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S. HRG. 111–822 

U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COUNTER 

VIOLENT EXTREMISM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 10, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM

MARCH 10, 2010

Page 

Reid, Garry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 

and Combating Terrorism ................................................................................... 2 

Benjamin, Ambassador Daniel, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department 

of State .................................................................................................................. 9 

Kearney, LTG Francis H., III, USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command .................................................................................................. 15 

Atran, Scott, Professor of Anthropology and Psychology, University of Michigan and John Jay College of Criminal Justice .................................................. 33 

Stone, Douglas, President and Chairman, Transportation Networks International ................................................................................................................. 42 

Forest, James J.F., Director of Terrorism Studies and Associate Professor 

of Political Science, U.S. Military Academy ....................................................... 53 

(III) 

(1) 

U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COUNTER 

VIOLENT EXTREMISM 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2010 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:58 a.m. in room 

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill Nelson (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Reed, 

Graham, and LeMieux. 

Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations 

and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, 

counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker, professional 

staff member; and Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard and Christine G. Lang. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; 

Greta Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Patrick Hayes, 

assistant to Senator Bayh; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator 

Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux, and Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator 

Burr. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good morning. Thank you all for coming. 

We’re going to hear from two panels. Appearing on the first 

panel are Garry Reid, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Combating Terrorism; Ambassador Dan 

Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of 

State (DOS); and Lieutenant General Frank Kearney, Deputy Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. 

We want to welcome you all. 

The topic today is timely because it has been 9 years since September 11, 2001, and the United States has been engaged in this 

fight with al Qaeda, and now associated groups, particularly in the 

Afghan/Pakistan region, as well as Iraq. Of course, al Qaeda is meVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tastasizing and now we find it over parts of Africa, on the Arabian 

Peninsula, et cetera. 

We also had the Christmas Day attempted bombing. It reminds 

us that they still have the capability of launching attacks, and they 

can launch them from many different places in the world. 

This threat of violent extremism is complex, and it has the ability to destabilize countries, create economic crisis, and, of course, 

cause violence. What we want to do is better understand the extent 

of the threat posed by this loose network of groups that comprise 

all of these terrorist groups and affiliates. 

In light of this threat, we are understanding that we can’t rely 

on overwhelming military power; we need a comprehensive strategy that works and a strategy that will counter this violent extremism that is now coming out in various forms. We have to employ 

the full spectrum of instruments of national power: military, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, informational, and a lot of other 

things, like helping poverty, digging wells, growing crops, getting 

kids educated, and bring that all into a cohesive vision for action. 

I want to welcome our panelists. We’re going to insert your written statements. They will be part of the official record. What I’d 

like to do is this—let’s have a conversation. 

We’ll just go right down the line, with you, Mr. Reid, first. Share 

your thoughts with us for about 5 minutes. We’ll next go to the 

Ambassador, then to the General, and then we want to get into a 

discussion with some questions. 

Mr. Reid. 

STATEMENT OF GARRY REID, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMBATING 

TERRORISM 

Mr. REID. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I do appreciate the opportunity to be here and share your views on the importance and the urgency of this particular issue. I appreciate you entering my statement into the record. I would just like to take a couple of minutes to hit three key points that are in that statement. 

The first is, right upfront, that, as you said, Mr. Chairman, the 

urgency and the importance of this topic, and to emphasize that 

countering extremism is the pathway to long-term success out of 

this period of current active conflict that we’re in, and have been 

in, as you said, Mr. Chairman, for many years. 

Counterterrorism activities, for good reasons, get a lot of attention, but the counterideology efforts are the more strategic and the 

more important, and they are in some ways more complex. We 

share your views on that. 

We recognize and the Secretary recognizes, and he’s said that we 

cannot capture/kill our way to victory. But, even within that, the 

manner in which we go about our counterterrorism activities, more 

and more we are learning and adapting that even within those approaches, so we can support and reinforce our counterideology and 

counterextremist objectives, as well. 

