In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-12-00147-CR

DAVID CHARLES DAVIDSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 102nd District Court

Red River County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR01451

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Opinion by Justice Carter
2

O P I N I O N

After having pled guilty to possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine, David 

Charles Davidson was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for two years in 

January 2010.1 In November 2010, Davidson’s guilt was adjudicated and he was sentenced to 

two years’ incarceration, probated for a period of five years. After Davidson refused to submit to 

drug testing and a firearm was discovered at his residence, Davidson’s community supervision

was revoked, and he was sentenced to two years’ incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

I. Background—the Revocation Hearing

The State moved to revoke Davidson’s community supervision, based on the allegations 

that (1) Davidson violated the terms of his community supervision by committing the offense of 

felon in possession of a firearm on June 8, 2012, and (2) Davidson refused to submit to a drug 

screen on June 8, 2012. Davidson pled “not true” to each allegation. 

Testimony at the revocation hearing revealed that on June 7, 2012, an armed robbery 

occurred in Bogata, Texas, and the investigation of that robbery pointed to Davidson as a 

suspect. Accordingly, Bogata Police Chief David Short planned to speak with Davidson on the 

morning of June 8. When Short was unable to locate Davidson, he contacted Staci Moore, 

 1

The State filed its first motion to proceed with adjudication in September 2010. Davidson pled “true” to the 

allegations in the motion, and a judgment adjudicating guilt was entered in November 2010. 
3

Davidson’s community supervision supervisor,2 to assist in locating Davidson. Moore was able 

to provide Short with an address for Davidson. 

 When Short arrived at Davidson’s residence—a travel trailer located near his father’s home—

he noticed the main door was open, but the screen door appeared to be closed. Short approached 

the screen door, heard a radio playing, and noticed the windows were open. When Short 

knocked on the screen door, the door rolled open, affording Short a view of the inside of the 

trailer. It was apparent Davidson was not home. Even though Short did not enter the trailer, he 

saw a rifle in plain view inside, to the left of the door.3 

Short obtained an evidentiary search warrant for Davidson’s residence pursuant to 

Article 18.02(10) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

18.02(10) (West 2005).4

 At some point during the day, the rifle was allegedly removed from the 

camper trailer. After having returned to the Davidson property with the search warrant, Short 

discovered the rifle—previously located in the trailer—a few feet away underneath a storage 

unit. Davidson was never arrested for the armed robbery. 

 2

Moore is employed by the community supervision department of Red River County and was Davidson’s 

supervisor. Davidson was serving his five-year probationary term for possession of methamphetamine at the time of 

the robbery. 

3

Because a handgun was allegedly used in the robbery, Short was not concerned that the rifle was evidence of 

Davidson’s involvement in the robbery. Short was advised by a potential witness that Davidson was seen earlier 

that morning on a bicycle headed “that direction” in dark clothing, right after the robbery. Short was able to see 

dark clothing of some sort through a window in Davidson’s trailer.

4

Article 18.02(10) provides that a “search warrant may be issued to search for and seize” “property or items, except 

the personal writings by the accused, constituting evidence of an offense or constituting evidence tending to show 

that a particular person committed an offense.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02(10). Short testified that he 

was looking for dark coveralls, a blue bicycle, a pair of brown cotton gloves, a dark mask designed to cover the face, 

a black semiautomatic pistol, and a white zipper bag. 
4

When Moore was advised that Davidson was a robbery suspect, she decided to make a 

home visit on June 8.5

 Davidson was home when Moore arrived at his residence, but indicated 

that he was unable to comply with Moore’s request for a drug screen. After Moore completed 

the home visit, Davidson was arrested for the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

Davidson’s arrest was unrelated to the robbery. 

Later that afternoon, Moore received a telephone call from the Bogata Police Department 

advising that they were transporting Davidson to the police department. Moore met Davidson at 

the police department and again requested a drug screen. Davidson refused. Moore then advised 

Davidson that failure to submit to a drug screen was a violation of the terms of his community 

supervision and that such refusal is considered a positive urinalysis. Davidson indicated he 

understood and signed a form refusing to submit to a urinalysis.6

At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the trial court found that Davidson violated 

the terms of his community supervision by committing the offense of felon in possession of a 

firearm on June 8, 2012, in Red River County, Texas. Additionally, the trial court found that 

Davidson violated the terms of his community supervision by failing to abstain from the 

possession or use of any controlled substance, narcotic, dangerous drugs, inhalants or 

prescription drug without first obtaining a prescription from a licensed physician when Davidson 

refused to provide a urine sample on June 8, 2012.7 

 5

Davidson lives three to four miles outside of Bogata. 

6

The drug-screen request form, marked “Refused to Submit,” is signed by Davidson and dated June 8, 2012. 

