move to

within five meters before opening fire, almost cutting the point man in half. Four or five others, including Captain Sayers and members of the command group, received wounds . At the same time ,

the enemy hit the entire column with mortar fire .

Casualties were heavy . With the aid of gunships and

artillery, the company finally gained fire superiorit y

and at 1200 it broke contact, pulling back to the to p

of a small knoll . There the company attempted to

evacuate some of its wounded, but as the helicopters

came into the area the infantrymen waved them off;

they were helping the NVA mortars to pinpoint the

Marines' position . At 1445, Captain Sayers reporte d

to Lieutenant Colonel Wilder that he had so man y

casualties that he could not move . "

The battalion ordered Captain Sayers to leave hi s

dead behind and bring out his wounded . Sayers

replied that he could not move, even with only th e

wounded. Resupply was impossible, the company

had only five operational radios, powered by wea k

batteries . Sayers reported he would move into the

fog, assume a defensive posture, and " . . . fight until

it was over. "12 This option proved unnecessary ,

however.

As Sayers later recalled :

Captain Glen Golden [the commander of Battery F ,

12th Marines at Khe Sanh] found me in the fog by walkin g

artillery rounds to me . (Once in the fog I could only make

an educated guess as to my exact position .) Artillery put a

"ring of steel" around my defensive position that was s o

tight we were taking dirt from the impact . It was the most

professional and accurate piece of artillery work that I hav e

ever seen . No doubt it saved our lives "

Lieutenant Colonel Wilder sent Captain Giles and

his one remaining platoon to assist Sayers . It took

Giles' party almost four hours to hack their way to

the battered company. Under the cover of a heavy

ground fog, darkness, and periodic downpours, an d

preceded by artillery fire from Battery I, the unite d

force began its move toward the battalion CP ,

skirting the south edge of Hill 861 . Progress was

slow. Every man, except the point and rearguard ,

was burdened with stretchers and the equipment o f

the casualties. Sayers remembered :

We were carrying KIM and WIAs in ponchos [borne by ]

four men to a litter. The heat deteriorated the bodies

rapidly and they bloated fast. Almost impossible to carry

in the dark, the mud, and the rain . Many times we stopped our march to retrieve a body that had fallen out of a

poncho and rolled down a hill . Identification was difficult

[as] KIA tags were lost . . . . not until we arrived back at

Khe Sanh and matched our company roster with the

evacuation list was I convinced that we had not left a fello w

Marine in the hills. i4
THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH 3 9

The weary column arrived at a safe area south o f

the 3d Battalion CP at 0500 on the 27th . Helicopters

soon arrived and by 0730 had evacuated all of th e

casualties and salvaged equipment . The remnants of

Company B refused the offer of trucks to transport

them back to Khe Sanh ; they marched back . "

Reinforcing the Hi11861 Attack

After the fierce action of the morning of the 26th ,

the 3d Marine Division realized the 3d Battalion, 3 d

Marines did not have the strength to carry Hill 86 1

alone . Major General Hochmuth shifted the SLF

Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Delong's 2d Battalion, 3d Marines back to its parent regiment for the

Khe Sanh operation . At the time, the battalion had

been conducting Operation Beacon Star, 16 mile s

north of Hue. Picked up in the middle of the operation at noon on 26 April, Delong's battalion flew t o

Phu Bai in helicopters from HMM-164 i6 and then to

Khe Sanh by transport aircraft . By 1600, companie s

E, G, and H and the battalion command group had

arrived at the Khe Sanh Combat Base and starte d

moving toward Hill 861 . The battalion established'

night positions approximately 500 meters east of

Wilder's battalion.

The 27th was a day of preparation . By 1130, th e

3d Battalion had completed all its medical evacuations and moved overland from Hill 861 to Kh e

Sanh base for replacements for its battle-depleted

companies . Colonel Lanigan transferred both Companies M of the 3d Marines and 9th Marines t o

Wilder's battalion in relief of Companies K, 3 d

Marines, and B, 9th Marines, which had sustaine d

the heaviest casualties. Company F, the remaining

company of the SLF battalion, arrived and assumed

the mission of regimental reserve . Battery B, 12th

Marines, the SLF artillery battery, arrived at 190 0

and was ready to fire by 2050 . By the end of the day ,

Battery B and Battery F, the resident artillery unit at

Khe Sanh, had established an organization that permitted them to function as an artillery group, with

one battery in direct support of each battalion . The

two 155mm howitzers and two 4.2-inch mortars attached to Battery F assumed the general support mission for the operation .

Artillery and air took on the job of softening up

the objective area . For the better part of the 27th

and 28th of April, the Khe Sanh artillery group and

the Army's 175mm guns, further east, poured tons

of high explosives onto Hill 861 . During the two-day

period, artillerymen fired more than 1,800 rounds of

observed fire and 270 of harassment and interdiction, but the preponderance of support came fro m

the air. During this period, the 1st Marine Aircraft

Wing dropped 518,700 pounds of ordnance on th e

target area . As each flight arrived on station, th e

Marine and Air Force airborne forward air controllers, (FAC[A]) directed them to orbit on the top

of a large holding pattern . The flights graduall y

worked their way downward as preceding flight s

dropped their ordnance and headed for home .

To destroy the solidly built and well-camouflaged

bunkers, the FACs devised a new technique . Many

of the bunkers were so thick that even a direct hi t

with a 500-pound bomb would not completel y

destroy them . Napalm was ineffective until the

jungle growth was cleared because the jellie d

gasoline .burned out in the treetops . Consequently ,

aircraft armed with 250- and 500-pound "snakeye "

bombs were called in on low runs to ripple their

loads, stripping the trees and heavy foilage from the

hill.* With the bunkers exposed, other aircraft armed with 750-, 1,000-, and 2,000-pound bombs cam e

in on high-angle passes to destroy the bunkers .

Late in the afternoon of the 28th, the Marine infantrymen were ready to resume the attack . The concept of operations involved a two-battalion assault ;

Hill 861 became Objective 1, Hill 881S was Objective 2, and Hill 881N was Objective 3 . From its position south of Hill 861, Lieutenant Colonel Delong's

2d Battalion was to seize Objective 1 on 28 April .

Lieutenant Colonel Wilder's 3d Battalion was to

follow the 2d Battalion . After taking the first objective, Wilder's Marines were to turn west, secure th e

ground between Hill 861 and 881S, then assault Objective 2 from the northeast . As the 3d Battalion attacked, the 2d Battalion was to consolidate Objectiv e

1, then move out toward Hill 881N, screening

Wilder's right flank, reinforcing it if necessary: After

securing Objectives 1 and 2 Delong's battalion was

to seize Objective 3, Hill 881N .

After the preparatory fire lifted, the 2d Battalio n

assaulted Hill 861 with two companies abreast . The

Marines moved up the hill against sporadic mortar

fire, but met no other resistance ; the NVA had

withdrawn. Both assault companies dug in on th e

*The "snakeye" is a 250- or 500-pound bomb with large tail fins

that unfold after release to retard the descent of the bomb . Fo r

greater accuracy, it was dropped at a low altitude . The slo w

parabolic trajectory of the "Snakeye" gives the aircraft time t o

clear the blast and fragmentation pattern .
40 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

objective while the command group and the reserve

company took up positions on the southern slope o f

the hill. A search of the objective revealed that the

enemy's withdrawal had been professional ; the area

was well policed, with no equipment or anything of

intelligence value left behind . Though the NVA

withdrawal had been orderly, it had not been

without cost ; the strong odor of dead bodies

saturated the area . Supporting arms had done a

thorough job . The hill was heavily fortified with 2 5

bunkers and more than 400 fighting holes, al l

mutually supporting, but the Marines took the hil l

without losing a man. Bombs and artillery had stripped most of the vegetation, leaving only charred an d

splintered trees .

Attacking Hill 881 S

After Hill 861 was secured, the 3d Battalion, composed of Companies M, 3d Marines and K and M ,

9th Marines moved from Khe Sanh to take position s

on the west flank of the 2d Battalion . A small hill

mass, 750 meters northeast of Hill 881S, was the battalion's intermediate objective. Lieutenant Colone l

Wilder planned to secure the intermediate objectiv e

the next day, as a jumping off point for the assault

on Objective 2, Hill 881S .

Early in the morning of 29 April the battalio n

started its advance, with Company M, 9th Marines a s

Marine Corps Historical Collectio n

Sgt R. E. Ferdeit, armed with a shotgun, keeps a

wary eye out for North Vietnamese soldiers as the 2 d

Battalion, 3d Marines completes its preparations o n

30 April for an assault on Hill 881S near Khe Sanh .

the lead element . At 1120, the point engaged an

enemy platoon in a small draw . The compan y

deployed, took the platoon under fire, and called fo r

artillery and air support . At the same time, the

second element of the battalion column, Compan y

M, 3d Marines, passed south of the firefight, continuing the attack toward the battalion objective .

At 1915, Company M, 3d Marines secured the intermediate objective with no contact, and dug in fo r

the night. Shortly after occupying the position, the

company spotted North Vietnamese soldiers emplacing mortars on Hill 881S . The company called in artillery, and the enemy fired only four rounds befor e

being dispersed. An hour later, the Marines spotte d

more North Vietnamese moving toward their

perimeter. Although it was dark by then, the FO

with Company M adjusted variable time (VT) fuze d

artillery fire on the enemy's position .* As the rounds

exploded over their heads showering the enemy with

fragments, screams of the wounded could be heard .

The NVA force quickly withdrew and the Marine s

passed the rest of the night without incident .

At first light on 30 April, while Wilder's battalio n

prepared to assault Hill 881S, Delong's battalio n

moved off Hill 861, along a ridgeline toward Hill

881N. Its mission was to clear the area on Wilder's

right flank, and to secure positions for a final assaul t

on Objective 3, Hill 881N . Company H, 3d Marine s

moved into the area where Company M, 9th Marine s

had made contact the previous day . As soon as it

entered the area, the company ran into two NV A

platoons in a bunker complex . After a brief, vicious

firefight, the Marines backed off to evacuat e

casualties, 9 dead and 43 wounded, of who m

helicopters evacuated 29 while artillery and air worked over the enemy positions. Later that afternoon ,

Company G assaulted the bunker complex and afte r

heavy preparation fires, the Marines overran the

position.

The men of Company G, like those of Compan y

H, knew that they had been up against a tough and

well-disciplined foe . Staff Sergeant Ruben Santos ,

platoon sergeant of the 1st Platoon, witnessed th e

tenacity of the defending North Vietnamese . One of

*VT fuze detonates an artillery round several meters above th e

ground, thus increasing the fragmentation pattern and effectiv e

kill radius. Air bursts are especially effective against troops in th e

open or in unprotected positions such as foxholes and open trenches.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH 4 1

his squads found two enemy soldiers in a bunker .

The Marines threw in several hand grenades killin g

one man, but the other grabbed a grenade and sat

on it to smother the blast. Although the explosion

"blew his ass off," it did not kill him . When one of

the Marines went into the bunker to clear it, the

enemy soldier shot and wounded him . Sergeant Santos grabbed the Marine and tried to drag him to safety but the NVA soldier fired another burst into the

Marine, killing him . Santos tried to flush the enemy

soldier from the bunker by throwing in tear gas but

he still would not come out . The Marines then threw

fragmentation grenades in until they were sure that

he was dead . Sergeant Santos later said, " . . . there

was no way of getting them out . . . unless you dragged them out after they were dead . " ' 7

The Marines of the 3d Battalion learned the same

lesson before the day was over. The strength and

dispositions of the NVA forces on Hill 881S wer e

unclear on the morning of the 30th . Thirty-three aircraft sorties had slammed 250 2,000-pound bomb s

into the positions on the evening of the 29th an d

over 1,300 rounds of artillery rained down on the hill

during the night . At 0800, as the last rounds of the

preparation fires hit, the Marines of Wilder's battalion began their assault .

The rough and broken terrain restricted the approach to the ridge; the Marines could not

maneuver. The 3d Battalion jumped off in the at -

tack against the hill from the northeast with Company M, 3d Marines in the lead, followed by Company K, 9th Marines. By 1025, the lead platoon

reached the western end of the top of the hill afte r

encountering only occasional small arms fire . A second platoon moved up and the two companie s

closed on the enemy. Suddenly the NVA struck bac k

with automatic weapons in camouflaged bunkers

and with accurate sniper fire from the trees . Thirty

mortar rounds fell on the attacking platoons . They

were stuck, unable to move forward or backwards .

NVA infantrymen from bypassed bunkers and hole s

blocked the way back down the hill . Company K

and the remaining platoon of Company M advance d

into the savage firefight. "Huey" (UH-1E) gunships

and attack aircraft streaked in, covering the enemy

positions with ordnance as close as 50 meters from

the Marines . At 1230, Lieutenant Colonel Wilder

ordered both companies to disengage and pull bac k

off the hill, but it took several hours to break con -

tact. When they did move back down the hill, the

Marines were able to carry their wounded with them ,

but not their dead . The cost had been high: 43

Marines died and 109 suffered wounds . Heavy

casualties rendered Company M temporarily ineffective as a fighting unit .

The cost was even greater to the enemy . Marine

infantry, artillery, and air strikes killed 163. Marine

aircrews flew 118 sorties and the Khe Sanh artiller y

group fired 1,685 rounds that day, but it had no t

been enough . More supporting arms preparation fir e

was needed before the hill could be assaulted again .

The next day the air space over Khe Sanh was

stacked high with Marine aircraft ; 166 sorties attacked hills 881N and 881S . Over 650,000 pounds of

ordnance, including 130 2,000-pound bombs an d

1,445 artillery rounds, plastered both hills. On one

occasion, the constant bombardment of Hill 881 S

became too much for the enemy to endure . After

three very heavy airstrikes, one enemy platoon ra n

from its bunkers . Once the NVA soldiers were in th e

open, they came under fire by aircraft, as well a s

mortar and small arms fire from Wilder's battalion .

Most died before they could escape . By the end o f

the day close air support pilots reported 140 more

enemy killed, including 81 killed by a single strike

west of the battle area .

While Hill 881S was being pounded, the 3d Battalion remained on its intermediate objective north -

east of 881S, reorganizing its companies . At 1200 ,

Company M, 3d Marines relinquished position t o

the regimental reserve, Company F, 2d Battalion, 3 d

Marines.* The depleted Company M returned to

Khe Sanh and flew to Dong Ha that evening .

With the reserve committed, Major General

Hochmuth transferred Company E, 9th Marines to

the control of the 3d Marines and by 1910, 1 May ,

the company was in position at Khe Sanh . During

the day both battalions brought up thei r

"Mule"-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles to assist i n

the reduction of enemy bunkers and fortifications b y

direct fire.**

*Captain Raymond H . Bennett, who was ashore from one o f

the carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin on a 30-day indoctrination

assignment, temporarily commanded Company M .

**The "Mule" is a small, rough terrain vehicle, primarily used

for resupply . It is the standard platform and transportation for th e

106mm recoilless rifle, an antitank weapon .
42 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Marine Corps Historical Collectio n

The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines used its 106mm recoilless rifles to destroy North Vietnamese bunkers on Hill 881 S prior to the 3d Battalions final assault on the hill, 2 May .

The 3d Battalion was ready to go again on th e

morning of the 2nd, and after a final artillery

preparation, the 9th Marines' Companies M and K

moved out against Hill 881S. By 1420, the Marine s

had secured the hill, having encountered only snipe r

fire in the process. That evening Lieutenant Colonel

Wilder established his CP on 881S and dug in for

the night with two assault companies. Company F ,

the most recent arrival, remained behind on the intermediate objective . The Marines, at last, had the

opportunity to see what they had run up against o n

the 30th .

The enemy had dug about 250 bunkers on th e

hill; after four days of heavy air strikes and artiller y

preparation fire, 50 remained . Wire communications connected the bunkers and they mutually sup -

ported each other with interlocking fields of fire .

Two layers of logs and as much as five feet of dir t

covered small bunkers, leaving only a small two-foo t

opening. Larger fortifications, capable of holdin g

four men, were equipped with small storage shelves ,

bamboo mat floors, and a simple but effectiv e

drainage system. The largest dugouts, command

posts, had two entrances and roofs covered by four to

eight layers of logs, in addition to 4 feet of dirt o n

top of the logs . The extent of the fortifications on

881S caught the Marines by surprise, but thei r

discovery alerted Delong's battalion as to what to expect on Hill 881N.

The Final Objective: Hill 881N

With Hill 881S secured, the Marines turned thei r

attention to Objective 3, Hill 881N . Since 28 April ,

when the battalion took Hill 861, Lieutenant Colonel Delong's Marines had been sweeping the area

northwest of the hill, checking out each successiv e

ravine and ridgeline . By the morning of 2 May th e

battalion was ready to move against 881N . At 1015 ,

the action began with Company E attacking the hil l

from the south and Company G assaulting from th e

east. Company H was in a supporting position between the two units. Company G made contac t

almost immediately and after a brief firefight pulle d

back to employ artillery fire . After the artillery attack, the company moved in, but again came unde r

automatic weapons and mortar fire . Additiona l

Marine supporting arms silenced the enemy . Corn-
THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH 4 3

pally H, moving to a position to support Compan y

G, also came under enemy mortar attack which

ceased when Company G called in fire support re -

quests . At the same time, Company E battered its

way almost to the top of the hill . Suddenly, a heavy

rain squall driven by gusts up to 40 miles per hou r

lashed the hills . Lieutenant Colonel Delong, realizing that control was impossible and that the coordinated assault by his units could not be made, pulled the battalion back to more defensible terrain for

the night.

A strong enemy counterattack, early in the morning of 3 May disrupted Marine plans to continue the

assault . At 0415, Company E, in night positions on a

small hill 500 meters south of Hill 881N, endure d

small arms and mortar fire followed by an aggressive

ground attack . Two reinforced NVA companies

struck the Marines' perimeter from the northeast

and, after bitter hand-to-hand fighting, penetrate d

that portion of the defenses. The attackers either

killed or wounded all Marines in this area . After

penetrating the lines, the NVA units moved into a

tree line in the middle of the position and reoc -

cupied some of the bunkers which the engineers ha d

not yet destroyed .

About 10 minutes after the first attack, Firs t

Lieutenant Frank M. Izenour, Jr., whose platoon

held the western half of the perimeter, receive d

orders to take a squad to attempt to seal off th e

penetration ., With his second squad, the lieutenant

moved forward, but immediately came under fir e

from two machine guns which hit several of his men .

Lieutenant Izenour reported that he needed reinforcements . Company commander Captain Alfre d

E. Lyon did not want to weaken the 1st Platoon further so he organized 11 attached engineers as a

squad and sent them into the fight . Both squads

took positions on the left edge of the penetratio n

and fired into the enemy's flank . With the help of

artillery, gunships, and jets, the Marines stalled th e

attack, but the platoon commander still did not have

enough force to drive the enemy out of the penetration. 1 8

A flareship arrived and its two-millioncandlepower parachute flares practically turne d

night into day . From Hill 881S, the Marines of th e

This well constructed, log-reinforced North Vietnamese Army bunker on Hill 881

South, its embrasure hidden among the deep shadows around the base, remained fully

intact despite a bomb explosion in April that left a large crater just over 10 feet away .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800216
44 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

3d Battalion could see approximately 200 NVA

soldiers moving toward Company E from the west .

They quickly moved the battalion 's 106mm recoilless

rifles into positions and fired more than 100 round s

into the enemy's flank, breaking up the attack . Then

artillery pounded the North Vietnamese force as it

withdrew .

By first light, the Marines had shattered the NV A

attack, but some enemy soldiers still remained insid e

Company E's position . At 0700, Company F reverted

to the operational control of its parent unit, the 2d

Battalion, 3d Marines. From its position on the 3d

Battalion's intermediate objective, one platoon o f

the company flew in helicopters from HMM-164 to a

landing zone next to the Company E perimeter . The

reinforcing unit immediately attacked the souther n

edge of the penetration. In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Delong ordered Company H to close

in on the enemy's rear from the northeast . Moving

toward each other the two units finally managed t o

seal the breach .

Company H then began the difficult task o f

eliminating the NVA soldiers in the bunkers an d

tree line . The effort required bitter close-quarters

fighting which continued until 1500 when the company reported the final bunker cleared. The NVA

soldiers fought virtually to the last man . The NVA

attack killed 27 Marines in the action and wounde d

84, but enemy bodies covered the area . The NVA attackers left behind 137 dead, and the Marines captured three prisoners, plus a large quantity of

weapons and equipment.

Interrogation of the prisoners revealed the enemy

planned another attack for that night . As a result ,

Lieutenant Colonel Delong consolidated his companies on the southern slope of Hill 881N an d

established a tight perimeter defense. After dark ,

helicopters from HMM-164 flew in extra defensive

equipment, including concertina wire, trip flares,

and Claymore mines. The Marines were ready for the

assault, but the attack failed to materialize . Instead

an NVA unit hit the Special Forces Camp at Lang

Vei 10 kilometers to the southeast . 1 9

At 0435, 4 May, a reinforced NVA company

assaulted the Lang Vei camp . The attack was to have

served as a diversion for the major NVA thrust from

the northwest which the Marines had preempted o n

24 April. The action had a little effect on the battl e

taking place in the hills, but was a tactical victory fo r

the Communists. The NVA attackers quickly over -

ran the camp's defenses and penetrated to the heart

of the compound . There, they destroyed vital installations and killed many key personnel, includin g

the U .S . Army Special Forces detachment commander and his executive officer. Despite artiller y

fire from the Marines at Khe Sanh, the attackers

withdrew with only light casualties . The South Vietnamese irregulars defending Lang Vei were not a s

lucky; 20 died and another 39 disappeared . To

counter any further threats from the southwest, th e

3d Marine Division ordered Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, airlifted from Phu Bai later i n

the afternoon of 4 May and added to the Khe San h

reserve .

The next morning Lieutenant Colonel Delong's

Marines advanced toward the final objective, Hil l

881N. His three companies had spent most of 4 Ma y

reorganizing, while additional preparatory fire s

blasted the hill . At 1530, the battalion moved into

assault positions on the southern slopes of the objective . At 0850 5 May, Companies E and F jumpe d

off, meeting gradually increasing resistance as the y

advanced . Both units temporarily disengaged so tha t

air and artillery could again work over the hill . At

1300, Company F resumed the attack while Company E established a base of fire and Company G

enveloped the north. The two attack Companies, F

and G, met only sniper fire and secured the objective

at 1445 . The Khe Sanh hill complex belonged to the

Marines .

End of the Battle

For the next three days, there was little contac t

with NVA units . Both battalions thoroughly searched Hills 881N and 881S, while engineers destroye d

the remaining enemy fortifications. Marine aircraft

struck suspected enemy positions to the north and

west, while platoon patrols covered the area immediately west of the two hills . Airborne observers

remained on station to call in artillery and air strike s

on likely avenues of escape . Air support achieved a

unique first during the period . An AO sighted a

lone NVA soldier waving a flag, indicating his desir e

to surrender. A helicopter flew in and picked up the

rallier.

Observers spotted enemy troops to the northwest .

The sightings indicated that the 325C NVA Division

was withdrawing toward North Vietnam and Laos .

On 9 May, a patrol of two platoons of Company F

finally caught up with one of the evading enem y

units. The patrol had just swept down the northern
THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH 4 5

finger of Hill 778, 3,200 meters northwest of Hil l

881N, when it ran into sniper fire from a ridgeline to

its front . The lead element deployed on line an d

started up the slope, only to be met pointblank by a

heavy fusillade . The action remained furious for 2 0

minutes as the Marines tried to gain fire superiorit y

and call in artillery fire .

Getting artillery support was not an easy matter.

Company F's forward observer, Second Lieutenant

Terrence M. Weber, tried feverishly to contact Kh e

Sanh Fire Support Control Center; apparently it was

out of radio range . Finally, Weber raised anothe r

Marine unit which relayed his fire requests . About

30 minutes after the firefight started, the Nort h

Vietnamese began to disengage and withdraw . As

they pulled back, artillery and gunships tore into th e

enemy ranks. The battalion ordered Company E ,

south of the engagement, to go to Company F's aid .

Company E's 60mm mortar hit the right flank of th e

NVA unit. The battalion also sent two 81mm mortars, two 106mm recoilless rifles, and a security platoon by helicopters to Company E's position . As a

result of the rapid reaction by reinforcing units an d

supporting arms fire, the enemy's orderly withdrawa l

turned into flight.2 0

When the fighting ended, the Marines counted 3 1

NVA bodies in the area . A search of the position uncovered large amounts of equipment and rice as wel l

as 203 freshly dug graves . The bitter fighting cost the

Marines 24 dead and 19 wounded, most of who m

became casualties in the opening minutes of the battle . Bad weather prevented a withdrawal, so Companies E and F set up a defensive perimeter and pass -

ed the night without further contact .

To the west, another encounter between a seven -

man reconnaissance team from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion and an enemy company marke d

the last significant action of the operation .

Helicopters inserted Reconnaissance Team Breaker a t

1650 on 9 May . Shortly after midnight it becam e

heavily engaged . The enemy easily could have over -

run the outnumbered Marines, but they chos e

not to do so. Apparently they were more intereste d

in shooting down helicopters attempting to extrac t

the team. The heroic performance of 18-year-ol d

Private First Class Steve D . Lopez highlighted the action . Wounded four times, twice in the head, the

young Marine remained on his radio for 12 hours ,

calling in artillery and air strikes practically on top of

his own position . In addition, he killed several

enemy soldiers at close quarters with his M-16 . 2 '

Helicopters made two attempts during the nigh t

to extract the team and another in the early morning; all three failed because of heavy ground fire . At

1145, they made a fourth try . After sealing off the

area with fixed-wing and gunship coverage, a UH-l E

landed and picked up the three survivors . Four

members of the reconnaissance team and one

helicopter pilot died in the action, as did a known

total of seven enemy soldiers.

This action ended the First Battle for Khe Sanh ,

one of the finest examples of an air-ground team effort during the war. The men of the 3d Marine s

fought a conventional infantry battle against a well -

entrenched NVA force . Although aggressive infantr y

assaults finally took the various objectives, much o f

the credit for overwhelming the enemy force belongs

to the supporting arms. The 1st Marine Aircraft

Wing flew more than 1,100 sorties, expending ove r

1,900 tons of ordnance during the operation . Air attacks proved particularly effective in uncovering and

destroying enemy bunkers and fortifications . Whil e

Marine air provided all the close and direct air sup -

port for the operation, 23 U .S . Air Force B-52 strike s

hit enemy troop concentrations, stores, and lines of

communications . Artillery also provided a larg e

share of combat support, especially during the man y

periods of reduced visibility . Artillery units fired

more than 25,000 rounds in support of their comrades on and around the Khe Sanh hills.

The battle was also the first major test of the M-1 6

rifle by the Marine Corps. Opinions of the results

were mixed . The light weight of the rifle and the

ability of the troops to carry more ammunition than

with previous rifles were important positive factors .

One Marine officer attributed the success of the final

assault on Hill 881 to the M-16s used by the attacking Marines . Others, however, strongly criticized th e

weapon for a tendency to jam . 22 *

The First Battle for Khe Sanh did not turn into the

spectacular victory that the North Vietnamese

desired . Reported enemy casualties in the action

from 24 April through 11 May stood at 940 confirm =

ed killed . The cost of stopping the Communist effor t

was not light ; 155 Marines died and another 425 suffered wounds.

*See Chapter 14 for a discussion of the problems with the M-1 6

and the efforts to correct them .
46 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Operation Crockett

With the enemy threat in the area relieved for th e

time being, Lieutenant General Walt began reducing forces at Khe Sanh . From 11-13 May, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines replaced the two battalions

from the 3d Marines and, at 1500 on the 13th, Colonel John J. Padley, commanding officer of the 26th

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18867 2

The 26th Marines constantly patrolled the area

around Khe Sanh after the beginning of Operatio n

Crockett in mid-May . This patrol from Company A

climbs through rugged terrain near Hill 881 North

that had been blasted by several earlier air strikes.

Marines, assumed responsibility for Khe Sanh fro m

Colonel Lanigan . *

The mission assigned to Colonel Padley's Marine s

was to occupy key terrain, deny enemy access into

the vital areas, conduct aggressive patrolling in order

to detect and destroy enemy elements within th e

TAOR, and provide security for the base and adjacent outposts . Colonel Padley was to support the

Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei with his organic artillery, as well as to coordinate all .activities of allied

units operating in the area . The code name for

Marine operations in the Khe Sanh TAOR was

Operation Crockett .

To accomplish the mission, the 1st Battalion, 26t h

Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Donal d

E . Newton, stationed one company each on Hill

881S and 861 ; a security detachment on Hill 950 at a

radio relay site ; and the remainder of the battalion at

the base, acting both as base security and battalio n

reserve . The units at the company outposts patrolle d

continuously within a 4,000-meter radius of thei r

positions. Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, operating from Khe Sanh, inserted reconnaissance teams at greater ranges to provide long -

range surveillance . Although numerous sightings

and reports indicated that all three regiments of the

325C NVA Division were still in the tri-border

region, there was only occasional contact durin g

May .

As June began, there was a sharp increase in the

number of sightings throughout the Crockett

TAOR . At 0101 6 June, twenty-five 120mm mortar

rounds and 102mm rockets hit the base . One hour

later the radio relay site on Hill 950 came under at -

tack from the west and northeast by an unknown

number of enemy soldiers. The enemy penetrate d

the position, but the defending Marines quickl y

forced them to withdraw, leaving 10 dead, on e

wounded, and seven weapons. Marine losses in th e

action were six killed and two wounded . The next

afternoon, mortar and small-arms fire hit a patrol

from Company B, approximately 2,000 meters west

of Hill 881S . The mortar attack immediately preceded an assault by about 40 NVA troops . The Marines

*The official designation of the unit at Khe Sanh was the 26t h

Maribes (Forward). It consisted of one battalion and a smal l

regimental headquarters. The other two 26th Marines battalions

were in Vietnam, but under the control of other units. The

regimental rear headquarters remained on Okinawa .
THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH 4 7

repulsed the enemy charge and called artillery in o n

the attackers. A platoon from Company A arrived by

helicopter to help . By 1630, when the enem y

withdrew, the two Marine units had killed 66 North

Vietnamese and lost 18 of their own men . Twentyeight Marines suffered wounds.

Two days later the enemy shot down an armed

UH-1E in the same area, killing the pilot and wounding the copilot. Friendly forces rescued the copilot

and two crew members, but the aircraft had to b e

destroyed . Due to the increasing number of enemy

contacts, Lieutenant Colonel Kurt L . Hoch's 3d Battalion, 26th Marines returned to the operational control of the 26th Marines (Forward) at Khe Sanh ; the

battalion arrived at Khe Sanh on the 13th .

During the two weeks after the 3d Battalion's arrival, both Marine battalions had many contacts wit h

isolated enemy forces throughout the TAOR . In the

early morning of the 27th, 50 82mm mortar round s

hit the Khe Sanh base . The attack was extremely

costly to the Marines; it killed nine and wounded

125 . Another attack occurred at 0525 by 50 102mm

rockets. Casualties resulting from the second attac k

totaled one killed and 14 wounded . The Marines' artillery answered both attacks with unknown results .

At 1230 on 27 June, Company I, 26th Marines,

while searching for a suspected mortar position t o

the west of the base, ran into two NVA companies.

Company L landed by helicopter to reinforce th e

engaged Marines. By 1900 the NVA broke contact

and withdrew to the northwest leaving 35 bodies o n

the battlefield . This was the last significant actio n

during June.

Operation Crockett continued as a two-battalio n

effort until it ended the 16th of July. During the July period of the operation there was a gradual in -

crease in the number of sightings, but only occasional contact . Nevertheless, the Marines knew th e

NVA was not ready to abandon the Khe Sanh area.

Following the battles of April and May for the Khe Sanh area, shell-scarred Hill 88 1

South, shown here in an aerial view, became a combat base for a 26th Marines company .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189356
0
PART II

SPRING FIGHTING IN

SOUTHERN I CORPS

CHAPTER 5

The War in Southern I Corps

The Situation— Operation Desoto—Deckhouse/Desoto—Desoto Continue d

Operation Union — Union II

The Situation

The buildup of regular NVA forces along th e

DMZ attracted command attention, but the fightin g

there was only one segment of the I Corps-III MAF

campaign. The 1st Marine Division, in the souther n

portion of the III MAF zone of operations, was

fighting a three-pronged war . Marine operations o f

battalion size or larger extended to the oute r

periphery of the division's TAOR to destroy Nort h

Vietnamese units and Viet Cong main forces an d

base areas, while company-size and smaller

counterguerrilla operations sought to protect both

allied installations and the civil population . At the

same time, the division provided support for th e

Vietnamese Government Revolutionary Development Program which was trying to neutralize the

guerilla infrastructure .

The area of responsibility of Major General Her -

man Nickerson, Jr.'s 1st Marine Division consisted of

the three southernmost provinces of I Corps: Quang

Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. This area was

important for diverse reasons . It contained a large

population, was a rich rice-producing basin, and was

a major source of salt.* Furthermore, the treecovered foothills of the Annamite Mountains juttin g

into the coastal plain and the numerous rivers provided the enemy with natural access to the area .

Forty-three large unit operations, involving a forc e

of at least a battalion, were conducted in southern I

Corps during the first six months of 1967 . In addition, thousands of small unit operations abetted th e

larger "sweeps . " During the first three months of the

year, for example, the 1st Marine Division carried

out no less than 36,553 company-size operations ,

patrols, and ambushes in the Da Nang Tactical Area

alone .

*Salt had traditionally been a medium of barter and a taxabl e

commodity in Vietnam . Moreover, the hot climate of Vietnam

makes its use a dietary necessity .

These small unit actions occasionally were hardfought battles with the Viet Cong . One such occurred on 31 January during a patrol approximately 1 5

kilometers southwest of Da Nang by Company H ,

2d Battalion, 1st Marines, commanded by Captai n

Edward J. Banks. Just before noon, as the compan y

approached the hamlet of Thuy Bo, located immediately west of the north-south railroad, it came

under heavy fire from a Viet Cong main-force battalion. The latter's armament included .50-caliber

and other automatic weapons which hit several

Marines in the lead platoon . The casualties mounted

as the enemy gunners' fire found the Marines takin g

shelter behind low rice paddy dikes. Evacuation of

the dead and wounded proved difficult and only on e

helicopter managed to land and pick up some of th e

casualties .

Captain Banks requested air and artillery strikes

on the enemy force . By 1330, he decided to ask for a

quick reaction mission to bring in reinforcements .

Supporting arms continued to hit the Viet Cong bu t

did not eliminate the main-force battalion's fire .

The Marines had to remain in their exposed positions the rest of the day and all night .

The following morning, the Marine compan y

assaulted the hamlet . There was some gunfire durin g

the assault; however, the enemy battalion had

withdrawn during the night . Marine casualties

numbered 5 dead and 26 wounded, most of who m

were from the lead units on 31 January . One Marine

later died from his wounds . The Marines estimated

they had killed 101 Viet Cong soldiers.

During the next two days, local Vietnamese

peasants brought 22 dead and 18 wounded villagers

to the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines command post .

These casualties had resulted from air, artillery, and

small arms fire . After an investigation, the battalion

determined that these civilian casualties were a

regrettable corollary to the fighting on 31 January

and 1 February .

The 1st Marines followed up the 31 January actio n

with Operation Stone, which lasted from 10-1 2

51
52 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A36988 2

Operation Desoto occurred as the 1st Marine Division prepared to issue the M-16 rifle t o

its infantrymen. MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., used a 21 February visit to Operation

Desoto to discuss the weapon with one of the few 1st Division Marines to have one .

February. Three Marine battalions participated i n

the operation's first phase on Go Noi Island, a

12-kilometer-long island formed by the river sout h

of Company H's action . Phase II took place north of

the river and included the Thuy Bo area . However ,

only a single reinforced battalion, the 1st Battalion ,

1st Marines, conducted the remainder of the operation.

The 1st Battalion managed to establish a cordo n

on 19 February around elements of the Viet Con g

R-20 Battalion. Beginning the following morning ,

the Marine battalion's companies took turns sweeping back and forth across the cordoned area . By the

end of the operation on 12 February, the 1st Battalion had killed a confirmed total of 68 Viet Con g

soldiers and captured 25 prisoners and 17 weapons .

Marine casualties for all of Operation Stone totaled 9 dead and 76 wounded. One Kit Carson Scou t

also died. The 1st Marines claimed 291 Viet Cong

killed in the entire operation and listed another 11 2

as probably killed, plus 74 enemy captured . While such actions established a tedious balanc e

in the "cat-and-mouse" game of subduing local guerrillas, operations of a larger scale, responding to con -

firmed intelligence reports, attempted to smas h

larger, established Communist concentrations . Four

major operations, Desoto, Deckhouse VI, Union ,

and Union II, produced the most significant result s

during January June 1967, and are discussed in thi s

chapter as being representative of the major unit

fighting in southern I Corps during this period .

Although these operations produced tangible and

significant results, it is, and was, impossible t o

measure the full impact of the "unsuccessful" operations, much less the small unit patrols and ambushe s

that encountered no enemy . "No contact" had to b e

considered as a potential victory in the war for are a

and people control.

The Vietnamese-U .S . 1967 Joint Combined Campaign Plan specified several areas of southern I Corp s

for allied operations in early 1967. The Thu Bon are a

between Da Nang and An Hoa and the rich, densel y

populated Que Son Valley were main areas of concern . The results of Marine and ARVN efforts i n

these regions for the past two years were tangible ,

but continued pressure was required to extend and

consolidate government authority there . Pacified

areas, and those undergoing pacification, required

protection, as did military bases and :populatio n

centers. The gradual increase of Communis t

capabilities made it necessary to pay higher costs fo r

the security of these locations.* At the same time ,

the enemy sanctuary in the Duc Pho-Mo Duc sections of Quang Ngai, demanded immediate attention. Intelligence reports indicated that NVA unit s

had moved north into these two districts from I I

Corps .

*On 27 February 1967, the enemy attacked the Da Nang air

base complex with 140mm rockets, which had a range of 8,000

meters. This was the first use of the weapon in the war . To counter

the increased firepower capability the Marines extended their

search areas by approximately 2,500 meters . (See Chapter 6 for a

more detailed account of this attack .)
THE WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 5 3

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37022 7

A peasant family's bomb shelter provides a place for a machine gun team from the 3 d

Battalion, 7th Marines to set up to provide covering fire for infantymen searching a

village during Operation Arizona in June . Arizona was one of the many conducted by

the 1st Marine Division to maintain control over the populated areas south of Da Nang .

Duc Pho, the southernmost district of Quan g

Ngai Province, had been under Communist influence for many years . The salt flats at Sa Huynh, a s

well as the rich and populated, fertile coastal plain ,

were a vital source of supply for the Viet Cong wa r

effort . Furthermore, the Tra Cau inlet and the coast

immediately to the north had long been suspected as

infiltration points. Intelligence reports also indicate d

that the district harbored the Viet Cong political

subdivision of the region. South Vietnamese Army

activity in Duc Pho had been restricted to the outposting of two predominant hills, Nui Dang an d

Nui Dau. An ARVN battalion occupied these

hilltops and controlled the area around the distric t

capital of Duc Pho, but nothing more . As a result ,

the guerrillas developed extensive fortifications and

supply installations throughout the countryside .

Astonishing as it may seem, the Communist contro l

over the area was so complete that many of the in -

habitants had never come in contact with militar y

forces other than the Viet Cong.

Geographically, the Duc Pho region is a

predominantly flat rice paddy interspersed with

numerous small streams having steep banks four to

five feet high. The majority of the streams are fordable. Hedgerows border vitually all the rice paddie s

and cane fields and bamboo groves are scattered

throughout the area .

Operation Desoto

Operation Desoto originated from the joint

Vietnamese-U .S . 1967 Combined Campaign Plan i n

which III MAF forces were to relieve ARVN units

from outpost duty so that they could be employe d

more effectively elsewhere in the Revolutionary

Development Program . The 4th Battalion, 4th Regiment, 2d ARVN Division, stationed in Duc Pho

District, was one of the units selected to concentrat e

on the pacification program. In turn, General Stiles'

Task Force X-Ray assigned one of its battalions to

relieve the ARVN battalion. Lieutenant Colonel

Raymond J. O'Leary's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines

received this mission . *

*LtCol O'Leary 's 3d Battalion came to the operation with considerable experience in fighting both NVA and VC units . During

the latter part of 1966, the battalion participated in Operatio n

Prairie I in the DMZ and in the Dai Loc /Hill 39 TAOR west of D a

Nang . Col Francis V. White, Comments on draft ms, 22Nov8 2

(Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)
Qoang (2)

N

ve'

Vinh B,nh (1)

0

1 2 kilometers Ld!

See Reterence Map. Section 60

Thuy :

Trieuf

54 FIGHTING THE Ni kill vll:lNANII.sl

Area of Action

Operation Desoto

27 - 30 January 1967

Sa Binh

Tan To Ill

an Tu (2)

--.::)

Hat Mon (1)

L

Truant

Sanh

Nw Dang - N / /?\\,\

'::-,2'

/

Vinh Lac Cl) I

Duc Pho NJ

7
I

Duc Lb"1 South

China

Sea

Li.

Due Pho and Viciny

Operation Desoto

January1967

- .. SaN I.',', S.. R.$..e,t. M..1 S., WI

THE WAR IN SOUTHEPJJ I CORPS 55

The relief operation termed Desoto began on 27

January. Marine helicopters lifted Company L and

four 105mm howitzers and crews of Battery I, 12th

Marines to Nui Dang to relieve the Vietnamese units

there. The howitzers were to provide fire support for

a battalion assault the next morning. At 0800 on the

28th, Company M, followed by the rest of the battalion, made a helicopter assault into landing zones

just north of the Nui Dang position. The only opposition was sniper fire, but intermittent firing continued throughout the day.

Shortly after the battalion's landing, Companies I

and M moved out to secure the villages of Vinh Binh

and Truong Sanh.* Sniper fire harried Company I

during its advance to Vinh Binh, but by the end of

the day the company had secured the village and

established night positions east of it. Company M

also encountered light harassing fire as it moved

toward Truong Sanh, but it occupied the village

without opposition. Villagers at Truong Sanh told

the Marines that strong VC forces were east of the

Song Quan (Quan River) in the hamlet of Tan Tu

(2).

*Tmong Sanh appears on maps in use in 1967 but not on the

1970 edition of the Mo Duc mapsheet. It occupied the area north

east of Nui Dang and south of the Song Quan.

To exploit this information, the battalion command group, Company M, and one platoon moved

east of the stream south of the hamlet. As the lead

elements began to move into Tan Tu (2) they came

under sniper fire, and when they tried to close with

the snipers a strong VC bunker complex stopped

their advance. The company called in artillery and

air strikes against the positions. After the bombardment, the Marines attacked again, but stopped once

more because of heavy fire from machine guns and

automatic weapons to the north and northeast. The

Marines directed more supporting arms fire against

the Communist positions. Under its cover, Company

M recovered its dead and wounded and, following

orders from the battalion, withdrew across the

stream and established company night positions.

Because of the sharp engagement east of the Song

Quan, Lieutenant Colonel O'Leary decided to use both Companies I and M to assault the Tan Tu

village complex on the 29th. During the night supporting arms blanketed the village to prepare for the

attack, and at first light both companies began moving toward the objective. As they forded the Song

Quan, sniper fire broke out. The enemy snipers were

unusually accurate; they wounded three men from

Company I almost immediately. Both companies

returned the enemy fire and pushed on into the

village against little resistance.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A369746

A rifleman races for the cover of a paddy dike as his

7th Marines unit draws snip erfire on 28 January, the

first day of Task Force X-Ray's Operation Desoto.
56 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

By 1330, the Marines had secured Tan Tu an d

moved into the adjacent village of Sa Binh, stil l

harassed by long-range sniper fire . Periodic bursts of

heavy fire were the only sign of the enemy ; the majority had withdrawn . The two companies searche d

the village and dug in for the night on a small knol l

north of Sa Binh .

The next day, Company M again searched the two

communities. One patrol found an enemy land -

mine foundry with 500 pounds of uncut metal, min e

molds, and tools. After photographing the entire

works for intelligence purposes, the Marine s

demolished the foundry .

Meanwhile, Company I had started to swee p

southeast toward the village of Hai Mon . Since this

area had sheltered enemy snipers on the 29th, th e

Marines first called in artillery and naval preparator y

fires on suspected positions near the community . As

the lead element advanced, they met heavy small

arms fire from Hai Mon . The FAC assigned to Company I called in jets armed with napalm an d

500-pound bombs, followed by attacks by two UH -

1Es which hit the area with rockets and machine gu n

fire . One UH-lE, badly damaged by ground fire,

force-landed at the battalion CP .

One of the battalion's 106mm recoilless rifle s

revealed the degree of fortification of the villag e

when one of its rounds hit one of the thatched hut s

and revealed an oval concrete bunker. A direct hit

from another 106mm round penetrated the bunker . '

Hai Mon proved to be more difficult by the

minute. The defending enemy had fortified many

rice paddy dikes to create positions providing a dead -

ly cross-fire . By 1330, Company I had taken cover i n

deep rice paddies west of the village . As the afternoon wore on, the situation became even worse .

Enemy gunfire, including fire from heavy machine

guns, raked the company from four sides . The company could not evacuate its casualties and ammunition tan low. At 1655, the battalion ordered Company I to break contact and withdraw to the west . Withdrawal and reconsolidation were not easy .

Company M fought its way up to the eastern flank o f

Company I and replenished the latter's ammunition ,

then both companies tried to disengage under the

cover of air strikes, artillery, and naval gunfire .* By

2000, Company M had established a casualty collec -

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A36981 8

Enemy fire on 1 February during Operation DeSoto

forced this Marine from Company I, 3d Battalion,

7th Marines to crawl to cover while another Marin e

elected to avoid the mud and dash forward on foot .

tion point and both companies gathered their

casualties there . The Marines could not complete th e

medical evacuation until 2200 because some

casualties had been point men caught in the open b y

the initial enemy fire . Marines could recover thes e

bodies only by crawling out under cover of darkness .

By then, the battalion estimated that Hai Mon wa s

60 percent destroyed . Supporting arms amounting

to 325 5-inch naval rockets, 125 5-inch shells, 590

105mm rounds, and 50 tons of aviation ordnanc e

had smashed the enemy fortifications .

Lieutenant Colonel O'Leary, realizing the village

was highly fortified, was not content with the

damage to Hai Mon and ordered more shelling t o

neutralize the area . Again on the 31st, the battalio n

directed air, naval gunfire, and artillery at all known

and suspected Communist positions in and aroun d

the village . While supporting arms pounded Hai Mon, Company M resumed the deliberate search of the Tan Tu

hamlets, as Company I swept the area west of Ha i

Mon. To the south, Company K, operating from

Nui Dau, made several small contacts, but enem y

activity was light . The heaviest action of the day occurred at 2200 when the battalion cornmand post

and logistic support area came under small arms and

60mm mortar fire . Shortly thereafter, 20 VC probe d

the perimeter. Company L and Headquarters and

*Col Francis V. White, then the 3d Battalion 's S-3 officer,

recalled in 1982 that, at the height of this firefight, Capt Alan L .

Orr, the battalion S-4 officer, led an ammunition party to Company M's position, then to Company I, to deliver badly needed

ammunition and to assist in casualty evacuation . Col Francis V.

White, Comments on draft ms, 22Nov82 (Vietnarn comment file ,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
THE WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 5 7

Service Company security troops stopped the attac k

in the outer wire of their defenses, killing two of the

enemy. Marine losses were 14 wounded, eight o f

whom required evacuation . The battalion's 81mm

mortars and supporting artillery fired on possibl e

escape routes to catch the withdrawing enemy, but a

followup search of the area turned up only two

Russian-made rifles, several grenades, and some satchel charges.

During early February, the battalion remained i n

the new TAOR and conducted repeated search an d

destroy operations . On 2 February, Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Bronars relieved Lieutenant Colone l

O'Leary as commanding officer of the battalion . The

next day, 3 February, Companies L and M, 5th

Marines, which joined the operation on 31 January ,

conducted a two-day sweep in the village comple x

southeast of Nui Dang. Although contact in the are a

was light, the Marines found the hamlets to be wel l

fortified, and discovered more than 100 tons of ric e

which they bagged and turned over to ARV N

authorities. After searching this community, the

Marines again turned their attention to Hai Mon an d

Hill 26 east of it .

Aerial observation reports and Company I's

bloody experience of the 30th indicated that most of

the enemy fortifications in the village pointed west.

Lieutenant Colonel Bronars decided to attack th e

position from the east by vertical envelopment, using Companies L and M . The morning of 5

February, artillery, naval gunfire, and air bombardment blanketed the objective area. The assault

helicopters from Lieutenant Colonel Ural W .

Shadrick's HMM-262 followed approach and retirement lanes which allowed the artillery at Nui Dan g

and the naval guns offshore to maintain suppressiv e

fire throughout the landing .

Light machine gun fire and several rounds o f

57mm recoilless rifle fire greeted the companies a s

they moved into the hamlets. They responded by

calling in artillery and naval gunfire . At this time ,

Marines spotted a number of sampans carrying abou t

30 Viet Cong fleeing northward across the Song Tr a

Cau. Bronar's Company M sprayed the withdrawing

force with small arms fire and fixed-wing aircraft

made several strikes, destroying several of the sampans .

After seizing Hill 26 and Hai Mon, the Marine s

searched the area and uncovered a vast, intricat e

bunker and cave system . They promptly destroyed

the bunkers, but the caves, particularly those on Hill

26, were so extensive that the battalion called i n

engineers to determine the amount of explosive s

needed to seal them . By the time the last cave on th e

hill had collapsed, the engineers had used 3,60 0

pounds of explosives. The well-prepared defensive

positions and the skillfully laid fields of fire confirmed that the Communists had expected an attack

from the west; the assault from the east caught them

by surprise . Possession of the village enabled the

Marines to control the southern bank of the Song Tr a

Cau inlet.

Desoto continued during February, consisting o f

frequent platoon and company sweeps and extensiv e

patrolling and ambushing throughout the area . The

battalion's area of operations expanded with each

passing day . The villages of Thuy Trieu, An Trung ,

Dong Quang, Vinh Lac, and Thanh Lam appeare d

on daily situation reports, but for the Marines on th e

ground each one was just another "ville" that had to

be seized and cleared, a dirty and often painful

task . 2 Attrition among company grade officers was

quite high, and the high tempo of daily operation s

had a noticeable deleterious effect on the rifle companies . 3

Snipers were a constant threat and the majo r

source of Marine casualties . The Marines countered

with scout-sniper teams positioned at carefull y

selected vantage points; however, the teams had difficulty in locating an enemy who fired from cleverly

constructed spider trap s

Throughout the month the battalion exploited

reports of Viet Cong positions with artillery and

naval gunfire and extensively used radar-controlled

aerial bombing of suspected enemy concentrations.

Surveillance reports indicated that the supportin g

arms attacks were very effective against the Communist sanctuaries.

Deckhouse/Desoto .

While Lieutenant Colonel Bronars' battalio n

gradually expanded control of the Nui Dang-Nu i

Dau area, the Marines of Colonel Harry D . Wortman's SLF landed near Sa Huynh at the southern ti p

of the district . The SLF's amphibious operation are a

included the only area in I Corps where the Annamite Mountains extend to the coastline . It was a

predominantly Communist-controlled area . The

heavily forested hills concealed the supply route s

leading to major enemy base areas further inland . A

sheltered harbor and anchorage, and several landin g

beaches on the coast enhanced Sa Huynh's infiltration potential .
58 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

SLF Operation Deckhouse VI had several goals : to

prevent free movement of Communist forces in th e

area ; to conduct harbor, beach, and airfield survey s

to locate a site from which to provide mor e

economical logistic support for allied forces in

southern Quang Ngai; and to provide security for

the construction of a CIDG camp which would

establish permanent government control in the

region . Upon completion of these tasks, the SLF was

to join with Bronar's battalion to continue searc h

and destroy operations throughout the Duc Pho

region .

The first phase of the operation began at 0800 1 6

February when the naval gunfire support ships, including the rocket ships USS Clarion River (LSMR

409) and USS White River (LSMR 536), began

preparation fires. When the naval fires ended, two

UH-lEs of VMO-2 directed air strikes on the primar y

and alternate landing zones. At 0855, the first wave

of helicopters from Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E .

Huntington's HMM-363 lifted off the deck of the

USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) with Company A of Lieu -

tenant Colonel Jack Westerman's 1st Battalion, 4th

Marines. The helicopters landed on high ground five

miles inland . Two UH-1E gunships accompanyin g

the flight suppressed a platoon-size ambush, killing

12 of an estimated 30-man VC force near the LZ .

On 20 February, operational control of the SLF

passed to General Stiles' Task Force X-Ray. Lack of

opposition around Sa Huynh allowed General Stile s

to reorient the BLT's efforts. He ordered Westerman

to begin deliberate search and destroy operations t o

the northeast, while elements involved in Operation

Desoto moved into blocking positions south an d

west of Nui Dau . By the afternoon of the 25th, th e

BLT had passed through Lieutenant Colonel

Bronars' battalion and moved into positions nea r

Nui Dau, thus ending the first phase of Operation

Deckhouse VI.

During their sweep north, Lieutenant Colone l

Westerman's Marines found numerous bunkers,

tunnels, caves, and supply caches ; they demolish

ed 167 fortifications, captured 20 tons of supplies,

and destroyed 10 caves and 84 booby traps. In the

process of defending these positions, the enemy

force killed six Marines and wounded another 61 . Most of the enemy casualties came from supporting

arms fire called in by reconnaissance teams operatin g

to the west ; these fires killed 201 enemy soldiers.

The operation plan scheduled the second phase o f

Deckhouse VI to take place along the northern por -

tion of the Desoto TAOR . Intelligence reports indicated that the 38th VC Battalion was infiltrating

into the Duc Pho area from the northwest. General

Stiles arranged to exploit this information by an

operation involving his Task Force X-Ray, the SLF,

and 2d ARVN Division units in Quang Ngai Province .

One Marine and two ARVN battalions were to be

helilifted into the area northwest of Duc Pho an d

sweep eastward . At the same time, other 2d ARVN

Division units would screen the northern flank of the

operational area while elements of the 3d Battalion ,

7th Marines secured the southern flank from blocking positions within its TAOR . The plan ordered the

SLF Marines to make an amphibious assault between

the Mo Duc-Duc Pho district boundary and the Son g

Tra Cau, then sweep southwest to entrap any VC

withdrawing from the other allied forces advancin g

eastward .

On the morning of 26 February, Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hilgartner's 1st Battalion, 5th Marine s

and two ARVN battalions landed northwest of Duc

Pho and began sweeping northeast . They encountered , only long-range sniper fire, but

discovered numerous caves and bunkers, all oriente d

toward the east. With the insertion of three battalions in the

western portion of the area of operation, General

Stiles ordered the SLF withdrawn, and by 1825 that

evening the BLT completed its withdrawal . Less than

15 hours after the last elements of the KT left the

beach near Nui Dau, the SLF made another amphibious assault, 10 kilometers further north in Du c

Pho District.

Following preparation of the beach area and landing zones by naval gunfire and aircraft, th e

helicopterborne assault elements launched from the

USS Iwo Jima at 0830 on 27 February . Two arme d

UH-lEs escorted the 12 UH-34s and two CH-46s car -

rying the first wave of Company A into LZ Bat ,

1,500 meters from the beach .

As the troop-laden helicopters from HMM-36 3

made their approach into LZ Bat, enemy soldiers ,

located in and around the landing zone, opened up

with a heavy volume of small arms fire . Marine

helicopter crewmen immediately returned fire with

their door-mounted machine guns ; the UH-lEs

closed in to provide suppressive fire with rockets an d

machine guns .

The first wave of Company A got into LZ Bat a t

the cost of battle damage to eight medium
THE WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 5 9

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A80097 1

A unit of BLT 1 /4 establishes a night defensive position in the middle of a broad expanse of muddy rice paddies during Operation Deckhouse VI . One of the Marines in the

foreground has obtained a non-issue MI rifle which rests against a pack on the dike .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19113 4

Capt Richard F. Corcoran uses his radio to coordinate the defense of Landing Zone Bat on 2 7

February at the beginning of Phase II of Operation

Deckhouse VI. Only one platoon and the company

headquarters managed to get into the LZ; heavy

enemy fire forced other units to land on the beach .

helicopters. All eight flew back to the Iwo Jima but

three made forced landings onto the flight deck .

Another three of the damaged aircraft also had to b e

grounded.

Company C landed by LVTs at 0837 . With the

beach area safe for helicopters, Company B and th e

remainder of Company A used the area as their LZ.

As soon as they reorganized, they moved toward LZ

Bat and linked up with the isolated elements of

Company A. Enemy sniper fire continued, wounding seven Marines by 1200 .

LZ Bat remained hazardous for aircraft all morning. At 1030, a UH-34 encountered heavy small

arms fire while making an emergency medevac from

the zone . Fortunately, it suffered no hits. Around

noon, two other helicopters from HMM-363 were

not so lucky . The squadron's after action report said :

At 1206H, two aircraft were launched for an emergency

med-evac [from) Landing Zone Bat. YZ-81 received five

rounds upon approach and had to wave-off. His wingman ,

YZ-83, then proceeded into the zone, but also encountered heavy fire on approach and, after taking three

rounds, waved off. One of the rounds lodged in the copilot's right thigh causing moderate injury . Shrapnel from

the same round hit the co-pilot's left foot and the pilot' s

chin, causing minor injuries . Both aircraft returned to the

USS Iwo Jima with battle damage .'
60 THE WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORP S

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18849 5

An armed Navy LCU lands Marines at Blue Beach during the first day of Operatio n

Deckhouse VI. Ships of the Seventh Fleet's Amphibious Ready Group dot the horizon .

The rest of the BLT continued to land and by mid -

day the command group was controlling the operation from ashore and the two artillery batteries wer e

set up, ready to support the battalion . Company D

landed by helicopter at 1430 and the battalio n

began to sweep to the southwest .

The SLF remained in almost constant contact with

fleeing groups of VC for two days after the landing ,

but by the afternoon of 1 March the contact

diminished . The morning of 3 March the operatio n

terminated. Phase II of Operation Deckhouse VI cost

the enemy 76 dead; but they killed a Marine an d

wounded 50 others . *

For Hilgartner's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,

operating inland with the ARVN battalions, the en -

tire operation had been frustrating . Although the

Marines found and destroyed numerous fortifications, they had very little enemy contact. The following excerpt from a report of 2 March typifies the battalion's encounter with the enemy during the period

26 February-3 March :

Company D while sweeping through a hamlet observe d

3 VC carrying packs. One VC was dressed in black, one i n

white, and one in green trousers . The VC spotted the

Marines and began to run in a westerly direction . Company D fired 10 rounds of small arms fire and physicall y

pursued the VC. VC wearing green trousers was captured .

The VC carried a well-stocked firstaid kit. Marines con -

*See Chapter 8 for detailed descriptions of SLF participation in

Operation Deckhouse VI .

tinned to pursue and captured the VC wearing whit e

trousers . This VC was carrying a pack with assorte d

clothing . Marines continued to pursue third VC wit h

negative results. 4 A

When Deckhouse VI ended on 3 March, the 1st

Battalion, 5th Marines, had accounted for 17 Communists killed and 11 captured . The 1st Battalion

suffered two killed and 12 wounded .

Both the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines and the 1s t

Battalion, 5th Marines departed the Duc Pho are a

after Deckhouse VI. The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines

reverted to SLF control while the 1st Battalion, 5th

Marines returned to Chu Lai. With the departure o f

these units, responsibility for the Duc Pho TAO R

again rested with the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines .

Desoto Continued

Operation Desoto continued through the month s

of March and April. The 3d Battalion conducted daily company- and platoon-size search and destroy

operations while maintaining and improving the

Nui Dang base camp and LSA area and positions o n

Nui Dau. Throughout this period, brushes with

local VC were frequent . Constant pressure by the

Marines forced the VC to give up attempts to defend

the hamlets and resort to delaying actions, harassment, and only an occasional attack .

The most damaging enemy action during th e

period took place early in the morning of 24 March

when an enemy force hit the battalion base camp

and logistic support area with 250 mortar and

recoilless rifle rounds . The first rounds landed in the
FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE 6 1

CP/LSA part of the camp . Battery I began counterbattery fire before its gun positions came under fire .

The VC quickly responded and fired 70 rounds into

the artillery revetments, scoring direct hits on two o f

the Marine guns, killing three Marines and wounding 14 others. The artillerymen fired more than 100

rounds, silencing the enemy weapons . The effects of

the Communist attack remained visible long after

the action stopped. The enemy fire had hit the tactical fuel dispensing system and dumps in the LSA ;

70,000 gallons of fuel burned far into the night .

A search of the area the next morning located 3 6

75mm recoilless rifle cannisters and several freshl y

dug mortar positions. All the positions showe d

damage from the thorough artillery counterbattery

fires. Followup intelligence reports revealed that th e

attacking force came from the 95th VC Battalion and

that they had forced local villagers to carry ammunition for the 12 recoilless rifles used in the attack .

A sequel to this incident occurred on the 27th ,

when the enemy attacked the destroyer USS Ozbourne (DD 843), lying 1,000 meters off the mout h

of the Song Tra Cau, with 18 rounds of recoilless rifle fire . There was no damage to the ship and her

answering fire drove off the attackers .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A36980 2

The strain of the constant patrolling and combat of

Operation Desoto shows on the face of this Marin e

from Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines . Company F served under the 3d Battalion, 7th Marine s

during some of the heaviest fighting in Desoto.

Operations in the Que Son Basin brought an increase in the base and logistics structur e

in the area. Here, a Marine CH-46 lands on a newly constructed helicopter platform surrounded by the sand-bagged bunkers at the fortified hilltop position of Nui Dang .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421627
62 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The same day, Company K conducted a searc h

and destroy operation northwest of Nui Dau, accompanied by the village chief and National Polic e

representatives. Company G, 7th Marines, whic h

had joined the operation on 23 March, assume d

blocking positions outside the village while a plan e

flew over the village, broadcasting advice to th e

villagers to remain in their homes.* As the Marine s

of Company K began moving into the hamlets, they

saw several VC slipping into the waters of the Da m

Lam Binh and into sampans moored nearby . The

Marines captured these, and found 13 more hidin g

in a bunker. The pilots of UH-lE helicopters supporting the operation saw more Communists

camouflaged with moss in shallow swamp water . The

gunships made several strafing runs to force the VC

toward shore . After each pass, some of the enemy

waded to shore to be captured by Company K . The

aviators flushed 3 VC from the swamp in this manner and killed another 23 . The number of prisoners

reached 49 during the operation .

By 31 March, the battalion had swept approximately 75 percent of the assigned area of responsibility. Reconnaissance teams operating in the hill s

to the west and aerial observers continued to repor t

moving enemy, which supporting arms took under

fire with good results. Targets outside the TAOR, acquired through intelligence sources, suffered attacks

by Marine radar-controlled air strikes and USA F

B-52s . The steady pressure exerted by the Marine infantrymen in the rice paddies and hamlets began to

pay dividends. The harassed local Communist force s

reverted to guerrilla tactics as evidenced by an in -

crease in their use of mines and booby traps .

The most costly mining incident during this

period occurred at dusk on 5 April . As full darkness

approached, Captain Robert B. Wilson began to

move his Company G, 7th Marines into a nigh t

defensive position on a small hill southeast of Nu i

Dang . Someone in a security element tripped an antipersonnel mine devised from a 105mm round . The

explosion wounded two Marines, one of whom required immediate evacuation. Unfortunately, th e

medevac helicopter, which had been in the area al l

day, had departed for Ky Ha . Instead, the pilot of a

UH-lE gun ship volunteered to make the evacuation.

*Company G, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines replaced Company F,

2d Battalion, 7th Marines which had relieved Company M, 3d

Battalion, 5th Marines on 23 February .

Captain Wilson suspected there might be additional mines hidden in the chest-high elephant grass

on the hill. He advised the UH-1E pilot by radio t o

hover, rather than land, when picking up the casualty. The pilot hovered just above the ground and

several infantrymen loaded the wounded Marine o n

board. As the loading occurred, a second, larger ex -

plosion disintegrated the UH-1E, causing numerou s

additional casualties. Other nearby Marines rushe d

to the scene to provide assistance only to be caugh t

by a third explosion as large as the second .

Darkness made it difficult for Captain Wilson to

get an accurate casualty count; the reported figure

was 10 dead and 13 wounded . (Not until a week

later did Marines recover the body of an 11th victim ,

a crew member of the UH-1E . The crewman's body,

still strapped in its seat, lay more than 200 meter s

from the site of the explosion .),

Company G searched the area around the three

craters and found two wires leading from the hill to a

cane field 500 meters away ; the VC had comman d

detonated the last two mines . Analysis of the craters

from the last two explosions revealed they had bee n

made by bombs of 250 pounds or larger .

While all the enemy's harassing actions were no t

as successful as the one on 5 April, Marine casualtie s

were high. Lieutenant Commander Robert M .

O'Brien's Company B, 1st Medical Battalion,

operating with the Marines at Duc Pho, treated an

average of 12 casualties and performed two major

surgical operations a day . On one day alone, they

handled 49 wounded . One of these casualties, a

young Marine who was seriously wounded and under

the influence of sedation, asked O'Brien if he woul d

live . A few minutes later the chaplain arrived and, a s

he approached, heard the wounded man say

"Chaplain, I don't need you . The doctor says I'm going to live ."6

The return of local Viet Cong units to guerrill a

tactics was not the only indication of the Marines'

growing influence in the region . District officials

reported that the populace, enjoying more security ,

became increasingly pro-Government . Indicative of

growing anti-Viet Cong feeling among the peopl e

was the fact that they often volunteered information

pinpointing VC locations.

Unfortunately, military success outpaced civic action progress, particularly in the resolution of th e

refugee problem. About 11,000 Vietnamese becam e

refugees from the heavy combat in the Duc Pho

area . Of these, local government officials considered
THE WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 6 3

about 7,500 as "permanent" refugees who were to b e

resettled on an island 10 miles off the coast.

However, since there were few vessels available t o

move such numbers, food and housing became

critical in the Desoto area of operations. ?

Local factors complicated the 3d Battalion, 7th

Marines' civic action problems . The area was the

home of the vice premier of North Vietnam, a fact i n

which many local Vietnamese took great pride . In

addition, intelligence sources gave indications th e

province chief was a Viet Cong sympathizer, as wer e

many of the refugees. Despite positive efforts by th e

commander of the Marine battalion, including obtaining new leadership for the attached Army civil

affairs platoon, the civic action aspects of Operatio n

Desoto remained unsolved long after the operatio n

ended . 8

By 7 April, when Operation Desoto ended, the

Marines had expanded positive military control ove r

43 square kilometers of the Duc Pho District an d

had ensured relatively safe movement in another 5 0

square kilometers. Revolutionary Developmen t

teams were able to work effectively, a virtual i m

possibility three months earlier . Desoto was a land -

mark in that it was an initial step toward restoration

of Government control in southernmost I Corps .

Logistically, Operation Desoto had been unique .

The terrain and tactical situation required that al l

logistical support be provided by helicopter. At the

beginning of the operation, the Marines establishe d

a logistical support area at the Quang Ngai airfield ,

and for the first six days flew all supplies from ther e

directly to units in the field . Thereafter, six CH-4 6

helicopters arrived daily from Chu Lai, to supply an

LSA at Duc Pho . On 8 February, to preserve th e

wing's helicopters and conserve critical flight time ,

III MAF obtained a Navy logistical support ship

which established a forward supply point providin g

all operational support . The ship, an LST, loaded a t

Chu Lai with all classes of supply and then statione d

itself off the coast, only five miles from the Duc Pho

LSA. Helicopters, hovering over the ship, picked u p

supplies as external lifts and moved them to th e

LSA. This technique reduced the daily helicopter requirement from six to four . The Navy further improved the system later in February by providing a

helicopter refueling capability by mooring an LC U

(landing craft, utility) alongside, loaded with two

10,000-gallon reinforced rubber tanks full of aviation gas. Helicopters landing on the cargo deck o f

the LST could have their fuel tanks filled from the

alongside LCU at the same time they reloaded for

another mission to Duc Pho . A forward supply point

at Quang Ngai backed up the logistic support ship .

Bulk items, fuel, and ammunition arrived there by

trucks from Chu Lai . A detachment of the Marines'

new heavy-lift helicopters, Sikorsky CH-53D Sea

Stallions from HMM-265, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William R. Beeler, lifted the bulk

items to the operational area when required . The

new helicopters made possible air transportation o f

heavy equipment such as Ontos, 155mm howitzers ,

and D-4 Caterpillar tractors for which there ha d

been no previous means of aerial delivery.

Logistical problems during the operation almost

equaled the operational difficulties of eliminatin g

the Communists from the area . From 27 January

when Desoto began, until 7 April when it ended an d

control of the area passed to elements of the U .S . Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the Marine s

killed a reported 383 enemy soldiers. But in terms of

American casualties the cost was high— 76 Marine s

died and another 573 received wounds .

Operation Union

Operation Union, like Desoto, was an outgrowt h

of the 1967 Joint Combined Campaign Plan and th e

requirement for III MAF to replace ARVN units a t

isolated outposts. The hill complex of Nui Loc Son,

overlooking the Que Son Valley, is 25 kilometers

northwest of Tam Ky .* In 1967 it was the site of one

. of the ARVN manned outposts.

The Marines realized that dominance of the fertile, densely populated Que Son Basin region astrid e

the Quang Nam-Quang Tin boundary was one o f

the keys to control of the five northern provinces o f

Vietnam . The enemy needed this agriculturally rich

and populous area to support operations in th e

coastal lowlands. Despite a number of operations in

the basin by both Marine and ARVN forces, Government control continued to be negligible .

The principal enemy force in the basin was the 2d

NVA Division . Although headquarters elements o f

the division appeared there in July 1966, units of it s

3d and 21st NVA Regiments did not arrive in force

until late February 1967 . As the year progressed, the

*Some sources refer to this area as the Nui Loc Son Basin . The

term Que Son Basin is used for consistency within this volume .
Action of 21 - 25 April1967

Operation Union

3 4

Oup

-on

From DaNang

Nui Loc Son Ba.

ft 1 RNGR

I

H

I III-p

I

'I

t

FmmchuLa,

F I 3 1 -

64 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

3d VCRegiment, also part of the 2dNVA Division,

joined them after moving north into theL region from

Quang Ngai Province.

The demand for Marine units elsewhere long

denied the permanent assignment of a battalion or

larger formation to the valley, and ARVN troops

lacked the strength to carry the burden alone.

However, the deployment of U.S. Army units to

southern I Corps during April freed the 1st Marine

Division for operations in this critical area. * Operation Union marked the beginning of the bitter campaign for control of the Que Son Basin.

In mid-January 1967, Captain Gene A. Deegan's

Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines had relieved

the ARVN unit on Nui Loc Son and began operations under the direct control of Colonel Emil J.

Radics' 1st Marines. By positioning Marines on this

small hill mass, III MAF hoped to achieve three

*Two battalions of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Air.

mobile) temporarily moved into Duc Pho pending the arrival of

Task Force Oregon units which were to be assigned to I Corps to

reinforce III MAE later in April. See Chapter 4 for a detailed account of the U.S. Army's arrival in I CTZ.

goals: establish a modicum of control over VC/NVA

access to this rice producing area; initiate a much

needed civic action effort in a region frequented

regularly by U.S. Forces; and force the 2dNVA Division into open battle.

Company F, reinforced with an 81mm mortar section and a 106mm recoilless rifle section from the

battalion and a 4.2-inch mortar battery from the 1st

Battalion, 11th Marines, engaged small enemy units

attempting to cross the valley floor. The company

undertook civic action projects which generated a

good relationship with the Vietnamese and produced accurate intelligence of NVA/VC activities in the

area. The successful combination of small unit

operations and civic action disturbed the NVA who

had previously operated with impunity in the Que

Son Basin. Colonel Radics described these actions as

the planned and premeditated utilization of a

Marine rifle company to create a situation." The 2d

NVA Division took the bait; in April it came out in

force to fight.

The enemy's desire for a fight did not go unnoticed. As Colonel Radics recalled:
THE WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 65

During early April, while making one of my twice weekly visits to Nui Loc Son, Captain Deegan advised me of increasing enemy movement in the hills to the west and

south of the Que Son Basin . We deduced that, perhaps ,

he was at last making his move . On April 15, [the enemy]

started infiltrating small units into the valley floor east of F

Company's position . This buildup continued through the

16th and 17th, and on the night of April 18, Captain

Deegan reported . . . that he believed the enemy [force] t o

be of at least two regiments in size .

My options were two . Let the enemy initiate action

against F Company on Nui Loc Son and then

react—or—assume the initiative and strike him first . I

chose the latter option . . . The concept of a heliborne

assault had been on the books and we only needed to kno w

where the enemy would locate his major elements . . . . His

option to locate east of Nui Loc Son was just what the 1st

Marines wanted . This would enable the regiment to inhibit the enemy from [either] assaulting F Company's position or rapidly seeking sanctuary in the mountains to the

south and east. 1 0

The 1st Marines staff worked throughout th e

night of 18-19 April developing its final plan of at -

tack . The plan provided for the following : Company

F was to make contact from its outpost position ,

covered by supporting arms fire ; elements of the 3 d

Battalion, 1st Marines would make a helicopterborne assault into the operational area, followed b y

the 1st Battalion (-), 1st Marines; and another, as ye t

undesignated, battalion from Chu Lai would act as

regimental reserve . Artillery from the 1st Battalion ,

11th Marines would move by helicopters to Que So n

village for direct support. The 1st Marines comman d

group would control the operation from the Nui Lo c

Son outpost.

The 1st Marines presented its plans to Genera l

Nickerson on the morning of the 19th, with the

recommendation for execution that same day.

General Nickerson approved the plan but delayed it s

execution because of another operation in progress

within the division TAOR. On the afternoon of the

20th, he gave permission to begin Operation Unio n

the following day .

Early on the morning of the 21st, Company F

moved out from Nui Loc Son . By 0700, the company

had several brief encounters with small NVA

elements and had seen a large enemy force movin g

into the village of Binh Son (1) four kilometers t o

the northeast. At 0930 the Marine company came

under heavy small arms fire and pulled back to a tre e

line where it called in artillery and air strikes on the

enemy positions. At 1100, Captain Deegan moved

his 2d and 3d Platoons against the village, while th e

1st Platoon provided covering fire . The assault

elements encountered almost no resistance as they

jumped off in the attack, but as they started to ente r

the village they were stopped cold by heavy fire . The

1st Platoon tried to flank the enemy position, but a s

it moved it came under equally heavy fire . Despit e

repeated artillery and air strikes on the NVA positions the company was stuck, unable to maneuve r

because of the volume of enemy fire .

Lieutenant Colonel Hillmer F . DeAtley, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, his command group, and Companies I and M, joined the fight, entering a hotly

contested landing zone 1,500 meters from the Company F action . The force fought its way to help

Deegan, who, despite serious wounds, continued to

direct his company until evacuated after DeAtley's

battalion arrived . At 1610, the lead elements of

Lieutenant Colonel Dean E. Esslinger's 3d Battalion,

5th Marines from Chu Lai began landing east of the

battlefield . Esslinger's Marines moved west through

scattered resistance to link up with DeAtley's

Marines . Lieutenant Colonel Van D . Bell, Jr.'s 1st

Battalion, 1st Marines arrived from Da Nang ,

landing in darkness near the 1st Marines comman d

post at the Nui Loc Son outpost . Bell's battalion

moved out immediately to join the battle .

To support the rapidly committed battalions,

helicopters lifted Battery B, 1st Battalion, 11th

Marines to Que Son village and a platoon of U .S. Army 175mm guns from the 3rd Battalion, 18th Field

Artillery moved from Chu Lai to Tam Ky . The

heaviest supporting arms fire power for the openin g

phase of the operation came from planes of the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing.

During the first day's action, the men of Compan y

F and the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines bore the brunt of

the fighting, but by dawn of the 22nd, all elements

were locked in battle . The Marines drove the enemy

soldiers out of their positions and maneuvered to

force them northward. While withdrawing, the

Communists suffered severe casualties from air

strikes and artillery . Bell's and Esslinger's battalions

attacked northeast, while the three-battalion ARV N

1st Ranger Group moved southwest from Than h

Binh to catch the fleeing enemy .

The pursuit continued as the infantrymen searched north and east of Nui Loc Son, but there were only scattered contacts. On the 25th, Colonel Kenneth

J. Houghton's 5th Marines arrived from Chu Lai and

moved into the valley, allowing the 1st Marines to be
66 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The Battle of Hill 11 0

1st Battalion, 5th Marines

and 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines

Operation Union 10 May 196 7

0 1 2

kml i

See Reference Map, Sections 38,39

H111 110 x~o Co AHit By

FrI .ndiy Alt Strik e

returned to their Da Nang TAOR.* By 26 April, all

elements of the 1st Marines had returned to D a

Nang, with the exception of Company F which remained at the Nui Loc Son outpost .

Lieutenant Colonel Esslinger's battalion began a

thorough search of the mountains south and west o f

the basin to find the NVA. Action was generally

light, but an incident on the night of the 27th proved that the enemy remained active in the area . A

Marine stepped on a mine which triggered a series of

explosions throughout a landing zone . Marine

casualties were one killed and 43 wounded, 35 o f

whom required evacuation .

On 28 April, Colonel James A . Gallo, Jr.'s new

SLF Alpha, which landed by helicopters southeast o f

the Nui Loc Son outpost, joined Esslinger's battalion .** Both battalions met only light resistance as

*The 5th Marines consisted of only the regimental CP and th e

1st and 3d Battalions. The 2d Battalion guarded the industrial

complex at An Hoa in the Da Nang TAOR under the operationa l

control of the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division .

**The code name for SLF Alpha's participation in the operation

was Beaver Cage . See Chapter 10 for a detailed account of SLF action during Beaver Cage .

they swept their respective zones. Despite the lack of

contact, intelligence reports indicated that majo r

enemy forces were still in the area .

Colonel Houghton, an experienced combat commander in two wars, responded to this information

by helilifting Lieutenant Colonel Hilgartner's 1st

Battalion, 5th Marines into the mountains 1 3

kilometers east of Hiep Duc on 1 May . Initially, th e

battalion encountered only light opposition, but a s

it swept west along the Song Chang, there was a

sharp increase in the number of engagements.

On 5 May, Hilgartner's Company D came upon an

enemy regimental storage site three kilometers north

of Hiep Duc . The cache contained recoilless rifl e

rounds, shoes, 8,000 uniforms, 3 complete surgica l

kits, maps, and other assorted equipment . "

As the two battalions of the 5th Marines continued to sweep north, Lieutenant Colonel Peter A .

Wickwire's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines helilifted int o

the Que Son area of the basin and began a sweep

northwest of Que Son village . As the operation progressed, all -three battalions had brief contacts wit h

small enemy units, but in each case the NV A

withdrew.
THE WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 6 7

On 10 May the Marines engaged a larger and mor e

determined Communist force . Hilgartner's Company C was moving up the southwestern slope o f

Hill 110, 4,000 meters north of Que Son, when i t

came under heavy fire from a battalion entrenche d

along the face of Nui Nong Ham to the southeast .

The Marines took Hill 110, but when they reached

the summit they found themselves still under deadl y

fire from a cane field below and from caves in th e

lower slopes of Nui Nong Ham . Captain Russell J.

Caswell, the company commander, called for help .

Companies B and C of Wickwire's battalion wer e

the nearest units to Caswell's Marines ; they were

northeast of Hill 110 . The two companies shifted t o

Hilgartner's operational control . They moved to joi n

the action but a determined enemy and heavy NV A

fire halted their advance . The Marines adjusted sup -

porting arms fire on the Communists' positions, bu t

it was not effective ; friendly and enemy forces wer e

too close . The two companies requested reinforcements. Marine helicopters flew a platoon of

Wickwire's Company A to the area . The platoon met

such fierce resistance while landing that furthe r

helicopters could not land . The enemy shot down

one UH-34 in the landing zone which further complicated the situation.

Hilgartner's Company A, 2,000 meters to the east,

moved to help Wickwire's companies . As the company approached the battle area it also came under

fire. The company commander, Captain Gerald L.

McKay, quickly deployed his troops to push throug h

the enemy positions. Just as the company began its

assault, an airborne forward air controller mistakenl y

marked the company's position with rockets and fou r

Marine F-4s strafed the company, killing five

Marines and wounding another 24 . The combination of the attack and the enemy fire halted Company A's advance.

Hilgartner's command group and Company D

were on the slope of Nui Nong Ham, southeast o f

Hill 110. They climbed over the crest of Hill 185 to

assist Company D and BLT 1/3 below them . By

1500, they had arrived at a position from which they

could support by fire . The battalion's mortarme n

could see the enemy in the valley below and coul d

immediately adjust their weapons. They fired at a

rapid rate ; the tubes were "just about red hot ."1 2

At 1530, Esslinger's Company M landed at

Hilgartner's position from helicopters and Compan y

D moved into Nui Nong Ham to join up with Captain Caswell's Company C . The two companies

quickly consolidated their position and began t o

provide covering fire for the Marines below . Under

the cover of supporting fire from above, the BLT

companies maneuvered against the NVA in the

sugar cane field and on the northern slope of Nu i

Nong Ham. By evening the Marines drove the

enemy force from its position and forced it to

withdraw to the northeast. Artillery and air strikes

followed the retreating North Vietnamese . Not all of

the NVA escaped . The Marines found the bodies of

116 enemy soldiers the following day . Marine losses

were also high : 33 died and another 135 receive d

wounds, including the casualties from the misguided air strikes on Company A.

On 12 May, BLT 1/3 turned over its responsibilities to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and th e

SLF flew by helicopters to its ships off the coast .

Although the operation was over for the SLF, it was

far from over for Lieutenant Colonel Bell's battalio n

and the two battalions of the 5th Marines . On the

12th and 13th of May, all three elements stayed i n

almost continual contact with enemy platoons an d

companies in the valley. Esslinger's battalion

engaged an enemy battalion five kilometers east o f

Que Son the evening of the 13th. After an exchang e

of mortar and small arms fire, the battalion called i n

artillery and air strikes . As the Marines began their

assault, aerial observers shifted supporting fires to

block possible withdrawal . The attacking Marine s

met only token resistance as the assault move d

through the area, but 122 Communist bodies scattered over the position attested to the ferocity of th e

battle.

For the next two days firefights continued and artillery missions and air strikes harried enemy units as

they tried to avoid the Marines in the valley . The

devastation caused by supporting arms became most

apparent on the afternoon of 14 May when Bell's

Company D found 68 dead enemy soldiers in on e

location, all killed by fragments or concussion .

The last major battle of the operation took place

on 15 May, when the 5th Marines' Companies A and

M found another bunker complex . Artillery and air

strikes pounded the fortifications as the Marines

maneuvered into assault positions. After the heavy

preparation fires, the Marines attacked . They me t

only light resistance and secured the position quickly . They counted 22 enemy bodies in what remaine d

of the fortifications.

The next day, Lieutenant Colonel Bell's battalion ,

following its orders, departed the valley and return-
68 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

ed to the Da Nang TAOR. The following mornin g

Colonel Houghton closed down Operation Union . It

had lasted for 27 days, during which time the

Marines killed 865 enemy troops ; including a

reported 486 who were NVA regulars of the 2d NVA

Division . The Marines suffered 110 killed, 2 missin g

in action, and 473 wounded.

Although the number of enemy casualties was

large, Colonel Houghton believed that the

psychological impact of Operation Union on th e

population of the basin was even more important .

As he stated :

The prolonged operations by the 5th Marines in the

agriculturally rich Hiep Duc-Que Son-Thang Binh corrido r

broke the VC control of the area that had spanned almost

twenty years. With the establishment of two permanent

bases deep in this corridor, the fixing and subsequent

destruction of hundreds of the enemy, the capture of

significant quantities of supplies, equipment and

weapons, the enemy loss in prestige in the eyes of the people is readily apparent . The psychological impact of

Operation Union equalled or even exceeded the materia l

damage to the Communist effort in this area of

operations. 1 3

Despite this optimistic opinion, enemy influenc e

in the Que Son Basin was far from erased . The 1st

Battalion, 5th Marines, which assumed the responsibility for the Nui Loc Son outpost and established

its battalion command post on Hill 51 west of th e

village of Que Son, had daily skirmishes with enem y

forces remaining in the area . Continuing activit y

substantiated reports that the 3d and 21st NVA

Regiments were moving back into the basin . Operation Union II was the response .

Union II

Union II, like Union I, involved coordination wit h

the 6th ARVN Regiment and the 1st ARVN Ranger

Group . The 1st and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines onc e

again became the maneuver elements for III MAF' s

portion of the operation . The operation plan

directed Hilgartner's 1st Battalion to establish blocking positions in the western portion of the valley .

The three RVN Ranger Group battalions were to at -

tack southwest from Thang Binh, while two units o f

the 6th ARVN Regiment were to attack northwest

from a position near Tam Ky . Essingler's 3d Battalion would move by helicopters into the southern

portion of the basin and sweep northeast . The

ARVN named their part of the operation Lien Ki t

106 .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC' A37044 8

Shortly after landing from helicopters at the beginning of Operation Union II, this rifleman and th e

rest of Company L, as well as Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines attack a fortified North Vietnames e

position firing upon helicopters in the landing zone .

On the morning of 26 May, Esslinger's Marines ,

three companies and a command group, made a

heliborne assault into an area five kilometers east o f

Nui Loc Son outpost. Company L's first two waves

experienced only sniper fire as they landed at L Z

Eagle, but as Company M and the command group

landed, heavy small arms and mortar fire struck th e

LZ. At 1134 the enemy defenders shot down a

CH-46 over the LZ . As Company I landed, Companies L and M attacked north to relieve the pressur e

on the LZ . The attacking companies found a wellentrenched enemy force northeast of the landing

zone . While artillery and air strikes pounded th e

NVA positions, Company I moved to the northeast

to envelop the enemy's flank, and in the face of

strong resistance drove through the position.

Fighting continued throughout the afternoon .

When the Marines finally overran the last enemy
ilLE \XAk IN ' it II IliRN I' (()

26 May

LZ Robin El)

'LZ Blue Jay

Operation Union II

Nui Loc Son Basin

Action of 26 - 29 May

0 I 2 3 4 5 8

km I S,,e Rolorenco MapSociioris 3839

— 27 May

29 May

26 May ActIon /

LZ Eagle

3 5(-)
70 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A42185 3

Low rice paddy dikes provided the only available cover for these men from the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines after debarking on 26 May from helicopters of HMM-361 . This

photograph, taken from a helicopter, shows the barrel of the crew's M-60 machine gun .

positions at 1630, they counted 118 dead NVA

soldiers scattered over the battlefield . The 3d Battalion lost 38 killed and 82 wounded, including

Lieutenant Colonel Esslinger, who was wounded in

the eye .

While the Marines of Esslinger's battalion

engaged the enemy force, Hilgartner's Marine s

established blocking positions to the northwest as

planned. The ARVN ranger and infantry elements

closed from the northeast and southeast to box in th e

enemy. For the next three days, all four forces swept

the area . There were only isolated exchanges of fire ;

once more the 3d NVA Regiment had withdrawn

from the basin . Convinced that the enemy had

escaped, the South Vietnamese ended their operation, but Colonel Houghton did not believe that all

the NVA forces had left the Que Son region .

After analyzing available intelligence, Houghto n

decided to change the direction of attack toward th e

hills along the southern rim of the basin, southeast

of the 3d Battalion's battle area of the 26th . On 30

May, he had his two battalions flown into the area by

helicopter and began a sweep to the northeast . Their

advance encountered only long-range sniper fire . By

the afternoon of 1 June, both battalions had

reentered the basin and moved northwest generall y

toward the site of the original 26 May contact .

On 2 June, the Marines moved out, two battalion s

abreast, with the 1st Battalion on the right . Objective Foxtrot in the Vinh Huy Village complex wa s

their destination . By 0930, the two lead companie s

of the 3d Battalion were under heavy fire from 20 0

dug-in North Vietnamese troops 1,000 meters eas t

of the objective, and roughly 3,000 meters east o f

the scene of the 3d Battalion 's heavy action on 2 6

May . By 1300, after savage fighting and extensiv e

use of supporting arms, the Marines overran th e

position. As the companies consolidated and began

to evacuate their casualties, a helicopter took a direc t

hit from a 57mm recoilless rifle, killing one Marin e

and wounding seven others . While the units of the 3d Battalion, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles B . Webster,

engaged the enemy, Hilgartner's 1st Battalion pushed forward to relieve the pressure . The battalio n

moved with Company D on the right and an attached company, Company F, 5th Marines, on the left .

About 1130, Company D began crossing a

1,000-meter-wide rice paddy that contained a

horseshoe-shaped hedgerow . The location of the
THE WAR IN II IERN I CORPS It

Que

So

Nwbc

Son

I.Jo

Operation Union II

Nui Loc Son Basin

Action of 30 May-2 June

0 See R

1 clarence Map.2 3 4 5 6

I Seclpons 38,39

1 Li Robin

2 June ActIon

2

I June

Objective Foxtrot

(.

3

May 30
72 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

hedgerow was such that the Marines could not approach it except by crossing the open paddy. When

the company was halfway across the field, well -

camouflaged NVA troops in fortified positions in

the horseshoe opened fire . The enemy fire swept th e

Marines' front and left flank, catching the left flan k

platoons in a crossfire . The reserve platoon tried to

envelop the enemy, but heavy automatic weapons

fire forced it back. The Marines consolidated their

positions while artillery and air strikes softened u p

the enemy fortifications.

Company F, commanded by Captain James A .

Graham, was in serious trouble on Company D' s

left . Initially, Graham's unit moved under the cove r

of air and artillery strikes and encountered onl y

sniper fire . As it began crossing a large open paddy

area, a Kit Carson Scout with the company started

shooting at several mats of hay lying in the paddy . *

The NVA had concealed themselves under the mats

and the Marines killed 31 of them as the company

advanced .

As the company continued across the open area ,

mortar and automatic weapons fire inflicted many

casualties. Hardest hit was the 2d Platoon ; two concealed enemy machine guns stopped it in the middl e

of the open field . Captain Graham quickly organized his small headquarters group into an assault uni t

and attacked through the 2d Platoon's position, forcing the North Vietnamese to abandon one of thei r

guns. With some of the pressure relieved, the platoon moved some of the wounded to a more secur e

area . Captain Graham then tried to silence the

second gun, but was unsuccessful. Wounded twice

by this time and with his men's ammunition exhausted, the captain ordered his Marines to mov e

back to friendly positions while he stayed behind t o

protect a wounded man who could not be moved .

The last word over the radio from Captain Graha m

was that 25 enemy soldiers were attacking his position.**

At 1420, Lieutenant Colonel Hilgartner's CP cam e

under heavy mortar, recoilless rifle, and RPG fire .

Despite the extensive use of air and artillery by th e

Marines, the Communist force was too well dug-i n

and too big for the battalion to dislodge . Colonel

Houghton, advised of the situation, asked for help .

Since his 3d Battalion was already involved in heavy

*Kit Carson Scouts were former enemy soldiers used by the

Marines. The program is discussed in detail in Chapter 11 .

**Captain Graham received the Medal Of Honor posthumousl y

for his action . See Appendix D for complete citation .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37026 5

PFC George Hate of Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines reflects on the initial combat of Operatio n

Union II when casualties sustained from North Vietnamese fire forced him to shift from ammunition

carrier to assistant gunner on his machine gun team .

fighting, he asked for the commitment of the division reserve, Lieutenant Colonel Mallett C . Jackson,

Jr .'s 2d Battalion, 5th Marines . Major General Don n

J. Robertson, a Navy Cross holder who had jus t

assumed command of the division on 1 June, concurred and the 2d Battalion prepared to move out b y

helicopter to join in the battle .* The three companies that made up Lieutenant Colonel Jackson's

force for this operation were his own Company E ;

Company D from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines;

and Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.**

The 5th Marines' commander paved the way for

the 2d Battalion's entry into the operation by ordering 90 minutes of air and artillery preparation of th e

planned landing zone . He intended to insert th e

battalion northeast of the enemy position so it coul d

drive south into the left flank of the NVA force . By

1900, the battalion command group and two com -

*General Nickerson, who had commanded the 1st Marine Division since September 1966, became Deputy Commandin g

General, III MAF, upon his relief.

**Colonel Hilgartner later described the insertion of Lieutenant

Colonel Jackson's battalion as crucial . "Mal Jackson's entry int o

the battle saved the day for us," he remembered . Colonel Peter L.

Hilgartner, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81 (Vietnam Commen t

file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)
THE WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORPS 7 3

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37026 8

During the last few days of May, two Marine battalions, engaged in Operation Union II ,

searched the rugged mountains found along the southern rim of the Que Son Basin .

panies had landed. They were unopposed and quickly organized the position .

As night fell, one of Jackson's companies still ha d

not arrived . Aware of the urgency of the tactical

situation facing Hilgartner's battalion, and concerned about the fate of Captain Graham's company

from his own battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Jackso n

requested permission to begin his attack without th e

missing company . 14 Colonel Houghton concurred .

Leaving a security platoon in the landing zone ,

Jackson maneuvered his force south against the

. enemy. The battalion had not gone far in th e

darkness before it collided with an NVA force tryin g

to withdraw to the north . The Marines quickly drove

through the Communists and continued south .

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines suffered almost 20

casualties in this initial contact. To evacuate the

wounded, the battalion's forward air controller called in a passing CH-53 . The pilot landed his

helicopter in the middle of the command post, no t

far from where Company E still engaged the enemy .

As Marines completed loading the wounded, a n

enemy mortar round landed just to the rear of th e

aircraft and enemy automatic weapons took it under

direct fire . The pilot quickly took off. The 2d Battalion later heard that, on its arrival at Da Nang,

ground crews counted approximately 58 holes in th e

helicopter.

ts

The sudden presence of a strong force on its

northern flank caused the NVA units to disengage

and make a hasty withdrawal to the southwest, bu t

the move proved costly . Once NVA soldiers left the

protection of their fortifications, they were eas y

targets for Marine supporting arms fire . Air strikes

were devastating. On one occasion two F-4 aircraft

used an unusual technique of target acquisitio n

which proved especially effective . The first aircraft

approached the area at low speed and switched on it s

landing and running lights. When the enemy fired

at the plane, the second aircraft, following closel y

behind without lights, spotted the enemy and dropped napalm on the firing positions .

While supporting arms fire hastened the Communist departure from the battlefield, the 5th

Marines spent the night regrouping and evacuatin g

casualties. The following morning, all three battalions swept the battle area . The Marines counte d

476 dead North Vietnamese in and around the contested rice paddy and its formidable hedgerow complex . The Marines themselves suffered 71 killed an d

139 wounded in the fight .

During the sweep of the battle area, Lieutenant
Union *1 An Hoa?\\ 21 AprIlMay

Union II

26 May6 February

3 March

Thien

DaNang

Quang

Nam

South

China

LAOS /

Sea

Quang

Tin

5June17 '7

C /1'Quang

/

Major MAF Operations

1 Ngai

Southern ICTZ

Desoto

27 JanuaryJanuary—June 1967

7 April

I

I flip' r S 0 25 50

C-.-) Deckhouse VI

74 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Colonel Hilgartner received a radio message from

one of his companies that enemy working parties

were out collecting the NVA dead. The company

commander asked if he should open fire. Hilgartner

declined for he saw this as a chance to recover his

own dead, including Captain Graham's body. For

the remainder of the day there was an undeclared

truce; the two sides intermingled but ignored each

other as they went about collecting their dead.'6

When the enemy main body withdrew, they

transported their wounded on two poles lashed

together, similar to the "travois" used by the

American Plains Indians. The day after the

undeclared truce, Hilgartner's battalion tried to

follow the travois skid marks but could not catch up

with the main body of the NVA force. Halts to call

in helicopters to evacuate casualties caused by the

enemy's rear guard hindered the Marines' progress.

The NVA force escaped.17

The action on 2 June marked the last significant

battle of Union II. Total enemy casualties were 701

killed and 23 captured, a favorable ratio to 110

Marines killed (the same number as during Union I)

and 241 wounded.*

Despite the heavy losses suffered during the two

Union operations, throughout the summer the

enemy continued to pump replacements into the

region in a determined effort to regain control of the

Que Son Valley. Elements of III MAF met and

thwarted each Communist thrust into the area.

Government control was returning to the region,

and forcing the Communists to pay a big price in

men and material.

*For action in both Union I and II the 5th Marines and units

under its operational control received the Presidential Unit Citation.
CHAPTER 6

Task Force Oregon

The heavy fighting of early 1967 had been anticipated by the American command . Throughout

the fall of the previous year, both III MAF and

MACV expressed concern over the NVA buildu p

north of the Demilitarized Zone and along the Laotian border to the west . In a 13 September 196 6

message to Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, Commande r

in Chief Pacific (CinCPac), General Westmorelan d

outlined his appreciation of the threat to I Corps:

The current enemy buildup . . . constitutes a direct

threat to US/FW GVN forces in I CTZ and to the security

of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. The seriousness

of this threat underscores the importance and urgency of

utilizing all practicable means to prevent the enemy from

generating a major offensive designed to ' liberate ' the provinces in question and to inflict maximum casualties o n

US/FW GVN forces. . . .

He continues to use the DMZ as a troop haven and as a

supply head for his forces moving into northern I CTZ . . . .

The size of his buildup, disposition of forces, forward

stockage of supplies, AA weapons systems being deploye d

southward, and depth of patrols are developing an offensive as opposed to a defensive posture . By October, th e

weather in Laos will be clearing and the enemy may be expected once again to move personnel and supportin g

material in quantity through the area. . . . Utilizing traditional [infiltration] routes through the Laos panhandle, he

will be able to reinforce large scale diversionary attacks further south in coordination with a main assault through th e

DMZ and the western flank . . .

To counter the threat, the Marines establishe d

positions covering the eastern and central infiltratio n

routes across the DMZ. They had already occupied

Khe Sanh, to the west, in late 1966, and they too k

over the ARVN camps at Ca Lu and Ba Long, bot h

astride natural routes leading east through the Cam

Lo Valley . While the occupation of these locations

did not entirely halt infiltration, they did make it

more difficult, but manning the positions seriously

depleted III MAF's strength as the year began .

In early 1967 several developments, other than

Vietnamese domestic problems, contributed t o

reduced III MAF troop availability . The necessity of

protecting large bases and the resulting extension of

the protective TAORs around them tied down a

large number of men . The requirement to relieve

ARVN units for redeployment to the revolutionary

development program also drained available forces .

The most threatening situation was the enemy troo p

buildup in Quang Ngai Province . Infiltration from

Laos and the influx of NVA troops and supplies into

the A Shau Valley and the mountains west of Hu e

caused some very touchy and precise repositioning o f

units. As January began, most of General Walt's

reserve consisted of already committed forces earmarked for oncall helicopter redeployment .

MACV Headquarters appreciated the proble m

facing III MAF but viewed things from a different

perspective . As Brigadier General Louis Metzger, th e

assistant division commander of the 3d Marine Division, recalled :

On one occasion General Westmoreland told me that he

knew that the 3d Marine Division was overextended, but

that he was achieving a victory (words not exact but that

was the meaning) in the II Corps Area, and we would just

have to hold on . One really cannot fault his position as he

was following the principle of war "Economy of Force ;"

holding with the Marines while expecting his Army

elements to the south to achieve a victory . It did make it

lonesome along the DMZ . '

For all practical purposes, these troop shortage s

reduced the allied situation in I Corps to a holdin g

action. III MAF did not have enough troops to expand TAORs and at the same time block NV A

thrusts across South Vietnam's borders. III MAF

needed additional forces to regain the initiative . On

11 January, after a visit to I Corps, General Wallac e

M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marin e

Corps, commented that " . . . one Marine division/wing team reinforced or its equivalent [was

needed] in I Corps in addition to those forces alread y

there ." He contended that these forces would permit

75
76 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Area

Infantry Battalion Location

Prior to Arrival of

Area

Task Force Oregon

0 kilometers L 25 50

-s 75

South

China

Laos

Ouang Nam

Sea

USMC Quang Tin

Chu Lii Area

'-C--.---.5

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N

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5--

( Sout h

4.

V\i e t n a m

Cambodia

S

\

I r

r.
TASK FORCE OREGON 7 7

III MAF to counter enemy infiltration across the

borders and regain momentum in pacifying th e

populated coastal areas . 2 At the beginning of th e

year these forces did not exist .

After the Tet cease-fire of 8-12 February, enemy

activity intensified . The NVA initiated aggressive efforts to offset the embryonic Revolutionary Development Program, while continuing the buildup of

forces in I and II Corps. The 2d NVA Division and

supporting battalions moved south from Quang Ti n

Province to Quang Ngai Province . This move appeared related to movement of other subordinat e

units at the turn of the year in preparation for a pro -

posed dry season offensive in Quang Ngai .

As enemy activity continued to intensify, both i n

southern I Corps and immediately south of th e

DMZ, on 19 February General Westmorelan d

directed his Chief of Staff, Major General Willia m

B . Rosson, to develop a contingency plan for the

organization and deployment of a divisional tas k

force to the troubled northern provinces . The purpose of the proposed shift was twofold : to release

Marine units for action along the DMZ and to use

the new force to expand the scope of operations i n

southern I Corps . Westmoreland's headquarters

code-named the proposed task force, "Oregon . "

The Oregon plan was not the first contingenc y

plan prepared for the reinforcement of III MAF . At

the time of the first NVA thrust across the DMZ i n

mid-1966, MACV Headquarters developed severa l

schemes. The Tennessee plan proposed the movement of a U.S . Army brigade to Chu Lai. Another ,

dubbed the South Carolina plan, was to deploy a n

Army brigade to the 3d Marine Division's area o f

operation in northern I Corps, while North Carolin a

would have introduced an Army brigade into

southern I Corps . The latter two contingency plan s

included the movement of a Republic of Korea Army regiment to Chu Lai . During November 1966 ,

General Westmoreland gave consideration to the

deployment of the 9th Infantry Division to I Corp s

when it arrived in South Vietnam, but shelved the

idea in December 1966 and the division moved into

the region east of Saigon.

While General Rosson and his staff were developing the Oregon plan, events in I Corps forced th e

planners' hand. On 27 February, NVA forces attacked Da Nang Airbase with 140mm rockets, the first

known use of large tactical rockets by the enemy in

South Vietnam . The Da Nang attack preceded

rocket attacks on Camp Carroll in Quang Tri Pro -

vince on 6 and 12 March and another attack on D a

Nang on 15 March .* The rockets were the enemy's

most economical weapon of the war. They were easily transported, usually backpacked, and required only a few personnel for installation and employment .

The February Da Nang attack demonstrated th e

speed with which the rockets could be launched . More than 50 rockets hit the base in less than a

minute.

With the introduction of rockets, the Marines expanded their protective patrolling out to a range o f

9,000 meters, rather than 5,000 meters, the maximum effective range of heavy mortars which had

been the primary concern before the rocket threat.

The speed with which the rockets could be employe d

also required the Marines to deliver counterbattery

fire on the rocket launching positions in a matter of

two to three minutes, a factor which complicated th e

already complex problem of coordinating the use of

air and artillery in populated areas .

Rocket attacks were not the only indication tha t

the enemy's main target was I Corps. During the first

six weeks after Tet, enemy attacks increased by approximately twice the 1966 rate . Enemy expenditures of artillery, mortar, recoilless rifle, and rocke t

ammunition for the month of March were 5,05 7

rounds, compared to 2,183 in January and 2,656 i n

February.

At the same time, the NVA buildup continued

along the DMZ. Intelligence agencies reported tha t

elements of another division, including fire support

units, had reinforced the 324B and 341st NVA Divisions. Captured prisoners and documents verified

the presence of the new units. Increased mortar fire

and the employment of artillery and rockets con -

firmed the arrival of the fire support units. The

seriousness of these developments was even more ap -

parent when Marine intelligence officers learned tha t

the NVA forces in the northern provinces of Quan g

Tri and Thua Thien were under the control of North

Vietnamese Army Military Region 4, with headquarters in Vinh above the DMZ . The North Vietnamese considered the targeted provinces as a

subregion of this command .