Collaboration across the government is crucial. We know that. I 

think we’re doing a pretty good job of that, but I know we have 

more to do in that area. We’re also getting strong convergence with 

allies. I think the greatest recent example of that is the acceptance 

3 

from our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies of the 

new strategy in Afghanistan/Pakistan, and the things that are coming together there; and also the appointment of a NATO senior civilian. All of these types of things that are coming out of Afghanistan are very symbolic of some of our learning and our adaptation, 

on our side, to this problem. 

At the same time, the enemy is significant, agile, and adaptive. 

I would say the enemy has maximized the use of global technology 

and global information tools to great advantage. The radicalization 

process has been accelerated. You talked about the Christmas 

bombing. Our understanding of that was about a 6-week process 

from contact to training to recruitment to dispatch to execution. 

September 11, from when bin Laden approved it, was about 21⁄2

years in the making. It was a more complex operation, but I think 

the point of that is, they have really improved their ability to 

radicalize people and bring them into the fight, which, of course, 

severely hampers our ability to disrupt and get ourselves involved 

in the process. 

They have a captive audience. A lot has been said about media 

exploitation, their use of the Internet and chat rooms to spread virulent messages and false information. They have an advantage 

there; they can spread lies and untruths, and we obviously operate 

in a different environment. 

My third point is just that, for the Department of Defense (DOD), 

the implications vary by the environment and by the area where 

we are operating. In Iraq and Afghanistan, in the sort of theaterof-war context, we have a wider range of activities that range from 

the tactical to operational to strategic, tightly nested with the diplomatic and DOS objectives, although down on the tactical end, obviously, there’s a little more scope and scale of activities that we 

do along with the full range of information operations—supporting 

the host nation, supporting their media needs and objectives, and 

supporting the U.S. Ambassador in our national strategic objectives. 

The key, here, in these areas is that we reinforce and establish 

the role, the sufficiency, and the capability of the partner nation’s 

security force. The DOD role is always going to be heavily on the 

creating security-space side, whether that’s creating a security 

force’s capability or creating space on our own, to allow these 

counterideology initiatives and efforts to take root and lead to governance, development, and all the long-term factors. 

In the rest of the world, we have a different role, largely in support of our DOS colleagues, largely in support of the U.S. Ambassador in these countries outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. We have 

a well-developed, embedded information support team capability 

there. This manifests itself, as you’ve seen, Mr. Chairman, in different task forces and counterterrorism initiatives in the different 

theaters. Of course, we still have work to improve the capabilities 

of the host nation and to get them more and more in the lead. 

I think there are many examples of success within each of these 

areas. I included some of those in my statement. 

For us, going forward, we know within DOD that we need to continue along the path the Secretary has put us on, in terms of rebalancing our capabilities to address some of these areas that have 

4 

been enabling or supporting capabilities, but really to take a front 

seat in our ability to field and support these activities. We want to 

build our expertise. We’re spending a lot of time on building regional expertise, the things that General McChrystal’s been coming 

out with, about understanding the environment and understanding 

the culture. We’re bringing those in and building those into our 

force development, our premission training, and all of these sorts 

of things, which, for us, feed right into how we relate to the population. This is a primary step for us. We have, probably, more surface contact than anybody, and we certainly have a lot of young 

troops out there, and they have a vital role in this. They have to 

understand the environment, understand the people, and we’re 

placing emphasis on that. 

Within the government, we continue, at the national level, the 

Washington level, to refine the strategies, do the best we can to define the lanes in the road. I don’t think there’s confusion on the 

lanes in the road, but, understandably, this is all a relatively new 

endeavor in the grand scheme of things, and we continue to learn 

as we go. We’ll continue to do that and continue to collaborate. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions and, again, 

thank you for inviting me here today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reid follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GARRY REID

Chairman Nelson, Senator LeMieux, and members of the committee, thank you 

for inviting me to this important hearing. 