7

One of the conditions of community supervision was that Davidson must “submit [a] urine, blood, or saliva sample 

to the Community Supervision Officer in charge of [his] case at anytime requested . . . .” 
5

II. Davidson Failed to Preserve Issue of Magistrate’s Authority to Issue Warrant

By his appeal, Davidson contends (1) the State did not prove that the municipal judge 

issuing the search warrant was a judge of a municipal court of record as required by 

Article 18.01(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and (2) even assuming the magistrate 

was authorized to issue the warrant, he was not authorized to issue a warrant to be executed 

outside the boundaries of the municipality.8

 Based on the alleged impropriety of the search 

warrant, Davidson contends the evidence discovered as a result of the improper warrant—a 

firearm located on his property and evidence of his refusal to submit to a drug screen—cannot 

support revocation. We disagree. 

At the outset, we examine the issue of error preservation. At the revocation hearing, 

Davidson complained that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, but did not 

complain that the magistrate lacked authority to issue the warrant.9 Davidson further complained 

that the evidence—the rifle and evidence of refusal to submit to a drug screen—was obtained by 

trespassing on Davidson’s property, and, thus, Davidson’s Fourth Amendment rights were 

violated. This complaint was not advanced on appeal.

To preserve error for appellate review, the complaining party must make a timely 

objection specifying the grounds for the objection if the grounds are not apparent from the 

context. Further, the objection must be made at the earliest possible opportunity, and the 

 8

The issue of whether the magistrate was authorized to issue a warrant outside of the municipality of Bogata is 

addressed in a later section of this opinion.

9

The trial court questioned the validity of the search warrant because it was not signed by a state judge. The State 

countered that a magistrate “in a county like Red River . . .” could validly sign the warrant. Davidson’s objection 

was that the magistrate was not authorized to issue a warrant outside of the municipal limits. 
6

complaining party must obtain an adverse ruling from the trial court. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a)(1); Rogers v. State, 291 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref’d). 

An objection based on one legal theory may not be used to support a different legal theory on 

appeal. Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Moreover, Davidson 

failed to file a motion in connection with the revocation proceeding to suppress the evidence he 

claims was obtained as a result of the allegedly invalid search warrant. Davidson’s claim that the 

magistrate lacked general authority to issue the search warrant was not preserved for review.

Even assuming error preservation, Davidson failed to prove that the magistrate was 

unauthorized to issue the warrant. The warrant in question was signed by Mark Whitehouse, 

Municipal Judge of Bogata, acting as Red River County Magistrate. Davidson contends that 

because Whitehouse was a municipal judge, he had no authority to issue the warrant. Article 

18.01(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth the applicable Code provision upon 

which Davidson bases his argument and states, in pertinent part:

Except as provided by Subsections (d), (i), and (j), only a judge of a municipal 

court of record or a county court who is an attorney licensed by the State of 

Texas, a statutory county court judge, a district court judge, a judge of the Court 

of Criminal Appeals, including the presiding judge, a justice of the Supreme 

Court of Texas, including the chief justice, or a magistrate with jurisdiction over 

criminal cases serving a district court may issue warrants under Article 18.02(10).

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(c) (West Supp. 2012). Davidson complains that even 

though a municipal judge is a magistrate,10 only a judge of a municipal court of record may issue 

 10See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.09 (West Supp. 2012).
7

a warrant under Article 18.02(10).11 Article 18.01(i) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 

provides an exception to the requirement that a warrant issue from a municipal court of record:

(i) In a county that does not have a judge of a municipal court of record who is an 

attorney licensed by the state, a county court judge who is an attorney licensed by 

the state, or a statutory county court judge, any magistrate may issue a search 

warrant under Subdivision (10) or Subdivision (12) of Article 18.02 of this code. 

This subsection is not applicable to a subsequent search warrant under 

Subdivision (10) of Article 18.02 of this code.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(i) (West Supp. 2012). Davidson claims this exception 

does not apply because the record is devoid of evidence showing Red River County is a county 

covered by this exception, and determining whether the exception applies would require 

evidence regarding matters outside the record. In Proctor v. State, 356 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d), the court rejected a similar argument, where the appellant 

acknowledged the existence of the exception but asserted, “There is nothing within the record 

which shows the applicability of the exception.” Id. at 686. The court recognized that

[t]he burden of proof in a hearing on a defendant’s motion to suppress is initially 

upon the defendant. Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 

When no objection is made, a presumption exists that the judge acted properly in 

the regular discharge of his duties. Zarychta v. State, 44 S.W.3d 155, 165 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). Because Proctor offered no 

evidence during the hearing to show that the county court judge who issued the 

warrant was without authority to do so, he did not overcome the presumption that 

the judge acted within his authority to issue the warrant. Id. Proctor’s contention 

regarding the county court judge’s authority to issue the warrant is overruled.