*The rockets employed in the attack against Camp Carroll wer e

102mm Communist copies of the U .S. 4 .5-inch barrage rocket ,

with a range of 5,000 meters . The 140mm Soviet rocket used a t

Da Nang had a range of almost 9,000 meters.
78 FIGHITNG THE NORTH VIETNAMESE 

In an 18 March message to Admiral Sharp, 

General Westmoreland reflected his concern over 

the growing threat to I Corps. He stated: 

In I Corps, the situation is the most critical with respect 

to existing and potential force ratios. As a minimum, a 

division plus a regiment is required for Quang Tri Province 

as a containment force. The latter had been justified 

previously in another plan. Employment of this force in 

the containment role would release the units now engaged 

there for expansion of the Da Nang, Hue-Phu Bai, and 

Chu Lai TAORs as well as increase security and control 

along the corps’ northern coastal areas. One of the most 

critid areas in RVN today is Quang Ngai Province. Even if 

a major operation were conducted in this area during 

1967, the relief would be no more than temporary. A force 

is needed in the province to maintain continuous prcssure 

on the enemy, to eliminate his forces and numerous base 

areas, and to remove his control over the large population 

and food ~CSSNCS. The sustained employment of a division 

of 10 battalions is mandatory in Quang Ngai Province if 

desired results are to be realized. Employment of this force 

would provide security for the vital coastal areas facilities, 

opening and securing Route 1 and the railroad and, 

perhaps equally important, to relieve pressure on northern 

Binh Dinh Province.‘ 

One week later, on 25 March, reconnaissance 

photographs verified increased infiltration of the Tri 

Thien subregion. They revealed five new bivouac 

areas and two possible way stations on infiltration 

routes from Base Area 606 in central Laos to western 

Quang Tri Province. The photographs also pinpointed new bivouac areas along infiltration routes 

in the northern A Shau Valley, indicating reinforcement in that region. Equally alarming, the NVA 

continued to hold three divisions in or near the 

DMZ, despite heavy casualties suffered during the 

Marines’ recently conducted Operations Prairie I1 

and Beacon Hill. 

At the same time, enemy activity in southern 

Quang Nam and Quang Tin increased; the enemy 

made multicompany attacks near Tam Ky. A highranking Communist officer, Colonel Haynh Cu, 

who surrendered to I11 MAF forces in early March, 

stated that the Que Son Basin would be a major objective for the forthcoming NVA summer campaign, 

scheduled to begin during April. He also revealed 

that Operation Desoto had uncovered a primary supply route which the VC believed required their control for effective operations in that region. This 

revelation added to the indications that Duc Pho 

would remain a primary enemy objective. 

In a 28 March followup message to CinCPac, 

General Westmoreland reiterated his earlier sentiments regarding additional forces required in I 

Corps, but this message reflected his increased concern over the growing enemy threat. General 

Westmoreland stated: 

Failure to provide two and one-third divisions for I 

Corps would result in the diversion of existing forces from 

other tasks to deny and defeat iditration or invasion. 

Security in support of Revolutionary Development could 

not be increased to the desired degree in the coastal area, 

the major LOCs could be able to continue operating virtually unmolested throughout the key Quang Ngai Province.’ 

If this force were available, Westmoreland 

estimated that I11 MAF could make gains in 1967, 

especially in the restoration of the populated areas of 

I Corps to secure GVN control. Unfortunately, the 

additional forces were not available. 

The first week of April confirmed the need for 

reinforcements as the enemy increased pressure 

throughout the five northern provinces. Intensified 

terrorism and regimental-size attacks marked the 

opening days of the month. On 6 April, a large 

enemy force broke into Quang Tri City, inflicting 

severe losses and permitting more than 200 VC 

prisoners to escape from the local jail. This was the 

first large-unit incursion into a provincial capital 

since early in 1965. The Quang Tri attack preceded 

an attack on an ARVN regimental headquarters 10 

miles north of the city of Hue. Generals Walt and 

Westmoreland agreed that these incidents heralded 

a large-scale, coordinated enemy offensive in the two 

northern provinces. On 6 April, therefore, General 

Wesunoreland decided to execute the Task Force 

Oregon plan. 

As conceived and refined by General Rosson’s 

staff, Operation Oregon was to be executed in three 

separate phases. First, an army brigade from I1 Corps 

was to move into the Duc Pho district. Two days 

later a second brigade from I11 Corps was to begin 

movement to Chu Lai, and at a later date a third 

brigade, and possibly a fourth, was to be shifted into 

the area. The Task Force Oregon headquarters was to 

be activated on the 12th, to arrive at Chu Lai no later 

than 20 April. 

By the afternoon of the 7th, the headquarters of 

the 2d Brigade, 5th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division, and two battalions, arrived at Duc Pho and 

relieved the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. The size and 

mobility of the Army force impressed the Marines. 
TASK FORCE ORGEON 79 

The Marine battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel John D. Counselman, recalled, “They had so 

many ‘choppers’ that the company defensive areas of 

317 were occupied in less than an hour. . . .”6 

The use of the 1st Air Cavalry unit was only temporary; according to the Oregon plan it was to be 

replaced by the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division 

before the end of April. To accomplish the logistical 

support for this unit, MACV temporarily included 

the two southernmost districts of Quang Ngai Province, Duc Pho and Ba To, in the 1st Air Cavalry 

Division’s TAOR, pending the arrival of the Task 

Force Oregon headquarters. 

On 9 April, Brigadier General Richard T. 

Knowles’ 196th Light Infantry Brigade of four battalions began arriving at Chu Lai. The brigade completed the move on the 14th, and the infantrymen 

assumed operational tasks in the Chu Lai area under 

the control of the 1st Marine Division. On 17 April, 

the brigade initiated Operation Lawrence, west of 

the airfield. This was the first U.S. Army operation 

in I Corps. Although the soldiers made no contact 

with the enemy during the three days of Lawrence, 

they gained a familiarity with their area of operation. 

The task force command group activated as 

scheduled on 12 April. The headquarters and 

selected combat support and combat service support 

units began deploying to Chu Lai. Task Force 

Oregon headquarters became operational on 20 

April and assumed control of all Army forces 

operating from Chu Lai.,The task force commander 

was Major General William B. Rosson, the former 

MACV chief of staff and author of the original 

Oregon plan. When Colonel James G. Shanahan’s 

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division arrived at Duc 

Pho two days later, it also came under control of 

Task Force Oregon. Combat support for the task 

force consisted of four artillery battalions, an 

engineer battalion, and one medium and three light 

helicopter companies. 

The arrival of the Army units allowed the Marines 

to concentrate in the northern three provinces of I 

Corps. The 7th Marines moved from Chu Lai to the 

Da Nang TAOR, completing the move on 13 April. 

The consolidation of the 1st Marine Division at Da 

Nang permitted the 3d Marine Division, in turn, to 

concentrate its regiments in the northern part of I 

Corps. 

The shift that produced the most immediate 

results occurred on 25 April when the 5th Marines, 

Depvtment of Defense Photo (USA) SC 639323 

A Marine amphibian tractor came5 members of the 

Army’s 196th Light Infantry Brigade on a vdlage 

search on 27 Apd, after Task Force Oregon took 

control of the former Marine enclave at Chu hi. 

with two battalions, moved into the Thang Binh 

area and assumed responsibility for operations in the 

Que Son Valley. The second of the two battalions 

did not arrive in the valley until 1 May because of a 

delay in the turn-over of its portion of the Chu Lai 

TAOR. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines served as a 

separate battalion under the direct control of the 1st 

Marine Division with responsibility for the security 

of the An Hoa industrial complex 22 miles southwest 

of Da Nang. 

With the shifting of these forces, the Marines 

deactivated Task Force X-Ray at 1200 on 26 April 

and Task Force Oregon, under 111 MAF operational 

control, assumed responsibility for all of the Chu Lai 

TAOR, including the Chu Lai Base Defense Command. The turnover went smoothly. The Army units 

were not equipped or manned to handle postal services, an exchange system, or a clubs system. Since 

the Marines previously had organized those services 

at Chu Lai, Marine personnel remained in place until the Army units took over these functions or 

substituted their own systems. 

Chu Lai continued to be the home of a large component of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Force 

Logistic Support Group Bravo, and the 7th Communications Battalion. In addition, approximately 

200 Marines assigned to combined action units also 
80 FIGHTING TUE NORTH V!IINAPIIN

C'

'St !Da

Hang DaNang

Area

tg.'n.t 21151

US MC USMC

USMC

DMZ

OMZ Area

I Iii

ng Tn

N

Infantry Battalion Realignments

Resulting from Deployment of

Task Force Oregon

as of

0 Area

USMC Thua Ba' Thien 2

k,Iometer5

30 April 1967

25 50 75

South

China

Laos

ng Nam

Sea

-7

Q

/

uang

USA V N

Quang Ngai

N.

5.—-—"

I

Sout (

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nam
TASK FORCE OREGON 8 1

remained in the area . Brigadier General Foster C .

LaHue, the former commanding general of Tas k

Force X-Ray, stayed at Chu Lai as the installatio n

coordinator. The command relationship betwee n

General Rosson and General LaHue was one o f

mutual coordination and cooperation, under th e

authority of General Walt .

During the first week of May, Brigadier Genera l

Salve H . Matheson's 1st Brigade, 101st Airborn e

Division joined Task Force Oregon . These additiona l

battalions . of the 1st Brigade permitted Genera l

Rosson to open a new offensive campaign in the important coastal region south of Quang Ngai City . On

11 May, five U .S . Army battalions began Operatio n

Malheur in the area immediately north of what had

been the Desoto TAOR . By the end of May, this extensive heliborne search and destroy operation had

succeeded in killing 369 Communists and capturin g

64.

Malheur II followed Malheur I and produced even

better results. Experiencing almost daily contact wit h

the Communists, the soldiers killed 488 of th e

enemy before the operation ended on 2 August .

Both operations concentrated upon eliminating

regular enemy formations in the area to reduce th e

pressure upon the rural populace . Once they accomplished this, the soldiers shifted their emphasis

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC 63931 8

Soldiers of the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade search a

deserted village in April as Army units gain familiarity with the Chu Lai tactical are a

after Task Force Oregon took responsibility for the region from the 1st Marine Division .

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC 639319
82 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC 64081 5

American soldiers (top) of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry advance toward a tree lin e

under enemy fire near Duc Pho in May in Operation Malheur, conducted by Task Forc e

Oregon after it assumed control of the Chu Lai area . As enemy fire increases (below), a n

armored personnel carrier of the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regimentfires in support.

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC 640811

to eliminating the guerrilla infrastructure . During

the ensuing months, the Viet Cong found it increasingly difficult to obtain support from the people i n

the surrounding countryside .

The introduction of Task Force Oregon was onl y

the first step in the buildup and realignment of

forces in I Corps . The second step was the temporary

commitment of the CinCPac reserve, the Sevent h

Fleet's Amphibious Ready Group with Special Lan -

ding Forces Alpha and Bravo. In mid-May, BLT 3/4 ,

the last major element of the Marines' Western

Pacific reserve, arrived in a 42-plane shuttle at Don g

Ha to participate in Operation Hickory . The 26th

Marines' regimental headquarters followed from

Okinawa to provide the operational control of units

in the Khe Sanh area in northwestern Quang Tr i

Province . *

*The movement of BLT 3/4 and the 26th Marines headquarters

to Vietnam ended unit rotation to Okinawa for refitting an d

retraining . This was a real loss to the Marine units fighting in Vietnam. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981),

(Vietnam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
TASK FORCE OREGON 8 3

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC 640809

A platoon leader of Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment radios for a

medevac helicopter after an encounter with an enemy unit in May's Operation Malheur.

The large number of enemy casualties in I Corp s

during the month of May reflected some of the impact of the sudden III MAF reinforcement . In I

Corps 6,119 enemy died fighting the Americans ,

compared with a total of 3,723 in the other three

corps areas. The surprise arrival of 12 new U .S. battalions and the reshuffle of forces already in I Corps

upset the Communists' plans . They did not find the

coastal plains undefended as expected, and Hano i

demanded adherence to the plan . The ability of the

allies to reinforce I Corps against the anticipated

summer campaign cost the Communists a high pric e

in troops lost and doomed North Vietnam's hope s

for a resounding 1967 summer victory .

PART III

CONTINUING ACTION

ALONG THE DMZ
CHAPTER 7

The Barrier — Another Approach

Evolution ofthe Concept

Evolution of the Concept

The arrival of Task Force Oregon with its nin e

maneuver battalions vastly changed the friendly t o

enemy troop ratio in I Corps. The increase was intended to give III MAF much more flexibility, bu t

this is not the way it worked out. At the time of

Oregon's addition, General Westmoreland directed

General Walt to begin a task which ultimately tied

down as many III MAF units as TF Oregon added .

The task was the construction of a barrier or strong -

point obstacle system below the DMZ .

The idea of a DMZ barrier had been under discussion in Washington for months. In March of 1966 ,

Secretary of Defense Robert S . McNamara raised the

question of a barrier with the JCS' which, in turn ,

requested the views of Admiral U . S . Grant Sharp ,

CinCPac, on the construction of a conventional mine

and wire barrier to be backed up by monitorin g

troops. The proposed barrier was to extend from the

South China Sea across northern South Vietnam

through the panhandle of Laos to Thailand .

The CinCPac staff studied the idea and in Apri l

Admiral Sharp pointed out a number of problem

areas with the concept . The problems included th e

tremendous strain that the project would place o n

logistic facilities in both South Vietnam an d

Thailand, the enormous construction effort, and th e

large number of troops it would require before, during, and after completion . Admiral Sharp also ex -

pressed his opinion that the barrier would deny th e

advantages of maneuverability to friendly forces.

September 1966 brought another proposal, thi s

one the result of a study conducted by a panel o f

scientists under the auspices of the Institute for

Defense Anaylses . Known as the Jason Plan, the

study proposed the employment of an aviation sup -

ported barrier system across infiltration routes into

South Vietnam and Laos. This barrier was to consis t

of two parts : one to block foot traffic and one to stop

vehicles. The foot traffic barrier was to be place d

along the southern edge of the DMZ, while the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 18904 2

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, show n

here during his visit to MA G-11 in July, believed a

barrier system south of the DMZ would retard the

move of NVA combat units into South Vietnam .

antivehicle system was to be built in Laos where th e

Communists were developing an extensive road network. The barriers were to consist of large number s

of gravel mines, button bomblets, and acoustic

detectors, supported by patrol and strike aircraft . *

Ground personnel, tasked to emplace detectors an d

plant mines would man the portion of the barrier i n

South Vietnam.

Admiral Sharp forwarded his response to the Jaso n

Plan to JCS on 13 September 1966 . The reply

pointed out that while the establishment of an aviation supported barrier might be technically feasible ,

CinCPac doubted that such a barrier would imped e

infiltration, even initially . He maintained that "a

*Gravel mines are small mines designed to damage feet an d

legs. Button bomblets are small mines which make a loud report ,

but are not designed to injure when stepped on by a shod foot ;

they make a noise to be picked up by acoustic sensors .

86
THE BARRIER—ANOTHER APPROACH 8 7

barrier system must be tended ; if not, it could be

breached with ease, while the flow of men an d

material to the VC/NVA continued ." An aerial

delivered obstacle would not be expected to sup -

plant the need for soldiers on the ground, and th e

time, effort and resources of men and material required to establish a ground barrier would b e

tremendous . "2

While military leaders showed little enthusiasm

for the barrier schemes, Secretary of Defens e

McNamara believed that the ideas had merit . On 1 5

September, he appointed Lieutenant General Alfred

D. Starbird, USA, director of the Defense Communications Agency, to head a joint task force

within the Department of Defense with the missio n

of devising an anti-infiltration system that woul d

stop, or at least inhibit, the flow of men and

material from North to South Vietnam . The mission

envisioned wide usage of air dropped munitions and

electronic sensors to establish the barrier. This directive formally established the program that was t o

become known as Project Practice Nine .

In October 1966, General Westmoreland suggested to Secretary McNamara, as an alternative t o

previous recommendations, that a conventional barrier utilizing strong points could be constructed

across all of northern South Vietnam . This barrier

would be augmented by selective use of air delivere d

munitions and sensors in Laos . Key terrain was to be

organized behind the barrier, with observation posts

and patrols integrated into the scheme . Reaction

forces were to be emplaced to respond if the barrier

was breached . General Westmoreland believed that

a division, supported by an armored cavalry regiment, would be needed as the containment force .

Secretary McNamara told General Westmoreland

that he was receptive to the concept and requested

that the idea be refined into a requirement plan . At

the same time, the Secretary charged the Starbir d

task force with functioning as an expediting agenc y

to obtain and deliver munitions, sensors, and equipment to support the MACV concept .

General Westmoreland ordered his staff and all

involved subordinate commands to develop th e

plan. The burden of preparing the aviation portio n

fell on the Seventh Air Force ; III MAF and th e

MACV Combat Operations Center were to provid e

the concept for the conduct of mobile defense and

conventional barrier aspects.

General Walt ordered the 3d Marine Division t o

prepare the Marine portion of the concept, since any

implementation of the idea would directly affect

that command . His only guidance to General Kyle,

the division commander, was that he wanted the

report to begin with a statement that III MA F

disagreed with the barrier idea and preferred th e

mobile defense currently being employed . 3 General

Kyle, briefing Walt on the division plan, also indicated his preference for a mobile concept, stating :

A mobile defense by the size of the force envisioned for

manning the barrier system (one and one-third divisions)

would in itself provide an effective block to infiltration

south of the DMZ, and in the process negate the necessit y

for construction of the barrier . 4

After the III MAF staff reviewed General Kyle's

plan, General Walt forwarded it to General

Westmoreland . His covering letter made III MAF's

view quite clear, stating, " . . . this plan was bein g

submitted in response to a directive, and that it wa s

the opinion of the Commanding General III MAF

that such a barrier, in effect, was not going to b e

worth the time and the effort that would be put into

it.

On 26 November, General Westmoreland for -

warded the plan to the Secretary of Defense after additional refining at MACV Headquarters . As submitted, it called for a linear barrier immediatel y

south of the DMZ, extending from the South Chin a

Sea to a point near Dong Ha Mountain, a distance o f

approximately 30 kilometers . This portion of the

barrier was to be 600-1,000 meters wide, consisting

of wire obstacles, minefields, sensors, watch towers ,

and a series of strong points. The line was to be backed up by an armored unit . From the west end of this

linear barrier to the Laotian border there were to be a

series of about 20 defile barriers, each to consist of a

minefield and wire obstacles extending roughly

1,000 meters across the avenue of approach to be

blocked by the barrier. Manned strong points were

to occupy commanding hills and ridgelines overlooking these obstacles . The plan called for a division to

man this portion of the system .

The plan also required the construction of artiller y

positions along Route 9 to provide fire support for

the system . These positions also were to house the

reaction forces needed to support the strong points.

Other construction projects included in the plan

were the improvement of Routes 1 and 9, expansion

of the Cua Viet port facility, and the establishment

of a major airfield near Hue .

After reviewing the proposal, Secretary McNamara
88 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

directed General Starbird on 19 December to

prepare a procurement program to provide th e

materials for the linear section of the barrier. The

materials were to be in South Vietnam by July 1967 .

Although the Secretary's memorandum did not

specify an exact date for commitment of th e

materials, it stated that at least a part of the system

should be operational by 1 November 1967 . On 22

December 1966, General Starbird submitted his

proposal which specified the time schedule to be

followed and funding and personnel needed by 1

November. 6

As 1967 began, MACV was preparing a new Prac -

tice Nine Requirement Plan to conform with the

timetable in the Starbird proposal . On 26 January

MACV completed this plan and forwarded it for

review. The study provided the concepts and

estimated troop and logistic requirements to suppor t

the anti-infiltration system for the eastern portion o f

the area as outlined in the earlier plan. The system

was to consist of a series of strong points and fortifie d

base areas . Barbed wire and minefield obstacles wer e

to be emplaced forward of the strong points to den y

the enemy likely avenues of approach and restric t

movement, while sensors, detector devices, nigh t

observation devices, searchlights, and radar were t o

be used to locate the enemy . The strong points and

base areas occupying key terrain features were to be

constructed by tactical units under the supervision o f

engineers. The positions were to serve as both patro l

and fire support bases . On-call, preplanned artiller y

fires were to cover the entire area, and tactical aircraft were to be available on short notice for support .

Reaction forces were to be stationed behind the

system in positions from which they could deploy

rapidly. All civilians were to be relocated behind the

system . The plan envisioned that future strong

points and obstacles possibly would be extended

westward to the Laotian border, but the westwar d

expansion would be contingent upon time, forces ,

material, and security conditions .

The study group also cautioned that the term

"barrier" should not be used, because the connotation of an impregnable defense exceeded the scop e

of this system, and that an effective obstacle syste m

across northern South Vietnam would require, at a

minimum, an additional force of one division an d

one armored cavalry regiment . The study group considered the minimum essential additional forc e

necessary to man the eastern portion of the system t o

be one infantry brigade, or Marine regiment,

augmented with supply, maintenance, construction ,

transportation, and other support units. ?

Despite the apparent growing interest in the

strong point obstacle system (SPOS) at MACV, th e

Marines' opinions of the concept remained unchanged. In January, at a briefing held for Under Secretar y

of the Navy Robert H . B. Baldwin at the 3d Marin e

Division Headquarters, the briefing office r

reiterated the III MAF view of the barrier concept :

To sum it all up, we're not enthusiastic over any barrier

defense approach to the infiltration problem. . . . We

believe thy¢ a mobile defense by an adequate force, say

one division, give or take a battalion, would be a much

more flexible and economical approach to the problem .,

III MAF was not the only command that had reservations about the idea. On 6 February, a CinCPac

message to JCS admitted that the SPOS was feasible ,

but questioned the necessity for one . The message

stated :

The level of infiltration in the area in which the obstacle

system is to be installed does not justify diversion of the effort required to construct and man such a system .

Moreover, there is no indication that present operation s

are inadequate to cope with what has been an insignifican t

infiltration problem in this particular area of SVN . 9

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A36997 3

The 3d Marine Division staff briefed Under Secretary

of the Navy Robert H. B. Baldwin, shown here

visiting a refugee center in January 1967, on the III

MAF view that a mobile defense of the DMZ regio n

was better than building an extensive barrier system .
THE BARRIER—ANOTHER APPROACH 89

Despite opposition from concerned Marine and

Navy commanders, on 8 March Secretary McNamar a

ordered General Starbird to procure the materials fo r

strong points and base camps, and enough sensor s

and surveillance devices to service a 10-kilometer sec -

tion of the obstacle system . At the same time, h e

directed the improvement of Route 1 and the ports

at Hue and Cua Viet. He also arranged with th e

State Department to secure South Vietnam Government support for required land acquisition and

civilian relocation .

On 17 March at III MAF headquarters, General

Westmoreland met with General Walt, General Lam

of the ARVN I Corps, and other GVN representatives to explain the basic concept of a strong poin t

system in northeastern Quang Tri Province . The

ARVN representatives warmly endorsed the idea an d

suggested that an early start should be made on th e

project to take 'advantage of the weather . They did

not believe that land procurement or civilian relocation would pose any problem .

As a result, General Westmoreland ordered

General Walt, in coordination with General Lam, t o

prepare a plan to locate, construct, organize, and occupy a SPOS . He also informed General Walt that

discussion of Practice Nine with the South Vietnamese at this time should be limited to the SPOS .

t o

General Walt, in turn, ordered his chief, G- 3

Plans Division and III MAF Practice Nine officer ,

Lieutenant Colonel Marvin D . Volkert, to meet with

his ARVN counterpart and begin the preparation o f

a combined barrier plan . Walt instructed Volkert t o

lead the planning and to complete the total effort

without divulging details of the Practice Nine pla n

such as equipment and forces required . By early

April, although no written document was in existence nor even expected for at least 30 days, combined planning had progressed sufficiently to permit

initial ground clearing between Con Thien and Gi o

Linh . At that time Marine spokesmen described th e

project as a modest effort to clear fields of fire and t o

install a limited obstacle system, but Lieutenant Colonel Volkert had ensured that the work would fit in -

to the Practice Nine concept .

Although the number of Marine units involved i n

the initial clearing effort was small, it precipitated

the basic problem that III MAF had feared would

result from the barrier project: the loss of flexibility .

On 19 April, a message from Westmoreland t o

CinCPac intensified the problem . General

Westmoreland indicated that, "The mission of

establishing a strong point/obstacle system south of

the DMZ initially will be given to the U .S. Marines ." 11 General Walt expressed his concern in a

26 April message to General Westmoreland, stating

that the assignment committed his entire 3d Marine

Division to the Practice Nine Plan. He pointed out

that ARVN participation in the anti-infiltration bel t

construction accelerated the anticipated reduction in

his forces.

The clearing of the area between Con Thien an d

Gio Linh was nearing completion, opening the wa y

for the installation of towers, wire, strong points,

mines, sensors, and communications. General Walt

emphasized that the manpower required to construct and man even that portion of the system

would not only use up all of the division's personnel ,

but also would fix all available division units in

place . General Walt observed that this was contrary

to all previous MACV positions.

From the outset the plan had :

Consistently protected [the] integrity of Marine Corps

forces in [the] northern portion of ICTZ (i.e ., have inferred that forces now in northern Quang Tri have not undul y

been tied to any of the projected barrier systems) .

Recognized the requirement for significant forces ove r

and above those now in place to construct and man

whatever system is finally adopted .

General Walt contended that both of these positions remained valid, and maintained that unless h e

received the additional forces required to install an d

man the Practice Nine system, his capability to conduct offensive actions in northern I Corps woul d

cease almost immediately . 1 2

There were no additional forces available in South

Vietnam at the time . The posting of the U .S . Army's

Task Force Oregon to southern I Corps had reduced

troop strength in the other three corps areas to a

minimum . These facts, and the 1 November targe t

date for the completion of the first portion of th e

SPOS, forced General Westmoreland to place th e

responsibility for the system's construction on III

MAF, but the MACV commander did indicate tha t

as additional forces became available he would us e

them to reinforce the Marines.

By 2 May the 11th Engineer Battalion had cleare d

a 200-meter trace between Con Thien and Gio Lin h

and was starting to clear a 500-meter perimete r

around each position . Once the battalion complete d

this task it planned to widen the 200-meter trace t o

600 meters and then extend it eastward beyond Gi o

Linh to the flood plain . While the engineers wer e

clearing the laud, at least one infantry battalion, but
The 

Poin

(III M

Kilomet

See Refer

Gio Linh

Con Thie n

A-4

n

Dong Ha
THE BARRIER — ANOTHER APPROACH 9 1

normally two, provided security and screening fo r

the engineering effort .

One of the major problems encountered by th e

engineers during the initial clearing of the trace was

the large number of civilians living in the area .

Although the government had begun the removal of

the population in this region, it appeared that this

would be an extremely difficult and extended task ,

but the inception of Operation Hickory on 18 Ma y

changed the picture completely . One of the objectives of Hickory was to clear the entire SPOS area of

civilians . By 23 May, GVN authorities reported that

there were 6,000 people already at the Cam Lo temporary resettlement site . By the end of Hickory, o n

29 May, the population at Cam Lo had grown to over

11,000; the construction zone was virtually free of

civilians .

On 18 June, III MAF published Operation Plan

11-67, outlining the SPOS concept . This plan envisioned that, in its completed form, the system woul d

require one U .S. regiment and one ARVN regiment ,

disposed at six strong points and three battalion bas e

areas . The U.S . portion of the defense was to includ e

four company strong points and two battalion bas e

areas . An additional U.S . battalion was to be base d

at Dong Ha to be employed in tactical operations in

support of the defense .

The plan divided the construction and mannin g

of the system into two phases. The first phase consisted of expansion of the trace to a 600-meter width ,

installation of a linear obstacle system, and clearin g

and construction of four strong points and three bas e

areas . Concurrently, III MAF units would improve

Routes 1, 9, and 561 and prepare a fortification

materials storage site at Dong Ha . The plan set the

completion date for Phase 1 as 1 November 1967 . *

The Marines planned to begin Phase 2 of the pla n

at the end of the monsoon season. It required the

construction of the final two strong points west of

Con Thien and continued obstacle construction o n

both flanks of the Phase 1 line . III MAF anticipate d

that the entire system would be completed by Jul y

1968 .

Although the III MAF plan had not used the

MACV code name Practice Nine, the plans wer e

identical . A partial compromise of the classified cod e

name Practice Nine occurred in June, and III MA F

received instructions to discontinue use of the Prac-

*The ARVN were to construct strong points A-1 and A-2 an d

base area C-1 .

tice Nine code name . MACV assigned the interim

name Illinois City for use until 14 July when th e

code name Dye Marker became effective . At the

same time, 14 July, the air-supported portion of th e

program, which was still in a conceptual stage, acquired the code name Muscle Shoals . *

Renaming of the project was not the only chang e

to occur in June . On 1 June, Lieutenant Genera l

Walt, the burly Marine veteran from Colorado, wh o

had led III MAF since June of 1965, relinquished hi s

command to Lieutenant General Robert E .

Cushman, Jr., recipient of the Navy Cross as a battalion commander on Guam during World War II .

General Cushman had been deputy commander a t

III MAF since early in the year . The new commanding general was well aware of the problems involved in the construction of the anti-infiltration system ,

but, unlike his predecessor, he believed that, once

completed, the system would free his forces for missions elsewhere .* *

During Secretary McNamara's visit to the 3 d

Marine Division in July, the division briefed him o n

the status of Dye Marker and flew him over the construction sites . The Marines had cleared the strong

points at Con Thien and Gio Linh to a 500-mete r

radius and had begun building bunkers in both

positions. They had cleared the 600-meter-wide

trace between the two strong points and extended i t

to the flood plain east of Gio Linh . The staff opinion

was that with release of the Dye Marker materials,

the division could finish Phase 1 of the system by th e

1 November target date . Since the monsoon would

greatly reduce trafficability in the area, the engineer s

made a major effort to improve Routes 1, 9, and 56 1

which linked the strong points to the base areas.

These accomplishments had been costly for II I

MAF. All of the forces used for clearing the strong

point obstacle system had come from III MAF and

they had not begun installation of wire and othe r

obstacles. The amount of Marine efforts devoted to

the Dye Marker project to that stage had been :

(1) Direct labor: 5,795 mandays; III MAF estimated the

*The air-supported portion of the system was the responsibility of the Seventh Air Force and this monograph does not cover it.

**General Cushman apparently was making the best of a bad

situation . In his comments in 1981 on the draft of this volume, he

wrote, "Your handling of the stupid barrier concept and operation was even handed ." Gen Robert E . Cushman, Comments on

draft ms, 17May81 (Vietnam Comment files, MCHC ,

Washington, D.C.)
92 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

11th Engineer Battalion was applying 50 percent of it s

resources to Dye Marker .

(2) Equipment hours: 18,440 .

(3) Equipment losses: destroyed tractors, 15 ; dump

trucks,. 2 .

(4) Personnel losses: KIA 4 ; WIA, 77 . 1 3

At the same time, the construction effort wa s

meeting increased enemy resistance, requiring mor e

security forces . Further, Marine units still had

responsibility for their respective TAORs . The 9th

Marine s' TAOR, for example, stretched from the se a

above Cua Viet to Con Thien in the west and as fa r

south as the newly constructed airfield at Quang Tri .

"Although the 9th Marines was reinforced with a t

least one additional infantry battalion and often

two, " recalled Colonel George E . Jerue, " the additional mission of assisting in the construction of th e

trace precluded any rest for the combat troops involved ." 14

One example of the effort required was that o f

Lieutenant Colonel Lee R . Bendell's 3d Battalion ,

4th Marines at Con Thien in late August and earl y

September. As one company worked on constructio n

projects within the perimeter, company-sized patrol s

conducted sweeps north, east, and west of Co n

Thien while platoon-sized patrols covered the south .

Those working within the perimeter endured over

100 rounds of incoming enemy artillery and rockets,

which dictated strict flak jacket discipline . "The

Marines much preferred to take their chances o n

patrol, " recalled Lieutenant Colonel Bendell, "than

be sand bag fillers and bunker construction 'experts'

interrupted by incoming barrages . "ls

By mid-August, the enemy situation in the DMZ

area was becoming critical . In a 16 August messag e

to General Westmoreland, General Cushman state d

that although he had increased his own troo p

strength in the area, he had received none of th e

forces considered as the minimum essential augmentation by the 26 January 1967 plan . The enemy

threat in the DMZ had increased progressively to th e

degree that Marine units were fully occupied wit h

holding back the Communists in the Con Thien-Gi o

Linh region. Allied forces along the trace (four battalions plus combat support and combat service sup -

port, with the effective assistance of extensive and

continuous artillery, air, and naval gunfire support )

were unable to defend their front and at the same

time construct, man, and operate the SPOS in thei r

rear. General Cushman concluded by stating that h e

required more forces in northern Quang Tri if h e

were to meet the 1 November target date for the

The construction of the barrier system, also called the strong point obstacle system ,

created severe logistics problems for III MAF. For example, the heavy timbers used in

this partially completed bunker at Strong Point C-2 had to be acquired and then haule d

to the site over dirt roads made almost impassable by the monsoon rains late in the year .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189849
THE BARRIER-ANOTHER APPROACH 9 3

SPOS. His only alternative, barring the arrival of

reinforcements if he was to continue the project, was

to shift one Task Force Oregon brigade north to free

elements of the 5th Marines for deployment in

Quang Tri . i6

General Westmoreland responded to CG III

MAF's request by ordering another Army brigade t o

I Corps to permit the 5th Marines to deploy furthe r

north. He also informed General Cushman that he

planned to send a second brigade into the area in

October . As a result, the III MAF commander in -

formed General Westmoreland that he would us e

nine Marine battalions; seven committed t o

searching, clearing, and screening in support of th e

construction effort, while the other two infantry battalions and an engineer battalion would construc t

the obstacles and man them as the work was completed . All of these forces would be in the range of

enemy artillery . Moreover, increased NVA use of

proximity fuzes posed a greater threat to those troop s

who would have to do the work, expected to take si x

weeks . Because of this, General Cushman emphasized that the flow of equipment and materials woul d

have to be timely . The general pointed out that th e

3 September artillery attack on Dong Ha also ha d

reduced his ability to proceed with the project .' ?

On 7 September, General Westmoreland directe d

III MAF to assess the cost of installing the SPOS i n

terms of casualties resulting from enemy fire . At the

same time, he requested that the Marines submit a n

alternate plan to be executed between then an d

November should a decision be made not to proceed

with the Dye Marker plan . On 10 September, III

MAF presented its analysis of the casualties that

could be expected if it pursued the existing plan .

The Marines based this analysis on actual casualtie s

from previous operations in support of the SPOS ,

with an adjustment made for the increased enem y

artillery capability. They estimated the system installation time as 29 days . Total projected casualties

were : 672 U.S. killed and 3,788 wounded ; projecte d

South Vietnamese casualties for the same perio d

were 112 killed and 642 wounded . 1 8

Three days after the submission of the casualt y

analysis, General Westmoreland approved III MAF' s

alternate plan, Operation Plan 12-67 . The major

change in the new plan was the cessation of obstacl e

construction until after completion of the stron g

points and base areas and stabilization of the tactica l

situation . Other changes outlined in the plan included relocation of Base Area C-3 nearer to Cam L o

and the addition of a fourth base area north of th e

Cua Viet POL facility . One other change, not involving construction, was the provision for manning al l

four strong points with ARVN forces, freeing a

Marine battalion for security of the new Quang Tri

airfield . Operations in the western, or defile, are a

were to be conducted from battalion combat

operating bases (COBs) . This plan envisioned that

the COBs would support the area between Camp

Carroll and Khe Sanh . Subsequently, the Marine s

would establish bases in the vicinity of Lang Ru'o u

and Lang Vei.1 9

The onset of the seasonal monsoon further complicated construction efforts. The heavy rains in

September, for example, turned Route 561 betwee n

Cam Lo and Con Thien into a quagmire impassable

to any type of vehicle . While CH-53 helicopters ,

often guided by TPQ-10 radar, attempted to ferr y

sufficient supplies to Con Thien, the 11th Engineer

Battalion received orders to make Route 561 useable ;

this became the battalion 's top priority . The major

problem facing the engineers was the location an d

movement of sufficient crushed rock to build a sub -

base for the road . The nearest supply was near Cam p

Carroll, which required hauling the rock in dum p

trucks more than 15 miles. "When the project was

completed and the first vehicles made it to Con

Thien," commented Lieutenant Colonel Willard N.

Christopher of the 11th Engineer Battalion ,

"General Hochmuth told me that he was elated t o

`get them off my back,' and congratulated the men

in the battalion who had done the bulk of th e

work. "2 0

By mid-October General Westmoreland was ex -

pressing dissatisfaction with the rate of progress on

the Dye Marker project . He realized that the heav y

rains in late September and early October had required a large effort to keep the roads open, and h e

also appreciated that there had been some dela y

because construction materials had not arrived o n

schedule, but, despite these recognizable problems,

he believed that more progress should have bee n

made. On 22 October, he told General Cushman

that, as a result of his own observations and inspections by his staff, he had concluded that quality control of the project was inadequate, that the Dye

Marker system had not received the priority consistent with its operational importance, and that th e

project required more command emphasis and bet-
94 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIENTAMESE

ter management.* He ordered General Cushman to

take immediate steps to correct deficiencies and to

institute a positive system of quality control over th e

entire Dye Marker project. 2 1

General Cushman appointed the assistant III MA F

commander, Major General Raymond L. Murray, a

distinguished and highly decorated veteran of two

wars, to head a permanent Dye Marker special staff.

At the same time, III MAF informed all commanders

concerned that the Dye Marker project had high national interest and a priority second only to emergency combat requirements. In addition, General

Cushman planned to move another regiment north

to provide more troops for tactical requirements .

General Cushman pointed out that although all construction was incomplete, all the A and C sites, except A-3, included in his 12-67 plan were manne d

and engaged in anti-infiltration operations. He

assured the MACV commander that the task of completing construction and improving the cases an d

strong points would be pursued as a matter of utmost urgency . 22

On 10 December, General Cushman reported

that III MAF had made significant progress. All

bunkers at sites A-4, C-2, and C-4 were complete .

Engineers had completed the wire and min e

emplacement at C-2, and had finished most of th e

other two sites. Construction had started on the

combat operating base at Ca Lu and Marines wer e

conducting tactical operations to clear the A-3 site .

Vietnamese Army construction at sites A-1 and C- 1

did not meet the new 1 December target date, bu t

completion was near. Engineers had prepared Rout e

561 to handle a 60-ton capacity and opened it fro m

Cam Lo to Con Thien, but delayed asphalting th e

road because of weather. The new Quang Tri airfiel d

was completely operational, substantially easing the

logistic burden in the area .

By the end of the year, III MAF units finished all

strong points and base areas, except A-3 and C-3 .

*Lieutenant Colonel Willard N . Christopher of the 11th

Engineer Battalion remembered a Saigon staff officer suggestin g

the bunkers be painted white, as the ones at Long Binh supposedly were . This convinced Christopher that the quality control issu e

basically was a matter of " cosmetics." General Metzger, however ,

suspected that such "nit-picking" criticisms from the MACV staff

stemmed, in part, from interservice rivalry . LtCol Willard N .

Christopher, Comments on draft ms, 31Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.); MajGen Louis Metzger ,

ltr to CG, FMFPac, Subj : Debrief, dtd 22Jan68 (Archives,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

Both A-3 and C-3 were approximately 70 percent

finished, as was the Ca Lu COB . The total Dye

Marker effort and its associated security tasks had re -

quired 757,520 mandays and 114,519 equipmen t

hours by 31 December . Equipment lost to enemy action during the construction effort amounted to a

monetary loss of $1,622,348 . 23

By the end of the year the Marine command 's opinion of the barrier concept had not changed . One

Marine officer stated, "With these bastards, you'd

have to build the zone all the way to India and i t

would take the whole Marine Corps and half the Army to guard it; even then they ' d probably burrow

under it." General Wallace M . Greene, Jr . the Commandant, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness in August 1967, declared,

"From the very beginning I have been opposed to

this project."24

Each of the strong points in the barrier system contained bunkers designed to withstand enemy artillery and rocket fire . These South Vietnamese

soldiers are adding a thick layer of dirt to the top of

this bunker at Strong Point C-2 in mid-October.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189856
CHAPTER 8

Con Thien and the Summer Battles Along the DMZ

Why Con Thien? — Operation Buffalo

Why Con Thien ?

The Marines along the DMZ began construction

of the strong point obstacle system south of the

border in the spring and fall of 1967 in compliance

with orders from MACV and Washington . The

system, called the "McNamara Line" by the Marines,

proved to be a major burden to the 3d Marine Division . Security of the troops building the line ,

coupled with the demands on Marine units to fil l

sandbags, creosote bunker timbers, install wire, an d

other associated tasks, severely restricted the

division's combat activities .

While the construction of the obstacle system

limited III MAF's flexibility, higher headquarters expected its speedy completion to force southboun d

NVA regiments to move westward into the mountains, thereby complicating the enemy's logistica l

problems . The Marines' combined-arms fire powe r

from strong points would then confront the anticipated enemy attacks. Smaller patrols and infiltration groups would face the challenge of the extensiv e

obstacle system . The Communists, however, chos e

to attack before the system became too strong .

The enemy decided to concentrate on the Marine

strong point at Con Thien, located 14 miles inland

and two miles south of the DMZ . This outpost wa s

crucial to Marine efforts in the area . It occupied wha t

would be the northwest corner of the strong poin t

obstacle system, which enclosed an area which

became known as "Leatherneck Square ." Con Thien

also overlooked one of the principal enemy routes in -

to South Vietnam . Capture of the outpost would

open the way for a major enemy invasion of Quan g

Tri Province by 35,000 NVA troops massed north of

the DMZ, a victory of immense propaganda value .

Colonel Richard B . Smith, who commanded the 9th

Marines, later described the outpost's importance :

Con Thien was clearly visible from the 9th Marine s

Headquarters on the high ground at Dong Ha 10 miles

away, so good line-of-sight communications were enjoyed .

Although Con Thien was only 160 meters high, its tenants

had dominant observation over the entire area . Visitors to

Con Thien could look back at the vast logistics complex of

Dong Ha and know instantly why the Marines had to hol d

the hill. If the enemy occupied it he would be looking

down our throats . '

The Communists made two offensive thrusts into

the Con Thien region during the second half of

1967 . Although reinforced by heavy artillery ,

rockets, and mortars north of the Ben Hai River i n

the DMZ, each thrust collapsed under a combination of Marine ground 2nd helicopter-born e

maneuvers coupled with supporting artillery, nava l

gunfire, and attack aircraft .

The first offensive aimed at Con Thien, the largest

in terms of troops committed, occurred in July . For

the first time the NVA employed extensive artiller y

to support its infantry, but the Marine counterattack, Operation Buffalo, beat back the enemy, netting more than 1,200 NVA dead .

The outpost at Con Thien, which this Marine patro l

is approaching, occupied a low hill, but one which

provided excellent observation of the surroundin g

area as well as the key installations at Dong Ha.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37055 1

95
96 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The second attempt came in September . A heavy

weapons attack of greater volume and duration sup -

ported a multipronged infantry assault on Co n

Thien, but this endeavor, too, ended in failure for

the Communists.

In reviewing the enemy invasion attempts across

the DMZ during 1967, analysts found the Communists used fewer troops as the year progressed, but

greatly increased their attacks by fire . The enemy

sanctuary in the northern half of the DMZ, protected by U.S . policy, was always available fo r

regrouping and employment of heavy artillery . This

unique situation caused considerable frustration fo r

the allied commanders . Even so, Communist plans

for a significant victory in the DMZ area remaine d

unfulfilled at the year's end, and construction of the

allied strong point obstacle system continued a s

planned.

Operation Buffalo

Operation Buffalo began on 2 July utilizing

Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Schening's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines in and around Con Thien . Companies A and B operated north-northeast of th e

strong point near a former market place on Rout e

561, while Company D, Headquarters and Servic e

Company, and the battalion command group remained within the outpost perimeter. Company C

was at Dong Ha at Colonel George E . Jerue's 9th

Marines command post. Colonel Jerue described th e

origins of the operation :

The TAOR assigned to the 9th Marine Regiment was so

large that the regiment could not enjoy the advantage o f

patrolling any particular sector on a continuing basis . As a

result, an area would be swept for a few days and then i t

would be another week or so before the area would b e

swept again . Consequently, it became evident that th e

NVA, realizing this limitation, would move back into an

area as soon as a sweep was concluded .

In an attempt to counter this NVA maneuver, it wa s

decided to send two companies of 1/9 ("A" and "B" Cos. )

into the area (1,200 yards east of Con Thien and north of

the Trace) which had just been swept during the last few

days in June . This is the reason the two companies wer e

(there on 2 July] .=

That morning, Captain Sterling K . Coates' Company B, a company which gained a reputation fo r

finding the enemy during earlier actions at Khe

Sanh, walked into the heaviest combat of its Vietnam assignment . It had moved a mile east of Co n

Thien the day before in company with Captain

Albert C . Slater, Jr.'s Company A to conduct a

sweep north of the cleared trace . At 0800 on th e

2nd, both units began moving north . Company A

was on the left. Company B moved along Route 561 ,

an old 8- to 10-foot-wide cart road bordered b y

waist-high hedgerows. The road led to trouble; two

NVA battalions waited in prepared positions .

Company B's movement started smoothly and b y

0900 the 2d Platoon had secured its first objective, a

small crossroads 1,200 meters north of the trace .

There was no contact. As the 3d Platoon and th e

command group moved up the trail, enemy snipe r

fire started. The 3d Platoon and Captain Coates'

command group moved to the left to suppress the

enemy's fire, but as they pushed north the NVA fir e

intensified, halting the platoon. Captain Coates

directed his 2d Platoon to shift to the right in a

second attempt to outflank the Communist position; at the same time he ordered the 1st Platoon

forward to provide rear security for the company .

The 2d Platoon tried to move, but enemy fire force d

it back onto the road . The number of wounded and

dead mounted as NVA fire hit the unit from the

front and both flanks. To worsen matters, the enem y

began pounding the Marines with artillery and mortars.

Shortly after the sweep began, Company A tripped two Claymore mines and the need for casualty

evacuation delayed its movement. Afterward, Captain Slater moved his company eastward to help

Company B, but could not link up because of heavy

small arms fire . Soon the company had so man y

casualties that it was unable to fight and mov e

simultaneously .

Company B's position deteriorated . Enemy artillery and mortar fire cut off the 3d Platoon and th e

command group from the 2d Platoon . The NVA

troops then used flamethrowers to ignite th e

hedgerows on both sides of Captain Coates' unit, a s

well as massed artillery in close coordination with a

ground attack .° Many of the Marines, forced into th e

open by the flamethrowers, died under the enemy

fire . The Communist artillery and mortar fire shifted

to the 2d Platoon as it attacked to help the 3d Platoon and the command group . This fire killed Captain Coates, his radio operator, two platoon commanders, and the artillery forward observer. The attached forward air controller, Captain Warren O .

Keneipp, Jr., took command of the company, but

he soon lost radio contact with the platoons . Only

the company executive officer, at the rear of the 2d
U )N TUIEN ANDTHE "L'IMI:R BA1TI L" ALONG THE DMZ

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3d MarDiv ComdC, July 196 7

Much of the terrain around Con Thien and the area south of the DMZ was well suite d

for armored vehicles. These infantrymen from Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines

have teamed up with M-48 tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion during Operation Buffalo .

Platoon, managed to maintain radio contact with

the battalion CP, but the heavy enemy fire kept him

from influencing the situation . 4

Down the road, the 1st Platoon also took heavy

punishment as it tried to push its way up to the lead

elements of the company . North Vietnamese troop s

swarmed against the platoon's flanks, but air support

arrived and the platoon commander, Staff Sergean t

Leon R . Burns, directed strikes against the enemy .

Burns said later, "I asked for napalm as close as 5 0

yards from us, some of it came in only 20 yards away .

But I'm not complaining ." The air strikes disrupte d

the enemy assault and the 1st Platoon reached wha t

was left of the 2d Platoon . Burns quickly establishe d

a hasty defense and began treating the wounded . ,

The 1st Battalion command post at Con Thie n

heard the crackle of small-arms fire from the 0930

action, followed by a radio report that Company B

had encountered a dug-in NVA unit . The first

assessment of enemy strength was a platoon, then a

battalion, and ultimately a multibattalion force . When the firing began to increase, Lieutenant Colonel "Spike" Schening alerted his Company C, at

Dong Ha, to stand by to be helilifted into Compan y

B's area . Since these reinforcements would not arrive

for some time, Schening dispatched a rescue forc e

composed of four tanks and a platoon from Company D. The assistant S-3, Captain Henry J . M .

Radcliffe, went with the small force to take corn -

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 19241 7

Moving through seven-foot-high "elephant grass" in

the DMZ region could be nerve-wracking . Grass offered the superb concealment desired by an enemy

lying in ambush. Close-range encounters were

always a threat that required constant alertness fo r

the slightest sign of the presence of NVA soldiers.

98
CON THIEN AND THE SUMMER BATTLES ALONG THE DMZ 9 9

mand of Company B if link-up could be made . First

Lieutenant Gatlin J. Howell, the battalion intelligence officer, went also because he was familia r

with the area where the enemy engaged Company

B. 6 The remainder of the battalion command grou p

remained at Con Thien .

The small rescue force moved down the cleare d

trace from Con Thien to the junction of Route 56 1

without incident, but as it turned north up the road

it came under fire . A North Vietnamese unit, trying

to encircle Company B, had moved south and wa s

opposite Radcliffe's small force . Helicopter gunships

and the fire from the four tanks dispersed th e

enemy. Company C began arriving by helicopter

and Captain Radcliffe ordered the Company D platoon to secure the landing zone and evacuate

casualties. As the lead elements of Company C cam e

into the zone they met a heavy artillery barrage,

which wounded 11 Marines.

Despite enemy fire, the platoon of tanks and th e

lead unit of Company C continued to push north

toward Company B. Half a mile up the road, the advancing Marines found the 1st Platoon . Captain

Radcliffe told Burns that he was the acting commanding officer and asked where was the rest of the company. Sergeant Burns replied, "Sir, this is the company, or what's left of it."

After organizing the withdrawal of the 1st Platoon's wounded, Radcliffe and the relief force, accompanied by Burns, continued to push forward t o

Company B's furthest point of advance to recover th e

company's casualties. The Marines set up a hast y

defense, making maximum use of the tanks'

firepower, and brought the dead and wounded into

the perimeter .

For Lieutenant Howell the scene had a particular

impact . He had commanded Company B's 3d Platoon for more than eight months. Howell was seemingly everywhere as he searched for the wounded.

Captain Radcliffe estimated that Howell and Corporal Charles A. Thompson of Company D were instrumental in the evacuation of at least 25 Marines. e

The Marines then loaded their casualties on the

tanks . Lacking space on the vehicles for the arms and

equipment of the wounded, Radcliffe ordered them

destroyed to prevent capture . The rescue force foun d

it impossible to recover all the bodies immediately ;

some bodies remained along the road .

The company came under heavy enemy artillery

fire as it began to pull back . Two of the tanks hi t

mines which further slowed the withdrawal . When

the company reached the landing zone it came

under devastating artillery and mortar fire again ,

hitting many of the wounded who awaited evacuation. Litter bearers and corpsmen became casualtie s

as well.

Casualties increased in the landing zone, amon g

them were the platoon commander and platoon

sergeant from Company D who had been directin g

the defense of the zone . In the resulting confusion ,

someone passed the word to move the casualties bac k

to Con Thien. A group of almost 50 started makin g

their way back until Marines at Con Thien spotte d

them in the cleared trace . Lieutenant Colonel Schening sent out a rescue party, headed by his executive

officer, Major Darrell C . Danielson, in a truck, jeep

and ambulance. Upon reaching the wounded

Marines, Major Danielson saw that many were in a

state of shock; some seemed in danger of bleeding t o

death . Fortunately, two helicopters landed in the

area and the Marines loaded the more seriou s

casualties on board . Enemy artillery fire delayed the

evacuation of the remainder but, despite the fire ,

Major Danielson and his party managed to ge t

everyone into the vehicles and back to Con Thien fo r

treatment and further evacuation . 9

During the battle, friendly and enemy supporting

arms engaged in a furious duel . In the first few hours

of the engagement Marine aircraft dropped 90 ton s

of ordnance during 28 sorties. Artillery fired 45 3

missions, while Navy destroyers fired 142 5-inch

rounds into enemy positions . The NVA force fired

1,065 artillery and mortar rounds during the day a t

Gio Linh and Con Thien ; more than 700 rounds fell

on Lieutenant Colonel Schening's 1st Battalion, 9th

Marines alone .

Captain Slaters Company A remained heavily

engaged. When the necessity of carrying the increasing numbers of wounded brought the company to a

halt, Slater had his 3d Platoon establish a hast y

landing zone in the rear of the company . After the

first flight of medevac helicopters departed the zone ,

the enemy hit the 3d Platoon with mortars an d

assaulted the position. Slater moved his 2d Platoo n

and company command group to reinforce the 3d

Platoon .* The enemy advanced to within 50 meters

of Company A's lines before small arms and artiller y

*In the confused fighting, the 1st Platoon of Company A broke

through the surrounding enemy and joined Captain Radcliffe' s

relief force . LtCol Albert C . Slater, Comments on draft ms,

12May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
100 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

fire broke up their attack . Enemy pressure and the

remaining casualties kept Company A in the defensive position until the NVA force withdrew later i n

the evening. to

At 1500 Schening, at Con Thien, notified the

regimental commander that all of his companies

were hard pressed, that he had no more units to

commit, and that the situation was critical . Colonel

Jerue, commanding the 9th Marines, ordered Major

Willard J . Woodring's 3d Battalion, 9th Marines to

move by helicopter to Schening's assistance . Three

companies and the command group of the 3d Battalion were in position north of the trace by 1800 . *

After landing, Major Woodring assumed operationa l

control of Companies A and C of the 1st Battalion .

The combined force made a twilight attack on the

enemy's left flank, while elements of Company B

and the platoon from Company D holding the

landing zone pulled back to the Con Thien

perimeter in expectation of an attack on the outpost .

The increased pressure provided by the 3d Battalio n

caused the enemy to break contact .

When the worn and exhausted survivors of th e

morning's encounter mustered for a head count, the

Marines found the total casualty figure shocking .

Staff Sergeant Burns, subsequently awarded the

Navy Cross, stated that only 27 Company B Marine s

walked out of the action . Lieutenant Colonel Schening's battalion lost 53 killed, 190 wounded, and 3 4

missing . Not until 5 July did the battalion complet e

the recovery efforts that reduced the number of miss -

ing to nine, but the number of dead increased t o

84:** The battalion established no accurate count of

enemy killed . "

During the next three days, 3-5 July, enemy contact continued . At 0930 on the 3rd, an Air Force air

observer reported more than 100 NVA soldiers ad -

*Enemy artillery quickly zeroed in on 3/9's LZs . Helicopters

could not land in the LZs during later resupply missions, whic h

caused 3/9 to go entirely without water for a day and a half. Co l

John C. Studt, Comments on draft ms, 9Ju1S1 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

**The XO of 3/9, Maj John C . Studt, supervised the recovery

of Company B's dead, " . . . a grisly task after 3 days in the hot su n

. . . .[Most] appeared to have been left right where they fell . The y

were in flank security positions too close to the road to hav e

prevented an ambush or in the [sunken] road itself which . . . [offered] some cover . . . [Company B] clearly had walked into a [ver y

well executed] ambush ." Col John C . Studt, Comments on draft

ms, 9Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)

vancing from positions north of Con Thien. Battery

E, 3d Battalion, 12th Marines fired on them and killed 75 . To the east, Major Woodring called in continuous air strikes for 12 hours to prepare for an at -

tack the following day. The same day, 3 July, Lieu -

tenant Colonel Peter A . Wickwire's BLT 1/3 fro m

SLF Alpha joined the 9th Marines and tied in with

Woodring's right flank . The regiment planned a

drive north to recover missing bodies and push th e

NVA out of the Lang Son area, only 4,000 meters

northeast of the Con Thien perimeter .

The attack started early the morning of the 4th .

The 3d Battalion encountered heavy resistance fro m

concealed enemy positions southwest of the site o f

Company B's engagement on 2 July . A prolonged

fight followed, involving tanks, artillery, and clos e

air support. By 1830 when the final Marine assault

ended, Woodring's 3d Battalion, 9th Marines had

lost 15 dead and 33 wounded . BLT 1/3 had 1 1

wounded during the same action . The same day Major Wendell O. Beard's BLT 2/3 from SLF Bravo

joined the operation ; the battalion landed b y

helicopter north of Cam Lo at LZ Canary and moved

west and then northward on the western edge of th e

battle area toward Con Thien .

During daylight on 5 July all units northeast o f

Con Thien came under enemy mortar and artiller y

fire, but there was relatively little ground contac t

while completing the grim task of recovering Company B's dead . That afternoon an air observer spotted a large concentration of enemy troops 3,00 0

meters northeast of Con Thien . He called in artillery

and tactical air strikes and reported seeing 200 dead

NVA soldiers .

Following preparatory fires on the morning of 6

July, all battalions continued moving north . Major

Beard's BLT 2/3 ran into an enemy force supported

by mortars less than 3 kilometers south of Con

Thien. In the brief engagement that followed the

battalion killed 35 Communist soldiers, while suffering five killed and 25 wounded .

Northeast of the outpost, Wickwire's and Woodring's battalions advanced under intermittent NV A

artillery and mortar fire . Major Woodring decided t o

move a reinforced company 1,500 meters to th e

north-northwest to cover his left flank . He chos e

Captain Slater's attached Company A, 9th Marines ,

which now included the survivors of Company C ,

and a detachment from 3d Reconnaissance Battalion . Slater's company moved into positio n

without opposition and established a strong combat
Marine Corps Historical Collectio n

Members of H&S Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines board a CH-46 helicopter as

their battalion moved to assist hard-pressed elements of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines,

then fighting a North Vietnamese force north of the Con Thien combat base on 2 July.

Members of Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines move behind one of their attached

tanksfrom the 3d Tank Battalion as it skirts a large bomb crater during Operation Buffalo. This tank-infantry combination, aided by artillery and air strikes, destroyed a

North Vietnamese defensive position in heavy fighting near Con Thien on 4 July 1967 .

3d MarDiv ComdC, July 196 7

101
102 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

outpost . Slater's composite force dug conceale d

fighting positions and sent reconnaissance patrols

north in an attempt to discover where the enemy

crossed the Ben Hai River.1 2

While Slater's move was unnoticed, the same was

not true for the advance of the main elements of the

two battalions. As they advanced, they encountered

increasingly heavy artillery fire and by 1600 the y

could go no further. Wickwire's battalion had lost a

tank and, because of the enemy fire, pulled bac k

without recovering it. Captain Burrell H. Landes,

Jr., commanding Company B, BLT 1/3, climbed a

tree to spot for air strikes and artillery fire in front o f

his position . An aerial observer radioed that a large

enemy force was approaching his position . When

Landes asked how big the force was, the reply was,

" I'd hate to tell you, I'd hate to tell you ." The AO

had spotted a 400-man force crossing the Ben Hai

River in approach march formation ; it was headin g

directly for the two battalions . After the sightings,

both battalions, less Slater's company, came under

heavy, accurate artillery fire . Between 500-600

rounds hit the 3d Battalion's position and about

1,000 landed on BLT 1/3 .

During the Communist bombardment, one of

Slater's reconnaissance patrols also spotted the

400-man NVA force and reported it moving toward

the 3d Battalion . The enemy, still in column formation, was unaware that it was heading directly int o

Captain Slater's concealed unit . The Marines opene d

fire at less than 150 meters distance . Captain Slate r

recalled:

When the point of the enemy column was brough t

under fire, the NVA alerted their unit with a bugle call

. . . . Their initial reaction was [one] of confusion and the y

scattered, some of them toward Marine lines . They quickl y

organized and probed at every flank of the 360 degre e

perimeter. Concealed prepared positions and fir e

discipline never allowed the NVA to determine what siz e

of unit they were dealing with . When the enemy forme d

and attacked, heavy accurate artillery was walked to withi n

75 meters of the perimeter . The few NVA that penetrate d

the perimeter were killed and all lines held . 1 ;

Heavy enemy probes, mortar fire, and small arms

fire continued through the early evening. Some

NVA soldiers crept close enough to hurl han d

grenades into the Marine lines. One of the attache d

Company C fireteam leaders, Lance Corporal James

L. Stuckey, responded by picking up the grenade s

and throwing them back toward their source . He was

wounded when the third grenade exploded as it left

his hand. He continued, however, to lead his

fireteam for the rest of the night without medical

assistance .1 4

Despite heavy Marine artillery fire that effectivel y

boxed in Slater's position, the NVA maintaine d

pressure on the Marines until 2200 . For the rest of

the night, enemy small arms and mortar fire harassed Company A, but the NVA units were withdrawing. First light revealed 154 enemy bodies strew n

around Company A's perimeter; the defenders ha d

12 casualties. Among the wounded Marines was

Lance Corporal Stuckey; only tattered flesh remained where his hand had been . *

While the attack on Company A took place, th e

rest of what intelligence officers later determined to

have been the 90th NVA Regiment assaulted th e

two Marine battalions. To add to the effect of thei r

preparatory fires, the attacking North Vietnames e

threw fuzed blocks of TNT into the Marine position s

to keep the Marines down as the assaulting troop s

moved in . The Marines countered with supporting

arms; flare ships, attack aircraft, helicopter gun -

ships, naval gunfire, and all available artillery concentrated their fire on the attacking enemy . By 2130 ,

the Marines had repelled the assault and the Communist forces began withdrawing to the north .

At 0520 the next morning, Major Woodrin g

ordered Captain Slater to pull back into the battalion perimeter. The decision was most opportune ;

immediately after Company A cleared the night

position, a 30-minute NVA artillery concentratio n

landed within its old lines .** Company A returne d

to the battalion's perimeter without incident . Both

battalions spent the rest of the 7th trying to determine the extent of the damage inflicted on the 90th

NVA Regiment. By 8 July the Marines raised th e

NVA casualty count to more than 800 . Counting

enemy bodies proved to be a most difficult task ; the

grisly carnage was beyond description . Hundreds o f

bodies covered the scarred battleground, some half

buried, others in pieces, all surrounded by a carpe t

of battered equipment and ammunition . Counting

enemy canteens was one method used to try to

*Corporal Stuckey received the Navy Cross for his actions on 6

July 1967 .

**Colonel John C. Studt, the XO of 3/9 in July 1967, said thi s

incident was typical of the battalion commander . "Major Wood -

ring, a former drill instructor, a woodsman and a deerhunter,

possessed that rare instinct which enabled him to frequently anticipate enemy actions. " Col John C. Studt, Comments on draft

ms, 9Jul81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)
CON THIEN AND THE SUMMER BATTLES ALONG THE DMZ 10 3

establish realistic figures . The vast area which th e

bodies covered further complicated the morbid

undertaking . As late as the afternoon of the 8th ,

Captain Gerald F . Reczek's Company C, BLT 1/ 3

found about 200 enemy bodies more than 600

meters east of Route 561 .

The scattering of bodies to the north occurred

when air and artillery hit groups of North Vietnamese moving toward or away from the main battl e

area. The lateral scattering from the 3d Battalion 's

position eastward across the front of BLT 1/ 3 was th e

result of the NVA attempt to outflank Major

Woodring's unit without realizing that the BLT wa s

on line . Trying to move further east, they lost eve n

more men to the guns of Wickwire's Marines." The

Marines found it impossible to compute an accurat e

total of Communist losses to supporting arms

because of the inability of allied forces to continu e

the count on the north side of the Ben Hai River.

The last significant engagements of Operatio n

Buffalo took place on 8 July, southwest of Co n

Thien. After BLT 2/3 closed on Con Thien durin g

its northward sweep, it had turned west, and the n

headed south toward the Cam Lo River . Moving

south, at 1030 Captain James P . Sheehan's Compan y

G discovered a bunker complex . When small arms

fire and grenades interrupted further investigation ,

Sheehan wisely backed off and called in air and artillery . At 1300, Company G moved in, but som e

NVA soldiers continued to fight. Later that afternoon, after clearing the complex, Company G

reported 39 dead Communists, 2 Marines killed, and

29 wounded, including the company commander .

At 1430 while Company G cleared the bunkers, a

Company F squad patrol, located some 1,200 meters

southwest of Company G, engaged another enem y

force . When the Communists counterattacked, th e

company commander, First Lieutenant Richard D .

Koehler, Jr ., sent in the rest of his Marines . When

82mm mortar rounds began falling, Koehler kne w

he was in trouble and called in artillery and air

strikes. The concentration of supporting arms cracked the enemy position, and when Company F move d

in, it counted 118 enemy bodies . The Marines

estimated the Communist unit to have numbere d

between 200 and 250 . Marine losses totaled 14 killed

and 43 wounded . Apparently the NVA had ha d

enough ; for the next five days BLT 2/3 encountered

only mines and harassing fires.

One ominous development which accompanie d

the Buffalo fighting was the accurate employment of

large-caliber, long-range NVA artillery . On 7 July ,

enemy artillery scored a direct hit on the comman d

bunker of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines at Co n

Thien, killing 11, including First Lieutenant Gatli n

J . Howell, the intelligence officer who had gone to

the aid of Company B, 9th Marines on 2 July.

Eighteen others sustained wounds ; one was the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Schening . *

The cause of the damage was a 152mm howitze r

round, which penetrated five feet of sand bags, loose

dirt, and 12x12-inch timbers .

The same day, at Dong Ha, a delay-fuzed 130mm

round landed at the base of the north wall of the 9t h

Marines' command post, exploding six feet belo w

the bunker floor. Luckily, there were no injuries.

The NVA also scored a direct hit on the Dong H a

chapel during Catholic services, killing the

chaplain's assistant . Storage areas, helicopte r

maintenance areas, and medical facilities wer e

among the targets of the long-range weapons. The

frequency and accuracy of the enemy fire caused Col -

Marine Corps Historical Collectio n

The heat during the summer battles south of th e

DMZ made water a precious commodity. Following

a helicopter resupply mission, these two Marines use

a Vietnamese technique to carry a five-gallon can of

water to their squad during Operation Buffalo.

*Lieutenant Colonel Schening also suffered wounds at Cap e

Gloucester and Peleliu in World War II, as well as in Korea . He

thus survived wounds in three wars.
104 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

onel Jerue to move his command post to a locatio n

northeast of Cam Lo. There, relative quiet prevaile d

for the remainder of the operation . *

Another indication of the Communist buildup

along the DMZ and around Con Thien during this

period was the increased employment of surface-toair missiles (SAMs). While an A-4 aircraft was attack -

ing the NVA in front of BLT 1/3 on 6 July, th e

enemy launched eight SAMs from sites north of th e

Ben Hai River. One hit Major Ralph E . Brubaker's

VMA-311 jet, causing the aircraft to crash in enem y

territory. Brubaker, only slightly wounded, remained in enemy territory until picked up the next morning by an Air Force rescue helicopter .

Operation Buffalo closed on 14 July 1967 . The

Marines reported enemy losses as 1,290 dead an d

two captured . Marine losses, in contrast, totaled 15 9

killed and 345 wounded . The Marines found the

enemy's large-scale July offensive against Con Thien

a short one, but considerably more vicious than most

*Colonel Joseph J. Kelly recalled in 1981 that the requirement

to find room for a forward division headquarters to be reopened a t

Dong Ha also influenced this move . In addition, regimental staff

officers knew the old French barracks housing the regimenta l

headquarters were prominent features on maps used by the Nort h

Vietnamese . Col Joseph J. Kelly, Comments on draft ms ,

29May81 (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)

of the Communist operations conducted in I Corps.

The most savage aspect was the heavy employmen t

of supporting arms by both sides . Of the known

enemy killed, more than 500 came from air, artillery, and naval gunfire . In addition, supporting

arms destroyed 164 enemy bunkers and 15 artiller y

and rocket positions, and caused 46 secondary explosions . To accomplish this, Marine aviation use d

1,066 tons of ordnance, Marine and Army artillery

consumed more than 40,000 rounds, and ships of

the U.S. Seventh Fleet fired 1,500 rounds from their

5- and 8-inch naval guns. On the other hand, enemy

artillery accounted for half of the Marine casualtie s

during the operation and posed a constant threat t o

the Marine logistical support installations .

The July fighting around Con Thien reaffirme d

the Marines' faith in supporting arms . In spite of th e

appearance of SAMs and the presence of excellent ,

long-range Communist artillery, the Marines coul d

prove that the latest enemy offensive had failed . Co n

Thien had held and at least one firstline enemy regiment was in shambles . The Buffalo victory did not

breed overconfidence, but the body-strew n

wasteland along the DMZ provided mute evidence

of the effectiveness of III MAF's defenses . The summer was far from over ; they would be challenged

again .

Con Thien proved that Marines, although offense-minded, also had to know how t o

build sturdy bunkers to fortify their defensive positions. This Marine inspects a bunke r

constructed of dirt-filled ammunition boxes which collapsed after being hit by artillery .

Marine Corps Historical Collection
PART IV

FALL COMBAT, NORTH AND SOUTH

CHAPTER 9

Continuing Operations Against the 2d NVA Division

Raids and Rockets in Quang Nam — Operation Cochis e

Operation Swift—A Busy Calm Before the Storm

Raids and Rockets in Quang Nam

During June allied units intensified operations

against elements of the 2d NVA Division and Viet

Cong units in the southern three provinces of I

Corps. The enemy continued to pump replacements

into the region in a determined effort to regain control of the area, particularly the Que Son Basin . The

allied forces, in greater numbers and with increased

firepower, thwarted each Communist move as i t

developed . As a result of continuing enemy defeats ,

the pacification program began to show positive

results as demonstrated by its expansion into virgi n

territory.

As July began, the 1st and 7th Marines, both fro m

the 1st Marine Division, which Major General Don n

J . Robertson still commanded, were operating in the

densely populated area around Da Nang . Two battalions of the 5th Marines continued operations

against elements of the 2d NVA Division in the Que

Son Basin, while the other battalion of the 5th

Marines, the 2d, provided security for the An Ho a

industrial complex and Nong Son coal mine ,

southwest of Da Nang .

Further south, the nine U.S . Army battalions o f

Task Force Oregon, now commanded by Major

General Richard T. Knowles, USA, continued their

operations in southern I CTZ. Four of the Army battalions operated in and around Chu Lai, while th e

remainder of the force expanded allied control ove r

the populated coastal plain of Quang Ngai Province .

The Korean Marine Brigade of three battalions remained in its TAOR south of Chu Lai.

The combined efforts of these units forced NV A

and VC main force units to pull out of the populate d

regions and move back into the mountains . Despite

this setback, the enemy tenaciously maintained a

Two battalions of the 5th Marines, the 1st and 3d, remained in the Que Son Basin afte r

the arrival at Chu Lai of Army units of Task Force Oregon . Marines of the 3d Battalio n

maneuver under fire on 21 July while in contact with units of the 2d NVA Division .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37021 6

107
108 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

presence in the three provinces by cutting lines o f

communication and attacking allied installations b y

fire . The Communists targeted Revolutionar y

Development teams and isolated units for their mai n

efforts . These tactics enabled the enemy to limit

force commitments and still gain moral and

propaganda victories while, at the same time ,

reconstituting regular units. Communist actions in

Quang Nam Province during July 1967 provide a n

excellent example of this modus operandi.

The Communists chose the relatively isolate d

Marine outpost at Nong Son, the site of the onl y

producing coal mine in South Vietnam, as their first

target. First Lieutenant James B . Scuras' Company F ,

5th Marines provided security for the mine . The

company manned two positions near the mine itself

and a third, with an attached 81mm mortar sectio n

and two 4 .2-inch mortars, on top of the hill

overlooking the mine . The enemy chose the mortar

position as his objective .

At 2327 on 3 July, a Marine listening post outside

the upper position reported, "I have movement to

my front," and within seconds, "They're all aroun d

me, " and then, "We've been overrun ."' Next, the

main position came under mortar attack. One of the

first rounds blew up the 4 .2-inch mortar ammunition dump. Immediately following their mortar barrage, enemy sappers moved into the position, throwing grenades and satchel charges into the Marine

bunkers. Simultaneously, other enemy units made a

mortar attack on the Marine artillery positions at An

Hoa to neutralize their support of the Nong Son out -

post . The Marines of Captain John Pipta 's Battery E,

2d Battalion, 11th Marines, however, immediatel y

began firing in support of the Company F Marines.

By the time Pipta's first artillery barrage lande d

around the edge of the position, the enemy assaul t

had already faltered . The attackers had not caught

all of the Marines in their bunkers . Private First Class

Melvin E . Newlin, an 18-year-old machine gunne r

from Wellsville, Ohio, and four other Marines had

been manning a perimeter position when the attac k

started . Although the initial attack killed his four

campanions and wounded him, Newlin kept his

machine gun in action . He fought off two additional

attempts to overrun his position before a grenade

wounded him again and knocked him unconscious .

With Newlin temporarily silenced, the Viet Cong

moved into the center of the outpost and destroyed

both 4 .2-inch mortars . As the enemy prepared to attack the Marines on the other side of the perimeter,

Newlin regained conciousness, remanned his

machine gun, and opened fire . His fire caused th e

VC to break off their assault of the remaining Marin e

bunkers and once again they attacked him . Newlin

withstood two additional enemy attempts to silenc e

his gun before he died . *

When the attack started, Lieutenant Scuras too k

two squads and moved to relieve the 1st Platoon in

the upper outpost . Arriving at the top of the hill a t

about midnight, the reinforcements, with the

assistance of the surviving defenders, drove the

enemy out of the position . As the VC withdrew from

the hill, the Marines remanned their 81mm mortars

and brought them to bear on the retreating force . In

addition, they called in artillery on suspected escap e

routes .

At approximately 0100, the battalion's Company

E arrived at Nong Son and assumed responsibility fo r

the two lower positions. The remaining elements of

Company F then moved to the top of the hill to

reconsolidate their position and evacuate th e

casualties. The attack had killed 13 Marines and

wounded 43 .

For the Viet Cong, the attack on the position was

expensive . They did not overrun the entire outpost

as they hoped, and the loss of 44 of their members

made the effort very costly, but they succeeded in

destroying the two heavy mortars in the position . 2

The Communists executed two other attacks to influence the people in Quang Nam Province . Both

mutually supporting actions took place on the night

of 14 July . The first attack occurred in the town of

Hoi An at 2300 when an enemy force hit the U .S.

advisors' compound with mortar fire . At the same

time, two platoons of VC, dressed in ARVN

uniforms, attacked the nearby provincial jail . The

enemy force broke into the jail and released 1,19 6

military and political prisoners . During the confuse d

fighting that followed, the ARVN recaptured 20 6

prisoners and killed 30, but 960 escaped . Only 5 of

the Viet Cong died in the attack; ARVN units

wounded another 29. The return of almost 1,00 0

cadre to the VC ranks increased their capacity to op -

pose the September elections, but the psychologica l

blow caused by the untimely "liberation" had a n

equally severe impact .

The Communists chose their other target equall y

well : the Da Nang Airbase, center of America n

*For his actions Private First Class Newlin received a

posthumous Medal of Honor . (See Appendix D for his citation .)
CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 2D NVA DIVISION 109

presence in the northern provinces . The home of

Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), Marine, and U .S . Air

Force tactical squadrons, the Da Nang Airbase stood

as an undisputed symbol of U .S . and GVN strength.

The Communists were aware that an attack on Da

Nang would be more difficult than their earlier at -

tempts to strike the base . Since the first rocket attac k

on the base in February, the Marines had intensified

their defensive efforts, instituting as many as 800

daily patrols and ambushes. Allied aircraft conducted overflights of the rocket belt itself to detec t

any movement in the area, and artillery fired mor e

than 2,000 rounds every 24 hours to interdict likel y

avenues of approach to the rocket belt .

Despite these impressive Marine countermeasures ,

the Communists were confident they could attack

the base successfully . The reason was their new

122mm rocket, a weapon which they had not use d

south of the DMZ. This rocket was a high trajectory

weapon, capable of being emplaced virtuall y

anywhere . A trained crew could prepare a 122mm

rocket for firing in less than 30 minutes . Its range of

12,000 meters, 2,000 meters greater than that of th e

140mm rocket, allowed emplacement beyond wha t

the Marines had established as the rocket belt .

During the night of 14 July, enemy rocket units

moved out of "Happy Valley," southwest of Da

Nang, and established six firing positions, divide d

into two clusters of three positions each . Each firing

position contained six individual launcher sites .

Shortly after midnight the enemy fired their rockets

at the airfield; within five minutes 50 projectiles hi t

the base .

Marines responded swiftly to the first volley .

Almost instantly, a number of friendly unit s

reported the firing and three minutes after the

enemy launched the rockets an Air Force plane attacked one of the sites . At the same time, artillery

units plotted the launch site locations and commenced firing at both the sites and the probable escape

routes. This rapid reply by supporting arms was exemplary, but it was only a countermeasure and not a

solution to the problem of defending the Da Nang

complex against the new, long-range threat . In the

attack, the rockets destroyed 10 aircraft, 13 barracks,

and a bomb dump, and damaged 40 more aircraft .

Eight Americans died and another 176 suffered

wounds.

The Communists had not only succeeded i n

destroying a large quantity of material, but the

resulting fires provided visible evidence of a successful attack to the 300,000 people living around

Da Nang. That the VC carried out the attack successfully, while the Marines and ARVN forces ha d

been actively trying to prevent it, vastly increased its

propaganda value.

The 14 July attack forced immediate adjustments

of III MAF 's defense of the airfield . III MAF extended the rocket belt to include the space between tw o

radii of 12,000 and 8,000 meters, the maximum

ranges from which the VC could launch both

140mm and 122mm rockets. The new belt also included the most likely areas of penetration by enemy

launching units . The Marines established a centralized control system for all aspects of the counter -

rocket effort and increased their patrols an d

overflights . They also instituted a waterway contro l

plan which included an 1800-0600 movement

curfew on all streams within the belt . Deep reconnaissance patrols along the enemy's approach route s

outside the belt increased by 40 percent . In addition, the 1st Marine Division developed an elaborat e

psychological operations (PsyOps) campaign t o

counter the threat, including the offer of 10,000-

piastre rewards for information on rockets, locatio n

of caches, and routes used to bring rockets into th e

Da Nang area . On a day-to-day basis, the division

allocated more than 90 percent of its PsyOps assets t o

this program . 3

For the Marines operating in the rocket belt the

war was particularly frustrating . Each patrol contended with the probability of encountering mine s

and booby traps. So called secure areas were neve r

entirely free from these threats . Over 50 percent o f

the division's casualties during the first half of 1967

resulted from explosive devices encountered whil e

patrolling in these dangerous though densel y

populated areas. There was no easy solution, and in

spite of the Marines' efforts rocket attacks continued .

Operation Cochise

While the Communist rocket gunners were annoying the Da Nang TAOR, intelligence agencies

reported that the 3d NVA Regiment had moved into

northern Quang Tin Province during late July . Intelligence also indicated the headquarters of the 1st

VC Regimentalso had moved from Quang Ngai Province to a new location east of Hiep Duc in the Qu e

Son Basin . Reacting to these reports, on 9 August

General Robertson reactivated Task Force X-Ray ,

again under the command of his assistant division
110 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

commander, Brigadier General Foster C . LaHue.

General LaHue received orders to strike the enem y

wherever possible within the Que Son Basin and surrounding hills, with emphasis on the Hiep Duc area

which intelligence officers believed contained the 2 d

NVA Division 's headquarters and logistic base . For

this operation, code named Cochise, Genera l

LaHue's Task Force X-Ray controlled the 1st and 3 d

Battalions of Colonel Stanley Davis' 5th Marines an d

Lieutenant Colonel Alfred I . Thomas' BLT 1/3 from

SLF Alpha .

General LaHue's concept of operations for Cochise

consisted of three phases . The first phase involved

the insertion of the two 5th Marines battalions south

of Nui Loc Son outpost between the tactical

elements of the 2d NVA Division and its suspected

logistic base. The two battalions were to drive east

toward friendly blocking positions and eliminat e

Communist tactical forces in the vicinity of th e

logistic installations. Phase II called for a helilift o f

two battalions into the suspected enemy base area ,

and the third phase a two-battalion sweep from th e

Hiep Duc region northeast to Que Son .

South of the Cochise area of operation the 2d

ARVN Division was about to conduct companio n

operation Lien Ket 112 ; its concept resembled

Cochise . Two ranger battalions were to be helilifted

into landing zones southeast of Hiep Duc and sweep

eastward, while three battalions of the 6th ARVN

Regiment occupied blocking positions west of Tam

Ky. Both operations began early on the morning of

11 August. _

The ARVN rangers made the first significant con -

tact. On the morning of the 12th, three battalions o f

the 21st NVA Regiment attacked the rangers. Heavy

fighting continued throughout the day and by 170 0

the rangers reported heavy casualties . Dangerousl y

low on ammunition, with darkness approaching ,

and with no sign of a letup on the part of the enemy ,

the rangers requested an emergency resupply. At

1730, a CH-46 from HMM-165, accompanied b y

two UH-1E gunships from VMO-6 arrived overhead

with the badly needed ammunition. The gunships

scouted the intended landing zone and reported tha t

the CH-46 could not land in the contested zone. The

pilot, Captain Jack H . McCracken, well aware . of

what would happen to the rangers without ammunition decided to try to deliver his cargo anyway . He

ordered his crew chief, Corporal James E . Bauer, t o

stack the ammunition on the rear ramp. Captain Mc -

Cracken nosed over his helicopter and raced for the

landing zone . McCracken then hovered 30 feet over

the zone, and Corporal Bauer lowered the ramp an d

most of the ammunition dropped into the zone . While repeated enemy small arms hits shook the

helicopter, Corporal Bauer kicked out the rest of the

ammunition . As the last box dropped, enem y

bullets severely damaged the helicopter, but McCracken's resupply permitted the rangers to continue

the battle 4 . At 2300, the NVA units finally pulled

back, leaving 197 bodies behind. The ranger losse s

also had been heavy, 81 killed and 153 wounded .

During the next three days, there were numerous

encounters with small VC elements . On the night of

16 August, enemy units twice attempted to infiltrat e

BLT 1/3's night positions, but turned back in th e

face of small arms and artillery fire, leaving 36

bodies behind. The next morning, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Nelson, commanding officer o f

VMO-6, in a UH-1E gunship, was escorting resuppl y

helicopters when he sighted more than 50 VC in

the open. The VMO-6 commander expended all o f

his ordnance in the process of fixing the enem y

group in place . He then directed a fixed-wing mission against the target . Meanwhile, a company of

Lieutenant Colonel Charles B . Webster's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines moved into assault positions

under cover of the air strike . After Webster's attack,

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37034 8

Col Stanley Davis, commanding the 5th Marines,

and the regimental operations officer, Maj Richard J.

Alger (right), confer in the field on 16 August wit h

LtCol Charles B. Webster of the 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines during Cochise in the key Que Son Basin .
CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 2D NVA DIVISION 11 1

a sweep of the area located 40 VC bodies . Total

Marine casualties totaled only three wounded .

On the afternoon of the 18th, the first phase of

Operation Cochise ended and Task Force X-Ra y

withdrew Webster's battalion . The next morning

helicopters lifted the remaining two battalions int o

the Hiep Duc area for Phase II . Though the Marines

anticipated a sizable enemy force in this region ,

there was little contact and the operation turned int o

a bush-beating effort. The final phase of Cochise

began on the 25th and continued until 28 August .

Enemy contact during the last three days consisted o f

sniper fire and booby traps .

Final casualty results for Cochise included 15 6

enemy killed and 13 captured . Marine casualtie s

were light in comparison, 10 killed and 93 wounded .

Vietnamese Operation Lien Kit 112 accounted fo r

206 NVA killed, 12 prisoners, and 42 weapons seized. ARVN losses were more severe than Marin e

casualties during Cochise, 83 killed, 174 wounded ,

and 3 missing .

Although these operations forced a major portion

of the 2d NVA Division to withdraw, III MAF ha d

no illusions of the enemy abandoning the densel y

populated, rice-bearing lands of the Que Son Basin .

Cochise and Lien Ket 112 had been tactical victories ,

but the 2d NVA Division had suffered only a

reverse, not a defeat .

Operation Swift

As September neared, the Communists faced a n

increasing loss of control of the population in th e

coastal region south of Da Nang . The 2d NVA Division again moved into the Que Son Basin.

The Marines anticipated that the Communists

would try to increase their strength in this area during this period, since it corresponded with the tim e

of the South Vietnamese national elections, as well

as preparations for the fall rice harvest . At the beginning of September, intelligence sources reported

that elements of all three regiments of the NVA division had moved into the area . There were increasing

indications that these enemy units planned offensive

actions to disrupt the elections in Que Son District.

The Marines responded with numerous small uni t

operations to screen the district polling places.

Operation Swift was the outgrowth of one of the

election day screening sweeps near Dong Son (1 )

village, eight miles to the southwest of Thang Binh

along Route 534.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37035 5

The second phase of Operation Cochise brought little enemy contact since the elements of the 2d NVA

Division had withdrawn from the Que Son Basin.

This Marine moves down a narrow trail through

thick vegetation as Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th

Marines searches for the elusive North Vietnamese .

The operation began when the enemy attacked

Captain Robert F. Morgan's Company D, 5th

Marines just before dawn on 4 September . The action unfolded slowly . At 0430, the enemy forc e

struck the Marine company with small arms fire an d

mortar rounds from positions 100 meters northwest

and west of the company perimeter. The Marine s

returned fire and recalled the company outposts .

Help arrived in the form of an armed UH-1E, bu t

when the Marines marked their position with a

strobe light, the NVA soldiers saw it too . As soon a s

the light began flashing, the enemy hit the positio n

with even more accurate small arms and mortar fire .

A short time later, Marines discovered enemy infiltrators inside the western segment of the compan y

perimeter. Captain Morgan organized a force to

drive the NVA out and by 0620 reestablished th e

perimeter. As it reorganized, more NVA automati c

weapons hit Company D, killing Captain Morgan .

The executive officer, First Lieutenant William P .

Vacca, called for air strikes, some within 50 meters of
112

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CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 2D NVA DIVISION 11 3

the company lines . The enemy pulled back. As the

fire let up, Vacca completed the perimeter

reorganization and requested helicopter evacuatio n

for his casualties. At the same time, he reported that

he faced at least an enemy company and needed

help. His battalion commander, Lieutenant Colone l

Peter L. Hilgartner, responded by ordering Captai n

Thomas D. Reese, Jr .'s Company B, then 4,00 0

meters to the west and near the battalion CP on Hil l

51, to move overland to Vacca's position .

Company B arrived in the vicinity of the battle b y

0820, and within the hour it came under fire from

another enemy force, apparently a company, entrenched in the town of Dong Son (1) . Captain Rees e

asked for a tear gas drop on the dug-in NVA, an d

"Hueys" from VMO-2 obliged by dropping 400

pounds of the agent on the enemy lines. The Communists broke and ran north toward the Ly Ly River .

Company B attacked, killing 26 of the enemy, an d

secured the eastern end of Dong Son (1). Whil e

Company B fought in the east end of town,

HMM-363 helicopters arrived over the battle area t o

pick up Company D's casualties. The NVA forc e

greeted the aircraft with heavy fire and decoy smoke

signals. They hit two UH-34s and shot one down

over Company D. They also shot down one of

VMO-2's UH-lEs, piloted by Major David L . Ross,

who managed to land in the Company D perimeter .

Ross changed his "Deadlock" radio call sign to

"Deadlock on the deck" and continued to help direc t

air strikes on the enemy. He also provided ammunition and machine guns from his aircraft to help i n

the defense of the perimeter . ,

At 0925, Lieutenant Colonel Webster's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, based at the regimental command post seven miles east of Que Son, received orders to prepare two companies for a helilift to the

Dong Son area for attachment to Hilgartner's battalion. By 1245 both of the 3d Battalion companies ,

K and M, and Hilgartner's 1st Battalion command

group had landed four kilometers east-northeast of

Dong Son (1) and were preparing to move towar d

Companies B and D. Meanwhile, Company B foun d

another enemy pocket in the west end of Dong So n

(1) . After an air strike, the company moved in an d

cleared the west end; they killed nine more Communists in this action . Fighting in the town

diminished as Companies B and D consolidate d

their positions in the western edge of the village ;

Hilgartner's force was less fortunate.

At 1430, Hilgartner's Companies K and M were

advancing in column . Company K, accompanied by

Lieutenant Colonel Hilgartner's command group ,

led the movement . "We were alerted to the impending conflict," said Hilgartner, "when one of our

scouts brought in a Chinese-made, magazine-fed ,

light machine gun which was found teetering bac k

and forth on a large rock ." Hilgartner radioed this

information to Major Richard J. Alger, the regimental operations officer. Alger replied that he had just

received an intelligence report that a large enem y

force was in the area. 6

These two events gave Hilgartner time to begin t o

change his tactical formation from a column to tw o

companies on line . He ordered Company M to move

up on Company K's right . As Company M advanced, both companies came under intense fire from a

large NVA force in what the Marines later found t o

be an L-shaped, entrenched position. ?

Company M's 1st Platoon was crossing a rice paddy about 1430 when it first came under heavy fir e

from an estimated enemy company . First Lieutenant

John D . Murray, commanding Company M, sent his

2d Platoon to assist the 1st Platoon . While crossing a

small knoll near the village of Chau Lam (1), the 2 d

Platoon ran head-on into still another entrenche d

NVA company . The 1st Platoon's commander, Second Lieutenant Edward L. Blecksmith, ordered his

Marines to pull back to the top of the knoll . While

the 2d Platoon fought the by now attacking Nort h

Vietnamese, Lieutenant Murray ordered the remainder of the company to move onto the knoll wit h

the 1st Platoon and set up a perimeter. The enemy

quickly encircled Company M and pounded it wit h

more than 200 mortar rounds, as well as extremel y

heavy automatic weapons fire . Murray requested a

tear gas drop on the enemy positions to help the 2 d

Platoon disengage . While the gas did slow up the

Communist assaults, it did not help the man y

Marines who had lost or discarded their gas masks

during the action .

As the gas lifted, the NVA renewed their attac k

and, on at least one occasion, succeeded in

penetrating the 2d Platoon's lines. Sergeant

Lawrence D . Peters, a squad leader, stood up t o

point out NVA positions until hit in the leg : Despite

his wound, he led his men until they drove the

enemy from the position . Sergeant Peters died late r

that evening from a fragment wound . *

*Sergeant Peters received a posthumous Medal of Honor for his

actions. See Appendix D for the citation .
114 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

The enemy attacks separated Hilgartner's two

companies ; each had to fight independently. Captain Joseph R. Tenny, commanding Company K,

fought and maneuvered his company against th e

enemy in a'firefight that lasted until nightfall . Finally, he had to back off and set up night positions with

Hilgartner's command group .

As darkness fell over the Que Son Valley, the

Marines called for air strikes . Captain Robert J . Fitzsimmons and his aerial observer, First Lieutenan t

Robert H . Whitlow, arrived over the battlefield in a

Cessna 0-1 Bird Dog to control the strike .* Napalm

and 500-pound bombs exploded as close as 5 0

meters to Company M's lines . To the west, Marine

artillery from Que Son fired in support of Companies B and D . Early in the evening the fightin g

reached a crescendo when the North Vietnames e

opened up against the attacking planes with heavy

machine guns. Marine A-6A Intruders, directed b y

Whitlow, attacked the main cluster of enemy antiaircraft positions on Hill 63 . After silencing thes e

guns, the A-6As struck at Communist mortars

within 60 meters of Company K . By 2000 the one -

sided air-ground duel was over . Although scattere d

action continued on the ground, the destruction of

the NVA antiaircraft positions signaled the end o f

major fighting . Corporal Joseph E . Fuller, a Company M squad leader, was one of many infantryme n

who recognized the value of Marine close air support

during the night of 4 September. Referring to the

strikes, Fuller later commented, "I'd like to than k

the FAC that called it in . . . I think that is what really saved us. " e

Marine artillery fire from Que Son and Than g

Binh continued to pound the North Vietnames e

after the heaviest fighting subsided . Under the cover

of artillery fire, UH-34 helicopters from Lieutenant

Colonel Robert Lewis, Jr .'s HMM-363 delivered supplies and evacuated casualties . At 0100, Captain

Francis M . Burke's Company I, 5th Marines fought

its way to Hilgartner's positions . After its arrival, the

enemy backed off and the rest of the night passed

quietly. While these events took place, Lieutenant Colone l

Webster's 3d Battalion Command Group and Company D, 1st Marines received orders to join Corn -

*The 0-1 observation aircraft were not part of VMO-2 at thi s

time . Instead they had their own officer-in-charge who functioned

directly under MAG-16 . Colonel Philip M . Crosswait, comments

on draft ms, 14Jul81 (Vietnam comment files, MCHC ,

Washington, D.C.).

panies B and D to the west . Early on 5 September ,

Webster 's force reached the two companies, at whic h

time he assumed operational control .

The same morning, 5 September, Hilgartner' s

troops searched the battle area and reported 13 0

dead NVA soldiers and 37 captured weapons .

Marine casualties were 54 killed and 104 wounded ;

among those killed was the 3d Battalion 's chaplain ,

Lieutenant Vincent R. Capadonno, USNR. During

Company M's heavy fighting, Chaplain Capadonno

made repeated trips out of the perimeter to help 2 d

Platoon casualties. Wounded twice, he refused

medical aid, continuing to help wounded until killed by the enemy . Lieutenant Capadonno received a

posthumous Medal of Honor for his gallantry ; he

was the first Navy chaplain killed in action in Vietnam. *

Although the NVA broke contact with the

Marines, they did not leave the basin area . The 5th

Marines commander, Colonel Davis, ordered his 1s t

and 3d Battalions to sweep toward the foothills

bordering the southern edge of the basin . The morning of the 6th, the two battalion command group s

exhanged operational control of their respectiv e

companies and the 5th Marines continued the attac k

to the southeast . At 1515 that afternoon Hilgartner's

companies ran into two battalions of the 1st VC

Regiment near Vinh Huy (3) . Lead elements of th e

Marine battalion came under fire from snipers and as

the Marines continued to advance, heavy automati c

weapons fire stopped the lead platoon, the 3d Platoon of Company B, in an open rice paddy . Captain

Reese sent his 2d Platoon around to the right of th e

stalemated platoon to provide covering fire so that it

could withdraw, but the 2d Platoon also came unde r

extremely heavy and accurate fire which stopped its

advance . The Marines took cover behind some grave s

and a hedgerow and once more tried to establish a

base of fire to cover the 3d Platoon's withdrawal .

Again, enemy fire superiority prevailed . Reese then

sent the 1st Platoon further to the right in still

another attempt to outflank the NVA . As the 1st

Platoon moved, it found itself outflanked an d

almost surrounded . Forced to pull back almost immediately, the platoon had to leave some of its dead

behind, but managed to bring out all of the wound -

ed. While the North Vietnamese concentrated o n

the 1st Platoon, there was a lull in the firing in front

*See Appendix D for Chaplain Capadonno 's citation .
CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 2D NVA DIVISION 11 5

of the 3d Platoon, so at last, it managed to pull bac k

from the exposed paddy .

Next, the NVA hit the 2d Platoon position with a

frontal assault, as well as an envelopment of the

right flank. Lance Corporal Lonnie R . Henshaw

recalled :

We looked up and saw many NVA in full uniforms ,

packs, and cartridge belts running across the rice paddy at

us. We started shooting and we could see them falling, bu t

they didn't stop and more and more of them kept coming .

Nothing could stop them, it was like they were doped up . 9

The platoon commander, First Lieutenant John E .

Brackeen, seeing the enemy's flanking attempt ,

ordered the platoon to fall back 50 meters to a trench

line and set up a new perimeter. The NVA closed

quickly and the enemy attack turned into a grenade

duel. One landed in the trench near Lieutenant

Brackeen and some of his men . The platoon guide ,

Sergeant Rodney M . Davis, seeing the danger to his

lieutenant and the others, jumped on the grenade ,

taking the full impact of the explosion with his

body. For thus giving his life, Sergeant Davis received the Medal of Honor. *

By now the enemy, in strength, was so close that

Lieutenant Brackeen realized he could not hold the

position much longer. He requested tear gas to cover

the withdrawal of what was left of the platoon to th e

battalion perimeter. The tear gas worked and the

Marines moved back to the battalion position with

their wounded, but,not their dead .

After the gas attack to support Brackeen's

withdrawal, enemy fire slackened, but as the gas

dissipated the NVA renewed their assault. Artillery

fire from Lieutenant Colonel Robert E . Hunter, Jr .'s

2d Battalion, 11th Marines landed within 50 meter s

of the Marine lines, while air strikes hit as close a s

100 meters from the position . The NVA assaults

stopped ; however, as night fell the battalion came

under heavy mortar and rocket fire . NVA soldiers,

crawling as close as 15 meters to the perimeter,

began lobbing grenades into the lines, while others

attempted to slip through the defenses . The battalion's S-3, Major Charles H. Black, checking a sector of Company D's lines, discovered some of the infiltrators. Major Black killed several of them as h e

rallied nearby Marines to drive out the others. The

enemy attacked until about 0200, at which time the y

withdrew, leaving behind 61 bodies . The Marines

had lost 35 killed and 92 wounded in the action .

*See Appendix D for Sergeant Davis' citation .

Northeast of the 1st Battalion action, the 3d Battalion also became heavily engaged on the afternoo n

of 6 September. By 1400, Lieutenant Colonel

Webster's Marines had seized Hill 48, withou t

meeting significant resistance . Webster then ordere d

Captain Francis M . Burke's Company I to seize Hill

43, 1,100 meters southeast of Hill 48 . When Burke's

company was about 200 meters from the base of th e

hill, the lead elements saw two camouflaged NVA

soldiers and opened fire on them . Automatic

weapons fire erupted from the left front, but initial

Communist resistance was light and the lead platoon

continued to push through . Resistance began to stiffen and Captain Burke ordered his other two platoons up on either flank of the lead platoon . All

three platoons continued to push on . At 1630, heavy

machine gun fire hit Burke's left platoon . The advance stopped. Burke ordered the other two platoon s

to shift over to help the stalled platoon, but they also

became heavily engaged . Finally the company

managed to consolidate its position . Lieutenant Colonel Webster ordered Company K to go to Burke' s

assistance . By the time that Company K had fought

its way to Burke's position, Company I had many

casualties, some of whom were still forward of the

company front. With'the arrival of the second company, the Marines recovered most of their casualtie s

and established a better perimeter .

While the Marines consolidated their position, a

UH-1E gunship from Lieutenant Colonel Philip M .

Crosswait's VMO-2 reported a large number of NVA

immediately south of the perimeter . The pilot cut

short his report, saying that the enemy was, " . . .

swarming all over the' top of this hill and I've got t o

get to work ." 10 The gunship killed 23 NVA before it

had to break off the attack to rearm and refuel .

Between 1900 and 2300, Companies I and K

repulsed two determined NVA assaults. Heavy

machine guns supported both attacks and the second

broke into the Marine positions before the Marine s

threw it back after furious hand-to-hand fighting .

At 2300, Lieutenant Murray's Company M, the battalion reserve, joined Companies I and K . The

enemy pressed the position until just after midnight

when the Marines used tear gas to drive them off.

Only a few mortar rounds interrupted the rest of the

night. Dawn revealed 88 enemy bodies around the

position . Webster's losses were 34 killed and 10 9

wounded.

At first light on 7 September, both battalion s

began searching the enemy dead for items of in-
Major Engagem

Operation Sw

4 - 15 Septembe

0 

kilometers t

See Reference Map, Sections 58

()Caches Found Here >~ r

001 ,,-o-o i

I(
CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 2D NVA DIVISION 11 7

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37039 9

Operation Swift's objective was to destroy elements of the 2d NVA Division and deny

the enemy access to the food derived from the basin's extensive rice paddies, such as

these being crossed by Marines with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines on 7 September .

telligence value . They found a map which reveale d

the defensive positions of a battalion of the 1st VC

Regiment. It pinpointed company and command

post locations, as well as mortar positions and am -

munition storage sites . This information triggered

an attack to the east by Hilgartner's battalion . Supporting arms blasted the plotted enemy positions

and then the infantry swept through them . As the

operation progressed, on the 9th, the 1st Battalion

Marines found 91 cases of small arms ammunition ,

27 cases of mortar rounds, hundreds of hand

grenades, and 6 cases of 75mm recoilless rifle round s

as well as a vast assortment of loose ordnance . The

Marines saved samples for intelligence purposes, an d

blew the rest in place . *

At this time, General Robertson again activate d

Task Force X-Ray under the command of Brigadie r

General LaHue . X-Ray now included the U.S .

Army's 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, commanded b y

Lieutenant Colonel Peter P . Petro, USA .

Simultaneously, the Vietnamese started their companion Operation Lien Ket 116.

*Lieutenant Colonel William K. Rockey arrived by helicopte r

around noon that day, 7 September 1967, and assumed command

of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines from Lieutenant Colone l

Webster. Colonel William K . Rockey, Comments on draft ms ,

28Jul81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)

There were two more significant encounters during the last days of Operation Swift . The first occurred on 10 September during a patrol northeast o f

Hill 43 by Captain Gene W. Bowers' Company H ,

2d Battalion, 5th Marines. *

Early in the afternoon, Company H searched a

small village and found it empty except for a few

women and children . The Marines noted, however ,

that the enemy had fortified the village with

bunkers, interlocking trenches, and barbed wire .

Upon completion of its search of the village, Company H continued its patrol. After moving another

1,500 meters, the company established a defensiv e

position on a small hill at about 1400 and requeste d

resupply by helicopter . To provide additional security, Captain Bowers ordered Second Lieutenant Alla n

J . Herman's 3d Platoon to patrol around the hill in a

circle with about a one-mile radius. The 3d Platoon

departed the perimeter and a heavy rain began falling .

The patrol route took the 3d Platoon back to th e

small village which Company H had recently search -

ed. In the interim, however, a reinforced North

Vietnamese company had slipped back and reoc-

*Captain Bowers' company served under the operational control of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines at this time .
118 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37039 7

LCpI Patrick J. Ferguson, who had received a superficial gunshot wound in the left side in June, takes a

breather on 7 September during Operation Swift .

LCpI Ferguson, who is carrying an AN/PRC-4 7

radio, was part of a forward air control team attache d

to the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines for the operation .

cupied the well-constructed defensive positions.

Herman's platoon reached the vicinity of the villag e

around 1430 and began crossing the rice paddies

around it. The North Vietnamese company remained quiet until the lead squad of Marines was abou t

to enter the village, then opened up with sudden ,

intense, automatic weapons fire, includin g

.50-caliber machine guns, and virtually eliminated

lead Marine squad. The heavy fire, supplemented by

60mm mortars, gave the North Vietnamese fire

superiority over the rest of the Marine platoon and i t

could not move . The platoon was soon leaderless;

Lieutenant Herman died trying to rescue a wounded

Marine in the rice paddy .

Company H had just received its supplies b y

helicopter when Captain Bowers heard the sound o f

automatic weapons and mortars from the directio n

of the village . Since he could not contact the 3d Platoon by radio, Captain Bowers left a small contingent to guard the supplies and quickly moved th e

rest of his company toward the sound of the firing .

Enroute, Bowers made radio contact with a wounded

corporal from the 3d Platoon who described the

situation, including the death of Lieutenant Herman.

Captain Bowers sent the 2d Platoon around to the

left where it could provide a base of fire as well as

cover by fire the enemy escape route from the rear of

the village. The company headquarters and the 1st

Platoon continued toward the 3d Platoon and attempted to gain fire superiority over the NVA unit .

"Mortar and artillery fire, " wrote Bowers, "was

brought to bear on the enemy . . . with fire landing

within 50 meters of friendly positions . Helicopte r

gunships arrived to rocket and strafe the NVA [posi -

tions] while artillery sealed the rear of the village . "1 1

Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, which

the battalion commander sent to assist Company H ,

arrived on the scene and joined the fight . After

several air strikes by fixed-wing aircraft armed wit h

250-pound bombs, two A-4 aircraft dropped tear gas

on the enemy. The two rifle companies then made a

successful, coordinated assault on the village . Only a

few NVA soldiers escaped out the other side of the

village .

After the assault, the Marines searched the village

and counted 40 dead NVA soldiers above ground.

Others, Bowers reported, probably lay buried in the

bunkers and trenches collapsed by the artillery an d

air strikes.

Nine Marines died in the action, six of them in th e

rice paddies just in front of the enemy fortifications .

"[They] were found," noted Bowers in 1981, "wit h

their M-16 rifles broken down in an attempt to

remove cartridges jammed in the chambers . They

had powder-burned bullet holes in their heads."1 2

The second engagement at the end of Operatio n

Swift started at 0330 the morning of 12 September.

Two NVA companies attacked Captain Burke' s

Company I patrol base . Burke's Marines repulsed th e

attack, but as the enemy withdrew they bumped in -

to one of Captain Tenney's Company K platoon out -

posts and received a further battering. NVA losses

were 35 killed and four captured .

During the same period, an ARVN ranger grou p

operating north of the Swift AO during Operation

Lien Ket 116 had two sizable contacts. The morning

of 10 September, the 37th Ranger Battalion cam e

under heavy mortar attack, followed by a groun d

assault by a NVA battalion . When the enemy finall y

withdrew, the rangers had lost 13 killed, 33 wounded, and 9 missing, but the NVA left 70 bodie s

behind.
CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 2D NVA DIVISION 11 9

Elements of two enemy battalions hit the rangers

again at 1700 on the 13th . The enemy closed to

grenade range and heavy action continued unti l

about 1900 . That night, more ARVN units arrived

in the area in helicopters to help the rangers . Both

the 1st and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines debarke d

from helicopters in a secure LZ northeast of th e

engaged ranger group . The Marine battalions attacked south-southeast to relieve the pressure on th e

rangers, and by dawn, the NVA broke contact leaving 49 bodies on the battlefield . The rangers suffered 69 wounded and 15 killed in the engagement .