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM DEFINED

I am pleased to be here today to express the Department of Defense (DOD) view 

on the U.S. Government’s strategy and efforts to counter violent extremism and 

radicalization, and to describe in part the U.S. military’s role in these efforts in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the world. 

Countering Violent Extremism is described in our national strategy and policy as 

the collective efforts of the United States and its partners to diligently undermine 

the spread of violent extremism and impede the radicalization process around the 

world in an effort to deny terrorists the next generation of recruits. The administration has emphasized the importance of engaging Muslim communities comprehensively even as we focus on countering violent extremism. The challenge we face is 

that the radicalization process has been developed, refined, and some might say 

mastered, by al Qaeda and its allies. 

While poverty, repressive regimes and lack of opportunity play a role for some 

people in the appeal of violent extremist groups, we must not lose sight of the role 

of ideology in attracting new recruits—and we must find appropriate ways to 

counter the ideology that drives violent extremism. 

Enabled by 21st century technology, extremists have optimized the use of Internet 

chat rooms, Web sites, and email chains to spread their virulent messages and 

reach a global audience of potential recruits. What was once a lengthy process of 

establishing contact, exchanging ideas, arranging meetings, providing training, and 

developing attack plans can now be condensed into a much shorter timeline, across 

multiple international boundaries, and beyond the reach of any single law enforcement agency or military task force. It is this highly evolved radicalization process 

that enabled al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to make contact with a wealthy Nigerian student living in London, recruit, train, and equip him in the remote tribal 

regions of Yemen, position him in the Netherlands, and ultimately dispatch him on 

a suicide mission to the United States, all within a period of weeks. By contrast, 

the September 11 operation took about 21⁄2 years to develop from the time Osama 

bin Laden approved it in April 1999. The condensed timeline of the December 25 

attempted terrorist attack over the United States underscores the critical need to 

get in front of the radicalization cycle sooner, and more effectively, than ever before. 

5 

NATIONAL EFFORTS

As the President said in Cairo, violent extremism is the first issue we must confront if we are to resolve sources of tension that fuel the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas. The administration has emphasized that the primary goal of 

countering violent extremism is precise: to prevent extremists from becoming ‘‘violent extremists.’’ Framing our overall interaction with the rest of the world, especially with Muslim communities, through the lens of counterterrorism or countering 

violent extremism can be counter-productive. This is why the United States is committed to engaging Muslim communities broadly—based on mutual respect and the 

pursuit of mutual interests, as the President said in Cairo—and not just around 

counterterrorism. There is no doubt that this broader engagement also helps further 

marginalize violent extremists by contrasting our positive vision with al Qaeda’s 

commitment to murder, violence, and destruction. 

For those involved in the counter-radicalization process, the phrase ‘‘actions speak 

louder than words’’ has new meaning in that it takes both the right words, and the 

right actions, to achieve our desired effects. Actions and words are interdependent: 

what we say must be supported by corresponding actions, and our actions must be 

highlighted and accurately characterized through our words. Some refer to this as 

avoiding the word-deed gap, or as ‘‘the battle of the narrative.’’ The Obama administration understands that getting the right message out is equally important as 

doing good deeds, and has strengthened the global outreach capabilities of the U.S. 

Government in several important areas. 

The implications for DOD have been significant. In June 2009, to facilitate effective strategic communication and ensure that efforts to counter violent extremism 

are appropriately addressed across the Department, the Undersecretary of Defense 

for Policy created the Global Engagement Strategy Coordination Committee. One 

core function of this group is to ensure that countering violent extremism is adequately addressed in long term planning and strategy documents, doctrine, and 

other DOD directives and instructions. In fostering interagency coordination, members represent the Department at the National Security Staff’s Strategic Communications Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), the Global Engagement IPC, and the 

Counterterrorism Security Group. Also, the Department participates in the countering violent extremism Interagency Coordination Group and Senior Interagency 

Support Team, chaired by the National Counterterrorism Center. 