Id. at 686–87. The same rationale applies here. That is, Davidson offered no evidence to show 

that the municipal judge who issued the warrant was without authority to do so. Davidson,

 11Various other judges, not at issue here, are authorized to issue warrants pursuant to Article 18.01(c). 
8

therefore, failed to overcome the presumption that the judge acted within his authority to issue 

the warrant. 

III. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Judgment

We review the trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision for an abuse of 

discretion. Meyer v. State, 366 S.W.3d 728, 729 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.). When 

the revocation order is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court does not 

abuse its discretion. Id. at 729–30 (citing Lively v. State, 338 S.W.3d 140, 143 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2011, no pet.). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

ruling. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). If a single ground for 

revocation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence and is otherwise valid, then an abuse 

of discretion is not shown. Lively, 338 S.W.3d at 143. We must respect the trial court’s role in 

evaluating witness credibility, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and in drawing reasonable 

inferences from the evidence. We must assume the trial court resolved evidentiary issues in a 

way that supports the judgment. Meyer, 366 S.W.3d at 730.

A. Felon in Possession of a Firearm

Davidson does not contest that the firearm observed inside his camper trailer was in his 

possession during the time he was on community supervision.

12 Likewise, he does not contest 

the fact that he refused to submit to a drug screen. Instead, Davidson complains that evidence of 

these violations resulted from a faulty search warrant and that the violations, therefore, do not 

 12A person who has been convicted of a felony offense commits an offense if the person possesses a firearm at any 

location until five years after the person has been released from community supervision, parole, or mandatory 

supervision. After the five-year period has expired, such person may possess a firearm at the premises where the 

person lives. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a)(1)–(2) (West 2011). This offense occurred while Davidson was on 

community supervision. 
9

support revocation. We disagree with the premise on which Davidson bases his argument—that 

the firearm and evidence of his refusal to submit to a drug screen were obtained in connection 

with the execution of the search warrant. In fact, Short lawfully observed the firearm in the 

trailer before the search warrant was requested or executed. 

Nothing prevents a police officer from addressing questions to citizens on the street.

Likewise, nothing prevents a police officer from approaching and knocking upon the front door 

of a home. Cornealius v. State, 900 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Rodriguez 

v. State, 653 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)). This is so because a police officer has 

the same right as any other person to enter onto residential property and walk up to the front 

door. Id. at 733–34 (citing Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 897 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), 

overruled on other grounds, Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).

Short went to Davidson’s residence to speak with Davidson about an armed robbery 

which occurred on the previous evening. When Short arrived, he approached the front door of 

Davidson’s residence, a travel trailer. Short was within his rights to peaceably approach 

Davidson’s door. See id.; see also Buchanan v. State, 129 S.W.3d 767, 772 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2004, pet. ref’d) (“[P]olice have the same right as any other person to enter onto 

residential property and walk up to the front door[.]”).

In the present case, the trailer had a screen door and a “regular hard door.” When Short 

approached the trailer, he noticed that the front door was open, but the screen door appeared to 

be in the closed position. Short also was within his rights to knock on the screen door. See 

Cornealius, 900 S.W.2d at 733; see also Duhig v. State, 171 S.W.3d 631, 635 (Tex. App.—
10

Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (absent express orders from person in possession of 

property not to trespass, anyone, including law enforcement officer, may approach front door of 

residence and knock). When Short knocked on the screen door of Davidson’s trailer, the door 

rolled open, affording Short a view of the inside of the trailer, where he observed a rifle in plain 

view to the left of the front door. The trial court made a finding of fact that Short knocked on the 

door of Davidson’s trailer, which was open except for the screen door, and observed a .22 caliber 

rifle inside the camper. Further, Davidson did not answer the knock. We give deference to this 

factual finding. 

While rightfully at Davidson’s front door, Short was free to observe evidence in “plain 

view.” Duhig, 171 S.W.3d at 636 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his 

own home, is not a search subject to Fourth Amendment protection[.]”). Nothing in the record 

suggests that Short intentionally opened the screen door to Davidson’s trailer. When Short 

knocked and the door rolled open, observation of the rifle inside the trailer was not a search. See 

id. at 636–37. The trial court, therefore, correctly concluded that Short did not violate 

Davidson’s Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure and that Short could 

see the rifle in “plain view” when he knocked on Davidson’s screen door.13 

Moreover, discovery of the rifle inside Davidson’s trailer did not result from execution of 

the search warrant issued by Magistrate Whitehouse.14 Only after leaving Davidson’s residence 

 13Officer David Jernigan testified that he assisted Short in the investigation and saw a rifle inside Davidson’s travel 

trailer. Jernigan further testified that Deputy Quinton Wallace of the Red River County Sheriff’s Office observed 

the rifle inside Davidson’s trailer. 