This action was the last sizable encounter of both

Swift and Lien Ket 116 .

Operation Swift ended on 15 September . Onc e

more allied forces had driven the 2d NVA Divisio n

from the basin. The enemy's 1967 dry season offensive in the southern part of I Corps had failed . By the

end of September allied commands regarded the 1st

VC and 3d NVA Regiments unfit for combat . Mor e

than 4,000 enemy troops reportedly died between 2 1

April, when Union I began, and the last day o f

September. A prime reason for this turn of event s

was the sudden arrival of a large U .S. Army force in

Southern I Corps, which allowed III MAF units to

operate in the Que Son Basin on a permanent basis ,

thereby breaking the Communist stranglehold o n

the area .

Operation Swift's heavy, sustained combat create d

personnel accounting problems which were unusua l

in the kind of war most of the 1st Marine Divisio n

fought in 1967 . The 5th Marines and the divisio n

encountered many difficulties during Swift wit h

casualty reporting, recovery, evacuation, an d

disposition of the dead, as well as with what Colone l

William R. Earney termed "the big No-No," missing

in action. "They [5th Marines] could tell you," commented Colonel Earney, "where the enemy v.-as an d

their body count [of enemy dead] but not a comprehensive report as to what their own conditio n

was ." 13 The task of answering many of the personne l

questions fell to the division staff, including, according to Colonel Earney, determining which morgu e

held the corpse of Medal of Honor ,recipient

Capadonno before his brother arrived in South Vietnam to view the body . "

Other allied activity, both north and south of the

Que Son Basin, also hurt Communist formations in I

Corps . The enemy, buffeted between the allied

forces in the basin and those in contiguous areas, los t

the initiative . To the north, Colonel Herbert E . Ing's

1st Marines continued to prod the VC around Ho i

An. Operation Pike, conducted in early August, wa s

one of the more significant operations in this area .

Two Marine battalions, Lieutenant Colonel George

E. Petro's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and Lieutenant

Colonel Webster's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines executed a box and sweep maneuver that accounted fo r

100 enemy dead and four captured . South of the

basin, General Knowles' Task Force Oregon conducted Operation Benton in the hills west of Chu La i

during the latter part of August . Army troops made

a helicopter assault of a suspected enemy base camp

and then drove south and east, encountering enemy

platoons and companies. When Benton ended, on 1

September, Task Force Oregon reported 397 NV A

soldiers killed and nine captured .

Much further south, between Quang Ngai an d

Duc Pho, Task Force Oregon 's Operation Malheur

series, lasting from 11 May through 2 August, produced a total of 857 enemy troops killed. A more

important result was the opening of Route 1 fro m

the border of II Corps to Dong Ha, the last section o f

this vital artery to be cleared in I Corps .

Hood River followed Malheur II in a locale 2 5

miles south of Quang Ngai City. Hood River occurred in conjunction with the Korean Marine Brigade' s

Dragon Head V and the 2d ARVN Division's Lien

Ket 110. The soldiers on Hood River claimed credit

for 78 enemy dead and 45 prisoners . Army casualtie s

were only three killed .

All of these operations maintained constant

pressure on the 2d NVA Division . Continual use of

the search and destroy process in the basin and adjacent areas from April through August by the 5th

Marines, the Special Landing Force, and ARVN

units forced the enemy to move south . As the Communists tried to regroup in the hills west of Chu Lai ,

Task Force Oregon pushed them back to the Que

Son Basin to face the Marine and ARVN Swift-Lien

Ket 116 operations . Once more the enemy

withdrew, this time trying to escape to the hills near

Tam Ky . There four U .S. Army battalions were on

hand to meet the remnants of the 2d NVA Division

during Operation Wheeler. Task Force Oregon

became the Americal Division on 22 September and

by the end of that month the soldiers of the Arm y

division had killed an additional 442 Communists.

Once more they drove the NVA units back into th e

basin . A new opponent was waiting for the North

Vietnamese division.
120 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

A Busy Calm Before the Storm

Increased September activity in I Corps once mor e

caused General Westmoreland to send reinforcements north . On 4 October, Colonel James D .

McKenna's 3d Brigade, 1st U.S. Cavalry Division ,

having been transferred to III MAF and, in turn, t o

the Americal Division, began Operation Wallowa in

the Que Son Basin . With the arrival of this brigade ,

the Americal Division took over responsibility fo r

the entire basin and the 5th Marines moved to Hoi

An, relieving Colonel Ing's 1st Marines there .

Operational control of the 1st Marines shifted from

the 1st to 3d Marine Division and Colonel Ing then

moved his headquarters and two battalions to th e

northern provinces of I Corps .' ,

Most operations in southern I Corps during th e

last three months of 1967 reflected the enemy 's

desire to avoid casualties, but even in this the enem y

was unsuccessful . The Americal Division, now commanded by Major General Samuel W . Koster, USA ,

continued to harry the 2d NVA Division in the Que

Son Valley as the Communists frantically tried t o

collect rice and supplies there . During October, th e

Army units, engaged in Operation Wheeler and

Wallowa, were in almost constant contact with small

NVA units . By the end of the month Operation

Wheeler had reported 498 enemy killed, while

Wallowa recorded another 675 NVA dead .

During November, the Americal Division combined Operations Wheeler and Wallowa as Operation Wheeler/Wallowa and a force of seven U .S. Army battalions, more than twice the number

previously available, deployed in the area . The army

battalions systematically pursued NVA elements as

they tried to escape to the mountains in the west .

Ancillary operations such as the 2d Battalion, 5t h

Marines' Essex in "Antenna Valley," six miles south

of An Hoa, drove the enemy back against the Arm y

units in the basin .

There were two main engagements with NV A

forces in Antenna Valley during Operation Essex . *

Both involved company-sized attacks on fortifie d

villages which the North Vietnamese chose to de -

fend. Lieutenant Colonel George C . McNaughton ,

commander of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines ,

described these fortified villages in his after-actio n

report:

*In Operation Mississippi in Antenna Valley during the fall of

1966, the Marines evacuated more than 2,000 refugees . Less than

600 civilians remained in the entire valley in 1967 .

In each instance, the village had a wire fence around the

perimeter . . . concisting of three to six strands of cattle

fence with woven wire running up and down through th e

horizontal strands . The wire fence line was either concealed in bamboo tree lines or camouflaged with bamboo an d

shrubs. Behind these perimeter fences, the enemy had dug

a communication trench . . . that was four to six feet deep

with firing positions and deep caves for protection agains t

artillery and air attack . Some of these caves were fiftee n

feet deep. Spider holes, caves, and bunkers were found i n

depth through the village . Fortifications were carefull y

located to achieve an interlocking and mutually supporting series of defensive positions. Both [villages] were

located such that attacking infantry had to cross strea m

barriers [to reach] the defensive positions. As attacking

troops emerged from the stream beds, they foun d

themselves to be within close range (50-150 meters) of th e

enemy perimeter defenses with open rice paddy in between . [Both villages were] situated on the sides of th e

valley adjacent to high ground such that the enemy had

ready routes of egress into the mountains . i6

Both Marine attacks took place during afternoo n

hours and the enemy force successfully defended its

positions into the night. In each case, however, the

NVA defenders withdrew from the fortified positions under cover of darkness in spite of continuous

artillery fire in and behind the village . " In

summary," wrote McNaughton, "when Marine units

attacked the villages in the afternoon, the enem y

defended with vigor. When Marine units delayed an

attack until dawn and conducted heavy preparatio n

by air and artillery, the NVA units made their

escape .' "

Company H, commanded by Captain Gene W.

Bowers, conducted one of the fortified village

assaults. Bowers used tactics similar to those that ha d

succeeded so well in a similar situation during

Operation Swift.

Company H had landed by helicopter in Antenna

Valley earlier in the day, as had the rest of the 2 d

Battalion, 5th Marines.* The company then proceeded toward its assigned objective, the village of

Ap Bon (2) in the northeast portion of the valley . As

it approached the objective, Company H made

heavy contact with a large enemy force within the

village .

Captain Bowers ordered Second Lieutenan t

Duane V. Sherin to maneuver his 2d Platoon to the

left of the village and then envelop the enemy . The

platoon, however, ran into more NVA soldiers in the

*Company F, according to the original plan, was not schedule d

to participate in Operation Essex . It was to remain in the battalion's primary TAOR as a rapid reaction force .
CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 2D NVA DIVISION 12 1

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18979 0

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines boards helicopters in November for Operation Essex in

Antenna Valley, six miles south of An Hoa . Essex drove the 2d NVA Division back into

the Que Son Basin where the America/ Division was conducting Wheeler/Wallowa .

heavy brush west of the village, sustained two

Marines killed and several wounded, and then, o n

Bowers' orders, withdrew with its casualties back to

the company . Upon its arrival at the company position, Bowers directed the 2d Platoon to move to the

company's right flank and establish a base of fire fo r

an assault on the village by the 1st and 3d Platoons .

The assault began after air and artillery strikes on A p

Bon(2). Bowers recalled the subsequent action :

The assault was well-coordinated and executed, maintaining continuous fire superiority over the enemy unti l

the assault line reached the bamboo hedgerow on the

periphery of the village . Eight taut strands of U .S . [-type ]

barbed wire were unexpectedly encountered woven amon g

the bamboo stalks. As the Marines fought to break

through the barrier, .50 caliber machine guns from 80 0

meters on the right flank and 800 meters on the left flan k

commenced enfilading, grazing fire down the line of barbed wire, as 60mm, 82mm, and 4 .2-inch mortar rounds

began impacting in the paddy before the village . One platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Robert W . Miller,

Jr., was killed and both platoon sergeants were severel y

wounded . The assault faltered and the Marines took cover ,

protected by small inter-paddy dikes . 1,

Edward J. "Buck" Byer, Jr .'s Company F arrived

about 1600 . With Company H acting as a base o f

fire on the village, Company F made an assaul t

which the North Vietnamese repulsed .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18979 1

Marine UH-34Ds land the 2d Battalion, 5th Marine s

in abandoned rice paddies in Antenna Valley at the

beginning of Operation Essex. Few civilians remained in the area after the evacuation of the valley in th e

fall of 1966 by Marines in Operation Mississippi.

The fighting developed into an exchange of rifl e

fire and grenades as reported air strikes hit the

village . Some bombs and napalm fell within 50

meters of the exposed Marines in the paddies. Captain Bowers requested reinforcements and Captain
122 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

At dusk, both companies moved back about 7 0

meters, carrying all wounded Marines and equipment, and established night defensive positions.

The North Vietnamese maintained pressure on the

two companies until almost dawn despite flares and

machine gun fire from AC-130s, which fired on

targets within 10 meters of the Marines. Around

0430, the North Vietnamese slipped away .

At dawn, the two Marine companies advanced

and searched the village without resistance . There

were no enemy bodies. All bunkers and trenches ha d

collapsed under the intensive artillery and air strikes .

The Marine companies had suffered 53 seriou s

casualties, including 16 dead, in the fighting of A p

Bon (2) .

The following days involved pursuit of smal l

groups of fleeing NVA soldiers . On 10 November,

the 2d Battalion captured an NVA aspirant (office r

cadet) who claimed to have been in Ap Bon (2) on 6

November . He said the village had contained a division headquarters battalion. A direct bomb hit on

the command post bunker killed the battalion commander; 60 enlisted men died in the fighting an d

many were severely wounded. Operation Essex ended a few days later, on the 17th .

By the end of December, cumulative reports for

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37066 1

A member of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines' 81 m m

Mortar Platoon, chilled and wet from the monsoo n

rains, takes a rest during Operation Pitt in December. Pitt was one of several operations late in th e

year which the 1st Marine Division conducted to protect the Da Nang air base from enemy rocket attacks .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37105 3

LCpl C. M. Wolfe, clad in a rain suit as protection from the cold monsoon rains in

December, takes a message over an AN/PR C-25 radio . He and other members of the 2d

Battalion, 7th Marines on Operation Pitt have fashioned a "hooch" from ponchos as protection from the weather. Air mattresses in the shelter keep the Marines out of the mud.
CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST THE 2D NVA DIVISION 12 3

Wheeler/Wallowa cited 3,188 enemy killed, 87 captured, and 743 weapons seized, while U.S. Army

units listed their own losses as 258 killed and 1,190

wounded. As 1967 ended there could be little question that control of the Que Son Basin was returnin g

to the South Vietnamese Government .

North of the Que Son Valley, in the 1st Marine

Division 's Quang Nam Province zone of action, the

level of enemy contacts dropped during this period .

Fifth Marines units executed Operations Onslow an d

Essex, while elements of the 7th Marines conducte d

Knox, Foster, Pitt, Citrus, and Auburn . All of these

operations were designed to keep the enemy out of

the Da Nang rocket belt. The most significant of

these was Foster and a companion SLF operation ,

Badger Hunt. *

Foster/Badger Hunt followed two savage Viet

Cong attacks against the district headquarters an d

refugee settlement at Duc Duc and Dai Loc, 15 miles

southwest of Da Nang . The attacks killed 34

civilians, wounded 42, and another 51 were reporte d

missing . In addition, the enemy destroyed 559

houses and left 625 families homeless.

*See Chapter 10 for the SLF participation in Badger Hunt .

The Marines retaliated with Operation Foster ,

conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Roger H .

Barnard's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines and Operation

Badger Hunt utilizing SLF Bravo 's BLT 2/3, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Englisch .

Both were coordinated search and destroy endeavors

in the river complex of the Dai Loc District and in

the flatlands and foothills west of the An Hoa industrial complex . Intelligence reports placed the

Viet Cong R-20 and V-25 Battalions and the Q-13

Company in these areas .

The operation began at 0900 on 13 November .

BLT 2/3 landed by helicopter west of An Hoa, an d

two hours later Barnard's Marines landed northwes t

of the complex near Dai Loc . Initially there wer e

numerous contacts with small groups of VC trying t o

escape . The Marines uncovered many VC bunkers

and logistic areas . With the exception of on e

company-size fight on 29 November, the enemy

concentrated on escaping. Marine reconnaissance

and air observers sighted numerous fleeing enemy

groups; artillery and air strikes directed against these

groups caused the majority of enemy casualties inflicted during Foster. For the Marine infantry units,

the operation was more successful in terms of

The rotor wash from a medevac helicopter, not to mention the proximity of the aircraft

itself forces men of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines to duck during Operation Foster, on e

of the operations protecting the Da Nang air base complex from enemy rocket attacks.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371016
124 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37065 9

Patrols in the rugged interior of South Vietnam could encounter dangers other than

enemy soldiers. Three men of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, wearing unorthodox

uniforms, proudly display the hide of a tiger they killed during a five-day patrol. They

are, from left, LCpl James Ortega, LCpI Thomas L . Little, and Sgt James L. Griffith.

destruction of enemy supplies and installations tha n

enemy killed . The Marines destroyed 6,000 enem y

buildings, bunkers, tunnels, and shelters and uncovered rice caches totaling 87 tons. By the end o f

the operation, 30 November, reported enem y

casualties totaled 125 killed and eight captured .

More important than the personnel losses inflicted

on the enemy, the Marines evacuated more than

11,500 refugees from the Communist-dominated

area .

The loss of a large, readily available labor and

manpower pool annoyed the local Communist

leaders . Previously, the enemy, following the Communist guerrilla dictum that the good will of th e

people must be preserved, had been very selective in

targeting acts of terror. During December, as th e

Marines challenged their hold on the populace ,

Communist terror attacks increased, demonstratin g

that the "liberating" Communists were not really

concerned about popular good will . Distrust of the

Communists spread in the refugee communities . Intended to force the refugees to abandon their

Government-sponsored settlements, the terror raids

caused grave doubts about the promises made by th e

Viet Cong.

The refugees from western Quang Nam Province ,

like those from the Que Son Basin and the coasta l

plains of Quang Ngai Province, demonstrated a

desire not to be incorporated in the Communist

system . Would they rally to the South Vietnames e

Government and be loyal citizens? The next step wa s

the implementation of the pacification program to

win the support of the mass of displaced, confused ,

and often apathetic residents of Vietnam's food -

producing regions. In I Corps it was III MAF's job t o

provide the physical security for the Vietnames e

Government's pacification efforts . It would prove t o

be a tough, unrewarding, tedious assignment .
CHAPTER 1 0

Fall Fighting in the North

Operation Kingfisher—Medina/Bastion Hill/Lam Son 13 8

Adjustments Within the 3d Marine Division

Operation Kingfisher

After the conclusion of Operation Buffalo, II I

MAF ordered a sweep of the southern half of the

DMZ. The Marines intended for the operation,

Hickory II, to destroy enemy fortifications, mortar ,

and artillery positions in the southern portion of the

buffer zone . The concept resembled that employed

during Operation Hickory, the Marines' initial entry

into the area on 18 May .

During Hickory II, two Marine battalions, one

from SLF Alpha, attacked north to the Ben Hai

River, wheeled about, and swept southward to th e

Cam Lo River. BLT 2/ 3 of SLF Bravo screened the inland left flank, while to the east three ARVN battalions and an armored personnel carrier troop advanced up Route 1 to the Ben Hai, then turned an d

attacked southward . On the coast east of the ARVN

thrust, Lieutenant Colonel Albert R . Bowman II's

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion drove northwar d

through the coastal sand dunes from Cua Viet .

There was little resistance . The sharpest action occur -

red on 15 July, when Bowman's battalion engage d

an enemy unit four miles east of Gio Linh, killin g

25 . Marine casualties, when the operation ended o n

16 July, were four killed and 90 wounded . Total

NVA losses totaled 39 killed and 19 weapons captured .

At the close of Hickory II, the two SLF battalions ,

upon release by III MAF, returned to a ready statu s

off the coast of I Corps, but the remaining five battalions which comprised the 3d and 9th Marines

began a new operation in the same general area .

Called Operation Kingfisher, its mission, as i n

previous operations along the DMZ, was to bloc k

NVA entry into Quang Tri Province . From the 16t h

through the 27th there were only minor contacts.

On 28 July the 3d Marine Division sent Lieutenan t

Colonel William D . Kent's 2d Battalion, 9th

Marines, reinforced with a platoon of tanks, thre e

Ontos, three LVTEs, and engineers, on a spoiling at -

tack into the DMZ. The main body, including th e

tracked vehicles, moved north on Provincial Rout e

606 with Companies E and G providing security o n

the flanks. Company F remained in a landing zon e

south of Con Thien, ready to board helicopters an d

exploit any heavy contact with the enemy .

There was no contact ; the armored column move d

north without incident . The terrain, however ,

restricted the tracked vehicles to the road and thic k

vegetation made movement difficult for the flankin g

companies. Further, the terrain canalized the column into a relatively narrow "V" of land bounded by

the Ben Hai River on the west and north and a

tributary stream to the east . The reinforced battalio n

would have to return by the same route by which i t

entered the DMZ.* The North Vietnamese were

already moving units into previously prepared positions covering Route 606 .

The North Vietnamese did not molest the Marine s

in their night defensive positions near the Ben Hai

River. The following morning, the 2d Battalion

scouted the objective area and destroyed severa l

small abandoned fortification complexes .

Late in the morning the battalion began its movement south out of the DMZ . It would move in a column led by Company E and followed by Comman d

Group A, H&S Company, Command Group B, and

Companies F, H, and G. An airborne forward ai r

controller circled overhead ; he would soon be busy .

Company E began moving south at 1000 ; at 111 5

the enemy detonated a 250-lb bomb buried in th e

road, wounding five Marines. Nearby, engineers

found a similar bomb, rigged as a command -

detonated mine, and destroyed it .

Upon the second explosion, North Vietnames e

soldiers near the road opened fire on the colum n

with machine guns, rifles, and 60mm and 82m m

*Major Willard H. Woodring, commanding the 3d Battalion ,

9th Marines, raised these objections at a division briefing prior to

the operation . Colonel John C. Studt, Comments on draft ms ,

9Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)

125
126 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

3d MarDiv ComdC, July 196 7

The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, supported by tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion, moves

through the open terrain south of the Ben Hai River in Operation Hickory II in July .

An armored column, composed of tanks, Ontos, amphibian tractors, and infantrymen

from the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines moves unopposed toward the Ben Hai River inside

the Demilitarized Zone on 28 July . NVA units, however, already were moving in

behind the column and it would have to fight its way south to safety the following day .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A191240
FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 12 7

mortars, initiating a running battle that did not en d

until dark. The NVA units, using heavy fire from

prepared positions combined with the maneuver of

other units, quickly fragmented the armored column

into roughly company-sized segments . Each isolated

segment fought its own way through the gauntlet o f

fire.

The tracked vehicles became more of a liability

than a tactical asset. They were restricted to the road

because the thick brush provided excellent cover fo r

NVA soldiers armed with antitank weapons . Instead

of providing support to the infantry Marines, th e

tracked vehicles required infantry protection . Using

them as ambulances to transport the wounded further reduced the vehicles' ability to fight.

Tracked vehicles suffered all along the column .

An RPG round penetrated both sides of an LVTE

moving with Company E . Another RPG explosion

disabled the turret of a tank with Company F, wounding three crewmen . When Company H brought up

an Ontos to suppress NVA fire that was holding up

its movement, an RPG gunner hit the vehicle and

wounded three crewmen. A second Ontos came for -

ward, beat down the enemy fire with its machine

gun, and permitted the company to move again .

The infantry's primary fire support came from the

airborne controllers, one of whom was on statio n

throughout the day . The controller maintained con -

tact with air representatives with each company an d

with the battalion air liaison officer. The airborne

forward air controller directed fixed-wing air strike s

whenever needed. The Marine infantrymen neede d

them often.

The North Vietnamese units knew the dange r

from American supporting arms and attempted t o

stay close to the Marine column. Company F had

hardly cleared its night defensive position when i t

realized an NVA unit had immediately occupied the

position . At another point, Marine engineers with

Company E spotted a 12 .7mm antiaircraft machine

gun just off the road . They attacked, killed seven

NVA soldiers, and destroyed the weapon and its ammunition. At the rear of the column, Company G

had problems with enemy units following in its trac e

and maneuvering back and forth across the road .

Company G killed 12 and wounded 10 of thes e

soldiers; an attached scout-sniper team kille d

another 15 . Shortly afterward, an enemy assaul t

from the flank almost cut the company in two, bu t

the attack failed .

Shortly after Company F took its place in the col -

umn, it received instructions to establish a helicopte r

landing zone for evacuating casualties from Company E and H&S Company . When the tanks carrying

the dead and wounded reached the zone, the enemy

opened up with RPGs, machine guns, and 60mm

and 82mm mortars . The mortar fire walked across

the entire landing zone . In addition to the earlie r

casualties, the Marines now had anothr seven men

killed and 31 more Marines and Navy corpsme n

wounded .

A gap then developed between the rear of H&S

Company and Company F . The latter company loaded the casualties in the zone on the tanks and attacked to close the gap . It did so at the cost of a further

two dead and 12 wounded by NVA mortar fire . The

company resumed its fight south .

Late in the afternoon, Company E and Command

Group A managed to break through the enemy t o

safety. They left behind, however, two Company E

squads which could not move because of intense

enemy automatic weapons and rifle fire that killed

two and wounded nine Marines . Company E and the

command group continued on until they linked up

at 1830 with Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marine s

which had moved up from Con Thien.

By this time the other companies of the 2d Battalion were no longer able to continue south ; there

were too many casualties to move . At 1930, Company H drew back and established a defensive position on high ground at the edge of the clearin g

through which Route 606 passed at that point . Joining Company H were Company F, two other squad s

from Company E, two squads from Company G ,

plus H&S Company . It was an all-infantry force ; the

tracked vehicles, carrying some of the wounded, ha d

broken through to join the lead elements at the position of Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines .

Company G's movement came to an end abou t

the same time . It could no longer both fight an d

transport its wounded. By 2100, the company was i n

a defensive position for the night .

The two isolated squads from Company E foun d

themselves rescued early in the evening. Lieutenant

Colonel Kent had taken operational control of Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines and accompanie d

that unit back to the two squads . They accomplishe d

the mission by 1930 and Company M moved into a

good defensive position for the night. To the south,

the bulk of Company E organized its defenses an d

called in medevac helicopters for the casualties .

The remainder of the night was relatively quiet ;
128 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

the NVA units were pulling back . Company G and

Company F both heard much shouting west of their

respective positions and called in artillery missions .

The final event of the fight occurred at 0330 when

an NVA soldier crept up to Company F's perimeter

and killed one Marine and wounded three with a

burst of automatic weapons fire . Other Marines

opened fire and the NVA soldier withdrew.

The following morning, the 30th, helicopters

evacuated all casualties located at Company G's position. Company M, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines an d

Lieutenant Colonel Kent moved north to link up

with the rest of the 2d Battalion. The Marines

evacuated the remainder of the casualties by 090 0

and all units were out of the DMZ by 1150 behind a

screen provided by the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines .

The gauntlet had been costly for Lieutenant Colonel Kent's 2d Battalion. Twenty-three Marines died

and the wounded totaled 251, of whom 191 required evacuation . There were 32 confirmed NV A

dead but the battalion estimated another 175 probably died . While the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines ' battle quickly entered the division's folklore as "2/9's armored

thrust into the DMZ," t an earlier and relatively

minor action on Route 9 had a more lasting impact

on the tactical situation in northern I Corps . It led to

an end to vehicle convoys to Khe Sanh ; thereafter ,

the base relied upon aerial resupply .

III MAF supplied Khe Sanh at the time by aircraft

and "Rough Rider" vehicle convoys from Dong Ha .

One of the largest of the convoys, composed of ove r

85 vehicles and several U .S . Army 175mm guns, 2

departed Dong Ha on 21 July . Part of its route passed through the TAOR of Lieutenant Colonel Robert

C. Needham's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. This gave

the battalion the responsibility for securing that portion of Route 9 .

Lieutenant Colonel Needham ordered his Company M to send a platoon out that morning to swee p

Route 9 from Ca Lu west to the boundary betwee n

the regimental TAORs of the 3d and 26th Marines .

The convoy departed Dong Ha at about the sam e

time as the 2d Platoon, Company M began its chec k

of the road.

The 2d Platoon searched Route 9 without inciden t

for about five kilometers . Then the point surprised

an NVA soldier urinating beside the road . 3 The

point opened fire ; other NVA soldiers answered with

rifle fire from high ground north of the road an d

from a tree line south of it. The whole platoo n

quickly became engaged with what the platoon commander first believed was an NVA platoon. He soo n

changed his estimate to an NVA battalion .

Infantrymen of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines move into the safety of the perimeter of

the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines on 30 July after a running battle the previous day with

NVA units that fought to fragment the column and destroy the reinforced Marine battalion piecemeal as it came back south from the Ben Hai River and out of the DMZ.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 189064
FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 12 9

The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines ordered the platoo n

to disengage but the unit could not do so . The battalion staff at Ca Lu worked quicky to coordinate ai r

and artillery support and alerted the rest of Company M to prepare to move to the 2d Platoon 's

rescue . In the midst of this activity, the Rough Ride r

convoy's arrival at Ca Lu created some confusion . 4

The battalion requested and received permission t o

halt the convoy immediately since there was only on e

place between Ca Lu and the 2d Platoon's position

where the convoy could be turned around . ,

Company M moved toward the firefight with tw o

U.S. Army vehicles in support. One of these

mounted dual 40mm cannon, the other carried a

quad- .50 machine gun . As the force neared the 2 d

Platoon, the enemy fired approximately 200 rounds

from 82mm mortars at the road . Enemy rifleme n

opened fire from the high ground north of the road .

Under the cover of fixed-wing aircraft strikes on

the high ground and heavy fire from the two Arm y

vehicles, Company M reached its 2d Platoon and th e

Marines disengaged . Two tanks came up from Ca Lu

and provided additional fire against the tree line t o

the south . The combined force then returned to Ca

Lu .

The Rough Rider convoy could not continue t o

Khe Sanh until the road was secure . The division

ordered it to turn around and return to Camp Carroll.

At noon the following day, the 22d, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, using its own Company L an d

Companies A and C of the 9th Marines, moved

against the enemy positions north of Route 9 . There

was only scattered contact with the enemy ; however,

the Marines found ample evidence the previous day's

action had prevented a major ambush of the Roug h

Rider convoy to Khe Sanh . They found 150 wellcamouflaged fighting holes in the area where the 2d

Platoon had engaged the enemy . The North Vietnamese obviously had constructed the fighting hole s

for a horseshoe-shaped ambush whose killing zon e

was the open road . Nearby was a large, abandoned

NVA base camp containing another 200 fightin g

holes and 25 two- and four-man log bunkers

camouflaged with dirt and elephant grass . The camp

also contained several huts, some for sleeping an d

others for cooking.

The following day Company K, 3d Marines, sup -

ported by tanks and Army M42 "Dusters" (the latter

mounting dual 40mm cannon), joined the operatio n

and attacked Hill 216 north of, and overlooking the

NVA ambush site on Route 9 . Company K ran int o

heavy machine gun fire from a bunker complex o n

the hill's east slope which killed one Marine an d

wounded two . The company called in an artillery

mission and the supporting tracked vehicles opened

fire on the enemy . Company K then pulled back t o

allow fixed-wing aircraft plenty of room to bomb th e

bunkers. At the completion of the strike, Compan y

K attacked, but the NVA unit had gone . The

Marines continued to the crest of Hill 216.

Later that afternoon, fixed-wing aircraft bombe d

Hill 247, located west of Hill 216 and which als o

overlooked Route 9 . Following the air strike, Company L, 3d Marines moved west on Route 9 and linked up with Company B, 26th Marines which ha d

cleared the road from the western edge of the 26t h

Marines' TAOR.

During its move, Company L uncovered 3 0

Chinese-made anti-personnel mines buried along

approximately 2,000 meters of the southern margi n

of Route 9. The enemy had rigged the mines wit h

trip wires to catch the Marines and soldiers from the

Rough Rider convoy as they sought cover from th e

planned ambush .

With Route 9 cleared, the Rough Rider convoy ,

minus any 175mm guns, completed the trip to Khe

Sanh on the 25th . The whole episode, however ,

changed the thinking about resupply for Khe Sanh .

There was one more large convoy to Khe Sanh and a

few to the Lang Vei Special Forces camp, but thes e

ended in early August . There were no other convoys

to Khe Sanh until Operation Pegasus opened Route

9 at the end of the "siege" of Khe Sanh in 1968 . *

For the next few weeks only scattered, small-scal e

fighting took place. Intelligence analysts reporte d

the probability of a major enemy offensive in the

region . They reported a large buildup of supplies

north of the DMZ, and estimated at least five Communist battalions were preparing for offensive

operations. Sighting reports of vehicles north of th e

Ben Hai increased substantially, including, for th e

first time, reports of armored vehicles there .

The first outburst of renewed NVA ground activity in the Kingfisher area happened in the

southwestern portion of the TAOR on the mornin g

of 21 August. A North Vietnamese battalion am -

*Robert Pisor's The End of the Line : The Siege ofKhe Sanh

(New York : 1982), p . 94 says the convoy with the 175mm guns

had ". . . run into 'one horrendous ambush' and turned

back . . . . " The NVA's planned ambush literally might have bee n

"horrendous" except for one NVA soldier's bladder discomfort .
130 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19326 1

CH-53 helicopters bring 105mm howitzers of Battery I, 12th Marines to Hill 881 South

near Khe Sanh on 3 August following intelligence reports of an NVA buildup nearby .

bushed a small Marine convoy traveling south o n

Route 9 from the Rockpile to Ca Lu . In the first

moments of the attack, enemy antitank rockets hi t

and put out of action two Marine trucks and two

Army track-mounted, dual 40mm guns of the 1st

Battalion, 44th Artillery . The security force with the

convoy returned fire and radioed for air and artillery

support. Company L of Lieutenant Colonel Robert

C. Needham's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines came dow n

from the Rockpile, and a reinforced platoon from

Company M moved up from Ca Lu. These

maneuvers trapped the ambushers. The action lasted

for more than six hours as the Marine units, sup -

ported by air and artillery, converged on the NVA

battalion. As night fell the enemy broke contact an d

fled to the west. Confirmed Communist losses were

light, but 3 Marines and 3 Army artillerymen died ,

with another 35 wounded .

The North Vietnamese tried again on 7

September at almost the same location, but agai n

the enemy commander miscalculated the location o f

Marine forces, their ability to maneuver, and th e

speed with which the Marines could bring supporting arms to bear. The NVA ambushed a convoy a t

1010, and again Marine units converged on the site

from the north and south . This time the battle continued for more than eight hours . The Marines killed

92 of the enemy before the fight ended at dusk .

American casualties in this encounter totaled five

killed and 56 wounded.

Additional indications that the Communists remained determined to achieve a victory at Con

Thien became evident during late August . To gai n

maximum propaganda effect, the North Vietnames e

timed their new offensive to coincide with the Sout h

Vietnamese elections scheduled for 3 September . As

the date for the elections approached, the NVA fire d

an increasing volume of artillery and rockets across

the DMZ at Cua Viet, Gio Linh, and Con Thien . On

26 August these hit Dong Ha in three separate attacks; 150 rocket and artillery rounds destroyed two

helicopters and damaged 24 others .

The most effective and spectacular of these attack s

took place on election day . Forty-one artillery rounds

slammed into Dong Ha base that morning, destroying the ammunition storage area and bulk fuel farm

and damaged 17 helicopters of Major Horace A .

Bruce's HMM-361 . Damage control teams fough t

the fire and explosions for four hours before the y

controlled the situation . Miraculously, no one died ,

but 77 suffered wounds, one seriously. Spectators as

far away as Phu Bai could see the billowing smoke

cloud that rose over the base . Because of this and

similar attacks, III MAF moved the logistics base i n

1968 from Dong Ha to Quang Tri, beyond the rang e

of the enemy's 130mm guns. ,

The attack on 3 September ended the use of Don g

Ha as a permanent helicopter squadron base facility .

HMM-361 personnel flew back to the Marble Mountain facility that day in the CH-53s of HMM-463 . All
3d MarDiv ComdC, August 1967 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A35557 6

Firemen contain the fire at the Dong Ha combat A burned-out Marine cargo truck sits in the middle

base following a rocket attack on 26 August, just a of the rubble of the ammunition storage area a t

week before NVA artillery destroyed the fuel facility . Dong Ha after the 3 September artillery attack .

Marines fight to save the fuel storage area at Dong Ha after a rocket attack on 26 August .

Some are trying to put out the fire while others cool down the remaining fuel bladders.

3d MarDiv ComdC, August 1967
132 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

of HMM-361 's aircraft caught on the ground suffered damage from blast, shrapnel, or both and the

CH-53s had to lift them to Marble Mountain . Until

III MAF readied a new field at Quang Tri, helicopte r

support for the DMZ area came from squadrons a t

Marble Mountain and Phu Bai. 8

Brigadier General Metzger had good reasons for

vividly remembering these attacks . He recalled :

When one of the attacks hit Dong Ha I was in a UH-1 E

on the pad getting ready to take off. The pilot lifted off

the ground and turned to the south, thereby flying righ t

through the barrage of "incoming." We felt the "bird"

shudder and knew we were hit. After a futile attempt to

spot the enemy firing batteries, we finally landed at Cam p

Evans and examined the plane . There was a hole about 1 5

inches in diameter in the tail . We were fortunate1 9

Con Thien was the primary NVA artillery target .

During September, the North Vietnamese subjecte d

the Marines there to one of the heaviest shellings o f

the war. The hill itself, known to local missionarie s

as "The Hill of Angels," was only big enough to accommodate a reinforced battalion . Almost daily Co n

Thien's defenders could expect at least 200 rounds o f

enemy artillery fire, and on 25 September more than

1,200 shells rained down upon the position . The

completed "Dye Marker" bunkers at Con Thien provided some cover as the NVA artillery and rocket attacks escalated ." )

Under cover of the artillery and rocket attacks ,

enemy ground activity increased . The NVA's mai n

thrust was to the south and southeast of Con Thien .

Since the beginning of Operation Kingfisher, the

9th Marines had been operating in that area with a

force varying between three and six battalions. The

level of combat was light, but enemy resistance

began to stiffen at the end of August.

On 4 September, Lieutenant Colonel Bendell's 3 d

Battalion, 4th Marines met strong opposition . At

1100 that morning, the battalion's Company I, commanded by Captain Richard K . Young, engaged an

enemy force 1,500 meters south of Con Thien . The

company pressed the enemy unit, but by 1400 its advance halted because of the volume of enemy fire.

Company M and the battalion command grou p

moved to the left of Company I and, after extensiv e

artillery preparatory fires, struck the NVA flank .

Moving slowly, with two tanks in support, Company

M pushed through the Communist position, relieving the pressure on Company I . The maneuver trapped a group of enemy soldiers between the tw o

Marine units, and Company I assaulted and overran

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A42191 0

Artillerymen from the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines

load their 105mm howitzer at Con Thien for

counterbattery fire against North Vietnamese Army

units. In the background are some of the bunkers in

which Marines took refuge during the frequen t

enemy artillery fire against the Marine combat base .

the entrapped NVA force . The count of the enem y

casualties at the end of the fight was 38 killed and

one captured . As Bendell's units returned to their

perimeters near Con Thien," they endured harassing fires from NVA mortar and artillery . Six

Marines died and 47 suffered wounds in the day's action.

Three days later, Company I of Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. Alderman's 3d Battalion, 26th

Marines* found the enemy again three miles south

of Con Thien. The fight lasted for five hours and

resembled the battle of the 4th, except this tim e

Marine tanks reinforced the infantrymen . Fifty-one

NVA died in this encounter; so did 14 Marines.

On 10 September, Alderman's Marines engaged

what seemed to be the entire 812th NVA Regiment.

The fight began in the early evening four mile s

southwest of Con Thien . In this instance the patrolling Marines spoiled a major enemy attack in the

making . The battalion's command chronology

reflects the intensity of this four-hour battle :

*3/26 participated in Operation Kingfisher from 7-1 1

September.
FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 13 3

1615H—Co M and Co K received estimated 60 rounds

of 140mm rockets followed by a coordinated attack b y

NVA (reportedly) wearing USMC flak jackets and helmets .

1630H—Co I and Co L came under attack by NV A

wearing USMC equipment and supported by mortars.

1637H—Co K and Co M were hit by 12 140mm rockets

followed by 12 more at 1645H .

1655H—Co I and Co L came under an extremely heavy

assault from the north and west sides of their perimeter by

an estimated NVA battalion . Fixed-wing air, which was on

station, began making strikes immediately, and napal m

consistently fell 50 to 75 meters from the friendly lines .

The flame tank and gun took d irect hits from RPGs fired

from approximately 75 meters. The flame tank was

destroyed and burned the remainder of the night, and the

gun tank was rendered useless and rolled into a draw. . . .

The crews of both tanks withdrew into the perimeter .

1700H—The tank supporting Co K fired on 100 NV A

in front of their lines with unknown results.

From 1705H to 1754H—Each company reported

numerous sightings of NVA in various sized units

maneuvering around both defensive perimeters.

1825H—The [battalion] CP received heavy incomin g

mortar fire and the NVA appeared to be massing for an at -

tack .

1825H—M-1 [1st Platoon, Company M] was pinne d

down in a bomb crater 70 meters west of the CP .

1900H—Co M pulled back towards the CP to consolidate the lines and was forced to abandon a disable d

tank .

1905H—An emergency resupply was attempted to Co I

and Co L and although suppressive fires were delivered ,

the enemy fire was too intense and the helicopter could

not land .

1905H—A flareship arrived on station . Co K and Co M

had formed perimeter around the CP and were boxed in

with well aimed artillery .

2030H—The enemy ground attack ceased althoug h

60mm mortar [rounds] were still being received by Co I

and Co L.

The next morning the companies searched the

battlefield for casualties and abandoned equipment ,

and evacauted all casualties by 1000 . The Marines

recovered a large quantity of enemy material, including cartridge belts, packs, ammunition, and

weapons ; 140 enemy bodies lay scattered throughout

the area . The 3d Battalion's losses totaled 34 killed

and 192 wounded . Alderman called it " . . . the

hardest fighting [the battalion] encountered sinc e

arriving in Vietnam ."1 2

Following this fight, the 3d Battalion, 26t h

Marines moved to near Phu Bai to refit . As its

replacement in the DMZ area, the division pulle d

Lieutenant Colonel James W . Hammond, Jr.'s 2d

Battalion, 4th Marines off an operation near Cam p

Evans and sent it north . Hammond later wrote :

We stopped overnight at Cam Lo and then went north

to take the place of [the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines] which

had been mortared [severely] in their position northwest of

Con Thien . We then became the roving battalion outside

Con Thien . . . the battalion moved every day but still was

shelled as much, if not more than Con Thien . The difference was that we had to dig new holes in every position

. . . we were hit pretty hard during our month-plus along

the DMZ.1 3

Both sides shed more blood around Con Thie n

before the month ended . At 0325 on the 13th, a

North Vietnamese company attacked the north -

northeast sector of the perimeter of the outpost .

Even though artillery, mortars, and heavy machin e

guns supported the attacking force, the Communists

failed to penetrate the wire . They gave up and

withdrew after a heavy pounding from the Marines'

supporting arms.

Following the attack of the 13th, Colonel Richard

B . Smith,* the new commanding officer of the 9t h

Marines, moved two battalions to a position behin d

Con Thien from which they could react if the enem y

attacked in force . Lieutenant Colonel John J.

Peeler's** 2d Battalion, 9th Marines occupied th e

area southeast of Con Thien while Lieutenant Colonel James W. Hammond, Jr.'s 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines moved to the southwest of the hill. 14 At the

same time, Colonel Smith ordered the 3d Battalion ,

9th Marines, now commanded by Major Gorton C .

Cook, to move inside the main perimeter . The anticipated assault did not materialize ; instead the

NVA bombarded all three battalions with savage artillery and mortar attacks for the next seven days .

With the passing of the immediate threat to Co n

Thien, the Marines there went on the offensive . On

21 September, Hammond's battalion started a

search and destroy operation 1,800 meters east o f

Con Thien. The battalion front, Companies E and F ,

moved out on line . Movement was cautious bu t

steady, but maintaining alinement proved difficul t

in terraced terrain broken up by hedgerows. The

command group and Companies G and H had to

stop, waiting for the rear elements to clear their

previous position .

*Colonel Smith, an experienced combat commander an d

veteran of two wars, assumed command of the 9th Marines from

Colonel Jerue on 13 September, the day of the attack on the out -

post.

**Lieutenant Colonel Peeler had the distinction of serving

twice as the commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines

during 1967, from 1 January to 4 July and 13 September - 28 October. He assumed command in September after enemy morta r

fragments severely wounded Lieutenant Colonel William D . Ken t

near Con Thien .
134 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

3d MarDiv ComdC, October 1967

Company K, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines moves offa

thickly-wooded hill during a patrol near Camp

Evans. The battalion moved to the base to refit afte r

heavy fighting with the 812th NVA Regiment four

miles southwest of Con Thien on 10 September.

As the lead elements advanced, maintainin g

visual contact became impossible in the thick under -

brush . At 0750, Company E encountered fire fro m

snipers. Then, when the company pushed forward ,

it came under heavy automatic weapons fire fro m

the front and left, which killed one Marine and

wounded four. The tempo of the battle increased ;

the Communists opened up with mortars . The

Marines, now close to the NVA force, heard shouted

orders and directions for a mortar crew, and the tw o

sides soon became involved in a deadly grenade

duel .* The battalion could not call in artillery

because of the close contact, and Company F was in

no position to help . Company E slowly withdrew to a

position which offered better cover and established a

landing zone to evacuate casualties.

Shortly after the beginning of the engagement ,

Lieutenant Colonel Hammond ordered Company G

to envelop the left flank of the NVA position, bu t

150 meters of open ground faced the assaultin g

troops. The company advanced to within 30 meter s

of the objective, but withdrew in the face of nearb y

*Lance Corporal Jedh C . Barker received a posthumous Medal

of Honor for his actions in this battle . See Appendix D for his citation.

NVA small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar

fire . Meanwhile, Companies E and F linked up an d

covered Company G by fire as it disengaged .

The battle turned into a stalemate . The battalion

needed tanks, but after 96 hours of rain the approaches to the area were impassable . At dusk the

fighting died down and the Marines pulled back t o

the main battalion perimeter. The NVA force had

killed 16 Marines and wounded 118 ; 15 of the

bodies remained on the battlefield until 10 Octobe r

when the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines went back an d

picked up its dead in a later operation in the same

area ." The battalion could not determine the tota l

Communist casualties but reported at least 39 NV A

soldiers killed .* Intelligence officers later identified

the enemy force as part of the 90th NVA Regiment .

After the action of the 21st, the enemy withdre w

across the Ben Hai River.

The persistent enemy attacks during Septembe r

appeared to be a desperate bid for a military victory ,

with its attendant propaganda value, before the fall

3d MarDiv ComdC, September 1967

A CH-53 delivers supplies destined for the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines to the muddy landing zone of

the Con Thien combat base in September 1967.

*Colonel Hammond remembered in 1981 that Major General

Hochmuth said that G-2 put the number of enemy casualties at

350 . Colonel James W. Hammond, Jr., Comments on draft ms,

18May81 (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)
FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 13 5

monsoon hit . Failing in attacks from three different

directions, the NVA resorted to a massive attack b y

fire against Con Thien . During the period 19-27

September, more than 3,000 mortar, artillery, and

rocket rounds blasted the position .

The Americans retaliated by massing one of th e

greatest concentrations of firepower in support of a

single division in the history of the Vietnam war . III

MAF artillery units fired 12,577 rounds at know n

and suspected enemy positions in the region, while

ships of the Seventh Fleet fired 6,148 rounds at th e

same area . Marine and Air Force fighter pilots flew

more than 5,200 close air support sorties and B-5 2

bombers of the Strategic Air Command dropped

tons of ordnance on the enemy in and north of th e

DMZ. The Con Thien garrison applauded the

results; North Vietnamese pressure on the outpost

subsided as September drew to a close .

Although enemy activity gradually diminished a t

Con Thien ; defense of the base remained a continuing ordeal . Marine searching and patrolling activity

discovered a multitude of bunker and trench complexes around the hill mass, most of which were

about 1,500 meters from the main perimeter . The

Marines destroyed the bunkers, but often durin g

subsequent patrols they found them rebuilt again .

During early October the Marines continued to fin d

bunkers, but by then these were usually unoccupied .

Experiences of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines during October typify the trend of activity around Co n

Thien during the fall . On 4 October the battalion ,

still under the command of Lieutenant Colonel

Hammond, conducted a sweep southwest of Co n

Thien in conjunction with Lieutenant Colonel Henr y

Englisch's BLT 2/3 from SLF Bravo . Leaving the line

of departure at 0645, the battalion had found thre e

NVA shelters by 0830 . An hour later and 1,000

meters further, the Marines found several more am -

bush sites and 16 bunkers. Shortly after that, Company H came upon 13 more bunkers while skirting

the southwest side of the Con Thien slope . Similarly ,

Company G found abandoned mortar positions ,

loose 82mm mortar rounds, and powder-charge increments. Just before 1500, the unmistakable odo r

of decaying human flesh led the Marines to the partially covered graves of 20 North Vietnamese .

Backtracking, Company G discovered fresh enem y

footprints around the previously destroyed bunkers .

Tension heightened . The three companies move d

back to the perimeter west of Con Thien, but whil e

pulling back Company G heard movement and called in artillery to cover their return march . The

Marines observed no NVA casualties, but had n o

doubt the Communists were still active .

Several days later the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines

relieved BLT 2/3 as the defense force for the recentl y

built bridge north of Strongpoint C-2 .* The construction of the bridge had permitted the reopening

of the vital road to Con Thien which the heav y

September rains washed out . The battalion defended the bridge** because the 3d Marine Division was

concerned that if the enemy destroyed it, they would

cut the only supply line to Con Thien . i6

The defense of the bridge was no easy task fo r

Lieutenant Colonel Hammond's battalion. Since its

move north from Camp Evans on 11 September, th e

constant combat around Con Thien had worn the

battalion down from a "foxhole strength" of 952 to

about 462 . The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines had grea t

difficulty in manning all the defensive positions

prepared by the departed full-strength BLT-2 / 3 .1 7

The defensive position around the bridge wa s

divided into quadrants by virtue of the road, which

ran roughly north and south, and the stream, whic h

ran east and west. Company G had the northwes t

quadrant; Company H was on the same side of the

road but across the stream in the southwest

quadrant. Company F was in the northeast ; Company E in the southeast . The battalion command

group set up beside the stream in Company G's are a

and near the center of the position .

At 0125 on 14 October, 25 artillery rounds,

rockets, and 135-150 mortar rounds hit Company H .

An ambush squad posted in front of the compan y

reported an enemy force moving toward it, and immediately took the advancing enemy under fire . The

Marine squad leader notified his company that he

had three casualties and that the enemy seriousl y

outnumbered his squad . The company commander,

Captain Arthur P. Brill, Jr., ordered the squad to

pull back and, at the same time, called for nigh t

defensive fires to block the avenues of approach to

his position . The battalion requested flare ships to illuminate the area . Using starlight scopes, snipe r

teams watched the enemy as they massed only 5 0

*BLT 2/3 phased out of Operation Kingfisher to resume it s

duties with the Special Landing Force .

In 1981, Lieutenant General Metzger described the defens e

of this bridge as an " . . . illustration of how our forces were tied t o

defending terrain and not free to operate ." Lieutenant Genera l

Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981) (Vietnam

Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)
136 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

meters in front of the company. The snipers and two

tanks attached to the company opened fire, forcin g

the North Vietnamese to start their assault

prematurely . The rest of the company held fire until

the NVA troops reached a clearing 20 meters from

the wire . Of the entire attacking unit, only two NVA

soldiers reached the wire and Marines killed both as

they tried to breach that obstacle .

The enemy withdrew, leaving bodies behind, bu t

they were far from finished . At 0230, enemy mortars

shelled Company G . Direct hits by RPGs destroyed a

machine gun emplacement and several backup positions on the primary avenue of approach into the

company position.* The NVA force attacke d

through this break, overran the company comman d

post, and killed the company commander, Captai n

Jack W. Phillips, and his forward observer . Three

platoon leaders, two of whom had just arrived in

Vietnam that morning, also died . The battalion sent

its S-3A, Captain James W. McCarter, Jr., to replace

Phillips, but enemy fire killed him before he reache d

Company G . 19 During the confused, hand-to-hand

combat some of the North Vietnamese fought their

way within grenade range of the battalion comman d

post in the center of the position.

In the command post, although wounded by a

grenade, Sergeant Paul H . Foster, a member of the

fire support coordination center, continued to direct

mortar and artillery fire upon the enemy . Another

grenade landed among a group of six Marines.

Sergeant Foster threw his flak jacket over the grenad e

and jumped on top of the jacket. The grenade blast

mortally wounded him, but this action saved hi s

fellow Marines .** Before the melee ended, th e

North Vietnamese killed or wounded the entire for -

ward air control team. 20 The enemy also killed the

battalion medical chief, and wounded the fire sup -

port coordinator, headquarters commandant, an d

battalion sergeant major . 2 1

Lieutenant Colonel Hammond moved what was

left of his command group to a better location

within Company H's position. He ordered Company

F to move to Company G's right flank and

*Lieutenant Colonel James E . Murphy commented in 1981 that

the NVA force used tear gas in their attack . "Company G got the

brunt of it and it lasted only for a few minutes but [the gas) greatly added to the confusion." Lieutenant Colonel James E . Murphy ,

Comments on draft ms, 6Aug81(Vietnam comment file, MCHC ,

Washington, D.C. )

**Sergeant Foster subsequently received a posthumous Medal

of Honor. See Appendix D for Sergeant Foster's citation .

counterattack to push the NVA forces out of th e

perimeter . Illumination and automatic weapons fir e

from "Puff, " the AC-47 requested at the beginning

of the fight and which arrived about 0330, aided th e

counterattack. By 0430, the enemy began retreatin g

out of the position, pursued by Company E .

The next morning the battalion reconsolidate d

and evacuated casualties. Twenty-one dead, including five officers, and 23 wounded were th e

night's toll. The NVA lost at least 24 killed . That

afternoon, Lieutenant General Cushman and Majo r

General Hochmuth visited the bridge site . The y

granted a request from Lieutenant Colonel Hammond that the new bridge be named Bastard's

Bridge* to honor the 21 Marines of the 2d Battalio n

who gave their lives in its defense . At 1400, Hammond's battalion turned over the bridge to Lieutenant Colonel Needham's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines

and then moved to Dong Ha where it assumed th e

mission of regimental reserve after 42 days of clos e

combat.21 .

The last major action of Kingfisher took place during a 9th Marines operation on 25-28 October. By

this time Hammond's battalion (minus Company G

which was attached to the 3d Battalion, 4t h

Marines), had moved to Cam Lo to take part in th e

operation . The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines was at Con

Thien and Needham's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines was

at C-2 Bridge. 23 The regimental frag order directe d

Hammond's Marines to sweep north on the west sid e

of Route 561 while the other two battalions provide d

blocking forces .

The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines began its sweep a t

0600 on the 25th. Lieutenant Colonel Hammon d

planned to move his understrength battalion all day

to reach the objective before dark . There was no

enemy contact but heavy brush slowed the move . As

darkness approached, the battalion was still abou t

1,000 meters from the objective . Hammond decide d

to halt the battalion and request additional ammunition before darkness.

Hammond's decision was prudent, given the

nature of the enemy in the DMZ region and the re -

*The nickname "Magnificent Bastards" has been claimed by th e

2d Battalion, 4th Marines for many years . Tradition traces the

nickname to World War II; however, the Marine Corps Historica l

Center has no evidence to substantiate the claim . It appears likely

that the battalion borrowed the phrase from the book, The

Magnificent Bastards by Lucy Herndon Crockett (New York :

1953) which is a fictionalized account of Marines in the Sout h

Pacific in World War II.
FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 13 7

cent combat losses that reduced his entire battalio n

to just over 400 men . Additional ammunition coul d

partially compensate for the loss of firepowe r

resulting from personnel shortages and the absenc e

of Company G. He controlled, at the time, a "battalion" only a little larger than a standard reinforce d

rifle company . The resupply helicopters would give

away the battalion's location, of course, but he too k

the risk that his command could receive its additional ammunition and move on to the objectiv e

before the enemy responded .

Helicopters were in short supply at this time ,

following the grounding of all CH-46s after a series

of accidents. III MAF by necessity reserved th e

available helicopters for meeting emergency requests

from units in the field . Hammond ordered an

" emergency resupply" of ammunition .

Lieutenant Colonel Hammond took a calculated

risk and lost . The resupply helicopters did not bring

everything he ordered but, worse, also delivere d

significant quantities and types of ammunition tha t

the battalion had not ordered, including thre e

pallets of tactical wire . There was more material than

the battalion could use or move . Hammond's

Marines would have to spend the night in place and

try to get the excess ammunition flown out the next

morning. Unfortunately, the helicopters had revealed the Marines' position to the enemy .

The North Vietnamese hit the battalion's

perimeter about 2330 with 10 rocket rounds .* The

battalion executive officer, Major John J. Lawendowski, died and Lieutenant Colonel Hammond

and two others required evacuation for wounds.

Lieutenant Colonel Frankie E . Allgood, the newly

promoted executive officer of HMM-363, landed his

UH-34D at the battalion command post and flew

the casualties to Dong Ha . Captain Arthur P . Brill ,

Jr., who had moved up the previous day from commanding Company H to be the battalion operation s

officer, took command of the battalion .

Upon learning that Hammond and Lawendowsk i

were casualties, Colonel Richard B . Smith, commanding the 9th Marines, decided to send an officer t o

take temporary command of the 2d Battalion, 4t h

Marines . The obvious choice was right at hand .

Lieutenant Colonel John C. Studt, the regimental

operations officer, knew the details of the curren t

*The official reports describe these as rockets, however, Colone l

Hammond believes they were actually artillery rounds . Colonel

James W. Hammond, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 18May8 1

(Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)

operation ; he had drafted the regimental frag orde r

implementing the division's directive for the operation. 24 Colonel Smith sent Studt to the Dong Ha airfield to catch a helicopter to the 2d Battalion .

Lieutenant Colonel Studt reached the airfiel d

shortly after medical personnel removed the 2d Battalion's casualties from Lieutenant Colonel Allgood' s

helicopter. Studt explained his mission and the two

officers discussed the chances of succeeding i n

reaching the 2d Battalion safely . Having had grea t

difficulty in evacuating the four casualties, Allgoo d

advised Studt that he wasn't sure he could make it

into the battalion's position . He also pointed out

that fog was increasing throughout the whole area .

Both officers decided, however, that the situation required that the flight be attempted . Studt climbed

into the passenger compartment of the helicopter ,

which, he noted, still had fresh blood on the floor .2S

Allgood lifted off from the airfield and managed t o

land the UH-34D inside the battalion perimete r

around 0300 on the 26th.

Studt immediately climbed into Captain Brill' s

foxhole to get an appraisal of the 2d Battalion' s

situation . The first thing that struck Studt were the

gaps in the battalion staff. Each time Studt asked

about a key staff position, Brill reported that the

respective officer was either a casualty in some

hospital or a new officer was filling the position . 2 6

The battalion had been ground down during a

month and a half of heavy fighting.

Company G, released back to the 2d Battalion's

control, arrived at the defensive perimeter th e

following morning . The additional strength was

welcome since Lieutenant Colonel Studt had learne d

he would have to leave one company behind t o

guard the pile of excess ammunition . Due to other

commitments, the regiment reported, there were n o

helicopters available to move it . "I could not help

but note," wrote Studt, " that this , short-sighte d

policy resulted in [III MAF] providing a number of

helicopters for emergency medevacs, which might

not have been necessary had they been a little mor e

flexible and appreciative of the tactical situation o n

this operation . " 27

Leaving Company F to guard the ammunition ,

the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines moved toward its objective and occupied it by 1300 . Shortly afterward ,

enemy 60mm mortars hit the battalion as it organized its defenses . One hour later, the NVA struck with

a heavy mortar barrage, followed by small arms fir e

from the west and northwest . The Marines began
138 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

taking casualties and requested a helicopter

medevac .

In an effort to pick up some of the casualties, Captain Ronald D. Bennett of HMM-363 attempted t o

land his UH-34D within the 2d Battalion 's

perimeter. Those on the ground waved him off

because of intense enemy fire . As Captain Bennett

pulled away, enemy fire hit the rear of th e

helicopter, separating the tail pylon . The aircraft

crashed, rolled and began burning about 150 meters

outside the Marine lines. Bennett and a gunner,

Corporal Edward Clem, died in the crash. Second

Lieutenant Vernon J. Sharpless and Lance Corporal

Howard J . Cones, both seriously injured, managed

to crawl from the burning wreckage .

A second helicopter from HMM-363, piloted by

Captain Frank T . Grassi, tried to land to pick up th e

survivors but could not. Enemy fire hit Grassi in the

leg and arm, damaged the helicopter, and slightly

wounded one of the gunners and a Navy hospital

corpsman. The aircraft limped away as far as Stron g

Point C-2 where it made a forced landing .

Captain James E. Murphy, the 2d Battalion, 4th

Marines' air liaison officer, who had been calling i n

air strikes in front of Company E, saw Bennett 's

helicopter go down . With his radio still on his back ,

Murphy crawled out to the downed helicopter, moving past NVA soldiers in his path . He found the two

survivors near the burning helicopter . The thre e

Marines were surrounded and there was no way Murphy could get them back to Marine lines. Fortunately, the enemy soldiers in the area either did not

know the three men were there or simply did no t

care . Captain Murphy could hear NVA soldiers near -

by and see some movement, however, and called in

air strikes within 50 meters of the crashed helicopte r

with the aid of an airborne observer in an 0-1C air -

craft overhead . The latter eventually managed to

direct a Marine A-4 attack aircraft to deliver a line of

smoke so that a UH-1 helicopter could land an d

rescue the three Marines . 28

The rescue helicopter was a UH-1C from the U .S.

Army's 190th Helicopter Assault Company whos e

pilot volunteered to make the pickup . Enemy fire hit

the aircraft twice during the rescue and the pilot suffered a minor wound in the arm. The UH-1C also

managed to reach Strong Point C-2 where it, too ,

made a forced landing .

Lieutenant Colonel Studt's observation during his

short period of command convinced him of the nee d

for reinforcements. At his request, the 9th Marines

ordered the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines at C-2 Bridge

to send two companies and a small command group

to the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines ' position. 2 9

Company F still occupied its exposed position an d

Studt decided to move it within the battalio n

perimeter. He directed the company to have its attached engineers blow up the excess ammunition ,

but they were unable to do so .* After several hours

of fruitless attempts by the engineers, Studt told th e

company to leave the ammunition and join the res t

of the battalion . The battalion had direct observation of the ammunition pile and would cover it b y

fire. a °

Company F reached the perimeter near dusk. The

two companies from the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines arrived at about the same time . 31 With these reinforcements, the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines was read y

for any NVA attacks that evening. Studt recounte d

the night's subsequent events :

From before dusk . . . until almost 0200 in the morning ,

we were under almost continuous attacks by both direc t

and indirect fire, and our perimeter was hit again and

again by ground attacks. . . . The wounded were being accumulated in the vicinity of my CP, which consisted of

foxholes, and their suffering was a cause of anguish . After

several attempts to medevac them by helicopter wer e

aborted due to intense enemy fire, we came up with th e

plan that on signal every man on the perimeter woul d

open fire on known or suspected enemy positions . . . for a

few minutes with an intense volume of fire . During this

brief period, a volunteer pilot . . . succeeded in zipping in -

to the zone and removing our emergency medevacs. The

[trick] . . . probably would not have worked again . 3 3

The ground attacks ceased around 0200 in the

morning of the 27th, but the Marines heard enem y

movement for the rest of the night as the Nort h

Vietnamese removed their dead and wounded .

Dawn revealed 19 enemy bodies within or in sight o f

the Marine positions. Lieutenant Colonel Studt

decided not to send anyone to sweep the area sinc e

any movement still drew enemy artillery and morta r

fire . "

The enemy completed its departure by dawn . The

Marines soon did likewise ; on orders from the 9th

Marines, the battalion made a tactical withdrawal .

Still harrassed by enemy rocket and mortar fire and

carrying the remainder of its dead and wounded, th e

2d Battalion, 4th Marines moved by echelon to

*The reason for the failure to detonate the ammunition is no t

clear from the records . Studt himself wrote in 1981 that he never

knew the reason . Col John C. Studt, Comments on draft ms ,

9Jul81 (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)
FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 13 9

Strong Point C-2 and then to Cam Lo . 34 During the

period 25-27 October, eight 2d Battalion Marine s

died and 45 suffered wounds giving the battalion a n

effective strength of around 300 Marines. Known

NVA casualties were the 19 bodies counted by th e

battalion on 27 October.

The battalion moved back to Dong Ha on th e

28th and resumed its role as the regimental reserve .

Lieutenant Colonel William Wiese took comman d

of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines and Lieutenant Colonel Studt returned to his duties at the 9th Marines '

command post .* That day a message from Lieu -

tenant General Cushman arrived, the last line o f

which read "2/4 has met and beaten the best th e

enemy had to offer . Well done . "3 5

Kingfisher listed 1,117 enemy killed and five captured ; Marine casualties totaled 340 killed and 1,46 1

wounded. General Westmoreland described the

operation as a "crushing defeat" of the enemy .

The Con Thien area remained a grim place . The

constant danger of artillery, rocket, and mortar fire ,

and massed infantry assaults, and the depressing

drizzle and mud from which there was no escape ,

combined to make it miserable for the Marine s

there. Neuropsychiatric or " shell shock" casualties ,

relatively unheard of elsewhere in South Vietnam ,

were not unusual. Duty on and around the drab hill

mass was referred to by all Marines as their "Turn in

the Barrel, " or "the Meatgrinder." 3 6

Medina/Bastion Hill/Lam Son 13 8

On 5 October, in conjunction with the arrival of a

fourth U.S . Army brigade in southern I Corps, Colonel Herbert E . Ing, Jr.'s 1st Marines, consisting o f

two battalions, came under the operational contro l

of the 3d Marine Division and moved north from th e

Da Nang TAOR to the southern part of Quang Tr i

Province. On the 11th, the regiment, reinforced by

SLF Alpha, started Operation Medina in the rugge d

hills of the Hai Lang National Forest.** The operation was part of III MAF's comprehensive program to

*Studt had hoped to retain command but Colonel Smith was

more interested in keeping him as the regimental operations officer. "Unfortunately, " wrote Smith, " I extolled [Studt's] virtue s

so much to General Tompkins that he was grabbed later to tak e

over a battalion at Khe Sanh where he distinguished himself. "

Colonel Richard B. Smith, Comments on draft ms, 21May8 1

(Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

**SLF Alpha 's (BLT 1/ 3) move to its Medina blocking positions

had the code-name Operation Bastion Hill.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18939 3

Marines and journalists wait on 2 October in the

safety of a trench beside Con Thien's landing zon e

until the arrival and touchdown of the helicopte r

that will take them from the base back to Dong Ha .

destroy enemy base areas previously left alone

because of lack of forces. The Hai Lang forest area

south of Quang Tri was the enemy's Base Area 101 ,

the support area for the 5th and 6th NVA

Regiments. Northeast of the Medina AO, two

ARVN airborne battalions conducted Operation

Lam Son 138.

Medina started as Lieutenant Colonel Albert F .

Belbusti's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and Lieutenant

Colonel Archie Van Winkle's 2d Battalion, 1st

Marines made a helicopter assault landing in the

forest. After landing they cleared the area around LZ

Dove and then swept in a northeasterly directio n

while BLT 1/3 blocked to the east . At 0330 on the

11th, Company C of BLT 1/3 came under morta r

and small arms fire, followed by a ground assault .

The company drove off the attackers and the

fighting subsided .

The next day both of the 1st Marines' battalions

continued searching to the southwest, while BLT 1/ 3

remained in its blocking positions. At 1515, Company C, 1st Marines was moving through thic k

jungle when the point element engaged 10 NV A

soldiers . The exchange of fire wounded several

Marines. Company C pulled back to a small clearing
NI)

C

lxi Ct K. to U C

2 C4

FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 14 1

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421900

Operation Medina begins early on 11 October as two battalions of the 1st Marines mak e

a helicopter assault into Landing Zone Dove in a III MAF drive to clear enemy base areas

in the thick Hai Lang forest, located approximately 12 miles south of Quang Tri City .

and established a perimeter before calling i n

helicopters to pick up wounded. Just after the evacuation was completed, three NVA companies attacked Company C from two sides . The firefight continued as darkness fell; hand grenades figured heavily in the exchange . The battle surged back and fort h

across the small clearing . At the height of the struggle a grenade landed in the company comman d

post . Corporal William T. Perkins, Jr., a combat

photographer attached to the company, yelled ,

"Grenade! " and threw himself on the deadly missile .

The explosion killed him . *

Lieutenant Colonel Belbusti reinforced Compan y

C with Company D and the two companies drove off

the attacking NVA force . Dawn on the 13th revealed

40 enemy dead around the Marines' position . The

enemy attack had killed eight Marines and wounded

39.

After these two fights, the enemy avoided furthe r

contact; Medina turned into a search for small

groups of North Vietnamese in the nearly impenetrable forests . The 1st Marines did find a

number of base camps, but the enemy had

evacuated the sites. The Marines captured more than

3d MarDiv ComdC, October 196 7

An air observer with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines

directs an air strike early in Operation Medina on

enemy positions located on an adjacent ridgeline .

*Corporal Perkins received a posthumous Medal of Honor,

becoming the first Marine combat photographer to receive the na -

tion's highest award . See Appendix D for Corporal Perkin s' citation .
142 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

four tons of rice, 16 weapons, and a quantity of

small arms ammunition .

The enemy's efforts to elude the sweeping Marine

units resulted in the largest action of the companion

Operation Lam Son 138 . On the morning of 20 October, the 416th NVA Battalion, a subordinate unit

of the 5th NVA Regiment collided with one of th e

ARVN airborne companies involved in Operation

Lam Son 138 . The airborne company held and, afte r

reinforcement, killed 197 North Vietnamese in th e

day-long battle .

Operation Medina ended on the 20th . The SLF

battalion transferred to Colonel William L . Dick's

4th Marines, which was conducting Operation Fremont to the south . The 1st Marines stayed in the

former Medina area and started Operation Osceol a

the same day. Osceola was an unspectacular, but

systematic, search for enemy forces in the Hai Lan g

forest .

Adjustments Within the 3d Marine Division

A new series of operations began in November .

Only Osceola continued from October. The 3d

3d MarDiv ComdC, October 196 7

A Marine with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines places

explosives before blowing a helicopter landing zon e

in the Hai Lang forest during Operation Medina.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19385 6

An LVTP-5 carries members of the 1st Amphibian

Tractor Battalion, operating as infantrymen, on a

sweep of the shoreline north ofthe Cua Viet River in

September. The battalion continued these patrols in

November and December in Operation Napoleon .

Marine Division split the Kingfisher TAOR in two :

Kentucky, embracing the region including Gi o

Linh, Con Thien, Cam Lo, and Dong Ha came

under the control of Colonel Richard B. Smith's 9th

Marines; and Lancaster, to the west, covered Cam p

Carroll, the Rockpile, and Ca Lu under Colonel

Joseph E . LoPrete's 3d Marines . The division renamed Operation Ardmore at Khe Sanh to Scotlan d

and continued it as a one-battalion operation under

the control of Colonel David E . Lownds' 26th

Marines. On the coast, the 1st Amphibian Tractor

Battalion conducted Operation Napoleon north of

the Cua Viet River . In Thua Thien Province, Colone l

William L. Dick's 4th Marines continued to cover approaches to Hue City west of Route 1 as Operatio n

Neosho replaced Fremont. The 3d Marine Divisio n

had tactical responsibility for all territory west of

Highway 1 in the northern two provinces of Quan g

Tri and Thua Thien, while the 1st ARVN Divisio n

was responsible for all terrain east of the road except

for the Napoleon operational area north of the Cua

Viet River .

Artillery support for all of these operations cam e

from Colonel Edwin S . Schick, Jr.'s 12th Marines.

Composed of five Marine artillery battalions, thre e

Army artillery battalions, and two Marine separate
FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 14 3

batteries, it was the largest artillery regiment in th e

history of the Marine Corps. The reinforced regiment's 220 weapons 37 were located throughout th e

division TAOR. Each infantry regiment could call

upon a direct support battalion of 105mm

howitzers. In addition, the artillery regiment's

medium 155mm howitzers and guns, and heav y

8-inch howitzers and 175mm guns, provided reinforcing or general support fires. While the new operations were beginning, the

division headquarters at Phu Bai prepared for a visi t

from Vice President Hubert H . Humphrey on 1

November. After the stop at the division comman d

post, the Vice President flew over the division 's are a

of operations; Upon his return to Da Nang, he

presented the Presidential Unit Citation to the 3 d

Marine Division for "extraordinary heroism an d

outstanding performance of duty in action against

North Vietnamese and insurgent Communist forces

in the Republic of Vietnam from 8 March 1965 to 15

September 1967 . "

After pinning the streamer on the division colors ,

the Vice President warmly congratulated the divisio n

commander, Major General Hochmuth . This was

the last official ceremony that the general attended .

Major General Hochmuth died on 14 Novembe r

when his UH-1E exploded and crashed five mile s

northwest of Hue .

Colonel William L . Dick, commanding the 4t h

Marines at Phu Bai, learned of the crash around 140 0

on 14 November. Since he had a helicopter sittin g

on a pad at his headquarters, Dick, accompanied b y

his operations officer, Major James D . Beans, an d

the regimental sergeant major, quickly reached th e

crash scene . Colonel Dick described the rescue at -

tempt:

After several passes, I spotted the Huey upside down i n

a rice paddy filled to the brim by the heavy rains which

had been falling for several weeks. . . . I directed the

helicopter pilot to land on the paddy dike nearest the cras h

site from where the three of us walked through about 20 0

yards of.paddy water until we reached the wreckage . There

were flames on the water's surface around the aircraft .

While the sergeant major attempted to extinguish these ,

Major Beans and I commenced diving beneath the surface ,

groping through the water for possible survivors. We had

no idea just how long it had been since the crash had occurred . This was a difficult task, as you can imagine, sinc e

the water was full of silt, not to mention leeches, and impossible to see through . The three of us were joined by a

Vietnamese farmer who refused to identify himself and

could be distinguished only by a small gold crucifix around

A machine gun team from Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines pauses during its

movement in November in Operation Lancaster in the 9th Marines' portion of th e

former Operation Kingfisher area. The team wears its ammunition bandolier-style .

3d MarDiv ComdC, November 1967
144 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19023 5

MajGen Bruno A. Hochmuth, the commanding general of the 3d Marine Division,

wearing a rainsuit as protection from the monsoon, sits in a UN-1E helicopter prior to a

routine inspection of the divisional area on 7 November, one week prior to his death .

his neck . The four of us, after getting rid of the aviatio n

fuel flames, repeatedly went below the surface into the

helicopter cabin and by touch, finally found the bodies,

one by one, of the six who had died in the crash . The

helicopter had turned upside down just before impact

which made the situation even more difficult . The last

body recovered was General Hochmuth . I found him in

the rear seat of the helicopter, the spot where he usually

traveled when visiting the various command posts. 38

Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins, a

veteran of more than 32 years' Marine service an d

holder of the Navy Cross as a battalion commande r

at Saipan, received immediate orders as Genera l

Hochmuth's replacement . Brigadier General Louis

Metzger, the assistant division commander, assumed

command until General Tompkins arrived from the

United States on 28 November.

One of General Tompkins' first steps after his arrival was to discuss the overall situation with his division operations officer, Colonel James R . Stockman ,

who had commanded an 81mm mortar platoo n

under Tompkins on Saipan . "Tell me, " said Tom- Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189947

pkins, "about the operational folklore in the divi- MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins inspects an hono r

sion's area of operations ." Stockman replied with, guard on 28 November during the ceremony at Da

among other things, descriptions of the enemy and Nang in which he assumed command of the 3d

the terrain and the frustrations of fighting under the Marine Division after MajGen Hochmuth 's death.
FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 14 5

restrictions imposed by MACV and Washington .

Stockman recalled that Tompkins disliked th e

system which considered infantry battalions as inter -

changeable parts to be shifted from one regimenta l

headquarters to another, depending upon the tactical situation . Tompkins accepted it, however, a s

"temporary operational folklore, " which he would

have to live with . "He faced," wrote Stockman, " a

worsening operational situation in the late part o f

1967 with as much fortitude and optimism a s

humanly possible ." 3 9

During November and December, the most

significant activity in the 3d Marine Division 's zone

of action was small unit fighting near the strongpoint obstacle system around Con Thien and Gio

Linh . In November, platoon and company-size NV A

units operated from well camouflaged bunkers in

the area, trying to ambush Marine patrols and t o

hinder the system's construction . The Marines

countered with attacks that drove the NVA units ou t

of their positions on four different occasions during

Novembet, killing 65 Communists . In addition ,

Marine patrols found and destroyed three extensiv e

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189948

Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines engages a n

NVA unit on 3 December during the portion of

Operation Kentucky conducted to prevent enemy

interference with the construction of Strongpoin t

A-3 of the barrier system south of the DMZ . The 3d

Marine Division originally planned to call this protective effort Operation Newton but decided on 28

November to consider it as simply part of Kentucky.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18999 7

A patrol from Company F, 9th Marines, part of th e

screening effort during the construction of Strong -

point A-3, moves out carefully after finding fres h

enemy footprints and bunkers on 22 December.

bunker systems. On 29 November, three Marine battalions and two ARVN battalions began clearin g

operations within the Kentucky TAOR between Co n

Thien and Gio Linh, the planned site of Strong

Point A-3 of the proposed barrier plan, or

"McNamara wall." The Marine units swept south of

Con Thien eastward to Site A-3, while the ARV N

units moved from near Gio Linh westward to clear a

road to the strong point location . The following day ,

Lieutenant Colonel William M . Cryan's 2d Battalion, 9th Marines found a North Vietnamese company in bunkers two and one-half miles northeast of

Con Thien . The battalion maneuvered to envelo p

the enemy and overran the position by 1800, killin g

41 defenders . Marine casualties totaled 15 killed and

53 wounded requiring evacuation .

Although the Marine and ARVN units continue d

screening operations north of A-3 during December ,

the largest engagement during the month took plac e

southeast of Gio Linh in the Napoleon area of operation. Lieutenant Colonel Edward R . Toner's 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion and Company F, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines were protecting the movement of

building materials to Strongpoint C-4 on the coast ,

two kilometers north of the Cua Viet River . Company F, under the operational control of the tracto r

battalion, occupied Strongpoint C-4 . Platoon and
146 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

squad patrols routinely operated 2,000 meters nort h

of C-4 as forward security for both the strongpoin t

and the battalion's position at Cua Viet port facility .

Early in the afternoon of the 10th, two squads

patrolled near the fishing village of Ha Loi Tay .

Their operational area was a sea of sand dunes, interrupted by a strip of scrub pine growth an d

hedgerows dotting the coastline . As they approache d

a break in the coastal tree line south of the village ,

sniper fire surprised them . The Marines fired back,

killing eight North Vietnamese . The enemy fire killed one Marine and wounded three in this brief en -

counter .

As the Marines checked the area, they discovere d

20-25 NVA soldiers, some wearing American

helmets and flak jackets. The Marines opened fire

and called for reinforcements. The company commander, First Lieutenant Michael H . Gavlick,

radioed the situation to the battalion CP, and then

took a platoon and the third squad of the engaged

platoon forward to join the battle .

Contact continued throughout the afternoon .

Before dark, Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered two

provisional rifle platoons from his Company B and

two LVTH-6s to go to the scene of contact to assist .

As darkness settled, Lieutenant Gavlick drew hi s

composite force into a tight perimeter. At 0630 on

the 11th, the composite unit moved out under a

light drizzle toward the area of the previous day's action . At 0800, lead elements spotted 40 of the

enemy trying to move south across the break in the

tree line . The Marines observed 11 NVA soldiers digging a mortar position and another 15 moving

behind a sand dune to the north . While the Marine s

took these enemy under fire with artillery and th e

LVTH-6s, Lieutenant Colonel Toner moved his

Company A, organized as an infantry unit, and hi s

command group to Strong Point C-4 . At the same

time, the U.S . advisor with the ARVN battalion occupying Strong Point A-1, 2,500 meters across th e

sand dunes west of the contact, asked if his battalio n

could help. Toner asked the ARVN battalion to

move a unit into a blocking position southwest o f

the action. The NVA force had moved around to th e

west of the Marines and were now attacking from th e

south. The advisor informed Toner that an ARVN

company would move to the desired blocking position. Fifteen of the enemy had already attacked th e

Marines and, although driven off, had fired 10 RPG

antitank rounds. One of these rounds hit a LVTH- 6

on the bow, but the round glanced off without

damaging the tractor. The LVTH-6 destroyed the

antitank gunners' position with direct 105m m

howitzer fire .

The number of enemy troops involved in the battle increased . A 30-minute firelight began ; Gavlick's

composite company took heavy small arms fire fro m

three sides, then the Communists began hitting th e

Marines with mortars . Throughout the action, the

two LVTH-6s maneuvered back and forth to engage

the enemy, often firing at ranges between 50 to 15 0

meters. The remaining four LVTH-6s at Cua Vie t

and a detachment of 4 .2-inch mortars at C-4 adde d

their fire to the battle .

As the Marines tightened their perimeter, th e

NVA made a second assault . Fifty-five of the enemy

attacked from the north, 12 more came in from the

northeast, and 20 others from the south . Again ,

mortar fire supported their assault . The Marine s

responded with artillery, and used naval gunfire to

hold back enemy reinforcements . The Communist

assault failed, but individual soldiers continued t o

pop up around the perimeter. One audacious NV A

mortar crew, protected by infantry, went into actio n

on an exposed sand dune only 90 meters from th e

Marine perimeter. They fired six rounds before

machine guns and direct fire from one of the

LVTH-6s killed them .

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 196 7

PFC F. N. Bunton carries a small Christmas tree o n

his pack while on Operation Kentucky with Company C, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines in December.
FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORTH 14 7

By this time, the ARVN company had crossed th e

sand dunes and was moving into its blocking position. As it entered the position, the company spotted a mortar crew that had been giving the Marine s

trouble from the southwest. After a brief fire fight

the enemy mortar crew ran away to the north, leaving two bodies behind . After this, the fightin g

dwindled to sniper fife .

Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered Company A t o

sweep the area north of C-4 and clear it of any remaining NVA soldiers. At the same time, he

ordered Lieutenant Gavlick to withdraw his composite company to C-4 . Artillery and naval gunfir e

continued to shell the tree line north of the battl e

position . As Lieutenant Gavlick's force moved south ,

they found a supply dump bordered by communications wire strung waist high from trees as a guide .

The site contained many full storage bins, dug int o

the sand dunes next to the trail. Live vegetation

camouflaged their trap-door entrances . The Marines

destroyed the bins as they discovered them, afte r

which they returned to Stongpoint C-4 . The daylong battle resulted in 54 enemy known killed,

while the composite Marine unit suffered 20 wound -

ed.

As the year came to a close, all of the operations

which had started in November remained in progress. Although contact was light, there were signs of

renewed enemy activity in the Scotland TAOR. Intelligence officers reported at least two NVA divisions, the 325C and 304th, moving into the Khe

Sanh region . Because of these reports, General Tompkins strengthened Khe Sanh with an additional

battalion during December and prepared to deplo y

more reinforcements on short notice . The year 1967

ended as it had begun ; a major invasion of northern

Quang Tri Province appeared to be the enemy's next

move .

PART V

SPECIAL EFFORTS
CHAPTER 1 1

The Special Landing Force

Doctrine Versus Expedient—Forming a Second SLF— Continuing Operations Throughout the Yea r

Doctrine Versus Expedient

In 1967 the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force

(SLF) was the Pacific Command's strategic reserve fo r

all of Southeast Asia, as well as Vietnam . The SLF

contained a Marine command element of approximately the same organization as an infantr y

regimental staff; a Marine battalion landing team,

consisting of a Marine infantry battalion reinforced

by artillery, a small logistics support unit, and othe r

elements to support independent operation ; and a

Marine helicopter squadron . The Marine SLF commander reported directly to the Navy amphibious

commander. Although under the overall operationa l

control of the Seventh Fleet, the SLF was readil y

available for MACV use in Vietnam .

SLF operations in 1967 concentrated in I Corps .

The reasons for this change in practice were not entirely the result of a national level strategy for th e

conduct of the war. Without considering the Communists' strategy, there were sufficient conflictin g

interests within the many command levels of th e

U.S. Armed Forces to cause diverse opinions of th e

most appropriate use of this unique striking force .

Opinions were divided even within the Marin e

Corps . In III MAF, Marine division and wing commanders wanted to control their own battalions an d

squadrons which were siphoned off to man the SLF .

Continuing reappraisals of required troop strength

to "do the job" in I Corps amplified this desire .

MACV and III MAF did not want troops floating off

the coast when they could be "in country" and, most

probably, in contact . However, the personnel in the

SLF did not count against the "in-country" authorized troop strength ceilings and, as one operations officer noted, the SLF at least served as a source of

emergency reinforcements following commitment o f

a division's reserve .' Other Marine commanders,

primarily those outside Vietnam, such as Brigaider

General Louis Metzger of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade on Okinawa, advocated a close

adherence to approved amphibious doctrine .

General Metzger later wrote, "As Commandin g

General, 9th MAB, and at the direction of CG ,

FMFPac, Lieutenant General Krulak, I was precise in

following the established amphibious operationa l

command relationships and logistic support. It was a

constant struggle, particularly with the Wing an d

Division commanders ."2

Compounding the problem was the Sevent h

Fleet's position, reinforced by approved doctrine ,

that the Navy-Marine amphibious capability provided by the Amphibious Ready Group/Special Lan -

ding Force organization added great flexibility to th e

allied strategic options, as well as the Vietnamese

tactical situation . U.S. Air Force consideration s

entered into the controversy because of air space control requirements . A final, but certainly not overriding, consideration in the III MAF stance was the

Marine Corps' situation in I Corps . ' If additional

MACV, in this case U .S . Army, troops could be

released to go into lower I Corps, the 1st Marin e

Division would be able to move north to cover Da

Nang, thereby allowing the 3d Marine Division t o

concentrate in northern I Corps. This would permit

the 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions to devote their

energies to pacification . These moves, however,

could occur only if the Marine divisions could accomplish their mission without the SLF battalion . In

January of 1967, all of the ramifications of this complex situation were not in evidence, but two basic

questions were starting to form . What Marine formations would provide the SLF with its landing

forces and where should it be used ?

The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) gained an

additional landing ship, tank (LST) in January 1967,

bringing the ARG ship total to five . The other ships

in the group were : an amphibious assault ship

(LPH), a dock landing ship (LSD), an attac k

transport (APA), and an amphibious transport doc k

(LPD) .

Early in 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made tw o

significant decisions. They authorized the formation

150
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 15 1

of a second SLF and directed CinCPac to commit

both SLFs to extended operations in Vietnam .

Neither of these decisions were restrictive as far as

the location of SLF landings, but the provision of th e

required logistic support provided a major reaso n

why SLF operations became a purely I Corps function .

Under the heading of "Logistic Support for th e

Special Landing Force" in April, FMFPac's report of

Marine operations in Vietnam revealed a major

reason for concentrating SLF operations in I Corps;

the support structure dictated operational location .

The report stated:

With the decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff`. . . to

commit the SLFs to extended operations in Vietnam, the

normal logistic support procedure required some changes .

The CG, III MAF now provides logistic support when the

SLF operates in areas contiguous to III MAF logistic installations. When operating in areas isolated fro m

established logistic support areas, ground units of the SLF

utilize their own resources, with -stocks reconstituted a s

practicable from the Force Logistic Command . While

operating from the LPH, aviation units of the SLF will be

supported by the LPH but, when operating ashore in the

III MAF area of operations, support by the 1st Marine Air -

craft Wing will augment that positioned by 9th MAB

aboard ship . If the operations ashore extend beyond 1 5

days, support of helicopters will become the responsibility

of CG, III MAF . When the SLF operates ashore in locations other than I CTZ (after 15 days), CG, III MAF wil l

provide only aeronautical spares and special support

equipment. All other logistic support responsibilities wil l

remain with CG, 9th MAB [on Okinawa] . *

A final determinant for SLF commitments which

received due consideration was the Communist plan

for 1967 . As the year opened with the sour memory

of an uneasy and far from inviolate 48-hour New

Year's truce, there were continuing indications of

enemy buildups and unit movements in and north

of the DMZ. As events proved, the Marine occupation of the bases at Con Thien and remote, but vital ,

Khe Sanh alarmed the Communists, but at this earl y

stage of the year there were no clear indications of

Communist intentions in northern I Corps.

Elsewhere in the corps area, the enemy obviously

would continue to exert as much pressure as possibl e

*"When the 9th MAB assumed responsibility for Marine aviation and ground units in the Western Pacific which were not i n

Vietnam, it became an important part of SLF operations. . . . Th e

Brigade's aviation component, MAG-15, became a composite

MAG consisting of helicopters, KC-130s, and fixed-wing attac k

and fighter aircraft, and, as such, was one of the largest air group s

we have ever had ." Col David O . Takala, Comments on draft ms,

2Jun81 (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

on allied units in order to immobilize or at least

distract them . The year 1967 tested the validity o f

the SLF concept as the Communists forced the expedient of long and often unrewarding SLF commitments on the Marine commanders in I Corps .

Operation Deckhouse V

6 - 15 January 1967

The first SLF operation of 1967, Deckhouse V, was

significant for two reasons. It was a sizable, combined U.S. Marine and Vietnamese Marine amphibious

operation . More ominously, for the proponents o f

the SLF concept, it was the last SLF landing to take

place beyond the boundaries of I Corps .

The ARG, under Captain John D . Westervelt,

USN, with Colonel Harry D . Wortman's SLF em -

barked, steamed south to the coast of Kien Ho a

Province in IV Corps for the landing . Deckhouse V

was the only SLF operation for Major James L . Day's

BLT 1/9 and it marked the end of SLF duty for Lieu -

tenant Colonel Marshall B . Armstrong's HMM-362 .

D-day for Deckhouse V was 6 January . Both BLT

1/9 and elements of Vietnamese Marine Brigad e

Force Bravo, primarily consisting of the 3d and 4t h

Vietnamese Marine Battalions, enjoyed support

throughout the operation from HMM-362's mixe d

force of UH-34 and CH-46 helicopters operating

from the USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) . The combined

seaborne and heliborne force assaulted an area o f

suspected Viet Cong concentrations on the coast between the Co Chien and Ham Luong reaches of th e

Mekong River . Lasting until 15 January, the operation produced unspectacular results . The combined

force killed only 21 Viet Cong, destroyed two smal l

arms workshops, and captured 44 weapons and 4 2

tons of rice . Seven U .S . Marines died and one Vietnamese Marine died accidentally .

Some participants attributed Deckhouse V's

failure to information leaks . The Marines encountered only local force VC in the operational

area, but prisoners stated that larger VC units had

been there before the landings. Someone told Captain Westervelt—he did not hear it himself—that a

Philippine radio station broadcast the news when th e

ARG departed Subic Bay that the Marines were

headed for the Mekong Delta . 3

Many other difficulties marred the execution of

the combined operation . Communications wer e

bad, rough seas interfered, planning was hurried ,

and on D plus 1 the 4th Battalion VNMC endured a
152 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19124 6

Two men of BLT 1 /9 look out over some of the flooded rice paddies that hampere d

mobility in Vietnam's Delta region during Operation Deckhouse V in January 1967 .

near record-breaking ship-to-shore landing-craft

move of 23 miles, rivaled only by some of the U .S .

shore-to-shore operations in the Pacific durin g

World War II. Captain Westervelt recalled these difficulties:

The Navy aspects of the Deckhouse V landings were formidable . Normal operating depths of water for the LPH ,

LPD and other deep draft ships in the Amphibious Read y

Group were about 8 to 10 miles to seaward off the coasta l

areas of Kien Hoa between the Co Chien and Ham Loun g

Rivers. The 8-inch gun cruiser Canberra had a fire support

station some eight miles, as I recall, from the impact area s

for her pre-assault bombardment . Water depths adequat e

for LST and rocket ship passage over the shallow bar into

positions for the assault landings obtained only at hig h

tide . Because an early morning landing time was require d

for the Marine assault forces in the LVT5 vehicles, this

meant that, to protect the surprise features of th e

landings, the LSTs and rocket ships had to proceed ove r

the bar late in the preceding evening at high tide to be i n

position by dawn . . . .

The long distance off-shore required by the principal

ARG ships plus the fact that some landing beaches wer e

well upstream from the seaward beaches accounted for th e

long boat rides (up to 23 miles) required for some of the

troops.

The seas were very rough on the original D-Day (4 Jan )

and again on 5 Jan, so the actual D-Day on 6 Jan was 2

days late . However, even on the 6th it was not possible t o

load the [Vietnamese Marines] from the Henrico into

LCM6's alongside, so Henrico, Thomaston and Vancouver

returned to Vung Tau, transferred Henrico s troops to the

LPD and LSD so loading could take place in the well

decks. The [Vietanamese Marines] actually landed on th e

7th . 4 *

The operation encountered problems at an even

higher level . Amphibious doctrine called for the amphibious task force commander to control all aircraft

in the amphibious operations area . Normally, these

aircraft would come from the Navy and Marin e

Corps . The location of Deckhouse V created specia l

circumstances, however, that dictated that all ai r

support come from the Seventh Air Force . As

Brigadier General John R . Chaisson later recalled ,

the commander of Seventh Air Force, Major General

William W. Momyer, agreed with Navy control o f

aircraft in a traditional amphibious assault against a

hostile shore . In the Mekong Delta, however, wit h

the Air Force air control system already in place ,

General Momyer saw no valid reason to change, the

existing system just because an amphibious force

*See Chapter 12 for the U .S. Marine advisors' accounts of th e

VNMC participation in Deckhouse V .
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 15 3

temporarily was operating in the area . General

Westmoreland backed the Navy in this argument in

this case but all future SLF operations were to be in

the I Corps area where such complicated command

relationships could be avoided . ,

Deckhouse VI/Desoto

16 February - 3 March 196 7

During late January the two main components o f

the SLF changed . Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E .

Huntington's HMM-363 relieved HMM-362 an d

Lieutenant Colonel Jack Westerman's BLT 1/ 4

replaced BLT 1/9 . Sailing from the Philippines, the

newly constituted SLF arrived off the coast of Vietnam on the 14th of February.

While the SLF underwent its transition, significant changes occurred in I Corps . To release mor e

ARVN troops for pacification work, U.S. Marine

Task Force X-Ray, commanded by Brigadier Genera l

William A . Stiles, relieved Vietnamese troops of

combat duties in southern Quang Ngai Province i n

January. General Stiles promptly initiated Operatio n

Desoto, a search and destroy operation directe d

against known Communist strongholds in th e

region. To augment Desoto, the SLF received orders

to operate in an area south of Task Force X-Ray 's

AO. The SLF operation was Deckhouse VI . As in

Deckhouse V, Colonel Wortman commanded the

SLF and Captain Westervelt, the ARG . 6

The mission assigned to the SLF ground element ,

BLT 1/4, called for it to disrupt enemy movement i n

the Sa Huynh salt flats, search northward in the Nui

Dau area, and, finally, link up with the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, then operating around Nui Da u

in Operation Desoto .

At 0800 on 16 February, two rocket-firing landin g

ships started the naval gunfire preparation for th e

Deckhouse VI landings. Fifty-five minutes later, th e

first wave of HMM-363's helicopters lifted off the

deck of the Iwo Jima and headed inland with th e

assault company, Company A . Company C lande d

in LVTs near Tach By and helicopters ferried the rest

of the battalion inland. The landings were unopposed.

Brigadier General Louis Metzger, the commanding general of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigad e

based on Okinawa, was there to observe this landin g

and commented later on the assault phase . He

wrote:

Because of the insistence of MACV a NOTAM [Notic e

to Airmen] was published several days before each amphibious operation, I suppose to protect any commercia l

air in the area . It didn't take a very effective intelligence

system for the Viet Cong and/or NVA to know just wher e

and when a landing was going to take place . Secondly, I

was concerned that even though this landing was takin g

place in a populated area, the amphibious force carried ou t

routine naval gunfire and air strikes. . . . Civilian

casualties did result. Following the operation, I discussed

the matter with Commander 7th Fleet [Admiral John H .

Hyland] and he supported my position . At least as long as

I was CG 9th MAB the NGF and Air Strikes in futur e

landings in populated areas were on call a

Captain Westervelt later commented on a numbe r

of problems encountered during the assault landing

in Deckhouse VI. He wrote:

Deckhouse VI was treated as a regular assault landin g

complete with heavy pre-assault fires for the boat landings.

In retrospect, because of the U.S. Army forces operatin g

just to the south and west and U .S. Marines operating t o

the north and west of the assault area, the pre-assault fire s

should have been "on call." There were weather problems

at Deckhouse VI when heavy fog and rain obscured the

landing zones on D-Day and caused a one-day postponement. Surface landings could have been carried out . The

cruiser firing pre-assault fires commenced fire in spite of

D-Day cancellation and probably gave some indication to

any VC in the area that something unusual might be

scheduled . However, this was improbable because the area

was normally frequented by gunfire support destroyers.

The population of the villages just south of Sa Huynh

congregated on the eastern face of a ridge, which sloped

up from the boat landing area, to watch the Marine landing show . Originally, the pre-assault fires had included

this area, but this had been changed on the advice of a

representative from the Province Chiefs staff on board the

flagship . He pointed with a dirty finger to the ridge an d

forced out his interpretation of " Friend" in English . We

took him at his word and put those particular fires "on

call ."8

The opening phase of Deckhouse VI was uneventful. The SLF planners had suspected this would be

the case. True to form, local Communist units concentrated on delaying and harassing tactics . The BLT

confirmed the Communist presence in the area by

destroying 167 fortifications and capturing 20 tons

of assorted supplies during the 32 days of Phase I .

Though there never were any major contacts, th e

BLT claimed 201 VC killed during this period ; only

six Marines died . Unfortunately, on 25 February, th e

HMM-363 commander, Lieutenant Colone l

Huntington, and his copilot received wounds durin g

a troop lift ; the squadron executive officer, Major

Marvin E. Day, assumed command on the 28th an d

continued in command for the duration of
154 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A191174

Heavy monsoon rains flooded the wide expanse of rice paddies through which these

Marines are wading during Operation Deckhouse VI near the coast in February 1967 .

which hit eight of the 14 helicopters in the assault

lift; and put six out of action . All other loaded

helicopters diverted to the beach area while supporting Marine aircraft strafed and rocketed the VC

defenders . Fortunately for the isolated Marines of

the assault element, the Communists pulled out and

that afternoon the rest of the battalion linked up

with its first wave . By dark the BLT had consolidate d

near LZ Bat and began preparations for the next

day's search and destroy operation .

Other than the. opposed landing at LZ Bat, Phas e

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19113 1

A member of Company A, 1st Battalion, 4t h

Marines hits the deck as his unit comes under fire in

Landing Zone Bat during Deckhouse VI, the SLF's

companion piece to Operation Desoto in February .

Deckhouse VI. Phase I ended on 26 February whe n

the SLF Commander, Colonel Wortman, ordered a

tactical withdrawal of the SLF from the Sa Huyn h

area to its ships to prepare for Phase II .

Only 14 and one-half hours after the last elemen t

of the battalion left the Sa Huynh salt flats, the SL F

landed again, this time 10 kilometers north of Sa

Huynh. Phase II of Deckhouse VI, by now integrated as part of the combined 7th Marines and

ARVN Operation Desoto, started at 0830 on 2 7

February.

As the SLF helicopters approached LZ Bat, fiv e

miles inland from the beach, they met heavy fire

Infantrymen from BLT 1 /4 rush a wounded Marin e

to a waiting CH-34D helicopter from HMM-363 for

a flight to the amphibious ship USS Iwo Jima on 23

February 1967 during Operation Deckhouse VI .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A188499
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 15 5

II action almost repeated Phase I . Occasional contac t

and intermittent sniper fire marked the only enemy

reactions. In the six days required to accomplish th e

second phase, the battalion killed 78 more VC ,

destroyed 145 fortifications, and captured an additional five tons of supplies . Similarly, as in Phase I ,

the price totaled six more Marines dead . Deckhouse

VI concluded on 3 March and the SLF promptly sailed for the Philippines; it returned to Vietnam,

however, long before the month ended .

Beacon Hill I

20 March - 1 April 1967

In the spring of 1967, III MAF faced a growing

Communist capability to overrun the Marine base at

Gio Linh and its appealing prize of four 175m m

guns . Units of the 3d Marine Division committed t o

Operation Prairie remained thinly spread over an extremely large area . Still more unsettling, intelligenc e

sources reported five NVA infantry battalions in o r

near the eastern portion of the DMZ .

In response to this threat, the SLF, offshore sinc e

14 March, went into action once more on the 20th . *

Lieutenant Colonel Westerman's BLT 1/4, an d

HMM-363 commanded by newly-promoted Lieutenant Colonel Day, the former squadron executiv e

officer, landed on the coast north of the Cua Viet .

Operation Beacon Hill had begun.

*The 1st Marine .Aircraft Wing reinforced HMM-363 with a

detachment of UH-lEs and CH-53s .

A Navy hospital corpsman with Company D, 4th

Marines treats a wounded Marine under fire in

Operation Beacon Hill north of Cua Viet in March .

3d MarDiv ComdC, March 1967

3d MarDiv ComdC, March 196 7

An unshaven Marine rifleman carefully remove s

enemy equipment from a bunker in the North Vietnamese defense line destroyed in Operation Beacon

Hill by BLT 1 /4 on 26 March after an intense two -

day preliminary bombardment by air and artillery .

Contact was light until 21 March when the BL T

engaged about 80 NVA troops, killing 14 . The next

day the battalion made contact again between Gi o

Linh and Con Thien. After a stiff fight the enemy,

apparently a company, withdrew leaving 43 bodies

behind. Progress during both days was slow because

the NVA laced their positions with connecting tunnels which required detailed search .

On the 26th, after a two-day air and artillery

preparation, the BLT broke through two well -

prepared defensive trench lines . Again, the Marine s

encountered interconnecting tunnels : Finding the

tunnels required care because the enemy had concealed them skillfully among the hedgerows. As the

battalion cracked the position, the Communist s

again withdrew. Only sniper fire and minor rea r

guard actions slowed the advancing Marines. On 28

March, BLT 1/4 shifted to the operational control o f

the 3d Marines and occupied a blocking positio n

1,300 meters south of the Con Thien perimeter i n

support of a 3d Marines attack. This was the last

phase of Beacon Hill and the operation ended on 1

April .

Beacon Hill results appeared promising . Although

BLT 1/4 had suffered 29 Marines killed and 23 0

wounded, it reported 334 NVA dead even though

the Communists had fought from positions which

were difficult to identify, much less exploit. With the end of Beacon Hill, the 1st Battalion ,

4th Marines transferred from the SLF to the 3 d

Marine Division. The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines,
156 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18849 6

LCpI Claude Tucker stands guard while the commanders of the two Special Landing

Forces, Col Henry D . IVortman (center) of SLF Bravo and Col James A. Gallo of SLF

Alpha look over a suspected Viet Cong on the first day of Operation Deckhouse VI.

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Wendell N.

Vest, a regular line battalion scheduled for

rehabilitation on Okinawa, started loading on boar d

the empty ships of the ARG shipping on 2 April .

The transports sailed on the 5th .

While this exchange of units, ships, and roles too k

place, Marines on Okinawa were implementing the

twin SLF concept. HMM-363 and the 1st Battalion ,

3d Marines joined SLF Alpha (Task Group 79 .4) and

the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines and HMM-164 became

part of SLF Bravo (Task Group 79 .5) battalion . Task

Group 79 .5 had operated as the single SLF sinc e

1965, but during the transitional period of March -

April 1967, TG 79.5, now designated SLF Bravo ,

went through a standdown phase . Neither of the

SLFs were in an offshore ready position during earl y

April 1967 . SLF Alpha, on board the ARG ship s

which sailed on 10 April, arrived on station near th e

DMZ on the 18th. The ships carrying SLF Bravo

followed shortly thereafter, sailing on 17 April .

Beacon Star

22 April - 12 May 1967

Beacon Star was the first operation for newly

designated SLF Bravo. As Navy Captain Richard L .

Cochrane's ARG steamed toward northern I CTZ ,

Colonel Wortman, the SLF commander sinc e

September 1966, experienced normal prelanding

doubts and anxieties. One reassuring factor was tha t

both of his major subordinate units were I Corps

veterans. The helicopter squadron, HMM-164, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rodney D .

McKitrick, had been in Vietnam since February

1966, and Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. Delong's BLT

2/3 originally arrived "in country" in May of 1965 .

Additional confidence stemmed from the fact tha t

the BLT had just come from a one-month rehabilitation period on Okinawa . It was at full strength an d

all equipment was ready for combat .

The target area for Beacon Star was a major V C

stronghold and supply area along the border o f

Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces . The small 0

Lau River is the natural terrain feature whic h

delineates the provincial borders in the coasta l

region. The center of the Beacon Star amphibiou s

objective area (AOA) was 27 kilometers northwest of

Hue, on the edge of what French soldiers called "La

Rue Sans foie," or "The Street Without Joy ." The
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19388 0

Col James A. Gallo briefs senior Marines on 7 May on SLF Alpha's progress in Operatio n

Beacon Star near the border of Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. Prominent among

the officers present are (seated, left) LtGen Victor H. Krulak and MajGen Robert E .

Cushman, Jr. MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr. and BGen Foster C. Lahue stand at left.

AOA was known for its heavy concentration of Communists; intelligence officers reported two battalion s

of the 6th Regiment and two main force battalions ,

the 810th and the 814th, were operating in th e

region.

The Beacon Star scheme of maneuver consisted o f

a waterborne and heliborne BLT landing on th e

coast. The battalion was to move inland, generall y

following the 0 Lau River, while, at the same time ,

gradually expanding its TAOR in a southwesterly

direction .

Bad weather and poor visibility delayed operations

on D-day, 22 April, but the first heliborne compan y

landed at 0809 . It met no opposition .* Beacon Sta r

progressed according to plan ; enemy resistance wa s

minimal . On D plus four the battalion launche d

a combined helicopter and overland assault in the

southwestern portion of the expanded TAOR to at -

tack an estimated 250 VC spotted in the target area .

Unfortunately, the BLT was not able to capitalize on

this intelligence .

Urgent orders from the Commander Task Grou p

79 .5 interrupted Beacon Star. The Phase I casualties,

one killed and 10 wounded, would seem insignificant in the face of what happened in the next 2 4

*BLT 2/3 suffered approximately 60 heat casualties withi n

about a three-hour period after landing . Colonel Rodney D .