In terms of interagency coordination, DOD’s relationship with the Department of 

State is particularly strong. The Secretary of Defense has made a commitment to 

work closely with our Department of State colleagues to ensure that the Department 

provides them all of the requisite support possible in Washington and in the field. 

In numerous key locations, the Department provides the U.S. Ambassador with a 

tailored military information support team that works through and with the host 

nation to promote effective strategic communications to counter violent extremism. 

Here in Washington, we are in regular dialogue with the office of the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and with the Ambassador At 

Large for Counterterrorism, as well as with regional bureaus on challenges specific 

to their area of responsibility. 

THE DEFENSE VIEW

The Defense Department understands, perhaps better than anyone, the limitations of military firepower in the complex global security environment. As Secretary 

Gates has said many times, we cannot capture or kill our way to victory in war 

against al Qaeda and its affiliates. Although we will continue to take immediate, 

necessary actions to protect the United States from terrorist attacks, our long-term 

focus is on working through and with partner nations to build their security capabilities, reverse the momentum of insurgents and extremist groups, create conditions that promote development opportunities, and disrupt the forces of violent 

radicalization that provide terrorists and extremists with new recruits. 

At the same time, we will continue efforts within DOD to balance capabilities essential to success in a counterinsurgency environment. These include expanding our 

language training programs, developing regional expertise, improving partnering 

skills, adding more Civil Affairs units, and recognizing the importance of knowing 

the ‘‘human terrain’’ as well as we know the physical terrain. Strengthening our capabilities in each of these areas enriches the contacts and relationships our forces 

have with local populations. 

Although our efforts to counter violent extremism are tailored to each specific region, they all rely on the concurrent execution of counterterrorism operations, 

partnered counterinsurgency, training and equipping local security forces, increased 

6 

intelligence collection, and tailored civic action programs linked and nested with 

those of our interagency colleagues and international assistance organizations. 

Finally, in these efforts to persuade and influence, DOD is a supporting agency. 

We take guidance and focus from the Department of State, and work in close collaboration with the country team. Our campaigns and products are reviewed and 

approved by the U.S. Ambassador. What DOD does and how our efforts are framed 

in conflict zones is necessarily different from our efforts elsewhere. 

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN

In President Obama’s December 1, 2009 address to the Nation, he announced the 

strategy the administration will pursue to bring the war in Afghanistan to a successful conclusion. He described the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region as an ‘‘epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda’’ which poses a serious threat to 

the United States, and endangers the people and governments of both Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. Accordingly, our engagement strategy views them as one theater of 

operations, in which our actions must be synchronized and coordinated on both sides 

of the border. 

In Afghanistan, the most significant military-related recent development in the 

realm of countering violent extremism is the emphasis we are now placing on providing security for the population. As Secretary Gates has said, ‘‘Defeating al Qaeda 

and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be 

untethered from one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.’’ Our 

new approach in Afghanistan has several key supporting elements. First and foremost, our revised close air support procedures have signaled to Afghans that we 

care deeply about civilian casualties. This carefully considered modification, and just 

as importantly, the manner in which our forces announced the change in policy, has 

had a tremendously positive effect on gaining popular support for the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It has undercut 

the enemy’s powerful propaganda enterprise, and sparked a wave of counter-extremism in areas only recently under strong Taliban control. We have also made significant changes to our driving policy, to be more careful of Afghan civilians on the 

roads. We also implemented an overarching Tactical Directive which provides guidance and intent for the employment of force in support of ISAF operations. It is designed to gain and maintain the support of the people, restricts the use of night 

raids, and establishes guidance on entry into Afghan medical facilities to respect 

and protect innocent civilians. 

The Tactical Directive has rebaselined our methodology for engaging with Afghan 

National Security forces in what is best described as ‘‘partnered counterinsurgency.’’ 