14Short also observed what he believed to be evidence of the robbery inside Davidson’s trailer—dark coveralls or 

dark clothing of the type the robber was allegedly wearing on the preceding evening.
11

did Short seek to obtain a search warrant. The warrant itself makes no mention of a rifle, as a 

rifle was not reported to have been used in the robbery.15 Because Short observed the rifle in 

plain view, such observation was not a search. The testimony of Short and Jernigan established, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, that a rifle was located in Davidson’s travel trailer at a time 

he was actively serving community supervision. Jernigan further testified that when Davidson 

arrived at his residence, prior to the execution of the search warrant, Davidson admitted to the 

presence of a firearm in the camper trailer. Officer Jacob Stinson placed Davidson under arrest 

for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that Davidson violated the terms 

and conditions of community supervision by possessing a firearm as set out in 

Section 46.04(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a)(1). This 

conclusion is independent of any issue regarding the validity of the search warrant.16

 

15The search warrant authorized seizure of a pair of dark coveralls, a blue bicycle with a light equipped to the front 

handlebars, a pair of brown cotton gloves, a dark mask designed to cover the face, a black semi-automatic pistol, a 

white zipper bag commonly used for carrying money (referred to as a bank bag), and any illegal contraband found 

within the scope of the search. Short testified that because a handgun was allegedly used in the robbery, he was not 

interested in the rifle when he discovered it inside the trailer. Neither the affidavit in support of the search warrant 

nor the search warrant mentioned the rifle. The fact that a rifle (which, according to Short, was the same rifle that he 

observed inside the trailer) was recovered from underneath a shed next to the trailer when officers executed the 

warrant has no bearing on the fact that Short and Jernigan testified that a rifle was located inside the trailer earlier in 

the day.

16Davidson also complains that the warrant was invalid because it exceeded the scope of the Magistrate’s 

jurisdiction. While this issue is not germane to the trial court’s findings that Davidson violated the terms and 

conditions of his community supervision by possessing a firearm and in refusing to submit to a drug screen, it is 

nevertheless incorrect. Davidson claims that the warrant is invalid because it ordered a search outside the city limits 

of Bogata and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Bogata municipal court. Judges of city courts of 

incorporated cities and towns are magistrates. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.09. No issue concerning the 

status of the City of Bogata has been presented. The evidence shows the city employs a city judge and a chief of 

police. It is located in Red River County. The jurisdiction of a magistrate is coextensive with the limits of the

county in which it sits. See Gilbert v. State, 493 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. Crim. App.1973). A justice of the peace is 
12

B. Refusal to Submit to Drug Screen

Davidson claims—as previously discussed—that the search warrant was improper. He 

further contends that the revocation was based on the allegation that he violated the conditions of 

his community supervision by possessing a firearm seized by law enforcement officers when 

they searched his property and that he refused a drug test after having been arrested for felon in 

possession of a firearm. He further reasons that had he not been jailed for this offense, he would 

not have been in a position to refuse Moore’s request for a drug screen. Thus, he claims, 

evidence of this refusal will not support revocation. For the reasons previously discussed, the 

record does not support the conclusion that the search warrant was invalid. 

Aside from this issue, Moore testified that Davidson was required to submit to a drug 

screen upon request. After his arrest, Davidson refused to comply with Moore’s request for a 

drug screen. Thereafter, Davidson was advised that the failure to submit was a violation of the 

terms of his community supervision, and such refusal is considered a positive urinalysis. 

Davidson indicated that he understood and signed a form refusing to submit to a urinalysis. The 

trial court acted within its discretion in finding that Davidson violated the terms and conditions 

of community supervision in refusing to submit to a drug screen. 

 a magistrate, just as a municipal judge is a magistrate. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.09. “[T]he jurisdiction 

of a justice of the peace, when acting as a magistrate, is coextensive with the limits of his county.”); see also Ex 

parte Clear, 573 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (orig. proceeding); Bitner v. State, 135 S.W.3d 906, 907 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). In light of this precedent, the jurisdiction of the municipal judge of the 

City of Bogata, when he acted as a magistrate in issuing a search warrant, was “coextensive with the limits of his 

county.” Gilbert, 493 S.W.2d at 784; Klepper v. State, No. 05-02-01283-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 9570, at *7 

(Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 12, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (judges of incorporated 

cites are magistrates and have jurisdiction coextensive with limits of county in which city sits). 
13

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jack Carter

Justice

Date Submitted: January 10, 2013

Date Decided: February 8, 2013

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