McKitrick later cited such incidents as part of the justification fo r

the placing of an acclimatization room in the new Tawara class

LHAs. Colonel Rodney D. McKitrick, Comments on draft ms ,

n .d . (1981) (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)

hours. The new SLF Bravo was about to undergo its

first real combat test . On 26 April, the name Khe

Sanh was just another place name to many of Lieutenant Colonel Delong's Marines ; by mid-March thos e

who survived would never forget it .

While Phase I of Beacon Star proceeded, th e

Marines of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines discovered

strong Communist formations in the hills west of

Khe Sanh, 43 miles from the Beacon Star area .

Realizing that one battalion could not carry the hill

mass, the 3d Marine Division commander, Major

General Hochmuth, ordered BLT 2/3 to break off

operations in the original Beacon Star AOA and proceed to Khe Sanh .

The tactical move to Khe Sanh was a transportation triumph . At 1200 on the 26th, the divisio n

placed BLT 2/3, in the field and in contact with th e

enemy, under the operational control of the 3d

Marines. By 1400, three of the BLT's companies an d

the command group were at Khe Sanh, and by 160 0

the BLT effected a link-up with elements of the 3 d

Battalion, 3d Marines northwest of the Khe Sanh

perimeter. The BLT moved by helicopter from th e

Beacon Star AOA to Phu Bai, and from Phu Bai t o

Khe Sanh by Marine and U .S . Air Force KC-130 and

C-130 Hercules transports. The total elapsed time

from receipt of the warning order until the link-u p

near Khe Sanh totaled less than seven hours .

The second phase of Beacon Star is more commonly known as "The Khe Sanh Hill Fights" or the "First

157
158 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Battle of Khe Sanh ."* The BLT's casualties during

the period 27April-12 May gave evidence of th e

violence of the fighting for the Khe Sanh hills . During these weeks the BLT lost 71 killed and 34 9

wounded, more than a fourth of its strength . Of the

78 Navy corpsmen assigned to the BLT, five die d

and 15 suffered wounds.

The fighting at Khe Sanh tapered off in May an d

SLF Bravo's BLT 2/3 transferred from the 3d

Marines' operational control back to the SLF . The

return to ARG ships started on 10 May and finishe d

on the 12th, signaling the official end of Beacon

Star.

Beaver Cage/Union I

28 April - 12 May 1967

The other special landing force, SLF Alpha, formed on Okinawa on 1 March 1967 under the command of Colonel James A . Gallo, Jr. The new SLF

contained BLT 1/3, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. "Pete" Wickwire, and HMM-263 ,

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward K . Kirby . Both the helicopter squadron and the battalio n

*For a detailed account of the bitter contest for Hills 558, 861 ,

881 North, and 881 South, see Chapter 4 .

A 60mm mortar crew with Company A, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines fires against a North Vietnames e

Army unit on 20 May during Operation Bea u

Charger, the SLF's portion of Operation Hickory

which cleared the southern portion of the DMZ.

3d MarDiv ComdC, May 1967

3d MarDiv ComdC, May 1967

2dLt John V. Francis, wearing no shirt under his armored vest because of the intense heat encountered

in Operation Beaver Cage, takes a short break on 1 2

May as BLT 1 /3 concludes its initial SLF operation .

had just finished rehabilitation periods on Okinaw a

and were at full strength. Departing from Okinawa

on 10 April, the ARG, with SLF Alpha embarked ,

headed for Vietnam and made its first landing on

the 28th .

The target for the first SLF Alpha landing, Operation Beaver Cage, was the rich and populous Que

Son Valley, 25 miles south of Da Nang, important to

the Communists as a source of both food and manpower. Beaver Cage started at 0700 28 April as th e

first heliborne elements of BLT 1/3 touched down .

For the next four days heat caused more casualties

than the enemy as operations continued agains t

negligible opposition .

Moving to a more promising operational area five

miles to the north, the BLT made its first significan t

contact on 2 May . An enemy force, at least a platoon, attacked Company C as it dug in for the night .

After dark, USAF AC-47 "Puff the Dragon" gunships and "Spooky" flare planes, Marine artillery ,

and the BLT's own supporting arms pounded th e

suspected Communist positions . The enemy fled .

The next morning the battalion resumed its

sweeping operations . The enemy did not react until

5 May . That night the VC struck back, hitting the

BLT headquarters and support elements with morta r

and small arms fire as they evacuated a landing zone .

The Headquarters and Service Company troops and
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 15 9

the attached Marines of 4 .2-inch Mortar Battery, 1st

Battalion, 12th Marines, repulsed the Communists .

Despite the intensity of the attack and reduce d

visibility caused by oncoming darkness, Lieutenan t

Colonel Kirby 's helicopters successfully extracted 20 0

men and more than 1 and one-half tons of ammunition without loss.

To the north, while BLT 1/3 conducted Beaver

Cage, the 5th Marines engaged in Operation Unio n

I. On 9 May the Beaver Cage scheme of maneuver

reoriented to include an eastward sweep toward th e

coast coordinated with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine s

on the BLT's right. In this manner the final stage of

Beaver Cage became a part of the Union I plan ,

although the BLT designed its maneuver to place i t

in position for an amphibious withdrawal .* During

the last week of the operation, 6-12 May, the BLT

endured continuous mortar attacks and sniper fire .

On 10 May, as the eastward sweep continued,

Companies B and C engaged in a day-long actio n

with a sizable VC force . After much maneuvering ,

air strikes, mortar missions, and the insertion of a

40-man Sparrow Hawk unit, the VC broke off th e

action, but only after the BLT killed 86 enem y

soldiers . Beaver Cage/Union I ended for the SLF

Alpha units on 12 May as they returned to their

respective ships.

The first operation for SLF Alpha had been a costly venture, but all units had demonstrated their

fighting qualities . Battalion casualties totaled 5 5

Marines killed and 151 wounded, but in 16 days of

continuous operations the BLT claimed 181 enemy

dead and a . bag of 66 prisoners. The next test of SLF

Alpha was only five days away.

Beau Charger/Belt Tight/Hickory

PrairielV/ Cimarro n

18 May - 10 June 1967

Because of the Communist rocket and artillery

buildup in the DMZ during the spring of 1967 ,

General Westmoreland issued a directive authorizing the entry of forces into the DMZ buffer zone

south of the Ben Hai River, actually South Vietnamese territory . The authorization triggered planning for a series of simultaneous operations to b e

conducted in the new manuever area, one by ARVN

forces and three by the U.S. Marines. The code

names for these operations were Hickory for 3 d

*See Chapter 3 for the 5th Marines' account of Union I .

Marine Divison units, Beau Charger for SLF Alpha,

Belt Tight for SLF Bravo, and Lam Son 54 for the

South Vietnamese task force.* The overall concept

envisioned the movement of SLF Bravo into th e

Hickory Operation by means of Operation Bel t

Tight, while SLF Alpha was to operate east of th e

Hickory/Lam Son 54 operational areas under th e

aegis of Beau Charger. The Beau Charger/Belt

Tight/Hickory plan was unique in that it called fo r

the employment of both SLFs in the same operational area at the same time .

The opening scheme of maneuver called for th e

movement of three separate assault forces to the Be n

Hai River where they were to face about and drive

south on roughly parallel axes, destroying all enem y

units and installations in their paths. The plan included the establishment of a free-fire zone whic h

would require the evacuation of more than 10,00 0

noncombatants from the buffer zone, a monumental task assigned to the Vietnamese National Police .

D-day for Beau Charger, SLF Alpha 's show, was

18 May. Fifteen UH-34s of Lieutenant Colonel Kirby's HMM-263 lifted from the flight deck of the US S

Okinawa (LPH-3) and headed inland, each loade d

with five Marines from the assault element, Company A, BLT 1/3 . L-hour was 0800 . The landing

zone, Goose, was less than six kilometers from the

North Vietnamese boundary of the DMZ, an d

almost within small arms range of the north bank o f

the Ben Hai River .

The SLF planners studied aerial photographs of

the terrain before the operation, but conducted n o

prelanding overflights to preserve secrecy . For the

same reason, they requested no air and naval gunfire

preparations of the LZ . Intelligence sources had

reported the presence of many enemy antiaircraft

machine guns in the area .

Flying lead, Kirby led his 34s toward the potentially dangerous zone, flying at altitudes of less tha n

50 feet to reduce the enemy gunners' effectiveness .

A maximum speed approach, about 80 knots, lack o f

prominent landmarks, and the tenseness of th e

situation made navigation difficult at best. Kirby

landed at the north end of the zone, but as he did

machine gun fire ripped into his helicopter . The

enemy bullets wrecked the helicopter's radio an d

wounded the copilot, crew chief, gunner, and thre e

infantrymen . Another infantryman, killed, fell ou t

of the helicopter. The wounded gunner returned fire

*The non-SLF operations appeared in Chapter 1 .
160 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

and, as Kirby later related, " . . . saved [our]

bacon ."1 0

Kirby managed to get the helicopter back in th e

air, but without a radio he had no contact with th e

rest of his flight or with the Okinawa . Four other

UH-34s in the assault wave and two escorting UH1Es suffered damage from enemy fire, but the entir e

wave unloaded its troops . As soon as Kirby got his

crippled helicopter back to the Okinawa, he briefed

the SLF commander, Colonel Gallo, on the ba d

situation at LZ Goose . Colonel Gallo ordered the

cancellation of all further lifts to Goose and the

substitution of the alternate LZ, Owl, 800 meters

south of Goose . The assault element of Company A

at Goose was very much alone and in trouble .

Second Lieutenant Dwight G. Faylor's 2d Platoon ,

Company A spread over 800 yards at LZ Goose . A

well-organized enemy force pressed his thinly hel d

position from the northwest. The BLT naval gunfire

liaison officer, Ensign John W . McCormick, vainly

tried to call in naval gunfire . The ships denied his re -

quests; no one was certain of the exact location o f

friendly positions and in many cases the enemy was

too close to use naval guns without endangering th e

Marines . Rescue was on the way, but the Marines a t

Goose were in desperate straits .

While the abortive assault at LZ Goose was takin g

place, Company D landed in LVTs at Green Beach ,

900 meters southeast of LZ Owl . This landing was

unopposed . By 0855, the remainder of Company A

had landed at Owl. Overland reinforcements arrive d

at Owl in the form of one platoon from Company D

and a section of tanks. At 0930 the lead elements of

Company B began landing . The force at Owl then

moved out to rescue the beleaguered platoon at LZ

Goose .

By 1100 the rescue force had regained contact with

Faylor's platoon, but the enemy showed no signs of

breaking off the engagement. Company B joine d

the fighting at Goose and the tempo of battle in -

creased . Stymied by a tenaciously held trenchline ,

the Company A Marines tried another avenue of at -

tack. Moving against the Communist position unde r

the cover of a tree line, the Marines engaged enemy

soldiers in furious hand-to-hand fighting . Company

A's advance bogged down again and the infantrymen called in close air support to crack the toug h

position. Eleven jets blasted the entrenched Communists and finally both Companies A and B, sup -

ported by tanks, moved forward . As the fighting

died down, the Marines counted 67 Communist

bodies.

Belt Tight started on 20 May. The initial missio n

of SLF Bravo was to land in the northeastern corner

of the 3d Division's Hickory operational area an d

conduct search and destroy operations within a

designated TAOR.* At 0714 on the 20th, Companies F and H with a BLT 2/3 command grou p

started landing at LZ Parrot . Companies E and G

followed with another command group landing a t

LZ Mockingbird at 0850 . The initial enemy reactio n

was deceptive ; the Marines encountered only ligh t

resistance .

The general trace of SLF Bravo's sweep in its

TAOR was in a southerly direction. The Hickory

planners wanted the SLF to dislodge enemy units i n

the area, thereby driving them into 3d Division units

moving up from the south . Neither the 3d Marine

Division nor SLF Bravo ever determined how man y

enemy troops Belt Tight displaced, but the SLF experienced four days of close combat during th e

operation, certainly an indication that its presenc e

had a spoiling effect on enemy intentions.

Throughout the Belt Tight period, BLT 2/3 en -

countered well-trained enemy troops who fough t

with skill and determination . The enemy's soundly

constructed positions and excellent weapons employ -

*A description of 3d Marine Division participation in Operation Hickory appears in Chapter 1 .

Two riflemen from BLT 1 /3 pass carefully through a

Vietnamese village while on Operation Beaver Cage .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A371988
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 16 1

ment caused severe problems for the battalion as i t

fought its way south. During one of the many mortar attacks, Lieutenant Colonel Delong, the BLT

commander, aggravated an old back injury whic h

necessitated his evacuation . His experienced executive officer, Major Wendell O . Beard, a forme r

Amphibious Warfare School instructor who joine d

the battalion in February, took command .

Belt Tight ended at 1559, 23 May 1967 . At this

time BLT 2/3 shifted to the operational control of

the 9th Marines which assigned the BLT a new are a

of operations as part of Operation Hickory, representing a continuation of the Belt Tight sweep . Until

Hickory ended at midnight on the 28th, the battalion continued its deliberate sweep operations.

The highlight of this period was a sharp engagemen t

between Company E, commanded by Captain Stuart

R . Vaughan, and a determined NVA force defending the village of Xuan Hai . The battle started on

the afternoon of the 24th and did not end until th e

Marines completed a detailed sweep of the village

ruins at 2155 on the following day . The enemy force

had built 40 defensive bunkers in and around th e

town. Company E destroyed them and counted 2 7

dead NVA soldiers on the site . SLF casualties were

light during the nine days of Belt Tight/Hickory ,

considering the fact that the battalion was either i n

contact or under artillery attack during most of th e

period . SLF Bravo had 17 Marines killed and 15 2

wounded. North Vietnamese losses totaled a confirmed 58 killed and one prisoner taken by th e

Marines. When Hickory finished on 28 May, BLT 2/3 remained in the field, still under the operational control of the 9th Marines. During the next three days

the battalion participated in Operation Prairie I V

which ended on the 31st . The BLT's assignment involved primarily a security operation in relief of bot h

the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines and the 1st Battalion ,

4th Marines. BLT 2/3 protected artillery positions

immediately north of the Cam Lo Bridge, the bridge

itself, and provided route security for both truck

convoys and engineer units on Route 61 from north

of the Cam Lo Bridge to Con Thien, an air distanc e

of slightly over 10 kilometers.

Although the Prairie IV assignment was of short

duation, the end of the operation did not eliminat e

the security requirements for Route 561 and nearb y

positions . As a consequence, SLF Bravo, still unde r

operational control of the 9th Marines, retained it s

Prairie IV mission as part of a new 3d Division plan,

Operation Cimarron . Cimarron lasted from 1 Jun e

until 2 July, though SLF Bravo 's involvement lasted

only through 10 June .

The SLF participation in Cimarron succeeded, i n

the sense that there was no local enemy activity . The

enemy stayed away, the road remained open, an d

Con Thien maintained its defensive integrity . The

BLT spent 9-10 June reorganizing and moving bac k

to Dong Ha combat base . Reembarkation on th e

11th marked the end of the longest SLF comba t

deployment ashore since its formation, 23 days o f

continous operations. The shipboard respite woul d

be short; SLF Bravo would land again in only a

week's time .

Day On, Stay On—SLF

Operational Tempo Increases

The spring and early summer of 1967 challenge d

the flexibility of the SLF concept in I Corps . Variations ranged from SLF Bravo's April "fire brigade "

action at Khe Sanh during Operation Beacon Star to

dull, but necessary, "housekeeping" duties assigne d

to BLT 2/3 during its 10 days with Operation Cimarron. As the year progressed, SLF operational commitments increased, not only in frequency, but also

in days ashore . During the first four months of 1967 ,

the average number of days of monthly combat commitment for a SLF was only 12 .* SLF Alpha 's Operation Beaver Cage landing in April signaled a drastic

increase in operational tempo . The May combat-da y

average jumped to 16 and one-half days per BLT ,

while June operations resulted in a new high of 22

days for SLF Alpha and 24 for SLF Bravo .

The remainder of the year reflected a muc h

heavier reliance on the SLFs . Average commitments

remained above the 20-days-per-month figure . Not

only did the number of combat days increase, bu t

the number of individual operations involving the

SLFs more than doubled.

The reasons for the increase in tempo were not

related to a single cause . The forthcoming Vietnamese National elections, continuing Communist

unit moves in northern I Corps, and offensive sweep s

to protect Marine fire support bases were only som e

of the factors which demanded SLF participation .

*SLF Bravo provided the basis for this computation because of

SLF Alpha's late entry into RVN, in April 1967 . SLF Bravo's combat days by month in early 1967 were : January, 10 ; February, 13 ;

March, 15 ; and April, 10 .
162 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Even though many of the SLF operations were inconclusive, their harried staffs deserve tribute . In

spite of the stepped-up operational tempo of 1967 ,

the SLF planners kept abreast of the often confusing,

and always demanding, I Corps tactical situation .

Bear Bite/Colgate/Choctaw/Marylan d

2-SJune, 7- 11 June,

12 - 23 June, 23 - 27 June 1967

Bear Bite, a conventional LVT and helicopte r

assault, was the first of SLF Alpha's June operations .

It targeted the Viet Cong operating along the coas t

40 kilometers southeast of the DMZ in the "The

Street Without Joy" region. Starting at 0730 on 2

June, BLT 1/3 spent the next 72 hours probing and

destroying unoccupied enemy positions . Enemy

snipers and a troublesome Marine tank stuck in a

paddy were the only hindrances to the operation .

There were no SLF casualties, but the Marines kille d

only two of the enemy and picked up nine suspects.

On 5 June the BLT returned to the 4th Marines '

perimeter by helicopter .

Two days later, the battalion moved out again o n

the uneventful Operation Colgate . During the intervening day the new SLF Alpha commander, Colonel John A . Conway, assumed command. The

subsequent Operation Choctaw, southwest of th e

Bear Bite AOA, involved 11 days of tedious sweep s

west of Route 1 along the Thac Ma River . About as

productive as Bear Bite, Choctaw netted only 1 5

more detainees and nine enemy killed . Nineteen

Marines suffered wounds. At 1300 on 23 June th e

last elements of the battalion returned from the fiel d

to the 4th Marines' Camp Evans, 23 kilometers

northwest of Hue .

When it started Operation Maryland on 25 June ,

BLT 1/ 3 moved by helicopters into the same genera l

area where it had been for Colgate . The battalion's

zone of action included the southwestern edge of th e

grave-covered Maryland area . Elements of a VC battalion operated in the region . The Marine battalio n

did not find them, but ARVN units advancing from

the north encountered what probably were two V C

companies . The ARVN units killed 114 Communists . In its own zone, the BLT killed seven Communists, took 35 prisoners, and salvaged almost nin e

tons of rice at the cost of three Marines wounded . By

mid-morning on the 27th, the BLT departed th e

area in helicopters as Maryland ended after fou r

weeks of probing graves and tunnels. On 28 June,

HMM-362, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nic k

J . Kapetan, relieved HMM-263 as the SLF Alpha

helicopter squadron, and the next day the BLT

reembarked. "

June was a trying time for SLF Alpha . Four

separate operations, none of which achieved significant results, could only be called "good experience . "

For the Marines of the SLF, the loss of three men and

the wounding of 51 others served as a terse reminde r

of the price of experience . The SLF Alpha BLT no w

had six operations to its credit, and, since its firs t

landing on 28 April, it had killed 307 Communists.

Beacon Torch/Calhou n

18June - 2 July, 25 June - 2 July 196 7

Operation Beacon Torch placed SLF Bravo sout h

of Da Nang in the coastal region near the Quang

Nam and Quang Tin provinical border . A conventional search and destroy operation, Beacon Torch

covered an enemy-controlled area east of the Troun g

Giang River and southeast of the city of Hoi An .

A companion operation, Calhoun, targeted

against the "Pagoda Valley" west of the Beacon

Torch AOA, started on 25 June . The area received

this name because of the many small pagodas on th e

valley floor . III MAF suspected "Pagoda Valley" of

being a Communist forward logistic base . In essence ,

BLT 2/3 phased into Calhoun and, when Calhoun

ended, it withdrew as originally planned in Beaco n

Torch .

Beacon Torch started at 0630 on 18 June as assault

elements of Company F, followed by Comman d

Group Alpha landed in what the helicopter pilots

thought was 12 Cardinal . Actually, the heliborne

troops landed 2,000 meters south of Cardinal. Company H landed at what the pilots believed was LZ

Wren. It, too, landed in the wrong place and 2,00 0

meters south of its planned starting position .

While the first heliborne companies untangle d

their LZ problems, Company G landed on Re d

Beach, followed by the 2d Platoon (Reinforced) ,

Company A, 3d Tank Battalion. Once the squadron

resolved the LZ location problems, it lifted Company E into the correct LZ Cardinal.

Company H made the first contact at 0930. Light

encounters continued throughout the day until 154 0

when Company H engaged about 100 enemy troops .

In the ensuing firefight, 43 of Company H's Marine s

succumbed to nonbattle causes; most were hea t

casualties . The enemy killed five Marines and

wounded 14 while the Communists left 23 bodies
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 163

behind. The enemy disengaged at sunset .

The BLT moved out again on the 19th . Small actions flared up throughout the day and the advancing Marines began discovering hidden enemy food

stocks .

After another quiet night, the BLT renewed swee p

operations at 0845 on the 20th when Company E

crossed the Troung Giang River. That afternoon,

Company H had great difficulty fording the Troun g

Giang, but by late afternoon the battalion began

moving westward again . Scattered contact continue d

west of the river for the next three days. The

highlight of this period was Company E's discovery

of three tons of rice and two tons of potatoes early o n

the morning of the 24th . At 0600, 25 June, Operation Beacon Torch phased into Operation Calhoun .

By 1300, 25 June Company E had discovered

another 1,000 pounds rice and at 1600 Company G

uncovered a two-ton cache . The rice hunt continued

and on the 26th the Marines bagged and helilifte d

another 7,600 pounds to the ARVN-controlled tow n

of Dien Ban, nine kilometers west of Hoi An . The

largest single find of the operation was a five-ton

cache discovered by Company F on the morning o f

the 27th. Complementing this discovery, Company

G, assisted by ARVN troops, rounded up and

evacuated 84 stray cattle .

Minor skirmishes and the detention of scattere d

suspects continued until Calhoun ended at 1200, 1

July. Reverting to the Beacon Torch plan, the BLT

began its retraction . As the last units returned t o

their respective ships, Beacon Torch ended at 1300 ,

2 July.

Beacon Torch/Calhoun hurt the Communists i n

central I Corps . The BLT captured more than 40 ton s

of rice and other food stocks, over 31 of which the y

evacuated for ARVN use . The rest they destroyed i n

place . The BLT's casualty ratio was favorable . Eighty -

six enemy died in contrast to only 13 SLF Marines .

The BLT suffered 123 nonbattle casualties.

Beacon Torch/Calhoun, however, had no lasting

impact, as emphasized by the fact that the departin g

Marines sighted enemy troops near the beach are a

during the retraction . The Communists could not afford to lose control of the population and immediately reoccupied the area to repair the damag e

caused by the operation .

SLF Alpha in Bear Claw/Buffalo/Hickory II

3 - 16 July 196 7

The first two days of July, SLF Alpha on board the

ships of TG 76 .4, prepared for Operation Bear Claw,

a proposed landing in eastern Quang Tri Province .

The SLF cancelled Bear Claw at 0100 on the 3rd

when it received orders alerting BLT 1/3 for immediate employment in the 9th Marines TAOR at

Con Thien. The 9th Marines was in trouble .

Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. "Spike " Schening's

1st Battalion, 9th Marines provided the security of

the Con Thien perimeter. Two of the battalion's

companies, A and B, on patrol a mile and a half

northeast of Con Thien, had discovered a large NV A

force, at least two battalions of the 90th NVA Regiment. The initial contact took place as the Marine

companies were trying to link up . In this awkward

situation, the North Vietnamese managed to punis h

each company separately . Additionally, the Communists hit the Marines with massed artillery fir e

from north of the DMZ. Casualties mounted o n

both sides as the battle intensified. Company B lost

most of its officers; the company commander, his

FO, the FAC, and two platoon commanders wer e

casualties . *

Responding to this serious situation, Lieutenan t

Colonel Schening committed Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, reinforced by tanks. The action

intensified as the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines arrive d

from Dong Ha to help regain control of the situation . At this stage, III MAF requested SLF Alpha .

Similarly, SLF Bravo, also at sea, went on alert . The

mission assigned to SLF Alpha during Operation

Buffalo, the name given the continuing engagemen t

with the 90th NVA Regiment, was to tie in to the

right flank of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines and

sweep the battle area to recover 1st Battalion, 9t h

Marines' casualties .

The original 0100 warning order for SLF Alph a

preceded a regimental briefing at 0700 which se t

L-hour at 1030 . After much frenzied action on th e

part of the SLF, the launch took place on schedule .

Throughout the late morning of 3 July, Lieutenan t

Colonel Kapetan's HMM-362 flew BLT 1/3 into the

zone of action, supplemented by CH-46s from SLF

Bravo's HMM-164 . 12 Unfortunately, the lead assaul t

elements of the BLT landed 2,500 meters south o f

the designated landing zone, a mile southeast of

Con Thien . Readjusting the battalion cost valuabl e

time . The first physical contact with the right flank

of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines occurred at 1315 .

By the time all of BLT 1/3 had moved into the cor-

*See Chapter 5 for additional description of this action .
164 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

rect positions, however, the level of fighting ha d

waned, and only Communist gunners remained active . The night of 3-4 July was relatively quiet, as wa s

the next day . The 5th opened with an early morning

enemy mortar attack against Companies A and C .

Exchanges of artillery and mortar fire punctuate d

most of the day. The battalion continued its sweep

operation. On the 6th, enemy rockets knocked out a

Marine tank . The fighting around the disabled tank

became so savage that the BLT did not reach th e

burnt-out hulk until 1000 on the 7th of July . The

Marines recovered the bodies of the crew early th e

next morning.

At 1330, 8 July, the BLT received orders to make

an immediate withdrawal . This was a challenging

operation even under ideal circumstances . Wickwire's battalion faced a dangerous situation .

There were five complications : it was daylight; the

battalion was in contact ; the withdrawal would occu r

over 600 meters of open ground ; two of the attache d

tanks were crippled; and the battalion had just

received resupplies and had no organic transport t o

move the vital, though cumbersome, material . A

sixth factor added to the BLT's problems . Just as the

withdrawal began, the Communists opened up wit h

small arms, mortars, and artillery . In spite of thes e

difficuties, the battalion carried out this complex

maneuver with only light casualties.

The next four days of Buffalo involved patrolling

the Con Thien perimeter. Buffalo ended on the

morning of 14 July . The Marines of BLT 1/3 had

recovered the bodies of 11 fellow Marines from th e

1st Battalion, 9th Marines, but their efforts wer e

costly ; the BLT's price was eight killed and 179

wounded . Operation Buffalo produced a total of 42 4

verified North Vietnamese dead for the BLT . While Buffalo neared its terminal phase, ComUSMACV directed that a followup sweep be con -

ducted of the area south of the DMZ and east of Con

Thien . In response, III MAF initiated Operation

Hickory II. The plan called for SLF Alpha's BLT 1/ 3

to move out from its final Buffalo positions with th e

1st Battalion, 4th Marines on the BLT's right . The

combined force would sweep southward in a search

and destroy operation . Three other battalions were

to block north and south of the operational area . All

Hickory II battalions came under the operational

control of the 9th Marines, with the exception of SLF

Bravo which served the 3d Marines as a blocking

force on the western edge of the sweep zone .

The evening of the first day of Hickory II, BLT 1/ 3

received orders to move to a phase line approximately 15,000 meters south of its position by 1700 th e

next day. As a consequence, though the deploye d

battalion formations remained prepared to engag e

the enemy, the required speed of advance prevente d

the battalion from making a detailed search of its

zone of action . During Hickory II, BLT 1/3 experienced no enemy contact, and the net result was

the capture of 17 suspects. There were no friendly

casualties. The operation ended at 1600 on 16 Jul y

and the next day SLF Alpha returned to the TG 79 . 4

ships .

SLF Bravo in Beaver Track/Buffalo/Hickory II

4 - 16 July 1967

When SLF Alpha joined Buffalo on 3 July, SLF

Bravo went on standby, and it entered the Buffal o

area on 4 July on Operation Beaver Track . At 0640 ,

Major Wendell O . Beard,* the BLT 2/3 commander, and Company H loaded in Lieutenant Colonel Rodney D . McKitrick's Ch-46s and flew off th e

USS Tripoli (LPH 10); destination: Cam Lo .

McKitrick's HMM-164 ferried the rest of the battalion to an assembly area north of Cam Lo wher e

the BLT prepared for employment as directed by th e

3d Marine Division. At 1300, BLT 2/3, under operational control of its parent regiment, gained the 1s t

Platoon of Company A, 3d Tank Battalion . The battalion spent the afternoon moving into position i n

preparation for impending search and destroy operations.

The Beaver Track operation order directed the

battalion to move out at 0700 on 5 July and attack

northward on a four-kilometer front to a point jus t

south of the southern limit of the DMZ . There, the

battalion was to turn and move roughly three

kilometers west . During Phase II, a return sweep ,

the battalion was to maneuver south to the Cam Lo

River from its DMZ position, following an axi s

parallel to but west of the Phase I axis of advance .

Friendly units had occupied the area as recently a s

two days before the start of Beaver Track, but intelligence sources reported that elements of the 29th

NVA Regiment were making a reconnaissance of th e

region .

At 0700, 5 July, Major Beard's troops moved out .

As in many similar operations, nothing happened a t

*Major Beard's nickname was "Moose," a reference to his size .

LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981) (Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 16 5

Courtesy of Mrs. Wendell O . Beard

Company H, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines boards CH-46A helicopters from HMM-164 for a

flight from the USS Tripoli to Cam Lo on 4 July as SLF Bravo begins Operation Beaver

Track, a subsidiary of the 3d Marine Division's Operation Buffalo south of the DMZ.

first. The Marines discovered and demolished abandoned bunkers as the day progressed . By midafternoon, Company E was enduring desultory snipe r

fire, but no contact developed . That night remaine d

quiet.

The enemy made the first move at 0535 on 6 Jul y

with a probe of Company E's perimeter. The Marines

met the attack with skillful, coordinated machin e

gun and artillery fire . The Communists broke off th e

engagement, leaving 14 bodies behind plus abandoned weapons and equipment . Shortly after the

beginning of the fight along the Company E

perimeter, 40 NVA mortar rounds hit the BLT command group and Company G, located about fou r

kilometers south of the DMZ . Return fires temporarily silenced the Communist gunners, but a t

0800 a Company H patrol less than three kilometers

to the northeast also came under mortar fire . Supporting tanks and artillery again silenced the enemy ,

but not before RPG rounds hit two of the supportin g

Marine tanks .

At 0930, the enemy struck a Company F patrol

with a command-detonated claymore-type mine ,

and half an hour later, Company G, operating east

of Company F, also encountered enemy claymores .

A brief flurry of action occurred when the tank pia -

toon commander, 2d Lieutenant Edward P. B.

O'Neil, spotted NVA troops in the vicinity of th e

destroyed town of Nha An Hoa . The tankers' 90mm

guns and heavy machine guns accounted for 16 o f

them. The remainder of the 6th of July reverted t o

duels between Communist mortars and U. S. artillery .

As the sweep continued on the 7th, the SLF Brav o

Marines confronted increasing numbers of enemy

bunkers, all deserted, but many showing signs of re -

cent use . The search for the elusive 29th NVA Regiment continued .

July 8th was a day filled with the curious whims o f

combat. At 0800 a patrol from Company H found a

completely stripped UH-34D surrounded with

assorted NVA equipment . While these Marines examined their disquieting prize, another Company H

patrol was busily engaged destroying captured

enemy equipment . Someone or something triggered

an unknown explosive device which killed eight

Marines. A Company G patrol tripped a "Bouncin g

Betty"* at 1030; two more Marines died and anothe r

received wounds. The tempo of action picked up an

*A "Bouncing Betty" mine, projected upward by a small

charge, explodes its main charge at waist level .
166 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Courtesy of Mrs. Wendell O. Beard

A division of CH-46A helicopters from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 carrie s

elements of BLT 2/3 to shore from the USS Tripoli during Operation Beaver Track .

hour and a half later when Company G engaged in a

sharp action in one of the many Communist bunker

complexes. Air and artillery smashed the enemy

position. The Company G Marines found 35 NVA

bodies in the wreckage after the bombardment .

The fortunes of war smiled on the BLT that afternoon . As the battalion patrol actions continued ,

Company F executed a classic example of fire an d

maneuver. One squad, immobilized by enem y

automatic weapons fire coming from a well -

developed position, became a pivot for the rest o f

the company . The Marines fixed the Communists i n

their dug-in positions and called in supporting arms .

The Marines counted 73 NVA bodies in th e

followup sweep and captured three 82mm mortars .

During the following days, the BLT Marine s

discovered and destroyed more bunkers, fightin g

positions, and shelters, but the Communists chos e

not to fight. Meanwhile, at sea on board the USS

Tripoli, Lieutenant Colonel McKitrick's HMM-16 4

turned over its SLF assignment on 12 July t o

HMM-265, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

William R. Beeler.

To capitalize on the results of Operation Buffalo ,

which had paralleled Beaver Track, ComUSMAC V

ordered that another sweep be made south of the

Ben Hai River to destroy enemy weapons positions i n

the southern half of the DMZ . Known as Operation

Hickory II, the plan was similar in concept to the

13-battalion Hickory I sweep conducted in the sam e

area during May . Hickory II was smaller in scale ; it

employed seven maneuver battalions and four blocking battalions . ** Since BLT 2/3 was already locate d

northwest of Cam Lo, it became a blocking battalio n

on the western edge of the zone of action.

SLF Bravo received the Hickory II operation orde r

on the morning of 13 July. At 0700 the next morning the battalion moved out, securing designate d

objectives en route to its final blocking position . At

1000, the battalion commander, Major Beard ,

became a casualty and his executive officer, Majo r

John H . Broujos, took over the battalion . By 1230

the battalion reached the blocking positions an d

searched the surrounding terrain. During BLT 2/3's

brief two-day involvement in Hickory II, Communist antipersonnel devices were the most seriou s

threat. Grenades rigged as booby traps killed two

Marines and wounded 13 . Other than mortar fire ,

the 2d Battalion had no contact with the enemy during Hickory II.

The BLT reconstituted at 0600 on 16 July as

Hickory II ended . Reembarkation began immediately . SLF Bravo's participation in the Beaver Track /

Buffalo/Hickory II operations produced an impressive, verified kill ratio. Sixteen SLF Bravo

Marines gave their lives, while the battalion kille d

148 NVA soldiers .

Bear Chain/Fremon t

20 - 26 July 196 7

At sea on 17 July 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Emi l

W. Herich assumed command of BLT 2/3, relievin g

**See Chapter 6 for the account of other III MAF units ' participation in Hickory II .
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 16 7

Major Broujos, who reverted to battalion executiv e

officer. Lieutenant Colonel Herich had only a brie f

"shakedown ;" SLF Bravo landed again on the 20th .

The operation, Bear Chain, targeted the coastal

region between Quang Tri City and the city of Hue .

The mission was to attack the exposed seaward flan k

of the 806th VC Battalion and to destroy it, or at

least drive it westward toward ARVN forces engaged

in Operation Lam Son 87 .

Southwest of the Bear Chain operational area, th e

4th Marines was conducting a search and destro y

operation named Fremont. As Bear Chain progressed, it phased into Fremont . At 1400 on 21 July, BLT

2/ 3 switched to the operational control of the 4t h

Marines for the rest of the operation .

Bear Chain/Fremont produced the desired results .

The enemy reacted as the Bear Chain planners had

hoped. Communist units moved west toward Rout e

1, directly into the Lam Son 87 ARVN forces. In the

following battle the South Vietnamese troop s

distinguished themselves. They held their position s

with determination and 25,2 Viet Cong died . A

secondary gain of Bear Chain/Fremont was the capture of an extremely large rice stock .

Late the afternoon of 24 July, BLT 2/3 Marines,

searching the village of Don Que, less than a

kilometer east of Route 555, captured a VC suspect ,

the only male found in Don Que . Company F received sniper fire from the village just before they captured the suspect. A search of the town turned up

enormous quantities of rice . Villagers stated that the

Viet Cong had told them to harvest their rice and b e

ready for the VC rice collectors who would arrive

"within a few days ." The final tally of rice was over

37 tons. The Marines bagged it and flew it out in

HMM-265's helicopters.

The BLT Marines had helped maul the 806th VC

Battalion and confiscated its rice supply . Its purposes

achieved, the Bear Chain portion of the operatio n

ended on 26 July and SLF Bravo went back to sea .

Nine Marines and two corpsmen died on the operation .

Beacon Guide

21 - 30 July 196 7

SLF Alpha's BLT 1/3 held a change of command

at sea on 16 July, the day after it returned fro m

Hickory II. Lieutenant Colonel Alfred I. Thomas

took over from Lieutenant Colonel Wickwire .

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas' first operation wa s

Beacon Guide . Starting with a helicopter and surface

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18913 2

LtCol Alfred I. Thomas, the new commander ofBLT

1/3, checks a fire plan diagram drawn on the back of

a cardboard C-rations case by one of his staff officers

during Operation Beacon Guide below the DMZ.

assault, Beacon Guide was a search and destro y

operation in the coastal region 18 miles southeast o f

Hue. The BLT's sweep was part of III MAF's continuing plan to maintain pressure on Viet Cong units i n

coastal I Corps . Beacon Guide was uneventful from

its start on 21 July . Tangible results were negligible ,

and SLF Alpha reembarked on the afternoon of 3 0

July.

Kangaroo Kick/Fremont

1 - 3 August, 3 - 21 August 1967

August was a month of aggravating frustration fo r

SLF Bravo and its new commander Colonel James G .

Dionisopoulos.* Twenty-one operational day s

resulted in the death of only three enemy, while th e

SLF lost three killed and 44 wounded .

Operation Kangaroo Kick, 1-3 August, was

another search and destroy sweep over the now

familiar sand dunes, graves, and rice paddies of th e

Viet Cong sanctuary region along the 0 Lau River ,

*Colonel Dionisopoulos replaced Colonel Wortman as the SLF

Bravo commander as of 1 August. Colonel Wortman had served as

the SLF commander since 1 September 1966 .
168 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

midway between Hue and Quang Tri . They had

operated there on Operation Beacon Star in April -

May and again in July on Bear Chain . Kangaro o

Kick, almost a carbon copy of the two previous

operations along the 0 Lau, precipitated the standard VC reaction ; they fled, only to return after the

BLT departed .

At 0800, 3 August, BLT 2/3 shifted to the 4th

Marines' operational control and rejoined Operatio n

Fremont . Operation Fremont assumed almost

marathon proportions ; it did not end until 31 October. The BLT's mission during its second tou r

under the 4th Marines required relieving the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines of its many and complicated

duties, including providing security for Camp Evans,

Hill 51, and Hill 674; interdicting enemy lines of

communications in the nearby Co Bi-Thanh Tan

Valley ; detaching one rifle company to the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines for operational use by that battalion; providing security for road sweeps between

the 4th Marines' perimeter and Route 1; providin g

one company for "Sparrow Hawk" rapid reaction

missions ; and being prepared to provide one company for " rough rider" truck convoys between Phu

Bai and Dong Ha .

Respite from the Camp Evans routine came on 1 6

August . The BLT, actually only Company F and

Command Group Alpha reinforced by Company E ,

2d Battalion, 4th Marines, conducted a daylong

sweep. The operation took place in the My Chanh

area north of the 0 Lau River, the scene of recentl y

completed Operation Kangaroo Kick . The sweep

was in conjunction with ARVN units operation i n

the same area .

BLT 2/3 lost one Marine killed and six wounded

during the day's sweep . Unfortunately, a supporting

tank returning to the 4th Marines command post ra n

over a mine, believed to have been made from a dud

500-pound bomb . The blast killed four Marines and

wounded five . Later that afternoon a tank retrieve r

hit another mine six kilometers west of the disable d

tank. The explosion wounded another six Marines.

Tank problems continued ; while trying to destroy

the tank lost on the 16th, an engineer tripped still

another exploding device ; one more Marine died .

The engineers finally destroyed the tank by 1530 . *

*The term exploding device refers to all enemy jury-rigge d

mines. The devices ranged from trip-wired grenades to pressure -

detonated, re-fused dud bombs .

Another variation of the multiple duties shared b y

the BLT occurred on 18 August . Company F move d

to Quang Tri to occupy the airfield there and to pro -

vide a show of force . At 0930 19 August, Lieutenant

Colonel Herich received authorization to start reembarkation . The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines relieved

BLT 2/3 of its Camp Evans duties and the SLF gladl y

went back to sea . III MAF released BLT 2/3 to CT G

79.5 at 1600 22 August .

The BLT commander, Lieutenant Colonel Herich ,

commenting on Kangaroo Kick and the 16 Augus t

Fremont sweep, expressed the growing frustration

with operations along the 0 Lau :

Operation Kangaroo Kick was . . . in an area generall y

controlled by the enemy. Although this operation prove d

successful in completing the assigned mission, as in th e

past, the entire area . . . was reoccupied by the enemy as

evidenced by his presence during the S&D [search an d

destroy] operation conducted by this BLT on 16 Augus t

1967 on Operation Fremont . 1 3

Beacon Gate/Cochise

7-11 August 1967, 11-27 August 1967

At 0700 on 7 August, SLF Alpha started Operation Beacon Gate by landing southeast of Hoi An

along the coastal boundary of Quang Nam an d

Quang Tin Provinces. Intelligence reports fixed

elements of the V25 Local Force Battalion and othe r

A radioman from BLT 1 /3 pauses in Operation

Beacon Gate to look over a cow and a calf in a she d

during a routine search of a Vietnamese village.

Denartment of Defense Photo (USMC) A650000
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 16 9

smaller VC units in the battalion's operational area .

During the five-day southerly sweep, the Marine s

endured continuous sniper fire . The infantrymen

made extensive use of armed UH-1E helicopters to

suppress the snipers . Operation Beacon Gate ende d

on 11 August at 0800; the Marines killed only 1 2

enemy soldiers .

The same day, SLF Alpha shifted to the operational control of Task Force X-Ray of the 1st Marin e

Division for the start of Operation Cochise . BLT 1/ 3

made a heliborne assault from the Beacon Gat e

AOA into a landing zone approximately seven mile s

east of Que Son . There the battalion occupied blocking positions to support elements of the 5th Marine s

which were attacking to the east .

On 16 August, BLT 1/3 started search and destroy

operations, also in an easterly direction, in conjunction with the 5th Marines. The BLT made heavy contact with an enemy force late on the 16th, but th e

enemy broke off the engagement during the night.

The rest of the first phase of Cochise consisted o f

sweep operations, still to the east, with contac t

limited to sniper fire .

Phase II of Cochise began on 19 August. BLT 1/ 3

transferred to the operational control of the 5t h

Marines . Enemy contact, as in Phase I, was negligible, but the Marines uncovered several rice cache s

and an ammunition dump. Phase III opened on 2 5

August. The BLT continued search and destro y

operations northeast from Hiep Duc to Que Son .

It encountered only snipers . When the battalon arrived at Que Son on 27 August Cochise ended .

The next day the BLT moved by helicopters to Chu

Lai where it began reembarkation . Beacon

Gate/ Cochise produced good results for SLF Alpha ;

the BLT claimed 59 VC/NVA killed and 65 detaine d

at a cost of nine Marines dead and 51 wounded .

Belt Drive/Liberty

27 August - 5 September, 1 - 4 September 196 7

Major Beard returned from hospitalization an d

reassumed command of BLT 2/3 on 23 August ,

replacing Lieutenant Colonel Herich. The same day , Major Gregory A. Corliss and his CH-46A squadron ,

HMM-262, landed on board the USS Tripoli to

relieve the departing SLF helicopter squadron ,

HMM-265. Four days later, SLF Bravo was in action

again . At 0545, 27 August, HMM-262 lifted the first

elements of Company H from, the Tripoli back to the

familiar terrain of eastern Quang Tri Province .

The Belt Drive operation's objective area was the

densely vegetated high ground on both sides of the

small Nhung River, less than nine kilometers south

of Quang Tri City . The operation involved a spoilin g

attack against Communist units that could have interfered with the voting in Quang Tri City during

the impending national elections. Small unit actions

flared up during the next five days as the battalion

encountered minor enemy formations, but no con -

tact involved any determined enemy resistance .

The battalion commander, Major Beard, reported

two interesting enemy reactions :

The use of demolitions by the enemy when attacking a

defensive position . . . is a tactic with which the battalion

had not yet been confronted . It is believed that it was

definitely designed to simulate mortar fire in order to keep

the defenders down deep in their positions. The exploding

charges were almost immediately followed by three or fou r

probers armed with automatic weapons who sought to

penetrate the perimeter.

During this operation . . . the enemy failed to . . . leave

a clean battlefield after an engagement . This situation is

by all means contrary to their principle of battle and the

first time in which the BLT was able to capture weapon s

and equipment without an immediate physical pursuit .

Enemy KIAs, one WIA, and weapons . . . lay undisturbed

overnight in killing zones and were easily recovered at first

light on the morning following the encounter . On one occasion, two enemy KIAs and one weapon were recovere d

almost two days later by a patrol which swept an area i n

which an air strike had been run . These instances ar e

reflections of the combat discipline and training of the

enemy which the BLT engaged in its operating area . "

At 0800 1 September, the BLT once more shifte d

to the 4th Marines' operational control, this time to

participate in Operation Liberty while holding Belt

Drive in abeyance . The Liberty operation orde r

assigned BLT 2/3 to sweep operations in the Hai

Lang District of Quang Tri Province . The battalion

was to assist the 4th Marines in blocking enemy approaches to Route 1, as well as Quang Tri City .

Liberty simply was a minor reorientation of Belt

Drive, with the provision of a command structur e

change .

At midnight 4 September, SLF participation in

Liberty ended and Belt Drive resumed immediately .

The last operational day, 5 September, involved

moving the battalion and its supporting units out o f

the TAOR. By 2000, SLF Bravo had complete d

reembarkation .

Four dead Marines and 59 wounded represented

the price of Belt Drive and Liberty, but 19 Communists died. The BLT Marines captured one dazed ,

wounded NVA soldier on the morning of 1

September . Unfortunately the BLT did not fully ex-
170 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

ploit his knowledge and mistakenly evacuated hi m

to Camp Evans rather than to the Tripoli. What he

knew of enemy locations might have changed the

outcome of Belt Drive.

Trouble of a different nature developed durin g

Belt Drive, trouble which caused serious problems

not only for the SLFs, but for all Marine activities in I

Corps. On 31 August, during a medical evacuation,

the lead helicopter, a CH-46A, disintegrated i n

flight while en route to the Tripoli. The crew and

their passenger died . The next day, another CH-46A

experienced a similar failure at Marble Mountain Ai r

Facility . These two similar accidents forced III MA F

to restrict CH-46A missions to emergency categories .

For all practical purposes, they were "down . " In a

matter of hours, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing lost 5 0

percent of its helicopter capability, and the LPHs

became little more than troop transports.

A Change In Scenario — The 46s are Grounded

The grounding of the CH-46As was a severe blow

to the SLFs. SLF Bravo's CH-46A Squadron ,

HMM-262, was "down . " SLF Alpha fared better ,

since HMM-362 was a UH-34D squadron . However ,

MAG-16 recalled HMM-362, though another UH -

34D squadron, HMM-163, replaced it only 4 day s

later . The USS Tripoli, the amphibious assault shi p

carrying SLF Bravo's helicopters, temporarily

withdrew from ARG duties to ferry faulty helicopters

to Okinawa for modification . The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing rescheduled all planned squadron rotations. Emergency requests prompted shipment of 1 0

CH-53s and 23 more UH-34Ds from west coast U . S.

ports, but they would not arrive until October . On

31 August 1967, III MAF had 150 available transpor t

helicopters, and the SLF could muster 39 more . The

next day, as the result of the grounding order, II I

MAF counted only 23 CH-53s and 73 UH-34Ds ,

while SLF Alpha could provide another 17 UH-34s .

Five squadrons of CH-46As could operate under extreme emergency conditions.

Initially, SLF operations suffered from the

helicopter strength reduction . Both landing forces ,

by necessity, operated as conventional ground unit s

until resolution of helicopter allocations . SLF Bravo

spent the rest of the year relying upon interim sup -

port from HMM-463's CH-53s operating from Marble Mountain . A detachment from HMM-262 remained on board the Tripoli to provide emergency

CH-46A support for SLF Bravo . This detachment,

known as the "Poor Devils," remained with SLF

Bravo until the end of the year, though the rest of

the squadron left in mid-October.

Necessarily, SLF operations reflected the reduce d

flexibility and lift capability . To provide better support for a landing force ashore, a new trend

developed. The SLF BLTs would land, conduct a

preliminary operation, and then shift to the operational control of a Marine regiment operating in th e

same area . Though this represented a reasonable

solution under the circumstances, during the fall of

1967 SLF BLTs found themselves assigned to missions ranging from fortification construction to roa d

security, a far cry from the stoutly defended SLF

tenets of early 1967 .

Beacon Point/Fremont/Ballistic Charge/Shelbyville

1 - 9 September 1967, 16 - 28 September 196 7

On 1 September SLF Alpha landed in Thua Thie n

Province on Operation Beacon Point for a southerl y

sweep of the by-now all too familiar "Street Withou t

Joy. " Snipers and surprise firing devices were the only resistance encountered. At 1800 on 4 September ,

Lieutenant Colonel Kapetan 's HMM-362 detache d

from the SLF and reverted to MAG-16 control . ForA ruined church dominates the skyline as infantrymen of Company D, 1st Battalion, 3d Marine s

move through a area of the coastal plain known to

both the French and the Americans as the "Stree t

Without Joy " in the quiet Operation Beacon Point.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189242
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 17 1

tunately, the lack of enemy activity did not subject

the BLT to the full impact of the loss of its assigned

helicopters. The most tangible result of Beacon

Point was the evacuation or destruction of more tha n

35 tons of Viet Cong rice . After the BLT marched to

an assembly area near Camp Evans on 5 September ,

Operation Beacon Point concluded at 0600 on th e

6th .

Later that morning BLT 1/3 phased into Operation Fremont, again under the operational control of

the 4th Marines. Elements of the battalion trucked

to their blocking and screening positions south of

Quang Tri. As during Beacon Point, snipers were the

only active enemy troops.

A solution to SLF Alpha's helicopter needs occurred on 8 September. Lieutenant Colonel Walter C.

Kelly's HMM-163, UH-34D equipped, reported o n

board the USS Okinawa just in time to prepare for

the following day's extraction . SLF Alpha droppe d

out of Fremont on 9 September.

One week later, on the 16th, BLT 1/3 lande d

again. Operation Ballistic Charge involved a

simultaneous heliborne and surface assault of an objective area four miles southeast of Dai Loc . The

operation consisted of a rapid sweep to the north

followed by a detailed search and destroy sweep t o

the south along the track of the first northward

move . Again, opposition consisted of Communist

snipers, but during Ballistic Charge the battalion di d

detain 55 suspects and three confirmed prisoners .

When Ballistic Charge ended on the 22nd, BLT

1/3 shifted to the operational control of the 1s t

Marines for Operation Shelbyville . BLT 1/3's involvement started with a heliborne assault from the

Ballistic Charge AOA to a landing zone four mile s

southeast of Dai Loc, close to the original Ballisti c

Charge objective area . While the 2d Battalion, 1st

Marines occupied blocking positions to the east, and

the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines blocked to the south ,

Lieutenant Colonel Alfred I. Thomas' BLT 1/ 3

swept the operational area in an easterly direction .

Sniper fire was the only enemy response .

On 25 September, the BLT reversed its axis of advance and, after a night movement, crossed th e

railroad tracks paralleling Route 1 on the morning of

the 26th . The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was on the

BLT's left during the advance . Late that afternoon,

Company B had a brief firefight with an enemy company, but friendly artillery fire put a quick end t o

the engagement for SLF Bravo. Subsequent action

remained limited to sniper fire . On the 28th the BLT

marched out of the operating area to the Libert y

Bridge, and then moved by trucks to Da Nang where

it reembarked . CTG 79.4 assumed operational control of SLF Alpha at 1715, 28 September .

September was not a spectacular month for SLF

Alpha. Twenty-two operational days resulted in 2 6

Communists killed, 3 prisoners, and 108 detainees.

To achieve this, eight Marines gave their lives and

another 97 sustained wounds .

Fortress Sentry/Kingfisher

17 - 25- September 1967,

27 September - 15 October 1967

On 16 July 1967, the 9th Marines initiated Operation Kingfisher near Con Thien . This lengthy operation employed a force varying from three to six battalions. As Kingfisher progressed, a new enemy

threat developed to the east in the I Corps coasta l

region . Identified NVA and VC units were operating

between the coast and Dong Ha on the northern side

of the Cua Viet River. To neutralize these Communist formations, III MAF planned to land SL F

Bravo in this by-now familiar operational area fo r

Operation Fortress Sentry . Previously, Operation s

Beacon Hill and Beau Charger swept the same

locale .

A significant operational change occurred following the untimely grounding of the CH-46s; SLF

Bravo had to land by surface means. III MAF

directed the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion to supplement the ARG landing craft.

Poor visibility, rough seas, and generally bad

weather hampered BLT 2/3's 17 September landin g

on the dunes bordering the "Street Without Joy ." As

usual, there was no resistance on the beach and only

light contact as the battalion took its initial objectives. As the battalion moved north-northeast

toward the DMZ, the 1st ARVN Division screened

its left flank . Land mines damaged some amphibian

tractors as the BLT moved inland, but contact remained light .

On 23 September about 100 NVA soldiers attacked the battalion, but it broke up the probe with the

assistance of helicopter gunships . On the morning of

the 24th, the Marines engaged another enemy forc e

near the village of An My, three miles east of Gi o

Linh. Prisoners revealed that the Communists ha d

expected an attack from the south or southwest an d

the appearance of the BLT east of their position ha d

been a complete surprise .
172 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18927 3

A Navy landing craft, utility (LCU) brings elements of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marine s

from the USS Tripoli to the beach on 17 September for Operation Fortress Sentry, th e

day before the battalion phased into the 3d Marine Division's Operation Kingfisher.

The next morning at 0800 Fortress Sentry terminated and BLT 2/3 phased into Operatio n

Kingfisher to the west. * SLF participation involve d

extensive sweep operations which resulted in onl y

minor contact. On 10 October Lieutenant Colone l

Henry Englisch relieved Major Beard as the BLT

Commander. SLF Bravo phased out of Kingfisher o n

15 October.

Bastion Hill/Medina/Liberty II/Fremont

10 - 19 October 1967, 19 - 23 October 1967

SLF Alpha, on board the ships of TG 79 .4, engaged in an extensive rehabilitation effort, while SLF

Bravo participated in Operation Kingfisher durin g

the first nine days of October .

On 10 October, the 1st Marines, having displace d

from Da Nang to Quang Tri Province, initiate d

Operation Medina in the rugged hills of the Hai

Lang Forest south of Quang Tri City . Medina was

part of a comprehensive plan to eliminate enem y

base areas. The Hai Lang Forest contained the Communist's Base Area 101, and elements of the 5th and

6th NVA Regiments operated in and around the

region .

SLF Alpha's mission in Medina was to serve as a

blocking force for the 1st Marines on the eastern

edge of the operational area . BLT 1/3 made its

helicopter move to assigned blocking positions on

the 10th under the operational code name Bastio n

Hill . The landing met no opposition . Except for one

*Chapter 8 covers Kingfisher in detail .

sharp action between Company C and a company of

North Vietnamese regulars early on the morning 1 1

October, the battalion 's contact with the enemy during Medina involved scattered firefights, incoming

mortar rounds, and many grenade mines and boob y

traps.

A major action related to Medina took place north

of the SLF sector the day after the operation officiall y

ened . There, the 6th NVA Regiment, moving

eastward away from the SLF's former location, ra n

into the ARVN units participating in Operation Lam

Son 138, an adjunct to Operation Medina . By the

end of the day-long battle which followed, th e

ARVN reported 197 NVA troops killed .

Immediately after Medina, BLT 1/3 moved south

to new blocking positions west of Route 1 and th e

railroad between Hai Lang and Phong Dien to participate in Operation Liberty II/Fremont . Upon

joining Liberty II/Fremont, operational control of

BLT 1/3 passed from the 1st Marines to the 4th

Marines. This operation sought to prevent the Communists from disrupting the South Vietnamese National Assembly elections . BLT 1/3 activity durin g

the next five days involved squad and fire team

patrols and encounters with the enemy . Liberty/Fremont ended on 23 October, and 1/3 moved by

trucks to Camp Evans to prepare for its next operation, Granite, which was only three days away . One

of the most appreciated preparations was the issue o f

an extra poncho and poncho liner to the SLF

Marines. The cold winter rains had come to I Corps.

Neither Medina nor Liberty II/Fremont produced
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 17 3

any telling results, at least in the opinion of SLF

Alpha. Two weeks in the field that accounted for only 9 confirmed enemy dead, 7 prisoners, and 1 1

suspects, while attrition gnawed at the battalion 's

rolls during both operations. The casualties totale d

10 Marines dead and 50 others wounded, 38 of

whom required evacuation .

Formation Leader/Liberty II/Knox

17 - 18 October, 18 - 24 October,

24 October - 4 November 1967

Only two days after leaving Operation Kingfisher,

Lieutenant Colonel Englisch's BLT 2/3 began

Operation Formation Leader in support of the 2 d

Battalion, 26th Marines . Envisioned as an area control operation, Formation Leader focused on the

stabilization of coastal Thua Thien Province east o f

Route 1, specifically Vin Loc and Phu Loc Districts .

Because of the impending Vietnamese Nationa l

Assembly elections, intelligence officers presume d

that the Communists would concentrate disruptive

efforts against these populated districts.

The Communists did not respond. BLT 2/3's

greatest problems during Formation Leader wer e

nontactical . Because of the grounding of the

CH-46s, all troop lifts from the USS Tripoli relied

upon CH-53s from Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L .

Sadowski's HMH-463, operating from Marble

Mountain . The lifts were entirely satisfactory, but

realining the BLT's serial assignment tables for th e

larger helicopters gave Major Douglas W. Lemon's

battalion S-3 office a good prelanding workout . Additionally, high seas and bad weather slowed th e

landing of attached heavy vehicles at Hue . In fact ,

some remained on board for the duration of th e

operation .

There were no enemy contacts on the 17th and a t

1000 on the 18th, BLT 2/3 shifted to the 3d Marin e

Division's operational control . Formation Leader terminated and a new operation, Liberty II, started ,

but SLF Bravo's mission and operational area remained the same . The enemy still did not respond .

The most significant incident was the sighting and

subsequent artillery attack on an enemy squad lat e

on the 21st . Sadly, the next day five Marines on a

trash-burning detail suffered wounds from the explosion of a grenade apparently dumped in th e

trash. Liberty II ended at 0800 on the 24th an d

Operation Knox started .

Shifted to the operational control of the 7t h

Marines, the BLT moved by truck to a new assembly

area 11 kilometers east of Phu Loc. There, it bega n

sweep operations under the direction of the 7th

Marines, and during the next 13 days the battalio n

experienced 12 enemy contacts, mostly mortar fire .

The Marines killed two enemy soldiers, but Kno x

had a debilitating effect on BLT 2/3 . Two Marines

died in accidents and, of the 78 nonfatal casualties,

only 15 were the result of enemy action . Fungus infections claimed 33 victims. Knox ended at 1000 o n

4 November; however, bad weather prevented reembarkation . Instead all elements of the BLT moved to

the Da Nang Force Logistic Command facility .

Granite/Kentucky II and III

26 October - 4 November, 6 - 16 November 196 7

On 26 October, Operation Granite began for SL F

Alpha with an early morning helicopterborne assault

into the Hai Lang Forest . Granite was a twobattalion search and destroy operation in the regio n

of Communist Base Area 114 . The two assault battalions, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, and SLF

Alpha's BLT 1/3, conducted Granite under the

operational control of the 4th Marines .

The first day of Granite was uneventful for th e

Marines of BLT 1/3, but during the next nine day s

the enemy "continuously harassed the BLT . . . staying within a few hundred meters . . . ," and "nigh t

probes were made with a consistency not normall y

experienced . . . ." 1 5

By the afternoon of the 30th some of the BLT

Marines began to believe that Granite was a jinxe d

operation; supporting arms mistakes were becoming

costly . A friendly air strike, short of target, wounde d

two Marines on the morning of the 29th . At dusk a

short 60mm mortar round wounded another Marine ,

and just after midnight a short artillery round

wounded still another BLT Marine . Fortunately, this

was the last Granite casualty inflicted by friendl y

forces .

BLT 1/ 3 never did find the enemy base area in th e

Hai Lang Forest, but it had no doubt of the presenc e

of enemy troops there . When the battalion finished

its sweep of the rugged terrain on 4 November, its

journals revealed that it had called in 59 fixed-win g

sorties and 652 artillery fire missions during the las t

10 days. The battalion captured five AK-47s an d

killed 17 Communists. The tangled vegetation o f

the Hai Lang hid the rest of the story . All of the BLT

returned to Camp Evans before dark on 4

November. Granite ended with three Marines dead

and 24 wounded .
174 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

The SLF Alpha battalion did not stay at Camp

Evans after Operation Granite . Just before noon on 6

November, the division shifted BLT 1/3 to the 9th

Marines' operational control. The BLT spent the rest

of the day moving west to Cam Lo where it joined

Operation Kentucky as the 3d Division reserve . Kentucky began on 1 November, the day after Operation Kingfisher ended . The Kentucky area of responsibility, including Con Thien and Cam Lo, was

nothing more than the eastern portion of the ol d

Kingfisher TAOR. Kentucky was the assigned

TAOR of the 9th Marines while Lancaster, to the

west, was the 3d Marines' responsibilty .

BLT 1/3 celebrated the 192nd birthday of th e

Marine Corps with an early morning move from Ca m

Lo north to attack positions less than two kilometers

east of Con Thien . With the 1st Battalion, 1st

Marines—comprised of only two companies and a

command group—on its right, BLT 1/3 jumped off

on Phase II of Kentucky the next morning . The

BLT's mission involved making a sweep from east t o

west around the northern face of the Con Thien

base . The 9th Marines conceived the operation as a

spoiling attack to disrupt suspected Communist concentrations around Con Thien .

The Kentucky planners were right . At 0830 on the

11th, Company D hit an enemy platoon from th e

east, the blind side of the well-dug-in and conceale d

Communist position . The Marines forced the surprised NVA to fight; seven died . That afternoon

Company D hit another dug-in enemy unit . This

one suffered a similar fate ; six more NVA soldiers

died. One survivor, a squad leader, told his captors

that his battalion had been in the Con Thien area for

about a month . Apparently, Kentucky, with excellent timing, upset Communist plans for Con

Thien.

The SLF battalion's combat commitment to th e

opening phases of Kentucky ended the morning of

12 November. The battalion marched back to Position C-3, a base area in the strong point/obstacl e

system, and then moved on to Dong Ha by truck .

BLT 1/3 remained at Dong Ha, again as 3d Marin e

Division reserve, from 12 November until release d

by the 9th Marines at 0900 on the 16th, at which

time the BLT started reembarkation . SLF Alpha ,

however, would see Kentucky again .

While the BLT phased out of Kentucky, III MA F

provided some relief for the loss of mobility cause d

by the grounding of CH-46s . On 15 November,

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel M . Wilson's HMM-361

flew its UH-34Ds out to the USS IwoJima to become

the new SLF Alpha helicopter squadron . The reliabl e

34's were a welcome addition, especially since circumstances forced the BLT to rely on other source s

for helicopter support during all of Kentucky II an d

III.

Badger Hunt/Foste r

13 - 29 November 196 7

In Quang Nam Province, north of the concluded

Beaver Cage area of operation, enemy contact durin g

the fall of 1967 had been relatively light . The 1st

Marine Division committed units of the 5th and 7th

Marines to spoiling operations to prevent infiltration

of the Da Nang rocket belt . In November SLF Brav o

participated in Operation Badger Hunt as a continuation of the spoiling tactics . The division conceived Badger Hunt as an amphibious operation t o

support the 7th Marines' Operation Foster which tw o

spectacular VC raids triggered . On 2 November and

again on the 8th, the Viet Cong raided the distric t

headquarters and refugee settlements at Hieu Duc

and Dai Loc, approximately 15 miles south of D a

Nang . The VC killed 22 civilians, wounded anothe r

42, and destroyed or damaged 559 houses.

To rid the area of the Communist raiders, bot h

operations focused on the river complex of Dai Loc

District and the flat lands and foothills west of th e

Thu Bon River. SLF Bravo, under its new commander, Colonel Maynard W. Schmidt, and consisting of BLT 2/3, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Englisch, and a detachment of HMM-262 ,

started Badger Hunt by landing at An Hoa . The 3d

Battalion, 7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenan t

Colonel Roger H. Barnard, began Operation Foster

west of Dai Loc and north of the Thu Bon River .

There was little contact during either operation ,

with the exception of one company-sized engagement on the 29th. The Communists evaded bot h

sweeps, heading for the hills to the west . The enemy

suffered some casualties as reconnaissance teams an d

air observers called in air strikes and artillery fire on

fleeing enemy groups . The final tally for Badger

Hunt and Foster totaled 125 Communists killed an d

eight captured . Marines losses added up to 25 kille d

and 136 wounded . The most significant accomplishment of both operations, other than driving the

enemy out of the area, was the destruction of most o f

the enemy's supporting installations in the region .

The Marines destroyed over 6,000 bunkers, tunnels,
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORC E

and shelters and captured 87 tons of rice . Badger

Hunt ended on 29 November.

17 5

Fortress Ridge

21 - 24 December 196 7

On 1 November 1967, the 3d Battalion, 1st

Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ma x

McQuown, learned it would be the new SLF Bravo

BLT, in relief of the BLT 1/3 . McQuown's battalion

passed to the command of SLF Bravo on 1 Decembe r

and the same day embarked for the Special Landing

Force Camp at Subic Bay in the Philippine Island s

for intensive training and equipment rehabilitation .

On the 17th, the SLF sailed again, destination : I

Corps .

Fortress Ridge involved seaborne and heliborne

landings on the beach area of Gio Linh District ,

seven kilometers south of the DMZ. After seizing

four separate objectives, each company was to con -

duct search and destroy operations in adjacent areas .

Intelligence sources reported one battalion of th e

803d NVA Regiment, an unidentified main force

battalion, and the K400 Local Force Company near

the beach. The operation started on the morning of

21 December as BLT 3/1's Company M, commanded by Captain Raymond A . Thomas, landed in LVTs

on Red Beach . Half an hour later, Company L landed on the north bank of the Cua Viet River, almost

five kilometers to the southwest . HMM-262 took

Companies I and K into two zones in the sand dunes

four kilometers inland from Company M .

Nothing happened during the morning, but at

1324 hours Captain Lawrence R. Moran's Company I

received small arms and mortar fire on the south sid e

of the village of Ha Loi Tay . A heavy firefight ensue d

between Company I and Communist forces. Information from Company I indicated that they had met

a sizable, well-entrenched enemy force . Accordingly, the battalion mounted Company M on LVTs an d

moved it north on the beach side of the Gulf o f

Tonkin, where it could support Company I . When

Company M arrived in the dune area north of .

Giem Ha Trung village, the Communists started

shelling it with mortars. Rocket and artillery fire

from Communists guns north of the Demilitarized

Zone hit both companies. Darkness came early and

Company I and the Communists broke contact .

Company I established a defensive position to th e

west of Ha Loi Tay . Company M set up a perimeter

defense in the area where it stopped that

afternoon. ' 6

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19022 6

Rain-soaked Marines of the Special Landing Forc e

board a Navy medium landing craft (LCM-6) for th e

return trip to their assigned ships after an operation.

Events of the 21st indicated that the Communists

were in force behind the beach, north of the day' s

area of operation . Lieutenant Colonel McQuown requested permission from the SLF to conduct search

and destroy operations 1,000 meters north of Objective 1 and 1,000 meters inland from the beach . The

SLF approved the plan, and shortly after 0800 on th e

22nd, Company M moved through the Communist

positions that had opposed Company I . The latter

company remained in position to support the advance of Company M . 1, By 0900 Company M

discovered the first positive result of Fortress Ridge :

three NVA bodies. Both Companies I and M continued moving northward for the rest of the day, finding quantities of enemy arms and equipment i n

abandoned positions. Company K, north of Objective 3, had no contact . At dusk, Company L, fou r

kilometers southwest of Companies I and M, came

under small arms fire from across the Cua Viet, th e

last enemy action of the day . After a quiet night, the

battalion resumed search and destroy sweeps on th e

23rd . The day remained uneventful. Company I

found the major portion of the day's harvest of dud s

and enemy ordnance .

Fortress Ridge concluded on the morning of th e

24th . By 1100 all units were back on board ship for a

contemplative Christmas Eve . In its first operation i n

its new role, SLF Bravo lost 10 shipmates and had

another 27 wounded, but the Marines, however, had
176 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37107 5

Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines continues to move northward with the rest of th e

battalion on 23 December as Operation Fortress Ridge along the coast draws to a close .

counted 10 dead VC soldiers and observed enoug h

enemy equipment on the battlefield to know the y

had hurt the Communists. In his after action report ,

Lieutenant Colonel McQuown summarized the

results of 21-24 December, writing, "Operation For -

tress Ridge provided the confidence and experienc e

needed for a newly formed BLT to perform as a professional combat unit . "

Badger Tooth

26 December 1967 - 2 January 1968

Special Landing Force Bravo's last commitment i n

1967 was Operation Badger Tooth . The original plan

called for the BLT to land one company by LVT t o

seize Landing Zone Finch, slightly more than three

kilometers inland from the beach on the southern

Quang Tri Province border. The rest of the battalio n

would follow by helicopter . The proposed objective

area was on the extreme western side of the "Stree t

Without Joy," and this time intelligence estimate s

placed as many as 1,700 enemy troops in the area o f

operation . 1 8

The BLT commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ma x

McQuown, described the plans for the operation :

The scheme of maneuver called for a river crossing ove r

the Song 0 Lau River once all the BLT Task Organizatio n

had landed from ARG shipping . After the river crossing

the BLT was to conduct search and destroy operations

through 14 towns and villages on a route running

southwest from 12 Finch terminating at the town of Ap

Phouc Phu, 11 kilometers from 12 Finch . Initial fire sup -

port for the operation would be organic 81mm mortars,

available on-call air support, and naval gunfire support.

Once the BLT had closed on the first intermediate objective, Thon Phu Kinh, 105mm howitzers from a platoon of

the 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines and a battery from the 1st

Battalion, 11th Marines would provide artillery support .i 9

Information relayed to the SLF by a U .S. Army

liaison officer with nearby ARVN units changed the

Badger Tooth plan. After the seizure of LZ Finch ,

the SLF directed the BLT to search new objectives

consisting of the coastal villages of Thom Tham Kh e

and Tho Trung An . Intelligence officers suspecte d

enemy forces hid there after evading ARVN operations to the north and west. Once the BLT cleared

the two villages, the SLF would continue with th e

originally planned sweep to the southwest .

Badger Tooth started as Company L in LVTs landed over Green Beach at 1100 on 26 December and

proceeded to LZ Finch . The operation continued as

scheduled against very light opposition . Major David

L. Althoffs "Poor Devils" from HMM-262 landed

the last elements of the battalion at Finch by 1415 .

Two hours later Company K suffered the first casualty of Badger Tooth when automatic weapons fir e

west of the LZ wounded a Marine .

The SLF commander, Colonel Schmidt, accompanied by the U.S. Army liaison officer to ARVN

forces in the area, arrived at the battalion comman d

post with orders for the BLT to change direction and
Operation Badger Tooth 26-28 December 196 7

1 - 26 December

2 - 27 December

3 - Thon Tham Khe Night of 27-28 December

1

2

3

It] 1

, Than • •' i ~ Green

Night Tham Khe•• Beach

Position s

26

December

0 200 400

meters I

L
178 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

sweep the coastal villages of Tham Khe and Trung

An. Company L received the mission of sweeping

Tham Khe, with Company M in support. After moving to the edge of the village in LVTs, Company L

advanced northwest into the built-up area . By 1822

Company L had cleared the first village and was well

into Trung An . Both towns were clean ; the Marine s

killed only three Viet Cong and detained four . The

infantrymen found no evidence of the presence o f

Communist formations. By 1940, both Companies L

and M had tied in for the night north and west o f

Tham Khe . The night was quiet .

At 0700 on the 27th, both companies moved ou t

on another sweep of the two villages . Company M

moved north on a line parallel to Trung An so it

could begin it's sweep of the village from north to

south . Company L, with the mission to sweep Tham

Ke, initially moved out to the northeast . Leading

elements of Company L were almost into the sout h

of Trung An when Company L's commander realized that his leading platoon had not turned south

toward Tham Ke . Company L reversed direction immediately and started toward Tham Ke .

Just as the leading platoon of Company L approached the edge of the village, a concealed enem y

force opened up with a devastating volume of fire

from machine guns, rifles, RPGs, and mortars . The

company immediately suffered many casualties an d

Captain Thomas S. Hubbel decided to pull his company back and regroup for another attack . He requested supporting arms fires on Tham Ke while his

company prepared for its new assault . After two air

strikes, followed by naval gunfire, Company L

assaulted the village . The enemy again met th e

Marines with withering defensive fires, killing Captain Hubbel and his battalion " tac-net" radio

operator. Lieutenant Colonel McQuown lost communications with the company for a short period until the acting company executive officer assume d

command of Company L.

During the period without radio contact wit h

Company L, Lieutenant Colonel McQuown ordere d

Company M to move east and south and join the

fight on the left flank of Company L . Company M

reached its attack position and immediately came

under heavy enemy fire . Lieutenant Colonel McQuown realized at this time that the two companie s

were up against a major enemy force in wellprepared defensive positions. The search of Tham

Ke the previous day had been inadequate .

Lieutenant Colonel McQuown ordered Company I

to move to the south of Tham Ke . He then reMarines of BLT 3/1 take cover as they fight to enter the village of Tham Khe on 27

December after their first search of the village the previous day failed to detect the

presence of the elaborate but well-camouflaged positions of the 116th NVA Battalion .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A190208
THE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE 17 9

quested that the SLF land the tank platoon from th e

ARG ships . Next, he instructed Company K to take

the pressure off Companies L and M by attacking the

south end of Tham Ke . After prepping the area wit h

81mm mortar fire, Company K attacked against

fierce resistance .

Company K made no progress until the arrival of

two Marine tanks at the company's position . Unfortunately, the two tanks had sustained water damag e

to their communications equipment during th e

landing and could not communicate with the infantrymen except by voice:* This reduced their effectiveness; however, the tankers did knock out som e

enemy bunkers by direct fire from their 90mm guns .

The inability to coordinate the tanks' fire with it s

own assault kept the company from making mor e

than a limited penetration into the village complex .

It did, however, gain a foothold in the village amid

the enemy defenses.

Companies K, L, and M continued their battle a s

night fell, Lieutenant Colonel McQuown expecte d

the enemy would use the darkness to cover thei r

escape . To counteract this, he moved Company I t o

the right flank of Company K where it could maintain control over the eastern, or beach side, of Tha m

Ke . Company M, to the north, could cover part of

the beach side of the village by fire . Lieutenant Colonel McQuown also moved elements of both Companies L and K to the west of Tham Ke . Even though

the extent of the area involved precluded a link-u p

of these elements, McQuown anticipated that his

unit dispositions would block the enemy within th e

confines of the village . Such was not the case .

The following morning, the 28th, Company K ,

already in the southern edges of Tham Ke, an d

Company I renewed their assault on the village .

They quickly subdued the initial heavy enemy smal l

arms fire and secured the village by noon . McQuown's Marines spent the afternoon in a detaile d

search of Tham Ke . He recalled :

This search revealed a village that was literally a defensive bastion . It was prepared for all-around defense in

depth with a network of underground tunnels you could

*Of the five tanks assigned to the BLT, only these two participated in this action . One tank was under repair at Da Nang ; a

second would not start and had to be left aboard ship . None appear to have been properly waterproofed for landing. The third

tank reportedly " submerged" during the landing and the other

two, though operable, "received water damage on landing ." BLT

3/1 AAR, Operation Badger Tooth, dtd . 16Jan68, p . 15 (Archives, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

stand up in, running the full length of the village . Connecting tunnels ran east and west . This tunnel system supported ground level bunkers for machine guns, RPG's, an d

small arms around the entire perimeter of the village . Thus

the NVA were able to defend, reinforce, or withdraw in

any direction . All defensive preparation had been artfully

camouflaged with growing vegetation . Residents of Tham

Ke, questioned after the fight, disclosed that the NVA had

been preparing the defense of this village for one year . 30

The search turned up numerous machine guns,

RPGs, AK-47 rifles, and thousands of rounds of am -

munition which clearly indicated that a major NVA

force had defended the village, not local Viet Cong.

A dying NVA soldier confirmed it ; the enemy forc e

had been the 116th NVA Battalion . The Marines

also learned that ARVN forces operating northwest

of Tham Ke had found over 100 bodies from th e

116th NVA Battalion abandoned in the sand dunes .

The enemy force apparently had evacuated its

casualties through the gap between L and K Companies during the night .

At 1800 on the 31st, a New Year's truce went int o

effect and SLF Bravo prepared to return to its ships ;

the New Year's stand-down cancelled any furthe r

thoughts of attacking inland . Bad weather and

rough seas slowed back-loading, but by 1130, 2

January the BLT had left the "Street Without Joy. "

In the sharp fighting at Tham Khe, the Marines suffered 48 killed and 86 wounded; 31 enemy soldiers

were known dead . Tham Khe was a bitter experienc e

for the Marines of BLT 3/1, but Badger Tooth was a

poignant tactical lesson which would be re -

membered in the clouded future of 1968 .

Ballistic Arch/Kentucky V/Osceola

24 - 27 November, 27 November - 29 December,

30 December—continuing 1968

Eight days after leaving Cam Lo, SLF Alpha landed again. While at sea, BLT 1/3's commander s

changed, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas turned ove r

his command to recently promoted Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Goodale . The 24 Novembe r

landing, Ballistic Arch, was a helicopter and surfac e

assault of Viet Cong-dominated villages on the northern coast of Quang Tri Province, only seve n

kilometers south of the southern DMZ boundary .

Ballistic Arch aimed at Communist sympathizers

reported in and around the hamlet of Mai Xa Thi .

The operation was a "walk through" for most of the

battalion, but the opening minutes were tense fo r

the crews of the LVTP-5s of the 4th Platoon, Conn-
180 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19021 1

Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines rests on the

beach on 28 December 1927 after it and Company K

completed their assault through the village of Tham

Khe and eliminated the rear guard of the 116th

NVA Battalion, which had covered the withdrawal

of the bulk of the enemy battalion during the night .

pally A, 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion and th e

embarked Marines of the BLT 's Company A.

Poor information on surf conditions presented th e

amphibian tractors with a serious problem . As they

approached the beach, they started to take on more

sea water than their pumps could handle ; at times it

was knee deep in the tractors. Two Marines, riding

on top of a tractor washed overboard, but fortunately others rescued them . At last the vehicles grounded

and climbed the dunes of the Quang Tri coast .

There were no losses .

The expected contact did not materialize . The

battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Goodal e

summarized the apparently poor intelligence whic h

triggered Ballistic Arch, saying, "no fighting holes ,

bunkers, or fortifications of any kind were uncovere d

during the operation . . . The area appeared to b e

quite pacified and the indigenous personnel wer e

very friendly ." 21 Ballistic Arch ended at noon on 2 7

November, and BLT 1/ 3 immediately came unde r

the 9th Marines' operational control .

The BLT again phased back into the continuin g

Kentucky Operation . Its only active participation ,

however, was a sweep during the period 28-3 0

November. On 2 December the battalion move d

back to the A-3 Strongpoint to provide security an d

engineer support for its construction . The Marine s

made a concerted effort to complete construction . By

Rice paddy mudprovides the only resistance to BLT 1 /3 Marines after poor intelligence

caused Operation Ballistic Arch to take place in a thoroughly pacified area of Vietnam .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189961
18 1

the time of the departure of BLT 1/3 on 2 9

December, the Marines had completed the defensive

wire and minefield and almost finished the bunker

complex.

Enemy contact during the stay at A-3 was ver y

light . The battalion experienced small enemy probe s

until 11 December when supporting arms broke up a

platoon-size Communist attack . Enemy ground action dropped off appreciably afterward . Enemy artillery, mortar, and rocket fire were the main deterrent to the Marines' engineering effort at A-3 . From

2 December until the 29th, 578 rounds landed on

the position. Phase V of Kentucky concluded on 2 9

December. BLT 1/3 made a combined tactical foo t

and motor march back to Quang Tri Airfield complex. The last two days of December passed as the

BLT prepared to relieve the 2d Battalion, 4t h

Marines, then involved in Operation Osceola . The

end of the year brought no slowing of the planne d

tempo of SLF operations.
CHAPTER 1 2

Pacification

The Problem Defined— County Fair

Marine Grass-Roots-Level Participation—Reporting and Evaluatio n

The Problem Defined

Military commanders in Vietnam realized tha t

operations against Communist main force units ,

alone, could not win the war. These operations coul d

only provide a shield of security behind which th e

South Vietnamese Government and its allies coul d

implement a Revolutionary Development o r

pacification program, a program aimed solely at winning the support of the people .

Pacification is a relatively simple concept ; the process and means of accomplishment are extremel y

complex. Because of differing interpretations an d

frequent interchanges of the terms "pacification, "

"revolutionary development, " and "nation

building," ComUSMACV issued a memorandum ,

"Clarification of Terms," which listed the followin g

definitions:

Pacification is the military, political, economic, an d

social process of establishing or reestablishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of th e

people . It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's

underground government, and the initiation of economi c

and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion . The economic element of pacification includes th e

opening of roads and waterways and maintenance of line s

of communication important to economic and military activity .

Revolutionary development, the leading edge o f

An infantryman from Company D, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines demonstrates the need fo r

a viable pacification program by holding up an empty bulgur wheat sack found in a

North Vietnamese Army unit's bunker destroyed by the battalion on 26 March 1967 .

3d MarDiv ComdC, March 1967
PACIFICATION 18 3

pacification, is the formalized Government of Vietna m

program, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, in specified hamlets generall y

within RD campaign areas . It includes the local security for

these hamlets and the political, economic, and social activities at that level.

Nation building is the economic, political, and social activity having an impact nationwide and/or in urban

centers. It is related to pacification in that it builds on the

results of pacification and contributes to the establishmen t

of a viable economic and social community . ,

Since the beginning of United States involvemen t

in Vietnam, security for the rural population remained the basic requirement for pacification, an d

how best to provide this security was the subject of

continuing debate between American and Vietnamese officials . The military side contended that

the problem was a fundamental military issue, tha t

physical security of the contested area must b e

established before starting any developmental pro -

grams ; civil officials, on the other hand, viewed th e

problem as a political issue, stating that political ,

economic, and social developmental projects would

make greater inroads on Communist influence an d

therefore should have greater priority . The contrasting views led to the initiation of programs whic h

often resulted in duplication, as well as confusion o n

the part of the Vietnamese offices charged with implementing and administering them . To help

already overloaded local administrators, MACV

dispatched more American advisors to the provinces ,

but, unfortunately, in many cases their presence actually retarded pacification progress . Zealous advisors often stifled local initiative .

At the same time, MACV experienced equally

perplexing problems . While MACV perceived tha t

security was the first prerequisite for a successful pro -

gram, it had difficulty implementing a sound ,

balanced management system . As in the civilian pro -

grams, military civic action concepts evolved by trial

and error.

The Vietnamese had experimented with pacification programs since 1954 . Based on past experience ,

a new program emerged late in 1965 . The Vietnamese adopted the concept of the armed propaganda cadre as the basis for the national program : The

civil side of the program began slowly in 1966 ,

primarily because of the shortage of trained cadre ,

but the Vietnamese Government provided enthusiastic direction and the prospects for success were

optimistic.

In February 1966, the Honolulu Conference aligned many of the diverse American and Vietnames e

opinions and actions. Top-level U.S . and Vietnamese policy makers agreed to consider the civilia n

aspects of the war as important as the military effort .

This summit changed the system of priorities an d

caused the initiation of additional programs an d

provision of more of the requisites needed to wage

what many called the "other war." Perhaps the most

significant outcome of the conference was Presiden t

Johnson's decision that only one person would direct

United States pacification efforts in Vietnam . This

led to the establishment of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) in late autumn 1966 . This new

organization brought the various U .S . civilian

pacification programs under the control of a senio r

official who, in turn, reported directly to the deput y

ambassador.

The South Vietnamese Government assigned th e

overall responsibility for the Vietnamese side of th e

national pacification plan, the Revolutionary

Development Program, to Major General Nguye n

Duc Thang, who headed the newly created Ministr y

of Revolutionary Development . A reorganization of

the Vietnamese war cabinet on 12 July 1966 gave

Thang direct supervision over the Ministries of

Revolutionary Development, Agriculture, Publi c

Works, and Interior. At this juncture, Thang gaine d

authority to direct coordination and integration of

civil/military Revolutionary Development activitie s

at all echelons of the government .

The main operational element for the civil aspect s

of Revolutionary Development was the 59-ma n

Revolutionary Development cadre team . The

government recruited these teams from within each

district, trained them at the National Cadre Trainin g

School at Vung Tau, and returned them to their provinces for assignment to a district thief for work in

one of his hamlets. Their first task involved the

security and defense of their assigned hamlets . Once

they established security they started working wit h

the people to create a better way of life within th e

hamlet .

In September, to ensure military assistance for th e

program, the South Vietnamese appointed General

Thang to the position of assistant .for territorial affairs and pacification to the Chief, Joint Genera l

Staff. Major functions of his position include d

development of policies and concepts for military activities in support of revolutionary development an d

supervision of the employment, maneuver, an d

training of regional and popular forces . The primary
184 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Revolutionary Development role of the military

forces required achieving a level of security whic h

would permit the accomplishment of civil activitie s

and subsequent nation building . The 1967 Combined Campaign Plan assigned the primary mission of

supporting the Revolutionary Development progra m

to ARVN forces, thus, by the end of 1966, the Sout h

Vietnamese Government had taken major steps to

consolidate its pacification programs . *

As the Vietnamese reorganized, the Americans

also continued to reform their own programs. The

Office of Civil Operations (OCO) confidently

reported that it had integrated the pacification effort

with military operations and was making significan t

progress in implementing the various programs . One

of the most important OCO contributions was the

appointment of four regional directors, one for eac h

corps area. These four men had full authority over all

American civilians in their respective regions an d

reported directly to the director of OCO; previousl y

there had been no central management of the

various pacification programs . During the spring o f

1967, the United States realized that it needed a

stronger organization and placed all of the variou s

components of the American pacification effort ,

both civilian and military, under a single manager ,

ComUSMACV . The name of the new organizatio n

was Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) .

On 23 May, MACV Directive 10-12 implemented

CORDS. Ambassador Robert Komer became

General Westmoreland's deputy for CORDS wit h

full responsibility for the entire program . The directive specifically charged the ambassador with "supervising the formulation and execution of all plans,

policies and programs, military and civilian, whic h

support the GVN's revolutionary development pro -

gram and related programs ." In addition, the directive provided for the integration and consolidation

of all OCO and revolutionary development support

activities at all levels: nation, corps, province, and

district. The OCO regional director became the

deputy for CORDS to each corps commander, whil e

the senior provincial and district advisors became

CORDS representatives at those levels . Accommodation of this extensive program proved to be a simpl e

matter in I Corps, chiefly because the I Corps Coor -

*For a detailed description of the Revolutionary Developmen t

Program during 1966 and the development of the Combine d

Campaign for 1967, see Shulimson, U. S. Marines in Vietnam,

1966.

dinating Council had performed a very similar function for 20 months.

By early August 1965, Marine civic action had expanded to the point that coordination with othe r

United States agencies in I Corps became imperative

for the effective support of the Vietnamese pacification program. General Walt ordered the creation o f

the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council . The council

drew its members from all major U.S . and Vietnamese agencies in I CTZ, including representative s

from both Marine and ARVN military staffs . When

the council met on 30 August 1965, it was the first

working regional council of its kind in South Vietnam. This organizational step preceded the formation of subcommittees for public health, education ,

roads, refugees, distribution, and police . Although

the Joint Coordinating Council had no directive -

making authority or material resources of its own ,

the influence of its members made it the most effective group for carrying out the total pacification program in I Corps.* By the fall of 1966, she success of

the council encouraged and assisted the formation o f

other joint coordinating councils ()CC) . These JCCs

were independent of the corps-level council, but ha d

similar staffs and missions . As 1967 began, growing

Vietnamese participation in council activities an d

sponsored programs indicated the value of the JC C

approach.

During 1965 III MAF created a fifth general staff

section, G-5, to coordinate all civic action programs .

The Marines established G-5/S-5 sections in every

Marine division, regiment, and battalion serving in

Vietnam. At the same time, to prevent overlap o f

projects, III MAF assigned responsibility for the

coordination of civic action in particula r

geographical areas to specific units. This enable d

them to coordinate all programs within their area s

with local government officials . By the end of 1966,

these two steps formed a sound base for both the III

MAF and Vietnamese pacification programs.

Following the formation of CORDS, many of th e

functions of the III MAF G-5 section shifted to th e

CORDS representatives at III MAF Headquarters .

Such a shift inevitably caused some friction between

the two offices . Among them was the tendency o f

*Vice Admiral Thomas R . Weschler wrote that General Walt 's

leadership was the key element that molded the various agencie s

into a team dedicated to a successful pacification campaign . Vic e

Admiral Thomas R. Weschler, Comments on draft ms, 18Jun8 1

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)
PACIFICATION 18 5

the CORDS staff to report through their own channels directly to Saigon, bypassing III MAF . Despit e

daily meetings, the G-5 section believed that muc h

information from the CORDS system was not

reaching the G-5 . "As CORDS took on more of th e

responsibility for pacification from the G-5, " wrot e

Colonel James L. Black, who served as III MAF G-5 ,

"coordination among the [III MAF] G-3, G-2, an d

G-5 became almost non-existent. " III MAF sharpl y

reduced the size of the G-5 section and it almost integrated into the CORDS staff. However, in spite o f

being the smallest staff section in III MAF, G-5 remained charged with major requirements to support

the pacification effort . 2

The G-5 officer found a number of obstacles in his

path. Even though the Army's 29th Civil Affairs

Company supported III MAF, the growth of CORD S

blurred the command relationship between III MAF

and the company. Further, Colonel Black did no t

believe the company's task organization properl y

reflected its mission. Another limiting factor was th e

lack of understanding of civil affairs among Marines

assigned to G-5/S-5 staffs at all command levels .

Few had been school trained in their duties and ha d

to learn on-the-job . Those with formal school training had to learn to shift their thinking fro m

theoretical, classroom concepts to the practical situation at hand. The learning process slowed progress i n

the III MAF civil affairs effort .

The importance placed upon civic action require d

the III MAF G-5 to submit a daily civic action report

to FMFPac headquarters . The report included such

topics as the amount of lumber, clothing, garbage ,

and other material distributed to the Vietnamese

people during the last 24 hours . This classified

report could not be delayed, not even by heavy

message traffic during peak operational periods . "If

this report did not reach FMFPac within 24 hours, "

wrote Colonel Black, "you would receive a 'nasty'

phone call [from Hawaii] ." The reports proble m

ended, according to Colonel Black, in the spring of

1968 .3

County Fair

Throughout 1967, the Marines concentrated on

the basics of pacification development . In accordance with the Honolulu Declaration of 1966, the

Marines directed much of their effort at the expansion and refinement of the pacification program the y

had initiated earlier . For their programs to succeed ,

the Marines needed to provide secure conditions i n

which the Vietnamese people could live and in

which all levels of legal government could functio n

without enemy interference . To this end, the

Marines' main objective was the isolation of the V C

from the people, both physically and economically .

Golden Fleece operations, in which Marines provided security during rice harvests, had proven successful in protecting the villagers' rice crops sinc e

September 1965 ; however, they occurred only during the two or three yearly harvest seasons. On the

other hand, the war on the VC infrastructure was a

daily affair.

The source of the enemy's strength was the local

guerilla organization which operated in 5- to 10-ma n

cells within each hamlet . Each cell acted as a

clandestine de facto government which worked to

foster Communist influence, while simultaneousl y

undermining the influence of local officials and th e

central government . If the local population was no t

sympathetic to the Communist cause, the guerilla s

resorted to intimidation and terror to control in -

habitants. Each guerrilla acted as an agent betwee n

the people and the VC main force units which needed food, recruits, and intelligence . Simply stated ,

pacification involved eliminating the agents and

thus reducing the large Communist units to th e

status of conventional forces groping around i n

hostile territory . Furthermore, with the destructio n

of the guerrilla infrastructure, the seeds of RVN influence could fall on neutral, if not completely fertile, ground .

The Marines recognized these realities during th e

early stages of the campaign and devised severa l

techniques to combat the guerrillas. One of the most

successful, initiated in 1966, was the County Fair

concept. Basically, County Fairs involved elaborate

cordon and search operations conducted by combined ARVN and Marine forces . Since the South Vietnamese government needed to know who belonged

where, the ARVN handled the population control

aspects, as well as the actual searching of the targete d

village, while the Marines usually remained in th e

background, providing tactical,"muscle . "

Once the combined commanders selected a n

operational area, Marine units moved in at night an d

established a cordon around the designated village

to prevent the VC, if any, from escaping or gainin g

reinforcements . At dawn, ARVN troops entered the

village, rounded up the inhabitants, apologized for

the inconvenience, and announced that they intended to search the hamlet . While district and villag e

leaders mingled with the people explaining what was
186 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37011 5

Vietnamese peasant women hold out their straw hats for the mixture of ham and ric e

prepared by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines during a "County Fair" operation in May .

happening, other officials checked identificatio n

cards and took a census .

The allies tried to make the experience as pleasan t

as possible . They set up a temporary dispensary to

provide the villagers with free medical and denta l

care . They fed the people, including providing candy and other delights for the children . Entertainment featured movies, live presentations, and ban d

concerts which helped to cover the serious business

of uprooting the Communists. These organized

amusements provided the name "County Fair . "

While the distractions continued in the assembly

area, South Vietnamese troops systematically combed the village . Often the guerrillas slipped into tunnels or spider holes at the first sign of approachin g

troops, but if the troops discovered the underground

hiding place they literally smoked out the VC . On

some operations, the searchers used portable

blowers, called "Mighty Mites," to saturate the shafts

with tear gas and smoke .* If the guerrillas chose to

run away, they encountered the Marine cordon

around the village .

While these operations proved successful, Count y

Fairs were not an end in themselves. When Marine

*The term Mighty Mite should not be confused with the similar

nickname for a light vehicle used as a jeep by Marine units in th e

1960s.

and ARVN units left the area, they took with the m

the security essential to the survival of progovernment villages. Even if the allies eradicated

the existing VC infrastructure, their departur e

created a vacuum into which other guerrilla cadre

could filter. During a survey conducted by Marin e

civil affairs personnel in the Chu Lai area, most

civilians interviewed stated that they appreciated the

medical care, the clothing, the new schools, and al l

of the other benefits, but what they really wante d

was protection from the Viet Cong . Revolutionary

Development teams and Popular Forces could onl y

partially remedy the situation because of thei r

limited training and armament. The Marines realized these facts, but they also recognized the unexploited potential which the popular forces offered :

total familiarity with local conditions, loyalties,

needs, and every physical characteristic of their hom e

villages . Marine recognition of this potential, and efforts to develop it, produced one of the most productive innovations in I Corps, the Combined Action Program.

Marine Grass-Roots-Level Participatio n

The birth of the Combined Action Program occur -

red in the summer of 1965 in Lieutenant Colonel

William W. Taylor's 3d Battalion, 4th Marines as a

means of controlling the population around the Phu
PACIFICATION 18 7

Bai combat base . The battalion civil affairs officer ,

Captain John J. Mullen, Jr ., provided the origina l

inspiration. Understanding the Vietnamese culture ,

Mullen realized that the militia troops living in th e

villages were the key to local security . Rural Vietnamese had an orientation toward families, ancestors ,

and hamlets ; they were not strong nationalists. Most

farmers spent their entire lives within a 10-mile

radius of their hamlets . PFs usually performed poorly if moved to another district, but in defense o f

their own homes they could be tough. In the war

with the VC, motivation alone could not overcome

superior firepower and experience . Mullen believe d

the Marines could add the necessary ingredients and ,

given proper leadership and firepower, the PFs no t

only could, but would stand up to the VC.

Lieutenant Colonel Taylor agreed with Mullen' s

idea and, on 3 August 1965, he sent four squads o f

Marines to work with six platoons of PFs in the thre e

villages northwest of his perimeter. First Lieutenant

Paul R. Ek, who spoke Vietnamese, became th e

company commander and a PF lieutenant worked as

his executive officer. Under this leadership, the pro -

gram got underway .

Lieutenant Ek's success with combined actio n

prompted III MAF to expand the program . General

Walt, a strong advocate of the pacification program ,

approved of the results at Phu Bai and, in Januar y

1966, decided to initiate similar programs at Da

Nang and Chu Lai.* General Walt's initiating order

stated:

1. . . . the Commanding General, .I Corps has concurred

in III MAF proposal to expand the Marine-Popular Forc e

program throughout all Marine enclaves and has published

instructions to subordinates throughout I Corps .

2. Action will be taken immediately to establish liaiso n

through Province, District, and down to village/hamlet as

required to take operational control of Popular Force unit s

within a zone of action in accordance with reference (b) . I n

each case ensure that local officials thoroughly understan d

the program and have been apprised of General Thi's let -

ter. Specifically, presentations will include that Marin e

forces intend to establish communications to Popular Forc e

units, provide supporting arms, reserve forces, and plan t o

place Marines with selected Popular Force Platoons . Where

possible Popular Force units in proximity to each other wil l

*Captain Mullen, who replaced Lieutenant Ek upon the latter' s

rotation in September 1965, and several members of the origina l

company assisted and advised in the establishment of the second

unit. Lieutenant Colonel John J. Mullen, Jr., Comments on draft

ms, 21May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington ,

D .C.)

be organized into Combined Action Companies .* In

discussions, stress the mutual benefits of the program i n

that Marines can profit from Popular Forces knowledge o f

area, language, and people while the Popular Force will

receive valuable training and will be provided additiona l

security . Of primary importance is the fact that this relationship will provide a basis for better understanding an d

building of mutual respect between our forces . In presenting the program to RVN officials, avoid the use of the

terms " operational control " by substituting "cooperatio n

or coordination . "

3 . Insure a thorough indoctrination on the overall aims o f

programs to all concerned . These are to improve the effectiveness and prestige of the Popular Forces with a view to

increasing recruitment to build up this critically

understrength force . The importance of the Popular Forces

to provide security for rear areas, which will allo w

Marine/ARVN combat forces to move forward, cannot be

overstressed . At every opportunity when dealing with

GVN officials, highlight the Popular Force problem an d

assess the adequacy of the program at local levels to improve this force .

4 . Upon receipt of this letter, report :

a. Location of Popular Force units in area of operation .

b. Assigned mission of each unit .

c. Commander.

d. Personnel present for duty .

e. Amount and condition of equipment.

f. Uniform requirements.

g. Plans for implementing program.

5 . After the initial report submit summary of operations

conducted and evaluation of the program on a weekl y

basis. ,

By January 1966, there were seven combined action platoons in existence ; by July, 38 ; and by the

beginning of 1967 the number had risen to 57 . III

MAF planned still more .

While it was important to have the support of III

MAF command levels for combined action, the success or failure of the venture ultimately rested on the

shoulders of 19- and 20-year-old Marines. Combine d

Action units needed a special Marine ; a man withou t

the necessary motivation, understanding, and compassion could do more harm than good . All Marine s

in the original program were volunteers with at least

four months' combat experience, a favorable recommendation from their commanding officer, n o

record of disciplinary action, and, all important, no

discernible racial prejudices . These men were the

*The name of these units soon changed to Combined Actio n

Platoons (CAPs) . The Marines found that the acronym "CAC"

was, under certain pronunciations, a vulgarity in the Vietnamese

language .
188 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

foundation upon which the Marine side of the program was built.

By mid-1967, III MAF had compiled statistic s

which illustrated the dedication of Marines in the

Combined Action Program . The average Marine participant had a 75-percent chance of being wounde d

once during his tour and a 30-percent chance of being hit a second time . The ultimate statistic, those

who would die, was just under 12 percent . Despite

these grim mathematical reminders, over 60 percen t

of the Marines volunteered for at least one six-month

extension to their normal 12-month tours in Vietnam. The high extension rate was a strong indication

to their leaders that the Combined Action Progra m

had a better than average chance of success.

The basic operating unit of the program, the combined action platoon (CAP), consisted of a 14-man

Marine squad and a Navy corpsman, integrated int o

a nominal 35-man Popular Forces platoon . The ideal

scenario following establishment of a combined action unit was as follows :

Initially, there was only one objective, aroundthe-clock security of their assigned hamlet . The first

days were the most dangerous, the period when uni t

cohesiveness and proficiency were most questionable. The Marines first had to teach the PFs t o

defend themselves . The Marines provided the

knowledge of tactics and weaponry while the PFs

contributed their knowledge of the terrain and local

conditions . In the field the Marine squad leader,

normally a sergeant, usually controlled the unit ; but

during the daily routine, cooperation replaced command. As the PFs' confidence and skill grew, CAP

patrolling became more aggressive. Continuous

sharing of experience gained through daily, side-byside participation in training and patrolling create d

truly effective, integrated platoons and a new degre e

of reliable hamlet security . As the strength of the

CAP grew, the peoples' willingness to accept th e

unit also increased . Then, and only then, could

lasting social action within the hamlets become a

reality .

Time worked paradoxically for the CAP Marines.

To ensure their own survival, they had to quickly

transform the CAP into a cohesive defense force, but

the opposite was the case in their dealings with th e

people . The Vietnamese, possessing a wariness of

outsiders typical of peasant societies, would not le t

the Marines force their way into the existing socia l

structure of the hamlet. Acceptance took time.

Usually the breakthrough in acquiring community

3d MarDiv ComdC, June 1967

This Marine, though wearing starched, presse d

trousers and shined boots for the visiting

photographer, wields a hoe alongside a Popula r

Forces militiaman to demonstrate the importance of

cooperative effort in the Combined Action Program .

acceptance came from the hamlet children . Since the

CAP compound was a natural gathering place for th e

naturally curious and uninhibited children, they accepted the Marines and, in turn, gained the friendship of the Americans. In most cases, hamlet

children became the most significant factor in bridging the cultural gap. As parents began to know and

understand the Marines through their own children ,

empathy could develop which aided the establishment of common purposes.

This approach was not without its pitfalls, as Nav y

Chaplain Vincent T. Capadonno, a former missionary on Taiwan, pointed out in a series of lecture s

to Marine units at Chu Lai in the summer of 1966 .

Young American males, he said, love to play wit h

children—for about 15 minutes . Then they tire o f

the children and start pushing them away ,

sometimes having to get rough before the childre n

realize the game is over. Further, in Vietnamese peasant society, where infant and child mortality wer e

high, children, though loved by their parents, ha d

little social standing . Among the Vietnamese, social

standing was a matter of age, with the elderly havin g

the highest, most respected status. The America n

cultural emphasis on youth could lead youn g

Marines to concentrate on young Vietnamese and ig-
PACIFICATION 189

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189582

Popular Forces militiamen and Marines work together to improve village defenses by

building a traffic control gate over a bridge near the combined action platoon's position .

note the village elders, a situation that could creat e

resentment within the village power structure . 6

In areas of strong Communist influence, th e

development of a close relationship was even mor e

difficult. The Marines had to counter VC propaganda which pictured them as blood-thirsty mercenaries

who burned, raped, and pillaged, but participants

managed to overcome these obstacles when their actions disproved the Communists' claims . They had

to live, work, and eat with the people, respect their

customs, and treat them as equals . The CAP corpsmen also helped to narrow the gap by providing

rudimentary but vital medical assistance. Most importantly, the Marines' approach had to demonstrat e

that they genuinely cared about the well-being of

the villagers .

Once the people accepted the Marines, true civi c

action could start, but again the Americans coul d

not take charge . For civic action to be effective, it

had to reflect what the people sincerely wanted, as

well as what they were willing to support . Once

everyone determined these needs, only the imagination and initiative of the Marines and the villagers

limited the extent of the program . The range of projects accomplished by Marines, PFs, and citizen s

working together ranged from school construction t o

animal husbandry . Many desired civic action projects

exceeded the material resources available to th e

CAPs, but they could turn to the vast inventories of

agencies as USAID and CARE . Local Marine commands also helped by providing the hamlets

available construction material, machinery, tools ,

and clothing.

When they demonstrated military proficiency an d

gained popular support, the CAPs could appl y

greater pressure on the VC . By denying the guerrillas

access to the hamlets, the defense force curtailed the

Communists' logistic and manpower sources. The

CAPs also established antiguerrilla intelligence net s

in their immediate areas . When the people realize d

that to help the CAPs was to help themselves, the y

provided the Marines information on V C

movements, storage areas, and the locations of

mines and booby traps.* Armed with this intelligence, the CAPs managed to inflict heavier

casualties on the Viet Cong, driving them further

from the mainstream of hamlet life .