This equates to a significant rise in combined military operations in which the Afghan forces are increasingly put in the lead, going door to door in villages, reassuring civilians, and rousting insurgents from their sanctuaries. The ongoing operation in Marjeh, in Central Helmand province, illustrates the value of partnered operations in countering violent extremism. Strategic messaging in the weeks before 

tactical operations began informed Afghans of the impending assault, and set favorable conditions for the advance of Afghan and coalition forces into the populated 

areas. Strong involvement by Afghan officials in decisionmaking leading up to the 

operation strengthened the legitimacy of the Karzai Government, and despite an 

early misstep by U.S. forces that led to a rocket strike that caused civilian casualties, popular support has been maintained. 

Clearing areas from enemy control is only the first step in countering extremism 

in Afghanistan, and clearing alone will not set the necessary conditions for longterm stability. Therefore, it is essential to follow quickly with the personnel and resources that support holding a cleared area, and facilitate introduction of public and 

private ventures that promote economic and social development programs. The ‘‘hold 

phase’’ is crucially important. The host nation must provide security, and essential 

goods and services, to the ‘‘at risk’’ population. By so doing the government demonstrates that it is a viable alternative to extremist control, strengthens its own legitimacy, and debunks the enemy’s narrative. The Defense Department supports 

these efforts by deploying Civil Affairs capabilities, fielding medical and dental assistance teams, conducting information support operations, and by manning and 

leading Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 

In Pakistan, where our access is significantly limited, we provide equipment, 

training, and assistance to Pakistan security forces to help improve their capabilities to defeat al-Qaida and its extremist allies in their country. Our Office of the 

Defense Representative for Pakistan serves as the central hub for DOD engagements with Pakistan, and synchronizes the delivery of assistance, training, and 

other supporting activities. Expanded engagements with Pakistani security forces, 

7 

facilitated by fusion centers and border crossing centers, have fostered new relationships among tactical units that portend a future of improved trust and cooperation 

between the armed forces of the U.S. and Pakistan. Using resources and authorities, 

which have been granted through DOD’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, and 

which will now migrate to State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, 

DOD will continue to work closely with the State Department and our Pakistani allies to identify the capabilities they need to counter violent extremism and provide 

them with the training and equipment needed to succeed. 

IRAQ

As extremist organizations in Iraq continue to be degraded and as we implement 

the responsible drawdown, our focus on countering violent extremism is increasingly 

more strategic. Iraqi forces are leading tactical operations, advised and assisted by 

U.S. forces who generally provide intelligence, command and control systems, 

forensics, and other enabling capabilities. As the transition in Iraq progresses, our 

support to Iraqi security forces and the U.S. Department of State will continue to 

shift towards public affairs and public diplomacy. 

OTHER AREAS OF INTEREST

Outside Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD is in a supporting role for U.S. and Coalition 

efforts to counter violent extremism. The level of effort and intensity of these activities varies by region, and the pace of operations is generally set by Department of 

State, working through the host nation government. 

In Saharan Africa, we support the Department of State’s Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership, which is a multi-year U.S. interagency program 

aimed at defeating terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States. 

In the Horn of Africa, our long term strategy is led by Combined Joint Task 

Force-Horn of Africa, which employs an ‘‘indirect approach’’ to counter violent extremism, conducting operations to strengthen partner nation security capacity to enable long-term regional stability, prevent conflict and protect U.S. and coalition interests. Across the continent, U.S. Africa Command collaborates closely with the Department of State to ensure that countering violent extremism activities are coordinated and deconflicted based upon the objectives and security situation in each 

country. 

In the Arabian Peninsula, DOD cooperates closely with Yemeni security forces to 

increase their capabilities to prevent cross border arms trafficking and regional foreign-fighter flows, develop competent counterterrorism forces, and mitigate the 

threat of improvised explosive devices. We anticipate continuing a high level of commitment to developing Yemen’s military and counterterrorism capacity in the future. In addition to counterterrorism cooperation, the Department will continue security assistance and training exercises to expand the capacity of the Yemeni Coast 

Guard and Navy to counter regional maritime security challenges, including smuggling, trafficking-in-persons, and piracy. Through a broad array of bilateral and 

multilateral initiatives, the Department supports U.S. Government efforts to address Yemen’s political, economic, and humanitarian concerns. 

