NO. 07-06-0341-CR IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL B JANUARY

22, 2007

______________________________ GWENDOLYN PEVEHOUSE, Appellant

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE 242 ND DISTRIC T COURT O F CASTRO COUNTY; NO. B3040-0510; HON. ED SELF, PRESI DING

_______________________________ Memorandum Opinion

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. The probation of

Gwendoly n Pevehouse w as revoked, and she was sentenced to serve two y ears in the s tate jail for t heft. Although s he pled true to t he allegati ons that she had violat e d the terms and co nditions of her pr obation, she conte nds on appeal that t he trial court should have sua sp onte co nducted a hearing to determine her competency at the time of the revocation hearing . We affirm the judgment.2

A person is incompetent to stand trial i f she does not have sufficient present ability to consult w ith her law

yer w ith a reasonabl e degree of rati onal understanding or a rational as well as

factual understanding of the pro ceedings against her. T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . art. 46B .003 (Ve rnon 20 06). Ifevidence suggestin g t he def endant may be incompetent

c omes to the attention of the t rial court , it must deter mine, sua sponte , by informal inquiry whethe r there is some evidence from any sourc e that would support a finding t hat th e defendant may be incompetent to stand tr ial. Id. art. 46B.004(c) . A com p etency hearing i s not requi red, however, unless th e evidence i s sufficient to cr eate a bona fide doubt in the mind of the judg e wheth er the defendant is l egally competent. Moore v. Stat

e, 9 99 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). And, w e review that trial court’s decision not to conduct such a he aring under the standard of abused discretion
. Id. Atthe time that appel lant pled true to the revocation alleg ations, she r evea led in re sponse to questioning from the trial court that she had suffered a nervous breakdow n three or four months ear lier and had been placed on medication. Sotoo did she disclose thatwhile the medica t ion origi nally taken several months earlier purportedly

left her “m essed up in the head,” that currentl y inges ted did not inter fere with her

abi lity t o understand the nature and consequences of the proceeding s. Appellant a lso stated that she was able to understand w hat her attorney had explain ed to her, answer his questions, and ask questions o f her own. The numerous answers she gave from the wit ness stand to both the questi ons propounded by her cou nsel and the trial court during the evidentiary3

hearing were also lucid and responsive to the questions asked. Appe llant’s counsel also represented that

he believed her competent. Prior hospi talizati ons and treatment or evidence of mental impairment alone does notraise a bona fide question r egarding one’s competency to stand tri al. Moore v. Stat e, 999 S .W.2d at 395. There must generally be evidence of recent severe mental illness, bizarre acts, o r moderate retardation. Id. This is especially true when the defenda nt is taking med ication to con trol her mental condition as appellant was here. Scott v. State, No. 07-01-0484-C R, 2002 Tex. App . L EXIS 4868 at *4 (T ex . App.–Amarill o July 3, 2002, pet. ref’d ) (not designated for pu blication). Further, no thin g in the re cord indicates appellant’s current medication affected her abilit y to comprehend the proce eding in which she was involve d, co mmu nica te with coun sel, or ass ist in her d efe nse. Thus , we conclude thatth e trial court did not abuse i ts discreti on in foregoing any further i nquiry into her competency to s tand trial and overrulethe issue. The judgment of the tr ial court i s affirmed.
Per Curiam Do not publish
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