The CAPs also attempted to erode Communist

strength through persuasion . They aimed this effort

primarily at the relatives of the local guerrillas . The

Marines entreated the resident families of known VC

to ask their kin to give up the VC cause, pointing ou t

that sooner or later the CAPs would find and

possibly kill them. This approach not only ac-

*The Marines rarely, if ever, patrolled without the PFs, becaus e

the Vietnamese, being more familiar with the area, could spo t

mines and booby traps more readily than the Americans .
190 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

celerated enemy defections, but it also reinforced th e

permanency of the.CAP program in the minds of th e

peasants.

All of these activities contributed to the growth o f

the villagers' belief in their own government an d

their allies . Perhaps the most important factor in

promoting confidence in the program was the fac t

that the Viet Cong had not regained control of any

area in which a CAP had established security . The

presence of a successful CAP in a village complex

prohibited further use of that village by the VC .

Not all CAP units succeeded, especially during

the period of rapid expansion of the program .

Lieutenant Colonel Max McQuown, the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, was no t

favorably impressed with either of the two units i n

his battalion TAOR . He described the problems of

these units:

Few of the Marines assigned to these two CAP units ha d

prior ground combat experience . . . . [They] were an admixture out of combat service support units . The leaders

and the Marines under them . . . lacked skills in scoutin g

and patrolling, mines and booby traps, map reading ,

observed fire procedures, basic infantry tactics, and V C

tactics and techniques . Further, they had scant knowledge

of the Vietnamese language and were unfamiliar with the

social and religious customs of the people they were livin g

with .

With respect to their PF counterparts, not one PF was a

resident of either village . . . all the eligible resident males ,

who should have been members of the PF platoons, wer e

gone! They had been drafted into the ARVN, joined th e

VC, or deserted the village to keep from [serving in eithe r

the ARVN or VC] . The strength of each PF platoon i n

these villages never exceeded 20 men . . . .

Marine [and PF] members of the CAP platoon . . . kep t

themselves aloof from the villagers they were supposed to

be helping. . . .

There was no record of either CAP unit capturing a VC,

let alone destroying the VC infrastructure in these villages.

In fact, the VC operated with impunity around thes e

villages unless elements of 3/1 were in the area . . . .

[The chiefs of the two villages], both many time s

wounded [and] ardent anti-communist leaders, chose to

deal directly with [the battalion S-2 and S-5 sections] wit h

respect to VC activity and civic action programs. Both

chiefs were instrumental in initiating 3/1 action agains t

VC operating in and around their villages. Neither chie f

had faith that the CAP units would accomplish anything . ,

The existence of similar problems among a

number of CAP units, which were traceable to rapi d

expansion of the program, was apparent to III MA F

headquarters. To enhance the program's effectiveness, General Cushman, the new III MAF commander, established a provisional combined actio n

group (CAG) headquarters at Da Nang. The

primary purpose of this provisional CAG was t o

oversee training and support of the combined actio n

units . A month later, III MAF formed two more

A large South Vietnamese flag flies over the bunkers and barbed wire protecting the

gate leading into the headquarters of Combined Action Platoon 3-1 in August 1967.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189537
PACIFICATION 19 1

CAGs to direct activities in the Phu Bai and Chu La i

areas.

During July, III MAF revised control and support

of the CAP Marines by removing them from th e

command of the Marine division responsible fo r

their area . The new chain of command linked the

CAPs through their companies and groups directl y

to III MAF. Under the revised system, supervisory

authority rested with the deputy commanding

general of III MAF, Major General Herman Nickerson, Jr., via his Combined Action Program Staff.

This command revision occurred following the

relocation of Marine tactical units after the arrival of

the Army's Task Force Oregon at Chu Lai .

The CAP program continued to grow durin g

1967 . By July there were 75 CAPs and by the end of

the year, 79 operated under 14 company headquarters .

The increasing success of the Combined Action

Program demonstrated the results achievable .

Pacification involved not changing, but rather, rein -

forcing the villagers' own aspirations. The successful

CAP Marines understood this and, because of it ,

achieved one of the basic goals of the entire pacification effort, the unification of interest between the

South Vietnamese villager and the individual

Marine . For the process to work in the Marine

TAORs, III MAF needed the same identity of interest between the Marines in the regular units an d

the local populace . Marines in companies and battalions had to realize that their mission was the protection of the people, while the Vietnamese peasants

had to learn to overcome their fear of Americans .

The Marine Corps attempted to solve this problem

with its Personal Response Project, a program

designed to help the individual Marine to understand the South Vietnamese . III MAF initiated the

project in July 1966, but it remained in a dat a

collecting stage until early in 1967 . The first steps of

the program consisted of making several surveys o f

Marines throughout I Corps to establish a representative sample of Marine attitudes toward the Vietnamese people . At the same time, III MAF chaplains

conducted lectures and discussions to acquaint th e

Marines with the basic features of Vietnames e

culture and civilization . III MAF distributed a Platoon Leader's Personal Response Notebook to all

small unit commanders as an instruction guide for

Marines under their command .

In February 1967, the 3d Marine Division

established a Personal Response Council and a Per -

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18965 0

Cpl Gary W. Armstrong fires his M-60 machine gu n

toward a Viet Cong sniper's position while on a combat patrol with a combined action unit on 9 May.

sonal Response Contact Team . The council and team

started a variety of programs directed toward improving Marine-Vietnamese relationships, essentiall y

through eliminating any negative attitudes held by

the Marines . 8 By the end of May, both the 1st

Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Win g

had similar programs .

The Headquarters, Marine Corps statement of th e

purpose and objectives of the Marine Corps Persona l

Response Project was :

The Personal Response Project is a systematic effort

toward attitudinal improvement in intercultural relations .

By discovering the ways in which people of another cultur e

relate their religious and ethical value systems to daily life

the project develops effective anticipation of acculturativ e

problems. Such anticipation and understanding is one of

the keys to the elimination of offensive behavorial pattern s

toward indigenous citizens. It is expected that appropriat e

mutual assistance between Marines and the citizenry wil l

be a by-product of increased understanding and contributory to the elimination of local guerrilla forces in an

insurgency environment .

The objectives of the Personal Response Project are to :

assist military personnel to respond to the predisposition of

indigenous citizens to act in concert with their social,

religious, and cultural value systems; identify the expression of these value systems and the motivation implicit i n

them; and recognize that the lives, relationships, and ac -
192 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

tions of indigenous citizens are of the same importance a s

those of all other human beings . 9

Despite the heavy language, the approach seemed

helpful. By the end of 1967, the Personal Response

Project had become one of the anchors of III MAF's

civic action program. Lieutenant Colonel Donald L.

Evans, the III MAF assistant G-5 at the time the project started, stated that he considered the Persona l

Response Project as important as psychological

operations and the Combined Action Program ."'

The Marines realized that any effective pacification plan must have both a political and a

psychological impact . They found that civic actio n

and psychological operations had to be mutuall y

supporting and to obtain a maximum benefit, required close coordination with Vietnamese officials .

To this end, the County Fair and Combined Actio n

Programs proved most effective . Other joint

psychological operations involved relocation o f

refugees from VC controlled areas and the support o f

tactical operations with armed propaganda teams'

presentations, leaflet drops, audio-visual productions, combat loudspeaker performances, and movi e

festivals. Vietnamese Cultural Drama Teams served

in Marine operational areas to entertain local

peasants; these teams presented short dramas and

songs weaving in appropriate political points.

The most significant psychological effort was the

Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program . This was the

government's campaign to win over the Viet Cong .

The government provided them with assistance for a

new start by teaching them a trade to use whe n

returning to their homes. Ralliers (hoi chanhs) often

provided valuable information, especially regardin g

the location of troops and equipment caches, bu t

more importantly, III MAF believed this progra m

provided still another avenue for achieving pacification. Consequently, III MAF accelerated planning t o

support the Chieu Hoi Program . Planned support

included the building of new Chieu Hoi centers t o

increase the handling capability of the returnees .

During 1967, the Chieu Hoi Program accommodated 2,539 ralliers in I Corps .

In July 1966, the Marines used hoi chanhs for the

first time during a County Fair operation . The hoi

chanhs addressed small groups of villagers to

describe the Viet Cong methods and intentions, as

well as the benefits of the Government's Revolutionary Development Program . The success of hoi

chanh employment rapidly became apparent ; for example, in two months' time one rallier identified

more than 30 VC.

Achieving the full potential of the ralliers

demanded rigid screening and orientation . Six participated in combat operations on a trial basis in October 1966 . The hoi chanhs' intimate knowledge of

the terrain, their familiarity with local people, an d

their knowledge of the VC modus operandi proved

invaluable to the tactical units. When Genera l

Nickerson, then commanding the 1st Marine Division, learned of the success of the trial, he ordere d

that all qualified returnees join field units as soon a s

possible . General Nickerson also originated the new

collective name for the hoi chanhs; he called them

Kit Carson Scouts, after the famous guide of the

western frontier. At the end of 1966, 19 scouts

served in the 1st Marine Division program .

In February 1967, General Walt ordered the pro -

gram adopted throughout III MAF . A newl y

established Kit Carson Training Center standardized

scout training, and by the end of December 13 2

scouts served with Marine units in I Corps . During

the year 1967, scouts killed 58 Viet Cong, capture d

37, and seized 82 weapons . Equally important to th e

Marines operating with them was the scouts'

discovery of 145 mines and explosive devices.

Among other civic action programs employed b y

the Marines during 1967, public health and educaPham Duoc, a veteran offive months as a Kit Carson

Scout, points on a map to likely Viet Cong hiding

places to LCpI R . D. Kilmer and Cpl P. F. Collins,

while fellow Scout Ho Quyet (center) watches.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189519
PACIFICATION 193

3d MarDiv ComdC, May 1967

2dLt Edward F. McCourt, Jr. (left), SSgt Roy C. Sharp, and He-Xung, an interpreter/translator, train Kit Carson Scouts on the M-16 at the training center at Phu Bai .

tion continued to be keystones of the effort. Of the

two, medical assistance produced the most immediate results . Almost every unit conducted

medical and dental civic action projects (MedCAP s

and DentCAPs) for their humanitarian value . As an

adjunct to MedCAPs, Navy medical personne l

distributed medical supplies to the Vietnamese an d

Vietnamese medical workers.

The Public Health Program bridged the gap between pure medical assistance and self-help projects .

These efforts operated under the aegis of CORD S

and the supervision of the Public Health Committe e

of I Corps' JCC. A general sanitation campaign included trash removal, innoculations, preventiv e

medicine, pest control, and water purification .

Just as good health was a prerequisite to the

villagers' general well being, education was mandatory for economic and social growth . Medical

assistance, particularly the MedCAP efforts, produced immediate, tangible results; conversely the III

MAF civil education program offered few short-ter m

advantages, but the Marines could not ignore the requirement for education and its long-range impact .

During 1967, the Marines expanded the school

building project they started during the spring o f

1966 . They coordinated this program through th e

Education Committee of I Corps JCC to determin e

the hamlets that wanted to participate . Each participating hamlet provided an adequate school site ,

agreed to provide labor for its construction, arrange d

for a teacher, and paid the teacher's salary . In return ,

the Marines agreed to provide construction

materials, technical advice, and heavy equipment.

Each application required coordination with the

local government and CORDS officials to ensure

compatibility with overall national school construction plans.

Even more widespread than the school buildin g

programs were those of providing school supplies .

Most of the refugee village schools needed every typ e

of school supply . Elementary school kits from the

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)

were the most popular item distributed to individual

students . Classroom supply kits, also from CARE,

went to those students who needed onl y

replacements . By the end of 1967, almost every

school-age child in I Corps had received, at one tim e

or another, one of the CARE kits .

These humanitarian programs were very difficul t

to accomplish in actual practice . Committing a battalion to an operation outside its TAOR or transferring it to another area could often disrupt the continuity of the pacification effort within a village .

Vietnamese teachers were understandably reluctan t

to risk their lives by working in newly-built schools

in contested villages . In addition, as Lieutenant Colonel McQuown of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marine s

pointed out, some projects required a 48-hour day to

complete . "The Vietnamese people," he wrote ,

"labored from dawn to darkness just to farm an d

raise enough food to subsist . At the end of the working day they were too tired to be interested in a lecture on the necessity of screening or covering a toile t

that had been open for 3,000 years . . . ."" In spite of
194 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37004 2

Lt Thomas E. Bunnell, a Navy physician assigned to

the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, gives a shot to a Vietnamese child during a medical civic action patro l

(Medcap) to a village five miles northeast of Chu Lai.

these and other obstacles, the Marines persisted in

their pacification efforts .

Reporting and Evaluatio n

As 1967 began, the Marines in I Corps used tw o

measurement systems to evaluate progress in the

various pacification programs. III MAF independently developed one system . On the othe r

hand, MACV used the Hamlet Evaluation Syste m

(HES) on a country-wide basis to evaluate all area s

where Government authority existed .

In February 1966, the Marines introduced an index system to measure and record a broad range o f

essential indicators of pacification status . The index

related civic action and Revolutionary Developmen t

programs in the TAORs and, at the same time, tie d

in Marine Corps combat operations to both pro -

grams. Essentially, the system equated progress i n

pacification with the progress of the war, and included indicators of improvement which required actio n

by military organizations . The system included fiv e

basic general indicators of progress:

1. Destruction of enemy military units

2. Destruction of enemy infrastructure

3. Establishment of local security by the Vietnames e

4. Establishment of local government by the Vietnamese

5. Status of Nev Life Development Programs

The village served as the basic measurement uni t

in this assessment since it consisted of a clearly defined area for applying uniform standards for comparative purposes . The evaluator determined the

level of pacification progress in each village based o n

five general indicators which, in turn, subdivided into subordinate elements . The subordinate elements

carried various weights, so that a village that full y

satisfied all elements of each indicator received 10 0

points. For the subdivision and specific weights of

the system, see table this page .

Pacification Progress Indice s

4 . Establishment of Local Governmen t

a. Village chief and council elected and functioning 4

b. Village chief lives and sleeps in the village 3

c. Hamlet chiefs and councils elected and functioning 4

d. Hamlet chief lives and sleeps in the hamlet 4

e. Psyops and public information services established 3

f. Village statutes enacted 1

g. Village social and administrative organization completed 1

2 0

1 . Destruction of Organized VC Military Force s

a. VC local/main force units destroyed or driven out 1 5

b . GVN/FW/MAF capable of defending the area 5

2 0

2 . Destruction of VC Infrastructur e

a . Census completed 2

b . VC infrastructure discovered and destroyed o r

neutralized 8

c. GVN intelligence network established 5

d. Census grievance teams completed interviewing eac h

family 2

e . Principal grievances proceed 3

2 0

3 . Establishment of Local Securit y

a. Defense plans completed 2

b. Defense construction completed 3

c. Local defense forces trained and in place 1 2

d . Communications established with supporting unit 3

20

5 . Completion of Initial New Life Hamlet Program s

a. Necessary public health works, required to meet initial needs of populace, completed 4

b. Necessary educational requirements, to satisfy initia l

needs, have been met 4

c. Necessary agricultural works completed 4

d. Adequate ground transportation into and out of th e

area has been established 4

e . Necessary markets established 4

2 0

Maximum points 100
PACIFICATION 19 5

Each component of the system depended on th e

others, thus the evaluation could not reflect a great

achievement in the category "Establishment of Loca l

Government" until the village made large advance s

in the category "Destruction of Enemy Units . " A

high score in "Completion of Initial New Life

Hamlet Programs" was possible only if it represente d

gains in security and the establishment of local apparatus in the village . A score of 60 points for a

village indicated that government had establishe d

firm influence . A "pacified" village was one whic h

attained the grade of 80 points. The system proved

to be highly successful and, with minor refinements ,

became the basic technique used by the Marines to

assess pacification progress. At the end of 1967, it remained the standard system .

The Hamlet Evaluation System, devised by the

Department of Defense in conjunction with the U .S .

Mission Council, Vietnam, appeared in December

1966 . Patterned after the Marine evaluation system ,

it differed in several important areas:

The HES system focused on the hamlet level, while th e

Marine system graded villages .

HES presented the results of its hamlet evaluation in let -

ter form, while the Marine project rated the village b y

numerical percentage .

Several HES elements required subjective evaluation ,

while the Marine system was basically objective .

HES evaluated all areas in which Government authorit y

was present, while the Marines' system rated only those

villages in which III MAF influence was present .

HES utilized the advisory structure for its information

while the Marine system used the military structure .1 2

HES, like the Marine system, operated on a

monthly reporting cycle . The heart of the system wa s

the Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet (HEW), whic h

each district advisor prepared for each of his district's

hamlets possessing some degree of Government control. The advisor analyzed each hamlet's pacificatio n

status in terms of six general categories:

1. VC military activitie s

2. VC political and subversive activities

3. Security (friendly capabilities)

4. Administrative and political activitie s

5. Health, education, and welfar e

6. Economic development

Each of the six categories received a rating indicator, from A (best) through E . The advisor als o

completed a multiple-choice list of 14 questions

about the hamlet's problems during the month .

Despite the basic differences between the Marines '

System and the HES, the systems proved compatibl e

as well as complementary .

Neither system was flawless, however . Both required a great deal of work to compile statistics that

were not always meaningful. As Colonel Black, the

III MAF G-5 noted, the fact a village chief slept i n

his village was misleading . "If the chief did," wrote

Black, "the usual assumption was made that

pacification was really in progress . [However, the ]

chief could be VC and sleep in the village and th e

village or hamlet could be under VC control. "

Nevertheless, III MAF considered the village report

the better indicator of pacified areas .13

PART VI

SUPPORT AND CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 13

Supporting Arms

Marine Air Operations—Fixed-Wing Operations—Helicopter Operations—Artillery

Marine Air Operations

At the start of 1967, Major General Louis B .

Robertshaw's 1st Marine Aircraft Wing consisted o f

three fixed-wing groups, MAGs-11, -12, and -13 ,

and two helicopter groups, MAGs-16 and -36 . One

fixed-wing group, MAG-11, operated from D a

Nang, while the other two were at Chu Lai. The two

helicopter groups operated from different bases also ;

MAG-36 was at Ky Ha, and MAG-16 split betwee n

Marble Mountain and Phu Bai. Wing headquarters,

services, command, and control functions came from

units of Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1

(MWHG-1) at Da Nang .

General Robertshaw, as III MAF's air componen t

commander, exercised operational control of thes e

units through his staff and by means of the Marine

air command and control system . The key unit i n

this system, the tactical air direction center (TADC) ,

was at wing headquarters in Da Nang .* This agenc y

monitored the employment of all wing aircraft an d

allocated resources to specific missions . TADC exercised control through two subordinate organizations,

the tactical air operations center (TAOC) and the

direct air support centers (DASCs).

*The senior agency in the Marine air command and contro l

system normally is the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC).

Since the Seventh Air Force had a TACC in Saigon, the 1st MA W

center used "TADC" as provided for in doctrine . Lieutenant

General Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam ,

1962-1970, " United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May

1971, p. 138 .

Sunlight reflects from a .50 caliber machine gun sticking from the side of a CH-46A

helicopter as it heads out on a late afternoon mission to a unit southwest of An Hoa .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A42167 5

199
200 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The TADC, manned by Marine Air Contro l

Squadron 7 (MACS-7), was the main control cente r

for both antiair warfare and air traffic control . Plotters wrote information from the unit's varipus radars

on vertical display boards from which controllers

maintained positive air traffic control, as well a s

target area air space control . In June, wing control

capabilities significantly increased when MACS-4 arrived to replace MACS-7 . The new unit brough t

with it a new semi-automated, computer-oriente d

TAOC which comprised part of the Marine Tactical

Data System (MTDS). This TAOC permitted th e

wing to handle more than 200 aircraft tracks at th e

same time . When the complete MTDS became

operational on Monkey Mountain on the Tiensh a

Peninsula northeast of Da Nang in July, it provide d

a link with the Navy Tactical Data System of the

Seventh Fleet for instant exchange of air defens e

data with ships operating in the Gulf of Tonkin .

Future plans for the MTDS included a connectio n

with the Air Force Tactical Data System for passing

air defense and air control data instantly fro m

Thailand to Da Nang and naval units in the Tonki n

Gulf.

While the TAOC, collocated with the MTDS an d

a Hawk missile battery on Monkey Mountain, serve d

as the hub of wing control and air defense, th e

DASCs were the main centers of support for ground

units. At the beginning of 1967, three DASCs were

in operation ; one at each of the division headquarters and one at the 3d Marine Division (Forward) Command Post at Dong Ha . Marine Air Support Squadrons (MASS) 2 and 3 provided the

DASCs . Requests for air support, both attack an d

helicopter, passed through battalion and regimenta l

air liaison officers to the DASC at division headquarters; requests from AOs and FACs went directly

to DASC.

The support squadrons also contained the air support radar teams (ASRTs) . During 1967, there wer e

five ASRTs in operation . Located at Chu Lai, D a

Nang, Phu Bai, and Dong Ha (two), each team used

TPQ-10 radar to control aircraft in direct support

missions during low visibility conditions. TPQ-10s

had a 50-mile range, thus the Marine radar coverag e

included almost all of I Corps .

Although their mission was not tactical in nature ,

the Marine air traffic control units (MATCUs) were

vital to the conduct of effective air operations . At all

Marine airfields, the MATCUs provided terminal

traffic control, including landing instructions and

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18998 4

Men from Marine Air Traffic Control Unit 62, a

subordinate unit of MAG-12, operate at the Khe

Sanh airstrip from expeditionary equipment they

have sandbagged against NIA artillery and rockets .

ground-controlled approach data during periods o f

low visibility .

Until the activation of Marine Air Control Grou p

18 on 1 September 1967, the units operating th e

Marine air command and control system were part o f

Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1 . With one

headquarters squadron, two air support squadrons,

two air control squadrons, and two antiaircraft

missile battalions on 1 July 1967, the group was on e

of the largest known to Marine aviation. Its personnel served throughout I Corps, including Chu Lai ,

Phu Bai, Dong Ha, Marble Mountain, Monkey

Mountain, and the Hai Van Pass . '

Throughout 1967 the 1st MAW operated under

the provisions of MACV Aviation Directive 95-4 of

25 June 1966 . This directive gave the commander of

the Seventh Air Force, in his capacity as Deput y

Commander USMACV (Air), the "coordinatin g

authority" for tactical air support in South Vietnam ,

but not actual operational control of Marine air . The

system allowed 1st MAW to meet all of III MAF's air

support requirements while making its excess sortie

capability available to Seventh Air Force for sup -

porting other U .S . and allied forces .

A Memorandum of Agreement between III MAF

and Seventh Air Force guided 1st MAW's air defens e

operations during 1967 . Both services recognized the
SUPPORTING ARMS 20 1

necessity of a unified air defense system in the even t

of a North Vietnamese air attack on South Vietnam .

The agreement gave the Air Force overall air defens e

responsibility, including naming an air defense commander. The 1st MAW designated which of its

forces would participate in air defense and grante d

the Air Force certain authority over those forces, including the scrambling of alert aircraft, designatio n

of targets, declaration of Hawk missile control status,

and firing orders.

Marine commanders were essentally satisfied wit h

the adequacy of these documents. In actual practice ,

1st MAW controlled all air operations in support of

ground units in I Corps while making available 25 to

30 sorties per day to the Seventh Air Force . 2 This

system remained in effect until the advent of "single

management" in early 1968 .

Fixed-Wing Operations

In the absence of enemy aircraft over South Vietnam, the day-to-day mission of the 1st MAW fighte r

and fighter attack squadrons became close air support (CAS) . 3 By long-established doctrinal definition, these air strikes were against targets so close to

friendly forces that each mission required integratio n

with the fire and maneuver plans of the ground combat element. For better coordination and to reduc e

the possibility of friendly casualties, a forward ai r

controller (FAC) with the supported unit or an airborne forward air controller (FAC[A]) controlle d

these strikes .

There were two basic categories of CAS mission ,

preplanned and immediate. A preplanned strike was

the culmination of a complex process. For example ,

a Marine battalion commander with the mission of

taking a specified objective normally would submit a

request for strike aircraft through his air liaison officer the day before the operation began . From the

battalion this request passed through the DASC a t

division and eventually to the wing TADC at D a

Nang . There, the TADC assimilated all requests and

assigned missions to one of the three fixed-win g

groups, depending on the nature of the target and

aircraft type desired for the mission .

As soon as the TADC passed the mission to a

MAG, the group operations officers compared th e

orders with aircraft availability within the group an d

assigned a schedule to each squadron for the following day . Each mission passed by TADC through

group received a mission number, a time on target

(TOT), and a prescribed ordnance load ;* the

squadron scheduling officer merely assigned pilots

and aircraft .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A42181 5

A Marine forward air controller in a small 0-1 observation aircraft checks a target after directing an airstrike on the position by fixed-wing attack aircraft .

At the appropriate time, the aircraft took off and

headed for the target . Once airborne, the fligh t

leader contacted TADC to confirm that his flight

was airborne and proceeding on schedule . Usually

the TADC simply cleared the leader for his origina l

mission, but if a target of higher priority developed ,

the TADC could divert the flight . In this case ,

before entering the new operating area, the leade r

contacted the responsible DASC, which cleared th e

flight to a local controller . Normally this was a division air liaison officer (ALO) or a Marine or Air Forc e

FAC(A) flying over the area of the infantry unit to

be supported .

FAC(A)s in either light observation planes or UH1E helicopters controlled most CAS missions in I

*Colonel John M . Verdi pointed out that this system did not

relieve the squadron commander of his responsibilities. The

squadron commander had to carefully supervise the weight an d

balance of the prescribed load on the aircraft to avoid unnecessary

danger to the crew and aircraft during takeoff and comba t

maneuvering. Col John M. Verdi, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun8 1

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafte r

Verdi Comments.
202 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Corps. During these missions, the airborne con -

troller monitored the ground unit's VHF radio ne t

and directed the attacking aircraft over his UH F

radio. When a flight arrived on station, the FAC informed the pilots* of the target description, elevation, attack heading, direction of pull-out, number

of passes desired, and the number and type of

bombs to be dropped on each pass . He also relayed

the direction and distance to the nearest friendl y

units . The FAC then marked the target with a whit e

phosphorous rocket or a smoke grenade . Once certain that the pilots had identified the correct target ,

the controller cleared the jet for an approach wit h

the phrase " cleared hot." Thus instructed, the fligh t

leader would make the first pass on the marked

target, followed closely by his wingman .

Throughout the strike, the ALO or FAC would rela y

corrections to the attack planes, often directing them

to new targets as the Communist troops maneuvered

or fled.

While preplanned missions required approximately 20 hours from time of request to time o f

delivery, the wing could respond much more quickl y

if necessary. This response was an "immediate mission ." If an emergency developed, the TADC o r

DASCs diverted airborne flights to another target ,

and briefed them en route to the new target . The

TADC also could launch aircraft from one of three

"hot pads. " Each of the three fixed-wing group s

maintained four planes on an around-the-clock aler t

for this type of emergency . Two of the planes at each

group were on primary alert, and the other two

served as a backup in case of another emergency . The

time lapse between notification to launch and until

the on-call aircraft became airborne normally wa s

just under 10 minutes. As soon as a flight of alert aircraft became airborne, another flight replaced it o n

the pad .

Another important aspect of Marine fixed-win g

operations was deep air support . These strikes di d

not take place in the immediate vicinity of friendly

forces and, therefore, did not require integration

with the ground maneuver plan . Deep air support

missions helped isolate the battlefield by destroyin g

enemy reinforcements, support troops, and logisti c

*Colonel John M. Verdi noted that such in-the-clear radio

transmissions also informed enemy monitors of the particulars o f

the mission . This was true of all radio transmissions, ground o r

air, without voice encryption devices, especially during this period

when radio frequencies and call signs did not change on a dail y

basis . Verdi Comments.

resources. If a FAC(A) was available in the objective

area, he controlled the strikes, but his services were

not mandatory because the distance from the targe t

to friendly forces eliminated the chance of accidenta l

bombing. However, pilots of strike aircraft often

preferred to work with a FAC(A) on such missions

because of the latter's greater familiarity with target s

and enemy defenses in the area . 4

The aircraft most frequently selected for close sup -

port missions was the Douglas A-4E Skyhawk . Colonel Jay W. Hubbard's MAG-12 included four A- 4

squadrons . The A-4E was a small, highly

maneuverable, attack jet capable of extremely ac -

curate bombing . The Skyhawk could deliver a variety of ordnance including bombs, rockets, napalm ,

smoke, and 20mm cannon fire . The most significan t

performance limitation of the A-4 was the size of it s

payload, roughly 3,000 pounds. *

The McDonnell F-4B Phantom II was a more versatile aircraft . Four F-4 squadrons operated in Vietnam during 1967, one assigned to Colonel Franklin

C. Thomas, Jr. 's MAG-11, at Da Nang and three

with Colonel Douglas D . Petty, Jr.'s MAG-13 .

Designed to perform the primary air-to-air missio n

and modified to perform a secondary air-to-groun d

mission, the F-4 was one of the fastest interceptors i n

the world, yet it could carry as many as twenty-fou r

500-pound bombs for ground support . ,

Lieutenant Colonel John M . Verdi commented ,

however, that this was a theoretical figure that di d

not reflect the realities of combat . He wrote recently :

. . . the F-4 could be loaded with as many as 24 Mk-8 2

bombs . . . But (1) not an F-4B (unless one elected to g o

with 2,000 pounds less than full internal fuel so as to comply with max gross weight), and (2) not if the target was

anywhere further away than the end of the runway . I

daresay somebody might have hauled such a load in combat (to get his picture taken), but in the real tactical world

the choices came down to TANK-3-6-3-TANK ([as di d

VMFA-] 122 and most USAF units) and 3-3-TANK-3- 3

(most Navy units) . Of course, Brand X [squadrons] did i t

6-3-TANK-3-6, which (1) overloaded the airplane, (2 )

cracked the wing spars, and (3) gave the crew an unmanageable rolling moment in event of failure of one of

those outboard MElts (multiple ejection racks] to release or

jettison (something [the Air Force] found out when they

tried it, which is why they went back to TANK-3-6-3-

TANK. ) 6

*As is common with aircraft, the A-4's practical payload varie d

from as much as 5,000 pounds in the winter monsoon to as littl e

as 2,000 pounds in the heat of summer, assuming a center-line external tank. Verdi comments.
SUPPORTING ARMS 20 3

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2645 3

A large ordnance load and multiple bomb racks made the A-4 Skyhawk, shown here in

the A-4F version entering production in 1967, a mainstay for close air support missions .

Two other types of Marine aircraft available fo r

ground support operations during 1967 were th e

Ling-Temco-Vought F-8E Crusader and the Grumman A6-A Intruder . One squadron of each typ e

served under MAG-11 at Da Nang .

The Crusader carried internally mounted 20mm

cannon and was the only Marine aircraft in Vietna m

configured to carry more than one 2,000-poun d

bomb until the arrival of the A-6A . Because the

F-8Es were originally designed as a high performance

fighter, the Marines phased out these planes and

replaced them with F-4s. 7

The morning of 1 April, VMA(AW)-533, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Williams P . Brown ,

arrived at Chu Lai to become MAG-12's first A-6

squadron.* The A-6A was the only operational U.S.

aircraft that had a self-contained all-weather bombing capability using a moving target indicator.8 It

flew extensive interdiction missions during the monsoon season, not only in South Vietnam, but also i n

Laos and North Vietnam. The Intruder could carry a

heavy bomb load to a target 400 miles away, drop it s

ordnance, and return to base, even during sever e

monsoon conditions.

The increase in heavy ground action in northern I

Corps during the early months of 1967 brought

demands for many more close and direct air support

missions in that region . The heavy fighting at Khe

Sanh in late April and early May provided a classi c

*Lieutenant Colonel Howard Wolf's VMA(AW)-242, also flying the A-6A and part of MAG-11, had arrived in Vietnam on 1

November 1966 .

example of integrated employment of modern ,

fixed-wing aviation in support of ground maneuve r

elements . In the two weeks of bitter fighting for

Hills 881 North and South, the 1st MAW flew more

than 1,000 sorties for Marine infantry units. The

defeat of the enemy on this critical terrain was th e

product of skillful and closely coordinated air -

ground action.

As the enemy continued to focus on northern

Quang Tri Province, Marine aviation, from 2 Jun e

under the command of Major General Norman J.

Anderson, increased the tempo of attack operations

there. Primary targets were enemy artillery an d

rocket sites, a major threat to allied units and installations along the DMZ . By July, intelligence officers had identified approximately 130 sites, including weapons as large as 152mm gun-howitzers .

The heaviest raids against these positions occurred

during and after the battle for Con Thien, whe n

Marine aircraft participated in joint operations called

Headshed, Neutralize, and Eradicate . These operations received the acronym SLAM, for searching ,

locating, annihilating, and monitoring . This concept used the entire spectrum of supporting fire :

B-52s, tactical air, artillery, and naval gunfire .

Elements of the Seventh Air Force, Strategic Ai r

Command, Seventh Fleet, Vietnamese Air Force ,

Marine and Army artillery, and 1st MAW concentrated on destroying the enemy fire support positions . By the end of the year, the effort destroye d

less than 40 of the NVA weapons .

While the majority of the 1st MAW's out-of-
204 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department ofDefense Photo (USMC) A422400-B

General purpose bombs hang from the wings of an A-6A Intruder from VMA(AW/)-242

and an F-4B Phantom II from VMFA-542 enroute on a scheduled mission in Vietnam.

country missions were in the DMZ area, Marine

pilots also participated in strikes against North Vietnam. These strikes involved the six areas of North

Vietnam which planners called "route packages . "

Route Package I was immediately north of the DMZ ;

Route Package VI lay in the extreme north of the

country . Bombing of the southern portion of Route

Package I, codenamed "Tally Ho"and under the control of Seventh Air Force, began in July 1966 . By the

winter of 1967, Tally Ho missions ceased as a

separate entity; strikes in the area thereafter fell

within the overall interdiction campaign . 9

The Seventh Air Force's retaliatory Rollin g

Thunder raids, initiated in March 1965, expanded t o

include high intensity interdiction missions durin g

1967 . On 18 May 1967, VMA(AW)-242 participated

in the first Rolling Thunder strike in Route Packag e

VI (Hanoi/Haiphong). 10 The other A-6A squadron ,

VMA(AW)-533, kept just as active . The

sophisticated electronic equipment and superb all -

weather capability of the Intruder made it an ideal

aircraft for attacks against attractive, but heavily

defended, North Vietnamese targets.

Because of the A-6's all-weather capability, 1st

MAW reduced the enemy's antiaircraft effectivenes s

by flying most Marine Rolling Thunder missions a t

night and as single-aircraft missions." During the

strikes, the attack pilots relied upon assistance fro m

their fellow Marines from VMCJ-1 . EF-10Bs and EA -

6As of VMCJ-1, the same basic aircraft as the A-6As,

carried equipment for electronic countermeasure

missions ; they carried no ordnance .12 During the

raids, the EF-10Bs or EA-6s orbited beyond North

Vietnamese surface-to-air missile range and jammed

the enemy's fire control radar while the attacking Intruders made their target runs. Because of .their

lighter equipment load, the EA-6As could remai n

on station longer than the attack aircraft, an ideal

situation for superior electronic countermeasure raid

protection . Prime targets for Rolling Thunder missions were bridges, fuel facilities, rolling stock, airfields, missile sites, and supply lines. *

In addition to close and deep air support missions ,

Marine fixed-wing squadrons conducted a variety o f

less dramatic, but equally important, tasks such a s

landing zone (LZ) preparation . These operations illustrated the then prevalent Marine Corps concep t

that the helicopter was a mode of transportation, no t

an attack aircraft . The 1st Wing provided fixed-wing

support for helicopter assaults of contested landing

zones . Prior to and during these landings, Marine at -

tack aircraft would strike the objective area to clea r

obstacles and neutralize possible antiaircraft threats .

As the troop-carrying helicopters entered the zone ,

the covering jet pilots would shift their attacks to ter -

rain around the LZ from which the enemy could op -

*After the NVA' s deployment of missiles in the DMZ area i n

April, electronic countermeasure EA-6As and older EF-10B Sky

Knights remained airborne over the area to. counter this threat .

Their effectiveness limited Marine aircraft losses to only tw o

missile kills during 1967 .
SUPPORTING ARMS 20 5

cargo . Such varied missions required great flying

skill, especially those into Khe Sanh and Dong Ha .

Flying into Khe Sanh under visual flight rules an d

into Dong Ha with its dust and short runway wer e

routine but far from dull missions for VMGR-15 2

pilots. 1 3

VMCJ-l's version of the Phantom II, the RF-4B ,

equipped with camels in the nose, performed a

variety of photo-reconnaissance missions for 1st

MAW. These aircraft also contributed directly to th e

defense of Da Nang, as described by one of th e

squadron's commanders, Major Edgar J. Love :

3d MarDiv ComdC, September 196 7

Cargo parachutes stream from the rear of one of

VMGR-152 's KC-130s bringing supplies to the Kh e

Sanh combat base in September 1967 after enemy

activity closed the only road leading to the base .

pose the landing . These strikes not only protecte d

the helicopters, but also shielded the first infantry

waves during the critical, early phase of the landing .

Other Marine fixed-wing pilots contributed immeasurably to the overall air effort, even thoug h

they never fired a shot or dropped a bomb . Some

flew the C-117Ds assigned to the headquarters of th e

aircraft groups . These C-117D missions varied from

routine logistics support to dropping flares ove r

friendly forces at night. Another group of transport

pilots came from VMGR-152 . The squadron's

Lockheed KC-130 Hercules provided extensive an d

varied support for both III MAF and 1st MAW.

Though VMGR-152's home base remained at MCA S

Futema, Okinawa, the squadron maintained a

detachment of at least four planes on a rotational

basis at Da Nang . The Marine transport's 30,000- to

35,000-pound cargo load, depending on mission

range, served many varied logistic requirements . The

130s flew diversified missions such as in-flight

refueling of jets, paradropping of bulk lots of am -

munition and supplies, flare drops, and even servic e

as airborne DASCs; as well as for daily, routine

shipments of hundreds of passengers and tons of

. . . after the second rocket attack on Da Nang, 14 July

1967, the RF-4B played a major role in helping to keep th e

VC from launching rockets within the 12,000 meter ring

[around the base] . Through use of its sensors, the RF-4B

was able to [monitor] a fairly large area on a daily basis

from about 5 miles north of Da Nang to about 20 mile s

south and from the sea on the east to some 30 miles in -

land . When it was determined that the various [enemy ]

teams transporting rockets were converging into a centra l

area, harassing fires or air strikes (including B-52s) wer e

directed into these areas. It was a coordinated effort of

reconnaissance patrols, artillery, air strikes, and airborn e

reconnaissance . As a side light, Major Richard W .

Hawthorne and Captain Richard R. Kane, while flying on e

The sun rises beneath the nose of a venerable C-11 7

at the Ky Ha airfield at the Chu Lai combat base i n

February. This particular aircraft had logged over

15,000 hours in the air and still performed reliably .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421604
206 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421998

Cpl William H. Mielke (top) and LCpI Phillip J.

Orlando of Headquarters and Maintenance

Squadron 36 repair the AD20-8 engine of their

squadron's C-117D at Phu Bai on 30 December.

of these many reconnaissance flights, crashed in

September 1967 and were declared missing .* "

Helicopter Operation s

The Vietnam War was the first conflict in history

to involve large-scale employment of helicopte r

forces. This "Cavalry of the Sky" provided the allie s

with the advantages of mobility and staying powe r

which negated much of the advantage held by a n

already elusive enemy . To the infantryman the

helicopter was more than a tactical expedient ; it was

a part of his life. Helicopters carried him into battle ,

provided him with life and fire support, and rushe d

him to the hospital if he were sick or wounded .

At the beginning of 1967, MAGs-16 and -36 and

the SLF had a total of 11 helicopter squadron s

operating in South Vietnamese air space . Of these ,

eight were transport squadrons flying either th e

Sikorsky UH-34D, a Vietnam veteran since early

1962, or the relatively new and larger Boeing-Vertol

CH-46A. The other three squadrons were observation squadrons equipped with the highl y

*The Marine Corps later administratively declared both officer s

legally dead . The determination occurred on 28 November 197 8

for Hawthorne and 26 February 1980 for Kane .

maneuverable, single-engined Bell UH-1E . *

The Marines used helicopters for five basic missions: tactical airlift of troops, insertion and extraction of reconnaissance teams, supply, downed aircraft recovery, and search and rescue . The helicopter

groups frequently supported more than a dozen major ground operations during a given month . The 1st

MAW maintained direct control of the helicopter

groups, issuing orders to them on the basis of the

ground units' daily needs. The air request and allotment chain of command was basically the same as for

fixed-wing squadrons. While the daily schedule

covered routine missions, many unforeseeable situations occurred, such as medical evacuations,

emergency extractions, and downed aircraft . To deal

with these contingencies, the squadrons kept a section of helicopters on strip alert, normally either one

UH-34 or CH-46 transport and one armed UH-1E t o

fly "chase . "

"Medevac" and emergency extractions were

especially critical because lives depended on th e

quick and effective response of the helicopter crews .

Most of these missions occurred when friendly force s

were in close contact with the enemy ; in such cases ,

ground fire in the landing zone was almost a certainty. Even with the jet and armed helicopter escort ,

rescue helicopters rarely departed the landing zone

without sustaining hits from enemy fire . Thes e

flights usually took place over extremely rugged ter -

rain, which gave the pilots problems in even findin g

the landing zone . MAG-16 and -36 squadrons flew

these missions daily. The skill and courage of the

helicopter crews were the major factors enablin g

nearly 99 percent of the wounded evacuees to survive .'s

A major factor in the success of these missions wa s

the presence of UH-1E "gunships . " Assigned to the

observation squadrons (VMOs), the UH-lEs functioned in a number of roles . The armed version, or

gunship, carried four fuselage-mounted, electricall y

fired M-60 machine guns and two 19-round rocke t

packs . Gunships flew escort and close air support

missions and also served as command and contro l

*VMO squadrons each rated 12 light helicopters in 1965 an d

the Marine Corps had obtained UH-lEs based on this figure . The

scarcity of suitable fixed-wing observation planes resulted in further procurement, so that by 1967 UH- lEs were the only aircraft

assigned to the three VMOs in Vietnam . By December of that

year, each squadron had between 21 and 27 UH-lEs available .

This interim measure continued until the arrival of the long -

awaited OV-10 in 1968 .
SUPPORTING ARMS 20 7

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421708

A Navy flight deck crewman on the USS Okinawa (LPH 3) signals the pilot of a Marin e

UH-1E that he is cleared for take offin support of Operation Beau Charger, Special Lan -

ding Force Alpha's assist to Operation Hickory against NVA forces below the DMZ .

"birds" for airborne forward air controllers as well as

senior ground commanders . Each division commander had a permanently assigned helicopter;

regimental and battalion commanders used others

on an "as available" basis .

In the FAC(A) mode, one rocket pack carrie d

white phosphorous marking rockets, the other contained high explosive missiles . In a clean, unarmed

configuration, appropriately referred to as a "slick, "

the aircraft could carry seven to nine fully equippe d

troops . "Slicks" also performed administrative and

transport missions such as VIP flights .

An incident occurred in southern Quang Ngai

Province in late 1967 which demonstrated both the

firepower of the armed UH-1E and the tenacity ,

skill, and courage of Marine gunship crews . On 19

August, Captain Stephen W. Pless, a VMO-6 gun -

ship pilot, was flying chase for an emergency

medevac mission when he heard over the radio net o f

another emergency situation . Pless learned that four

U .S . Army soldiers were stranded on a beach nort h

of Duc Pho and were about to be overwhelmed by a

large Viet Cong force . Breaking off from his original

mission, the Huey pilot flew to the scene . On arrival ,

Pless saw about 50 VC in the open ; some were

bayoneting and beating the Americans. He swept in

1 stLt Jack H. McCracken, a helicopter pilot with

HMM-165, escaped serious injury during a resupply

mission in Quang Ngai province when th e

.30-caliber round he holds smashed into his cockpit

and lodged in the hard rubber heel of hir left boot.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A423001
208 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A42206 8

The terror of a helicopter medevac flight under fire shows on the faces of a wounde d

Marine, Cpl Larry R. Miklos (center) and an unidentified Navy hospital corpsman as

they watch an enemy machine gun shooting toward their helicopter on 1 September .

on the VC, killing and wounding many and drivin g

the survivors back into a treeline . He made his rocket

and machine gun attacks at such low levels that

fragments from his own ordnance pelted the gunship . Though still under heavy small arms fire, Pless

landed his gunship between the Communists in th e

treeline and the wounded soldiers. His two enliste d

crewmen, Gunnery Sergeant Leroy N. Poulson and

Lance Corporal John G. Phelps, leaped out of th e

helicopter and raced through enemy fire to help the

wounded men .

Captain Rupert E. Fairfield, Jr ., the co-pilot, killed three of the nearest VC with a burst from a M-6 0

machine gun, then ran to help Poulson and Phelp s

drag the soldiers to the aircraft. Captain Pless

hovered his UH-1E and sent streams of machine gun

fire into the Viet Cong positions in the treeline .

Under cover of his fire, the three crewmen pulled th e

wounded soldiers into the helicopter. Pless heade d

the dangerously overloaded aircraft out to sea . Four

times the helicopter settled into the water . Each time

Captain Pless skipped it back into the air . While the

crew threw out all unnecessary gear to lighten th e

craft, Pless jettisoned the rocket pods . Gradually,

the UH-1E gained altitude and limped back to the

1st Hospital Company's landing pad at Chu Lai . In

addition to rescuing the Americans, the crew received credit for killing a confirmed total of 20 VC and

probably killed another 38 . Fairfield, Poulson, an d

Phelps each received the Navy Cross; Captain Pless

The Da Nang press center provides the location fo r

this photograph taken during a news conference o n

26 August following the dramatic flight that earned

VMO-6's Capt Stephen W. Pless (second from left)

his Medal of Honor. Others of the UH-1E crew, LCpI

John G. Phelps, Capt Rupert E. Fairfield, Jr., and

GySgt Leroy N. Poulson, received the Navy Cross.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189212
SUPPORTING ARMS 209

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37041 2

A smoke grenade marks the landing zone as a member of a helicopter support teambrings in a CH-34D with supplies for the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines in Operation Shelby .

received the Medal of Honor, the first awarded to a

member of the 1st MAW for action in Vietnam . *

While the armed helicopters participated in man y

dramatic exploits, the yeoman's share of the

workload fell to the transport helicopters, th e

UH-34s and the CH-46s. In March of 1966, the 1st

Marine Aircraft Wing's tactical/logistical airlift

capability significantly increased with the arrival o f

the CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter. It could carry a

four-man crew and 17-20 combat-loaded troops, o r

4,000 pounds of cargo, in contrast to the five t o

seven troops, or 1,500-pound lift capacity of the aging UH-34 . The twin-engined, tandem-rotor

transport had a retractable tail ramp, a 115-mil e

combat radius, and a top speed of about 145 knots .

The Sea Knight was the only Marine helicopter i n

*In addition to the Medal of Honor, Captain Pless, who flew

over 700 combat missions in two tours in Vietnam, earned th e

Silver Star Medal, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Bronze Star

Medal, 32 Air Medals, the Navy Commendation Medal, the

Korean Order of Military Merit, and the Purple Heart . After

returning to the U.S., this colorful Marine aviator died in a tragic

motorcycle crash at Pensacola, Florida, in 1969 . See Appendix D

for Captain Pless' Medal of Honor citation .

Vietnam armed with two .50-caliber machine guns. *

The arrival of another aircraft in 1967 further improved Marine helicopter capabilities . On 8 January ,

a four-plane detachment of CH-53A Sea Stallion s

from HMH-463 joined MAG-16 at Marble Mountain . They were the first increment of a phased

replacement of the obsolescent CH-37s . By the end

of the year, 36 of the big CH-53s operated in I

Corps. These twin-turbine, single-rotor assault

transports could carry an impressive internal cargo o f

8,000 pounds, but more significantly the "53A" had

a six-ton external lift capability which permitted battlefield salvage of disabled UH-34Ds and CH-46s .

By the end of 1967, Marine Sea Stallions had retrieved more than 120 damaged aircraft which avoide d

*Major General Norman J . Anderson has cautioned that ther e

was a greater complexity behind this simple statement about tw o

.50-caliber machine guns on helicopters . This became standard ,

replacing the .30-caliber," he wrote, "only after extensive experience proved the need for the range and impact of the heavier

weapon . Issues such as this, and there were many in the ordnance

and engineering areas, were important and should not b e

[overlooked] or you create the impression that aviation saile d

through the war without problems." MajGen Norman). Anderson, Comments on draft ms, 10Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file ,

MCHC, Washington, D.C.).
210 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A37057 5

Infantrymen lean forward against the rotor wash and rush forward to unload supplies

from a CH-46A Sea Knight helicopter in the 1st Marine Division's Operation Citrus.

destroying them in place. Troop lift and ambulanc e

capabilities also increased with the Sea Stallions' arrival ; normal loads were 37 combat troops or 24 litters. Fully loaded, the aircraft could accomplish missions at ranges up to 200 miles at a comfortabl e

cruise speed of 120 knots .

The arrival of the "Super Bird," as the Marines

quickly nicknamed the CH-53, was providential . In

September III MAF grounded all CH-46s followin g

several unexplained crashes. An on-site investigation, conducted by a joint Naval Air Systems Command/Boeing Vertol accident investigation team ,

revealed that structural failures were occurring in th e

area of the after pylon .* The team recommended

structural and systems modifications to reinforce the

rear rotor mount, as well as the installation of an indicator to detect excessive strain on critical parts of

the aircraft.

*Lieutenant General Louis Metzger, a former assistant divisio n

commander of the 3d Marine Division, recently wrote his recollections of the grounding of the CH-46s : "Several CH-46s had gone

down in flight before this . One was observed by an assistant air officer of the 3d Marine Division, a major [who was an] aviator . He

had described seeing the tail fly off a CH-46 in flight . However, it

is believed that [because of] a desire to accord the lost cre w

members the honor of dying in combat rather than in an accident ,

this observation was ignored . It wasn't until the accidents occured

as stated in the text, that the CH-46s were grounded . LtGen Louis

Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981) (Vietnam Commen t

file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)

The entire modification program, requiring approximately 1,000 man-hours per aircraft, occurre d

in three phases: (1) disassembly of the aircraft, (2 )

incorporation of the modifications, and (3)

Aviation personnel at Dong Ha on 16January look

over one of the huge CH-53s from HMH-463 only

eight days after the first detachment of four of the

new helicopters arrived in South Vietnam for servic e

with MAG-16 at the air facility at Marble Mountain .

3d MarDiv ComdC, January 1967
SUPPORTING ARMS 21 1

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 196 7

A CH-53, the Marine Corps ' largest and most powerful helicopter, retrieves a UH-34 downed in a mission to the Con Thien combat base in December.

reassembly and flight tests. Marines performed

phases one and three; Boeing Vertol personnel completed phase two . Okinawa served as the principal

modification site because it was the nearest secur e

Marine base which could provide both adequate

facilities and skilled civilian workers . The program

modified 80 aircraft at MCAF Futema, Okinawa ,

while the remaining 25 aircraft, already undergoin g

normal overhaul in Japan, received their modifications there .

The Marines of HMM-262, commanded by Lieu -

tenant Colonel Gregory A . Corliss, detached from

the SLF to perform the Marine portion of the work .

On 11 October, the Marines unloaded 40 CH-46s at

Futema, and disassembly began immediately . Five

days later, 114 Boeing Vertol specialists began phas e

two . By the end of December, the program had

modified 89 aircraft and began phasing them back

to the squadrons. The remaining 16 aircraft completed the modification program in February 1968 .

Until the 46s returned, III MAF lost approximately half its tactical/ logistic airlift capability and had t o

find replacement helicopters . As soon as the Marine

Corps learned the seriousness of the CH-46s' defect,

it rushed 23 UH-34s from the United States by carg o

planes . They arrived on 15 October and immediatel y

entered battle, often flown by pilots from the downed CH-46 squadrons . Ten additional CH-53s

entered the wing's inventory to further augment the

lift capability in Vietnam . Finally, 31 U.S . Army

UH-lDs of the 190th Aviation Company joine d

General Anderson 's forces at Phu Bai until the Sea

Knights returned to flight status. 16

The shifting of additional ground forces into the

northern two provinces of I Corps during the fall of

1967 increased the tempo of helicopter operations .

During this period, the two main areas of enemy activity were the DMZ and the Que Son Basin south of

Da Nang, but as combat to the north intensified ,

MAG-36 at Chu Lai found itself further and further

from the scene of Marine ground operations . As a

result, General Anderson ordered MAG-36 to Ph u

Bai where it could better support 3d Marine Divisio n

operations. The first squadron, VMO-6, relocated on

4 October and 11 days later Colonel Frank E. Wilson

displaced his group headquarters from Ky Ha to Ph u

Bai. The next day, Colonel Wilson took ove r

VMO-3, HMM-164, HMM-362, and MATCUs-6 2

and -68 from Colonel Edwin O . Reed's MAG-16 . At

the same time, HMM-265, a MAG-36 CH-4 6

squadron at Marble Mountain, passed to Colone l

Reed's command . On 30 October, another UH-34

A CH-46A from HMM-164 lands on 2 March 196 7

to pick up infantrymen from the 3d Battalion, 4th

Marines engaged in Operation Prairie II north of

Cam Lo, while an escort helicopter circles overhead.

3d MarDiv ComdC, March 1967
212 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 18979 1

CH-34Ds, the mainstay of transport helicopter operations following grounding of th e

CH-46s for structural problems, land infantrymen in a dry paddy for Operation Essex.

squadron, HMM-163, joined MAG-36 from the US S

Okinawa (LPH 3) and moved to the new airfield a t

Quang Tri .* By the end of the month, MAG-36 occupied its new home ; only HMM-165 remained at

Ky Ha, until space became available at Phu Bai in

November. The relocation of MAG-36 proved to b e

*Before joining the SLF, HMM-163 had been at Phu Bai as par t

of MAG-16 . LtCol Horace A. Bruce, Comments on draft ms,

14Jul81 (Vietnarn Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

A CH-46A takes offafter bringing supplies to an infantry unit on a hill top somewhere in Vietnam .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A370584

a wise decision, as events of early 1968

demonstrated.

Operational statistics indicate the sharply increased scale of Marine helicopter squadrons' efforts i n

Vietnam during 1967 . The sorties rate increased b y

more than 20 percent over that of 1966 . In 1967, 1st

MAW helicopters flew 510,595 sorties, carryin g

628,486 personnel and 70,651 tons of cargo .

Artillery

In January of 1967, the Marines had the entir e

family of Marine Corps artillery—light, medium ,

and heavy—in I Corps . The method of employment

of these weapons differed little from World War II

and Korea: direct support of a specific unit or

general support of divisional units .

Division-level light artillery, the 4.2-inch mortar

or the 107mm M30 mortar and the 105mm M101A 1

howitzer, provided direct support of infantry units.

Division Medium artillery, the 155mm M114A 1

howitzer (towed) and the 155mm M109 selfpropelled (SP) howitzer, were the general support

weapons.* Force artillery elements attached to th e

*The Marine Corps replaced 155mm M114Als in the Marine

divisional artillery regiments with the 155mm M109/SP just

before the the Vietnam conflict . As the need for more artillery

developed, the Marine Corps shipped the old towed weapons t o

Vietnam and formed provisional batteries. Personnel and required equipment came from artillery battalions already there .

Ironically, the older M114A1 enhanced the overall mobility of the

divisional 155mm capability . The heavy tracked M109/SP wa s

essentially roadbound and served in a " fortress artillery " role ,

while the lighter M114A1 could move both by helicopter and

truck .
Marine Artillery Capabilities

WEAPONS RANGE

(meters)

WEIGHT

(pounds)

SUSTAINED

RATE OF FIR E

PER MINUTE

PRIME MOVER

EFFECTIVE AREA O F

BURST : METERS ,

ONE ROUND

AMMUNITI

TYPES

AVAILABLE

FUZES

AVAILABLE

DEPJH WIDT H

105mm How

Towe d

M101A1

11,000 4,980 3

Hel o

2'A-ton truck

20 30

Q, D

T i

V T

CP

155mm Ho w

Towe d

M114A1

14,600 12,950 1

Hel o

5-ton truck

30 50

H E

H E

Ilium

w P

Smok e

RA P

Gas

Nuclear

Q, D

T i

V T

CP

155mm Ho w

(SP)

M109A1

14,600 53,060 1 S P

8" How

(SP)

M110

16,800 58,500 0 .5 SP 30 80

HE

spot

Gas

Nuclear

Q, D

T i

VT

CP

155mm Gu n

(

SP

)

M53

23,500 96,000 0 .5 SP 30 50

Q

107mm Mort

M30

5,656 671 15-20

Hel o

'/.-ton truck

30 30

Iliu m

wp

Gas

Q, D

T i

VT
214 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A421672

A maintenance team from HMM-165 rigs a hoist sling to a CH-46A sitting in a mountain stream northwest of Chu Lai on 12 May . Enemy ground fire had set the aircraft on

fire andthe pilot, Capt James F. Pleva, force-landed in the stream, dousing the flames .

artillery regiments provided increased range an d

delivery capabilities.' ? Force artillery included th e

155mm M53 self-propelled gun and the 8-inch M5 5

self-propelled howitzer . The Marine Corps replace d

the M55 during the year with the new M110 selfpropelled model.

Although the basic techniques of artillery employment in Vietnam differed little from those use d

elsewhere, local circumstances required certai n

refinements. Probably the most difficult problem

facing Marine artillerymen and the infantry the y

supported was the need to minimize civilia n

casualties and property destruction, while still furnishing adequate fire support . Strongly worded

MACV directives, further amplified by instruction s

from III MAF and the divisions, enjoined restraint

and careful fire planning . These required carefu l

selection of helicopter landing zones and schedulin g

artillery and air strikes with the goal of keeping bot h

Marine and civilian casualties at the lowest possibl e

level, especially in heavily populated areas such as

those around Da Nang . Firing into populated areas ,

using reconnaissance by fire, and planning harassment and interdiction fires presented significan t

problems . The Marine artillerymen continuall y

balanced the possible tactical advantages against th e

danger to long-term pacification goals . When

Marine units planned operations in coordinatio n

with Vietnamese province and district chiefs, a

liaison officer from the Marines or a Marine or Arm y

advisor stayed at the district headquarters to cool.-

An unidentified Marine helicopter crewman smoke s

a cigarette beside his M-60 machine gun mount during a quiet flight in a CH-53A in December 1967 .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A370848
38,703 rounds

III MAF

commenc e

authorize d

firing into

on 25 Februar y

DMZ.

1967 to

9,081

rounds

e

LY,°,'~~

rK~~

Ytr~i~T~

FF~~: iw t . --

=3 +

?4a` " .idl ii:' git sal t:,

yam,#~x~

fti

l

t

!

?I, y
216 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A370303

Bystanders cover their ears on 25 June as MajGen Donn J. Robertson, the commanding

general of the 1st Marine Division, fires from a self-propelled 155mm howitzer th e

30,000th artillery round shot by the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines in the Vietnam War .

dinate fire support, as well as other aspects of th e

operations . ARVN liaison officers performed a

similar function at American headquarters . *

These operational considerations, formalized as

rules of engagement, were necessary restrictions but

did not deprive any American unit of the right to de -

fend itself against hostile action . Though plannin g

helped to avoid the problem of noncombatant

casualties, sound judgment during operations by

both field commanders and fire support centers remained the final determinant.

Another technique of fire coordination, the "sava-plane," appeared because of the crowded air space

over Vietnam, particularly over Route 1 along the

coast of I Corps . Any artillery unit operating near the

road contended with innumerable aircraft flyin g

through its zone of action. The competition for

space to shoot and space to fly was a constan t

headache for both participants. The 1st MAW considered the established practice of restrictive fire

planning too burdensome because of the episodi c

nature of artillery firing . As a result, III MAF introduced the sav-a-plane system as a technique for

keeping friendly aircraft safe from allied artillery

while, at the same time, permitting liberal use o f

both arms .

.*Forty Marines augmented the U .S . Army advisory staff with

the ARVN in I Corps during 1967 .

Sav-a-plane was simply a radio procedure whic h

told a pilot where and when artillery or naval gunfire

was shooting . From that point on, it was the individual pilot's responsibility to stay clear of the firing area . When a battalion or regimental fire sup -

port coordination center (FSCC) initiated a sav-aplane, the message went to the division

FSCC/DASC for broadcast to all pilots in the area .

The elements of a sav-a-plane transmission included

target area, location of the firing unit, time of firing ,

and maximum trajectory ordinate . Though the

system was not foolproof, artillery and naval gunfire

hit very few, if any, aircraft . *

Supplemental safeguards to the sav-a-plane

system included air sentries at battery positions and ,

whenever possible, collocation of the artillery liaiso n

officers with infantry battalion forward air controllers . The latter technique ensured that all

*"I don 't know that any aircraft has ever been hit by artillery

fire," commented Colonel Edwin S . Schick, a former commander

of the 12th Marines. "There was some talk that an Army outfit did

hit a plane . . . . So long as the proper fusing is maintained . . .

[and the] coordination principle of the restrictive fire plan i s

adhered to, no harm will come to our air brethren ." Col Edwin S .

Schick, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 11Jun81 (Vietnam Comment

file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.) Current doctrine does not include the sav-a-plane concept . Statistical studies support the "bi g

sky-small bullet " principle by indicating very little probability o f

artillery hitting an aircraft in flight .
SUPPORTING ARMS 21 7

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18915 8

Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, listens as Co l

William L. Dick, commander of the 4th Marines, points to explosions on a nearby hill

demonstrating artillery support available to his regiment from the 12th Marines . The

latter was one of the largest artillery regiments ever fielded under Marine command .

elements kept abreast of artillery firing and also permitted immediate response for lifting or shifting o f

fires .

The employment of individual batteries in Vietnam differed from all previous American war experiences. A single battery often provided the sup -

port normally expected from an artillery battalion .

The individual 105mm and the provisional 155m m

towed batteries possessed the capability to deploy to

widely separated positions, each with its own fire direction and communication capability . Each battery

maintained its own 360-degree (6,400 mills to artillerymen) firing capability . Often the battery fire

direction center coordinated its own reinforcing fire s

and those of nearby ARVN artillery as well . Marine

artillery batteries also made increased use of

helicopter displacement. This practice required battery personnel to break down the guns, section gear ,

and ammunition into helicopter-transportable load s

on short notice . These procedures required greater

versatify of artillerymen in Vietnam than in th e

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A370317 Korean War and World War II .

The fire direction center of Battery G, 3d Battalion, Traditional unit descriptions provided misleading

11th Marines receives and computes a fire mission . indicators of artillery capabilities in Vietnam . When
218 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A80097 0

A Marine M-98 107mm "Howtar, " a 4.2-inch heavy mortar mounted on a 75mm pack -

howitzer chassis, awaits a fire mission in support of the Special Landing Force in Operation Deckhouse VI, a subsidiary of Task Force X-Ray's Operation Desoto near Duc Pho .

the tactical situation dictated, the 3d Marine Division, for example, formed provisional batteries usin g

a mix of artillery calibers. At times these were close r

to being "mini-battalions" than conventional batteries. Such practices in task organization also affected the artillery battalions ; at times they assumed

the size of "mini-regiments."' a

Fast and accurate response traditionally provide d

the measure of good artillery support . If contact appeared imminent, the infantry battalion's forward

observer notified the FDC, where chart operators

prepared to plot the mission while the computer

stood ready to provide gun data . The artillery liaison

officer in the battalion FSCC then could arrange for

a sav-a-plane to avoid losing time in gettin g

clearance to fire . As the same time, word passed t o

the gun crews of the impending mission . To ensure

accuracy of firing data, both the battery and battalion FDCs computed the fire missions, providing a

double check on the information sent to the guns.

In July 1967, a new piece of equipment, the M1 8

Field Artillery Digtal Computer (FADC), arrived a t

artillery battalion FDCs. Prior to its arrival, th e

Marines manually computed all firing data computations. FADC was supposed to accelerate the process

of providing the batteries with accurate firing dat a

and decrease the time between the initial request

and the impact of the first round on the target .

FADC did not favorably impress either Colonel

Edwin S . Schick, Jr., or Lieutenant Colonel Clayto n

V. Hendricks, who respectively commanded th e

12th and 11th Marines. Colonel Schick noted that " a

well-disciplined and trained fire direction team

[would] out perform [FADC] with speed, reliability ,

and all-weather capability . . . and no materia l

failures." Lieutenant Colonel Hendricks re -

membered that the 11th Marines continued to compute manually and used FADC only as a check o n

the results. However, those doing the manua l

calculations often had to wait on FADC. In addition, FADC depended upon electricity from

undependable power generators."

On-call fires provided another means used to

reduce reaction time. When an infantry uni t

operated in enemy-controlled areas, preplotted on -

call fires along the route of advance were commo n

practice . To execute the mission, the artilleryme n

used previously prepared firing data . Last minut e

clearance was the only requirement before firing th e

mission . Marines often resolved such delays b y

employing a long-term umbrella or area type sav-aplane which permitted the battalion FSCC to retai n

local firing control . In such cases, they did not nee d

higher-level firing clearance . On-call preparations,
SUPPORTING ARMS 21 9

"almost instant artillery," were particularly effectiv e

as a counter to meeting engagements and ambushes .

Other uses of artillery involved flushing th e

enemy from concealed positions, denying his use o f

escape routes, and deceiving him as to the directio n

of attack. Night employment included illumination

of avenues of approach, harassing and interdictio n

fires, and navigational orientation for friendly

elements. The Marines also used jungle application s

dating back to the island campaigns of World War

II . A lost patrol could reorient itself by requesting a

marking round on a nearby, grid line intersection .

Another common jungle technique was the use o f

artillery fire to guide units toward their objectives.

Following the advancing fire by only a few hundred

meters, the infantry worked their way forward whil e

the artillery forward observer adjusted the firing t o

suit the situation .

The Sting Ray concept represented a novel innovation which blended maximum use of supportin g

arms and the talents of III MAF's reconnaissance personnel. As III MAF initiated large-unit operations

beyond assigned TAORs, and as TAORs increased i n

size to accommodate the operational tempo, reconnaissance teams operated at ever increasing range s

from their battalion command posts . The lightl y

The crew of a 105mm howitzer from Battery C, 4th

Battalion, 12th Marines, prepares to respond to a fire

mission in support of infantrymen engaged in

Operation Chinook about 12 miles north of Hue .

3d MarDiv ComdC, January 1967

armed and equipped teams usually landed by

helicopter at points near their operational areas an d

then moved stealthily to a designated observatio n

post. Their primary mission was to gather intelligence in areas of suspected heavy enemy movement, but the Marines was soon learned the teams

could call in artillery fire and air strikes and remain

undetected by the enemy . This led to the evolution

of Sting Ray which caused substantial enemy

casualties at the risk of a very few Marines. Enemy

troops, away from the main battle areas, relaxed ,

and feeling relatively safe, moved with less cautio n

and often concentrated in large numbers. , Alert

Sting Ray teams exacted a heavy toll on unwar y

Communist units by hitting them with accurate artillery fire and precision air strikes.

For the Sting Ray teams, artillery served both as a

defensive and an offensive weapon . If the enemy

detected the team, artillery provided a ring of fir e

around its position while helicopters moved in for

the rescue . Though enemy units hotly conteste d

many extractions a surprisingly large number o f

Sting Ray teams escaped with only minor casualties ,

while Communist losses multiplied greatly from th e

heavy concentration of fire . To overrun a Sting Ray

position, the Communists had to concentrate their

forces; as soon as helicopters extracted the team, the

abandoned site became a killing zone . When the North Vietnamese sent large units

across the DMZ during the fall of 1966, mor e

American artillery units moved into the region, including the U .S . Army's 2d Battalion, 94th Artiller y

with its 175mm self-propelled guns. These heavy

weapons, with a range of 32,700 meters, added a

new dimension to III MAF artillery support. By

March of 1967 the 11th and 12th Marines provide d

artillery coverage from the Gulf of Tonkin to Lao s

and substantially reduced enemy freedom of movement.

The U.S . Army's ist Battalion, 40th Artillery also

arrived to reinforce Marine artillery during 1967 . Its

M108 self-propelled 105mm howitzers had a

360-degree traverse capability and could respon d

rapidly to calls for fire from any direction . In

recognition of its quick response and rapid rate o f

fire, the 3d Division Marines called the 40th's Battery A "Automatic Alpha . "

Artillery strength further increased in I Corps during 1967 following the arrival of the 1st Battalion ,

13th Marines ; the 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor

Company (105mm howitzers); the 5th 155mm Gun
220 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189143

Battery A, 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery, one of several Army units sent north to provide

needed artillery reinforcements to III MAP, fires a 175mm gun into the A Shau valley in

Operation Cumberland in August. The operation closed at the start of the monsoon.

Battery; a platoon from the 5th 8-inch Howitzer Battery ; and another battalion of Army 175mm guns ,

the 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery . By the end of the

year, 35 Marine artillery batteries from the 11th ,

12th, and 13th Marines, as well as four separat e

Force Troops and 10 Army batteries supporte d

Marine operations in I Corps. *

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the war,

from an artilleryman's point of view, was the massiv e

supporting arms effort employed to counter enem y

artillery and rockets in the DMZ region . In the

spring of 1967, the NVA introduced rockets as wel l

as medium and heavy artillery to support actions

there . As the year progressed, the North Vietnames e

employed more and larger-caliber weapons . According to intelligence on the enemy order of battle ,

the North Vietnamese had approximately 130 artillery pieces in the area north of the Ben Hai River ,

including 152mm gun howitzers with a range in excess of 10 miles. Marine positions at Cua Viet, Gi o

Linh, Dong Ha, Con Thien, Cam Lo, and Camp

Carroll suffered frequent attacks. These bombard-

*K Battery, 4th Battalion, 12th Marines remained on Okinawa

awaiting gun repairs and equipment.

ments threatened not only the Marine forward positions, but also lines of communication, command

posts, airfields, and logistic installations.

There were many difficulties in countering the in -

creased enemy artillery acitivity, but the biggest problem involved determining the precise location of

the enemy weapons. The Marines had limited

ground observation because of the political/military

probibition of operations in the DMZ, and NVA

missile and antiaircraft fire challenged aerial observation . Intelligence and damage assessments remained, at best, skimpy . The available assessments cam e

from diversified sources . The prolonged collecting

and collating time, however, produced targeting

results which often were too old to be worthwhile .

Conversely, the Communists knew the exact locations of Marine forces and installations . The fact tha t

the Marines occupied prominent terrain further

simplified the enemy's observation task .

The Marines response to the expanded NVA artillery and rocket threat involved a pronounced in -

crease in counterbattery fire, augmented by naval

gunfire and aviation . III MAF increased Marine artillery along the DMZ to 84 of the 180 piece s

available to the 3d Division . In August, USAF B-52s
SUPPORTING ARMS 221

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cm

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ES

1<0>1—z

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"4"

C)

1 q

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222 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18946 6

Soldiers of Battery G, 65th Artillery, equipped with truck-mounted, quad-.50 machine

guns, stand by to escort a Marine "Rough Rider" truck convoy in I Corps in October.

added their immense bomb loads to the battl e

against the Communist artillery. The 3d Marine

Division staff initiated an intensive effort to improve

the counterbattery program and installed new rada r

and sound-flash ranging equipment at key locations.

An Army unit, the Target Acquisition Battery fro m

the 2d Battalion, 26th Artillery worked to improv e

target information. The Dong Ha FSCC received

more personnel and communications equipment .

Because the Seventh Air Force controlled fir e

clearances north of the DMZ, it sent an Air Forc e

liaison officer to the Marine FSCC to speed up fir e

mission clearances. On 28 September 1967, the Marines established a fire support information cente r

(FSIC) that employed data processing equipment, t o

speed collection and collation of target information

from all 3d Marine Division, III MAF, and Seventh

Air Force sources. Additional observation aircraft

were made available, nearly doubling the number o f

hours of aerial observation over the DMZ area .

The Marines initiated large-scale, joint counter -

battery and interdiction operations such a s

Ropeyarn, Headshed, Neutralize, and Eradicate . Artillery, naval gunfire, and air strikes blanketed all

known and suspected firing and support positions

north of the DMZ . For example, during Operation

Headshed, both artillery and naval gunfire hi t

enemy positions, and air strikes followed to catch th e

survivors of the earlier bombardment .

As a result of these measures, enemy fire decline d

steadily from a September peak, but the Communists retained their capability to disrupt militar y

activity and cause significant allied casualties .

The DMZ experience highlighted the necessity of

relying on supporting arms to offset the disadvantage of operating next to an enemy sanctuary . The

problem of neutralizing enemy artillery remaine d

one of the most frustrating dilemmas of the war.

Though supporting arms eased the situation ,

political considerations ruled out the only satisfactory solution, seizure of the enemy guns.

For the Marines not involved in the war along th e

DMZ, base defense remained one of the most worrisome responsibilities . Beginning in February, th e

threat of rocket attack menaced all I Corps bases . At

Da Nang the enemy could launch rockets from an y

point in a 200-square-mile belt surrounding the city .

Five thousand Marines participated in the defence o f

this TAOR, but the high mobility of the enem y

rocket enabled the Communists to maintain the

threat. To combat the rockets, the 11th Marines
_____________________ .4— 1) H- I —

.. J—1II

I I

Rocket Attack

DaNang Airbase

14 July 1967

rnnd:r 0,11Q00 2000

Se. lL Seciuon 2'

3000 !H-I

DaNang

IMPACT -;-c\

CONCENTRATIONS

-

ROCKET FIRING

POSITIONS )

N

SUPPORTING ARMS 223

3d MaxDiv ComdC, December 1967

An artilleryman covers his ears and turns his back

after dropping a round down the tube of a 4.2-inch

mortar in a position at Dong Ha in December 1967.

repositioned firing batteries so that by July, at least

two batteries covered each part of the Da Nang

TAOR. Observation aircraft flew constant patrols

over the rocket belt.20 Additionally, artillerymen

manned strategically located observation posts

throughout the belt, but the threat persisted.

III MAF artillery, totaling 49 Marine and Army

batteries at the end of the year, faced a vast array of

tactical and technical problems. Counterbattery fire

across the DMZ, neutralization of the Da Nang

rocket threat; coverage of numerous, simultaneous

ground operations; and countless harassment and interdiction missions provide samples of the complex

gunnery problems confronting III MAF artillery during 1967. As an example of the quantity of artillery

support needed, the Communists fired 42,190

rounds during the 1967 artillery duel, while the III

MAF Marine and attached Army gunners replied

with 281,110 rounds.
CHAPTER 1 4

Logistics

Upgrading the Logistics System—Problems with the M-16 Rifl e

Navy Support—Marine Corps Engineers

Upgrading the Logistics System

When 1967 began, the Marine logistics system i n

support of the Vietnam War was still undergoing

growing pains . The means to fight were available ;

however, as Brigadier General Louis Metzger noted ,

there were many weaknesses, not excluding the pro -

vision of such necessities as socks and uniforms .

"While CG, 9th MAB," he wrote, "I was appalled a t

the condition of the Marines and their equipment

when they arrived on Okinawa [from Vietnam] . My

observations in-country [as assistant commander of

the 3d Marine Division] did nothing to dispel m y

opinion." 1

The Marines landed in March 1965 with logisti c

support tailored for their initial requirements; onl y

592 personnel provided motor transport, supply ,

and maintenance services . As III MAF's role in I

Corps expanded, the logistic organization increased

FLC ComdC, December 196 7

The headquarters of the Force Logistic Command (above) sits almost surrounded by

water while (below) parts of the maintenance and storage area stretch toward Da Nang .

FLC ComdC, December 1967
LOGISTICS 22 5

To provide sustained logistical support to III MA F

organizations; to provide staff augmentation and selfsustaining, balanced, mobile logistic support elements i n

support of III MAF units up to and including brigade siz e

when deployed on independent missions; and to provide

logistic support to other organizations as may be directed . 2

FLC ComdC, July 196 7

GySgt D. B. Durrell, assigned to the inventory section of Supply Battalion, checks some of the materia l

stored by FLC at Camp Brooks in Da Nang in July .

both in scope and size and led to the creation of the

Force Logistic Command . FLC realignment starte d

with the transfer of the 1st Force Service Regiment

from Camp Pendleton to Da Nang on 15 February

1967 . Although only the 1st FSR headquarters colors

arrived, involving no personnel or equipment movement from Camp Pendleton, this transfer permitte d

the FLC to restructure its elements to conform with a

service regiment's table of organization and equipment provisions . The required personnel wer e

already in Vietnam, but FLC needed a new structur e

to administer an inventory which had grown to mor e

than 60,000 supply items. By 28 February th e

Marine logistic organization in I CTZ, which was t o

remain essentially unchanged until the end of th e

year, was:

Dong Ha : Force Logistic Support Unit 1

Phu Bai: Force Logistic Support Group Alpha ,

3d Service Regimen t

Da Nang: Force Logistic Command Headquarters, 1st Force Service Regimen t

Chu Lai: Force Logistic Support Group Bravo,

1st Service Battalion

FLC strength totaled 5,500 men ; its mission was:

By 31 December, FLC 's authorized strength had

grown to 9,551 men . Elsewhere, the Marine Corp s

adjusted existing tables of organization and forc e

levels to accommodate the compelling needs in I

Corps. The realignment provided a III MAF "toothto-tail" ratio of 6 .5 to 1 . This ratio measured the

relative numbers between Marine combat and combat support troops to combat service support troop s

in Vietnam .

Providing supplies and services to the Vietnam

Marine was a worldwide Marine Corps logistic net -

work which spanned the United States from Albany ,

Georgia, and Barstow, California, across the Pacifi c

to Hawaii, then Okinawa, and finally to I Corps.

Most of the supplies flowed directly into the comba t

zone ; the rest stopped at, the Marines' supply base o n

Okinawa, thus providing a "surge tank" that could

respond rapidly to demands from the units in RVN .

The 3d Force Service Regiment (FSR) on Okinawa re -

mained the nerve center of the Marine logisti c

system in the western Pacific . Continuously exchangThe operator of one of the most important pieces of

equipment in the Marine logistics system, a rough -

terrain forklift, carefully removes cargo from the rear

ofa KC-130F at the air freight facility at Dong Ha.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A190069
226 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

FLC ComdC, October 1967

A Marine operates the keyboard in air-conditioned

comfort surrounded by other components of the

IBM-360 computer used by the Force Logistic Command to fill over 63,000 requisitions each month .

ing computerized information with III MAF, this activity processed 1,333,140 III MAF requisitions between January 1966 and September 1967, filling 8 2

percent of them from stores on hand . The remainder

passed to the Marine Corps Supply Center a t

Barstow, or in some cases to the Naval Suppl y

Centers at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, or Oakland ,

California . During this period, the Okinawa Marines

shipped 19,521 short tons of material to Vietnam b y

air and 78,949 measurement tons by ship .

The focal point for all logistic support flowing int o

III MAF was the Force Logistic Command (FLC),

commanded by Brigadier General James E . Herbold,

Jr. FLC handled all supplies and equipment goin g

to, or coming from, III MAF, as well as performin g

maintenance of equipment and facilities.

This logistic pipeline was a two-way system ; as it

moved new equipment into combat, damaged an d

worn items headed in the other direction for repair ,

salvage, or disposal . The 3d FSR acted as both a coor -

dinating agency and a rebuilding center. Work

repairs occurred either in Marine shops on Okinawa ,

at the Public Works Center, Yokosuka, Japan, or in

the continental United States . Between January 1966

and September 1967, 3d Force Service Regiment

repair facilities completed work orders on 77,28 6

items of combat equipment .

Frequent shifting of units to new locations, th e

rapid pace of the fighting, and bad weather all combined to aggravate supply problems. FLC introduced

new supply management techniques to accelerat e

delivery of critical materials. The first of these was

the Red Ball system introduced in September 1965 .

It sped the delivery of problem items through the

normal distribution system by means of individual

personal attention and continuing followup actions .

When III MAF designated an item as Red Ball, FLC

notified all supply agencies in Fleet Marine Force,

Pacific . Thereafter, designated action officers at eac h

command level monitored the status of each Re d

Ball item and took every possible measure to speed

delivery. By the end of September 1967, over 5,70 0

items had received the Red Ball treatment since the

program's inception .

FLC introduced another special system in 196 5

which it called the Critipac program . Under this pro -

gram, each month the Marine Corps Supply Center

at Barstow provided every major III MAF unit wit h

one box of rapidly expended supplies which it required on a routine basis . Critipac eliminated th e

process of requisitioning and the inherent wait fo r

the supply system to respond .

These two 5-ton trucks, one heavily damaged by a n

enemy mine and the other rebuilt to fully-usabl e

condition, illustrate the heavy maintenance

capabilities of PLC's motor transport repair shops.

FLC ComdC, August 1967
LOGISTICS 22 7

3d MarDiv ComdC, January 196 7

A Rough Rider convoy of 150 vehicles enroute to Phu Bai moves through the Hai Va n

Pass, the only land route across the mountains that reached the sea north of Da Nang .

Repair parts and similar expendable items, usuall y

in the Class II supply category, continued to be a

headache during 1967 . No matter how many of

these items flowed into Vietnam through the suppl y

system, the demand seemed insatiable . The explanation rests with the wide variety of items required ,

86,000 during 1967, as well as the high usage rate .

The increased tempo of combat operations and hars h

weather conditions played a significant role in the

rapid expenditure of supplies and equipment . This

increased the number of requisitions submitted eac h

month within III MAF. The number rose from onl y

2,500 in April 1965 to 70,959 in October 1967 .

Enemy action also influenced supply levels an d

created sudden shortages. One of the most dramatic

incidents of this nature occurred on 3 Septembe r

when enemy artillery hit Dong Ha combat base ,

touching off one of the most spectacular series of ex -

plosions in the war. The initial blasts damage d

seventeen helicopters. Force Logistic Support Unit

1's bulk fuel storage farm went up in flames . The

enemy fire destroyed the main ammunition storag e

area ; 15,000 short tons of vitally needed ammunition vanished. The explosions continued for mor e

than four hours and people as far south as Phu Bai ,

more than 40 miles away, could see the enormou s

column of smoke .

Replacing the destroyed ammunition and the

bulk fuel system while continuing normal supply

operations plus providing building materials for construction of the "McNamara Line" represented

monumental tasks . 3 As an interim measure, the men

of Force Logistic Support Unit 1 established a drum

refueling point immediately after the attack . This

functioned until engineers completed another bul k

fuel farm at Dong Ha a week later. The ammunition

situation was better. Fortunately, two small, alternate supply points in the immediate Dong Ha area

survived the attack. Quantities of artillery and other

ammunition remained limited, however, until

emergency sea and airlifts replenished th e

dangerously low stocks. Bad weather, heavy seas,

and flooding of the Dong Ha LCU ramp during the

period of 17-23 September complicated the resupply

effort . The Marines circumvented this untimel y

development by offloading munitions at Hue an d

then moving them by truck to Dong Ha . ConcurA forklift, mired to the axles in mud created by

monsoon rains in January, sits in the Force Logisti c

Support Group Alpha open storage lot at Da Nang .

FLC ComdC, January 1967
228 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

rently, they started construction of new dumps at

Quang Tri City, well beyond enemy weapons ' range .

Luckily, the Communists did not capitalize on th e

disaster.

Enemy artillery fire in October almost cause d

another serious setback to these resupply efforts . Fortunately, the immediate efforts of three Seabees an d

four Marines, one of whom was a general officer,

prevented another disaster. "On 29 October our

second and smaller ammunition dump in Dong Ha

was hit by enemy fire," recalled General Metzger .

"Knowing we simply could not lose it, thre e

Marines, three Seabees, and I put out the fire ."4 *

Another of FLC's inherited missions involved personnel management . By 1967, the task of processin g

personnel to and from the western Pacific had grown

to prodigious proportions . Over 191,000 Marines required processing during 1967 . Approximately

97,000 went .by aircraft to Vietnam and 7,872 arrived in surface shipping; 82,000 flew back to the

United States and another 4,276 traveled home b y

ship . This complex evolution required the writing of

orders, rosters, and schedules ; and administering

physical examinations, baggage inspections, troo p

handling, and billeting at transient facilities and

processing centers reaching from South Vietnam

*Each of the seven received the Bronze Star Medal for their efforts in saving the ammunition dump .

back through Okinawa to El Toro and Camp

Pendleton in California . In addition, all Marin e

posts and stations faced the tasks of filling outboun d

quotas and absorbing returnees .

At first, the main control center for the stream o f

Marines flowing through the western Pacific remained at Camp McTureous, Okinawa. In mid-1966 this

activity moved to Camp Hansen, Okinawa to accommodate the increasing two-way personnel flow. By

early 1967, the Transient Battalion, commanded b y

Lieutenant Colonel Donald K. Cliff, processed as

many as 25,000 troops in a single month . This complicated operation included accounting for all

hospitalized casualties and expediting emergency

leave personnel movement by arranging for these

Marines' transportation, clothing, and pay, as well a s

many other services. Computerization sped such involved operations as the modification of orders o f

personnel still in transit . By 1967, the Transient Battalion reduced the average holding time for transients at Camp Hansen to about 40 hours. The transient program also involved the classification and

storage of excess baggage and clothing in 3d FSR' s

climate-controlled warehouse . The hard-working

troop handlers and administrators of the Transient

Battalion received little praise, but their long hour s

of demanding work were as vital to the support o f

the Marines in I Corps as food and ammunition .

The Air Delivery Platoon of FLC was one of th e

Newly arrived Marine replacements await processing in front of a long line of tropical

huts at the Force Logistic Command's transient facility in July at the Da Nang airfield.

FLC ComdC, July 1967
LOGISTICS 22 9

FLC ComdC, April 1967 FLC ComdC, July 196 7

Feeding the thousands of Marines assigned to III MAF required facilities as large and efficient as many stateside commerical establishments. Some of the average of 2,592

loaves of bread provided each day by the bakery sit on cooling racks at Phu Bai . A Vietnamese civilian (right), one of 53 employed in PLC's milk plant, analyzes a sample of

the more than 40,000 pints of reconsituted milk produced each day in April 1967 .

more unusual Marine logistic units. The members of

this specially trained 33-man platoon were graduate s

of the parachute school at Fort Benning, Georgia, a s

well as the parachute rigger school at Fort Lee ,

Virginia . The platoon supported requests for aeria l

delivery of supplies throughout I Corps. During

September and October, the platoon rendered

especially valuable service during the aerial resupply

of the 26th Marines at Khe Sanh . Because of subsurface water damage, landing on Khe Sanh airstrip

had become extremely hazardous for transport

planes. Beginning in late August, the Air Deliver y

Platoon helped airdrop large quantities of supplies

to the Marines at Khe Sanh during repairs to the

runway . During the more than two months the strip

remained closed, the Air Delivery Platoon made air -

drops on 40 days, handling an average of 51 shor t

tons per day, more than double its normal, rate d

capacity .

At the end of 1967, to improve logistic support

and keep pace with the northward movement of II I

MAF combat elements, FLC emphasis shifted to northern I Corps. Force Logistic Support Group Bravo

moved from Chu Lai to Dong Ha, leaving Supply

Company (-)(Reinforced) as the agency responsibl e

for logistic support of Marine elements in the Ch u

Lai area .

Problems with the M-16 Rifle

Problems with the M-16 rifle posed a logistics

burden of staggering proportions for III MAF . After

the heavy fighting at Khe Sanh in April and May a

furor developed over reported deficiencies in the

newly issued M-16. Many Marines lost confidence i n

the weapon, creating a situation which had a

definite impact on combat operations and morale . ,

The issue generated considerable reaction in the

American press and Congress . Some Marines contributed to the furor by spreading exaggerated ac -

counts of problems with the M-16, as described b y

General Metzger:

. . . a congressional investigating team of two congressmen . . . arrived on the scene . It was my unhappy duty to escort them to units along the DMZ. If it weren't s o

serious it would have been laughable . They insisted o n

questioning individual Marines with no officers and NCO s

present, I suppose to ensure they got the truth, without

command influence . The result was that they were fed the
230 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

FLC ComdC, July 1967 FLC ComdC, July 1967

Offduty Marines watch a 20-lap race organized by Marines enroute to the United States in July 1967 o n

the Force Logistic Command on 4 July as part of ef government transportation line up at the airline

forts to provide diversified recreation to III MAF . ticket office at the FLC transit facility in Da Nang to

buy tickets from the west coast to their homes.

Security forces' aerial flares, photographed by a time exposure as they drift over Camp

Brooks, serve as a blunt reminder of the nearness of FLC's Marines to the dangers of war .

FLC ComdC, August 1967
LOGISTICS 23 1

most awful line of "hog wash" imaginable . Tall tales of

heroic actions, patrols wiped out, etc ., all due to the M-1 6

rifle, but which according to the sergeant major of on e

unit involved, had never taken place . The young Marines

had a field day . 6

The main criticism was that the rifle jammed ; it

would not extract spent cartridges . III MAF conducted numerous field tests and studies to deter -

mine if the weapon was faulty and, if so, what coul d

be done about it. Much of the evidence pointed t o

the absolute necessity of keeping the weapon immaculately clean, mainly because of the extremel y

fine tolerances of its moving parts and the tendency

of rounds to bend in the chamber . .The studies cited

dirty ammunition and poor cleaning methods as th e

major reasons for malfunctions. Commanders a t

every level hammered away at the traditional Marin e

theme of frequent weapon cleaning, which had been

less important when armed with the M-14 rifle wit h

its chrome-plated chamber and bore .

Even this was not always adequate . "The earlier

[M-16] weapons—even when cleaned to usual stan -

RAdm Thomas R. Weschler, commander of the

Naval Support Activity, Da Nang discusses his command and its capabilities with Gen Wallace M .

Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps,

on board a small craft in Da Nang harbor in January .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A188112

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189370

Two large cargo ships unload at the Naval Support

Activity's deepwater piers at the Da Nang harbor.

dards (not always possible in any sustained combat)

still developed microscopic 'pits' in the chamber, "

recalled Colonel James C . Short. "The [rifles] woul d

then fail to extract, usually at an awkward time ." 7

When further investigation revealed that the problem could be alleviated by changing the chambers ,

the FLC faced the urgent task of modifying all

Marine M-16s. It set up an assembly line and re -

placed all of the original chamber assemblies wit h

new ones having a chrome coating . This modification reduced chamber friction, making extractio n

more reliable. At the same time, FLC installed a

modified buffer group to reduce the cyclic rate of

fire . The M-16's teething problems plagued FLC fo r

the rest of the year, and a final solution waited unti l

1968 .

The controversy over the new rifle had other longterm side effects that affected III MAF's combat effectiveness and logistic posture . These effects

originated from the policy that each Marine would

test fire his rifle before departing on a patrol . "So,

obeying orders, each Marine dutifully fired his

weapon regularly before each patrol," recalle d

General Metzger, "which depleted our ammunitio n

supply and conditioned the Marines to shootin g

without aiming, so that the standard of marksman -

ship in combat dropped sharply ." e

Navy Support

Throughout 1967, the Naval Support Activity
232 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19381 1

A Navy medium landing craft (LCM-8), with folding cots on top of its improvised pilo t

house cover, moves a tank from the 3d Tank Battalion up the Dong Ha River on 6July .

(NSA), Da Nang, served as the focal point for Navy

activities supporting the Marines in I Corps. The

Navy established NSA in July 1965 to relieve th e

Marines of the administrative and logistic task s

associated with an advanced naval base . During 1966

the command's responsibilities grew to the poin t

that a flag officer, Rear Admiral Thomas R.

Weschler, became the unit's commander . By the end

of 1967, NSA developed into the largest U .S. Navy

overseas shore command with more than 10,000 officers and men .* It provided III MAF with a n

average of 39,661 measurement tons of supplies pe r

month in 1967.

Besides operating the Da Nang port facilities,

sailors of NSA served throughout I Corps in several

separate detachments to accomplish some rather

diverse missions. Personnel of the comman d

operated small craft on the dangerous waters of th e

Cua Viet to supply the fighting forces along th e

DMZ. Detachments at Hue/Tan My performe d

similar duties. At Chu Lai another detachmen t

shared the burden of supplying all allied forces in

*For a fuller treatment of Navy logistics in Vietnam, see Vic e

Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret), Mobility, Support and Endurance : A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam

War, 1965-1968 (Washington : Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1972).

lower I Corps, aided by the southernmost NSA

detachment at Sa Huynh . NSA built the Sa Huynh

A sailor on the Navy's Swift Boat 80, operating iiri

the South China Sea in September, prepares to fire

an 81 mm mortar at enemy coastal positions two

miles south of the Demilitarized Zone . The dual

mount also includes a .50-caliber machine gun installed above the mortar and recoil mechanism .

3d MarDiv ComdC, September 1967
LOGISTICS 23 3

3d MarDiv ComdC, June 196 7

Navy hospital corpsmen remove a wounded man

from a medevac helicopter at Dong Ha for the short

ride to the 3d Medical Battalion's field hospital.

facilities shortly after the arrival of Task Force

Oregon in the summer of 1967 .

In addition to transhipping material from Da

Nang to the smaller ports, NSA performed a variet y

of other tasks . It provided loading and unloadin g

services, and transient and terminal storage at thes e

ports; operated base supply depots for supply o f

material common to all U .S . forces in I Corps ; supplied port and harbor security ; coordinated activitie s

with RVN agencies and the U .S . Agency for International Development in support of military operations; supervised industrial relations ; provided all

petroleum requirements; provided public works support in secure areas ; maintained airfields in coordination with III MAF; and operated in-countr y

R&R facilities.

Another vital NSA service involved providin g

hospital facilities for combat troops in I Corps . The

NSA station hospital opened at Da Nang in Januar y

1966 . It expanded from a 60-bed capacity to 460 b y

year's end. The staff included more than 500 doctors, nurses, corpsmen, and technicians . This

modern hospital boasted the only frozen blood ban k

in Vietnam, and had competent departments such a s

X-ray; eye, ear, nose, and throat; neurosurgery;

urology; orthopedic ; research; and preventive

medicine facilities. Served by a convenient

helicopter pad, the NSA hospital, working with the

facilities of the 1st and 3d Medical Battalions and th e

1st Hospital Company, provided III MAF with th e

most modern medical technology available .

In addition to the fixed medical facilities, hospital

ships cruised the waters off Vietnam to receiv e

casualties evacuated directly from the battlefield b y

helicopter . The USS Sanctuary arrived on 10 April

1967 to join her sister ship, the USS Repose, a

veteran of almost a year's Vietnam service . In her

first 50 days of action, Sanctuary admitted 1,200 patients. Operating from Da Nang, the Sanctuary,

with 560 hospital beds and 27 doctors embarked ,

could move to Chu Lai in less than two hours and t o

the seaward approaches to the DMZ in less than fiv e

hours. The presence of a fully-equipped hospital

ship only minutes away provided solace for man y

Marines as they contemplated their chances of survival.

No account of naval support would be complet e

without mention of the Marines' long-term friends ,

the Seabees . By midsummer of 1967, nine Navy

mobile construction battalions (NMCBs) were in

Vietnam : two at Dong Ha, one at Phu Bai, five at

Da Nang, and one at Chu Lai . These formed the 3 d

Naval Construction Brigade, commanded by Rea r

HMC Marvin L. Cunningham, Navy medical corpsman, removes mosquitoes from a trap with a portable vacuum cleaner before sending them to the

Navy Support Activity at Da Nang for examination .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A189498
234 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A36985 6

General purpose tents of the type commonly called "GP Medium" house a small fiel d

hospital run by the 1st Medical Battalion in support of Operation Desoto near Duc Pho .

Admiral Robert R. Wooding, CEC . His force included 7,000 officers and men .

The Seabees in Vietnam demonstrated their

amazing capability and traditional versatility . One

of the best examples of their ability to respond wit h

speed and determination took place during the fall

of 1967 when they built an airfield and quarters fo r

500 men at Quang Tri . The field served as a backu p

installation for the strip at Dong Ha, by the n

vulnerable to NVA rocket and artillery fire . Seabee s

and equipment converged on the site within a day o f

General Westmoreland's order to complete the fiel d

before the monsoon season . NMCB-10, the Pacific

Fleet's Alert Construction Battalion on Okinawa ,

deployed immediately to take charge of the urgen t

project and relieve the composite force already at

work. The specifications called for a 4,100-foot strip

of sand cement covered with metal matting, plu s

15,000 square yards of parking aprons and taxiways .

Heavy rains hit the region in late September, ad -

ding to the problem of stabilizing shifting sand in

the construction area. The Seabees also faced the

delicate task of negotiating and supervising th e

removal of approximately 11,000 Vietnamese grave s

located in the middle of the proposed site . The latte r

problem occurred frequently in Vietnam and its

solution required subtle and skillful diplomacy . In

spite of these obstacles, the first KC-130 landed a t

Quang Tri on 23 October, nine days ahead of th e

scheduled completion date and only 38 days afte r

the project started .

Concentration shows on the faces of Cdr Ronald L .

Bouterie and his assistants during surgery on the hip

of a wounded Marine on board the USS Tripoli.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A704398
LOGISTICS 23 5

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A18999 2

Seabees of Mobile Construction Battalion 301 battle the mud on 29 November as they

set and seal runway mats into place during the rebuilding of the runway at Khe Sanh .

Navy Seabees use special mobile equipment in September to crush rock for repairing the

damage caused by heavy monsoon rains to the runway at the Khe Sanh combat base .

3d MarDiv ComdC, September 1967
236 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Photo courtesy of Maj Henry Wayne Gardne r

A Navy chaplain assigned to the 2d Battalion, 4t h

Marines conducts a non-denominational service in

February using three C-ration boxes for an altar.

Seabees also made a major contribution by thei r

continual struggle to maintain "Liberty Road, " the

route connecting Da Nang with the An Hoa industrial complex, 23 air miles to the southwest .

Elements of the 3d, 7th, and 9th Marine Enginee r

Battalions worked with the Seabees to keep the roa d

open as heavy two-way traffic strained its man y

culverts and bridges . The constant threat of enemy

mines and sapper attacks added to the Seabees' an d

Marines' worries on "Liberty Road ." Lieutenant Colonel Frank W. Harris III's 7th Engineer Battalion

replaced one bridge blown up by enemy demolition s

on 4 February 1967, with a 96-foot, 60-ton-limit ,

timber bridge in the remarkable time of only 1 6

days .

The Seabees, however, claimed credit for th e

largest single bridge building feat on "Liberty

Road." NMCB-4, commanded by Commande r

Richard M . Fluss, CEC, built the 2,040-foot-lon g

"Liberty Bridge" across the Thu Bon River . The

bridge rested on more than 800 80-foot-long piles ,

each one driven approximately 40 feet into the rive r

bed. The battalion used more than five tons o f

10-inch nails and 5,000 24-inch bolts in its construction. It completed the job in less than five

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A36996 3

HM Andre A. Bougie, a 19-year old Navy medica l

corpsman in_the 1st Marine Division, tries to keep a

wounded Viet Cong alive in Operation New Castle .

The visiting Commandant of the Marine Corps, Ge n

Wallace M. Greene, Jr., pins a Navy Unit Commendation streamer on the colors of the 3d Medical Battalion in a ceremony at Phu Bai on 7 January 1967 .

3d MarDiv ComdC, January 1967
LOGISTICS 23 7

3d MarDiv ComdC, April 1967 3d MarDiv ComdC, July 196 7

Two Marines from Company D, 11th Engineer Bat- A bulldozer pushes trees aside as the 11th Enginee r

talion perform a ritual common in the Vietnam Battalion completes construction on Route 561 nea r

War. PFC T. Outlaw, having located a suspected the strategic combat base at Con Thien in July 1967 .

enemy mine with a mine detector during a roa d

sweep on 12 April, watches as Pvt R. P. Dotson

cautiously probes the ground with his bayonet tip .

A pontoon ferry constructed by Company C, 11th Engineer Battalion carries severa l

Marine vehicles across- the Perfume River 15 miles west of the city of Hue on 16 May .

3d MarDiv ComdC, May 1967
238 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

3d MarDiv ComdC, April 196 7

Smoke pours from the 11th Engineer Battalion's new asphalt plant constructed at Dong

Ha for improving the highway network necessary to the defense of the DMZ region .

months, from 3 April to 2 September . Enemy sappers attacked the bridge during the early morning

hours of 6 September and knocked out two spans. A

scant 32 hours later, the Seabees had complete d

repairs and traffic moved once more on "Libert y

Road . "

For the majority of Marines in Vietnam, the most

frequently encountered evidence of Navy suppor t

were the naval personnel assigned to his unit. Each

battalion, aircraft group, and higher headquarters

had its own Navy chaplain. Each battalion an d

squadron, as well as higher headquarters, had its

own complement of Navy medical personnel, headed by a physician . The enlisted Navy medical

corpsmen provided immediate medical care at all

levels, down to the individual rifle platoon . In addition, each Marine division included a medical battalion and a dental company commanded by a

Medical Corps or Dental Corps officer.

Captain John T. Vincent, MC, USN, who commanded the 3d Medical Battalion, described his

unit's disposition in support of the 3d Marine Division:

During 1967 there were two essentially complet e

hospitals, one at Phu Bai and the other at Dong Ha whic h

we staffed and equipped for definitive surgical treatment .

In addition, two clearing platoons (essentially the

equivalent of an Army MASH [Mobile Army Surgical

Hospital] unit) were in the field : one at Khe Sanh and the

other at a fire support base between Phu Bai and Quang

Tri. The deployment of a clearing platoon of "C" Company, 3d Medical Battalion to Khe Sanh during the fight

for Hills 861 and 881 was an extremely expeditious and efficient operation and provided excellent combat support . 9

Dental Corps personnel could be found operating

with Marines under similar conditions. For example,

to provide primary dental care to Marines at Du c

Pho, the 1st Dental Company rigged a dental chair

and other equipment in a 3/4-ton trailer . A

helicopter flew the trailer from Quang Ngai to Du c

Pho. When dug in and sandbagged, it allowed th e

provision of excellent dental care throughout th e

Marine stay at the base, despite such occurrences as a

near miss from a mortar during the enemy attack on

24 March. ro

Marine Corps Engineers

No Marines in Vietnam faced more frustrations .in

the accomplishment of their mission than th e

engineers. Organized and equipped to accomplis h

engineer support for short duration amphibious

operation, five Marine engineer battalions, the 1st ,

3d, 7th, 9th, and 11th, found themselves committed to a protracted land war in an underdevelope d

country. The wide spectrum of urgent tasks, har d

equipment use, torrential rains, mud, heat, abrasive

dust, replacement shortages, lack of spares, and a

long supply pipeline were some of the more corn-
LOGISTICS 23 9

mon hindrances. Only forceful leadership, grueling

work schedules, and considerable ingenuity kept th e

battalions abreast of mounting demands fo r

engineering support. They met their military commitments while still managing to build dams ,

schools, dispensaries, bridges, and other facilities for

the people of South Vietnam . 1 1

One of the most challenging tasks facing th e

engineers in 1967 involved maintaining and

upgrading more than 2,000 miles of I Corps roads.

The opening of Route 9 connecting Dong Ha with

Khe Sanh in March provided a prime example of

Marine engineering accomplishment. Flooding and

enemy damage closed the road to vehicular traffic

west of Cam Lo in 1964 . This 42-mile road include d

49 bridges, 27 of which occupied the 15-mile stretch

between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh . Once open, the road

required continuous maintenance to repair the constant ravages of flooding and enemy action . Additionally, the engineers reinforced all bridges to sup -

port 60-ton loads. The Route 9 project tied u p

almost a full engineer battalion for all of 1967 .

Another project which tested the resolve of the

battalions was the construction of the DMZ barrie r

system in northern Quang Tri Province . The 11th

Engineer Battalion, under the sucessive command o f

Lieutenant Colonels Ross L. Mulford and Willard N .

Christopher, comprised the initial project force, bu t

by the end of the summer, the mammoth effort involved 30 percent of all III MAF engineer forces. 1 2

U.S. Army motor transport and helicopter units

were deployed from other Corps areas to help;

Seabees provided additional support, especially in

the construction of observation towers and bunkers;

and ARVN engineers contributed their share. By the

end of the year, the barrier construction effort and

associated security tasks had absorbed 757,520 ma n

days . Casualties among the engineers mounted a s

the enemy employed snipers, mines, mortars, an d

artillery to discourage them .

The generator shortage caused headaches for

Marines throughout 1967 . The engineers owned and

operated the major share of III MAF's power -

generating equipment, but they were purel y

expeditionary-type generators . The Marine Corps

possessed only a limited quantity of garrison equipment, including power generators . The rapid con -

struction of many new installations in I Corps, all o f

which required electricity, quickly depleted existing

generator stocks . The engineers had the task of servicing and exchanging generators to keep up wit h

seemingly insatiable power demands . Clubs, messes ,

air conditioners all demanded electricity, and the re .

quirements often exceeded the means .

The generator situation in 1967 would have bee n

even more acute save for actions taken in 1966 b y

Colonel George C . Axtell, then the commander o f

Marines from the 3d Engineer Battalion use ropes and muscle power as they manhandl e

a dud 250 pound bomb in the mud of a farmer's paddy near Camp Evans in October.

3d MarDiv ComdC, October 1967
240 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

[of the Third Naval Construction Brigade], joint actio n

was taken to obtain some larger (60 kilowatts and up) Nav y

generators for all complexes where power grids could be

built and to release the smaller expeditionary generators to

more remote locations . Care and maintenance of the expeditionary generators was primarily by their "owners "

(i .e ., the engineers) with backup from FLC . Care and

maintenance of the larger Navy generators was first by

selected engineer personnel from FLC and backed

up/augmented by Navy Seabees. 1 3

Photo courtesy of Col Frank W. Harris III

The 7th Engineer Battalion, in an assignment common to all engineer units in Vietnam, goes beyon d

its combat duties and aids the pacification program

by building an irrigation dam to allow local Vietnamese farmers to grow a second rice crop each year.

the Force Logistic Command . Colonel Richard D .

Taber, Sr., recently recalled :

When the shortage of generators began to be realized ,

Colonel Axtell personally called higher headquarters in th e

Pacific and United States to get all available expeditionar y

generators made available to III MAF. Then, following a

discussion with Captain [Albert R .] Marschall (CEC) USN

While the Marine engineers spent much tim e

engaged in construction and maintenance, they als o

devoted many hours to road clearing sweeps . Each

day, prior to the departure of the first truck convoy ,

engineers teams, with infantry support, ensured th e

reads were clear of mines, booby traps, and ambushes.1 4 When the engineers found enemy explosives they either disarmed of blew them in place ,

depending upon their size and type . The slow ,

tedious, and dangerous sweeps were a necessary par t

of keeping supplies moving throughout I Corps .

The Marine engineers in Vietnam demonstrate d

true versatility . Not only challenged by new and

demanding tasks, but they also faced vastly differen t

physical properties of soil and rock, as well as a clever

and determined opponent . Every engineering project involved constant exposure to sabotage, mining ,

ambush, or some other nagging threat. The

dramatic aspect of combat eclipses most supporting

efforts, but this was not the case of the Marin e

engineers in Vietnam. If nothing else, the mer e

physical size of their accomplishments bears witnes s

to their contribution .

Father Nguyen Thanh Hoan, LtCol Ross L . Mulford of the 11th Engineer Battalion, an d

others stand in front of the school in Dong Ha partially supported by the battalion .

3d MarDiv ComdC . March 1967
CHAPTER 1 5

Other Marine Activitie s

Marines with MACV— The Embassy Guard—The Advisors—I Corps Advisors—The Rung Sat Special Zon e

The Marine Advisory Unit—Action In Binh Dinh Province—Action in the South

Marines with MACV

The Marine Corps provided the MACV staff 72 officers and 67 enlisted men at the beginning of 1967 .

The assigned Marines comprised slightly less than

five percent of the total MACV staff personnel .

Another 25 officers and 24 enlisted Marines served

with the MACV field components . The senior

Marine officer on the staff was the director of the

combat operations center (COC), Brigadier General

John R. Chaisson. General Chaisson remained in

this vital position through 1967 and up until

mid-1968 . Other Marine billets covered a broad

spectrum of assignments which ranged from

membership in the Studies and Observation Grou p

to duty with the radio and television staff.

Marine participation in MACV functions had a

dual importance . Not only did they make Marine

views readily available to the staff in Saigon, bu t

MACV Marines clarified Saigon's decisions with their

fellow Marines in I Corps. General Chaisson was

himself a former member of the III MAF staff and

the only Marine general out of 20 flag officers at

MACV Headquarters . He had direct, personal con -

tact with General Westmoreland and his senior staff

members, as well as other senior American an d

Marine BGen John R. Chaisson, the director of the MACV combat operations center in

Saigon, listens as Gen Creighton W. Abrams, the deputy MACV commander, confers

with III MAFs LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., and the 3d Marine Division's MajGe n

Bruno A. Hochmuth during Gen Abrams' visit to the division at Phu Bai on 13 July .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 18888 0

241
242 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

foreign representatives. From these associations, he

gained considerable insight into the way the othe r

services viewed Marines. None ever criticized

Marines' fighting characteristics, except for the belief

that Marines did not know how to dig in when occupying a defensive position, such as Con Thien in

1967 . Not all the remarks were so charitable, as he

recounted some years later at the Basic School :

Sometimes they made disparaging remarks about our

rather casual approach to logistics and communications

and these rather ancillary supporting activities . They

weren't quite sure that we were up to speed in these

regards. . . . I don't think they gave us credit for having too

many smarts. They had a feeling that we liked to put ou r

head down and go up the middle rather than get the least

bit fancy . I can remember one day a senior officer of the

Army came back [after] he'd visited a Marine battalion . He

said to me, 'John, you know, I met a real intelligent battalion commander up there . Real unusual guy . " Now, I

wasn 't sure that . . . [of the Marine's] two

characteristics—intelligent and unusual—whether the on e

followed the other. '

Some of the other 1967 Marine MACV Staff

members were : Colonel James C . . Stanfield, chief of

the Plans and Requirements Division 0-4) ; Colone l

William L. Traynor, the COC air operations officer ;

and Colonel Joseph C . Fegan, Jr., who served as

General Chaisson's deputy director of the COC. Colonel Kirby B . Vick was the deputy director of the

Doctrine and Analysis Branch (J-34) until March ,

when his relief, Colonel David D . Rickabaugh, arrived.

Many controversial issues confronted the Marines

assigned to MACV . These involved doctrinal an d

policy matters of direct interest to other commands,

such as FMFPac, Seventh Fleet, and III MAF and its

subordinate units. Marine participation in MAC V

functions helped in arriving at palatable solutions

for many of the problems which developed during

the year.

The MACV viewpoint, of necessity, covered a

broader range than that of the respective corps commands. MACV maintained a fine balance betwee n

the attitudes of the U.S . participants, as well as thos e

of Vietnamese and allied staffs . Typical of the issues

which confronted MACV in 1967 was the structuring

of U.S. Army participation in I Corps. The provisio n

of Task Force Oregon represented only the beginning of the northward move of Army troops . The

fact that the displacement of each unit to I Corp s

meant that another corps area faced a force reduction, or a postponement of force buildup, remained

a constant staff annoyance throughout the year.

General Westmoreland's continuing concern abou t

Communist use of the A Shau valley and the protection of the remote cities of Kontum and Pleiku was

another worrisome matter . The enemy rocket attacks

against Da Nang posed still another dilemma . If

enemy rockets could hit Da Nang, they also coul d

hit Bien Hoa and, for that matter, Saigon . Another

issue was the "barrier," or the "McNamara Line"

along the DMZ. Even with the accelerated troop

buildup in I Corps, the number of troops required t o

man, much less build, the unpopular barrier serve d

as a continuing source of irritation . Added to this ,

the question arose of what to do with the left flan k

of the proposed barrier, an area comprising all o f

western Quang Tri Province . In III Corps a new

threat developed. Even though Operations Cedar

Falls and Junction City had badly mauled Communist formations in the "Iron Triangle" northwest

of Saigon, at least three enemy divisions threatene d

Long Binh and Bien Hoa . To the south in IV Corps ,

U.S. riverine operations were expanding, but agai n

the I Corps troop drain reduced the effectiveness o f

this tactical innovation .

An entirely different and equally perplexing conflict was the dispute between Marine and Air Forc e

fire restrictions in the DMZ . The Air Force contended that it should be responsible for all territory north

of the Ben Hai River, but Marine staffs demanded to

be allowed to fire to the maximum range of their attached 175mm guns in order to silence North Vietnamese artillery . An interim decision limitin g

Marine fires to the northern boundary of the DM Z

and placing Air Force control north of the sam e

boundary, satisfied neither service, and the issue remained in contention for the rest of the year .

The year 1967 was filled with innumerabl e

perplexing situations for the MACV staff. America n

troop strength increased from 385,000 to 486,000 ,

but Communist activity also intensified . In August ,

the MACV Headquarters moved from downtown

Saigon to a new complex at Tan Son Nhut Airbas e

on the outskirts of the city . The improved facilities

did not diminish the number of problems, but they

did improve the staffs' working conditions. The

coming year proved that the move occurred none to o

soon.

The Embassy Guard

The year 1967 brought on expansion of the

Marine Security Guard Detachment (MSGD) at the
OTHER MARINE crivrns 24

miles i

kilometers

AIGON AREA
244 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

American Embassy in Saigon. The detachment of

Marines, one officer and 67 enlisted men at the

beginning of the year, came under the administrative control of Company C, Marine Security

Guard Battalion, headquartered at the U .S. Embassy in Manila . The parent battalion, established in

February 1967, was the Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Department) located at Headquarters ,

Marine Corps . The Saigon detachment's chain o f

command consisted of one of the longest small uni t

command links in the world, more than 650 miles

from Saigon to Manila and over 9,000 miles to battalion headquarters in Washington . At the beginning of the year, First Lieutenant Philip E . Tucker

commanded the Saigon detachment ; his deputy ,

and the only staff noncommissioned officer, wa s

Staff Sergeant Gary G . Stoces .

The Marines assigned to the Embassy protected

American lives and property within the Embassy an d

its associated U.S . Agency for Internationa l

Development (USAID) and U .S. Information Service (USIS) buildings . The guard consisted of an administrative section and a watch section . The watc h

section broke down into three separate units: a

Guard Section, charged with protection of the Embassy, USAID, and USIS compounds; an Ambassador's Residency Guard ; and the Ambassador's

Personal Security Unit, the bodyguard of th e

Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge and his wife . The

Embassy Security Officer, Mr . Robert A . England ,

exercised operational control of the detachmen t

through First Lieutenant Tucker. The Embassy

Marines had no connection with Marines elsewhere

in Vietnam .

Weapons and radio equipment for the Marine s

came from the U.S . Department of State . The

detachment's highly sophisticated radio net consisted of extremely reliable fixed and portable unit s

which linked guard posts, vehicles, the detachment

office, and the security offices . The standard weapon

for the embassy guard was the Smith and Wesso n

.38-caliber, 4-inch barrel revolver. However, the

Residency Guard carried the 2-inch barrel Smith an d

Wesson .38, while the Personal Security Unit use d

the Colt "Python," a .357-caliber, magnum revolver.

Both the Residency and the Personal Security Unit s

had 9mm Beretta sub-machine guns, which they carried in unobtrusive attache cases. A 1966 test of

some of the world's available sub-machine gun s

resulted in the selection of the Beretta because of its

accuracy, reliability, and light weight.* Backing up

the arsenal of hand guns, each internal post possessed 12-gauge Remington Shotguns, loaded with 0 0

buckshot shells .

One major problem encountered by the officer in

charge during 1967 was that his command expanded

so rapidly that he and his one staff NCO were har d

put to exercise adequate control. As a result,

sergeants supervised watch sections of as many as 3 0

Marines, located at different posts in a potentiall y

insecure city . This situation ceased only after Captain Robert J. O'Brien became OIC of the detachment in April and Gunnery Sergeant Alexander

Morrison arrived in February .

The security guard faced an additional difficulty

during the construction of a new embassy facility .

During the construction period, the Marines guarded the site on a 24-hour basis and, because of security considerations, monitored the workers on the job .

The Marine guard requirements constantly change d

at the new building site and the contractors did no t

finish the new complex until the fall .

The year 1967 passed without any significant tes t

of the Saigon MSG's mission capability . The events

of February 1968 justified the long and tedious

hours devoted to drills, alerts, passive defens e

measures, and tests of the security system .

The Advisors

Major operations such as Cedar Falls and Junctio n

City in III Corps, the Prairie series, the Hickory

sweeps, and the protracted defenses of Con Thie n

and Khe Sanh in I Corps served as focal points fo r

the year 1967 . Because of the tactful and often

delicate nature of their missions, American advisor s

often found their activities in Vietnam overshadowed by these more dramatic events . The advisors' role

in Vietnam, however, included every aspect of th e

conflict.

Following the signature of the Geneva Accords o n

20 July 1954, the South Vietnamese Government requested U.S. military aid . The United States grante d

the request and established the Military Assistanc e

Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam. In February

1955, MAAG Vietnam's mission expanded to include the organization and training of the Viet-

*The weapons tested included the Thompson SMG ( .4 5

caliber), the Swedish K, the Israeli Uzi, and the Beretta . LtCol

Philip E. Tucker, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981) (Vietnam

Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)
OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES 24 5

namese forces. Continued growth of the MAAG le d

to the formation of the U .S . Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam (USMACV) in February 196 2

to direct the expanding effort . By the end of 1962 ,

MACV personnel strength reached 11,000 . As the

level of combat increased, MACV grew accordingly ,

and during 1967 General Westmoreland, recognizing the value of the advisory program, requested th e

addition of 3,100 advisory personnel . By 31

December 1967, 7,038 U .S. Army, Navy, Air Force ,

and Marine advisors served in the field with thei r

Vietnamese counterparts ; 76 were Marines .

Marine advisors fell into two categories. The

largest contingent, 40 officers and enlisted men ,

served as members of the 845-man USMACV I Corp s

Field Advisory Element . The Naval Advisory Grou p

(NAG) carried the other Marine advisors on its rolls .

NAG Marines operated with two separate advisor y

components: The Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) an d

the Marine Advisory Unit (MAU) . The Rung Sa t

Special Zone was a small, joint Navy-Marine advisor y

unit, while the Marine Advisory Unit was directed to

the growing Vietnamese Marine Corps.

I Corps Advisors

Marine advisors assigned to I Corps came unde r

the control of the Army Advisory I Corps Headquarters, located at Da Nang, and commanded by ,

Colonel Archelaus L. Hamblen, USA. Colone l

Hamblen reported to the senior advisor ; I Corps,

Lieutenant General Lewis W . Walt, who, in addition to commanding III MAF, wore the advisory

"hat" in the Corps area .

The Marine advisors in I Corps, 20 officers and 2 0

enlisted men, spread throughout the entire I CTZ ,

but most of them concentrated in the 1st ARVN

Division while the rest served with the 2d ARVN

Division and the 51st ARVN Regiment . The I Corps

advisory teams contained U.S . Marine and Army and

Australian personnel. 3

One of the major accomplishments of the Army -

Marine advisory teams with the 1st ARVN Division

involved the improvement of the division's

firepower. During September 1967, the 1st ARV N

Division took over a sector of the DMZ defenses, and

to strengthen its defensive capabilities, the division

received 106mm recoilless rifles and M-60 machin e

guns. Its mortar allocations increased, and late in th e

year the entire division was reequipped with M-1 6

rifles .

Photo courtesy of LtCol James R . Davis

Marine Capt James R. Davis (second from right), th e

senior advisor to a battalion of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division, and his assistants, pose with the battalion's commander (center) . Comprising the team

are a Marine lieutenant, an Australian warrant officer, Capt Davis, and an Army sergeant first class.

Five major ARVN actions during 1967 in I Corp s

demonstrated increased South Vietnamese unit combat effectiveness, the goal of the advisory effort . In

February, 2d ARVN Division battalions engage d

elements of the 1st VC and NVA Regiments in

Quang Ngai Province, killing 813 enemy . To the

north, 1st ARVN Division regulars accounted for

392 NVA killed during May as they worked with th e

3d Marine Division during Operation Lam So n

54 /Hickory.

Lam Son 54 provided an excellent example of the

rigors experienced by advisors assigned to I Corps.

On the night of 20 May 1967, Marine First Lieu -

tenant William M. Grammar, senior advisor to the

3d Battalion, 1st Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, was

with the battalion command group. Suddenly a

large North Vietnamese force lunged out of th e

darkness, completely overrunning the group . During the confused action which followed, enemy fir e

hit one of Grammar's assistants . Grammar tried to

carry him to safety, but the wounded American

refused, saying that he would stay behind and pro-
246 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

3d MarDiv ComdC, April 196 7

Marine Capt Roger E. Knapper, an advisor to the 1s t

AR VN Infantry Division, inspects a well-constructe d

bunker at one of the divisions bases in April 1967 .

vide covering fire . Lieutenant Grammar, with the

rest of his team, fought his way through the encircling enemy to the relative safety of a nearby village .

There, an enemy search party discovered them .

Grammar, trying to draw the Communists awa y

from his group of survivors, broke into the open an d

ran into an open field . His efforts failed and th e

enemy force captured him .

Meanwhile, the 4th Battalion of the 1st ARVN

Regiment received orders to go to the assistance of

the survivors of the 3d Battalion . By 0600 the 4t h

made contact with the same enemy unit that ha d

overrun the 3d Battalion. The battle raged all morning; close air support and artillery helped the 4t h

Battalion to drive the North Vietnamese from their

original positions . Senior battalion advisor, Marine

Captain James R. Davis, directed the supportin g

arms effort. At 1100, the 4th Battalion located the

main enemy force near a church . The South Vietnamese launched a determined assault against th e

enemy position at 1300 and, despite heavy NV A

automatic weapons fire and B-40 rockets, the battalion carried the Communist position . The NVA

unit broke off the engagement . The 4th Battalio n

consolidated the church position, where they foun d

the body of First Lieutenant Grammar . His captors

had killed him before they fled . *

Later in the year, during July, the 1st ARVN Division conducted a sweep operation, Lam Son 87 ,

north of Hue. During the . operation, the divisio n

shattered the 802d VC Battalion. The final enemy

body count reached 252 . The next month, in Quan g

Nam Province, units from the independent 51st

ARVN Regiment tracked down a battalion of th e

21st NVA Regiment, and killed 197 . Later in the

fall, during Lam Son 138 east of Quang Tri City, a

1st ARVN Division battalion smashed another NV A

battalion. At the end of the day-long battle, a total

of 107 North Vietnamese bodies covered the field .

Marine advisors participated in all of these actions .

In I Corps during 1967, South Vietnamese large-uni t

actions killed more than 8,000 enemy troops, as

compared to 5,271 in 1966 . The advisors were accomplishing their mission .

The Rung Sat Special Zone

Since the beginning of Vietnamese history, th e

Rung Sat, literally "forest of assassins, " represented a

source of vexation to the rulers of Cochin China . The

Rung Sat is a dense maangrove swamp covering th e

400 square miles separating Saigon from the sea .

Saigon's main waterway to the South China Sea, th e

Long Tau River, meanders through the tangle of th e

Rung Sat . The area served as the hideout of countles s

pirates and other fugitives in the past and remaine d

ideally suited for the Viet Minh and later the Vie t

Cong. The only way to move in the Rung Sat is b y

small, shallow draft boat, and its tidal waterway s

challenged navigation . Only long term residents o f

the Rung Sat knew its secrets, and the Viet Con g

were long term residents. The primary VC threa t

from the Rung Sat was the possibility of sinking

large shipping in the Long Tau, thereby blocking th e

Saigon port . The VC attempted this many times an d

forced the South Vietnamese into an extended "ca t

and mouse" game of finding and expelling the Communists from their sanctuary.

As one solution to the threat posed by the Vie t

Cong presence in the Rung Sat, the South Vietnamese Government designated the region as a

*Lieutenant Grammar received a posthumous Silver Star Meda l

for this action . LtCol James R. Davis, Comments on draft ms ,

14May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)
OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES 24 7

special tactical operational area, thus the designatio n

Rung Sat Special Zone . As in all other arenas of conflict in Vietnam, American advisors served there . By

1967 the RSSZ Advisory Team consisted of two

Marine officers, one Navy officer, three enliste d

Marines, and two sailors . The team had its head -

quarters at Nha Be, sevetl miles south of Saigon, on

the west bank of the Long Tau River. The base provided an ideal operational site since it lay at the junction of the Long Tau and the Soi Rap River, the latter forming the southern boundary of the RSSZ.

Boats from Nha Be could reach the entire perimete r

of the swamp .

The RSSZ advisors faced multiple duties . As the

resident experts, they coordinated all efforts to forc e

the Communists out of the swamp . Initially, they

worked with a meager Vietnamese force consisting

only of local RF and PF units . As the year progresse d

the unit's advisory responsibilities increased as th e

South Vietnamese directed larger formations and

more sophisticated equipment against the enemy i n

the zone. During the year, the United States improved the Nha Be base to support U .S . Navy river

patrol boats, minesweepers, landing craft, and the

invaluable Navy Sea Wolf helicopter fire teams . On

28 February 1967, the U .S . Navy established the

Riverine Assault Force (TF 117), which represented

the Navy element of a new tactical organization, the

Mekong Delta Mobile Assault Force . This force

made its combat debut in a joint operation with the

9th U .S . Division in the Rung Sat during March .

Following this penetration, operations in the Rung

Sat increased in tempo and scale through the summer and fall .

The Communists responded to the increased

allied efforts . They shelled Nha Be twice durin g

August, and during the first attack on 3 August, the

Communists wounded 24 men . Enemy attacks

against shipping continued. On 16 March the Communists hit the SS Conqueror with six 75mm

recoilless rifle rounds as it sailed up the Long Tau .

On 18 November they hit the SS Buchanan 1 9

times. On 22 December, a mine exploded under th e

SS Seatrain Texas while it lay at anchor near Nha Be .

The Buchanan shelling touched off a reaction

which is an excellent illustration of advisory activit y

in the Rung Sat . At the time of the incident, Marine

Captain Clifford R. Dunning served as the RSSZ advisor to a specially formed Vietnamese commando/intelligence unit. The unit quickly planned an

operation that sent a reaction force in three

helicopters after the VC gunners. The helicopters

could not land, which forced Dunning and his unit

to jump into the swamp from the hovering

helicopters from a height of about 12 feet . About

200 meters from the insert point, the reaction forc e

caught up with the Viet Cong . After a sharp

firefight, the enemy broke and ran, leaving behin d

two 75mm recoilless rifles . An air strike intercepted

the fleeing VC . One enemy charged out of the

swamp toward Captain Dunning . Dunning shot

him . Shortly thereafter, the air strike ended and th e

surviving VC regrouped and counterattacked th e

Vietnamese commando party . Dunning 's unit stopped the VC charge. Another heavy firefight

developed, and once more the South Vietnamese at -

tacked . While the South Vietnamese drove the VC

back, a smoke grenade dropped from a friendl y

helicopter injured Dunning . Once more the Viet

Cong withdrew and Dunning and his men established a night position . They counted 16 VC bodies on

the battlefield . In addition, the capture of the two

recoilless rifles deprived the VC of their best antishipping weapons . *

Once inside the dank, smelly confines of the

swamp, the rest of Viet Nam seemed as remote a s

another world . The Rung Sat Advisors fought a very

personal, almost private, war in the slime and heat

of the Forest of Assassins.

The Marine Advisory Unit

The Marine Advisory Unit adapted its size according to the needs of the expanding Vietnames e

Marine Corps (VNMC) . Starting as a single battalion

in 1955, by the spring of 1967 the Vietnamese

Marine Corps had grown to a strength of six infantr y

battalions, an artillery battalion, and supporting

elements. The advisory unit expanded from one officer in 1955 to 25 Marine officers, one Navy officer ,

and five enlisted Marines by January 1967 .

At the beginning of the year, Colonel Nels E .

Anderson served as the senior Marine advisor . He

assigned teams of two officers, usually a major and a

captain, to each battalion, while other members o f

the group served as technical advisors or performe d

the diverse administrative functions of the MAG . When the Vietnamese Marines deployed in brigad e

or task force formations, normally two infantry bat -

*For his actions on 18 November 1967, Captain Dunning

received the Silver Star Medal .
248 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

talions and an artillery battery, an additional pair of

advisors went with the force headquarters .

Both the Vietnamese Marine Brigade and the Airborne Brigade operated as the national strategic

reserve . This designation was, however, a misnomer ;

the so-called strategic reserve seldom sat uncommitted. The units engaged in combat operations mor e

than 80 percent of the year . The role of the Marines

resembled that of a theater reserve, but the emphasis

was on rotational commitment, rather than retention as a static reserve element .

All but one of the VNMC battalions had their

home base on the outskirts of Saigon . The one exception was the 4th, which operated from Vung

Tau, located on the sea 60 kilometers southeast o f

Saigon. For this reason, when a Marine battalio n

began a scheduled rehabilitation, it usually returned

to Saigon and assumed duties in either the Capital

Military District, the geographic area including and

surrounding Saigon, or the Rung Sat Special Zone ,

(RSSZ), which also lay near the battalions' base

camps.

The strategic role and high commitment rate

caused the officers and men of the Marine Advisory

Group to see as much, if not more, of Vietnam during their respective 12-month tours than any othe r

group of Americans . The familiar Vietnamese verb ,

"Di!" (Go!), assumed a special meaning to the ad -

visors. Not only did it raise the immediate question

of where, but experience soon taught the unwary

that "Di!" could mean "We're going!" for weeks—o r

possibly months. For example, during 1967, the 1st

Battalion remained in the field in Binh Dinh Province for 117 days, from 14 July until 8 November .

Vietnamese Marine operations during 1967 fell in -

to three general categories : security operations in

both the Capital Military District and the Rung Sat

Special Zone, a year-long campaign against the well -

entrenched Viet Cong in Binh Dinh Province in II

CTZ, and search and destroy sweeps in III and I V

Corps.

One exception occurred with Operation Son g

Than/Deckhouse V, a joint U .S. Marine-Vietnamese

Marine effort . The first large-scale USMC/VNMC

amphibious operation, Song Than/Deckhouse V

went after VC elements reported active in the coasta l

regions of Kien Hoa Province . Intelligence officers

reported the Communist units there included

elements of the 516th, 518th, and 261st VC Battalions.

The landing force of Vietnamese Marines came

from VNMC Brigade Force Bravo, consisting of th e

3d, 4th, and part of the 6th Battalion, reinforced b y

Battery C of the VNMC Artillery Battalion . The

American force came from the Special Landing Forc e

(SLF), then consisting of BLT 1/9 and HMM-362 .

Colonel Anderson recalled the problems he en -

countered in coordinating the command relation -

ships of this operation :

When I learned that Deckhouse V was to be conducted

in Kien Hoa Province, I seized upon the opportunity to get

the Vietnamese Marines involved at last in an amphibiou s

operation, which, after all, was supposed to be their

primary mission . I knew this would involve certain risk s

because none of the Vietnamese Marines had had any

training whatsoever in this, the most complex of all

military operations. One plus factor, however, was that th e

field-rank officers that were to participate were graduate s

of Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, and several

junior officers and senior N.C.O.s had attended school at

Landing Force Training Command, Pacific .

The first thing I did was to discuss the operation with

the Commandant, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang,

at his headquarters at Bien Hoa . (Bien Hoa was the head -

quarters of the III Corps of which General Khang was commander at this time .) Khang, also a graduate of AWS wa s

very enthusiastic when told about the operation . Amon g

other things discussed were the command relations in amphibious operations as established by existing doctrine . He

said he understood perfectly and that he would place the

Vietnamese Marine units to be in Deckhouse V under the

command of the Amphibious Task Force Commander.

This of course would be a departure from command relationships then existing between U .S . and South Vietnamese Forces.

After embarkation, I learned that the Vietnamese Joint

General Staff had disapproved of the command relationships agreed to by General Khang and that the ol d

"cooperation and coordination" system would be in effect .

I never could see the logic for such arrangement, and in m y

opinion the lack of unity of command between the U .S .

and Vietnamese forces was a glaring weakness in the entir e

war ?

Song Than/Deckhouse V got off to a bad start . A

compromise of the operation occurred even befor e

the Vietnamese Marines embarked . Hurried planning, unclear command structures, faulty radio nets,

and poor liaison compounded operational problems.

Even the elements turned against the Marines.

Rough seas postponed the landing for one day, and

after returning to Vung Tau for ship-to-ship

transfers, the Marines devised a new landing plan .

The new plan called for helilifting most of the

assault force . By this time, as many as 40 percent o f

the Vietnamese Marines had succumbed to

seasickness. The landing on- 7 January did not•
OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES 24 9

brighten their spirits . Major Donald E . Wood, the

operations and training advisor, reported :

Following the assault across Red Beach . . . Brigade

Force Bravo was informed by local inhabitants in the area

that VC elements had been alerted regarding the scheduled date and location of the operation three weeks prior to 1

January . The result was that very light contact was gained

with VC by assault units. ,

Song Than/Deckhouse V ended on 15-16 Januar y

as Brigade Force Bravo went through the tedious

process of reloading from the shallow beaches o f

Kien Hoa and unloading again at Vung Tau . The

week in the recently harvested rice fields and vexing

mangrove swamps of the Mekong Delta resulted i n

five dead VC and the capture of 25 suspects, 10 o f

whom proved to be Viet Cong . These were lackluste r

results for an operation conducted by 1,750 Vietnamese Marines . One 4th Battalion Marine drowne d

and seven other troops suffered accidental wounds .

The " lessons learned" were manifold ; however Song

Than/Deckhouse V represented the last operation o f

its type . MACV restricted the SLF to I CTZ and the

Vietnamese Marines reverted to their previous landlocked role . *

During the year four Vietnamese Marine battalions participated in forays into the forebodin g

swamps of the Rung Sat :

*See Chapter 11 for the SLF account of Deckhouse V .

1st Battalion 2-8 Feburary

4th Battalion 11 March-12 April

1st Battalion 11 April-12 May

6th Battalion 12 May-21 Jul y

3d Battalion 12 August-15 Septembe r

The 6th Battalion senior advisor's report of the 1 2

May-21 July occupation provides an insight into the

conditions in the Rung Sat. Major Robert L . Fischer

reported:

The tidal range in the TAOR is 12 feet . . . . At low tid e

many small streams are dry and larger rivers and stream s

present high, steep banks. The rapid currents during filling and receding tides make small streams dangerous for

troop crossing and difficult for maneuverability of smal l

boats. At high tide it is virtually impossible to move rapidly by foot . . . . Ambushers placed along streams ofte n

found themselves waist deep in water for at least half of

the ambush period .6

Another frustration of Rung Sat duty stemme d

from the Viet Cong's ability to recognize Marine intentions, which made decisive engagements virtuall y

impossible . Major Fischer's report revealed some of

the simple but effective VC measures :

The Viet Cong utilize a simple system of early warning

and signal towers. Near each active camp located in th e

TAOR was a tree platform or tower . On ten occasions VC

were observed either in the tower or dropping from it an d

running into the nearest dense area . These towers are

located across the Rung Sat and undoubtedly serve t o

signal elements crossing the Rung Sat between adjacen t

A unit of Vietnamese wades ashore from a landing craft in a flooded part of the Mekon g

Delta during the joint Operation Deckhouse V in the Delta region in January .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A 190966
250 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

provinces, as well as providing early warning and uni t

massing capability . ?

Simply stated, Rung Sat duty remained hot, wet ,

filthy, frustrating, and dangerous . Myriad bugs,

gnats, mosquitoes, and ants added to the grim atmosphere of the swamp . In spite of these obstacles ,

the five VNMC Rung Sat battalion-size operations i n

1967 cost the Viet Cong 30 killed at a price of fou r

Marines killed and 21 wounded .

Action In Binh Dinh Province

An area of major VNMC action in 1967 was Binh

Dinh Province in northern II CTZ. After operating

there since mid-1964, all Vietnamese Marines

became familiar with the beautiful Bong Son plai n

and the seemingly endless ridge lines that exten d

westward to Laos . In 1965, the first U.S. ground

forces moved into II Corps. The 1st U. S . Cavalry

Division (Airmobile) went to An Khe with the mission of keeping Route 19 open between Pleiku an d

Qui Nhon . Joint U.S. /RVN operations started shortly after the arrival of the "1st Cay . "

For the Vietnamese Marines, operations in Bin h

Dinh proved different from those in III and IV CTZs

to the south . The dense forest of the uncultivated

areas, the concentration of the population in a narrow coastal strip, cooler weather, long periods of

morning fog, and much more solid land forms, all

contributed to tactical variations. Generally, the Vie t

Cong in Binh Dinh represented a different breed .

Dominated by the Viet Minh in the Fifties, the province remained notorious for its solid Communist

base . The Binh Dinh Cong were "hard core" in ever y

sense of the term.

The terrain in Binh Dinh supports cultivation onl y

in the coastal regions, hence the population center s

there . The rest of the province, all forested, served as

an enormous VC sanctuary . Only woodcutters and

scattered Montagnards roamed the hinterlands ; the

Communists moved at will under the vast fores t

canopy . Operating from the spacious inland sanctuary, the VC had the enviable position of operatin g

on interior lines against the densely populate d

coastal region .

The GVN forces, on the other hand, sought to

protect vulnerable Routes 1 and 19, as well as th e

railroad and the Bong Son Airfield, all in lowlan d

regions, except for the western end of Route 19 .

Similarly, most of the population requiring protection concentrated in these same lowlands. The con -

centrated population made government contro l

somewhat easier, but the local citizens remained

apathetic ; the Communists long dominance made

their influence strong .

Operationally, the terrain proved suitable for a

different type of guerrilla warfare, unlike that experienced in the swamps and delta region i n

southern South Vietnam . In Binh Dinh Province th e

ground is hard, even during the rainy season . Cove r

and concealment is excellent . Seasonal, dense morning fog neutralizes the effect of air superiority . These

factors provided the Communists with excellent

mobility and they moved without fear of detection .

Consequently, their vast natural hiding place, the

inland forests, allowed the Viet Cong to operat e

more audaciously than elsewhere in the country .

One commodity, food, remained in short suppl y

in Binh Dinh Province . The main cultivated areas la y

along Route 1 . In 1967, the government still con -

trolled the food producing areas and the Communists wanted them . That brought the Vietnames e

Marines and 1st U .S. Cavalry Division to northern II

Corps .

The first major VNMC action in II CTZ during

1967 was Operation Pershing/Song Than 9, a joint

operation with the 1st Cavalry Division near Bon g

Son. Song Than 9. was a satisfactory operation . During the period 14-22 February Brigade Force Bravo ,

the 2d and 3d Battalions, killed 54 Viet Cong . In

return, the enemy killed three Marines and wounde d

27 . Remaining in the Bong Son area, the brigad e

force spent the rest of February, all of March, an d

the first part of April conducting sweep operations.

They coordinated . these operations with the 1st

Cavalry Division 's operations in adjacent areas, bu t

the Marine sweeps remained separate operations .

On 18-19 April, Brigade Force Alpha flew t o

English Airfield at Bong Son where it relieve d

Brigade Force Bravo . On the 22nd, Force Alpha

began search and destroy/pacification of a TAOR including Tam Quan on the north, Bong Son to the

south, the portion of Route 1 connecting the two

towns, with the South China Sea serving as th e

eastern boundary . Elsewhere in II CTZ, Brigade

Force Bravo, under the direction of the 22d ARVN

Division, conducted two major operations from 1 8

March through 18 April . Again, these actions paralleled but remained separate from 1st Cavalry Division operations . Brigade Force Alpha stayed in the

Bong Son region until July . At the conclusion o f

Operation Bac Thien 817 on 12 July, Brigade Force
OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES 25 1

Alpha resumed patrolling of its TAOR until relieved

by Brigade Force Bravo on the 26th . The latter uni t

started Operation Song Than 14 the next day .

Brigade Force Alpha left II Corps in late July; Force

Bravo remained until 6 November . The two units

again switched places and Force Alpha remaine d

there until well into 1968 .

Vietnamese Marine operations in II CTZ during

1967 showed impressive results. Communist losses

totaled 202 killed and 282 captured . Marine losse s

for the year's II CTZ campaign numbered 49 killed

and 215 wounded .

Action in the South

Other than periodic assignments to the Rung Sat ,

security operations around Saigon in the Capital

Military District, and rotations to II CTZ, the rest of

the Vietnamese Marines' 1967 operations took place

in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones; six occurred

in the former and five in the latter .

From 22 February through 11 March, Brigade

Force Alpha, consisting of the reinforced 1st and 5th

Battalions took part in Operation Junction City, a

search and destroy operation with the 25th U .S . Infantry Division . Force Alpha became the only Vietnamese unit to participate in the largest allied operation since the beginning of the war. Marine contac t

was very light, but the net results of the joint operation included the seizure of more than 364 tons o f

rice and significant damage to enemy installations i n

the Communists' War Zone C, This zone lay in a

triangular territory formed by Route 13, the Cambodian border, and a line connecting Ben Cat with Ta y

Ninh. Vietnamese Marine-U . S. relations improved

further when the brigade force commander, Colone l

Bui The Lan, requested that his force be granted a

more aggressive role in the 25th Division's scheme o f

operations. The Americans granted the request an d

Brigade Force Alpha avoided acting as a blocking

force.

In May, Brigade Force Bravo, then consisting o f

the reinforced 1st and 5th Battalions moved fro m

Saigon to Vi Tanh, 45 kilometers southwest of Ca n

Tho in IV CTZ. There, under 21st ARVN Division

control, the Marine force participated in the

uneventful Operation Dan Chi 287/C. On 28 May ,

Force Bravo left its attached artillery behind an d

undertook a riverine assault . This operation, Lon g

Phi 999/N, proved unproductive and the Marine

elements became the 9th ARVN Division reserve a t

Vinh Long .

On 7 June, Brigade Force Bravo moved to Tan

Uyen village, 13 kilometers north of Bien Hoa in II I

CTZ where it came under the direct control of III

Corps Headquarters . On 20 June the 1st Marine Battalion left to participate with the 1st U.S . Infantry

Division in Operation Billings, north of Tan Uyen .

The net result of these actions for the Marines included the loss of nine killed, 34 wounded . Among

the wounded was the 1st Battalion's assistant ad -

visor, Captain Manfred E . Schwarz . Communist

losses were 14 killed and one captured . Vietnamese

Marine operations in III and IV Corps got off to a

slow start in 1967 .

When Operation Billings ended on 9 July ,

Brigade Force Bravo moved from Tan Uyen to

neighboring Phuoc Tuy Province . There, with the

9th U.S. Infantry Division, the 1st Australian Tas k

Force, and the 43d ARVN Regiment, Force Bravo ,

now consisting of the 2d and 3d Marine Battalions,

joined Operation Paddington. The mission involve d

locating and destroying the 274th VC Regiment .

The Marines opened their phase of the operation a t

0900 on 10 July with a helicopter landing in thei r

respective zones of action . Contact continued ligh t

throughout the 10th and 11th, but at 0900 on 12 July, elements of the 3d Battalion made contact wit h

what appeared to be an enemy battalion . Heavy

fighting continued until 1600 when the VC brok e

off the engagement. For the next three days the

Marines conducted search operations but made n o

contact . Finally, on the 15th, Brigade Force Brav o

regrouped at Xuan Loc and motored back to its bas e

camp at Thu Duc outside Saigon . Brigade Force

Bravo reported 43 Communists dead as the result o f

Paddington; 11 Marines died and 31 suffered

wounds during the operation .

One of the most serious problems faced by ad -

visors in the field revolved around establishing th e

precise status of the advisor vis-a-vis his counterpart.

Often the Americans gave advice which their Vietnamese counterparts ignored . Third parties often

compounded this situation . Major Charles E . Parker,

senior advisor with Brigade Force Bravo during

Operation Paddington, summed up the proble m

when he stated :

On two occasions coordination with U .S . units consisted

of the [American] unit commanding officer simply statin g

his intentions to the nearest USMC advisor, then leaving

without waiting for a discussion with the Task Force Com -

mander. This abruptness, however, was probably more a

result of late receipt of orders rather than any obstinacy on

the part of the U.S. command . As it turned out,
252 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

liaison/coordination problems were solved befor e

dangerous situations developed .

Major Parker continued :

The U.S . Army commanders and their staffs are no t

aware of the organization and functions of U .S. Marine ad -

visors. They work on the assumption that we operate wit h

teams similar to U .S . Army advisory teams (which wer e

larger). They also seem to forget that USMC advisors ar e

just what the term implies, advisors, not commanders . '

During the last week in July, the 3d Battalion participated in Operation Concordia VII with the 2 d

Brigade, 9th U.S. Infantry Division . The operation

produced no contacts or casualties, but the riverin e

landing in Long An Province proved that the Vietnamese Marines were prepared for this type o f

maneuver .

Intelligence sources reported a concentration of

elements of it least four VC battalions in Dinh

Tuong Province during late July . Accordingly, a

quickly planned operation, Coronado II/Song Tha n

63/67 began under the control of the 9th U .S . Infantry Division . Other units assigned to Coronado I I

included 1st Brigade, 25th U.S . Infantry Division ;

11th Army Armored Cavalry Regiment ; and the

ARVN 44th and 52d Ranger Battalions. Marine participation consisted of Task Force Alpha made up o f

the 3d and 4th Marine Battalions and Battery B from

the Marine Artillery Battalion .

The first phase of Coronado II started on 30 July .

Helicopters put the 3d Battalion into a landing zon e

north of the Mekong River. It was a bad zone . Immediately upon landing the battalion found itself in

trouble . The Viet Cong occupied the heavily fortified area north of the LZ in force . The 3d Battalio n

could not move . To help, the 4th Battalion went by

helicopters into a second LZ north of the 3d Battalion's position . The 4th Battalion moved to put

pressure on the Viet Cong positions which now lay

between the two Marine' battalions . A prisoner

revealed that elements of the veteran 263d and

514th VC Battalions faced the Marines. The battl e

raged all day in the jungle-canopied terrain as gun -

ships, air strikes, and artillery pounded the well -

entrenched Communists . At dusk the VC tried t o

break out, but the 3d and 4th Battalions held . Fir e

fights continued all night.

Captain Jerry I. Simpson, senior advisor to the 3d

Battalion, spent the entire day and most of the nigh t

directing supporting arms against the tough enem y

position. Enemy mortar rounds, rockets, and small

arms fire continued to hold back the Marines' advance . Suddenly, at 0500 on the 31st, a VC force of

about two companies attempted a mass break-out .

Their path led them directly to the 3d Battalio n

command post located partly in a small hut . In the

confused fighting which followed, the VC overran

the CP, but Captain Simpson and surviving Marines

drove the VC back through the CP toward the VC 's

original positions. After that, the fighting stoppe d

abruptly . The remaining Viet Cong managed to sli p

away in the jungle . At 1300, helicopters extracted

the 3d Battalion and returned it to Dong Tam . The

4th Battalion continued sweep operations until 1500

the next day when it too withdrew to Dong Tam . On

1 August the 5th Battalion relieved the 3d and th e

latter moved by transport aircraft to Thu Duc .

Phase II proved uneventful and Vietnamese par=

ticipation in Coronado II ended on 4-5 August . The

4th and 5th Battalions returned to their Thu Du c

bases. The sharp action of 30-31 July hurt the VC i n

Dinh Tuong Province . The Marines killed 108 an d

captured six. Total South Vietnamese losses for th e

operation numbered 44 killed and 115 wounded . Of

these, one of the dead and seven of the wounde d

were the result of friendly fires, an accident whic h

provided a bitter lesson in coordination.

Task force Alpha went to the field again on 1 1

August . Operation Song Than 701-67, a three-phas e

operation in Bien Hoa Province, dragged on until 2 1

October. Various battalion combinations under Task

Force Alpha permitted the 2d, 4th, 5th, and 6th

Battalions to participate, but the results prove d

disappointing . They killed one VC. Coordinatio n

problems plagued the multibattalion, join t

U.S ./Vietnamese sweep . The most tragic error happened on 16 September. A 155mm round, fired

from an improperly laid howitzer scored a direct hi t

on the 6th Battalion's command post and killed

three Marines and wounded 11 .

Credit for the most successful operational series i n

1967 belongs to the 5th Battalion . During the

period 9 November through 22 December, the 5t h

served as one of three maneuver battalions of th e

U .S . Mobile Riverine Force . Their operations concentrated in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Kien

Phong Provinces. The 5th Battalion took part in nine

separate actions during this period. The 44 days of

riverine operation netted the battalion the impressive total of 186 dead Communists and 3 2

prisoners, including one VC province chief.
OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES 25 3

While assigned to the Mobile Riverine Force, th e

battalion normally stayed in the field for three day s

of operations, followed by a stand down period of

the same duration . Missions generally started wit h

the battalion moving in boats of the River Assaul t

Division to an area of operations. Once in the assigned area, the battalion moved frequently, either b y

boat or helicopter, depending on the tactical situation.

A classic riverine operation, executed by Majo r

Huong Van Nam's 5th Marine Battalion, started a t

midnight on 3 December as the Marines embarke d

on assault ships at Sa Dec . Their mission : destruction

of the 267th Main Force and 502d Local Force VC

Battalions, then located in eastern Kien Phong an d

western Dinh Tuong Provinces. The force moved

down the northern bank of the Mekong and entere d

the Rach Ruong Canal to make a landing on the west

bank of the canal at 0800 . The plan called for the

Marines to land, move west, and then sweep sout h

back toward the Mekong . Two U.S. Army battalions, one embarked, supported the operation .

The sun came up as the river craft entered the

canal . All remained quiet until 0740 when the rear

of the boat column came under light small arms fir e

from the west bank. As the column moved up th e

canal, heavier fire, including recoilless rifles an d

B-40 rockets, opened up from positions furthe r

north on the west bank . All of the boats returne d

fire and the South Vietnamese called in the supporting gunships. A Communist B-40 rocket hit one o f

the ATCs (an armored troop carrying boat), an d

wounded 18 Marines. The 5th Battalion continue d

on toward its original landing beaches . Only the end

of the column came under enemy attack . The boat

formation carrying the 3d Battalion, 47th U .S . Infantry, which followed the 5th Battalion, heard the

enemy fire and took advantage of their warning . The

3d Battalion promptly landed on the west bank,

south of the first VC firing position .

At 0800 the Communists opened fire on the 5th

Battalion again, this time from another west ban k

position about 2,500 meters north of the last firin g

site . Obviously, a large VC force occupied the west

bank of the Rach Ruong . Enemy B-40 rounds hit six

ATCs. Major Nam ordered his battalion to land o n

the west bank immediately . The 2d and 3d Companies landed near Objective 18, while the 1st, 4th ,

and Headquarters Companies landed at Blue Beac h

1 .

The 1st Company became heavily engaged as soon

as it landed, while Headquarters Company and the

4th Company met much lighter opposition . Neither

the 2d and 3d Companies, to the north, had any

contact . The 4th Company moved 250 meters inland, stopped, and called in air and artillery . Majo r

Nam realized that his left flank units, the 1st an d

4th Companies, were engaging the northern portio n

of the VC formation, by then identified as the .502 d

Local Force Battalion . Major Nam ordered the 2 d

and 3d Companies to retract and land again at Blu e

Beach 2, move inland, seize objectives 114 and 213 ,

and encircle the Communists. Both companies accomplished the mission ; the VC found themselve s

surrounded . The riverine force boats blocked escap e

to the east across the canal .

By this time the 4th Company had lost contact ,

so, on Major Nam's orders, it withdrew to the beach ,

reembarked, and landed again just south of Blu e

Beach 1 . The VC greeted the company's landing

with intense rocket and automatic weapons fire . The

guns of the assault craft established fire superiority a s

the 4th Company Marines scrambled ashore an d

gained a foothold . The 1st Company closed the ring ,

moving in from the northwest. Coordinated attacks

by both the 1st and 4th Companies slowly rolled u p

the VC position, as the other companies blocked th e

rest of the perimeter. Contact was too close to use

supporting arms . The Marines destroyed the enemy

bunkers systematically, but their progress continue d

slow because their 57mm recoilless rifle had little effect on the well-constructed Communist bunkers .

The senior battalion advisor, Major Paul L .

Carlson, reported final stages of the fight :

By 1600 one major Viet Cong complex remained 60 0

meters inland and withstood all assaults. Rocket gunships

peppered the bunker system . The assaulting units the n

stormed the bunkers using grenades to destroy the opposition and physically tore the bunkers apart with entrenching tools. ,

The battle ended by 1630 . Throughout the night

and the next morning, Viet Cong survivors continued to emerge from hiding places. Some had

reverted to the classic VC trick of hiding under

water, breathing through hollow reeds . The Marines

knew the trick, also .

Enemy casualties during the "Battle of Rac h

Ruong" totaled 175 Viet Cong killed by the 5th

Marine Battalion . They found the bodies of the chief

of staff of the 502d Battalion, one company commander, two platoon commanders, one doctor, and
254 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

two newsmen among the dead . The Marines captured 12 more confirmed VC, including a provinc e

chief, and picked up an additional 12 suspect s

before the 5th Battalion withdrew at 1400 on 5

December . Battalion losses amounted to 40 killed

and 103 wounded, 34 of whom did not requir e

evacuation .

Elsewhere in the AO, other units accounted for

another 91 enemy killed, at the cost of nine

American soldiers killed and 89 wounded . While the

5th Marine Battalion was scoring its resounding victory, the 3d Battalion, 47th U .S. Infantry assaulte d

the VC positions which had fired the openin g

rounds. The Army assault prevented the Communists from going to the aid of their besieged comrades to the north. The Army action provided a

valuable assist, but the Rach Ruong battle remains a s

one of the finer moments in the brief history of th e

Vietnamese Marine Corps.

While the 5th Battalion participated in Coronad o

IX, the 2d Marine Battalion, the major component

of Task Force Bravo, engaged in Operation Son g

Than 808/Buena Vista . Operating with the 199th

U .S . Infantry Brigade, TF Bravo joined Buena Vista

on 7 December. The search and destroy operatio n

covered portions of Binh Hoa and Binh Duong

Provinces. During the 11-day sweep, the Marines

discovered the base camp of the VC Dong Nai Regiment and the Binh Duong Provincial Forces. The

Marines suffered light casualties .

The last Vietnamese Marine Operation of 196 7

was Task Force Bravo's Operation Song Than 809 .

Lasting only three days, 29-31 December, Son g

Than 809 resulted in a 20-hour battle with the 261st

and 263d VC Main Force Battalions in Dinh Tuon g

Province in IV CTZ. At this time TF Bravo consisted

of the 1st and 2d Marine Battalions, reinforced b y

Battery B of the Marine Artillery Battalion ; control

of the operation rested with the 7th ARVN Division .

Helicopters landed both battalions in separat e

zones during the morning of 29 December. There

was no contact. On the 31st the 2d Battalion executed a second helicopter assault . This time the battalion made contact immediately after landing .

Complications came from an unexpected quarter .

At 1700 the 7th ARVN Division forward command

post, controlling Song Than 809, shut down operations in anticipation of the New Year's truce. This

left TF Bravo in the field and in contact. To make

matters worse, the 2d Battalion almost ran out of

ammunition and enemy fire drove off a pre-dar k

helicopter ammunition resupply . As a last recourse ,

the helicopter crewmen dropped the ammunition

during a low pass. Unfortunately, it fell in an open ,

fire-swept area between the 2d Battalion and th e

Viet Cong . Senior battalion advisor, Major Jon A .

Rindfleisch, and a volunteer squad of Marines race d

out into the drop zone, gathered up the scattere d

containers, and rushed them back to the battalion's

lines . The supply kept the 2d Battalion goin g

through the night. *

Meanwhile, to add to the uncertainty of the situation, the 7th ARVN Division released all of its aviation at 1800, again, in anticipation of the Ne w

Year's truce . In spite of these disquieting

developments, contact continued throughout the

night, finally ending at 0530, 1 January when th e

VC withdrew . First light disclosed 85 VC bodies.

The Marines took eight prisoners during the fight

and picked up 71 enemy weapons. Task Force

Bravo's losses included 28 Marines killed and 8 3

wounded. This ended the last Vietnamese Marine

action of 1967 .

During the year 1967, the Vietnamese Marines

participated in 24 major combat operations, 15 of

which were brigade- of task-force-scale maneuvers.

Total VNMC casualties included 201 killed and 70 7

wounded . The Communists suffered 693 killed and

342 captured from Vietnamese Marine actions . The

kill ratio of 3 .45 :1, though not as impressive as th e

U .S. Marine 1967 kill ratio of 5 .18 :1, was a tribut e

to the courage of the Vietnamese Marines, as well as

the dedication of their advisors. The Marine advisors

were fortunate during 1967 ; three suffered wound s

but none died . From the advisory viewpoint, 196 7

represented a year of investment. The dividends included positive results ; the immediate future woul d

affirm the advisors' faith in the abilities of their Vietnamese contemporaries.

*For this and other actions during Song Than 809, Major Rindfleisch received the Silver Star Medal .
CHAPTER 1 6

The Situation at the End of the Yea r

Operational Aspects—Personnel and Logistics—The Outlook for Victory

Enemy Dispositions—The Changed Situatio n

Operational Aspects

During 1967, III MAF's concerns increasingl y

focused north as it shifted the bulk of its Marin e

units toward the DMZ to counter the continuin g

threat of a North Vietnamese invasion . This threa t

forced III MAF to change its top priorities fro m

pacification and counter-guerrilla warfare to fightin g

a conventional war against regular North Vietnamese

infantry units. Enemy intentions followed a similar

pattern . Beginning in 1966, Hanoi referred to th e

conflict as a "regular-force war," with the insurgenc y

playing a secondary role . '

The MACV commander also recognized the DM Z

threat and, in April, reinforced III MAF with the Army's Task Force Oregon at Chu Lai . General

Westmoreland also planned to send the 1st U .S.

Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to I Corps where it

could employ its high mobility around Khe Sanh as

it had in the Central Highlands. He saw the latter

move as a preparatory step should Washingto n

authorize a drive into Laos or an amphibious landin g

just north of the DMZ. 2

Construction of the Dye Marker project continue d

during December, with emphasis on completing

Strongpoint A-3 . The North Vietnamese responde d

with mortar and artillery fire . Marine units conducted continuous search and destroy operations

around and north of A-3 in an effort to control th e

high ground and avenues of approach to the construction site .

An Air Force C-123 "Provider" lands on the air strip at Khe Sanh with supplies afte r

Navy Seabees completed resurfacing the monsoon-damaged strip on 1 November 1967 .

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 196 7

255
256 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 196 7

A Marine, identified only as PFC Bola, shows th e

damage done to his helmet by a near miss fro m

small-arms fire while at the Con Thien combat base .

Enemy units engaged in two types of activity during the final month of the year. In the early weeks o f

December, the North Vietnamese initiated a series

of limited ground attacks along the DMZ using units

as large as companies. Enemy forces also overran an d

destroyed the Binh Son District Headquarters on 5

December. During the final two weeks of 1967 ,

however, the enemy assumed a more defensive

posture, only to sustain heavier casualties because o f

having to fight at a time and place not of their

choosing .

The statistics from III MAF in December provide d

ample evidence that the enemy was not yet defeated .

III MAF conducted 11 large-unit operations during

the month. The Marines killed a confirmed total o f

1,237 enemy soldiers and listed another 701 as

probably killed. Marines also captured 77 prisoners

and 362 weapons ; however, 96 Marines died i n

December.

During 1967, U .S. forces under III MAF contro l

killed 25,452 enemy soldiers and listed anothe r

23,363 as probably killed. These enemy losses totaled 14,728 more than in 1966, a reflection of the increased scale of large-unit battles in northern I

Corps. These forced the North Vietnamese to feed

over 24,000 replacements into their units in I Corps

during the year. By comparison, over 3,600

Americans died in I Corps during the same period .

There were bright spots in the picture for III MA F

at the end of 1967 . During the year, the North Vietnamese had attempted to conquer the northern provinces of South Vietnam only to suffer defeat each

time they took the offensive . Meanwhile, the South

Men of the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines stand in a loose formation beside the air strip a t

Khe Sanh just after arriving in transport aircraft to reinforce the base in December 1967 .

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 1967
THE SITUATION AT THE END OF THE YEAR

Vietnamese Army, as a whole, grew by 130,000 during the year. Its units in I Corps were at 101 .7 percent strength, despite considerable losses due t o

desertions by former peasants unhappy with

assignments far from their home villages and provinces . The arrival of U.S. Army units in I Corps for

service under III MAF also eased the Marines' troop

density problem .

III MAF had 79 Combined Action Platoons in

operation; these killed 259 of the enemy and captured 56 during the second half of the year . Pacification appeared to be regaining the momentum it lost

in 1966, which accounted for the increase in ARV N

strength and the increasing difficulty faced by the

Viet Cong in recruiting new members. Finally,

Highway 1, the main north-south artery, was ope n

from the DMZ to the border of Binh Din h

Province . 3

25 7

Personnel and Logistics

The average strength for III MAF during

December was 103,591, which was 4,203 highe r

than the previous month . Most of these personne l

were Marines (72,782), but 27,565 were in U .S. Army units . The U .S. Navy and U .S . Air Force contributed 3,161 and 83, respectively .

There were some changes underway in III MAF's

force structure as the year ended . III MAF had order s

to deactivate its antitank battalions and to activat e

another company, Company E, for the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, a unit of the 3d Marine Division.

III MAF faced several significant logistic s

problems in the final month of 1967, primarily fro m

the effects of the northeast monsoon . Channel

silting brought on by bad weather and high seas

forced the closing of the LST facility at Tan My on 10

December . Cua Viet's LST facility also closed from

7-29 December for the same reason . Further, the

rough seas prevented transshipment of materials a t

Da Nang for seven days. The weather also affected

airlift capabilities; for example, high winds limited

or curtailed C-123 flight operations for 23 days during December. However, the air strip at Duc Pho

opened for C-130 use on 4 December 1967 .

The M16A1 rifles continued to provide problem s

for Marines in Vietnam . A random inspection o f

rifles issued in the first increment of weapons revealed that a large number had pitted and eroded

chambers . III MAF then terminated the issue of th e

second increment . As of 17 December, a FLC con -

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 196 7

Men from the 3d Engineer Battalion use a bulldozer

at Con Thien in December to push aside some of th e

monsoon-created mud in an attempt to make i t

easier for Marines to walk inside the combat base .

tract team had inspected 9,844 rifles and found tha t

6,603 (67 percent) required replacement. At III

MAF's request, Headquarters, Marine Corps initiated action to obtain chromed chambers for installation by June 1968 .

Finally, III MAF logisticians were not pleased with

a MACV study, published late in the year. The

theme of the study was a desire for a downward revision of authorized stock levels with the expectatio n

of reducing construction costs and achievin g

operating economies. In essence, the study called fo r

fighting a war under peacetime management principles under which stock levels reflected previou s

usage data . Both III MAF and FMFPac took the position that any reduction in authorized stock levels

would impair III MAF's operational capabilities an d

lower the Marines' readiness for emergencies .

The Outlook for Victory

As the year entered its last quarter, the war appeared to be going well . General Westmoreland, in

his often-quoted speech on 21 September at the National Press Club in Washington expressed optimis m

about the future course of the war . He expressed his

belief that the defeats inflicted on the enemy in the
258 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A42200 6

South Vietnam's Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky meets with LtGen Hoang Xuan Lam ,

the I Corps commander; LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., the III MAF commander; and

Army MajGen Samuel W. Koster of the Americal Division at Chu Lai on 28 December .

past year, plus the continued growth of the ARVN

would permit phasing out U .S . units within about

two years. "I am absolutely certain, " he said, "that

whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is

certainly losing." 4

Westmoreland's speech coincided with th e

Johnson Adminstration's highly publicized "progress" campaign in the fall of 1967 . That campaig n

sought to show that the allies were winning the wa r

in South Vietnam . General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. ,

the Commandant of the Marine Corps, was ,

however, one of the few officials who did speak out

on the problems still remaining . His statements ,

which received little media attention, reflected th e

concerns of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and II I

MAF over inadequate manpower, particularly in th e

I Corps area . At a speech in Chicago in September ,

General Greene said :

In the Marines' area of South Vietnam alone, we hav e

1,282,000 people inside our security screen . We must double that number . This will take time—and fighting me n

on the ground .

We have over 2,000 square miles of territory inside th e

same screen of security. But we need a total of 3,000

square miles.

Again, it will take time—and fighting men on th e

ground to do this.

I cite these figures just to give you some idea of the problems—in the Marines' area alone . ,

Enemy Dispositions

The number of regular NVA soldiers in I Corps

numbered just over 21,000 at the end of the year.

Their distribution was follows :

Quang Tri Province . The major units were th e

812th and 90th Regiments of the 324B NVA Division, the 29th and 95th Regiments of the 325C NVA

Division, and the 2d Battalion and regimental head -

quarters of the 9th NVA Regiment. Other forces in

the province included the 5th NVA Regiment, the

27th NVA Independent Battalion, and four independent companies . Total : 10,805 .

Thua Thien Province . The Northern Front Headquarters, the 5th NVA Regiment, four independen t

NVA battalions, and four independent companie s

operated in the province . Total : 3,645 .

Quang Nam Province . This area contained th e

368B NVA Artillery Regiment, four independen t

NVA battalions, and four independent NVA companies. Total : 2,940 .

Quang Tin Province . Operating in this provinc e

were the headquarters and other support units of the

2dNVA Division, the 1st Vietcong Main Force Regi-
THE SITUATION AT THE END OF THE YEAR 25 9

ment, the 21st NVA Regiment, the 3d NVA Regiment, three independent NVA battalions, and seve n

NVA independent companies . Total : 6,075 .

Quang Ngai Province . The major units were the

headquarters of Military Region 5, the 97th Battalion of the 2d Vietcong Main Force Regiment, six

independent NVA battalions, and nine independent NVA companies. Total : 3,645 .

The Changed Situatio n

The bright element of the tactical situation picture quickly faded at year's end in the face of mounting evidence of an impending major enemy offensive . General Westmoreland's optimistic speech at

the National Press Club in September had been based upon an analysis that indicated the allies wer e

winning the war . Hanoi read the same signs an d

changed its strategy .

Previously, Hanoi followed a strategy of protracted war; however, late , in 1967 capture d

documents began containing exhortations for enemy

units to make a maximum effort politically an d

militarily to win the war quickly . During the same

period, the number of enemy defectors decrease d

and captured prisoners began speaking of the coming "final victory ." Intelligence sources in I Corps in -

dicated the 2d NVA Division was shifting its area of

operations in preparation for an offensive. Other

sources reported the 325C NVA Division had moved

back to positions near Hill 881 North, while th e

304th NVA Division, which listed Dien Bien Ph u

among its battle honors, had moved from Laos t o

positions southwest of Khe Sanh .

General Westmoreland analyzed these and simila r

reports and detected an alteration in enemy strategy .

On 20 December, he explained the changed situation in a message to his superiors in Washington . He

emphasized the enemy might seek to gain a majo r

military victory somewhere in South Vietnam, or

perhaps even seek to gain an apparent position o f

strength before assenting to negotiations . "In short, "

wrote Westmoreland, "I believe the enemy has

already made a crucial decision to make a maximum

effort."6

General Westmoreland considered the base a t

Khe Sanh an obvious target for an enemy offensiv e

and ordered III MAF to conduct a buildup i n

preparation for a fight for the base .? In the last few

days of 1967 he repeatedly advised reporters to expect "an intensified campaign in the coming

months." The President echoed these expectation s

when he told the Australian cabinet about th e

enemy buildup . "We must try very hard to b e

ready," said President Johnson . "We face dark days

ahead . "8

Amid the mud, barbed wire, sand-bagged positions, and welter of supplies at the Co n

Thien combat base, a young Marine stands radio watch as the year 1967 draws to a close .

3d MarDiv ComdC, December 1967

Notes

PART I

The DMZ in Early 196 7

CHAPTER 1

THE SITUATION AT THE START OF THE YEA R

Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derive d

from : Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN, and Genera l

Westmoreland, USA, Report on the War In Vietnam, hereafter

Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War; FMFPac, U .S.

Marine Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67 Historical Summary ,

Volume I: Narrative ; FMFPac monthly summaries, Operation o f

U .S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, Jan Jun67 ; III MAF ComdCs, JanJun67 ; 3d Marine Division ComdCs, Jan-Jun67 ; 1st marine Aircraft Wing ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ; 3d Marine Division AAR, Operation Prairie I, 28 Apr67 ; Brigadier General Edwin H . Simmons,

"Marine Corps Operation in Vietnam, 1967, " USNI, Naval

Review 1969, hereafter Simmons "USMC Ops in RVN, 1967 . "

Unless otherwise noted all documentary material cited is located

in the Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington ,

D .C.

1. Colonel John C. Studt, Comments on draft ms, 14May81 .

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

2. Quoted in Sharp and Westmoreland, Report On The War, p .

132 .

3. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n ..d . (1981 )

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

CHAPTER 2

SPRING ACTION SOUTH OF THE

DMZ—FEBRUARY-APRIL 196 7

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived

from FMFPac monthly summaries, Operations of U .S. Marine

Forces, Vietnam, Jan-Jun67, hereafter FMFPac, MarOps V

(month, year); III MAF ComdC JanJun67 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC ,

Jan-Jun67 ; 1st MAW ComdC, Jan-Jun67 ; BGen Edwin H . Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967, " USNI,

Naval Review 1969, hereafter Simmons, " USMC Ops, RVN . "

Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located

at the Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington ,

D.C.)

Operation Prairie I Continue s

Additional material in this section is derived from 3d MarDi v

AAR, Opn Prairie I, 28Apr67 ; 3d Mar ComdC, Jan67 ; 12th Mar

ComdC, Jan67 ; 3/4 ComdC, Jan67 . All documentary material

cited is in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Operation Prairie II

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s

derived from 3d MarDiv AAR, Opn Prairie II, 19May67 ; 3d Mar

ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 9th Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 12th Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 3d Recon Bn

ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 2/3 ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 3/3 ComdC, Feb -

Mar67 ; 3/4 ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 1/9 ComdC, Feb-Mar67 ; 2/ 9

ComdC, Feb-Mar67 . All documentary material cited is in th e

MCHC, Washington, D .C.

1. LtCol Robert F . Sheridan, comments on draft MS, 11Jun8 1

(Vietnam Comment File) .

2. Ibid .

3. Ibid .

4. Ibid .

5. Ibid .

Operation Prairie III

Additional material in this section is derived from 3d MarDi v

AAR, Opn Prairie III, 13Jun67 ; 3d Mar ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 3 d

Recon Bn ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 11th Engr Bn ComdC, MarApr67 ; 3/3 ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 1/4 ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 3/ 4

ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 1/9 ComdC, Mar-Apr67 ; 3/9 ComdC, MarApr67 . All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC ,

Washington, D .C.

CHAPTER 3

COMBINED US/ARVN OPERATIONS

IN THE DMZ

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derive d

from 3d MarDiv AAR, Opn Prairie IV, 13Jul67 ; 3d MarDiv AAR,

Opn Hickory, 3Aug67 ; SLF Alpha (TG 79 .4) AAR, Opn Bea u

Charger/Hickory, 10Jun67 ; 1/3 AAR, Opn Beau Charger ,

12Jun67 ; HMM 263 AAR, Opn Beau Charger, 10Jun67 ; SLF

Bravo (TG 79 .5) AAR, Opn Belt Tight/Hickory, 22Jun67 . Unless

otherwise noted, all documentary cited is located in the MCHC , Washington, D .C.

261
262 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Operation Prairie IV Begins

Additional material in this section is derived from 9th Mar

ComdC, May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, May67 ; 1/4 ComdC, May67 ; 1/ 9

ComdC, May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, May67 ; 11th Engr Bn ComdC,

May67 .

Attack on Con Thien

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s

derived from 1/4 ComdC, May67 ; 11th Engr Bn ComdC, May67 ;

1st Amtrac Bn ComdC, May67 .

1. LtCol Rheaford C. Bell, Comments on draft ms, 25May81

(Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

Into the DMZ

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is

derived from III MAF ComdC, May67 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC,

May67 ; 1st MAW ComdC, May67, 3d Mar ComdC, May67 ; 9t h

Mar ComdC, May67' 1/4 ComdC, May67 ; 3/4 ComdC, May67 ;

1/9 ComdC, May67 ; 2/9 ComdC, May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, May67 ;

2/26 ComdC, May67; HMM-164 ComdC, May67 ; HMM-36 3

ComdC, May67 .

2. BGen Harvey E . Spielman, Comments on draft ms, 27May8 1

(Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C .).

Operation Beau Charger

Additional material in this section was derived from 1/ 3

ComdC, May67 ; HMM-263 ComdC, May67 .

Operation Hickory

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section was

derived from 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67 ; 3d Mar ComdC, May67 ; 2/3 ComdC, May67 ; 3/4 ComdC, May67 ; 2/9 ComdC,

May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, May67 ; HMM-164 ComdC, May67 .

3. Col Duncan D . Chaplin, III, Comments on draft ms, 31May8 1

(Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafter

Chaplin comments, May81 .

4. Ibid .

5. Col James R. Stockman, Comment on draft ms, 27Jun81 ;

Chaplin comments, May81 .

Operation Prairie IV Ends

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is

derived from 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67 ; 3/4 ComdC, May67 .

6. Maj Walter E. Deese, Comments on draft ms, 9Jul81 (Vietna m

Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafter Deese

comments, Jul81 .

7. 3d MarDiv ComdC, May67 ; Deese comments, Jul81 .

CHAPTER 4

THE FIRST BATTLE OF KHE SANH

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derive d

from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Jun67 ; 1st MAW ComdC, AprMay67 ; 3d Mar AAR, Khe Sanh, dtd 9Jun67 ; 1/3 AAR, Opn

Prairie I, 7Feb67 ; Sharp and Westmoreland, Report on the War;

Capt Moyers S. Shore, II, The Battle for Khe Saab (Washington :

HisBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1969), hereafter Shore, Khe Sanh ; Maj

Michael W . Sayers, Comments on draft ms, 18May81 (Vietna m

Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafter Sayers

Comments, May81, Unless otherwise noted, all documentary

material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

The Early Day s

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is

derived from 3d Mar ComdC, Apr67 ; 1/3 ComdC, Sep66-Feb67 ;

1/9 ComdC, Feb-Apr67 ; 2/9 ComdC, Mar67 ; 2/ 12 ComdC, Feb -

Apr67 . Unless otherwise noted all documentary material is locate d

in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .

1. Sayers comments, May81 ; 2dLt John M . Kramer, intvw by 3 d

MarDiv dtd 28Feb67, (No . 567, OralHist Coll, MCHC) .

2. III MAF ComdC, Mar67, p . 3 ; LtGen Louis Robertshaw, comments on draft ms, 29May81 (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC) .

3. Capt William B. Terrill, et .al ., intvw by 3d MarDiv, dt d

24Mar67, (No . 1017, OralHistColl, MCHC) .

4. Sayers Comments, May81 .

Opening Moves of the Battl e

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s

derived from : 3d Mar ComdC, Apr-May67 ; MAG-11 ComdC ,

Apr-May67 ; MAG-12 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; MAG-16 ComdC ,

Apr-May67 ; 1/3 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, Apr-May67 ;

1/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 2/12 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/ 13 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3d AT Bn ComdC ,

Apr-May67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material i s

located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

5. SSgt Leon R . Burns intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 8May67, (No .

993, Oral Hist Coll, MCHC) ; 2dLt Thomas G . King, intvw by 3 d

MarDiv dtd 8May67, (No . 994, Oral Hist Coll, MCHC), hereafte r

King Intvw.

6. Sayers Comments, May81 .

7. King Intvw .

Hill 86 1

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s

derived from : 3d Mar ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, AprMay67 ; 1/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 .

8. Sayers comments, May81 .

9. Capt Bayliss L . Spivey, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 13May67 ,

(No . 950, OralHistColl, MCHC) hereafter Spivey Intvw; LtCol

Bayliss L . Spivey, Comments on draft ms, 28May81 and 18Jun8 1

(Vietnam Comment File, MCHC) .

10. Sayers Comments, May81 .

11. Spivey Intvw, May67 .

12. Sayers Comments, May81 .

13. Ibid .

14. Ibid .

15. Ibid .
NOTES 263

Reinforcing the Hill 861 Attac k

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s

derived from 1st MAW ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 2/3 ComdC, Apr -

May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 1/12 ComdC, Apr-May67 ;

2/12 ComdC, Apr-May67 .

16. LtCol Rodney D. McKitrick, Comments on draft ms,

15Jun81, (Vietnam Comment File, MCHC), hereafter, McKitrick

Comments.

Attacking Hill 881 S

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is

derived from: 2/3 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, AprMay67 ; 2/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/9 ComdC, Apr-May67 .

17. SSgt Ruben Santos, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 12May67, (No .

949, OralHistColl, MCHC) .

The Final Objective : Hill 881N

Unless otherwise noted, additional r:+taterial in this section is

derived from : 2/3 ComdC, Apr-May67 ; 3/3 ComdC, AprMay67 ; 1/26 ComdC, May67 .

18. lstLt Frank M. Izenour, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 12May67 ,

(No. 2105, OralHistColl, MCHC) .

19. McKitrick Comments, Jun81 .

20. 2dLt Terry M . Weber, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 12May67 ,

(No. 996, OralHistColl, MCHC) .

21. Sea Tiger, 19May67, p . 3 . PFC Lopez received the Navy Cross

for this action .

22. BGen Edwin H . Simmons, " Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967, " USNI, Naval Review 1969, p . 136, records a

favorable comment on the M-16 . For a negative view, see Col

Peter L. Hilgartner, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81, (Vietnam

Comment File, MCHC).

End of the Battl e

Additional material in this section is derived from : 26th Mar

ComdC, AprJul67 ; 1/26 ComdC, May-Ju167; 3/26 ComdC,

May-Ju167 .

PART II

Spring Fighting in Southern I Corps

CHAPTER 5

THE WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derive d

from: FMFPac, "U.S . Marine Corps Force in Vietnam Mar65 -

Sep67, Historical Summary, " v .I: Narrative, FMFPac Operations

of U .S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan Jun67 ;

III MAF ComdCs Jan Jun67 ; 1st Mar Div ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ; 1st

MAW ComdCs Jan-Jun67 ; Task Force X-RAY ComdCs, Jan -

Apr67 . All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC ,

Washington, D .C.

Operation Desoto

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : III MAF Journal File, Operation Desoto, 27Jan -

7Apr67 ; Task Force X-RAY, sit reps, Operation Desoto, 27Jan -

7Apr67 ; 3/7 AAR Operation Desoto, 1 Jun67; 3/7 ComdCs, JanJun67 ; HMH 463 ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ; 3/ 12 ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ;

1st Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Jun67 ; Col Francis V . White, Comments on draft ms, 22Nov82 . All documentary material cited is

located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

1. LtCol Edward J . Bronars intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 3Apr67 ,

(No . 808, Oral HistCollection, H&MDiv, HQMC) .

2. Captain Kenneth W. Johnson, intvw by Combat Informatio n

Bureau during Operation Desoto, (No . 0619, Oral HistCollecdon, HMDiv, HQMC) .

3. Col Robert C. Rice, Comments on draft ms, 10Jun81, (Vietnam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

Deckhouse / Desoto

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from: SLF (TG 79 .5) AAR Operation Deckhouse VI ,

14Mar67 ; 1/4 AAR Operation Deckhouse VI, 9Mar67 ; HMM 36 3

AAR Operation Deckhouse VI, 12Mar67 . 1/5 AAR Operatio n

Deckhouse VI/Desoto, 10Mar67, hereafter 1/5 AAR ,

Deckhouse/Desoto . All documentary material cited is located i n

the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

4. HMM-363 AAR, Operation Deckhouse VI, 12Mar67 .

4A. 1/5 AAR ; Desoto/Deckhouse, p . 14 .

Desoto Continued

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : III MAF Journal File, Operation Desoto, 27Jan -

7Apr67 ; Task Force X-Ray, sit reps, Operation Desoto, 27 Jan -

7Apr67 ; 3/7 AAR Operation Desoto, 1Jun67 ; 3/7 ComdCs, Jan -

Jun67 : HMH 463 ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ; 3/ 12 ComdCs, Jan Jun67 :

1st Engr Bn . ComdCs, Jan Jun67 . All documentary material cited

is located in the MCHC, Washinghton, D .C.

5. Col Robert C. Rice, Comments on draft ms, 10Jun81, (Vietnam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

6. Captain Patrick J . Morgan intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 4Apr67 ,

(No . 811, OralHistColl, HMDiv, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )

7. LtCol Joseph T. Smith, Comments on draft ms, 30May81 ,

(Vietnam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D.C. )

8. Ibid .

Operation Union

Unless otherwise noted additional material in this section i s

derived from : 1st Mar ComdCs, Jan-Apr67 ; 5th Mar ComdCs,

Jan-Jun67 ; 5th Mar AAR Operation Union, 20Jun67 ; 1/5 AAR

Operation Union, 29May67 ; 3/5 AAR Operation Union I, Jun67 ;

3/1 ComdC, Apr67 ; 1/1 ComdC, Apr-May67 . All documentar y

material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .

9. Col Emil J . Radics, Comments on draft ms, 19May81, (Comments files, MCHC, Washington, D.C. )

10. Ibid .

11. LtCol Peter L. Hilgartner intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 4Apr67 ,

(No. I233, Oral HistCollHist MusDiv, MCHC, Washington ,

D .C. )

12. Col Peter L. Hilgartner, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81 ,

(Comments files, MCHC, Washington, D .C .), hereafter Hilgartner comments, 2Jun81 .

13. 5th Mar AAR, Operation Union, p .7 .
264 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Union II

Unless otherwise noted additional material in this section i s

derived from : 5th Mar AAR Operation Union II, 17Ju167 ; 1/ 5

AAR Operation Union II, 16Jun67 ; 2/5 AAR Operation Unio n

II, 8Jun67 ; 3/5 AAR Operation Union II, 11Jun67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the

MCHC, Washington, D.C.

14. Col Mallett C. Jackson, Comments on draft ms, 24May81 ,

(Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D.C. )

15. Ibid .

16. Hilgartner Comments, 2Jun8 1

17. Ibid .

CHAPTER 6

TASK FORCE OREGON

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derive d

from: " U .S . Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67 ,

Historical Summary," v .l: Narrative, hereafter, FMFPac HistSum :

FMFPac Operations of U .S . Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthl y

summaries, Jan-Dec67, hereafter FMFPac USMC Ops inRVN; III

MAF ComdCs Jan-Dec67 : Department of Defense, United StatesVietnam Relations,1945-67, 12 Bks (Washington : GPO, 1971),

hereafter Pentagon Papers. Additional sources for this section are :

CMC Trip Reports, Jan and Aug 67, hereafter CMC Trip Report ;

HQMC Cmd Center Operation Oregon File ; III MAF Journal File ,

Operation Oregon, pts I and II ; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ;

Task Force X-Ray CmdC, Apr67 . Unless otherwise noted, al l

documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington ,

D .C.

1. MACV msg No . 41191 to CinCPac, 13Sep66, as cited in Pentagon Papers, bk5, v .II, p.64 .

2. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981),

(Vietnam Comment files, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

3. CMC debriefing at FMFPac Headquarters, 11 January 1967 ,

CMC file (Archives, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

4. MACV msg 09101 to CinCpac, 18Mar67, as cited in Pentagon

Papers, bk5, v .II, p .64 .

5. COMUSMACV 10248 to CinCPac, 28 Mar67, subject : Program

4 Force Requirements, as cited in Pentagon Papers,bk5, v .II ,

p .71 .

PART III

Continuing Action

Along the DMZ

CHAPTER 7

THE BARRIER —ANOTHER APPROAC H

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived

from: "U.S . Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67 ,

Historical Summary," V . I: Narrative, hereafter FMFPac HistSum ;

FMFPac Operations of U .S . Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly

summaries, Jan-Dec67, hereafter FMFPac USMC Ops in RVN; II I

MAF ComdCs Jan-Dec67 ; Department of Defense, United States

Vietnam Relations, 1945-67, 12 bks (Washington : GPO, 1971),

hereafter Pentagon Papers. MACV Cmd History, 1967 . All

documentary material cited in located in the MCHC,

Washington, D.C.

Evolution of the Concep t

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section was

derived from : III MAF Dye Marker msg file ; III MAF Op-Admi n

Plans 11-67 ; III MAF Op-Admin Plans 12-67 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Mar67 ; BGen Edwin H.

Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967, " USNI,

Naval Review 1969, hereafter Simmons "USMC Ops in RVN

1967 . " All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC ,

Washington, D .C.

1. Dr. Robert J. Watson, Comments on draft ms, 26May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

2. Pentagon Papers, bk 5, v .I, p.6 6

3. Copies of MACV working papers on barrier concept, Encl 2, to

3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct 66 .

4. See Briefing Paper, Practice Nine Requirement Plan of

26Jan67, End 6, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan67 .

5. LtGen John R . Chaisson, intvw by Historical Division, HQMC,

dtd 3Apr72, (Oral HistColl MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

6. Memo, Dir JTF 728 to SecDef, dtd 22Dec66, Subj : Plan for In -

creased Anti-infiltration Capability for SEA in Box 8 Barrier Star -

bird Folder (MACV Historical Records, 69A702) ; also FMFPac

Journal File .

7. Practice Nine briefing paper, End 6 to 3d MarDiv ComC ,

6Jan67 .

8. Practice Nine briefing paper for Under SecNav Baldwin, Encl 3

to 3d MarDiv Coin C, Jan67 .

9. CinCPAC 060820Z February 1967 to JCS, Subj : "Barrier Plan . "

as cited in Pentagon Papers, bk 5, v . II, p . 43 .

Building the Barrier

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s

derived from : III MAF Op-Admin Plans 12-67 ; 3d MarDiv CorndCs, Mar-Dec67 ; 9th Mar ComdCs, Mar-Dec67 ; 3d Bn, 4th Ma r

ComdCs, Aug-Sep67 ; 11th Engr Bn ComdCs, Mar-Dec67 ; an d

Simmons " USMC Operations in Vietnam, 1967 . " All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

10. ComUSMACV msg to CG III MAF, 261038Z Mar 67, Subj :

Strong Point Obstacle System. Also SecState msg to AMEm b

Saigon, 161730Z Mar67, Subj : SVN Strong Point-Obstacl e

System, III MAF, Dye Marker msg file .

11. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 191125Z Apr67, II I

MAF, Dye Marker msg file .

12. CG III MAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 261046Z Apr67, II I

MAF, Dye Marker msg file .

13. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 30JuI67 .

14.Col George E . Jerue, Comments on draft ms, 25May81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

15. LtCol Lee R. Bendell, Comments on draft ms, 25May81 ,

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

16. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 16Aug67 .

17. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 5Sep67 . The 3 Septembe r

artillery attack on Dong Ha is covered in Chapter 14 .

18. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 13Sep67 .
NOTES 26 5

19. III MAF Operation Plan 12-67, dtd 12Sep67 .

20. MajGen Louis Metzger, ltr to CG, FMFPac, Subj : Debrief,

22Jan68 (Archives, MCHC, Washington, D .C.); LtCol Willard

N . Christopher, Comments on draft ms, 31Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

21. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 22Oct67 .

22. III MAF, Dye Marker msg file, dtd 240ct67 .

23. FMFPac, USMC Ops in RVN, Dec67.

24. Quoted in Simmons, "USMC Ops in RVN 1967," p . 134.

CHAPTER 8

CON THIEN AND THE SUMMER BATTLES

ALONG THE DMZ

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derive d

from ; "U .S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67 ,

Historical Summary," v .1 ; FMFPac Operations of U .S . Marin e

Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jul-Dec67 ; III MAF CorndCs, Jul-Dec67 ; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Dec67 ; 3d Mar CorndCs, Jul-Dec67 ; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67 ; 12th Mar ComdCs ,

Jul-Dec67 ; MAG-16 ComdCs, Jul-Oct67 ; 1st Mar ComdCs, Oct -

Dec67 ; LtCol Ralph F . Moody et al, "Marines in Vietnam," Ms .

(Archives, MCHC, Washington, D .C.); Brigadier General Edwi n

H . Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967 "

USNI, Naval Review 1969 ." All documentary material cited is

located in MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Why Con Thien ?

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is

derived from : III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Aug67 ; 3d MarDiv ComdCs ,

Mar-Aug67 ; 9th Mar ComdCs, Mar-Aug67 . All documentar y

material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Operation Buffalo

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s

derived from : 1/9 AAR Operation Buffalo; 3/9 AAR Operation

Buffalo ; 1/3 AAR Operation Buffalo ; 2/3 AAR Operation Buffalo ; 9th Mar AAR Operation Buffalo ; 3d Mar AAR Operation

Buffalo . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited i s

located in the Historical Branch, History and Museums Division ,

HQMC.

1. Col Richard B. Smith, "Leatherneck Square," Marine Corp s

Gazette, Vol . 83, No . 8 (Aug 69), p . 35 .

2. Col George E . Jerue, Comments on draft ms, 25May81, (Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

3. lstLt William F. Delany intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 7Jul67 (No .

1269, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

4. Maj Darrell C. Daniels on intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 7Jul67 ,

(No .1264, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

5. SSgt Leon R . Burns intvw by 3dMarDiv, dtd 7Jul67 (No . 1265 ,

Oral HistCollection MCHC, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Burn s

intvw.

6. Col Richard J. Schening, Comments on draft ms, 26May81 ,

(Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )

7. Burns intvw .

8. Maj Henry J. M. Radcliffe intvw by MCHC, dtd 14Dec73 .

9. Maj Darrell C. Danielson, intvw by 3d MarDiv, 7Jul67, (No .

1264, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

10 . . LtCol Albert C. Slater, Comments on draft ms, 21May81 ,

(Vietnam comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafte r

Slater comments.

11. Capt Burrell H . Landes, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd (No . 1519 ,

Oral HistCollection, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

12. Slater comments.

13. Ibid .

14. Ibid . ; Navy Cross Citation, Cpl James L . Stuckey, Dec&Me d

Br, HQMC, Washington, D .C.

15. Col George E . Jerue, Comments on draft MS of " U.S. Marines

in Vietnam." pt V, 12Jan70 .

PART IV

Fall Combat, North and South

CHAPTER 9

CONTINUING OPERATIONS AGAINST

THE 2D NVA DIVISIO N

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived

from : FMFPac, " U .S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-

Sep67, Historical Summary," v . I : Narrative ; FMFPac Operations

of U .S . Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jun-Dec67 ;

III MAF ComdCs, Jun-Dec67 ; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jun-Dec67 ;

1st MAW ComdCs, Jun-Dec67 ; MAG-36 ComdCs, Jun-Dec67 ;

MAG-16 ComdCs, Jun-Dec67 ; 1st Mars ComdCs, Jun-Dec67 ; 7t h

Mars ComdCs, Jun-Dec67 ; 2/5 ComdCs Jun-Dec67 ; 3/5 ComdCs, Jun-Dec67 ; F .J. West, Jr., The Enclave : Some U.S. Military

Efforts in Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province 1966-1968, (Santa

Monica : The Rand Corporation, 1969), hereafter West, The

Enclave . All documentary material cited is located in the MCH C

Washington, D .C .

Raids and Rockets in Quang Nam

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section is

derived from III MAF ComdC, Ju167 ; 5th Mar ComdC, Jul67 ; 2/ 5

ComdC, Ju167 ; and 2/11 ComdC, Jul67 . All documentar y

material is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

1. 2/5 ComdC, Jul67, p . 3 .

2. West, The Enclave, pp . 42-45 .

3. Col Joseph T . Smith, Comments on draft ms, 30May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

Operation Cochis e

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : Task Force X-Ray Operations Order 1-67 (Operation Cochise), dtd 9Aug67 ; 5th Mar AAR, Operation Cochise ,

dtd 20Sep67 ; 1/5 AAR, Operation Cochise, dtd 3Sep67 ; 3/ 5

AAR, Operation Cochise, dtd 1Sep67 ; 1/3 AAR, Operation

Cochise, dtd 3Sep67 . All documentary material cited is located in

the MCHC, Washington, D .C.
266 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

4 . MAG-36, ComdC, Sep67, Encl 1, p . 1 .

Operation Swift

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from: Task Force X-Ray AAR, Operation Swift, dt d

20Oct67 ; 5th Mars AAR, Operation Swift, dtd 11Oct67 ; 1/ 5

AAR, Operation Swift, dtd 27Sep67 ; 3/5 AAR, Operation Swift ,

dtd 22Sep67 ; 2/11 AAR, Operation Swift, dtd 29Sep67 ; LtCo l

Gene W. Bowers, Comments on draft ms, 15Sep81 (Vietnam

Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafter Bowers

comments. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary materia l

cited in located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

5. Col Philip M . Crosswait, Comments on draft ms, 14Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

6. Col Peter L. Hilgartner, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )

7. Ibid .

8. Cpl Joseph E . Fuller, et . al . intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd 19Sep6 7

(No . 1612, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )

9. Sgt James E. Dougherty, et al., intvw by 1st MarDiv, dtd

23Sep67 . LCpI Henshaw account in reel 3, side 2 and reel 4, sid e

1 . (No. 1630, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

10. lstLt Donald R. Dunagan, intvw by 1stMarDiv dtd 20Sep6 7

(No . 1294, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

11. Bowers comments .

12. Ibid .

13.Col William R. Earney, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

14. Ibid .

A Busy Calm Before the Storm

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 7th Mar AAR, Operation Foster, dtd 14Jan68 ; 2/ 3

AAR, Operation Badger Hunt/Foster, dtd 7Dec67 ; 2/5 AAR ,

Operation Essex, dtd 29Nov67 ; and LtCol Gene W. Bowers ,

Comments on draft ms, 15Sep81 (Vietnam Comment file ,

MCHC, Washington, D .C.) hereafter Bowers Comments . . Unless

otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in th e

MCHC, Washington, D .C.

15. LtGen Donn J. Robertson, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun8 1

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

16. 2/5 AAR, Operation Essex, p . 16-17 .

17. Ibid ., p . 17 .

18. Bowers comments.

CHAPTER 10

FALL FIGHTING IN THE NORT H

Unless otherwise noted, the material for this chapter was dervied from : III MAF ComdC, Jul-Dec67 ; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, JulDec67 ; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67 ; 3d Mar ComdCs, JulDec67 ; 4th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Dec67 ; 12th Mar ComdCs, JulDec67 ; 2/9 ComdC, Ju167 ; 2/4 ComdCs, Aug-Oct67 ; and 3/2 6

ComdC, Sept67 . All documentary material cited is located in the

MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Operation Kingfishe r

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from : 9th Mar AAR Operation Hickory II; 9th Mar AAR

Operation Kingfisher ; 3d Mar AAR Operation Kingfisher ; 1/ 9

AAR Operation Kingfisher; 2/9 AAR Operation Kingfisher; 2/ 3

AAR Operation Kingfisher ; 3/3 AAR Operation Kingfisher ; 2/ 4

AAR Operation Kingfisher ; 3/4 AAR Operation Kingfisher; 3/2 6

AAR Operation Kingfisher ; and 9th MT Bn ComdC, Jul-Aug67 .

1. Major Walter E. Deese, Comments on draft ms, 9Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )

2. Col Robert C. Needham, Comments on draft ms, 27Jun8 1

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafte r

Needham comments.

3. Ibid .

4. Ibid .

5. Needham comments and Col James Stockman, Comments o n

draft ms, 27Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington ,

D.C.).

6. 9th MT Bn ComdCs, Jul-Aug67 .

7. Col Julian G. Bass, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 28May81 ,

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

8. LtCoI Horace A . Bruce, Comments on draft ms, 14Jul81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

9. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981 )

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Wasington, D .C.), hereafte r

Metzger comments.

10. Col Lee R . Bendell, Comments on draft ms, 25May81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

11. Ibid .

12. 3/26 ComdC, Sep67 .

13. Col James W . Hammond, Jr., Comments on draft ms,

18May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.),

hereafter Hammond comments.

14. Col Richard B. Smith, Comments on draft ms, 21May8 1

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafter

Smith comments.

15. Hammond comments.

16. Metzger comments.

17. Hammond comments.

18. Ibid .

19. LtCol James E . Murphy, Comments on draft ms, 6Aug81 ,

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafte r

Murphy comments.

20. Ibid .

21. 9th Mar AA, Operation Kingfisher (2/4 )

22. Hammond comments .

23. Needham comments.

24. Col John C. Studt, Comments on draft ms, 9Jul81 (Vietna m

Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafter Studt comments.

25. Ibid .

26. Ibid .

27. Ibid .

28. Murphy comments.

29. Studt comments.

30. Ibid .

31. Ibid .

32. Ibid .

33. Ibid .

34. Ibid .

35. 2/4 AAR, Operation Kingfisher.
NOTES 26 7

36 . Hammond comments.

Medina/Bastion Hill/Lam Son 138

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 1st Mar AAR Operation Medina ; 1/ 1 AAR Operation Medina ; 2/1 AAR Operation Medina ; 1/3 AAR Operatio n

Medina/Bastion Hill.

Adjustments Within the 3d Marine Divisio n

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 3d Mar AAR Operation Lancaster; 9th Mar AAR

Operation Kentucky; 26th Mar Operation Scotland ; 1st AmTracBn AAR Operation Napoleon .

37. Col Edwin S . Schick, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 11Jun8 1

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

38. Col William L . Dick, Comments on draft ms, 14May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

39. Col James R. Stockman, Comments on draft ms, 27Jun8 1

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

PART V

Special Efforts

CHAPTER 1 1

THE SPECIAL LANDING FORC E

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derive d

from: COMUSMACV Comd Hist, 1967 ; COMUSMACV Monthl y

Evaluation Report, Jan-Dec67 ; FMFPac "U.S . Marine Forces, Viet -

nam," monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67 ; III MAF ComdCs, JanDec67 ; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-DEc67 ; LtCol Ralph F . Moody

and Mr. Benis M. Frank, "The Special Landing Force" (ms,

MCHC, Washington, D.C., 1972). Unless otherwise noted all

documentary material cited is located in the Marine Corp s

Historical Center, Washington, D .C.

Expedient or Doctrine

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from : III MAF ComdCs, Aug66-Feb67 ; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary

material cited is located in the Marine Corps Historical Center ,

Washington, D.C.

1. Col James R. Stockman, Comments on draft ms, 27Jun8 1

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

2. LtGen Louis Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981 )

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.) hereafter

Metzger comments.

Operation Deckhouse V

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

dervied from: 1stBn, 9th Marines ComdC, Jan67 ; HMM-36 2

ComdC, Jan67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary materia l

cited is located in the Marine Corps Historical Center ,

Washington, D.C.

3. Capt John D. Westervelt, USN, Comments on draft ms,

9Jun81 (Vietnam Comments file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

hereafter Westervelt comments.

4. Ibid .

5. LtGen John R. Chaisson, intvw by Hist Div, HQMC, 3Apr7 2

(Oral Hist Coll, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

Deckhouse VI/Desot o

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 1st Bn, 4th Mar ComdCs, Feb-Mar67 ; HMM-36 3

ComdCs, Feb-Mar67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentar y

material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

6. Westervelt comments.

7. Metzger comments.

8. Westervelt comments .

Beacon Hill I

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from: lstBn, 4th Mar ComdCs, Mar-Apr67 ; HMM-36 3

ComdCs, Mar-Apr67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentar y

material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

9. VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN, Comments on draft ms ,

24May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C.)

Beacon Star

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Apr-May67 ; HMM-16 4

ComdCs, Apr-May67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary

material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Beaver Cage/Union I

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Apr-May67 ; HMM-26 3

ComdCs, Apr-May67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary

material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Beau Charger/Belt Tight/Hickory/Prairie IV/Cimarro n

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, May-Jun67 ; 2d Bn, 3 d

Mar ComdCs, May-Jun67 ; HMM-164 ComdCs, May-Jun67 ;

HMM-263 ComdCs, May-Jun67 . Unless otherwise noted all

documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington ,

D.C.

10. LtCol Edward K. Kirby, Comments on draft ms of Moody, et

a!, "Marines in Vietnam," 18Jan70 (Vietnam Comment file ,

MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

Day On, Stay On

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Jan Jun67 ; 2d Bn, 3d Ma r

ComdCs, Jan-Jun67 ; HMM-164 ComdCs, Jan-Jun67 ; HMM-26 3

ComdCs, Jan-Jun67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary

material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.
268 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Bear Bite/Colgate/Choctaw/Marylan d

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Jun67 ; HMM-263 ComdC ,

Jun67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is

located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

11. 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Jun67 .

Beacon Torch/Calhou n

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from: 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Jun Ju167 ; HMM-16 4

ComdCs, Jun Ju167 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentar y

material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Bear Claw/Buffalo/Hickory II

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, JuI67 ; HMM-263 ComdC ,

JuI67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited i s

located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

12. Col John A. Conway, Comments on draft ms, 8Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )

Beaver Track/Buffalo/Hickory II

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Ju167 ; HMM-164 ComdC,

Ju167 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is

located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Bear Chain/Fremont

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Ju167 ; HMM-164, ComdC ,

Ju167 ; HMM-265 ComdC, Ju167 . Unless otherwise noted, al l

documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington ,

D.C.

Beacon Guide

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, JuI67 ; HMM-263 ComdC,

Ju167 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is

located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Kangaroo Kick/Fremon t

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Aug67 ; HMM-265 ComdC, Aug67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary materia l

cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

13. 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Aug67 .

Beacon Gate/Cochis e

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Aug67 ; HMM-263 ComdC, Aug67. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary materia l

cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Belt Drive/Libert y

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Aug-Sep67 ; HMM-26 2

ComdC, Aug-Sep67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentar y

material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

14. 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Sep67 .

A Change In Scenario—The 46s are Grounde d

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from: III MAF ComdC, Aug67 ; 1st MAW ComdC,

Aug67 ; MAG-16 ComdC, Aug67 ; HMM-262 ComdC, AugDec67 ; HMM-163 ComdC, Aug67 ; HMM-463 ComdC, Aug67 .

Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located

in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Beacon Point/Fremont/Ballistic Charge/Shelbyvill e

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 1st Bn, 3d Mat ComdC, Sep67 ; HMM-362 ComdC ,

Sep67 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Sep67 ; 1st Mar ComdC, Sep67, 2d Bn ,

1st Mar ComdC, Sep67 ; 3d Bn, 5th Mar ComdC, Sep67 . Unless

otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in th e

MCHC, Washington, D.C.

Fortress Sentry/Kingfishe r

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 9th Mar ComdCs, Sep-Oct67 ; 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Sep-Oct67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary

material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Bastion Hill/Medina/Liberty II/Fremon t

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 1st Mar ComdC, Oct67 ; 4th Mar ComdC, Oct67 ;

1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Oct67 . Unless otherwise noted al l

documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington ,

D.C.

Formation Leader/Liberty II/Kno x

Unless otherwise noted additional material for this section is

derived from: 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Oct-Nov67 ; 7th Mar ComdCs,

Oct-Nov67 ; 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdCs, Oct-Nov67 ; 2d Bn, 26t h

Mar ComdCs, Oct-Nov67 . Unless otherwise noted, all docume n

tary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Granite/Kentucky 11 and Ill

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 4th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Nov67 ; 9th Mar ComdC,

Oct-Nov67 ; 1st Bn, 4th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Nov67 ; HMM-36 1

ComdCs, Oct-Nov67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary

material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

15. 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Nov67 .

Badger Hunt/Foste r

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 5th Mar ComdC, Nov67 ; 7th Mar ComdC, Nov67 ;

3d Bn, 7th Mar ComdC, Nov67 ; 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Nov67 ;

HMM-262 ComdC, Nov67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.
NOTES 269

Fortress Ridg e

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 2d Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Nov-Dec67 ; 3d Bn, 1st Ma r

ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68 ; HMM-262 ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68 .

Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located

in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

16. Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft ms, 20May81 (Comments files, MCHC, Washington, D .C.) hereafter McQuown

comments.

17. Ibid .

Badger Toot h

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 3d Bn, 1st Mar ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68 ; HMM-26 2

ComdCs, Dec67-Jan68 .

18. McQuown comments.

19. Ibid .

20. Ibid .

Ballistic Arch/Kentucky V /Osceola

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from: 9th Mar ComdCs, Nov67-Jan68 ; 1st Bn, 3d Mar

ComdCs, Nov67-Jan68; 2d Bn, 4th Mar, ComdC, Dec67 . Unless

otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in th e

MCHC, Washington, D .C .

21. 1st Bn, 3d Mar ComdC, Nov67 .

CHAPTER 12

PACIFICATION

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derive d

from : FMFPac, " U .S . Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-

Sep67, Historical Summary," vols. I and II; FMFPac Operations o f

U .S . Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67 ; III

MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; 1st

MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 . Documentary material cited is

located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

The Problem Defined

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s

derived from III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; and 1st MAW CorndCs, Jan-Dec67 . Documentary material cited is located in th e

MCHC, Washington, D .C.

1. LtCol D . L. Evans, "USMC Civil Affairs in Vietnam : A

Philosophical History," Marine Corps Gazette, v . 52, no . 3 (Ma r

1968, p . 22 .

2. Col James L . Black, Comments on draft ms, 23May81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafter Blac k

Comments .

3. Ibid .

4. Ibid .

County Fai r

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from: Captain Russel H. Stolfi, USMCR, U.S. Marine

Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965 - March 1966,

(Washington D .C. : Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S . Marine Corps, 1968) ; Captain William D. Parker ,

USMCR, U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps Republic of

South Vietnam, April 1966 to April 1967, (Washington D .C. :

Historical Division, Headquarters, U .S . Marine Corps, 1970).

Documentary material cited is located in the MCHC,

Washington, D .C.

Marine Grass-Roots-Level Participation

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from : Captain William D . Parker, USMCR, U.S. Marin e

Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps Republic of South Vietnam, Apri l

1966 to April 1967, (Washington D .C. : Historical Division ,

Headquarters, U.S . Marine Corps) . Documentary material cited i s

located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C .

5. III MAF ComdC, February 1967 .

6. V . Keith Fleming, Jr., personal recollection, 9Nov82 .

7. Col Max McQuown, Comments on draft ms, 20May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.), hereafter Mc -

Quown Comments. '

8. lstLt Robert E . Mattingly, intvw by 3d MarDiv, dtd 23Oct6 7

(No. 1602, Oral Hist Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C.

9. AO3E-cem, "Personal Response Project," June 1968 .

10. Col Donald L . Evans intvw by HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 15Feb72 ,

(Vietnam Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

11. McQuown comments.

Reporting and Evaluation

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from : Captain William D . Parker, USMCR, U.S. Marin e

Corps Civil Affairs in I Corps Republic of South Vietnam, April

1966 to April 1967, (Washington D .C. : Historical Division ,

Headquarters, U .S. Marine Corps) . Documentary material cited i s

located in the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D .C.

12. FMFPac, Hirt Sum, p . 5-36 .

13. Black comments.

PART VI

Support and Conclusion

CHAPTER 1 3

SUPPORTING ARM S

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived

from: FMFPac, U .S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, Mar65 -

Sep67, Historical Summary, vols . I and II; FMFPac Operations of

U .S . Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67 ; III

MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; LtCo l

Ralph F. Moody et al., Ms, "U .S. Marines in Vietnam, "

Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, Part VII . Unless otherwise noted all

documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington ,

D.C.
270 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Marine Air Operation s

Unless otherwise noted, additional material in this section i s

derived from LtGen Keith B . McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation i n

Vietnam, 1962-1970," United States Naval Institute Proceedings , May71, p . 122-155, hereafter McCutcheon "Marine Aviation i n

Vietnam," and Gen William W . Momyer Air Power in Three

Wars (GPO, Washington, D .C. : 1978), hereafter Momyer, Air

Power. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material i s

located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

1. Col Kenneth T . Dykes, Comments on draft ms, 23Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .).

2. BGen Edward J. Doyle, Comments on draft ms, 14Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

Fixed-Wing Operations

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : MAG-11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; MAG-12 ComdCs,

Jan-Dec67 ; MAG-13 ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; McCutcheon, " Marine

Aviation in Vietnam ." Unless otherwise noted, all documentar y

material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

3. Colonel John M . Verdi, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) hereafter Verdi

comments.

4. Ibid .

5. Ibid .

6. Ibid .

7. Ibid .

8. Verdi comments and Col Edgar J . Love, Comments on draft

ms, 30May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington ,

D.C.) hereafter Love Comments.

9. Momyer, Air Power, p . 199 and LtCol Earl E . Jacobson, Jr. ,

Comments on draft ms, 8Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC,

Washington, D .C.) hereafter Jacobson comments .

10.Jacobson comments.

11. Ibid .

12. Love comments .

13. LtGen Louis B. Robertshaw, Comments on draft ms ,

22May81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D.C. )

14. Love comments.

Helicopter Operation s

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : MAG-16 ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; MAG-36 ComdCs,

Jan-Dec67 ; MajGen Keith B . McCutcheon, USMC . "Air Support

for III MAF," Marine Corps Gazette, v .51, no .8 (Aug 1967), pp .

19-23 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is

located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

15. Cdr F.O. McClendon, Jr., MSC, USN . "Doctors and Dentists,

Nurses and Corpsmen in Vietnam," Naval Review 1970, Annapolis; U .S . Naval Institute, 1970, p .283 .

16. LtCol William R. Fails, Ms, "Development of Marine Corps

Helicopters, 1962-1972," Chapter 6 .

Artillery

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from : 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; 12th Mar ComdCs ,

Jan-Dec67 . Unless otherwise noted all documentary material cite d

is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

17. Col Ernest W . Payne, Comments on draft ms, 4Jun81, (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .) hereafter Payn e

comments.

18. Col Edwin S . Schick, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 11Jun8l ,

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.) hereafte r

Schick comments.

19. Schick comments and Col Clayton V . Hendricks, Comments

on draft ms, 31May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC ,

Washington, D.C. )

20. Payne Comments .

CHAPTER 1 4

LOGISTICS

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derive d

from : FMFPac, U .S . Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, Mar65 -

Sep67, Historical Summary, Vols I and II ; FMFPac, Operations o f

U .S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, monthly summaries, Jan-Dec67 ; III

MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; 3 d

MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 .

Unless otherwise noted, all cited material is located in the MCHC ,

Washington, D .C.

Upgrading the Logistics System

Unless otherise noted, additional material in this section is

derived from : FLC ComdCs, Jan-Dec67 ; Col G. C. Axtell, intvw

by FMFPac, 5Oct66 (No . 219, Oral History Coll, MCHC) ; Col W.

H . Cowper, intvw by FLC, 29Jan67 (No . 377, Oral Hist Coll ,

MCHC). Unless otherwise noted, all cited material is located i n

the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

1. LtGen Louis M . Metzger, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981),

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C ., hereafte r

Metzger comments .

2. FMFPac Hist Summ, pp . 6-8 .

3. Metzger comments.

4. Ibid .

5. Ibid .

6. Ibid .

7. Col James C. Short, Comments on draft ms, 29May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

8. Metzger comments.

Navy Support

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from : Cdr W. D. Middleton, "Seabees in Vietnam," U .S.

Naval Institute Proceedings, Aug67, v . 93, No . 8, pp . 54-64 ; U S

NavSupAct Da Nang, Naval Support in I Corps 1968 . Unless

other noted, all material cited is located in MCHC, Washington ,

D.C.

9. Capt John T. Vincent, (MC), USN, Comments on draft ms,

7Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

10. Col Robert C. Rice, Comments on draft ms, 10Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C .)
NOTES 27 1

Marine Corps Engineers

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from : 1st, 3d, 7th, 9th, 11th Eng Bns ComdCs, Jan -

Dec67 . Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is

located in the MCHC, Washington, D.C.

11 . Col James L . Black, Comments on draft ms, 23May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )

12 .- Col Ross L . Mulford, Comments on draft ms, 1Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

13. Col Richard D . Taber, Comments on draft ms, 7Jun81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C. )

14. LtCol Willard N. Christopher, Comments on draft ms,

31Jul81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C . )

CHAPTER 1 5

OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES

Unless otherwise noted, material for this chapter is derive d

from: HQMC Comd Status of Forces reps, Jan-Dec67 ; Adm U. S .

Grant Sharp, USN, and Gen William C . Westmoreland, USA ,

Report on the War in Vietnam (Washington, GPO, 1968) . All

documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington ,

D .C.

Marines with MAC V

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section is

derived from MACV Strength Reports, 1967 ; BGen John R.

Chaisson debrief, HQMC, 1Aug67 (No . 6172, Oral Hist Col l

HQMC). All documentary material cited is located in the MCHC ,

Washington, D.C.

1. LtGen John R. Chaisson, Transcript of Remarks at a Basi c

School Mess Night, 17Nov70 (Oral Hist Coll, MCHC ,

Washington, D.C.) .

The Embassy Guard

Material in this section is derived from : HQMC Comd Center

Status of Forces rept, Jan-Dec67 ; MSG Bn Comd ComdCs, Feb -

Dec67 ; MACV Strength Reports, 1967 ; Maj Philip E . Tucker intvw by HistBr, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 6Jun75 (No . 6019, Oral

Hist Coll, MCHC, Washington, D .C.). Unless noted otherwise al l

documentary material cited is located in the MCHC, Washington ,

D .C. .

2. LtCol Philip E . Tucker, Comments on draft ms, n .d . (1981 )

(Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

I Corps Advisors

Unless otherwise noted, additional material for this section i s

derived from: HQMC Comd Cntr Status of Forces rept, Jan -

Dec67 ; SMA, AA rpts, Jan-Dec67 ; MajGen W. B. Fulton, USA ,

Vietnam Studies, Riverine Operations, 1966-1969 (Washington ,

GPO, 1973); VAdm E. B . Hooper, USN (Ret .), Mobility, Sup -

port, Endurance, (Washington, GPO, 1972). Unless otherwis e

noted, all documentary material is located in the MCHC ,

Washington, D.C.

3. LtCol James R . Davis, Comments on draft ms, 21May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.).

4. Col Nels E . Anderson, Comments on draft ms, 17May81 (Vietnam Comment file, MCHC, Washington, D .C.)

5. SMA AA Rept, Song Thanh/Deckhouse V, dtd 1Mar67, Enc l

(10) .

6. SMA AA Rept, RSSZ Ops (unnamed), dtd 28JuI67 .

7. Ibid .

8. SMA AA Rept, Operation Paddington, dtd 28Nov67 .

9. SMA AA Rept, Operation Coronado IX, dtd 12Feb68 .

CHAPTER 1 6

THE SITUATION AT THE END OF THE YEAR

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derive d

from FMFPac ComdC, Jul-Dec67 ; III MAF ComdC, Dec67 ; Ge n

William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. (Garden City :

Doubleday, 1976), hereafter Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports;

and Peter Braestrup, Big Story, (Boulder : Westview Press, 1977) ,

hereafter Braestrup, Big Story . All documentary material cited i s

located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

Operational Aspects

Additional material in this section is derived from 1st MarDi v

ComdC, Dec67 ; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 ; 1st MAW ComdC ,

Dec67 ; and FLC ComdC, Dec67 . All documentary material cited

is located in the MCHC, Washington, D .C.

1. Douglas Pike, conference remarks, quoted in A Conference

Report: Some Lessons and Non-Lessons of Vietnam Ten Year s

After the Paris Peace Accords. (Washington : Woodrow Wilson

Center for Scholars, 1983) .

2. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 204 ; Gen William C.

Westmoreland, Oral History Interview, 4Apr83 (Oral History Collection, MCHC, Washington, D .C .).

3. BGen Edwin H . Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967," Naval Review, 1969 ; FMFPac ComdC, Jul-Dec67 ;

and III MAF ComdC, Dec67 .

Personnel and Logistics

Additional material for this section is derived from III MA F

ComdC, Dec67 . All documentary material cited is located in th e

MCHC, Washington, D .C.

The Outlook for Victory

Additional material for this section is derived from III MAF

ComdC, Dec67 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 ; and 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Dec67 . All documentary material cited is located in th e

MCHC, Washington, D .C.

5. Quoted in Braestrup, Big Story, p . 53 and 59 .

Enemy Dispositions

Additional material for this section is derived from III MA F

ComdC, Dec67 ; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec67 ; and 3d MarDi v

ComdC, Dec67 . All documentary material cited is located in the

MCHC, Washington, D .C.

6. Gen William C. Westmoreland, quoted in Braestrup, Big

Story, Vol . 1, p . 61 .

7. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam ,

1962-1970," Naval Review, 1969 .

8. Quoted in Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p . 239 .

Appendix A

Marine Command and Staff List

January-December 196 7

MARINE COMMAND AND STAFF LIST, Col Joseph F . Holzbauer 15-17Sep6 7

for III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE Col John E. Hays 18Sep-31Oct6 7

1 January - 31 December 1967' LtCol James L. Black, Jr. lNov-31Dec6 7

*Unless otherwise indicated, dates refer to the period when a

unit was in Vietnam . Only permanent Marine organization of

battalion/squadron-size or larger are listed; exceptions are 3 d

Marine Division (Fwd), Task Force X-Ray, and the Force Logistic

Command and its components . The following listing reflects administrative rather than operational organization. (For a complete

listing of locations and strength of Marine units in the western

Pacific, see Appendix F.)

III MM Headquarters 1Jan-31Dec67

CG LtGen Lewis W. Walt lJan-31May67

LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr . lJun-31Dec67

DepCG MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr. lJan-31Mar67

MajGen Robert E . Cushman, Jr . lApr-31May6 7

MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr. 1Jun-17Oct6 7

MajGen Raymond L . Murray 18Oct-31Dec6 7

C/.S BGen Hugh M . Elwood lJan-31Mar6 7

BGen Robert C . Owens, Jr. lApr-20Dec6 7

BGen Earl E . Anderson 21Dec-31Dec6 7

G-1 Col John L . Mahon 1Jan-3Jun6 7

Col James H . Berge, Jr. 4Jun-15Jul6 7

Col Poul F. Pedersen 16Ju1-31Dec6 7

G-2 Col Roy H . Thompson 1Jan-13Feb6 7

Col Benjamin S . Read 14Feb-9Ju167

Col Kenneth J. Houghton 10Jul-31Dec6 7

G-3 Col Drew J. Barrett, Jr. lJan-2Ju16 7

Col Fred E . Haynes, Jr. 3Ju1-13Nov6 7

Col Thomas L. Randall 14Nov-31Dec6 7

G-4 Col Joseph F . Quilty, Jr . 1Jan-2Jun6 7

Col Rex O . Dillow 3Jun-31Dec6 7

G-5 Col Eric S. Holmgrain 1Jan-31Jan67

Col John T . Hill lFeb-26Apr67

Col George 0. Ross 27Apr-17May67

Col Robert F . Warren 18-31May67

Col George 0. Ross 1Jun-1Jul6 7

Col James A . Gallo, Jr. 2Ju1-5Sep6 7

LtCol James L. Black, Jr. 6-14Sep67

1st Marine Division Headquarters lJan-31Dec6 7

CG MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr. lJan-31May6 7

MajGen Donn J. Robertson* 1Jun-31Dec6 7

ADC BGen William A . Stiles 1Jan-23Mar6 7

BGen Foster C. LaHue* 24Mar-31Dec67

*BGen LaHue was Acting 1st Marine Division Commander

during the period 27Oct-28Nov67 .

C/S Col Sidney J . Altman lJan-31May6 7

Col Edward L . Bale, Jr. 1-12Jun67

Col Henry J. Woessner, II 13Jun-31Dec67

G-1 Col Charles C. Crossfield, II 1-18Jan67

Col Arnold L. Emils 19Jan-lOMay6 7

Col William R . Earney llMay-31Dec6 7

G-2 Col John J. O'Donnell 1-14Jan6 7

Col Stanley Davis 15Jan-30Jun6 7

LtCol Emmett B . Sigmon, Jr. 1-7Ju16 7

Col James C. Short 8-11Jul6 7

LtCol Emmett B . Sigmon, Jr. 12Ju1-30Sep6 7

Col Russell E . Corey 1Oct-31Dec6 7

G-3 Col Herman Poggemeyer, Jr. lJan-31May6 7

Col Herbert E . Ing, Jr. 1Jun-8Ju16 7

Col Robert D . Bohn 9-11Jul67

Col James C. Short 12Jul-31Dec67

G-4 Col Edward L . Bale, Jr . 1Jan-27Jun6 7

LtCol Earl K . Vickers, Jr. 28Jun-31Dec6 7

G-5 Col Walter Moore 1Jan-2Feb6 7

Col Donald L. Mallory 3Feb-31May6 7

LtCol Richard F . Peterson 1Jun-11Jul6 7

Col Emil J. Radics 12Jul-30Sep6 7

LtCol Richard F . Peterson 1-4Oct6 7

Col Herbert L . Beckington 5Oct-31Dec6 7

Headquarters Battalion

CO Col Warren A . Leitner 1Jan-31Jul6 7

Col Joseph F . Donahoe, Jr. lAug-31Dec6 7

Task Force X-Ray lJan-26Apr67 '

*TF X-Ray activated at Chu Lai on 10 October 1966 an d

27 3
274 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

operated from there until 26 April 1967, at which time it

deactivated when Task Force Oregon assumed its mission .

3d Battalion, 5th Marines

CO LtCol Dean E . Esslinger 1Jan-27May6 7

Col Charles B. Webste r

Col William K . Rockey

28May-6Sep6 7

CO BGen William A 7Sep-31Dec6 7 . Stiles 1Jan-24Mar6 7

BGen Foster C. LaHue 25Mar-26Apr6 7

C/S Col Fred E. Haynes, Jr. 1Jan-26Apr6 7

G-1 LtCol Roland L. McDaniel lJan-3Mar67

7th Marines

CO Col Lawrence F . Snoddy, Jr.* 1-20Jan67

Maj John C. Hergert, Jr. 4Mar-26Apr67

G-2 Maj Glenn K . Maxwell 1-4Jan67

*Surname changed to Snowden 19Apr72

Col Charles C . Crossfield, II 21Jan-14Aug6 7

Maj Daniel Z. Boyd 5Jan-26Apr67 LtCol Russell E . Johnson 15-21Aug6 7

G-3 LtCol Edward J . Bronars 1Jan-2Feb67 Col Ross R. Miner 22Aug-31Dec6 7

LtCol Robert E . Hunter, Jr. 3Feb-26Apr6 7

G-4 LtCol Louis A . Bonin lJan-3Mar67

1st Battalion, 7th Marine s

CO LtCol Basile Lubka 1Jan-27Feb67

LtCol Basile Lubka 4Mar-26Apr67 LtCol Jack D . Rowley 28Feb-14Sep67

G-5 Maj Joseph T. Smith 1Jan-26Apr67 LtCol William) . Davis 15Sep-31Dec6 7

1st Marines

2d Battalion, 7th Marines

CO LtCol Warren P. Kitterman 1Jan-16Aug6 7

CO Col Donald L. Mallory 1Jan-28Jan67 LtCol John R . Love 17Aug-31Dec6 7

Col Emil J. Radics 29Jan-11Ju16 7

Col Herbert E . Ing, Jr. 12Ju1-31Dec67

3d Battalion, 7th Marines

CO LtCol Raymorid J . O' Leary 1Jan-1 Feb6 7

1st Battalion, 1st Marines

LtCol Edward J. Bronars

LtCol John D . Counselman

2Feb-4Apr6 7

5Apr-18Oct6 7

CO LtCol Van D . Bell, Jr. lJan-4Jun67 LtCol Roger H . Barnard 19Oct-31Dec6 7

LtCol George E. Petro 5Jun-27Aug67

LtCol Albert F . Belbusti 28Aug-16Nov67

LtCol Marcus J. Gravel 17Nov-31Dec67

11th Marines

CO Col Glenn E . Norris 1Jan-28Jun6 7

2d Battalion, 1st Marines LtCol Clayton V . Hendricks 29Jun-18Jul67

CO LtCol Haig Donabedian 1-31Jan67 Col Ernest W. Payne 19Jul-27Dec67

LtCol Marvin M . Hewlett lFeb-5Aug67 LtCol Clayton V . Hendricks 28-31Dec6 7

LtCol Archie VanWinkle 6Aug-14Nov6 7

LtCol Evan L . Parker, Jr . 15Nov-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol Mark P. Fennessy 1Jan-18May6 7

Maj Joseph J. Marron 19May-31Jul6 7 3d Battalion, 1st Marines'

*The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines became part ofSLF BRAVO o n

1 Dec67 .

LtCol David A . Rap p

LtCol Robert C . V . Hughes

lAug-60ct6 7

7Oct-31Dec6 7

2d Battalion, 11th Marines

CO Maj Ivil L . Carver lJan-21Feb6 7 CO LtCol Hillmer E. DeAtley 1Jan-26Apr6 7

LtCol Robert C . Rice 27Apr-28Aug67 Maj Joseph H. Marron 22Feb-11May6 7

LtCol Max McQuown 29Aug-30Nov67 LtCol Robert E . Hunter, Jr. 12May-28Sep6 7

LtCol David A . Clark 29Sep-31Dec6 7

5th Marines

CO Col Fred E. Haynes, Jr. 1Jan-27Feb67

3d Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol Alexander S . Ruggiero 1Jan-28Jun6 7

Col Kenneth J. Houghton 28Feb-30Jun67 LtCol George T . Balzer 29Jun-31Dec67

Col Stanley Davis 1Jul-16Oct6 7

Col Robert D . Bohn 17Oct-31Dec67

4th Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol George R. Lamb Ilan-lFeb67

1st Battalion, 5th Marines LtCol Joseph M . Laney, Jr. 2Feb-18Apr67

CO LtCol Peter L . Hilgartner 1Jan-19Sep67 LtCol Gordon M . B. Livingston 19Apr-31Ju167

LtCol Oliver W. Vandenberg 2OSep-31Dec67 Maj John S . Hollingshead lAug-31Dec6 7

2d Battalion, 5th Marines

CO LtCol William C. Airheart 1-31Jan67

1st Reconnaissance Battalio n

CO LtCol Donald N . McKeon lJan-20May67

LtCol Mallett C . Jackson, Jr. 1Feb-18Ju167 Maj Bill G . Lowrey 21May-10Jul67

LtCol George C. McNaughton 19Ju1-31Dec67 LtCol Browman C. Stinemetz 1 lJul-31Dec67
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 27 5

1st Antitank Battalion* 11th Motor Transport Battalion

*The 1st Antitank Battalion deactivated on 21Dec67 . CO Maj Lee V . Barkley lJan-11Feb6 7

CO Maj John J. Keefe lJan-4Jun67 Maj Robert C. Tashjian 12Feb-6Ju16 7

Maj Pat S . Galligan 5Jun-20Jul67 LtCol Joseph B. Brown, Jr. 7Jul-31Dec6 7

LtCol Pierre D. Reissner 21Jul-21Dec6 7

1st Tank Battalion

1st Field Artillery Group

CO LtCol Joe B. Stribling 1Jan-12Mar6 7

CO Maj John W . Clayborne 1Jan-1Feb67 LtCol Robert B . Metcalfe 4May-17Nov6 7

LtCol Richard M . Taylor 2Feb-10Nov67 LtCol Spencer F . Thomas 18Nov-31Dec6 7

LtCol Vincent J. Gentile

1st Motor Transport Battalion

CO Maj Jim T. Elkins

l lNov-31Dec6 7

lJan-31Mar67

7th Engineer Battalion

CO LtCol Frank W . Harris, III 1Jan-29Jul6 7

Maj Kenneth H. Reagan lApr-18Jun67 LtCol Ray Funderburk 30Jul-31Dec6 7

LtCol Kenneth M . Buss

Maj Charles F . Cresswel l

1st Engineer Battalion

19Jun-7Nov67

8Nov-31Dec67

9th Engineer Battalio n

CO LtCol Richard W. Crispen 1Jan-6Feb67

CO LtCol Charles 0:Newton 1Jan-24May67 LtCol George A . Babe 7Feb-6Aug67

Maj James M. Mackenzie 25May-10ct67 Maj Edward W. Lifset 7-30Aug6 7

LtCol Logan Cassedy 2Oct-31Dec67 LtCol Horacio E. Perea 31Aug-31Dec6 7

1st Shore Party Battalio n

CO LtCol Edward H. Jone s

Maj Jack E. Townsend

1Jan-17Sep6 7

18-28Sep67

3d Marine Division Headquarter s

CG MajGen Wood B . Kyle lJan-17Mar6 7

MajGen Bruno A . Hochmuth 18Mar-14Nov6 7

LtCol Nicholas Kavakich 29Sep-31Dec67 BGen Louis Metzger 15-27Nov6 7

MajGen Rathvon M . Tompkins 28Nov-31Dec6 7

3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion ADC BGen Lowell E . English 1-6Jan6 7

CO Maj Jack D . Rowle y

Maj Frederick N . Van Sant

lJan-26Feb6 7

27Feb-5Jun67

BGen Michael P . Ryan

BGen Louis Metzger

7Jan-19May6 7

20May-14Nov6 7

Maj James E . Swab 6-26Jun67 BGen Louis Metzger 28Nov-31Dec6 7

LtCol Robert L . Shuford 27Jun-31Dec67 C/S Col John B . Sweene y

Col Alexander D. Cereghino

1Jan-2Mar6 7

3Mar-31Ju167

1st Medical Battalion

Col Walter H . Cueni n

G-1 Col Robert M . Jenkins

lAug-31Dec67

lJan-20Mar67

CO Cdr Robert H. Mitchell (MC) USN 1-31Jan67 LtCol Charles S . Kirchmann 21Mar-14Sep67

Cdr John C. Robins (MC) USN 1Feb-12Apr67 LtCol James W . Marsh 15Sep-31Dec6 7

Cdr Paul D . Cooper, Jr. (MC) USN 13Apr-31Aug67 G-2 LtCol Jack L . Miles lJan-9Feb67

Cdr Clinton H . Lowery (MC) USN 1SSep-31Dec67 LtCol Lemuel C . Shepherd, III lOFeb-1Jun6 7

1st Military Police Battalion

Col Philip A . Davis

Col Edward J. Miller

2Jun-22Sep6 7

23Sep-31Dec67

CO LtCol Paul J. Stavridis lJan-21May67 G-3 Col Edward E . Hammerbeck 1Jan-17May67

LtCol Twyman R. Hill 22May-31Dec67 LtCol Harvey E . Spielman 18-27May67

Col Edward E . Hammerbeck 28May-15Jun67

7th Motor Transport Battalion Col Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr . 16Jun-10Jul67

CO Maj Sydney H . Batchelder, Jr 1Jan-10Sep67 Col Roy H. Thompson 11Jul-3Sep67

Maj Lance D . Thomas llSep-31Dec67 Col James R. Stockman 5Sep-31Dec67

7th Communication Battalion

G-4 Col John F. Mentze r

Col Francis I . Fenton, Jr.

1Jan-28May67

29May-31Dec67

CO LtCol William M . Clelland 1Jan-18Nov67 G-5 Col Edward R . McCarthy 1Jan-31Jul6 7

LtCol Harry O . Cowing, Jr. 19Nov-31Dec67 Col Milton A . Hull lAug-31Dec67
276 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Headquarters Battalion

CO LtCol Thomas J . Johnston, Jr. lJan-13Mar6 7

LtCol Charles R . Figard 14Mar-10Apr6 7

Col James R. Stockman 11Apr-17May6 7

Col John P . Lanigan 18May-3Jul6 7

Maj Homer L . Welch 4Jul-23Sep6 7

Col George E . Jerue 24Sep-31Dec67

Col Edward E . Hammerbeck

LtCol Joseph J. Kell y

Col George E . Jerue

Col Richard B . Smit h

1st Battalion, 9th Marines'

18-28May6 7

29May-3Jun6 7

4Jun-12Sep6 7

13Sep-31Dec6 7

*The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines served with the SLF during the

period IJan-4Feb67 .

3d Marines

CO Maj James L . Day 5Feb-17Mar6 7

Maj Donald J. Fulham 18Mar-21Jun6 7

CO John P . Lanigan IJan-17May67 LtCol Richard J. Schening 22Jun-9Sep6 7

Col James R . Stockman 18May-25Aug67 Maj Darrell C . Danielson 10-24Sep6 7

Col Joseph E . Lo Prete 26Aug-31Dec67 LtCol John F. Mitchell 25Sep-31Dec6 7

1st Battalion, 3d Marines' 2d Battalion, 9th Marines

*The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines joined the SLF on 8Feb67 and CO LtCol John J. Peeler IJan-4Jul6 7

remained under its control for the rest of the year. LtCol William D . Kent 5Jul-12Sep6 7

CO LtCol Peter A . Wickwire IJan-7Feb67 LtCol John J. Peeler 13Sep-280ct6 7

2d Battalion, 3d Marines' LtCol William M . Cryan 290ct-31Dec6 7

*The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines served as a SLF BLT from

13Apr67 until 3ONov67 .

3d Battalion, 9th Marines

*The battalion departed for Okinawa on 11Jan67 andreturned

to RVN on 28Feb67.

CO LtCol Victor Ohanesian lJan-28Feb6 7

LtCol Earl R. Delong lMar-12Apr6 7

LtCol Henry Englisch 1-31Dec67

CO LtCol Sherwood A. Brunnenmeyer 1-10Jan6 7

1-4Mar6 7

3d Battalion, 3d Marines

CO LtCol Earl R. Delong IJan-21Feb6 7

LtCol Gary Wilder 22Feb-30Jun6 7

LtCol Robert C . Needham 1Ju1-31Dec6 7

4th Marine s

CO Col Alexander D. Cereghino IJan-14Feb6 7

Col Roy H. Thompson 15Feb-9Ju16 7

Col William L . Dick 10Jul-31Dec67

Maj Samuel G . Faulk 5-8Mar6 7

LtCol James S . Wilson 9Mar-28May6 7

Maj Willard J. Woodring, Jr. 29May-8Sep6 7

Maj Gorton C. Cook 9Sep-31Dec6 7

12th Marines

CO Col Benjamin S . Read 1-22Jan6 7

Col William R . Morrison 23Jan-20Jul6 7

Col Edwin S . Schick, Jr. 21Ju1-31Dec6 7

1st Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Lavern W . Larson 1Jan-15Feb6 7

LtCol Wayne H . Rice 16Feb-6Sep6 7

LtCol Charles H . Opfar 7Sep-31Dec6 7

2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Willis L. Gore IJan-27Apr6 7

LtCol Jack L. Norman 28Apr-8Sep6 7

Maj George C. Harris, Jr. 9-10Sep6 7

LtCol Robert Schueler 1lSep-2Dec6 7

LtCol Ronald P . Dunwell 3-31Dec6 7

3d Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Charles) . Kirchmann IJan-28Feb6 7

LtCol Jack L . Miles 1Mar-12JuI6 7

LtCol David B. Barker 13Ju1-8Nov6 7

Maj Robert W. Green 9Nov-31Dec6 7

4th Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol David G . Jones IJan-6Apr6 7

Maj Louis G . Snyder 7Apr-23Ju16 7

1st Battalion, 4th Marines'

*The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines served with the SLF during the

period IJan-1Apr67.

CO LtCol Theodore J . Willis 2Apr-12May67 *

Maj Rheaford C . Bell 13May-29Ju16 7

LtCol Edwin A . Deptula 30Jul-31Dec6 7

2d Battalion, 4th Marines '

*The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines arrived in Vietnam on 6Jan67 .

CO LtCol Arnold E . Bench 6Jan-15Jul6 7

Maj Wells L . Field, III 16-18JuI6 7

LtCol James W. Hammond, Jr. 19Jul-270ct6 7

LtCol William Weise 28Oct-31Dec6 7

3d Battalion, 4th Marines

CO LtCol William J. Masterpool IJan-3Mar6 7

LtCol Wendell N . Vest 4Mar-21JuI6 7

LtCol Lee R. Bendell 22Ju1-31Dec6 7

9th Marines

CO Col Robert M . Richards lJan-20Mar67 LtCol Joseph K. Gastrock, III 24Jul-31Oct6 7

Col Robert M . Jenkins 21Mar-17May67 Maj Rudolph W. Bolves 1Nov-31Dec67
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 27 7

3d Reconnaissance Battalion

CO LtCol Gary Wilder 1Jan-15Feb6 7

Maj Charles N . Dezer, III 16Feb-13Apr6 7

Maj James R .A. Rehfus 14Apr-2Aug6 7

Maj Rheaford C . Bell 3Aug-9Nov67

LtCol William D . Kent llNov-31Dec67

11th Engineer Battalion

CO LtCol Ross L . Mulford 1Jan-lOJul67

LtCol Willard N. Christopher 11Jul-4Nov67

LtCol Victor A . Perry 5Nov-31Dec6 7

5th Marine Division Units in Vietnam

3d Antitank Battalion

CO LtCol Charles R . Case y

LtCol Gene M . McCain

Maj Robert M. Jordan

3d Tank Battalion

CO LtCol William R. Corson

LtCol Robert J. Norto n

Maj Eddis R. Larson

Maj Vernon L. Sylveste r

LtCol Duncan D . Chaplin, III

3d Motor Transport Battalion

CO Maj Richard F . Armstrong

Maj William O . Day

Maj William H . Stewart, Jr.

lJan-29Aug6 7

30Aug-20Nov6 7

21Nov-31Dec6 7

1Jan-14Feb67

15Feb-23Mar6 7

24-26Mar6 7

27Mar-28Jun6 7

29Jun-31Dec6 7

1Jan-6Sep6 7

7Sep-6Oct67

7Oct-31Dec6 7

3d Engineer Battalion

CO Maj Joseph A. Shearman, Jr.

LtCol Garry M . Pearce, Jr.

LtCol James H . Reid, Jr.

LtCol Robert C . McCutchan

LtCol Jack W. Perrin

3d Medical Battalion

CO Cdr John T . Vincent (MC) US N

Cdr Robert A. Brown (MC) USN

9th Motor Transport Battalion

CO Maj Donald R. Tyer

Maj David J. Maysilles

Maj John R. Stanley

26th Marines *

*The regimental headquarters arrived 26Apr67.

CO Col John J . Padley 26Apr-12Aug6 7

Col David E . Lownds 13Aug-31Dec6 7

1st Battalion, 26th Marines

CO LtCol Donald E . Newton 1Jan-3Ju16 7

LtCol James B. Wilkinson 4Jul-31Dec6 7

2d Battalion, 26th Marines

CO LtCol John M. Cummings lJan-lOApr6 7

LtCol Charles R . Figard llApr-18May6 7

LtCol William). Masterpool 19May-26May6 7

LtCol Duncan D . Chaplin, III 27May-3Dec6 7

LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr. 4-31Dec6 7

3d Battalion, 26th Marines

CO LtCol Garland T . Beyerle 1-17Jan6 7

LtCol Kurt L . Hoch 18Jan-20Aug6 7

LtCol Harry L . Alderman 21Aug-31Dec6 7

1-31Jan67 1st Battalion, 13th Marines *

1-17Feb67 *The battalion arrived in Vietnam on 23Jul67 .

18Feb-20Oct67 CO Maj Thomas J. Coyle 23Ju1-9Dec6 7

21Oct-6Nov67 LtCol John A . Hennelly 10-31Dec67

7Nov-31Dec67

Headquarters, Force Logistic Command *

*(Redesignated Headquarters, 1st Force Service Regiment/Forc e

Logistic Command on 16Feb67 . The staff for both units was th e

same.

CG BGen James E . Herbold, Jr. 1Jan-5Oct6 7

BGen Harry C. Olson 6Oct-31Dec6 7

C/S Col William H. Cowper 1Jan-23May6 7

Col Lyle S . Stephenson 24May-lAug6 7

Col Roy I. Wood, Jr. 2Aug-31Dec6 7

G-1 Maj Joe B . Noble 1-2Jan6 7

Maj Leonard E . Fuchs 3Jan-4May6 7

LtCol Stanley H . Rauh SMay-30Jun6 7

Capt Harold B. Jensen, Jr. 1-29Ju167

LtCol Minard P . Newton, Jr. 30Jul-31Dec67

G-2 LtCol Richard M . Taylor 1-30Jan67

LtCol Arthur R . Mooney 31Jan-11Jun67

Capt Joseph G . Vindich 12-28Jun67

Maj Clarence E. Watson, Jr. 29Jun-31Dec67

1Jan-20Jun67 G-3 Col Lyle S . Stephenson 1Jan-23May67

21Jun-3Sep67 LtCol Nolan J. Beat 24May-21Dec67

4Sep-31Dec67 Col George K . Reid 22-31Dec67

3d Shore Party Battalion

CO LtCol Donald E. Marchett e

Maj Willard T . Layton, III

LtCol James W. Quinn

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

CO LtCol Albert R. Bowman, II 1Jan-15Ju16 7

Maj Austin C. Rishel 16-25Ju16 7

LtCol Edward R. Toner 26Jul-31Dec6 7

lJan-9May6 7

10May-31Jul6 7

lAug-31Dec67

1Jan-22Aug6 7

23Aug-31Dec67
278 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

G-4 Maj Gilbert C . Hazard lJan-30Jun67

Maj Richard D . Taber, Sr. 1-11Ju167

Maj William E. Snyder 12-19JuI67

LtCol Robert W . Howland 2OJul-31Dec67

G-5 Maj Leonard E . Fuchs 1Jan-60ct67

Maj Thomas J. Smyth 7Oct-31Dec67

Force Logistic Conunand Subordinate Units '

*When the FLC changed its designation to FSR/FLC o n

16Feb67, the orders also redesignated and restructured its subordinate units. For clarity, the command list shows, first, the integral FLC units through 15Feb67 . The subsequent listing

presents the new alignment and, where applicable, the previou s

unit designation .

Force Logistic Support Group Alpha

CO Col Robert R. Weir 1Jan-6Feb67

Col George C . Schmidt, Jr. 7Feb-15Feb67

Force Logistic Support Group Bravo

CO Col Kermit H . Shelly 1Jan-15Feb67

Force Logistic Support Unit 2

CO LtCol Rollin F. Van Cantfort 1Jan-15Feb67

Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment '

*Formed 16Feb67 with the arrival of 1st FSR at Da Nang .

CO LtCol Kenneth D . Seibert 16Feb-27Ju167

LtCol William F . Koehnlein 28Jul-31Dec67

Supply Battalion, 1st Force Service Regimen t

(Ex-Force Logistic Support Group Alpha)

CO Col George C. Schmidt, Jr. 16Feb-2Aug6 7

LtCol Jack 0. Arford 3-13Aug6 7

Col Julian G. Bass, Jr . 14Aug-31Dec6 7

Maintenance Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment'

*Established in Vietnam 16Feb67 .

CO LtCol Abie Gordon 16Feb-31Jul6 7

LtCol Jack M . Hermes lAug-31Dec6 7

3d Service Battalion, Force Logistic Support Group Alph a

(ex-Force Logistic Support Group 2)

CO LtCol Rollin F . Van Cantfort 16Feb-28Apr6 7

Col Stanley D . Low 29Apr-2Sep6 7

Col James R. Jones 3Sep-31Dec6 7

1st Service Battalion, Force Logistic Support Group Bravo

(ex-Force Logistic Support Group Bravo)

CO Col Kermit H . Shelly 16Feb-14Mar6 7

LtCol Esten C. Carper, Jr. 15-21Mar6 7

Col Stanley D . Low 22Mar-27Apr6 7

LtCol Esten C . Carper, Jr. 28Apr-24May6 7

LtCol Lynn A . Hall 25May-4Aug6 7

LtCol Richard J. Smith 5-30Aug67

LtCol John H . Maloney 31Aug-31Dec67

United Attached to Force Logistic Command '

*The 5th Communications Battalion was the only battalion-siz e

unit attached to FLC for the entire year.

5th Communications Battalio n

CO Col Phillip K . Leesburg 1Jan-12Apr6 7

Maj William A . Read 13-20Apr6 7

LtCol Arnold G . Ziegler lMay-3Nov6 7

LtCol Donald L . Lindermuth 4Nov-31Dec67

CG MajGen Louis B. Robertshaw

MajGen Norman J. Anderson

AWC BGen Robert G . Owens, Jr.

BGen Robert P . Keller

C/S Col Edward J. Doyl e

Col Herbert H. Lon g

Col John S . Payne

Col Franklin C . Thomas, Jr.

G-1 Col Dan H . Johnso n

Col Jay W. Hubbard

LtCol Harry D. Stott

Col Robert Bair d

G-2 Col George H . Dodenhoff

Col Robert D . Lim berg

G-3 Col Guy M . Clou d

Col Douglas D . Petty, Jr.

Col Joel E . Bonner, Jr.

G-4 Col Herbert H. Long

Col Franklin C . Thomas, Jr.

Col Joel E . Bonner, Jr.

Col Charles A . Armstrong, Jr .

G-5 LtCol Ernest J. Berger

LtCol Edward R. Rogal

*The G-5 Section came under Wing G- 4

1Aug67 .

Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1 (MWHG-1 )

CO Col William L . Atwater 1Jan-5Apr67

Col Kenneth T . Dykes 6Apr-14Aug67

LtCol Wesley H . Rodenberger 15Aug-170ct6 7

Col Tolbert T . Gentry 18Oct-31Dec67

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 1 (H&HS-1 )

CO Maj Carl C. Foster 1Jan-21Feb6 7

LtCol Stanley A . Herman 22Feb-9Jun6 7

Maj Thomas R . Maddock 10Jun-6Aug6 7

LtCol Merton R . Ives 7Aug-200ct6 7

LtCol Albert W. Keller 21Oct-31Dec6 7

Marine Air Support Squadron 2 (MASS-2) '

*MASS-2 transferred to MACG-18, effective 1Sep67 .

CO LtCol Harry Hunter, Jr . lJan-15Jun6 7

LtCol Ben C. Rowe 16Jun-8Dec6 7

LtCol John M . Johnson, Jr. 9-31Dec6 7

1st Marine Aircraft Wing Headquarters

1Jan-2Jun6 7

3Jun-31Dec6 7

1Jan-1Apr6 7

2Apr-31Dec6 7

lJan-31Mar6 7

lApr-3Sep6 7

4Sep-70ct6 7

8Oct-31Dec6 7

lJan-4Feb6 7

5Feb-3May6 7

4May-30Aug6 7

31Aug-31Dec6 7

lJan-5Jul6 7

6Jul-31Dec6 7

1Jan-5Feb6 7

6Feb-1Aug6 7

2Aug-31Dec6 7

1Jan-3Feb6 7

4Feb-6Jun6 7

7Jun-1Aug6 7

2Aug-31Dec6 7

lJan-9Jun6 7

1OJun-31Jul67 *

cognizance on
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 27 9

Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (MASS-3) '

*MASS-3 transferred to MACG-18, effective 1Sep67 .

CO LtCol Donald L . Fenton 1Jan-29Mar6 7

LtCol Gordon D . McPherson 30Mar-14Sep6 7

LtCol Hugh R. Bumpas, Jr. 15Sep-31Dec6 7

Marine Air Control Squadron 4 (MACS-4) '

*MACS-4 arrived in Vietnam from CONUS on 4Jun67 an d

transferred to MACG-18 on 1Sep67 .

CO LtCol Conrad P . Buschmann 4Jun-20Dec67

LtCol William A . Cohn 21-31Dec67

Marine Air Control Squadron 7 (MACS-7) '

*The squadron returned to CONUS on 15Jul67 .

CO Maj Thomas K. Burk, Jr. 1Jan-15Ju16 7

1st Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion (1st LAAM Bn) '

*The battalion transferred to MACG-18, effective 1 Sep67.

CO LtCol Merton P . Ives 1Jan-4Aug6 7

LtCol Marshall). Treado 5Aug-31Dec6 7

2d Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion (2d LAAM Bn) *

*The battalion transferred to MACG-18, effective 1 Sep67 .

CO LtCol Thomas I. Gunning 1Jan-12Jun67

LtCol Stanley A . Herman 13Jun-31Dec67

Marine Wing Communications Squadron 1 (MWCS-1)'

*The squadron activated on 1Sep67 with the reorganization of

MWHG-1 .

CO Maj David H . Tinius 1Sep-31Dec6 7

Marine Wing Facilities Squadron 1 (MWFS-1) '

*The squadron activated on 1Sep67 with the reorganization of

MWHG-1 .

CO Maj Edward A . Laning 1Sep-31Dec6 7

Marine Wing Support Group 17 (MWSG-17 )

CO Col Orlando S. Tosdal 1Jan-28Mar6 7

Col Victor A . Armstrong 29Mar-30Jun6 7

Col John E. Hansen 1JuI-31Dec6 7

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 17 (H&MS-17 )

CO LtCol John J. Leogue 1Jan-9Aug6 7

LtCol Eugene V. Goldston 10Aug-31Dec6 7

Wing Equipment and Repair Squadron 17 (WERS-17)

CO LtCol Lawrence P. Hart 1Jan-11Apr6 7

LtCol John R. Hansford 12Apr-31Dec67

Marine Air Control Group 18 (MACG-18) '

*MACG-18 activated at Da Nang on 1Sep67. For other units

assigned to MACG-18, see the command lint for MASS-2,

MASS-3, MACS-4, 1st LRAM Bn, and 2d LAAM Bn under

MWHG 1 .

CO Col Lyle V. Tope lSep-31Dec6 7

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 18 (H&HS-18)'

*H&HS-18 activated with the formation of MACG-18 o n

1Sep67 .

CO LtCol John M . Johnson, Jr. lSep-5Nov67

LtCol Paul B . Montague 6Nov-31Dec6 7

Marine Aircraft Group 1 1

CO Col Franklin C . Thomas, Jr. 1Jan-3Feb6 7

Col William F. Guss 4Feb-30Jun6 7

Col Arthur O . Schmagel lJul-29Dec6 7

Col LeRoy T . Frey 30-31Dec6 7

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 11 (H&MS-11 )

CO LtCol Raymond A. Cameron lJan-30Apr6 7

LtCol Charles E . Dove IMay-31Aug6 7

LtCol Earl E. Jacobson lSep-3Nov6 7

LtCoI Anthony L . Blair 4Nov-31Dec6 7

Marine Air Base Squadron 11 (MABS-11 )

CO Maj Guy R . Campo 1-23Jan67

Maj Edgar J. Love 24Jan-30Apr67

LtCol Lonnie P. Baites IMay-11Jun6 7

Maj Stanley D . Cox 12Jun-90ct6 7

LtCol John W. Irion, Jr. 130ct-31Dec6 7

Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1 (VMCJ-1)

CO LtCol William B. Fleming lJan-30Apr6 7

Maj Edgar J. Love lMay-150ct6 7

LtCol Robert W . Lewis 160ct-31Dec6 7

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115) '

The squadron left Vietnam for Iwakuni, Japan on 15Feb67 .

CO Maj Larry Vandeusen 1-23Jan6 7

Maj Guy R. Campo 24-15Feb6 7

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 (VMFA-122) '

*The squadron joined MAG-11 from CONUS on 1Sep67 .

CO LtCol John M . Verdi 1Sep-31Dec67

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 242 (VMA (AW)-242 )

CO LtCol Howard Wolf 1Jan-30Apr6 7

LtCol Earl E. Jacobson, Jr. lMay-17Aug6 7

LtCol Lewis H . Abrams 18Aug-26Nov6 7

Maj Arthur W. D. Lavigne 27Nov-31Dec6 7

Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 232 (VMF (AW)-232 )

*The squadron departed for CONUS 31Aug67.

CO LtCol Nicholas M . Trapnell, Jr. 1Jan-22Mar67

Maj Melvin H . Sautter 23Mar-31Aug67
280 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 235 (VMF (AW)-235) '

*The squadron arrived in Vietnam on 1SFeb67 .

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311)'

*During the period 1Mar-3Jun67 the squadron was at MCAS,

CO LtCol Edward R Iwakuni, Japan for rehabilitation . . Rogal 15Feb-31May6 7

LtCol Wallace Wessel 1Jun-150ct6 7

LtCol Lee E . Blanchard 160ct-28Dec6 7

LtCol Carl R. Lundquist 29-31Dec67

CO LtCol Roger A. Morris 1Jan-17Jun6 7

LtCol Eugene Lichtenwalter 8Jun-25Aug6 7

LtCol Edgar K . Jacks 26Aug-21Sep6 7

LtCol Richard B. Taber 22Sep-31Dec6 7

Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12 )

CO Col Jay W . Hubbard 1Jan-15Feb67 Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 533 (VMA [AW]-533)

Col Baylor P . Gibson, Jr *VMA (AW)-533 arrived from CONUS on 1Apr67 . . 16Feb-31Aug6 7

Col Dean Wilker 1Sep-31Dec67 CO LtCol William P . Brown lApr-1Oct67

LtCol William H . Fitch 20ct-31Dec67

Marine Air Group 13 (MAG-13)

CO Col Douglas D . Petty, Jr. lJan-5Feb67

Col Dan H . Johnson 6Feb-7Aug67

Col Edward F . LeFaivre 8Aug-31Dec67

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 12 (H&MS-12 )

CO LtCol Paul G. McMahon

Maj Eugene Lichtenwalte r

LtCol Robert E . Miller

LtCoI Dan C. Alexander

1Jan-31Mar67

lApr-28May67

29May-9Nov67

lONov-31Dec67

Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12) Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 13 (H&MS-13 )

CO LtCol Ralph D . Wallace 1Jan-2May67 CO LtCoI Walter E . Domina 1Jan-30Mar67

Maj Forest G . Dawson 3May-2Sep67 LtCol Lynn F . Williams lApr-19Jul67

LtCol Leo J. Leblanc, Jr. 3Sep-31Dec67 LtCol James E. Miller 20Ju1-22Sep67

LtCol Paul Sigmund 23Sep-31Dec67

Marine Air Base Squadron 13 (MABS-13 )

CO LtCoI Owen L. Owens 1-25Jan6 7

LtCol David W. Morrill 26Jan-23Mar67

LtCol Kenny C . Palmer 24Mar-27Ju16 7

LtCol Richard E. Carey 28Jul-50ct6 7

Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121) '

*During the period 3Jun-SSep67, the squadron was at Iwakuni,

Japan undergoing rehabilitation.

CO LtCol Donald R. Stiver 1Jan-16Mar6 7

Maj Forest G . Dawson 17-30Mar67

LtCol Leroy A . Madera 60ct-31Dec6 7

LtCol James H . McGee 31Mar-24Sep6 7

Maj Richard J. Kern 25Sep-31Dec67

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115) '

*The squadron arrived in Vietnam from MCAS, Iwakuni,Japan

on 1SMay67.

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211) '

*The squadron departed from Vietnam on 3Sep67 for

CO LtCol Guy R. Campo 15May-27Jul6 7

LtCol Kenny C . Palmer 28Jul-50ct6 7

LtCol Richard E. Carey 60ct-31Dec67

rehabilitation at MCAF Iwakuni, Japan and returned to Vietnam

on 1 Dec67.

CO LtCol William G . McCool 1Jan-25Feb6 7

LtCol Knowlton P . Rice 26Feb-30Jun6 7

Maj Gerit L . Fenenga lJul-25Aug6 7

LtCol Francis H . Thurston 26Aug-31Dec6 7

Marine Attack Squadron 214 (VMA-214) '

The squadron departed for CONUS 3Apr67 .

CO Maj Richard E . Hemingway 1Jan-3Apr6 7

Marine Attack Squadron 223 (VMA-223) '

*The squadron arrived from Iwakuni, Japan on 2Mar67 an d

returned to Iwakunifor rehabilitation on 3Dec67 .

CO LtCol Leonard C. Taft 2-25Mar67

LtCol Claude E. Deering, Jr. 26Mar-26Sep67

LtCol Arthur W. Anthony 27Sep-31Dec67

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314) '

*During the period 16Aug-16Nov67 the squadron was at

MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan for rehabilitation .

CO Maj William H. Heintz lJan-31May67

LtCol Frank D. Topley lJun-31Dec67

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (VMFA-323) '

*The squadron departed from Vietnam on 13May67 for MCAS ,

Iwakuni, Japan for a rehabilitation period; it returned to Vietnam

on 15Aug67 .

CO LtCol Aubrey W. Talbert 1-29Jan6 7

LtCol Gordon H . Keller, Jr. 30Jun-14Ju16 7

LtCol Edison W. Miller 15Ju1-130ct67

LtCoI Harry T . Hagaman 140ct-31Dec67
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 281

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542 (VMFA=542) CO LtCol McDonald D. Tweed 16-28Feb6 7

CO LtCol Donald L . May 1Jan-2Feb67 LtCol Earl W. Traut lMar-23May6 7

LtCol Frederick L . Farrell, Jr. 3Feb-18Ju167 Maj Homer A. Bruce 24May-170ct6 7

LtCol John Hubner 19Ju1-14Sep67 LtCol Daniel M . Wilson 18Oct-15Nov6 7

LtCol Richard C . Marsh 15Sep-31Dec67

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16)

CO Col Frank M . Hepler iJan-21Apr67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362) '

*The squadron joined MAG-16 from the SLF on 8Sep67 ando n

15Oct67 it transferred to MAG-36 .

Col Samuel F . Marti n

Col Edwin O . Reed

22Apr-4Sep6 7

5Sep-31Dec67

CO LtCol Nick J. Kapetan 8-13Sep67

LtCol Richard W . Cline 14Sep-150ct6 7

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 16 (H&MS 16)

CO LtCol Lucius O . Davis

LtCol Walter C . Kell y

LtCol William E. Deeds

Maj Glenn A . Stephens

LtCol Lawrence J. Flanagan

1-31Jan6 7

1Feb-21Apr6 7

22Apr-20Ju16 7

21Jul-30Sep6 7

IOct-31Dec67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM-363) '

*The squadron joined MAG-13 from the SLF on 4Apr67.

CO Maj Marvin E . Day 4Apr-10Jul6 7

LtCol Robert Lewis, Jr . 1 lJul-2Dec6 7

LtCol Frankie E . Allgood 3-31Dec6 7

Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16 )

CO LtCol Rodney D. McKitrick 1-4Jan67 Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463) '

*The major portion of the squadron arrived in Vietnam from

CONUS on 23May67, but a detachment hadserved with MAG-1 6

since 26Dec66.

LtCol Charles E . Wydner, Jr. ' 5Jan-30Sep6 7

LtCol Frederick M . Kleppsattel, Jr . 1-250ct6 7

LtCol Samuel J. Fulton 26Oct-31Dec67

CO LtCol Samuel G . Beal 23May-50ct6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163) ' LtCol Joseph L . Sadowski 6Oct-31Dec67

*The squadron tranferred to the SLF on 9Sep67 .

CO LtCol Rocco D . Bianchi 1Jan-26Apr6 7

LtCol Walter C . Kelly 27Apr-8Sep67

Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2)

CO LtCol William F . Harrell iJan-14Jul6 7

Maj Morris G . Robbins 14-23Ju16 7

LtCol Philip M. Crosswait 24Jul-10Dec6 7

LtCol Morris G . Robbins 11-31Dec6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164) '

*During the period 3Apr-13Ju167 the squadron served with th e

SLF; it transferred to MAG-36 effective 160ct67 .

CO LTCoI Warren C . Watson Ilan-14Feb6 7

LtCol Rodney D . McKitrick 15Feb-24Jul6 7

LtCol Manning T. Jannell 25Jul-16Sep6 7

LtCol Robert F . Rick 17Sep-150ct67

Marine Observation Squadron 3 (VMO-3) '

*The squadron transferred effective 160ct67.

CO Maj Kyle W . Townsend 1Jan-17Aug6 7

LtCol Glenn R . Hunter 18Aug-150ct6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263) '

On 1SFeb67 the squadron returned to MCAS, Futema,

Okinawa to assist in the CH-46 repair program .

CO LtCol Leslie L . Darbyshire iJan-15Feb67

Marine Air Group 36 (MAG-36)

CO Col Victor A . Armstrong 1Jan-28Mar6 7

Col Orlando S . Tosdal 29Mar-1JuI6 7

Col Frank E . Wilson 2Jul-31Dec6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265) '

*During the period 12Ju1-23Aug67 the squadron served with

the SLF; on 23Aug67 it returned to MAG-36 and on 160ct67

transferredback to MAG-16 .

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 36 (H&HS-36)

CO LtCol William C . Carlso n

Maj Harold E . Roth

lJan-14Aug6 7

15Aug-130ct6 7

CO Maj Frank B. Ellis 1-31Jan6 7

LtCol Clifford D. Corn lFeb-2Apr67

LtCol Richard G. Courtney 140ct-31Dec6 7

Marine Air Base Squadron 36 (MABS-36 )

LtCol Robert L . Gover, Jr. 3Apr-18Jun67 CO LtCol Joseph A . Nelson lJan-26Mar67

LtCol William R. Beeler 29Jun-31Dec67 LtCol Thomas E . Fish 27Mar67-30Apr6 7

LtCol William L . Walke r

Maj Claude E . Hendrix

lMay-3Sep6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMM-361) ' 4Sep-50ct6 7

*The squadron arrived from Okinawa on 16Feb67 ; on 16Nov67 LtCol Melvin J. Sternberg 6Oct-15Dec6 7

it transferred to the SLF. Maj James C . Robinson 16-31Dec6 7
282 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163) '

The squadron joined MAG-36 from the SLF on 300ct67 .

Marine Observation Squadron 3 (VMO-3) '

*The squadron joined MAG-36 from MAG-16 on 160ct67 .

CO Maj Frederick A: Rueckel 300ct-19Nov67

LtCol Louis W. Schwindt 2ONov-31Dec67

CO LtCol Glenn R . Hunter 160ct-31Dec6 7

Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6)

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164) '

*The squadron transferred from MAG-16 to MAG-36 on

CO LtCol William R. Maloney 1Jan-27Mar67

LtCol Joseph A . Nelson 28Mar-16Sep67

LtCol William J. White 17Sep-31Dec6 7 160ct67.

CO LtCol Robert F. Rick 160ct-31Dec67

9th Marine Amphibious Brigade/Task Force 79 '

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (HMM-165 *The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB) activated o n )

CO LtCol William W . Eldridge, Jr. lJan-30Apr67 1 March 1966 and assumed responsibility for Task Force 79 (TT

LtCol John A . Reames 1May-310ct67 79) duties on that date . On 15Apr66, 9th MAB assumed respon -

LtCol Richard E . Romine 1Nov-31Dec67 sibility for tactical Marine aviation and ground units in the

Western Pacific which were not in Vietnam .

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262) '

*The squadron transferred to the SLF on 23Aug67. 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade Headquarter s

CO LtCol Ural W . Shadrick 1Jan-15Jun67 CG BGen Michael P . Ryan 1-4Jan6 7

Maj Gregory A. Corliss 16Jun-23Aug67 BGen Louis G . Metzger 4Jan-18May6 7

BGenJacobE . Glick 19May-31Dec67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263) ' C/S Col Richard R. Amerine 1Jan-16Sep67

*The squadron joined MAG-36 from the SLF on 13Jun67 and Col Elton Mueller 17-27Sep67

departed from Vietnam for CONUS on 310ct67 . Col James A. Etheridge 28Sep-31Dec67

CO LtCol Edward K. Kirby 13Jun-9Jul67 G-1 LtCol Edward V . Easter lJan-lOSep67

Maj James C. Robinson 1OJul-310ct67 Maj Patrick E . Duffy 11-24Sep6 7

LtCol George H . Benskin, Jr. 25Sep-31Dec67

G-2 Maj James C . Hitz lJan-21Feb67

Capt Eugene B. Burleson, Jr. 22-27Feb6 7

Maj Clark G . Henry 28Feb-25Ju16 7

Capt Eugene B. Burleson, Jr. 26Jul-28Aug6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265) '

*The squadron joined MAG-36 from the SLF on 23Aug67 an d

transferred to MAG-16 on 160ct67.

CO LtCol William R. Beeler 23Aug-160ct67

Capt Hugh S . Jolley 29Aug6 7

Maj James V . Knapp 30Aug-31Dec6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362)' G-3 LtCol James G . Dionisopoulos lJan-25Jun6 7

*The squadron joined MAG-36 from the SLF on 19Jan67. On LtCol William L . Smith 26Jun-12Jul6 7

8Sep67 it transferred to MAG-16, but on 160ct67 it rejoined Col David E. Lownds 13-24Ju16 7

MAG-36. LtCol Bruce F. Meyers 25Ju1-31Dec6 7

CO LtCol Marshall B . Armstrong 19Jan-15Mar67 G-4 Col Elton Mueller 1Jan-8Sep6 7

LtCol Nick J. Kapetan 16Mar-13Sep6 7

LtCol Richard W. Cline 14Sep-23Dec67

Col Warren A . Butcher 9Sep-31D&6 7

Maj Walter H . Shaver 24-31Dec67 Regimental Landing Team 26 (RLT-26)/Task Force 79 .2 '

*On 26Apr67, RLT-26 Headquarters became RLT-26 (Forward)

when it deployed to Vietnam, leaving RLT-26 (Rear) on Okinawa.

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM-363) '

*The squadron transfered to the SLF on 19Jan67 as a replacement for HMM-362 .

CO LtCol Kenneth E . Huntington 1-19Jan6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 (HMM-364) '

*The advance party of HMM-364 arrived in Vietnam o n

290ct67; the rest of the squadron arrived during November.

CO LtCol Louis A . Gulling 290ct-31Dec67

CO Col John J. Padley 1Jan- l lAug6 7

Col David E. Lownds 12Aug-31Dec6 7

Regimental Landing Team 26 (Rear) (RLT-26 [Rear]) '

*During the year 1967, RLT-26 and later RLT-26 (Rear) acted as

the command headquarters for battalion and battalion landin g

teams as they arrived in Vietnam for training, rehabilitation, an d

deployment. All of the regiment's integral battalions had

deployed in Vietnam, consequently the listing of battalions whic h
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 28 3

follows presents only the periods when the individual battalions

came under 26th Marines' control. They appear in the sequence of

their arrival during the year, rather than in any numerical sequence.

CO LtCol Joseph K. Gastrock, III 26Apr-15Ju16 7

LtCol Richard D. Alexander 16Ju1-31Dec67

dent and transient, appears in order of arrival during the year

1967.

CO Col Charles Kimak 1Jan-31Aug67

LtCol David O . Takala 1-27Sep67

Col Wilbur C . Kellogg, Jr. 28-30Sep67

LtCol David O . Takala 1-31Oct67

Col Wilbur C . Kellogg 1Nov-31Dec67

1st Battalion, 13th Marines *

*The battalion arrived on Okinawa on 20Aug66. Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 15 (H&MS-15 )

CO Maj Robert L . Christian, Jr. 1Jan-12May67 CO LtCol James McDaniel 1Jan-22Aug67

Maj Alva F. Thompson, Jr. 13May-15Jun67 LtCol Herman L . Mixon 23Aug-31Dec6 7

Maj Thomas J. Coyle 16Jun-14Dec6 7

LtCol John A . Hennelly 15-31Dec67

Marine Air Base Squadron 15 (MABS-15)

CO LtCol George H . Albers

LtCol Clement C. J. Chamberlain

lJan-6Sep67

7Sep-31Dec6 7

1st Battalion, 4th Marine?

*The battalion became BLT 1/4 for planning on 13Jan67,

transferred to the SLF on 27Jan67 and departedfrom Okinawa on

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152)

CO LtCol John Urell 1Jan-15May6 7

28Jan67.

LtCol Royce M . Williams 16May-31Dec6 7

CO LtCol Jack Westerman 1-26Jan67

Battalion Landing Team 3/9 (BLT 3/9) *

*The BLT arrived from Vietnam on 14Jan67, deactivated as a

BLT on 18Jan67, but rejoined the SLF on 22Feb67, and sailed

from Okinawa on 24Feb67 .

CO LtCol Sherwood A . Brunnenmeyer 14Jan-22Feb6 7

Battalion Landing Team 1/9 (BLT 1/9) *

*The battalion arrived from Vietnam on 24Jan67 and departed

for Vietnam on 31Jan67 .

CO Maj James L . Day 24-31Jan6 7

Battalion Landing Team 1/3 (BLT 1/3) *

*The BLT arrived from Vietnam on 13Feb67 and departed as

part of the SLF on 4Apr67 .

CO LtCol Peter A. Wickwire 13Feb-4Apr6 7

Battalion Landing Team 2/3 (BLT 2/3) *

*The BLT arrived from Vietnam on 13Mar67 and departed a s

part of the SLF on 14Apr67 .

CO LtCol Earl R. Delong 13Mar-14Apr6 7

Battalion Landing Team 3/4 (BLT 3/4) *

*The BLTarrivedfrom Vietnam on 11Apr67 and, upon receip t

of orders recalling it to Vietnam, departed Okinawa on 16May67 .

CO LtCol Wendell N . Vest 11Apr-16May6 7

Marine Air Group 15 (MAG-15)/Task Group 79 .3 *

*Marine Air Group 15, stationed at MCAS, Iwakuni, Japa n

served as a commandant/ control headquarters for Marine aviation

units requiring repair, rehabilitation, and training between Vietnam deployments. The following listing of squadrons both resiMarine Air Control Squadron 6 (MACS-6)

CO Maj William K. Hutchings lJan-30Mar6 7

Maj Rollin E. Hippler 31Mar-31Dec67

Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 235 (VMF[AW]-235) *

*The squadron transferred to MAG-11 on 14Feb67 .

CO LtCol Edward R . Rogal 1Jan-14Feb6 7

Marine Attack Squadron 223 (VMA-223) *

*VMA-223 transferred to MAG-12, effective 1Mar67 an d

returned to MAG-15 after relief by VMA-221 on 1Dec67 .

CO LtCol Leonard C. Taft lJan-28Feb6 7

LtCol Anhur W. Anthony, Jr 1-31Dec6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMM-361 )

*The squadron transferred to MAG-16 on 17Feb67 .

CO LtCol McDonald D . Tweed lJan-17Feb6 7

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115) *

*The squadron departed MAG-11 in Vietnam on 15Feb67 an d

transferred to MAG-13 on 14May67.

CO Maj Guy R . Campo 15Feb-13May6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263) '

*The squadron arrived from MAG-16 on 20Feb67 and departe d

to the SLF on 3Apr67.

CO LtCol Edward K . Kirby 2OFeb-3Apr6 7

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311) '

*The squadron arrived from MAG-12 on 1Mar67 and returne d

to MAG-12 on 1Jun67 .

CO LtCol Roger A . Morris lMar-1Jun6 7
284 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (VMA-323) '

*The squadron arrived from MAG-13 on 16May67 and returned to MAG-13 on 17Aug67 .

CO I.tCol Gordon H . Keller, Jr 16May-15Ju16 7

LtCol Edison W. Miller 16Ju1-17Aug6 7

Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121) '

*The squadron was joined from MAG-12 on 1Jun67 and

returned to MAG-12 on 5Sep67 .

CO LtCol James H . McGee 1Jun-5Sep6 7

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314) '

*The squadron arrived from MAG-13 on 18Aug67 and returned to MAG-13 on 15Nov67 .

CO LtCol Frank D . Topley 18Aug-15Nov67

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211) *

*The squadron joined from MAG-12 on 6Sep67 and was

returned to MAG-12 on 1Dec67.

CO LtCol Francis H . Thurston 6Sep-1Dec67

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542 (VMFA-542) '

*The squadron joined from MAG-13 on 15Nov67.

CO LtCol Richard C . Marsh 15Nov-31Dec67

Special Landing Force Alpha (SLF Alpha)/TG 79 .4 )

Activated 1Mar67, SLF Alpha was in fact junior to its companion SLF, Bravo, which as Task Group 79.5, formed in 1966.

CO Col James A. Gallo lMar-11Jun6 7

Col John A . Conway 12Jun-31Dec6 7

Special Landing Force Alpha Battalion Landing Team

Battalion Landing Team (BLT 1/3) '

*BLT 1 /3 joined SLF Alpha on 3Apr67 . During the period

11-2 7Aug67, BLT 1 /3 served under the operational control o f

Task Force X-Ray in Vietnam .

CO LtCol Peter A . Wickwire 3Apr-15Ju167

LtCol Alfred I . Thomas 16Ju1-17Nov

LtCol Richard W . Goodale 10Nov-31Dec6 7

Special Landing Force Alpha Helicopter Squadron '

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263 )

*HMM-263 joined SLF Alpha on 3Apr67, the same date as BLT

1/3 . During the periods 13-27Jun67 and 31Oct-14Nov67, n o

squadron served with SLF Alpha, and during the period

16-27Aug67 HMM-362 reverted to the operational control of 1st

MAW.

CO LtCol Edward K. Kirby 3Apr-12Jun67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362 )

CO LtCol Nick J . Kapetan 28Jul-7Sep67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163

CO LtCol Walter C . Kelly 8-22Sep67

Maj Fredrick A . Rueckel 23Sep-300ct67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMM-361 )

CO LtCol Daniel M . Wilson 15Nov-31Dec6 7

Special Landing Force Bravo (SLF Bravo)/TG 79 .5 '

*The first special landing force, Task Group 79 .5 became

Special Landing Force Bravo on 1Mar67 .

CO Col Harry D . Wortman 1Jan-6Jul6 7

Col James G . Dionisopoulos 7Jul-5Nov6 7

Col Maynard W . Schmidt 6Nov-31Dec6 7

Special Landing Force Bravo Battalion Landing Tea m

Battalion Landing Team 1/9 (BLT 1/9)

CO Maj James L . Day 1-25Jan6 7

Battalion Landing Team 1/4 (BLT 1/4)

CO LtCol Jack Westerman 26Jan-28Mar67

LtCol Theodore J. Willis 29Mar-lApr67

Battalion Landing Team 2/3 (BLT 2/3) '

*Effective 2Apr67, BLT 1/4 transferred to the 3d Marine Division . Its replacement BLT 2/3, activated on Okinawa on 3Apr6 7

but did not embark until the 13th .

CO LtCol Earl R. Delong 3Apr-21May6 7

Maj Wendell 0. Beard 22May-12Jul6 7

Maj John R. Broujos 13-16Jul6 7

LtCol Emil W. Herich 17Jul-22Aug6 7

Maj Wendell 0. Beard 23Aug-90ct6 7

LtCol Henry Englisch 100ct-31Dec6 7

Battalion Landing Team 3/1 (BLT 3/1 )

CO LtCol Max McQuown 1-31Dec67

Special Landing Force Bravo Helicopter Squadron s

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 362 (HMM-362)

CO LtCol Marshall B. Armstrong 1-18Jan6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363 (HMM-363)

CO LtCol Kenneth E . Huntington 19Jan-3Mar6 7

Maj Marvin E . Day 4Mar-3Apr6 7

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (HMM-164 )

CO LtCol Rodney D . McKitrick 4Apr-12Jul67

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265 )

CO LtCol William R . Beeler 12Jul-22Aug67
COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 28 5

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262) CO Maj John W . Alber 12Oct-23Nov67

CO Maj Gregory A. Corliss 23Aug-11Oct67 Maj David L. Althoff 24Nov-31Dec6 7

Detachment Alpha, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 '

*Detachment Alpha, HMM-262 formed when the 1st MAW

grounded the CH-46s. Used only for emergency operations, th e

detachment remained with the ARG shipping until correction of

the CH-46 structural problems.

Marine Advisory Unit, Naval Advisory Grou p

SMA Col Nels E . Anderson 1Jan-23Jul6 7

Col Richard L . Michael, Jr. 24Jul-31Dec67

Appendix B

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

A-1E—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine, at -

tack aircraft.

A-4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, jet attack aircraft

in service on board carriers of the U.S . Navy and with land -

based Marine attack squadrons .

A-6A—Grumman Intruder, a twin-jet, twin-seat, attack aircraf t

specifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completel y

obscured by weather or darkness.

AAR—After action report .

AC-47—Douglas C-47 Skytrain, twin-engine fixed-wing transport

modified with 7 .62mm miniguns and used as a gunship .

ADC—Assistant division commander .

AdminO — Administrative officer .

Adv—Advanced .

AGC—Amphibious command ship . The current designation is

LCC.

AK-47—Russian-made Kalashnikov gas-operated 7 .62mm

automatic rifle, with an effective range of 400 meters. It was

the standard rifle of the North Vietnamese Army.

AKA—Attack cargo ship, a naval ship designed to transport

combat-loaded cargo in an assault landing . LKA is the current

designation .

ANGLICO—Air and naval gunfire liaison company, an organization composed of Marine and Navy personnel speciall y

qualified for control of naval gunfire and close air support.

ANGLICO personnel normally provided this service while attached to U .S . Army, Korean, and ARVN units.

AOA—Amphibious objective area, a defined geographical area

within which is located the area or areas to be captured by th e

amphibious task force .

APA—Attack transport ship, a naval ship, designed for combat

loading elements of a battalion landing team. LPA is the current designation .

APC—Armored personnel carrier .

Arc Light—The codename for B-52 bombing missions in South

Vietnam.

ARG—Amphibious ready group .

Arty—Artillery .

ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

ASRT—Air support radar team, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system which provides groun d

controlled precision flight path guidance and weapons releas e

for attack aircraft.

B-3 Front—North Vietnamese military command established i n

the Central Highlands of South Vietnam to control military

operations in Kontum, Dar Loc, and Pleiku Provinces .

B-52—Boeing Stratofortress, U .S . Air Force eight-engine, swept -

wing, heavy jet bomber .

BGen—Brigadier general .

BLT—Battalion landing team .

Bn—Battalion .

Brig—Brigade .

C-117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine transport aircraft. The

C-117D was an improved version of the C-47, the military version of the DC-3 .

C-130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine turboprop transpor t

aircraft.

CAAR—Combat after action report .

Capt—Captain .

CAS—Close air support .

Cdr— Commander.

CG—Commanding general.

CH-37—Sikorsky twin-engine, heavy transport helicopte r

which carries three crew members and 20 passengers .

CH-46—Boeing Vertol Sea Knight, a twin-turbine, tandem-rotor

transport helicopter, designed to carry a four-man crew and 1 7

combat-loaded troops .

CH-53—Sikorsky Sea Stallion, a single-rotor, heav y

transport helicopter powered by two shaft-turbine engine s

with an average payload of 12,800 pounds . Carries crew o f

three and 38 combat-loaded troops .

CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Group, South Vietnames e

paramilitary force, composed largely of Montagnards, th e

nomadic tribesmen who populate the South Vietnames e

highlands, and advised by the U .S . Army Special Forces.

CinCPac— Commander in Chief, Pacific .

CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet .

Class (I-V)— Categories of military supplies, e .g ., Class I, rations;

Class III, POL ; Class V, Ammunition.

CMG— Commandant of the Marine Corps.

CMH—Center of Military History, Department of the Army .

CNO— Chief of Naval Operations .

CO—Commanding officer.

Col—Colonel.

CORDS—Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Sup -

port, the agency organized under MACV in May 1967 an d

charged with coordinating U .S. and Vietnamese pacification

efforts.

Combined action program—A Marine pacification program

which integrated a Marine infantry squad with a South Viet -

namese Popular Forces platoon in a Vietnamese village .

ComdC—Command chronology .

ComUSMACV—Commander, U .S . Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

COSVN—Central Office of South Vietnam, the nominal Communist military and political headquarters in South Vietnam .

287
288 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

County Fair—A sophisticated cordon and search operation in a

particular hamlet or village by South Vietnamese troops ,

police, local officials, and U.S. Marines in an attempt to screen

and register the local inhabitants.

CP— Command post.

CRC—Control and reporting center, an element of the U.S. Air

Force tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical

Air Control Center, which conducted radar and warnin g

operations.

CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone .

DASC—Direct air support center—A subordinate operational

component of the Marine air control system designed for control of close air support and other direct air support operations.

D-Day—Day scheduled for the beginning of an operation .

DD—Navy Destroyer .

DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam .

DRV—Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) .

Dtd — Dated .

Div—Division.

DOD—Department of Defense .

Duster—The nickname for the U .S. Army's tracked vehicle, the

M-42, which mounted dual 40-mm automatic weapons .

EA-6A—The electronic-countermeasures version of the A-6A Intruder.

ECM—Electronic countermeasures, a major subdivision of electronic warfare involving actions against enemy electroni c

equipment or to exploit the enemy 's use of electromagneti c

radiations from such equipment .

EF-10B—An ECM modified version of the Navy F-3D Skynight, a

twin-engine jet night-fighter of Korean War vintage .

ELINT—Electronic intelligence, the intelligence informatio n

gained by monitoring radiations from enemy electronic equipment.

Engr—Engineer .

F-4B—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engined, two-seat, long -

range, all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber .

FAC (A)—Forward air controller (Airborne) .

FFV—Field Force, Vietnam I and II, U .S . Army commands in I I

and III Corps areas of South Vietnam .

FLC—Force Logistic Command .

FLSG—Force logistic support group .

FLSU—Force logistic support unit .

FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific .

FO—Forward observer .

FSCC—Fire support coordination center, a single location involved in the coordination of all forms of fire support .

FSR—Force service regiment .

Fwd—Forward .

G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e . g ., G-1 woul d

refer to the staff member responsible for personnel ; G-2 in -

telligence ; G-3 operations; G-4 logistics, and G-5 civil affairs .

Gen— General .

Golden Fleece—Marine rice harvest protection operation .

Grenade Launcher, M79—U .S.-built, single-shot, breech -

loaded shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and

weighs approximately 6 .5 pounds when loaded ; it has a sustamed rate of aimed fire of five-seven rounds per minute an d

an effective range of 375 meters .

Gun, 175mm, M107—U .S.-built, self-propelled gun whic h

weighs 62,000 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a

maximum range of 32,800 meters . Maximum rate of fire is

one round every two minutes.

Gun, 155mm, M53—U.S.-built, medium, self-propelled gun ,

with a 23,300 meter range, and weighing 96,000 pounds. It

has a sustained rate of fire of one round every two minutes .

GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam) .

H&I fires—Harassing and interdiction fires .

H&S Co—Headquarters and service company .

HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air guided missile, designed t o

defend against low-flying enemy aircraft and short rang e

missiles.

HE—High explosive .

H-Hour—The specific hour an operation begins .

HistBr, G-3Div, HQMC— Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, the Vietnam-era predecessor o f

the History and Museums Division .

HLZ—Helicopter landing zone .

HMM—Marine medium helicopter squadron .

Howitzer, 8-inch (M55)—U .S.-Built, self-propelled, heavy -

artillery piece with a maximum range of 16,900 meters and a

rate of fire of one round every two minutes .

Howitzer, 105mm, M101A1—U.S.-built, towed, general purpos e

light artillery piece with a maximum range of 11,000 meters

and maximum rate of fire of four rounds per minute .

Howitzer, 155mm, M-114A towed and M-109 selfpropelled—U.S.-built medium artillery with a maximum

range of 15,080 meters and a maximum rate of fire of 3 round s

per minute . Marines employed both models in Vietnam . Th e

newer and heavier self-propelled M109 was largely roa d

bound, while the lighter, towed M114A could be move d

either by truck or by helicopter.

Howtar—A 4 .2-inch (107mm) mortar tube mounted on a 75mm

pack howitzer frame .

"Huey"—Popular name for UH-1 series of helicopters .

ICC—International Control Commission, established by th e

Geneva Accords of 1954 to supervise the truce ending the Firs t

Indochina War between the French and the Viet Minh an d

resulting in the partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel . Th e

members of the Commission were from Canada, India, an d

Poland .

ICCC—I Corps Coordinating Council, consisting of U .S. and

Vietnamese officials in I Corps who coordinated the civilia n

assistance program in I Corps.

I Corps—The military and administrative subdivision which includes the five northern provinces of South Vietnam .

J—The designations for members of a joint staff which include s

members of several services comprising the command, e .g . ,

J-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel ;

J-2 intelligence ; J-3 operations; J-4 logistic and J-5 civil affairs.

JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff (U .S.).

JGS—Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese) .

JTD—Joint table of distribution .
GLOSSARY 28 9

KANZUS—A proposed international brigade to man defenses

along the DMZ; the acronym stands for Korean, Australian ,

New Zealand, and United States.

KC-130—The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of th e

C-130 Lockheed Hercules .

KIA — Killed-in-action .

Kit Carson Scout—Viet Cong defectors recruited by Marines to

serve as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents .

L-Hour—In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour

the helicopters land in the landing zone .

LAAM Bn—Light antiaircraft missile battalion .

LCM—Landing craft mechanized, designed to land tanks, trucks,

and trailers directly onto the beach .

LCVP—Landing craft, vehicle, personnel, a small craft with a bo w

ramp used to transport assault troops and light vehicles to the

beach .

LOI—Letter of Instruction .

LPD—Amphibious transport, dock, a ship designed to transport

and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters . It

has both a submersible well deck and a helicopter landing

deck .

LPH—Amphibious assault ship, a ship designed or modified to

transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means

of embarked helicopters .

LSA—Logistic support area .

LSD—Landing ship, dock, a landing ship designed to combat

load, transport, and launch amphibious crafts or vehicles

together with crews and embarked personnel, and to provid e

limited docking and repair services to small ships and crafts. It

lacks the helicopter landing deck of the LPD .

LST—Landing ship, tank, landing ship designed to transport

heavy vehicles and to land them on a beach .

Lt—Lieutenant .

LtCol—Lieutenant colonel .

LtGen—Lieutenant general .

Ltr—letter.

LVTE—Amphibian vehicle, tracked, engineer ; a lightly armored

amphibious vehicle designed for minefield and obstacl e

clearance .

LVTH—Amphibian vehicle, tracked, howitzer; a lightly armored ,

self-propelled, amphibious 105mm howitzer . It resembles a n

LVTP with a turret for the howitzer .

LVTP—Landing vehicle, tracked, personnel ; an amphibian vehicle used to land and or transport personnel .

II—Landing zone .

MAB— Marine Amphibious Brigade .

Machine gun, .50 caliber—U .S . built, belt-fed, recoil-operated ,

air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 8 0

pounds without mount or ammunition ; it has a sustained rate

of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range o f

1,450 meters.

Machine gun, M60—U.S. built, belt-fed, gas-operated, aircooled, 7 .62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 20 pounds without mount or ammunition ; it has a

sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,000 meters.

MACS—Marine air control squadron, provides and operates

ground facilities for the detection and interception of hostil e

aircraft and for the navigational direction of friendly aircraft i n

the conduct of support operations.

MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam .

MAF—Marine amphibious force .

MAG—Marine aircraft group .

Main Force—Refers to organized Viet Cong battalions an d

regiments as opposed to local VC guerrilla groups .

Maj—Major.

MajGen—Major general .

MaDiv—Marine division .

—Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e .g . 3d Marines.

MASS—Marine air support squadron, provides and operates

facilties for the control of support aircraft operating in direc t

support of ground forces.

MAW—Marine aircraft wing .

MCAF—Marine Corps air facility .

MCAS—Marine Corps air station .

MCCC—Marine Corps Command Center.

MCOAG—Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group .

MedCap—Medical civilian assistance program .

MIA—Missing-in-action .

MilHistBr—Military History Branch .

Mortar, 4 .2-inch, M30—U .S. built, rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop -

fired weapon consisting of tube, base-plate and standard ;

weapon weighs 330 pounds and has a maximum range of

4,020 meters. Rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute .

Mortar, 60mm, M19—U .S. built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded ,

weapon, which weighs 45 .2 pounds when assembled; it has a

maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained

rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute ; the effective range is

2,000 meters.

Mortar, 81mm, M29—U .S. built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded ,

which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled ; it

has a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute and an effective range of 2,300-3,650 meters, depending upon am -

munition used .

Mortar, 82mm, Soviet-built, smooth-bore, mortar ,

single-shot, high angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 25

rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters .

Mortar, 120mm—Soviet or Chinese Communist built, smoot h

bore, drop or trigger fired, mortar which weighs approximately 600 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per

minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.

MR-5 —Military Region 5, a Communist political and military sec -

tor in northern South Vietnam, including all of I Corps. NVA

units in MR-5 did not report to COSVN .

MS—Manuscript.

Msg — Message .

NAG—Naval Advisory Group .

NCC—Naval component commander .

NCO—Non-commissioned officer .

NLF—National Liberation Front, the political arm of the

Communist-led insurgency against the South Vietnames e

Government .

NMCB—Naval mobile construction battalion (Seabees) .

NMCC—National Military Command Center.

NPA—National priority area, designated targeted area for
290 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

pacification in South Vietnam .

Nui—Vietnamese word for hill or mountain .

Nung—A Vietnamese tribesman, of a separate ethnic group and

probably of Chinese origin .

NVA—North Vietnamese Army ; often used colloquially to refe r

to a North Vietnamese soldier .

0-1B—Cessna, single-engine observation aircraft .

OAB, NHD—Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division .

Ontos—U.S . built, lightly-armored, tracked antitank vehicl e

armed with six coaxially-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles .

OpCon—Operational control, the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned for specific missions or task s

which are usually limited by function, time, or location .

OpO—Operation order, a directive issued by a commander t o

subordinate commanders for the execution of an operation .

OPlan— Operation plan, a plan for a single or series of connecte d

operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession ; i t

is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and

orders .

OpSum — Operational summary .

OSJS (MACV)—Office of the Secretariat, Joint Staff (Military

Assistance Command Vietnam) .

PAVN—Peoples Army of Vietnam (North Vietnam). This

acronym dropped in favor of NVA .

PF—Popular Force, Vietnamese militia who were usuall y

employed in the defense of their own communities .

POL—Petroleum, oil, and lubricants.

Practice Nine—The codename for the planning of the antiinfrltration barrier across the DMZ .

Project Delta—A special South Vietnamese reconnaissance grou p

consisting of South Vietnamese Special Forces troops and U .S .

Army Special Forces advisors.

Recoilless rifle, 106mm, M401A1—U .S built, single-shot,

recoilless, breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 pound s

when assembled and mounted for firing; it has a sustained

rate of fire of six rounds per minute and an effective range o f

1,365 meters.

RF—Regional Force, Vietnamese militia who were employed in a

specific area .

RF-4B—Photo-reconnaissance model of the F4B Phantom II .

RF-8A—Reconnaissance version of the F-8 Chance Vough t

Crusader.

Regt — Regiment .

Revolutionary Development—The South Vietnamese pacification

program started in 1966 .

Revolutionary Development Teams—Especially trained Vietnamese political cadre who were assigned to individual

hamlets and villages and conducted various pacification and

civilian assistance tasks on a local level . (See rural reconstruction. )

Rifle, M14—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, semiautomatic, 7 .62mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 1 2

pounds with a full 20-round magazine ; it has a sustained rate

of fire of 30 rounds per minute and an effective range of 46 0

meters.

Rifle, M16—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, automatic, 5 .56mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 3 . 1

pounds with a 20-round magazine ; it has a sustained rate of

fire of 12-15 rounds per minute and an effective range of 46 0

meters .

RLT—Regimental landing team .

ROK—Republic of Korea (South Korea)

Rolling Thunder—Codename for U .S . air operations over North

Vietnam.

Rough Rider—Organized vehicle convoys, often escorted b y

helicopters and armored vehicles, using Vietnam's roads to

supply Marine bases.

Route Package—Code name used with a number to designat e

areas of North Vietnam for the American bombing campaign .

Route Package I was the area immediately north of the DMZ .

RRU—Radio Research Unit .

Rural Reconstruction—The predecessor pacification campaign t o

Revolutionary Development .

UN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)

RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces .

S- -Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels .

S-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel ;

S-2 intelligence ; S-3, operations; S-4 logistics; and S-5 civil affairs.

SAR—Search and rescue .

SATS—Short airfield for tactical support, an expeditiontary airfield used by Marine Corps aviation that included a

portable runway surface, aircraft launching and recover y

devices, and other essential expeditionary airfield components.

SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization .

2d AD—2d Air Division, the major U.S. Air Force command i n

Vietnam prior to the establishment of the Seventh Air Force .

SecDef— Secretary of Defense .

SecState—Secretary of State .

Seventh AF—Seventh Air Force, the major U.S . Air Force command in Vietnam.

Seventh Flt—Seventh Fleet, the U .S . fleet assigned to the Pacific .

SitRep —Situation Report.

SLF—Special landing force .

Song—Vietnamese for "river" .

SOP—Standing operating procedure, set of instructions layin g

out standardized procedures .

Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft.

Sparrow Hawk—A small rapid reaction force on standby ,

ready for inserion by helicopter for reinforcement of units i n

contact with the enemy .

Steel Tiger—The codename for the air campaign over Laos .

Stingray—Special Marine reconnaissance missions in which smal l

Marine reconnaissance teams call artillery and air attacks o n

targets of opportunity .

SPOS—Strong point obstacle system, often called the

"McNamara Line," which had the intended purpose of con -

trolling movement of NVA units from North Vietnam into I

Corps.

Strike Company—an elite company in a South Vietnamese infantry division, directly under the control of the division commander .

TAC(A)—Tactical air coordinator (Airborne), an officer in an
GLOSSARY 29 1

airplane, who coordinates close air support.

TACC—Tactical air control center, the principal air operations installation for controlling all aircraft and air-warning function s

of tactical air operations.

TADC —Tactical air direction center, an air operations installatio n

under the tactical air control center, which direct aircraft an d

aircraft warning functions of the tactical air center.

TAOC—Tactical air operations center, a subordinate componen t

of the air command and control system which controls all

enroute air traffic and air defense operations.

TAFDS—Tactical airfield fuel dispensing system, the expeditionary storage and dispensing system of aviation fuel at tactical airfields. It uses 10,000 gallon fabric tanks to store the

fuel.

Tally Ho—Bombing campaign under ComUSMACV begun inJuly 1966 of Route Package I in North Vietnam .

Tank, M48—U .S. built 50 .7-ton tank with a crew of four ; primary

armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30 caliber

and one .50 caliber machine gun . Maximum road speed of 3 2

miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles.

TAOR—Tactical area of responsibility, a defined area of land fo r

which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commande r

of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support .

TE—Task element.

TG—Task Group .

Tiger Hound—Airstrikes in Laos directed by U .S . Air Force small

fixed-wing observation aircraft, flying up to 12 miles in

southeastern Laos.

TU—Task unit .

UH-1E-Bell "Huey"—A single-engine, light attack/obseration

helicopter noted for its maneuverability and firepower ; carrie s

a crew of three ; it can be armed with air-to-ground rocke t

packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns .

UH-34D—Sikorsky Sea Horse, a single-engine medium transport

helicopter with a crew of three, carries 8-12 combat soldiers ,

depending upon weather conditions .

USA—United States Army .

USAF—United States Air Force .

USAID —United States Agency for International Development .

USMC—United States Marine Corps .

U.S . Mission Council—Council, chaired by the U .S . Ambassador

to South Vietnam and included ComUSMACV, which

developed and coordinated U.S . policy within South Vietnam.

USN—United States Navy.

USOM—United States Operations Mission, the United States

civilian organization in RVN including the U .S . Embassy ,

AID, etc.

VC—Viet Cong, a term used to refer to the Communist guerrill a

in South Vietnam; a derogatory contraction of the Vietnames e

phrase meaning "Vietnamese Communists. "

Viet Minh—The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam Doc Lap

Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalist

groups, which actively opposed the Japanese in World War I I

and the French in the first Indochina War .

VMA—Marine attack squadron . In naval aviation, the "V"

designates "heavier than air" as opposed to craft that were

"lighter than air. "

VMF (AW)—Marine fighter squadron (all-weather) .

VMFA—Marine fighter attack squadron .

VMCJ— Marine composite reconnaissance squadron .

VMGR—Marine refueller transport squadron .

VMO —Marine observation squadron .

VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force .

VNMB—Vietnamese Marine Brigade .

VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps .

VNN— Vietnamese Navy.

VT—Variable timed electronic fuze for an artillery shell whic h

causes airburst over the target area .

WestPac—Western Pacific .

WIA—Wounded-in-action .

WFRC—Washngton Federal Records Center .

Appendix C

Chronology of Significant Events

1 January III MAF strength totaled 65,789 .

6 January Operation Deckhouse V, the first major offensive by U .S. forces int o

the Mekong Delta, began with helicopter and waterborne landings b y

the SLF and Vietnamese Marines . The Viet Cong knew of the operation in advance and departed before the Marines landed.

26 January MACV headquarters completed its Practice Nine Requirement Plan fo r

constructing a strong point obstacle system (SPOS) south of the DMZ.

26 January Operation Desoto began . Task Force X-Ray controlled this operatio n

which involved elements of the 4th and 5th Marines in a search and

destroy mission in Quang Nam Province . The operation lasted 73 days .

31 January Operation Prairie, the 3d Marine Division's multi-battalion operation ,

which began in August 1966, ended in Quang Tri Province . The

operation opposed elements of two North Vietnamese divisions.

1 February The 3d Marine Division began Operation Prairie II, a continuation o f

Prairie I.

8-12 February These dates marked the ceasefire for Tet, a major Vietnamese holiday .

Thereafter, North Vietnamese units, for the first time, defended ke y

terrain from well-constructed, fortified lines and employed artiller y

weapons ranging from 82mm to 130mm in size .

12-22 February The 1st Marines conducted Operation Stone in Quang Nam Province .

In this operation, Marines destroyed a vast network of caves, tunnels,

and bunkers . In the operation's second phase, Marines surrounde d

elements of the R-20 Battalion and then swept back and forth over the

cordoned area .

2 .1 February Dr. Bernard Fall, noted . historian of the French combat experience i n

Indochina, died in a explosion of an enemy mine . Dr . Fall was accompanying the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines on Operation Chinook II.

26 February The 1st Marines began Operation Lafayette, a multi-battalion effort i n

Quang Nam Province .

10 March III MAF completed the introduction of the M-16 to Marines in Vietnam.

18 March The first woman Marine to serve in Vietnam, MSgt Barbara J. Dulinsky, arrived in Saigon, for assignment to the MACV combat operation s

center.

18 March The 3d Marine Division ended Prairie II and began Paririe III th e

following day . The latter continued until 20 April .

26 March COMUSMACV ordered III MAF to prepare a plan for locating, constructing, and occupying a strongpoint obstacle system south of the

DMZ .

5 April The 4th Marines began a multi-battalion operation named Big Horn in

Thua Thien Province.

293
294 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

6-DO April The 1st Marines conducted Operation Canyon with South Vietnames e

ranger battalions participating .

20 April Operation Prairie IV began in Quang Tri Province . It ended on 1 7

May .

20 April Task Force Oregon arrived at Chu Lai .

24 April The First Battle of Khe Sanh began . Units of the 3d Marine Divisio n

subsequently fought bitter battles with regular NVA forces for contro l

of Hills 8815, 881N, and 861 . This battle continued into May .

2 May 11th Engineer Battalion completed clearing a 200-meter wide trace

between Con Thien and Gio Linh and began clearing a 500-mete r

perimeter around each position .

13 May The 26th Marines began Operation Crockett in the Khe Sanh area .

18 May Units of the 3d Marine Division, augmented by the SLF and ARV N

forces, began Operation Hickory by moving into the southern portion

of the DMZ in a three-pronged attack against North Vietnamese units

using the area as a sanctuary .

26 May The 5th Marines began Operation Union II, which continued until 5

June.

31 May LtGen Robert E . Cushman, Jr., succeeded LtGen Lewis W . Walt a s

CG, III MAF .

7 June A company-size force from the 26th Marines engaged an NVA forc e

on Hill 881 during Operation Crockett and reported killing 59 NV A

soldiers.

14-22 June The 7th Marines conducted Operation Arizona with a multi-battalio n

force . The operation moved 1,650 refugees to camps at Duc Duc, th e

headquarters of the An Hoa industrial complex 15 miles south of Da

Nang.

18 June III MAF published its OpPlan 11-67 outling the SPOS concept.

25 June LtGen Cushman and MajGen Hoang Xuan Lam, the Vietnamese Army I Corps commander, opened the new 1,680 foot prefabricate d

bridge across the Da Nang River.

3 July North Vietnamese artillery fired supply dumps at the Marines' base a t

Dong Ha .

14 July The name "Dye Marker" became effective as the title of the efforts t o

construct an SPOS south of the DMZ .

15 July An early morning enemy rocket attack heavily damaged aircraft an d

the southern end of the Da Nang Air Base .

28-29 July The 3d Marine Division sent the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, reinforce d

with armored vehicles, into the DMZ north of Con Thien on a searc h

and destroy mission. The battalion had to fight its way out on th e

DMZ on the second day.

7-11 August BLT 1/3 of the SLF conducted Operation Beacon Gate southeast o f

Hoi An.

10-28 August The 1st Marine Division's Task Force X-Ray conducted Operatio n

Cochise in Quang Tin Province in conjuction with the ARVN Operation Lien Ket-122 .

27 August The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines began Operation Yazoo in Happy

Valley near Da Nang . There was little contact and the operation ende d

on 5 September .
CHRONOLOGY 29 5

3 September North Vietnamese artillery fire destroyed the large ammunition dum p

at Dong Ha .

4 September Navy Chaplain Vincent R . Capodanno died earning the Medal of

Honor while serving with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines .

4-15 September Task Force X-Ray's Operation Swift pitted elements of two Marine battalions against a large and well-equipped force of NVA soldiers northwest of Tam Ky . ARVN forces and elements of Task Force Orego n

fought simultaneous operations in conjunction with Swift .

6 October BGen Harry C . Olson relieved BGen James E . Herbold, Jr., as commander of the Force Logistics Command .

11-20 October The 1st Marines conducted Operation Medina near Quang Tri.

20 October The 1st Marines began Operation Osceola .

24 October The 7th Marines began Operation Knox, which ended 4 November, i n

the Phu Loc-Hai Van area .

31 October Operation Ardmore, Fremont, and Kingfisher, which began in mid -

July, ended in northern I Corps.

1 November Vice President Hubert H . Humphrey, on a visit to South Vietnam,

presented the Presidential Unit Citation to the 3d Marine Division an d

the 7th ARVN Airborne .

14 November MajGen Bruno A . Hochmuth died in a helicopter crash near Hue .

BGen Metzger assumed command of the 3d Marine Division pendin g

the arrival of MajGen Tompkins.

6-17 November The 5th Marines conducted Operation Essex in Quang Nam Province .

13-30 November The 7th Marines conducted Operation Foster northwest of An Hoa .

1-31 December The 3d Marine Division continued Operation Scotland, Lancaster ,

Kentucky, Napoleon, Neosho, and Osceola .

23 December The 7th Marines terminated Operation Citrus .

31 December As of this date, III MAF units had expended 757,520 man days and

114,519 equipment hours on the construction of the strong poin t

obstacle system, which many Marines referred to as the "McNamar a

Line ." Enemy action had destroyed $1,622,348 worth of Marine equipment being used on the project .

Appendix D

Medal of Honor Citations, 1967

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JAMES ANDERSON, JR .

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a

rifleman, Second Platoon, Company F, Second Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division in Vietna m

on 28 February 1967 . Company F was advancing in dense jungle northwest of Cam Lo in an effort to extract a

heavily besieged reconnaissance patrol . Private First Class Anderson's platoon was the lead element and ha d

advanced only about 200 meters when they were brought under extremely intense enemy small arms an d

automatic weapons fire . The platoon reacted swiftly, getting on line as best they could in the thick terrain, and

began returning fire . Private First Class Anderson found himself tightly bunched together with the other

members of the platoon only 20 meters from the enemy positions . As the fire fight continued several of the

men were wounded by the deadly enemy assault . Suddenly, an enemy grenade landed in the midst of th e

Marines and rolled along side Private First Class Anderson's head . Unhesitatingly and with complete disregar d

for his own personal safety, he reached out, grasped the grenade, pulled it to his chest and curled around it a s

it went off. Although several Marines received shrapnel from the grenade, his body absorbed the major forc e

of the explosion . In this singularly heroic act, Private First Class Anderson saved his comrades from serious in -

jury and possible death . His personal heroism, extraordinary valor, and inspirational supreme self-sacrifice

reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the Unite d

States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .

297
298 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL JEDH COLBY BARKE R

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a machine gunner with Company F, Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division, in th e

Republic of Vietnam on 21 September 1967 . During a reconnaissance operation near Con Thien, Corpora l

Barker's squad was suddenly hit by enemy sniper fire . The squad immediately deployed to a combat formatio n

and advanced to a strongly fortified enemy position, when it was again struck by small arms and automati c

weapons fire, sustaining numerous casualties . Although wounded by the initial burst of fire, Corporal Barke r

boldly remained in the open, delivering a devastating volume of accurate fire on the numerically superio r

force . The enemy was intent upon annihilating the small Marine force and, realizing that Corporal Barker wa s

a threat to their position directed the preponderance of their fire on his position . He was again wounded, this

time in the right hand, which prevented him from operating his vitally needed machine gun . Suddenly, an d

without warning, an enemy grenade landed in the midst of the few surviving Marines . Unhesitatingly an d

with complete disregard for his own personal safety, Corporal Barker threw himself upon the deadly grenade ,

absorbing with his own body the full and tremendous force of the explosion . In a final act of bravery, he crawled to the side of a wounded comrade and administered first aid before succumbing to his grievous wounds .

His bold initiative, intrepid fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the face of almost certai n

death undoubtedly saved his comrades from further injury or possible death and reflected great credit upo n

himself, the Marine Corps, and the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
MEDALS OF HONOR 29 9

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

SECOND LIEUTENANT JOHN PAUL BOBO

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Weapon s

Platoon Commander, Company I, Third Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, in Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 30 March 1967 . Company I was establishing night ambush sites when the

command group was attacked by a reinforced North Vietnamese company supported by heavy automati c

weapons and mortar fire . Lieutenant Bobo immediately organized a hasty defense and moved from position t o

position encouraging the outnumbered Marines despite the murderous enemy fire . Recovering a rocket launcher from among the friendly casualties, he organized a new launcher team and directed its fire into the enem y

machine gun positions. When an exploding enemy mortar round severed Lieutenant Bobo's right leg belo w

the knee, he refused to be evacuated and insisted upon being placed in a firing position to cover the movement of the command group to better location . With a web belt around his leg serving as a tourniquet an d

with his leg jammed into the dirt to curtail the bleeding, he remained in this position and delivere d

devastating fire into the ranks of the enemy attempting to overrun the Marines . Lieutenant Bobo was mortall y

wounded while firing his weapon into the mainpoint of the enemy attack but his valiant spirit inspired hi s

men to heroic efforts, and his tenacious stand enabled the command group to gain a protective position wher e

it repulsed the enemy onslaught. Lieutenant Bobo's superb leadership, dauntless courage, and bold initiativ e

reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the Unite d

States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
300 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

LIEUTENANT VINCENT R. CAPODANNO

CHAPLAIN CORPS, UNITED STATES NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepedity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty a s

Chaplain of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Reinforced), FMF, in connection with operations against enemy forces in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 4 September 1967 . In respnse t o

reports that the 2d Platoon of M Company was in danger of being overrun by a massed enemy assaulting force ,

Lieutenant Capodanno left the relative safety of the Company Command Post and ran through an open are a

raked with fire, directly to the beleaguered platoon . Disregarding the intense enemy small-arms, automatic -

weapons, and mortar fire, he moved about the battlefield administering last rites to the dying and givin g

medical aid to the wounded . When an exploding mortar round inflicted painful multiple wounds to his arm s

and legs, and severed a portion of his right hand, he steadfastly refused all medical aid . Instead, he directed

the corpsmen to help their wounded comrades and, with calm vigor, continued to move about the battlefiel d

as he provided encouragement by voice and example to the valiant Marines . Upon encountering a wounde d

corpsman in the direct line of fire of an enemy machine gunner positioned approximately fifteen yards away ,

Lieutenant Capodanno rushed forward in a daring attempt to aid and assist the mortally wounded corpsman .

At that instant, only inches from his goal, he was struck down by a burst of machine gun fire . By his heroi c

conduct on the battlefield, and his inspiring example, Lieutenant Capodanno upheld the finest traditions o f

the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life in the cause of freedom .
MEDALS OF HONOR 30 1

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

SERGEANT RODNEY MAXWELL DAVI S

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -

ing as the right guide of the Second Platoon, Company B, First Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division ,

in action against enemy forces in Quang Nam Province-, Republic of Vietnam, on 6 September 1967 . Elements

of the Second Platoon were pinned down by a numerically superior force of attacking North Vietnamese Arm y

Regulars. Remnants of the platoon were located in a trench line where Sergeant Davis was directing the fire of

his men in an attempt to repel the enemy attack . Disregarding the enemy hand grenades and high volume o f

small arms and mortar fire, Sergeant Davis moved from man to man shouting words of encouragement to eac h

of them while firing and throwing grenades at the onrushing enemy. When an enemy grenade landed in th e

trench in the midst of his men, Sergeant Davis, realizing the gravity of the situation, and in a final valiant ac t

of complete self-sacrifice, instantly threw himself upon the grenade, absorbing with his own body the full an d

terrific force of the explosion . Through his extraordinary initiative and inspiring valor in the face of almost certain death, Sergeant Davis saved his comrades from injury and possible loss of life, enabled his platoon to hol d

its vital position, and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service .

He gallantry gave his life for his country .
302 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The President of the Uniied States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS DOUGLAS EUGENE DICKE Y

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with the Second Platoon, Company C, First Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division in th e

Republic of Vietnam on 26 March 1967 . While participating in Operation Beacon Hill 1, the Second Platoo n

was engaged in a fierce battle with the Viet Cong at close range in dense jungle foliage Private First Clas s

Dickey had come forward to replace a radio operator who had been wounded in this intense action and was being treated by a medical corpsman . Suddenly an enemy grenade landed in the midst of a group of Marines ,

which included the wounded radio operator who was immobilized . Fully realizing the inevitable result of his

actions, Private First Class Dickey, in a final valiant act, guickly and unhesitatingly threw himself upon th e

deadly grenade, absorbing with his own body the full and complete force of the explosion . Private First Class

Dickey's personal heroism, extraordinary valor and selfless courage saved a number of his comrades from certain injury and possible death at the cost of his own life . His actions reflected great credit upon himself, th e

Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country .
MEDALS OF HONOR 30 3

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

SERGEANT PAUL HELLSTROM FOSTER

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -

ing as an Artillery Liaison Operations Chief with the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division, near Con Thien in the Republic of Vietnam. In the early morning hours of 14 October 1967, the Secon d

Battalion was occupying a defensive position which protected a bridge on the road leading from Con Thien t o

Cam Lo. Suddenly, the Marines' position came under a heavy volume of mortar and artillery fire, followed b y

an aggressive enemy ground assault . In the ensuing engagement, the hostile force penetrated the perimete r

and brought a heavy concentration of small arms, automatic weapons, and rocket fire to bear on the Battalion

Command Post . Although his position in the Fire Support Coordination Center was dangerously exposed t o

enemy fire and he was wounded when an enemy hand grenade exploded near his position, Sergeant Foster

resolutely continued to direct accurate mortar and artillery fire on the advancing North Vietnamese troops . As

the attack continued, a hand grenade landed in the midst of Sergeant Foster and his five companions . Realizing the danger, he shouted a warning, threw his armored vest over the grenade, and unhesitatingly placed hi s

own body over the armored vest . When the grenade exploded, Sergeant Foster absorbed the entire blast wit h

his own body and was mortally wounded . His heroic actions undoubtedly saved his comrades from further injury or possible death. Sergeant Foster's courage, extraordinary heroism, and unfaltering devotion to dut y

reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the Unite d

States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
304 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF

HONOR posthumously to

CAPTAIN JAMES ALBERT GRAHA M

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer, Company F, Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Viet -

nam on 2 June 1967 . During Operation Union II, the First Battalion, Fifth Marines, consisting of Companie s

A and D, with Captain Graham's company attached, launched an attack against an enemy occupied position ,

with two companies assaulting and one in reserve . Company F, a leading company, was proceeding across a

clear paddy area one thousand meters wide, attacking toward the assigned objective, when it came unde r

heavy fire from mortars and small arms which immediately inflicted a large number of casualties . Hardest hit

by fire was the second platoon of Company F, which was pinned down in the open paddy area by intense fir e

from two concealed machine guns . Forming an assault unit from members of his small company headquarters ,

Captain Graham bodly led a fierce assault through the second platoon's position, forcing the enemy to abandon the first machine gun position, thereby relieving some of the pressure on his second platoon, and enabling evacuation of the wounded to a more secure area . Resolute to silence the second machine gun, which continued its devastating fire, Captain Graham's small force stood steadfast in its hard won enclave . Subsequently, during the afternoon's fierce fighting, he suffered two minor wounds while personally accounting for a

estimated fifteen enemy killed . With the enemy position remaining invincible upon each attempt to withdra w

to friendly lines, and although knowing that he had no chance of survival, he chose to remain with one ma n

who could not be moved due to the seriousness of his wounds . The last radio transmission from Captai n

Graham reported that he was being assaulted by a force of twenty-five enemy ; he died while protectin g

himself and the wounded man he chose not to abandon . Captain Graham's actions throughout the day were a

series of heroic achievements . He outstanding courage, superb leadership and indomitable fighting spirit undoubtedly saved the second platoon from annihilation and reflected great credit upon himself, the Marin e

Corps, and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life for his country .
MEDALS OF HONOR 30 5

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS GARY WAYNE MARTINI

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty . On April

21, 1967, during Operation Union, elements of Company F, conducting offensive operations at Binh Son, en -

countered a firmly entrenched enemy force and immediately deployed to engage them . The Marines in Privat e

Martini's platoon assaulted across an open rice paddy to within twenty meters of the enemy trench line wher e

they were suddenly struck by hand grenades, intense small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire . The

enemy onslaught killed 14 and wounded 18 Marines, pinning the remainder of the platoon down behind a

low paddy dike . In the face of imminent danger, Private Martini immediately crawled over the dike to a for -

ward open area within 15 meters of the enemy position where, continuously exposed to the hostile fire, he

hurled hand grenades, killing several of the enemy . Crawling , back through the intense fire, he rejoined his

platoon which had moved to the relative safety of a trench line . From this position he observed several of hi s

wounded comrades laying helpless in the fire-swept paddy . Although he knew that one man had been killed

attempting to assist the wounded, Private Martini raced through the open area and dragged a comrade back t o

a friendly position . In spite of a serious wound received during this first daring rescue, he again braved the

unrelenting fury of the enemy fire to aid another companion lying wounded only 20 meters in front of th e

enemy trench line. As he reached the fallen Marine, he received a mortal wound, but disregarding his ow n

condition, he began to drag the Marine toward his platoon's position . Observing men from his unit attempting to leave the security of their position to aid him, concerned only for their safety, he called to them to re -

main under cover, and through a final supreme effort, moved his injured comrade to where he could be pulle d

to safety, before he fell, succumbing to his wounds . Stouthearted and indomitable, Private Martin i

unhesitatingly yielded his life to save two of his comrades and insure the safety of the remainder of his platoon . His outstanding courage, valiant fighting spirit and selfless devotion to duty reflected the highest credi t

upon himself, the Marine Corps, and the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
306 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS MELVIN EARL NEWLIN

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a machine gunner attached to the First Platoon, Company F, Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, Firs t

Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on 3 and 4 July 1967 . Private Newlin, with four other Marines ,

was manning a key position on the perimeter of the Nong Son outpost when the enemy launched a savage an d

well coordinated mortar and infantry assault, seriously wounding him and killing his four comrades. Propping

himself against his machine gun, he poured a deadly accurate stream of fire into the charging ranks of Vie t

Cong . Though repeatedly hit by small arms fire, he twice repelled enemy attempts to overrun his position .

During the third attempt, a grenade explosion wounded him again and knocked him to the ground unconscious . The Viet Cong guerrillas, believing him dead, bypassed him and continued their assault on th e

main force . Meanwhile, Private Newlin regained consciousness, crawled back to his weapon, and brought it t o

bear on the rear of the enemy causing havoc and confusion among them . Spotting the enemy attempting to

bring a captured 106 recoilless weapon to bear on other marine positions, he shifted his fire, inflicting heav y

casualties on the enemy and preventing them from firing the captured weapon . He then shifted his fire back

the primary enemy force, causing the enemy to stop their assaults on the marine bunkers and to once again attack his machine gun position . Valiantly fighting off two more enemy assaults, he firmly held his ground unti l

mortally wounded . Private Newlin had singlehandedly broken up and disorganized the entire enemy assault

force, causing them to lose momentum and delaying them long enough for his fellow marines to organize a

defense and beat off their secondary attack . His indomitable courage, fortitude, and unwavering devotion t o

duty in the face of almost certain death reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps and uphel d

the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service .
MEDALS OF HONOR 30 7

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

CORPORAL WILLIAM THOMAS PERKINS, JR.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -

ing as a combat photographer attached to Company C, First Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division, i n

the Republic of Vietnam on 12 October 1967 . During Operation Medina, a major reconnaissance in force

southwest of Quang Tri, Company C made heavy combat contact with a numerically superior North Vietnamese Army Force estimated at from two to three companies. The focal point of the intense fighting was a

helicopter landing zone which also serving as the Command Post of Company C. In the course of strong hotil e

attack, an enemy grenade landed in the immediate area occupied by Corporal Perkins and three othe r

Marines. Realizing the inherent danger, he shouted the warning, "Incoming Grenade" to his fellow Marines ,

and in a valiant act of heroism, hurled himself upon the grenade absorbing the impact of the explosion with

his own body, thereby saving the lives of his comrades at the cost of his own . Through his exceptional courag e

and inspiring valor in the face of certain death, Corporal Perkins reflected great credit upon himself and th e

Marine Corps and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life

for his country.
308 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

SERGEANT LAWRENCE DAVID PETER S

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -

ing as a squad leader with Company M, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division in the Republi c

of Vietnam on 4 September 1967 . During Operation Swift, in the province of Quang Tin, the Marines of the

second platoon of Company M were struck by intense mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire from an en -

trenched enemy force . As the company rallied its forces, Sergeant Peters maneuvered his squad in an assaul t

on an enemy defended knoll . Disregarding his own saftey, as enemy rounds hit all about him, he stood in th e

open, pointing out enemy positions until he was painfully wounded in the leg . Disregarding his wound he

moved forward and continued to lead his men . As the enemy fire increased in accuracy and volume, his squa d

lost its momentum and was temporarily pinned down . Exposing himself to devastating enemy fire, he consolidated his position to render more effective fire . While directing the base of fire, he was wounded a second

time in the face and neck from an exploding mortar round . As the enemy attempted to infiltrate the positio n

of an adjacent platoon, Sergeant Peters stood erect in the full view of the enemy firing burst after burst forcin g

them to disclose their camouflaged positions. Sergeant Peters continued firing until he was critically wounded

by a gunshot wound in his chest . Although unable to walk or stand, Sergeant Peters steadfastly continued t o

direct his squad in spite of two additional wounds, persisted in his efforts to encourage and supervise his me n

until he lost consciousness and succumbed . Inspired by his selfless actions, the squad regained fire superiorit y

and once again carried the assault to the enemy . By his outstanding valor, indomitable fighting spirit an d

tenacious determination in the face of overwhelming odds, Sergeant Peters upheld the highest traditions o f

the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
MEDALS OF HONOR 309

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL

OF HONOR to

MAJOR STEPHEN WESLEY PLES S

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a helicopter gunship pilot attached to Marine Observation Squadron Six in action against enemy force s

near Quang Ngai, Republic of Vietnam, on 19 August 1967 . During an escort mission Major (then Captain )

Pless monitored an emergency call that four American soldiers, stranded on a nearby beach, were being overwhelmed by a large Viet Cong force . Major Pless flew to the scene and found 30 to 50 enemy soldiers in th e

open. Some of the enemy were bayoneting and beating the downed Americans. Major Pless displayed exceptional airmanship as he launched a devastating attack against the enemy force, killing or wounding many of

the enemy and driving the remainder back into a treeline . His rocket and machine gun attacks were made a t

such low levels that the aircraft flew through debris created by explosions from its rockets . Seeing one of the

wounded soldiers gesture for assistance, he maneuvered his helicopter into a position between the wounde d

men and the enemy, providing a shield which permitted his crew to retrieve the wounded . During the rescue

the enemy directed intense fire at the helicopter and rushed the aircraft again and again, closing to within a

few feet before being beaten back . When the wounded men were aboard, Major Pless maneuvered th e

helicopter out to sea . Before it became safely airborne, the overloaded aircraft settled four times into th e

water. Displaying superb airmanship, he finally got the helicopter aloft . Major Pless' extraordinary heroism

coupled with his outstanding flying skill prevented the annihilation of the tiny force . His courageous actions

reflect great credit upon himself and uphold the greatest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States .

Naval Service.
310 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

SERGEANT WALTER K. SINGLETON

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the rick of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -

ing as Supply Sergeant, Company A, First Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division, on 24 Marc h

1967 . Sergeant Singleton's company was conducting combat operations in Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, when the lead platoon received intense small arms, automatic weapons, rocket ,

and mortar fire from a well entrenched enemy force . As the company fought its way forward, the extremely

heavy enemy fire caused numerous friendly casualties . Sensing the need for early treatment of the wounded ,

Sergeant Singleton quickly moved from his relatively safe position in the reat to the foremost point of the advance and made numerous trips through the enemy killing zone to move the injured men out of the dange r

area . Noting that a large part of the enemy fire was coming from a hedgerow, he seized a machine gun an d

assaulted the key enemy location, delivering devastating fire as he advanced . He forced his way through the

hedgerow directly into the enemy strong point . Although he was mortally wounded, his fearless attack kille d

eight of the enemy and drove the remainder from the hedgerow . Sergeant Singleton's bold actions completel y

disorganized the enemy defense and saved the lives of many of his comrades . His daring initiative, selfless

devotion to duty and indomitable fighting spirit reflected great credit upon himself and the Marine Corps ,

and his performance upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service .
MEDALS OF HONOR 31 1

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

CORPORAL LARRY EUGENE SMEDLEY

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serv -

ing as a squad leader with Company D, First Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division, in connectio n

with operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam. On the evening of 20-21 December 1967, Corporal Smedley led his six-man squad to an ambush site at the mouth of Happy Valley, near Phouc Ninh (2) in

Quang Nam Province . Later that night, an estimated 100 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army Regulars ,

carrying 122mm rocket launchers and mortars, were observed moving toward Hill 41 . Realizing this was a

significant enemy move to launch an attack on the vital Da Nang complex, Corporal Smedley immediately

took sound and courageous action to stop the enemy threat . After he radioed for a reaction force, he skillfull y

maneuvered his men to a more advantageous position and led an attack on the numerically superior enem y

force . A heavy volume of fire from an enemy machine gun positioned on the left flank of the squad inflicte d

several casualties on Corporal Smedley's unit . Simultaneously, an enemy rifle grenade exploded nearby ,

wounding him in the right foot and knocking him to the ground . Corporal Smedley disregarded this seriou s

injury and valiantly struggled to his feet, shouting words of encouragement to his men . He fearlessly led a

charge against the enemy machine gun emplacement, firing his rifle and throwing grenades, until he wa s

again struck by enemy fire and knocked to the ground . Gravely wounded and weak from loss of blood, he rose

and commenced a one-man assault against the enemy position . Although his aggressive and singlehanded attack resulted in the destruction of the machine gun, he was struck in the chest by enemy fire and fell mortall y

wounded . Corporal Smedley's inspiring and courageous actions, bold initiative, and selfless devotion to dut y

in the face of certain death were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the Unite d

States Naval Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
312 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL O F

HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL ROY MITCHELL WHEA T

UNITED STATES MARINE CORP S

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life, above and beyond the call of duty, while serving as a fire team leader with the First Platoon, Company K, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine

Division, in the Republic of Vietnam. On 11 August 1967, Corporal Wheat and two other Marines wer e

assigned the mission of providing security for a Navy construction battalion crane and crew operating along

Liberty Road in the vicinity of the Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province . After the Marines had set up

security positions in a tree line adjacent to the work site, Corporal Wheat reconnoitered the area to the rear o f

their location for the possible presence of guerrillas . He then returned to within ten feet of the friendly position, and here unintentionally triggered a well concealed, bounding type, antipersonnel mine . Immediately, a

hissing sound was heard which was identified by the three Marines as that of a buring time fuse . Shouting a

warning to his comrades, Corporal Wheat in a valiant act of heroism hurled himself upon the mine, absorbin g

the tremendous impact of the explosion with his own body . The inspirational personal heroism and extraordinary valor of his unselfish action saved his fellow Marines from certain injury and possible death, reflected

great credit upon himself, and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Nava l

Service . He gallantly gave his life for his country .
Appendix E

List of Reviewers

Marines

Gen Robert E . Cushman, Jr. (Ret)

Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr . (Ret)

Gen Lewis W. Walt (Ret)

LtGen Hugh M. Elwood (Ret )

LtGen Jospeh C. Fegan, Jr . (Ret)

LtGen Louis Metzger (Ret )

LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr . (Ret)

LtGen Louis B . Robertshaw (Ret)

LtGen Donn J . Robertson (Ret)

MajGen Norman J. Anderson (Ret)

MajGen Lowell E . English (Ret )

MajGen William B . Fleming (Ret)

MajGen Kenneth J. Houghton (Ret)

MajGen Wood B . Kyle (Ret)

MajGen Herman Poggemeyer, Jr . (Ret)

MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins (Ret)

BGen Edward J. Doyle (Ret)

BGen Jacob E . Glick (Ret )

BGen Harvey E. Spielman (Ret )

BGen William A . Stiles (Ret)

Col Harry L. Alderman (Ret)

Col Nels E. Anderson (Ret)

Col Marshall B . Armstrong (Ret)

Col Robert Baird (Ret)

Col Arnold W. Barden (Ret)

Col Drew J. Barrett, Jr . (Ret)

Col George F . Bauman (Ret )

Col Julian G . Bass, Jr . (Ret)

Col Lee R. Bendell (Ret)

Col James L. Black, Jr. (Ret)

Col Louis A . Bonin (Ret)

Col Billy D. Bouldin (Ret)

Col Edward H . Boyd

Col Henry K. Bruce (Ret)

Col Alexander D . Cereghino (Ret )

Col Duncan D . Chaplin III (Ret)

Col John A. Conway (Ret)

Col John D . Counselman (Ret )

Col Charles C . Crossfield II (Ret )

Col William H. Dabne y

Col Philip A . Davis (Ret)

Col William J . Davis (Ret)

Col William L. Dick (Ret)

Col Rex O. Dillow (Ret)

Col Dale D. Dorman

Col Kenneth T. Dykes (Ret )

Col William R. Earney (Ret)

Col Arnold L. Emils (Ret )

Col Dean E . Esslinger (Ret)

Col Charles R. Figard (Ret)

Col Leroy T. Frey (Ret)

Col James A . Gallo, Jr . (Ret)

Col Tolbert T. Gentry (Ret)

Col Baylor P. Gibson, Jr. (Ret)

Col Vincent J . Gottschalk (Ret)

Col William F. Guss (Ret)

Col Edward E . Hammerbeck (Ret)

Col James W. Hammond, Jr. (Ret)

Col Frank W. Harris III (Ret)

Col William H . Heintz (Ret)

Col Clayton V. Hendricks (Ret)

Col Frank M . Hepler (Ret)

Col Peter L. Hilgartner (Ret)

Col Milton A . Hull (Ret)

Col Kenneth E. Huntington (Ret)

Col Mallett C . Jackson, Jr. (Ret)

Col Robert M . Jenkins (Ret)

Col George E . Jerue (Ret)

Col Wilbur C. Kellogg, Jr. (Ret)

Col Joseph J . Kelly (Ret)

313
314 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Col William D . Kent, Jr.

Col Charles Kimak (Ret )

Col Edward N . Le Faivre (Ret )

Col Robert W . Lewis (Ret)

Col Robert D . Limberg (Ret )

Col Herbert H . Long (Ret)

Col Joseph E . Lo Prete (Ret)

Col Edgar J. Love (Ret )

Col Stanley D . Low (Ret)

Col David E . Lownds (Ret )

Col John L . Mahon (Ret)

Col Donald L. Mallory (Ret)

Col Samuel F . Martin (Ret)

Col Glenn K. Maxwell (Ret)

Col George C . McNaughton (Ret )

Col Max McQuown (Ret)

Col Ross L. Mulford (Ret)

Col Robert C . Needham (Ret)

Col Ernest W . Payne (Ret)

Col John S . Payne (Ret)

Col Poul F. Pederson (Ret)

Col Richard F. Peterson (Ret)

Col Emil J . Radics (Ret)

Col Robert L. Rathbun (Ret)

Col Stanley Rauh (Ret )

Col Edwin O . Reed (Ret)

Col Robert C . Rice (Ret)

Col David D . Rickabaugh (Ret )

Col William K. Rocke y

Col Joseph L. Sadowski (Ret)

Col Richard J. Schening (Ret )

Col Edwin S . Schick, Jr . (Ret)

Col George C. Schmidt, Jr . (Ret)

Col Maynard W . Schmidt (Ret)

Col James C . Short (Ret )

Col Richard B. Smith (Ret)

Col James C . Stanfield (Ret )

Col James R . Stockman (Ret)

Col John C. Studt

Col Richard D . Taber, Sr . (Ret)

Col David O. Takala (Ret)

Col Orlando S . Tosdal (Ret )

Col George M . Van Sant (Ret )

Col Wendell N . Vest (Ret)

Col Kirby B . Vick (Ret)

Col Marvin D . Volkert (Ret)

Col Francis V. White, Jr.

Col Gary Wilder (Ret)

Col Dean Wilker (Ret )

Col Theodore J. Willis (Ret)

Col Donald E. Wood

Col Roy I . Wood, Jr . (Ret)

Col Robert J . Zitnik (Ret)

LtCol Rheaford C . Bell (Ret)

LtCol Gene W. Bowers

LtCol Albert R. Bowman, II (Ret)

LtCol Harold F . Brown (Ret)

LtCol Horace A. Bruce (Ret )

LtCol Willard N . Christopher (Ret)

LtCol Philip M . Crosswait (Ret)

LtCol James R. Davis

LtCol Edwin A . Deptula (Ret )

LtCol Henry Englisch (Ret )

LtCol Frederick L. Farrell, Jr. (Ret)

LtCol Wells L . Field, III (Ret)

LtCol Abie Gordon (Ret )

LtCol John C. Hergert, Jr. (Ret)

LtCol Jack M . Hermes (Ret)

LtCol Earl E. Jacobson, Jr. (Ret)

LtCol Roland L. McDaniel (Ret)

LtCol Rodney D . McKitrick (Ret)

LtCol John J . Mullen, Jr . (Ret)

LtCol James E. Murphy (Ret)

LtCol Raymond J . O'Leary (Ret)

LtCol Charles E. Parker (Ret)

LtCol Wesley H. Rodenberger (Ret)

LtCol Richard E. Romine (Ret)

LtCol Robert F . Sheridan (Ret)

LtCol E . Bruce Sigmon, Jr. (Ret)

LtCol Albert C . Slater

LtCol Joseph T . Smith (Ret)

LtCol Bayliss L. Spivey, Jr.

LtCol Philip E .Tucke r

LtCol Charles B . Webster (Ret)

LtCol James B. Wilkinson (Ret)

LtCol James S. Wilson (Ret)

Maj Walter E . Dees e

Maj Leonard E . Fuchs (Ret)
REVIEWERS 31 5

Maj Michael W. Sayers (Ret)

Maj William E. Snyder (Ret)

Maj Raymond A . Thomas

Navy

Adm U .S . Grant Sharp (Ret )

VAdm Thomas R. Weschler (Ret)

RAdm Norvell G. Ward (Ret )

RAdm Edwin B . Hooper (Ret)

Capt P.D . Cooper

Capt John T. Vincent (Ret)

Capt John D . Westervelt (Ret)

Others

Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Center of Military History, Department of the Arm y

Office of Air Force History, Department of the Air Force

Naval History Division, Department of the Nav y

BGen James L . Collins, USA (Ret)

Dr. Robert J. Watson

Mrs . Janet D . Beard

Mrs . John H. Malone y

Mrs . Glenn E . Norris

Mrs . Harry D . Wortman

Appendix F

Distribution of Aircraft

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

December 196 7

UNIT DA NANG CHU LAI PHU BAI OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHER*

MAG-1 1

H&MS-11 3/TA-4 F

1/C-1 17 D

VMCJ- 1

VMFA-122

8/ EF- IO B

9/RF-4B

4/EA-6 A

14/F-4B

VM F

(AW)-235 16/F-8 E

VM A

(AW)-242 11/A-6 A

MAG-1 2

H&MS-12 1/C-1I 7

VMA-121

3/TA-4 F

16/A-4E

VMA-211 21/A-4E

VMA-311 15/A-4E

(AW)-533 I2/A-6A

MAG-1 3

H&MS-13 3/TF-9J

1/C-117 D

VMFA-115 14/F-4B

VMFA-323 12/F-4B

VMFA-314 10/F-4 B

MAG-1 5

H&MS-15 5/UH-34D 3/C-54

4 / TF-9J

1/C-117 D

VMGR-152 12/KC-130F

VMA-223 19/A-4C

VMFA-542 6/F-4B

HMM-262 12/CH-46A 9/CH-46 A

HMM-361 23/UH-34D *

MAG-1 6

H&MS-16 1/C-117 D

14/0-1C

4/UH-34D

VMO-2 29/UH-1E

HMM-265 6/CH-46A 15/CH-46A* *

HMM-363 29/UH-34 D

HMM-463 36/CH-53A

*Aircraft indicated in " other" column with SLF, Seventh Flee t

**CH-46A REhab Program .

31 7
318 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

UNIT DA NANG CHU LAI PHU BAI OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHER

MWSG-1 7

H&MS- 17 5/UH-34 D

3/C-117 D

2/US-2B

MAG-3 6

H&MS-36 3/UH-34D

1/C-117 D

VMO- 3

VMO- 6

HMM-163

20/UH- E

2I /UH-1 E

26/UH-34D

HMM-164 3/CH-46A 12/CH-46A* *

HMM-165 3/CH-46A 16/CH-46A* *

HMM-362 25/UH-34D

HMM-364 6/UH-34D

MAG-33

H&MS-33 2/T-1 A

VMCJ-3 1I/RF-4 B

7/EF-10B

VMF-214 17/A-4C

VMFA-232 17/A-4C

VMFA-334 15/f-4J

MWSG-3 7

H&MS-37 4/T-1 A

4/C-117 D

3/C-54Q

VMGR-352 4/KC-130F 11/KC-130 F

MHTG-3 0

H&MS-30 3/UH-34D

HMMT-301 24/UH-34D

HMMT-302 23/UH-I E

1ST MA R

BRI G

H&MS 3/UH-34 D

l/VH-34D

3/T-LA

VM F

(AW)-21 2

MAG-56

H&MS-5 6

VMO- 5

HMM-26 3

HMH-462

16/F-8D/B

6/CH-46 D

23/UH-1E

24/CH-46A

19/CH-53 A

TOTAL PA C

AIRCRAFT

Fixed Wing

(338) 72 129 16 34 15 7 2

Helicopters

(364) 108 94 24 23 5 68 4 2
Appendix G

Distribution of Personne l

Fleet Marine Force, Pacifi c

31 December 1967

UNIT NOTE

STRINGED

STRENGTH

STR RPT

DATE DANANG CHU LAX . PHU BAI DONO HA OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHE R

HEADDUARTERS

HQ . FM', PAC

USIC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN URIC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN URIC USN URIC USN

_ •

.6

FM F, PAC (FWD) ~1T 27IAUG 7 5

H&S BN, FMF, PAC 1065 30 23NOV 1065 30 _

CAMP S . M . BUTLER 1241 109 6NOV X241 109

CASUAL/TRANSIENT W87 6NOV 1287

_

HQ, V MEF 82 2 23NOV

_

82 2

1ST CIV AFF GIP 80 7 23NOV - - 80 7

HO, 5TH MAR DIV

HORN, 5TH MAR DIV 1407 41 23NOV 1407 A l

HQ, FORTRPS, FMF, PAC

HQ CO, FORTRPS 321 18 23NOV -

_

321 1 8

HQ . 1ST MAR BRI G

HQ CO, 1ST MAR BRIG 214 17 23NOV 214 1 7

HQ, 9TH MA B

HQ CO, 9TH MAB 422 12 23NOV 422 12

HQ . III MAF

_

H&S CO, III MAF

_

1ST 6 7D CAG 4 76R 62 2NOV 7AR 6 7

HQ, 1ST MAR DI V

HOBN, 1ST MAR DIV 1588 16NO V

HQ, 3D MAR DIV

32 1588 3 2

HQBN, 3D MAR DIV 1897 32 1650V

_

1897 3 2

INFANTRY

1ST MARINES

HQ CO 255 6 16NOV 255 6 _

1ST BATTALION 1132 49 16NOV 1132 49

2D BATTALION 1081 54 16NOV uj8,1 5 4

3D BATTALION 1 1498 94 1650V 1498 9 4

3D MARINES

HO CO 218 5 16NOV 218 5

1ST BATTALION 1 1533 83 1750V 1533 8 3

20 BATTALION 1123 54 120CT 1173 5 4

3D BATTALION 1081 50 1680V 1081 50

4TH MARINES

HQ CO 218 3 16NOV 218 3

1ST BATTALION 1082 48 16NOV I 1082 4 B

__2D BATTALION 1051 49 16404 1051 49

_

3D BATTALION 1062 53 16140V 1062 5 3

5TH MARINE S

HQ CO 214 4 16NOV 234 4

1ST BATTALION 905 51 16NOV 995 S 5

20 BATTALION 11601 45 1650V 1001 4 5

3D BATTALION 982 51 1650V 982 51

7TH MARINES

HQ CO 223' 7 16NOV 1223 7

1ST BATTALION 1050' 54 1680V 1050 54

20 BATTALION 1030 53 1650V 1030 5 3

3D BATTALION 1039 51 1680V 1039 51

9TH MARINES

HQ CO 219 3 16NOV 219 3

1ST BATTALION 1052 52 1650V 1052 5 2

20 BATTALION 1079 51 1650V 1079 51

_

3D BATTALION 1040 49 1650V 1040 4 9

26TH MARINES

HQ CO 503 17 2350V 220 2 283 1 5

1ST BATTALION 1012 50 1680V 1012 5 0

20 BATTALION 1058 49 1650V 1058 4 9

3D BATTALION 1079 40 1f,NOV 1079 4 9

27TH MARINES

HQ CO 216 3 23NOV 216 1

1ST BATTALION 3 1491 65 2380V 1491 65

20 BATTALION 1017 33 23N0V 1017 3 3

3D BATTALION 1012 32 2350V 1012 32

31 9
320 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

28TH MARINES

HO CO 113 5 23NOV 11 3

BATTALION oe7 35 23NOV

942

1 1

2D BATTALION y45 i y 9945.1 5 9 5

3D BATTALION 91/ irNO' 916 1 1

ARTILLERY

11TH MARINE S

HQ BTRY 262 7 16NOV 262 7

1ST BATTALION 431 14 16N0V 431 1 4

2D 'BATTALION 638 11 16NOV 638 11

3D BATTALION 577 15 16N0V 577 1 5

4TH BATTALION 427 11 16NOV 427 1 1

12TH MARINE S

HQ .BTRY v . 4 NOV

1ST BATTALION 703 13 16N0V 703 1 3

2D BATTALION 541 8 16NOV 541 8

3D BATTALION 516 9 16N 516 9

4TH BATTALION 646

_

12 _ 16NOV _ 646, 12 ,

• UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATION ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLEC T

DAY_TO_DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN REPORTING PERIODS .

UNIT NOTE ASSIGNED

STRENGTH

S RPT

DATE

DANANG CHU LAI PHU BAI GONG HA OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHER

13TH MARINES

USMC USN USMC USN USI USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USPC USN USMC US N

HQ BTRY 255 5 23NOV 255 5

1ST BATTALION SRR R ISNCV 388 R

2D BATTALION 4n1 R 23NOV 401 8 3D BATTALION 627 14 23N0V 627 1 4

4TH BATTALION 366 8 23NOV 366 8

HQ BTRY, 1ST FAG 91 2 16NOV 91 2

HQ BTRY, 5THFAG 156 5 23NOV 156 5

1ST 155MM GUN BTRY 115 1 16NOV

-

118 3 3D ISSMM GUN BTRY 140 3 16NOV 140 3

5TH I55MM GUN BTRY 150 3 16NOV , 150 3

7TH 155MM GUN BTRY 167 3 21NOV _162 1ST 8" HOW BTRY 0

3D B. HOW BTRY 197 3 16NOV 197 1

5TH B . HOW BTRY 203 2 23NOV 203 2

1ST SEARCH LIGHT BTRY 111 2 16NOV 111 2

RECONNAISSANC E

1ST RECON BN 441 , 74 16N2V 441 2 4 3D RECON BN 500 14 16NOV 500 3 4

5TH RECON BN 334 15 23NOV 31 1 304 14

1ST FORCE RECON CO 146, 4 16NOV 146 4

3D FORCE RECON CO 151 7 1SNOV 161 7 5TH FORCE RECON CO 116 1 21NOV _ 116 3

ANTI-TANK

1ST AT BN 303 7 16NOV 303 7

3D AT BN 348 7 16NOV 348 7

5TH AT UN 269 7 23N0V 20 1 249 6

TAN K

1ST TANK BN 591 15 16NOV 593 1 5

3D TANK BN 611 A 1 NnI 611 8 5TH TANK BN 604 17 23NOV 77 1 527 11

AMTRA C

1ST AMTRAC BN 631 15 16NOV 631 1 5

3D AMTRAC BN 656 15 16N0V 656 1 5

5TH AMTRAC BN 705 17 23NOV 110 1 595 1 6 1ST ARM AMPHIB CO 244 3 16NOV 244 3

ENGINEE R

1ST ENGR BN 665 14 I6NOV 668 1 4

3D ENGR BN 672, 11 16NOV 672 11 5TH ENGR BN 491 12 23NOV 37 1 456 1 1 7TH ENGR BN 947 22 16NOV 947 2 2

9TH ENGR BN 946 14 16NOV 946 1 4

11TH ENGR BN 1165 21 16NOV 1165 2 1

13TH ENGR BN 869 17 71NOV 869 1 7 1ST BRIDGE CO 140 16NOV 140

3D BRIDGE CO

5TH BRIDGE CO

15 6

118 2

16NOV

23NOV

156

118 2

MOTOR TRANSPORT

1ST MT 9N 246 5 16NOV 246 5

3D MT B N

5TH MT BN

39 5

193

8

B

16NOV

23NOV

395 8

12 1 181 7 7TH MT B N

9TH MT BN

357

366

3

9

16NOV

16NOV

387 3

11TH MT BN 151 9 13NOV 381 9

366 9

13TH MT BN 358 9 23 NOV 358 9

COMMUNICATION .

1ST RADIO BN 475 7 23NOV 247 228 2 5TH COMM B N

7TH COMM BN

71 7

669

7

13

16NOV

16NOV

71 7

669

7

9TH COMM BN 670 4 24NOV

13

190 3 4Rn ANGLICO 2 110 In 71NOV 1113 2

19 7

SHORE PARTY

1ST SP BN .

3D SP BN

37 1

496

1 5

15

1RNO V

16NOV

373 15

8

5TH SP BN

_

79R 21 21NOV 496 35

21 4 277 17
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL 32 1

MILITARY POLICE

1ST MP BN 614 6 16NOV 614 6

3D MP BN 688 9 16NOV 688 9

5TH MP BN 249 6 23NOV 7,9 6

SERVICE/SUPPOR T

FLC, III MA F

HQ, FLC/1ST FSR

H&S BN 1480 37 16NOV 1480 37

SUPPLY BN 1536 13 16NOV 1536 1 3

7TH SEP BK FUEL CO 145 9 16NOV 145 9

MAINT BN 1075 1 16NOV 1075 1

FLSG_A/3D SERV BN 1998 27 16NOV 1998 27

FLSG-B 1ST SER(rBN 752 12 16NOV 752 1 2

3D FSR

H&S BN 1067 41 2390V 1067 4 1

SUPPLY BN 1318 12 23N0V 1318 1 2

MAINT BN 1017 23NOV 101 7

5TH FS R

1365 BN 474 35 24N0V 474 1 5

SUPPLY BN 554 25 24NOV 562 2 5

MAINT BN 567 7dNOV 56 7 '

5TH SERVICE BN 612 20 23NOV 6.12 2 0

PROV SERVICE BN, 91H MAB 922 13 24NOV 922 1 3

9TH SEP BULK FUEL CO 256, _ 23NOV _ 256

UNIT NOTE STRENGT

H ASSIGNED ST R

DATE

RPT DANANG CHU LAI PHU BAI DONG HA OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHE R

MEDICAL

1ST MED BN

USlC USN

NOV

USIC USN USMC USN USPC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN USMC USN

lftl `ii7

5TH MED BN

ST

MED

HOSP

BN®Q1I'~ET'

C .

_~~

~ ]RLID®

.D:UMMO_•MML'

' n~~WN®®~~n©0~~_~~~~~

nn-_-_

=ts!lL~nn5TH HOSP

1ST DENTAL CO

CO ~1jJ1~t

__f(i_{~-,~~~nn1~n~~~1nnn~~mn

3D DENTAL CO

TH DENTAL CO

_~

1n~~IN

.11_.•O_M

.~ rM lM-Ri

11TH DENTAL CO -_~~_~

13TH DENTAL CO n~~T•1_~n 1

17TH DENTAL

DENTAL CO

CO

1n©ET:_ •IIIM~n~n~M~~~~n~nEEM1EF>~

_R~RI~RRaRa=RaR'n~~~n1~'©mn

usw 85 790 25,463 1 737 12 186 15 134 Mr. 3 131 Mg 8

GROUND

USN

/ 1 GROUND TOTAL

3,855 1,154 100 668 575 222 125 826 18 5

89,645 26,617 1,837 12,854 15,709 8,355 3,256 17,604 3,41 3

AVIATION UNITS

HO SQDN FMFPAC 74 2NOV 7 4

1ST MAW MWHG- 1

136135-1 792 37 16N0V 792 3 7

MWFS_1 141 16NOV 14 1

MWCS_1 246 16NOV 746

MWSG_1 7

H&MS-17 697 18 16NOV 697 18

WERS_17 749 16NOV 249

MACG_18

H&HS_18 178 16NOV 178

MASS_2 2 1 .NOV

MASS_3 204 2 16NOV 204 2

MACS_4 263 3 16NOV 263 3

1ST LAAM BN 5 13 16NOV 563 1 3

2ND LAAM BN 481 12 1690V 481 1 2

HAG-1 1

H&MS-11 448 16NOV 44 8

MA6S-11 453 30 16NOV 453 3 0

VMCJ_1 458 1 16NOV 458 1

VMFA_122 317 1 16NOV 317 1

VMF(AW)-235 218 16NOV 21 8

VMA(AW)_242 306 1 16N0V 306 1

MAG-1 2

HEMS-12 501 16NOV 50 1

MABS_12 565 35 I6NOV 565 3 5

MATCU-67 88 16NOV 8 8

VMA-121 192 1 16NOV 192 1

VMA-211 721 1 1690V 271 1

VMA_311 1A5 1 16NOV IRS 1 VMA(AW)_533 261 1 9NOV 261 1

MAG-1 3

H&MS-13 134 16NOV 33 4

MABS-13 510 7A 16NOV 510 JA

VMFA-115 317 1 16NOV 317 1

VMFA-314 322 1 16NOV 322 1 VMFA_323 339 '1 16NOV 339 1
322 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

MAG_ 1 6

HSMS_16- ~~~ 49 6

MABS_16 ~ T:1ERIICM7i

MATCU_

MATCU_68

. _ E

i[]

Mn

n

_71

~

~

7 3

VNO_2 ~~~ 163 1

HMH-463 mel[~ 306 1

'F l - 265 ~179 4

HMM_ ~~J~ 187 1

--

MAG_36 -n_ '

HEMS- 6

MARS _

JJRJ7IMi[1T nR'4

~

VMO

''9411 ma il-1

JBMMI19

ir_,li~

2

HMM_©~

. 225 4

176 1

HMM_ 65 UE1EL•~ 185 1

HMM-362 MIMS•

HMM-364 R TINNFI .i1! '

M _

H AG 1s ..-

H&MS-1 97 47 1

MASS- 383 2 9

H6H3 IWAKUNI ~~® 394 29 3

HAHS FUTEMA ~m~ 244 6 1

MACS_ . 208 2

MATCU_60 ]~I 6 9

MATCU

VMGR_ IM1t~l_~ •1 6

VMA-223 ]1~ 20 9

VMFA-542 ®i © . 303 2

HMM-262 ~0 .® 163 1

HMM_361 1 ~Ippp!i~ 192 4

UNIT NOTE

ASSIGNE D

STRENGTH

STR RPT

DATE DANANG CHU LAI PHU BAI DONG HA OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHE R

TA BRIG

HAMS 1ST BRIGADE

USMC USN

23NOV

USMC USN USFC USN USMC USN US1•C USN USMC USN USDC USN USMC USN USPC USN USMC US N

93 9 3

MACS-2

VMF A -212 233 1 9NOV 233 1

3D MAW

MWHG- 3

H&HS-3 676 6 23NOV 676 6

MWFS_3 170 23NOV

_

17 0

MWCS_3 149 23NOV

_

14 9

MHTG_3 0

H&MS-30 457 1 23NOV 457 1

HMMT-301 261 1 23N0V 261 1

HMMT_302 307 1 23N0V 307 1

MAG_3 3

H&MS-33 75R 23NOV 75 8

MABS_33 145 2 23NOV 145 7

MATCU-65 79 23NOV 7 9

VMCJ_3 419 2 23NOV 419 2 J

VMA-214 251 1 16NOV 25 1

VMFA-232 238 1 16NOV 23 8

VMFA_334 305 2 23NOV 30 5

MWSG_1 7

H&MS_37 694 3 23NOV 69 4

WERS_37 251 23NOV 25 1

VMGR-352 449 1 23NOV 449

MACG-3 8

H&HS-38 221 23NOV 221

MASS-5 186 23NOV 186

MACS-1 301 23NOV 301

MACS-3 226 23NOV 2 26

MACS-7 194 4 2 OCT 19,

5TH LAAM BN 489 4 21NOV 489 9

MAG_5 6

H&MS_56 327 1 260CT 327 1

MABS_56

VMO-5 368 4 23NOV 36B 4

HMH-462 205 1 23NOV ,n 5 1

HMM-263 229 3 190CT 9 3

USPC

USN

27 280 . 2

717 143 85 41 4 70 326 1 43 4

AVIATION TOTAL 27,997 _ 7,807 _ 4,790 2,575 _ 229 1,211 _ 2,155 636 8,398 196
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL 32 3

RECAPITULAnON OF FNFPAC PERSONNEI DISTRIBUTIO N

ASSIGNED

STRENGTH DANANG CHU LAI PHU MI DONG HA OKINAWA JAPAN HAWAII EASTPAC OTHER

USMC 85,790 25,463 1,737 12,186 15,134 8,133 3 .131 16,778 3 .228

USN 3,855 1,154 100 668 575 222 125 826 185

USMC 27,280 7,664 4,705 2,534 225 1,141 1,829 635 8,355 19 2

USN 717 143 85 41 4 70 326 1 43 4

USMC 113,070 33,127 6,442 14,720 15,359 9,274 1,829 3,766 25,133 3,420

USN 4,572 1,297 185 209 579 292 326 126 869 189

NO 1 . FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO SLF's AND ARE BLT STRENGTHS .

2 . FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS RVN LOCATIONS .

3 . STRENGTH INDICATED IS FOR BLT 1/27 .

4 . AT VARIOUS I CTZ LOCATIONS .

GROUND TOTAL

AVIATION IOTA

GRAND TOTAL

Index

A Shau Valley, 75, 78, 220, 24 2

Abrams, Gen Creighton W., 241

Advisors

American advisors, 108, 146, 183, 244

Advisory teams, 245, 25 2

I Corps Advisors, 24 5

Marine Advisors, 251-25 2

Marine Advisory Unit (MAU), 24 5

Marine Advisory Group, 247-24 8

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam ,

244-24 5

Naval Advisory Group (NAG), 24 5

Rung Sat Advisory Team, 24 7

Australian advisors, 245

Aerial observer, 11 4

Aerial photographs, 159

Aerial resupply, 12 8

Air defense, 20 1

Air-gound team, 4 5

Air liaison officer, 127, 138, 201-20 2

Air observers, 14, 138, 14 1

Air strikes, 34, 56, 65, 110-111, 113-114, 15 3

Air support radar (TPQ-10), 9, 26

Aircraft

Types

Bell UH-1C (Huey), 138

Bell UH-1D (Huey), 21 1

Bell UH-1E (Huey), 19, 29, 33, 41, 47, 56, 58, 62, 110, 113 ,

115, 143-144, 155, 169, 201, 206-208

Boeing B-52 (Stratofortress), 45, 62, 135, 203, 220

Boeing Vertol CH-46A (Sea Knight), 9, 33, 33n, 58, 60, 63 ,

137, 151, 163, 165-166, 169, 174, 199, 206, 209-214 ,

grounding of CH-46As; effects on operations, 170

Cessna 0-1C (Birddog), 114, 138, 20 1

Douglas A-4 (Skyhawk), 23, 118, 138, 202-20 3

Douglas AC-47 ('Puff the Dragon"), 136, 15 8

Douglas C-117D (Skytrain), 205-206

Douglas EF-10B, 204

Fairchild C-123 (Provider), 255-25 7

Grumman A-6A (Intruder), 114, 203-204

Grumman EA-6A, 204

Ling-Tampco-Vought F-8E (Crusader), 20 3

Lockheed C-130 (Hercules), 16, 157, 25 7

Lockheed KC-130 (Hercules), 33, 151, 157, 205, 23 4

McDonnell F-4B (Phantom II), 202-204

McDonnell RF-4B, 20 5

Rockwell International OV-10 (Bronco), 206 N

Sikorsky UH-34D (Sea Horse), 33, 36, 58-59, 67, 113-114 ,

137-138, 151, 154, 159-160, 165, 170-171, 174, 206, 209,

211 ; illus., 20

Sikorsky CH-37 (Majave), 9, 209

Sikorsky CH-53 (Sea Stallion), 63, 73, 93, 130-134, 155, 170 ,

173, 209-21 1

Air Force, U .S ., 33, 100, 104, 135, 150, 157, 201, 222, 242, 245 ,

255, 25 7

Air Force air control system, 15 2

Air Force Command s

Seventh Air Force, 87, 91n, 152, 199, 201, 203-204, 22 2

Strategic Air Command, 135, 20 3

Airlift capabilities, 25 7

Air strikes, 127, 138 (See also Supporting Arms)

Air support radar teams (ASRTs), 200

Albany, Georgia, 22 5

Alderman, LtCol Harry L., 132-133

Alger, Maj Richard J ., 11 3

Allgood, LtCol Frankie E ., 137

Althoff, Maj David L ., 176

Ammunition storage, 13 0

Amphibious doctrine, 15 2

Amphibious operations area (AOA) 15 2

Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, 161, 24 8

An Hoa, 52, 79, 107,120-121, 174, 199

An Hoa industrial complex, 107,12 3

An My, 17 1

An Trung, 5 7

Anderson, PFC James, Jr ., 12 n

Anderson, Col Nels E ., 247

Anderson, MajGen Norman J ., 203, 209, 21 1

An Khe, 250

Annamite Mountains, 51, 5 7

Antenna Valley, 120-12 1

Antipersonnel devices, 16 6

Ap Bon (2), 120-12 2

Ap Phouc Phu, 176

Armstrong, LtCol Marshall B ., 15 1

Army (U .S .), 9, 19, 64-65, 123, 128-130, 138-139, 150, 153, 176 ,

185, 191, 207, 211, 219-222, 239, 242, 245, 25 7

Army Commands and Units

Army Advisory I Corps Headquarters, 245, illus., 8

Special Forces, 3 1

Task Force Oregon, 70, Ch . 6, 86, 89, 93, 107, 191, 233 ,

242, 25 5

29th Civil Affairs Company, 18 5

190th Aviation Company, 138, 21 1

8th Battalion, 4th Artillery, 220

3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 8 2

3d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery, 6 5

Target Acquisition Battery, 2d Battalion, 26th Artillery, 222

325
326 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, 8 2

Company C, 8 3

Battery A, 1st Battalion, 40th Artillery, 21 9

1st Battalion, 44th Artillery ,

3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, 253-25 4

Battery G, 65th Artillery, 22 2

2d Battalion, 94th Artillery, 29, 21 9

114th Army Armored Cavalry Regiment, 25 2

196th Light Infantry Brigade, 7 9

4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 8 1

Americal Division, 119-121, 25 8

1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 63, 78-79, 250, 25 5

1st Infantry Division, 25 1

2d Brigade, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, 78

3d Brigade, 1st U.S. Cavalry Division, 120

9th Infantry Division, 77, 25 1

2d Brigade, 9th U.S . Infantry Division, 25 2

1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 25 2

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 79

Artillery, 56, 60, 65, 11 5

Artillery cannister rounds, 2 7

Artillery check fire, 37

Artillery group, 3 9

Asphalt plant, 23 8

Australia, 259

1st Australian Task Force, 25 1

Axtell, Col Ceorge C., 239-24 0

Ba Long, 10, 16, 20, 7 5

Ba Tu, 79

Baldwin, Under Secretary of the Navy, Robert H . B., 8 8

Banks, Capt Edward S., 5 1

Barrier, The (See Strong Point Obstacle System )

Barnard, LtCol Roger H ., 123, 174

Barstow, California, 22 5

Base Area 101, 139, 17 2

Base Area 114, 17 3

Basic School, Quantico, 24 2

"Bastards' Bridge", 13 6

Bauer, Cpl James E ., 11 0

Beans, Maj James D ., 143

Beard, Maj Wendell O ., 100, 161, 164, 164n, 166, 169, 17 2

Beeler, LtCol William R., 6 3

Belbusti, LtCol Albert F., 139, 14 1

Bell, LtCol Van D ., Sr., 6 5

Ben Hai River, 10, 17, 21, 23-28, 95, 102, 103, 104, 125-129 ,

134, 159, 242

Bendell, LtCol Lee R., 92, 13 2

Bennett, Capt Raymond H ., 41 n

Bennett, Capt Ronald D., 13 8

Bien Hoa Province, 242, 248, 251-25 2

Binh Dinh Province, 8, 78, 248-25 1

Binh Son, 6 5

Binh Son District, 25 6

Black, Maj Charles H ., 115

Black, Col James L., 185, 19 5

Blecksmith, 2dLt Edward L ., 11 3

Bobo, 2dLt John P ., 19n

Bockewitz, Capt Carl E ., 10, 11, 1 2

Bola, PFC, 25 6

Bougie, HM Andre A., USN, illus., 23 6

Bouterie, Cdr Ronald L ., USN, 234

Bowers, Capt Gene W ., 117-118, 12 0

Bowman, LtCol Albert R ., II, 125

Boyd, Maj Edward H ., illus., 2 3

Brackeen, lstLt John E ., 11 5

Brill, Capt Arthur P ., Jr., 135, 13 7

Bronars, LtCol Edward J., 57, 58

Broujos, Maj John H ., 166-16 7

Brown, LtCol Williams P ., 203

Brubaker, Maj Ralph E ., 104

Bruce, LtCol Horace A ., 25N 130, 21 2

Bulk fuel farm, 13 0

Bunnell, Lt Thomas E ., (MC) USN., 194

Burke, Capt Francis M ., 115, 11 8

Burns, SSgt Leon R., 98-10 0

Button Bomblets, 8 6

Burke, Capt Francis M ., 114, 11 5

C-2 Bridge, 135-13 8

Ca Lu, 10, 16, 20, 75, 94, 128-130, 142, 23 9

Cam Lo, 9-11, 12n, 14, 16, 18, 20-21, 23, 91, 93, 100, 104 ,

136, 139, 142, 164, 174, 220, 23 9

Cam Lo Bridge, 16 7

Cam Lo River, 10, 12 5

Camp Brooks, 225, 230

Camp J.J. Carroll, 9-11, 16, 33, 36, 38, 77, 93, 129, 142, 22 0

Camp Evans, 133, 162, 168, 171, 174, 239

Camp Hansen, Okinawa, 22 8

Camp McTureous, Okinawa, 22 8

Camp Pendleton, California, 5n, 228

Can Tho, 25 1

Capodonna, Lt Vincent R., CHC, USNR, 114, 119, 188

Capital Military District, 248,25 1

Carlson, Maj Paul L ., 25 3

Caswell, Capt Russell J., 6 7

Central Highlands, 25 5

Chaplains, 236-23 8

Chaplin, LtCol Duncan D ., III, 2 9

Chaisson, LtGen John R., illus., 8, 152, 24 1

Chang River, 66

Chau Lam (I), 11 3

Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program, 192

Christopher, LtCol Willard N., 93, 23 9

Chu Lai, 3, 5, 6, 63, 65, 77-79, 81, 107, 119, 169, 187-188, 191 ,

199-200, 203-205, 214, 225, 229, 23 2

Chu Lai Base Defense Command, 7 9

CinCPac (See Commander-in-Chief, Pacific)

Civic action, 64, 184, 189-19 3

Civic affairs, 63, 186-18 7

Civil education program, 193

Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), 31, 35, 5 8

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Suppor t

(CORDS), 184-18 5

Clem, Cpl Edward, 13 8

Cliff, LtCol Donald K ., 228

Close Air Support (See also Supporting Arms), 38, 41, 201
INDEX 32 7

Co Bi-Thanh Tan Valley, 16 8

Co Chien, 151, 15 2

Coates, Capt Sterling K ., 96

Cochin-China, 246

Cochrane, Capt Richard L., 15 6

Collins, MajGen William R ., 3

Combat Operating Bases (COBs), 9 3

Combat Operations Center, 3d Marine Division, 24

Combat photographer, 14 1

Combat service support units, 19 0

Combined Action Company Oscar, 3 5

Combined Action Program, 35n, 187-192, 25 7

Combined Campaign Plan for 1967, 6, 52-53, 63, 18 4

Command relations, 5- 6

Commandant of the Marine Corps, 7 5

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, 4, 75, 78, 82, 188-89, 15 1

Communications, 147

Communist Party, 7

Computerization, 228

Cones, LCpI Howard S ., 138

Cook, Maj Gorton C., 133

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), 189, 19 3

Congress, U.S ., 7

Con Thien, 9-10, 17-20, 22-23, 29-30, 36, 89, 91-92, 95-96 ,

98-100, 104, 125-145, 151, 155, 161, 163-164, 171, 174 ,

211, 237, 244, 25 9

Conway, Col John A., 162

Corcoran, Capt Richard F., 5 9

Corliss, Maj Gregory A ., 169, 174, 21 1

Counselman, LtCol John D ., 7 9

Counter-guerrilla warfare, 25 5

County Fair, 185-186, 19 2

Critipac Program, 22 6

Crockett, Lucy Herndon, 136n

Crosswait, LtCol Philip M., 115

Crumrine, PFC R . L., illus., 2 9

Cryan, LtCol William M ., 145

Cu, Col Haynh, 7 8

Cua Viet, 10, 16-17, 87, 89, 92-93, 125, 130, 146, 220, 23 2

Cua Viet River, 70, 142, 145, 175

Cultural Drama Teams, 19 2

Cunningham, HMC Marvin L., 233

Cushman, LtGen Robert E., Jr., 91-94, 136, 139, 190, 246, 25 8

Da Nang, 3-6, 16, 20, 52, 52n, 66, 68, 73, 78-79, 107, 109, 123 ,

139, 143-144, 150, 158, 162, 172, 173, 187, 190, 199-203 ,

211, 214, 225, 232-23 3

Da Nang Air Base, 3, 77, 108, 12 2

Da Nang Rocket Belt, 109, 123, 174, 22 3

Da Nang Tactical Area, 5 1

Dai Loc, 123, 171, 174

Danielson, Maj Darrell C ., 9 9

Darlac, 8

Darnell, LCpI Dana C ., 266

Davis, Capt James R ., 245-246, LtCol, 246 n

Davis, Sgt Rodney M ., 11 5

Davis, Col Stanley, 110, 114

Day, Maj James L., 14, 18, 151; illus., 14; LtCol, 151, illus., 14

Day, Maj Marvin E., 24-25, 153 ; LtCol 155

De Atley, LtCol Hillmer F ., 6 5

Deegan, Capt Gene A ., 64-65

Deep Air Support, 20 2

Deese, Lt Walter E., 3 0

Defense, Secretary of, 8

Delong, LtCol Earl R ., 13, 39-40, 43-44, 156-157, 16 1

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 3-4, 8-10, 16, 19, 21-22, 25-26, 30 ,

75, 77-78, 86 . 92, 95, 104, 125-130, 133, 135, 159, 175 ,

211, 219, 22 9

"2/9's armored thrust into the DMZ, " 12 8

Department of State (See United States Government)

Dick, Col William L., 142-143, 21 7

Dien Bien Phu, 21, 36, 25 9

Dinh Tuong Province, 252-25 4

Dionisopoulos, Col James G ., 167, 167 n

Direct Air Support Center (DASC), 199-201, 20 5

Dong Ha, 4, 9, 13, 18, 21-25, 34, 36, 41, 82, 91, 93, 96, 98, 103 ,

119, 128, 130-131, 136-142, 161, 163, 168, 171, 174, 200 ,

205, 210, 220, 223, 227, 238-23 9

Dong Ha Mountain, 18, 8 7

Dong Ha LCU ramp, 22 7

Dong Quang, 5 7

Dong Son (I), 11 3

Dong Tam, 252

Dong Tri Mountain, 3 1

Dotson, Pvt R. P., 237

Duc Pho, 52-53, 58, 61-63, 78-79, 82, 119, 207, 218, 23 8

Dunning, Capt Clifford R ., 24 7

Durrell, GySgt D . B., 225

Dye Marker Project (See Strong Point Obstecle System)

Earney, Col William R ., 119

Ek . lstLt Paul R., 187

Electronic Sensors, 8 7

El Toro, California, 22 8

Engineers, 17, 30, 43-44, 89, 91, 93-94, 125, 129, 161, 168, 240

England, Mr., Robert A., 244

Englisch, LtCol Henry, 123, 135, 172-174

English, BGen Lowell E ., 4

Esslinger, LtCol Dean E ., 65-68

Evans, LtCol Donald L ., 192

Fairfield, Capt Rupert E., Jr., 208

Faylor, 2dLt Dwight G ., 160

Fegan, Col Joseph C., Jr., 24 2

Ferguson, LCpI Patrick J., 118

Festa, Capt Donald, illus., 14

Ferdeit, Sgt R. E., 40

Figard, LtCol Charles R ., 24, 26

Fire direction center, 3 3

Fire Support Bases, 16 1

Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), 136, 216, 218, 22 2

° Fitzsimmons, Capt Robert J., 114

Fischer, Maj Robert L ., 249

Flathman, Capt John H ., 29

Fluss, Cdr Richard M., (CEC) USN, 23 6

Forklift, 22 7

Fort Benning, Georgia, 229
328 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Fort Lee, Virginia, 22 9

Forward Air Controller (FAC), 56, 100, 114, 200-20 2

Forward Air Controller, airborne [FAC (A)], 39, 44, 125, 127 ,

201-202, 20 7

Forward Air Control Team, 1 '18, 134

Forward observer (FO), 35, 40, 13 6

Foster, Sgt Paul H., 136

Freefire zone, 23, 15 9

French, 17 0

Fuller, Cpl Joseph E ., 11 4

Gallo, Col James A ., Jr., 66, 157-158, 160

Garner, 2dLt Jerry D ., illus., 14-1 5

Gavlick, 1stLt Michael H ., 146-14 7

Geneva Accords, 24 4

Getlin, Capt Michael P ., 1 8

Giang River, 16 2

Giles, Capt Jerrald E ., 3 8

Giem Ha Trung, 17 5

Gio Linh, 9-10, 16-17, 19, 21-22, 24, 28, 36, 89, 91, 99, 125 ,

130, 142, 145, 154, 171, 22 0

Golden, Capt Glen, 35, 38

"Golden Fleece" operations, 18 5

Go Noi Island, 5 2

Goodale, LtCol Richard W ., 179-18 0

Government of South Vietnam (GVN) (See South Vietna m

Government)

Graham, Capt James A., 72, 72n 7 4

Grammar, lstLt William M ., 245-24 6

Grassi, Capt Frank T ., 138

"Gravel " Mines, 8 6

Greene, Gen Wallace M ., Jr., 75, 94, 217, 231, 236, 25 8

Griffith, Sgt James L., 124

Guam, 9 1

Guerrilla cadre, 186

Guerrilla infrastructure, 7

Gulf of Tonkin, 200, 21 9

Ha Loi Tay, 146, 17 5

Happy Valley, 109

Hai Lang District, 16 7

Hai Lang Forest, 139-142, 172-17 3

Hai Mon, 56-5 7

Hai Van Mountains, 5

Hai Van Pass, 200, 22 7

Ham Loung, 151-15 2

Hamblen, Col Archelaus L ., USA, illus., 8, 245

Hammerbeck, Col Edward E ., 2 4

Hammond, LtCol James W., Jr., 133-13 7

Hanoi, 7, 255, 259

Harper, Sgt Donald E ., Jr., 3 3

Harris, LtCol Frank W ., III, 23 6

Hartney, Capt Alan H ., 10-1 1

Hawaii, 22 5

Hawthorne, Maj Richard W ., 205

Hayes, SgtMaj Wayne N ., 1 3

Helicopter, 31, 36, 38, 65, 17 1

Helicopter refueling, 6 3

Hendricks, LtCol Clayton V ., 218

Henshaw, LCpl Lonnie R ., 11 5

Herbold, BGen James E., Jr., 22 6

Herich, LtCol Emil W., 166-169

Herman, 2dLt Allan J., 117-11 8

Hiep Duc, 66, 68, 109-111, 16 9

Hieu Duc, 17 4

Hilgartner, LtCol Peter L., 58, 66-68, 70, 72-73, 72n 74, 113-114 ,

11 7

Hill 26, 5 7

Hill 43, 115, 11 7

Hill 48, 11 5

Hill 51, 11 3

Hill 63, 11 4

Hill 110, 6 7

Hill 117, 29-30

Hill 124, 11, 12n

Hill 162, 1 4

Hill 174, 3 0

Hill 185, 67

Hill 216, 12 9

Hill 247, 12 9

Hill 674, 168

Hill 700, 3 6

Hill 778, 45

Hill 861, 31, 34-40, 46, 23 8

Hill 881 North, 31, 34, 39, 44-45, 203, 23 8

Hill 881 South, 31, 34, 38-41, 43, 46, 130, 23 8

Hill 950, 4 6

Hoch, LtCol Kurt L., 4 7

Hochmuth, MajGen Bruno A ., 19, 39, 41, 93, 134, 136, 143-144 ,

157, 241, illus., 4, 8, 144

Hoi An, 108, 119-120, 162, 16 3

Hoi Chanhs (Ralliers), 19 2

Honolulu Conference, 18 3

Honolulu Declaration, 18 5

Hospital Corpsmen, 26, 138, 188-189, 233, 236, 23 8

Hospitals, 23 8

Houghton, Col Kenneth J., 65-66, 68, 73

Howell, 2dLt Gatlin J ., 34, lstLt, 99, 103

Hubbard, Col Jay W ., 202

Hubei!, Capt Thomas S ., 17 8

Hue, 6, 39, 75, 87, 89, 142, 162, 167-168, 173, 232, 237, 24 6

Hunter, LtCol Robert E., Jr., 11 5

Huntington, LtCol Kenneth E ., 58, 15 3

Humphrey, Vice President Hubert A ., 143

Hyland, Adm John H ., USN, 15 3

I Corps (See Army of the Republic of Vietnam)

Ing, Col Herbert E ., 119-120, 139

Intra Theater Unit Rotation Program, 5

"Iron Triangle" , 24 2

Izenour, lstLt Frank M ., Jr., 4 3

Jackson, LtCol Mallett C ., Jr., 72-7 3

Jenkins, Col Robert M ., 2 0

Jerue, Col George E., 92, 96, 104, 13 3

Johnson, President Lyndon B ., 183, 259

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 88, 150-151, 258
INDEX 32 9

Joint Coordinating Council UGC), 184, 19 3

Kane, Capt Richard R., 205

Kapetan, LtCol Nick S ., 162-163, 170

Kelley, Col Joseph J., 104

Kelly, LtCol Walter C ., 171

Keneipp, Capt Warren O ., Jr., 9 6

Kent, LtCol William D ., 125-128, 133

Khang, LtGen Le Nguyen, 248

Khe Sanh

Khe Sanh Combat Base, 9-10, 16, 21, 33-39, 41, 44, 46-47, 93 ,

128-130, 142, 147, 151, 157-158, 203, 205, 229, 235, 239 ,

244, 255-25 6

Khe Sanh Fire Support Control Center, 4 5

First Battle of Khe Sanh, 35, 15 7

"The Khe Sanh Hill Fights" (See also Khe Sanh, First Battle of),

15 7

"Siege of Khe Sanh", 12 9

Khe Sanh Village, 3 5

Kien Hoa Province, 151, 248-249

Kim, BGen Yun Sang (KMC), 5, illus ., 5

King, 2dtLt Thomas G ., 35-3 6

Kirby, LtCol Edward K ., 158-16 0

Kit Carson Scout, 52, 7 2

Knapper, Capt Roger E ., illus ., 24 6

Knowles, BGen Richard T ., USA, 79, 107, 11 9

Koehler, lstLt Richard D., Jr., 12, 103

Komer, Amb Robert, 18 4

Kontum, 8, 184, 192, 24 2

Korea, Army of the Republic of, 7 7

Korean Marine Brigade, 5, 107, 10 9

Koster, MajGen Samuel W ., USA, 120, 25 8

Krulak, LtGen Victor H ., 4-5, 150, 15 7

Ky, Vice President Nguyen Cau, 258

Ky Ha, 62, 199, 205, 211-21 2

Kyle, MajGen Wood B., 4, 19, illus., 4

LaHue, BGen Foster C ., 81, 110, 117, 15 7

Lam, LtGen Hoang Xuan, 89, 258 ; illus., 6, 8

Lam Binh, 6 2

Lan, Col Bui Thi, 25 1

Landers, Maj James H ., 2 9

Landes, Capt Burrell H ., Jr., 102

Landing Zones (LZ)

Landing Zones, 5 8

Landing Zone Bat, 58-59, 15 4

Landing Zone Canary, 100

Landing Zone Cardinal, 16 2

Landing Zone Dove, 139

Landing Zone Finch, 176

Landing Zone Goose, 29

Landing Zone Mockingbird, 160

Landing Zone Owl, 16 0

Landing Zone Parrot, 16 0

Landing Zone Wren, 16 2

Lang Rui Ou, 9 3

Lang Son, 10 0

Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, 31, 33, 36-37, 44, 46, 93, 129

Lanigan, Col John P ., 9-11, 37, 4 6

Laos, 10, 31, 44, 21 9

Lawendowski, Maj John J., 137

"Leatherneck Square " , 22, 28, 30, 95

Lemon, Maj Douglass W ., 173

Lewis, LtCol Robert Jr ., 11 4

Liberty Bridge, 17 1

Liberty Road, 236, 23 8

Little, LCpI Thomas L., 124

Logistical Support Installations, 103-10 4

Logistics in Operation DeSoto, 6 3

Logistics Support Area (LSA), 60-61

Long An Province, 25 2

Long Binh, 24 2

Long Tau River, 246-24 7

Lopez, PFC Steve D ., 4 5

LoPrete, Col Joseph E ., 142

Lord, Sgt Donald, 3 4

Love, Maj Edgar J ., 205

Lownds, Col David E ., 142

Ly Ly River, 11 3

Lyons, Capt Alfred E ., 43

McCarter, Capt James W., 136

McCormick, Ens John W ., USN, 160

McCracken, Capt Jack H ., 110, 20 7

McCutcheon, LtGen Keith B ., 197

McKay, Capt Gerald L ., 67

McKenna, Col James D., 120

McKitrick, LtCol Rodney D., 28, 156, 164

McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S ., 86-87, 89, 9 1

"McNamara Line", 95, 145, 227, 242, (See also Strong Obstacle

System)

McNaughton, LtCol George C ., 120

McQuown, LtCol Max, 175-179, 190, 193

MACV (See "Military Assistance Command, Vietnam )

Magnificant Bastards, 136n (See also "Bastard's Bridge" )

Mai Loc, 16, 2 0

Mai Xa Thi, 179

Manila, 244

Marble Mountain Air Facility, 130, 132, 170, 173, 199, 209-21 1

Marine Air Command and Control System, 199

Marine Bases, illus., 7

Marine Corps Commands and Units

Headquarters Marine Corps, 191, 244, 25 7

Landing Force Training Command, Pacific, 24 8

Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, California, 26 6

Marine Corps Air Facility, Futema, 205, 21 1

Marine Security Guard Battalion, 244

Marine Security Guard Detachment (MSGD), 24 2

9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), 3

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), 4-5, 150-151, 185, 242 ,

25 7

9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), 8, 150-151, 153, 22 4

Special Landing Force (SLF), 3, 5, 17, 19n, 23, 57, 119, 135 ,

142, 150-151, 153-155, 160, 175, 179, 206-207, 218 ,

248-249

SLF Alpha, 23, 66, 100, 110, 125, 139, 156-159, 161, 161n ,

163-164, 167-174
330 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

SLF Bravo, 24, 28, 82, 100, 123, 125, 135, 156-158, 161 ,

167-170, 175-17 6

5th Marine Division, 5 n

III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), 3-8, 16, 20, 23, 31, 33 ,

37, 51, 63, 68, 74-75, 78, 83, 86, 89, 91, 93-95, 104, 111 ,

119-120, 124, 125, 128, 130, 132, 135, 139, 150-151, 155 ,

163, 170, 174, 185, 187-192, 199, 205, 210, 214, 216 ,

219-222, 224, 226, 241-242, 255, 258

Task Force X-Ray, 5, 53, 55, 58, 79, 81, 109-111, 169, 21 8

1st Marine Division, 3-5, 51-52, 64, 79, 107, 109, 119-120, 123 ,

150, 169, 191, 210, 216, 23 6

1st Marines, 64-65, 107, 119-120, 139-142, 166, 172, illus ., 4 1

1st Battalion, 52, 65, 57, 139, 141, 174, illus., 142

Company D, 67, 11 4

2d Battalion, 51, 64, 139, 17 1

3d Battalion, 64, 175, 178, 19 0

Company I, 175-176, 178, 180

Company K, 125, 179-180

Company L, 175, 178-179

Company M, 175, 178-17 9

5th Marines, 66n, 67, 72-73, 79, 93, 107, 110, 114, 119-120 ,

123, 159, 159n, 165, 169, 17 4

1st Battalion, 58, 61, 68, 74, 107, 110, 113-114, 117, 119, 159

Company A, 6 7

Company B, 113-11 5

Company C, 67

Company D, 61, 66-67, 72, 111, 114-11 5

2d Battalion, 72-73, 79, 107, 120-12 2

Company E, 108

Company F, 72, 108, 120-122

Company H, 51, 117, 118-122

3d Battalion, 65, 70n, 72, 107, 110, 113-115, 117-119, 171, 194

Company I, 68, 114-115, 11 8

Company K, 113-115, 11 8

Company L, 57, 68

Company M, 57, 67-68, 113, 115, 11 8

7th Marines, 3, 5, 79, 107, 122, 154, 174

1st Battalion, 7 2

Company D, 7 2

2d Battalion, 6 2

Company E, 7 2

Company F, 6 0

Company G, 6 2

3d Battalion, 53, 55-58, 61-63, 78, 153, 17 4

Company I, 55-5 7

Company K, 6 2

Company L, 53, 5 7

Company M, 55-5 7

11th Marines, 218-220, 22 2

1st Battalion, 64-6 5

Battery B, 6 5

2d Battalion, 11 5

Battery E, 10 8

3d Battalio n

Battery G, 21 7

4th Battalion, 21 6

7th Engineer Battalion, 236, 238, 240

1st Medical Battalion, 23 3

Company B, 6 2

1st Dental Company, 238

1st Hospital Company, 208, 23 3

3d Marine Division, 3-5, 8-9, 16, 20-28, 34, 39, 44, 75, 79 ,

87-88, 91, 95, 120, 125, 135, 139, 142-145, 155, 157 ,

159-161, 164-165, 173, 191, 210-211, 222, 224, 238, illus. ,

144

3d Marine Division, (Fwd), 9, 200

3d Marines, 9, 16, 18, 29, 35, 37, 46, 125, 128, 142, 155, 157 ,

164, 17 4

1st Battalion, 3, 26, 33, 66-67, 100-104, 110, 139, 139n ,

156-164, 167-175, 179-18 3

H&S Company, 15 8

Company A, 67, 160, 164

Company B, 67, 102, 159-160

Company C, 67, 103, 139, 158-159, 164, 17 2

Company D, 160, 174, illus ., 170

2d Battalion, 10-13, 28, 41-44, 100, 125, 135, 135n158-174 ,

illus., 1 3

Company E, 39, 42-45, 160-163

Company F, 11-12, 41-45, 103, 160, 167

Company G, 11-13, 39-44, 103, 160-16 6

Company H, 39-44, 160-16 9

3d Battalion, 10, 14, 17, 18, 20, 37-44, 128-129, 136-138 ,

illus., 1 8

Company I, 18, 20

Company K, 38-39, 12 9

Company L, 129-13 0

Company M, 41, 129-13 0

4th Marines, 5, 142-143, 155, 162, 167-17 3

1st Battalion, 17, 19, 19n, 20-21, 23-24, 58-59, 61, 126 ,

153-155, 161, 17 3

Company A, 21, 58-59, 153-154

Company C, 59, 15 3

Company D, 21-22, 6 1

BLT, 6 1

2d Battalion, 133-139, 168, 181, 23 6

Company E, 133-136, 138-16 8

Company F, 67, 73, 133-137, 145-14 6

Company G, 133-13 7

Company H, 133, 135-136

12th Marines

Battery E, 100

Battery F, 3 5

Battery I, 5 3

3d Battalion

Battery I, 33, 35, 53, 60

3d Battalion, 9, 12, 17, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 82, 92, 132, 156 ,

186 ; illus., 27, 12 8

Company I, 17, 30 ; 13 2

Company K, 29, 29n

Company L, 10-11, 12, 13, 30 ; illus., 1 1

Company M, 12, 13, 30, 127-128, 132 ; illus., 1 2

9th Marines, 20-21, 24, 29, 132-133, 136-139, 142-143 ,

161-164, 171, 174

1st Battalion, 14, 17-24, 33, 96-103,136, 151-153, 163, 248 ; illus., 14, 15, 1 6

H&S Company, 96

Company A, 18n 96, 99, 102, 129 ; illus., 13, 1 4

Company B, 33-39, 96, 98-100, 10 3

Company C, 96, 98-100, 102, 129 ; illus., 1 6

Company D, 96, 98-100
INDEX 33 1

2d Battalion, 24, 26-27, 125, 126-128, 128n, 133, 133n, 16 1

H&S Company, 125, 12 7

Company E, 34-35, 41, 125, 12 7

Company F, 12, 26, 125, 127-128, 14 3

Company G, 125, 127, 129

Company H, 27, 125, 12 7

3d Battalion, 3, 18, 20, 24, 28, 40, 100, 102-103, 134, 16 3

H&S Company, 10 1

Company I, 18-1 9

Company K, 28, 37-42, 98, 10 1

Company L, 28 ; illus., 28

Company M, 28, 40, 42, 13 4

12th Marines, 9-10, 142-143, 216-22 0

1st Battalion, 15 9

4 .2-inch Mortar Battery, 15 9

2d Battalion, 33, 38, 13 2

Battery I, 130

3d Battalion, 17 6

Composite Artillery Battalion, 17, 21-2 2

13th Marines, 22 0

1st Battalion, 33, 39, 219

Battery B, 31, 33, 3 9

26th Marines, 5, 46, 84, 128-129, 142, 229, 25 6

26th Marines (Fwd), 46-4 7

1st Battalion, 44, 4 6

Company A, 47

Company B, 46, 12 9

Company C, 44

2d Battalion, 20, 24, 26-29, 29n, 17 3

Company E, 2 9

Company F, 2 9

Company H, 2 9

3d Battalion, 47, 132n, 132-13 3

Company I, 47, 13 3

Company K, 133

Company L, 47, 13 3

Company M, 13 3

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 125, 142, 145-146, 177 ;

illus ., 14 2

Company A, 146-14 7

Company B, 14 6

5th Amphibian Tractor Battalio n

Company A, 18 0

3d Medical Battalion, 233, 236, 23 8

Company C, 23 8

3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 33, 100, 25 7

Company A, 46

3d Tank Battalion, 101, 12 6

Company A, 162, 16 4

9th Motor Transport Battalion, illus., 1 6

3d Engineer Battalion, 236-23 9

9th Engineer Battalion, 236-23 8

11th Engineer Battalion, 17, 19-20, 30, 89, 92-93, 237-239 ;

illus., 16, 23 8

Company C, 23 7

Company D, 237

1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Company, 21 9

5th 8-inch Howitzer Battery, 22 0

5th 155mm Gun Battery, 21 9

1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW), 3-4, 6, 23, 33, 39, 45, 65,

79, 104, 109, 135, 151, 155, 170, 191, 199-21 2

Marine Wing Headquarters Group (MWHG) 1, 20 0

Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 11, 199-20 3

Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 12, 199-20 3

Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 13, 199, 202

Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 15, 15 1

Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 16, 170, 199, 206, 210-212

Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 36, 199, 206, 211-21 2

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS) 36, 20 6

Marine Air Control Group 18, 200

Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 4, 20 0

Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) 7, 20 0

Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 311, 104

Marine Attack Squadron (All Weather) (VMA[AW]) 242, 203 -

204

Marine Attack Squadron (All Weather) (VMA[AW]) 533, 20 3

Marine Attack Squadron (All Weather) (VMA[AW]) 542, 20 4

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 163, 170-171 ,

212 ; illus., 20

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadrom (HMM) 164, 28, 39, 44 ,

156, 163-166

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 165, 110, 207 ,

212, 214

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 262, 57, 170, 174 ,

175, 176, 21 1

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 263, 158-15 9

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 265, 167, 169 ,

21 1

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 361, 70, 130-132 ,

174

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 362, 151, 153 ,

156, 162-163, 170, 211, 248

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 363, 58-59, 113 -

114, 137-138, 153-15 5

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 463, 130, 170 ,

173, 209-210

Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 2, 58, 113, 11 5

Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 6, 110, 207, 21 1

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) 152, 20 5

Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) 2, 200

Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) 3, 200

Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron (VMCJ) 1, 204-20 5

Force Logistic Command, 151, 173, 224-225, 229, 240, 25 7

3d Force Service Regiment (FSR), 225, 228

Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) Alpha, 225, 22 7

Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) Bravo, 79, 225, 229

Force Logistic Support Unit (FLSU) 1, 225, 22 7

Supply Battalion, 22 5

Supply Company (-) Reinforced, 229

Transient Battalion, 22 8

Transient Facility, 23 0

Air Delivery Platoon, 22 8

Mangrove Swamp, 24 6

Marshall, Capt Albert R., CEC, USN, 24 0

MASH (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital), 238

Masterpool, LtCol William J., 26, 29

Matheson, BGen Salve H ., 8 1

"Meatgrinder" the, 139

Medal of Honor, 12, 19, 72, 108, 113-115, 141, 20 9

Medical Civic Action Patrol (MedCap), 194
332 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

Medical evacuation (Medevac), 39, 40, 59, 62, 138, 170, 20 6

Mekong River, 151, 249, 25 2

Mellon, 2dLt Richard C., Jr., 1 2

Merchant Ship

SS Buchanan, 247

SS Conqueror, 24 7

SS Seatrain Texas, 247

Metzger, BGen Louis, 8, 75, 132, 144, 150, 153, 224, 228-229 ;

LtGen ., 23n, 82n, 135n, 164n, 210n

Mielke, Cpl William H., 206

"Mighty Mite", 186

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 4, 6, 8, 17, 20 ,

23, 75, 79, 88, 94-95, 145, 150, 153, 164, 182-184, 194 ,

214, 241-242, 245, 249, 255, 25 7

MACV Aviation Directive 95-4, 20 0

MACV Contingency Plans, 7 7

MACV Combat Operation Center, 87

MACV Directive 10-12, 184

MACV I Corps Field Advisory Element, 245

Office of Civil Operations (OCO), 183-18 4

Miller 2dLt Robert W., Jr., 121

Mobile Riverine Force, 252-25 3

Mo Duc, 5 2

Morrison, GySgt Alexander, 244

Momyer, MajGen William W ., USAF, 15 2

Monkey Mountain, 200

Monsoon, 91, 93, 202, 234-235, 25 5

Montagnards, 35, 25 0

Moran, Capt Lawrence R ., 175

Morgan, Capt Robert F., 11 1

Morley, Maj William F ., 3 3

Mortar Fire, 3 4

Mulford, LtCol Ross L., 17,33 9

Mullen, Capt John J., Jr., 187

Murray, lstLt John J., 113, 11 5

Murray, MajGen Raymond L., 9 4

My Chanh, 16 8

Nam, Huong Van, 25 3

Nation Building, 182

National Cadre Training School, 183

National Press Club, 257-25 9

Naval Component Commander, 4

Naval gunfire, 56, 58, 146, 153, 203, 22 2

Naval Liaison officer, 16 0

Naval Vessels (General)

Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH), 150-152, 17 0

Amphibious Transport, Dbck (LPD), 150, 15 2

Fire Support ships, 2 5

Hospital Ship, 23 3

Landing craft, 247

Landing craft, medium, 17, 17, 152, 17 5

Landing craft, utility (LCU), 17, 61, 63

Landing ship, Dock (LSD), 152

Landing ship, Medium (Rocket), 15 3

Landing ship, Tank (LST), 17, 63, 150, 15 2

'Logistical Support Ship, 6 3

Minesweeper, 247

River patrolboats, 247

Swift Boat, illus., 80

Navy, U.S ., 25, 152, 231-232, 24 5

Navy Commands and Units

Naval Air Systems Command, 21 0

Naval Support Activity, Da Nang (NSA) 231-233 ; illus., 231

Seventh Fleet, 3, 5, 17, 26, 104, 135, 150, 153, 203, 24 2

Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), 5, 17, 82, 150-152, 156, 158 ,

17 9

Task Group 79.4, 156 (See also SLF Alpha)

Task Group 79.5, 156-157 (See also SLF Bravo)

USS Canberra (CAG 2), 15 2

USS Clarion River (LSMR 409), 5 8

USS Henrico (APA 45), 15 2

USS Iwo Jima, 58, 151, 153-154, 17 4

USS Ozbourne (DD 843), 60

USS Repose (AH 16), 23 3

USS Sanctuary (AH 17), 23 3

USS Thomaston (LSD 28), 15 2

USS Tripoli (LPH 10), 164, 166, 169-170, 173, 234

USS Okinawa (LPH-3), 159, 171, 207, 21 2

USS Vancouver (LPD 2), 15 2

USS White River (LSMR 536), 5 8

3d Naval Construction Brigade, 233, 240

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 4, 23 6

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 10, 31, 23 4

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 301, illus ., 235

Needham, LtCol Robert, 128, 130, 13 6

Nelson, LtCol Joseph A ., 110

Neuropsychiauic ("Shell chock") casualties, 13 9

New Life Hamlet Program, 195

Newlin, PFC Melvin E., 108, 108n

Newton, LtCol Donald E., 4 6

Nha Be, 24 7

Nhung River, 169

Nickerson, MajGen Herman, Jr., 51, 52, 65, 191-192 ; illus., 4- 5

Nong Son Coal Mine, 107-10 8

North Vietnam, 8, 44, 63, 83, 87

North Vietnamese, 114, 130, 141, 156, 159, 25 5

Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), 7

North Vietnamese Army (NVA), 3, 6-7, 9-10, 12-14, 17, 31 ,

33-34, 37-38, 40, 51, 75, 93, 103, 110, 115, 127, 129 ,

132-133, 136-137, 146, 153, 161, 165, 174, 201, 207, 219 ,

245-24 6

Artillery, use of, 77, 95-96, 99-100, 102-103, 132, 138, 137 n

Mortars, use of, 134, 138, 14 6

Base Areas

Base Area C-3, 93

Base Area 606, 7 8

Dry Season Offensive, 1967, 11 9

Regional Commands

B-3 Front, 8

Military Region 4 (MR-4), 8, 7 7

Military REgion 5 (MR-5), 8, 25 9

Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region, 8

NVA Divisions

2d NVA Division, 63-64, 68, 77, 107, 110-111, 117, 119-121 ,

258-25 9

3d NVA Division, 8, 11 9

304th NVA Division, 8, 147, 25 9

320th NVA Division, 8
INDEX 33 3

324B NVA Division, 3, 8, 17, 77, 25 8

325C'NVA Division, 8, 37, 44, 46, 147, 25 9

341st NVA Division, 17, 7 7

NVA Regiments

1st NVA Regiment, 24 5

3d NVA Regiment, 63-64, 70, 109, 25 9

5th NVA Regiment, 139, 142, 172, 25 8

6th NVA Regiment, 139, 157, 17 2

9th NVA Regiment, 25 8

21st NVA Regiment, 63, 110, 25 9

29th NVA Regiment, 164-165, 25 8

31st NVA Regiment, 2 5

90th NVA Regiment, 102, 134, 163, 25 8

368B NVA Artillery Regiment, 25 8

803d NVA Regiment, 17 5

812th NVA Regiment, 10, 25, 132m 25 8

NVA Independent Battalions

6th NVA Battalion, 17 2

27th NVA Independent Battalion, 25 8

116th NVA Battalion, 178-18 0

416th NVA Battalion, 142

810th NVA Battalion, 15 7

814th NVA Battalion, 17, 15 7

NOTAM (Notice of Airmen), 15 3

NVA, (See "North Vietnamese Army" )

Nui Dang, 53, 55, 57, 60, 6 1

Nui Dau, 53, 58, 62, 15 3

Nui Luc Son, 63-65, 68, 166

Nui Luc Son Basin, 63 (See also Que Son Basin)

Nui Luc Son outpost, 11 0

Nui Nong Ham, 6 7

O Lau River, 157, 167, 17 6

O'Brien, Capt Robert J ., 244

O'Brien, Lt Robert M ., 6 2

O'Leary, LtCol Raymond S ., 53, 55-5 7

O'Neil, 2dLt Edward P .B., 165

Ohanesian, LtCol Victor, 10-13 ; illus., 1 3

Okinawa, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 37, 46, 150, 151, 153, 156, 158, 160,

170, 205, 211, 224-225, 228

Operational Control (OpCon), 5, 144

III MAF Operation Plan 11-67, 9 1

Operation Plan 12-67, 93, 9 4

Operations, ARVN

Operation Bac Thien 817, 25 0

Operation Dan Chi 287/C, 25 1

Operation Lam Son 54, 23, 23n, 25, 15 9

Operation Lam Son 87, 16 7

Operation Lam Son 138, 139, 142, 172, 24 6

Operation Lien Ket 106, 68

Operation Lien Ket 110, 11 9

Operation Lien Ket 112, 110-11 1

Operation Lien Ket 116, 117-11 9

Operation Long Phi 999/N, 25 1

Operation Song Than, 248

Operation Song Than 9, 25 0

Operation Song Than 14, 25 1

Operation Song Than 63/67, 252

Operation Song Than 701/67, 252

Operation Song Than 808, 254

Operation Song Than 809, 254

Operations, Korean

Operation Dragon Head V

Operations, U .S.

Ardmore, 14 2

Audurn, 12 3

Badger Hunt, 123, 174, 17 5

Badger Tooth, 176, 179

Ballistic Arch, 179-180

Ballistic Charge, 17 1

Bastion Hill, 139 ; illus., 172

Beacon Gate, 168-16 9

Beacon Guide, 167

Beacon Hill, 17-18, 19n, 78, 17 1

Beacon Point, 170-17 1

Beacon Star, 39, 156, 157, 161, 168

Beacon Torch, 162-16 3

Bear Bite, 16 2

Bear Chain, 167-168

Bear Claw, 16 3

Beau Charger, 25, 26, 30, 159, 171, 207 ; illus ., 2 4

Beaver Cage, 66, 158-161, 17 4

Beaver Track, 164-166

Belt Drive, 169-17 0

Belt Tight, 28, 30, 159-161 ; illus., 24

Benton, 11 9

Billings, 25 1

Buena Vista, 254

Buffalo, 95-96, 101, 104-125, 163-16 5

Calhoun, 162-163

Cedar Falls, 242-24 4

Choctaw, 16 2

Cimarron, 30, 16 1

Citrus, 123, 210

Cochise, 109-111, 16 9

Colgate, 16 2

Concordia, VII, 25 2

Coronado II, 25 2

Coronado, IX, 254

Crickett, 46-47

Cumberland, 220

Deckhouse V, 52, 151-152, 154, 248-24 9

Deckhouse VI, 58, 61, 21 8

Desoto, 51-63, 78, 81, 154, 21 8

Eradicate, 22 2

Essex, 120-12 3

Formation Leader, 173

Fortress Sentry, 171-17 2

Fortress Ridge, 175-17 6

Foster, 123, 174

Fremont, 142, 167-168, 17 0

Granite, 172-17 4

Hastings, 3

Headshed, 22 2

Hickory I, 28, 30, 82, 91, 159-161, 164, 207, 245 ; illus., 24, 2 9

Hickory II, 125-126, 16 7

Hood River, 11 9

Illinois City, 91
334 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

Junction City, 242-244, 25 1

Kangaroo Kick, 167-16 8

Kentucky, 145, 174, 180-18 1

King Fisher, 125-139, 143, 171-17 3

Knox, 123, 17 3

Lancaster, 143

Lawrence, 7 9

Liberty, 169, 172-17 3

Malheur, 81-83, 11 9

Malheur II, 81, 119

Maryland, 16 2

Medina, 14 1

Muscle Shoals, 9 1

Napoleon, 142, 14 5

Neosho, 142

Neutralize, 22 2

New Castle, 23 6

North Carolina, 7 7

Onslow, 12 3

Oregon, 77-79 (See also Task Force Oregon )

Osceola, 142, 18 1

Mississippi, 12 0

Paddington, 25 1

Pegasus, 12 9

Pershing, 25 0

Pike, 119

Pitt, 122

Prairie I, 3, 31, 33, 24 4

Prairie II, 9-10, 12, 14, 7 8

Prairie III, 16-17, 2 0

Prairie IV, 20, 30, 35, 16 1

Rope Yarn, 22 2

Rolling Thunder, 204

Scotland, 142, 14 7

Shelbyville, 17 1

SLAM, 203

South Carolina, 7 7

Starlite, 3

Stone, 51-5 2

Swift, 111, 117-12 0

Tennessee, 7 7

Union, 52, 65, 68, 119, 159, 159n

Union II, 52, 7 4

Wallowa, 12 0

Wheeler, 119-120

Wheeler/Wallowa, 120-12 3

Orlando, LCpl Philip J ., 206

Orr, Capt Alan L ., 5 6

Ortega, LCpl James, 12 4

"Other War", 183

Outlaw, PFC T., 237

Pacification, 7, 52, 107, 150, Chp, 1 2

Pacification Evaluation Systems

Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), 194-195

Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet (HEW)

Village Report

Padley, Col John J ., 4 6

Pagoda Valley, 162

Parachute School, 22 9

Parachute Rigger School, 22 9

Parker, Maj Charles E ., 251-25 2

Peasant Society, 18 8

Peeler, LtCol John J., 24, 26, 13 3

Perfume River, 23 7

Perkins, Cpl, 141, 141 n

Personal Response Project, 191-192

Personal Response Contact Team

Personal Response Council, 19 1

Platoon Leader's Personal Response Notebooks, 19 1

Personnel Management, 228

Peters, Sgt Lawerence D ., 11 3

Petro, LtCol George E., 11 9

Petro, LtCol Peter P., USA, 11 7

Petty, Col Douglas D ., Jr., 202

Philippine Islands, 151, 153, 155, 17 5

Philips, Capt Jack W ., 13 6

Phong Dien, 24, 172

Phu Bai, 3, 4, 36, 39, 44, 130, 132, 143, 157, 168, 187, 199-200 ,

206, 211-212, 225, 227, 22 9

Phu Duc District, 17 3

Phuoc Tuy Province, 25 1

Pipta, Capt John, 108

Pisor, Robert, 129n

Pleiku, 8, 242, 25 0

Pless, Capt Stephen W ., 207-20 9

Pleva, Capt James F., illus., 21 4

Poncho, 17 2

Poncho Liner, 17 2

Poulson, GySgt Leroy N ., 208

Power generators, 218, 239-240

"Practice Nine" Project, 87 (See also Strong ' Point Obsticle

System)

Practice Nine Requirement Plan, 8 8

Presidential Unit Citation, 143, 74 n

Provisional Artillery Battalion, 21 7

Provisional Rifle Companies, 14 6

Psychological Operational (PsyOps), 109, 19 2

Public Works Center, Yokosuka, Japan, 22 6

"Puff the Magic Dragon" (AC-47), 13 6

Quang Nam Province, 6, 51, 78, 107-109, 123-124, 162, 174 ,

246, 25 8

Quang Ngai Airfield, 6 3

Quang Ngai City, 6, 8 1

Quang Ngai Province, 5-6, 8, 51-53, 58, 64, 75, 77-79, 81, 119 ,

124, 153, 207, 238, 24 5

Quang Tin Province, 5-6, 8, 51, 77-78, 168

Quang Tri Airfield, 94, 18 1

Quang Tri City, 17, 19, 78, 92-93, 141, 167, 169, 172, 228, 24 6

Quang Tri Province, 3-4, 6-7, 9-10, 17, 31, 75, 77-78, 89, 95 ,

109, 125, 132, 139, 156-157, 163, 168-169, 172, 176, 179 ,

203, 212, 234, 239, 242, 25 8

Que Son Basin, 52, 63-68, 74, 78-79, 107-114, 120-124, 158 ,

169, 211, 60n

Que Son Village, 65-66, 113-11 4

Qui Nhon, 250
INDEX 33 5

"R&R" facilities, 23 3

Rach Ruong Canal, 25 3

Radar, 2 3

Radcliffe, Capt Henry J.M., 98-99

Radics, Col Emil J., 6 4

Radio relay, 46

Rao Quan River, 3 1

Reconnaissance Team, 10, 12, 34, 45, 58, 10 9

Reczek, Capt Gerald F ., 103

"Red Ball"System, 226

Reed, Col Edwin O., 211

Reese, Capt Thomas D ., Jr., 113-11 4

Revolutionary Development Program, 51, 63, 78, 182-183, 186 ,

19 2

Revolutionary Development Cadre Teams, 18 3

Rice, LtCol William H., 1 7

Rickabaugh, Col David D ., 242

Rindfleisch, Maj John A., 254

River Assault Division, 25 3

Riverine Assault Force (TF-117), 24 7

Riverine operations, 24 2

Road Clearing Sweeps, 240

Robertshaw, MajGen Louis B ., 199 ; illus., 4

Robertson, MajGen Donn J ., 72, 107, 109, 117, 21 6

Rockey, LtCol William K., 117n

Rocket attacks, 131, 205, 24 2

Rocket Belt, 109 (See also Da Nang Rocket Belt)

Rockpile, 9-10, 20, 130, 142 ; illus., 20

Rosson, MajGen William B., USA, 77-79, 8 1

Ross, Maj David L., 113

"Rough Rider" Truck Convoys, 13, 128-129, 161, 168, 222, 227

Route 1, 25, 87, 89, 91, 119, 125, 142, 162, 167-168, 172-173 ,

25 0

Route 9, 17, 21, 31, 87, 91, 128-130, 239, 37n ; illus., 1 6

Route 13, 25 1

Route 19, 250

Route 555, 16 7

Route 561, 23, 91, 93-94, 96, 99, 103, 161, 23 7

Route 606, 125, 12 7

"Route Package" System, 20 4

Route Package 1, 204

Route Package VI, 204

Rozman, Capt John J., 29

Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), 245-25 0

Ryan, BGen Michael P ., 9, 14, 21, 3 4

"Ryan's Road" , 2 1

Sa Binh, 5 6

Sa Huynh, 53, 57, 153-154, 23 2

Sadowski, LtCol Joseph L., 173

Saigon, 77, 242, 246

Saipan, 144

Salt Flats, 53 (See also Sa Huynh)

Santos, SSgt Ruben, 40-4 1

Sauer, lstLt Phillip H., 35, 37

"Sav-a-Plane " System, 216

Sayers, Capt Michael W ., 33-36, 38 ; Maj 36n

Schening, LtCol Richard S ., "Spike", 96-100, 103, 16 3

Schick, Col Edwin S ., Jr., 142, 216, 218

Schmidt, Col Maynard W ., 174, 17 6

Schwartz, Capt Manfred E ., 25 1

Scuras, lstLt James B., 108

Seabees, 228, 233-236, 239-240, 255, (See also Navy, U.S .)

Serial assignment tables, 17 0

Shadrick, LtCol Ural W ., 5 7

Shanahan, Col James G ., 7 9

Sharp, Adm U .S . Grant, USN, 4, 75, 7 8

Sharpless, 2dtLt Vernon S ., 138

Sheehan, James P ., 103

Sheridan, Maj Robert F., 10-12

Shirley, Capt Troy T., illus., 28

Short, Col James C., 231

Simpson, Capt Jerry I., 25 2

Singleton, Sgt Walter K ., 18n

Slater, Capt Albert C., Jr., 96, 99-10 2

Smith, Col Richard B., 95, 133, 137, 139, 142

Sniper teams, 13 5

Soi Rap River, 24 7

South China Sea, 87, 232, 246, 25 0

South Pacific, 136

Southeast Asia, 15 0

South Vietnam, 87, 95, 150-151

South Vietnam Government, 89, 91, 123, 182, 186, 192, 244,

25 0

War Cabinet, 183

Ministry of Revolutionary Development, 18 3

National Elections, 130, 169, 172-173

National Police, 62, 159

South Vietnamese Armed Force s

Joint General Staff, 183, 24 8

Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ)

I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) 3-8, 51, 77-78, 82, 86, 89, 104 ,

107, 120, 124, 128, 139, 150, 161, 184, 187, 200, 219, 242 ,

245, 249

II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ), 75, 77-78, 119, 250-25 1

III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ), 78, 242, 25 0

IV Corps Tactical Zone (IV CTZ), 151, 242, 250-251, 25 4

Air Force, 109, 20 3

South Vietnamese Commands and Units

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 3, 6, 9, 19, 53, 57 ,

64, 70, 75, 108, 110, 119, 125, 145-147, 153-154, 159 ,

162-163, 167, 172, 176, 179, 184, 190, 216-217, 245, 25 8

1st ARVN Division, 6, 23, 25, 142, 150, 171, 245-24 6

2d ARVN Division, 6, 53, 58, 110, 119, 150, 24 5

7th ARVN Division, 25 4

9th ARVN Division, 25 1

21st ARVN Division, 25 1

22d ARVN Division, 25 0

ARVN Airborne Brigade, 25, 28, 139, 142, 24 8

1st ARVN Regiment, 24 5

3d Battalion, 24 5

4th Battalion, 246

4th ARVN Regiment, 5 3

4th Battalion

6th ARVN Regiment, 11 0

43d ARVN Regiment, 25 1

51st ARVN Regiment, 6, 245-246

ARVN Ranger Unit s

1st ARVN Ranger Group, 6, 65, 118-119
336 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

37th Ranger Battalion, 11 8

44th ARVN RAnger Battalion, 25 2

52d ARVN Ranger Battalion, 25 2

Vietnam Marine Corps (VNMC), 6, 151-152, 245-25 4

VNMC Brigade Force Alpha, 250-25 1

VNMC Brigade Force Bravo, 151, 248-25 1

1st VNMC Battalion, 249, 25 1

2d VNMC Battalion, 251, 25 4

3d VNMC Battalion, 151, 248-25 2

4th VNMC Battalion, 151, 248-249, 25 2

5th VNMC Battalion, 252-25 4

6th VNMC Battalion, 248-24 9

VNMC Artillery Battalion, 248, 25 2

Battery B, 25 2

Battery C, 248

South Vietnamese Militia

Popular Forces (PFs) 6, 186-190, 247

Regional Forces (RFs) 6, 24 7

Sparrow Hawk Rapid Reaction Missions, 51, 159, 16 8

Spivey, Capt Bayliss L ., Jr., 37-38

Stanfield, Col James C., 242

Starbird, LtGen Alfred D ., USA, 87-8 9

Stiles, BGen William A ., 53, 58 ; illus., 5

"Sting Ray " Concept, 21 9

Stoces, SSgt Gary G., 244

Stockman, Col James R., 144-14 5

Strategic Reserve, 15 0

"Street Without Joy " 156, 162, 170-171, 176, 17 9

Strong Point Obstacle System (SPOS), 21, 30, 86-95, 132, 145 ,

239, 25 5

Strong Point A-1, 94, 14 6

Strong Point A-3, 94, 145, 180-181, 25 5

Strong Point A-4, 94, 10 4

Strong Point C-1, 94

Strong Point C-2, 92, 94, 135, 138-139

Strong Point C-3, 9 4

Strong Point C-4, 94, 145-14 7

Stuckey, LCpl James L., 102

Studt, Maj John C., 100 ; Ltcol, 137-139 ; Col, 100n 102n, 139n

Subic Bay, 151, 17 5

Supporting Arms, use of, 11, 18-19, 23, 26, 28-30, 33-34, 37-40 ,

42-45, 47, 51, 56-58, 65, 67, 70, 72-73, 95, 99, 102, 104 ,

.108-109, 114, 117, 122-123, 128-130, 132-135, 142 ,

146-147, 158, 164, 170, 174, 178, 252

Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), 23, 104

Taber, Col Richard D ., Sr., 240

Tach Bay, 15 3

Tactical Air Command Center (TACC), 199n

Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), 199-202

Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC), 199-200

Tactical Area ofResponsibility (TAOR), 28, 46

Tactical Fuel Dispensing System (TFDS), 6 0

Takala, Col David O., 15 1

"Tally Ho", 20 4

Tam Ky, 63, 65, 78, 110, 119

Tan My, 232, 25 7

Tan Son Nhut Airbase, 242

Tan Tu, 55-56

Tan Uyen, 25 1

Tang Binh, 11 4

Tanks, use of, 11-13, 22, 26-27, 35, 99, 102, 125-127, 129 ,

132-136, 160, 162-165, 17 9

Task Force Oregon, 82 (See also Army, U.S. )

Tay Ninh, 251

Taylor, LtCol William W., 186-187

Tenny, Capt Joseph R., 114, 11 8

Terrill, Capt William B ., 3 4

Tet Nguyen Dan, 10, 7 7

Thac Ma River, 16 2

Thailand, 200

Tham Khe, 178-180

Thang Binh, 68, 79

Thang, MajGen Nguyen Duc, 18 3

Thanh Binh, 6 5

Thanh Lam, 57

Tho Trung An, 17 6

Thom Tham Khe, 17 6

Thomas, LtCol Alfred I ., 167, 170, 179

Thomas, Col Franklin C., Jr., 202

Thomas, Capt Raymond, A ., 175

Thompson, Cpl Charles A ., 9 9

Thon Phu Kinh, 176

Thu Bon River, 52, 174, 23 6

Thu Duc, 251-25 2

Thua Thien Province, 4, 6-7, 9, 75, 77, 142, 156-157, 170, 173 ,

25 8

Tien Sha, 200

Time-on-target (TOT), 201

Tompkins, MajGen Rathvon McC ., 139, 144-145, 147

Toner, LtCol Edward R., 145-14 7

"Tooth-to-tail" ratio, 22 5

Trung An, 17 8

Thuy Bo, 51-5 2

Thuy Trieu, 57

Tra Cau River, 58, 60

Tra Cau Inlet, 5 7

"The Trace" 21, 89, 91, 100 (See also Barrier)

Traynor, Col William L., 242

Tri border region, 46

Troung Giang River, 16 3

Truce (New Year's) 151, 254

Truong, BGen Ngo Quang, ARVN, 8

Troung Sanh, 5 5

Tucker, lstLt Phillip E ., 244

United States Government, 86, 95, 145, 255-25 9

Senate Subcommittee on Prepardness, 94

Department of Defense, 87, 19 5

Defense Communications Agency, 8 7

Department of State, 89, 244

U .S. Embassy, Saigon

U.S. Mission Council, Vietnam, 19 5

U .S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 189, 233 ,

244

U.S . Information Service (USIS), 24-4

U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, illus., 20
INDEX 33 7

VHF (Very High Frequency) radio, 20 2

Vacca, lstLt William P ., 111, 11 3

Van Winkle, LtCol Archie, 13 9

Vaughan, Capt Stuart R., 161

Vehicles and Equipment (See also "aircraft" and "weapons" )

Armored Troop Carriers (ATC), 25 3

Armored Vest ("Flak jackets"), 133, 136, 14 6

Concetina wire, 44

Electronic Equipment Systems

AN/PRC-25 Radio, 12 2

AN/PRC-47 Radio, 11 8

AN/TPQ-10, Radio, 93, 20 0

IBM-360 computer, 22 6

M 18 Field Artillery Digtal Computer (FADC), 21 8

Tactical Data Systems

Air Force Tactical Data System, 200

Marine Tactical Data Systems (MTDS), 20 0

Navy Tactical Data Systems (NTDS), 200

Parachute flares, 4 3

"Spooky" flareship aircraft, 133, 135, 15 8

Starlight scopes, 13 5

Tracked Vehicles

Amphibian Tractor (MP-5) 22 ; - 59, 142, 152-153, 162, 175 -

174, 178-17 9

Armored Amphibion Tractor (See also Weapons-Artillery )

Bulldozer, 237

D-4 caterpillar tractors, 6 3

Engineer Amphibion Tractor (LVTE), 125, 12 7

Tank retriever, 168

Wheeled vehicles

1/4-ton truck, 21-2 2

5-ton trucks, 226

Mechanical Mule, 4 1

Verdi, Col John M ., 201

Vertical envelopment, 5 7

Vest, LtCol Wendell N ., 24, 27, 29, 15 6

Vick, Col Kirby B., 242

Viet Cong (VC), 3, 6-7, 52-53, 57-58, 61-63, 108-109, 153, 179 ,

185, 189, 192, 207, 236, 246

Viet Cong Infrastructure, 18 6

Viet Cong Units

1st VC Regiment, 3, 8, 109, 114, 117, 119, 245, 25 8

2d VC Regiment, 25 9

274th VC Regiment, 25 1

VC Dong Nai Regiment, 254

R-20 VC Battalion, 52, 12 3

V25 VC Local Force Battalion, 123, 16 8

38th VC Battalion, 5 8

95th VC Battalion, 60

261st VC Battalion, 248, 25 4

263d VC Battalion, 252, 25 4

267th VC Battalion, 25 3

502dLocalForce VC Battalion, 25 3

514th VC Battalion, 25 2

516th VC Battalion, 24 8

518th VC Battalion, 24 8

802d VC Battalion, 246

806th VC Battalion, 167

808th VC Battalion, 1 7

Q-13 VC Company, 123

K400 VC Local Force Company, 17 5

Viet Minh, 246, 250

Vin Luc, 17 3

Vincent, Capt John T ., (MC) USN ., 23 8

Vinh, 7 7

Vinh Binh, 5 5

Vinh Huy, 70

Vinh Huy (3), 11 4

Vinh Lac, 5 7

Vinh Long, 25 1

Volkert, LtCol Marir D., 89

Vung Tau, 183, 248-24 9

Walt, LtGen Lewis W., 3, 17, 36, 46, 75, 78, 81, 91, 184, 187 ,

192, 245 ; illus., 4, 8,

War Zone C, 25 1

Waterway Control Plan, 109

Weapons (See also " Aircraft" and "Vehicles and Equipment " )

Anti-Aircraft weapon s

12 .7mm antiaircraft machine gun, 114, 127

Quad- .50 machine gun, 3 5

"Duster, " Self-Propelled dual-40mm anti-aircraft gun, M4 2

35, 129-13 0

Hawk missile, 200-20 1

Anti-tank weapons

Antitank rockets (General), 130

3 .5-inch rocket launcher, 3 0

Panzerfaust, lln

RPG-7, 11, 21, 27, 127, 146, 165, 179

B-40, 246, 25 3

Artillery

Armored Amphibian Vehicle (Howitzer) LVTH-6 (W/105mm

howitzer), 10, 19, 21, 14 6

105mm howitzers (general), 10, 130, 132, 143, 146, 17 6

105mm howitzers, towed, 21 2

105mm howitzers, self-propelled, 21 9

152mm howitzer, 103, 20 3

155mm guns, self-propelled, 10, 14 3

155mm gun, self-propelled, 21 4

155mm howitzer (general), 33, 39, 63, 14 3

155mm howitzer, self-propelled, 212-21 6

8-inch howitzer, self-propelled, 143, 21 4

175mm gun, self-propelled, 9-10, 29, 33, 39, 65, 128-129 ,

143, 219-220, 24 2

Artillery Fuzes

Proximity, 9 3

Variable Time (VT), 40, 40n

"Beehive " antipersonnel ammunition, 2 2

Bombs

250-pound bomb, 118, 23 9

500-pound bomb, 11 4

Napalm, 114, 13 3

"Snakeeye bombs, 39, 39n

flamethrower, 21, 30, 9 6

Machine Guns

M-60 machine gun (7 .62mm), 108, 206, 208, 24 5

.50 caliber machine guns, 31, 118, 121, 199, 23 2

Mine s

Mines (general), 99
338 FIGHTING THE NORTH VIETNAMES E

"Bouncing Betty" mine, 165, 165n

Claymore mine, 44, 9 6

"Surprise Firing Devices", 17 0

Mortars

60mm, 36-37, 45, 121, 127, 133, 13 7

81mm, 21, 35, 45, 57, 64, 108, 122, 144, 176, 179, 23 2

82mm, 11, 30, 33, 36, 38, 47, 103, 121, 125, 127, 129, 13 5

107mm, M30, 21 2

107mm, M-98 "Howtar" , 21 8

4 .2-inch, 10, 33, 39, 64, 108, 121, 212, 223

120mm, 31, 4 6

Recoilles Rifles

57mm, 57, 25 3

75mm, 61, 117, 24 7

106mm, 35, 41-42, 44-45, 56, 145 (See also below "Ontos" )

Rifles

AK-47, 173, 179

M-16A1, 45, 52, 118, 229, 231, 245, 25 7

Rocket, Aerial (White Phosphorous), 20 2

Rocket, Artillery

Rocket (General), 122, 137, 22 2

102mm, 14, 46-4 7

122mm rocket, 10 9

140mm, 21, 24, 77, 13 3

Smoke Grenade, 202

Tear Gas, 113, 11 5

Tracked Vehicle s

Ontos, 26, 35, 63, 125-127, 26n, 35 n

Tanks, (See also Tanks, use of)

Weber, 2dLt Terrence M., 4 5

Webster, LtCol Charles B ., 70, 110-115, 119

Weise, LtCol William, 139

Weschler, RAdm, Thomas R ., USN., 231-232 ; VAdm, 184n

Westerman, LtCol Jack, 5 8

Western Pacific, 15 1

Westervelt, Capt John D ., USN ., 151, 15 3

Westman, LtCol Jack ., 153, 15 5

Westmoreland, Gen William C., USA., 4, 7-8, 75, 77-78, 87-89 ,

92-93, 120, 139, 153, 159, 184, 234, 241-242, 245, 257 ,

259, illus., 8, 17n

White, Col Francis V ., 5 6

Whitlow, lstLt, Robert H ., 11 4

Wickwire, LtCol Peter A ., 31, 33, 66-67, 100, 102-103, 158, 164,

167

Wilder, LtCol Gary, 14, 18, 37-4 1

Willis, LtCol Theodore J., 19, 21

Wilson, LtCol Daniel M ., 17 4

Wilson, Col Frank E ., 211

Wilson, LtCol James S ., 18, 20

Wilson, Capt Robert B ., 62

Wolf, LtCol Howard, 20 3

Wolfe, LCpI C.M., 12 2

Wood, Maj Donald E ., 249

Wooding, RAdm Robert T ., (CEC) USN., 234

Woodring, Maj Willard J ., 100-10 3

World War II, 91, 136

Wortman, Col Harry D ., 57, 153, 154, 156, 167

Xuan Hai, 16 1

Xuan Loc, 25 1

Young, Capt Robert K., 132