In South Asia, our efforts are anchored by the Joint Special Operations Task 

Force-Philippines (JSOTF–P) and are supported by other training and assistance 

engagements throughout Southeast Asia. The mission of JSOTF–P is to support the 

comprehensive approach of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their fight 

against terrorism in the southern Philippines. At the request of the Government of 

the Philippines, JSOTF–P works alongside the AFP to defeat terrorists and create 

the conditions necessary for peace, stability and prosperity. 

In each of these endeavors our approach is to improve the capabilities of our partners—not just of their kinetic forces, but also their general ability to provide security. When the host nation can counter the threats to its security posed by violent 

extremists, and increase its legitimacy in the eyes of its population, we are on the 

road to successfully countering violent extremist messages of intolerance and hatred. 

SUMMARY

Effectively countering violent extremism requires a fully integrated national and 

international approach that addresses the problem in three dimensions: (1) the message, (2) the media, and (3) the messenger. Getting the right message requires indepth understanding of the people, the culture, and the social dynamics at the vilVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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lage, district, national, and regional levels. We clearly have more work to do in this 

area. The U.S. Government, including the military, lacks the depth of expertise to 

operate in the areas of the world where violent extremism poses the greatest threat. 

Although programs across the U.S. Government programs are underway to 

strengthen our knowledge of the most important issues, it will take continued longterm efforts to build the depth we need. Leveraging the various forms of media is 

equally important, and also requires both micro and macro understanding of the information landscape. 

On one end of the media scale, low-power portable transmitters, delivered to key 

leaders in remote villages, help reduce the ability of violent extremists to intimidate 

and mislead local civilians. On the other end of the spectrum, al Qaeda’s use of 

highly advanced Internet technology, including social network sites and mass messaging, is one of the reasons for our development of media sites that promote positive, truthful messages that provide an alternative narrative the narrative of the 

violent extremists. We recognize, however, that in many cases messages propagated 

and delivered by U.S. officials have limited impact on our intended audience. For 

this reason, it is essential that we involve our partners and allies as the primary 

messengers in their struggle. Ultimately, it is local officials that must shoulder the 

burden of governance, and provide their people with a credible message of vision, 

hope and pride. 

DOD contributions to countering violent extremism will vary by region, and will 

be driven by the political circumstances at hand. We recognize that our most effective work will be done in support of broader interagency initiatives, and be implemented through and with partners. To that end, we continue to build our capabilities that improve the quality of our interactions, promote mutual understanding, 

and inculcate a counterinsurgency mindset across the force. We are continually looking for ways to be adaptive and progressive in our efforts to counter violent extremism. I thank you again for the opportunity to discuss countering violent extremism 

from the Department’s perspective, and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Reid. 

Mr. Ambassador, before I call on you, let me call on my colleague, Senator LeMieux. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE LEMIEUX 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

holding this important hearing. 

I want to add my welcome to that of the chairman for the folks 

who are here to testify today. 

This subcommittee has an important role to play, not only for anticipating emerging threats to our Nation’s security, but ensuring 

that our brave men and women in uniform are prepared to counter 

those threats. I add my thanks to you for the fight that you’re 

doing to make sure that we’re keeping our troops and the people 

in this country safe and free. I look forward to the discussion of the 

critical issues. 

Mr. Chairman, with that, I’ll submit the rest of my statement for 

the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator LeMieux follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR GEORGE LEMIEUX

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this important hearing. This subcommittee 

is important in its role—not only for anticipating emerging threats to our Nation’s 

security—but ensuring that our brave men and women in uniform are prepared to 

counter the threats—that don’t involve bullets or body armor. 

I add my welcome to the distinguished panel of witnesses before us today. I don’t 

think we, as a government, spend enough time discussing—what it means to 

counter violent extremism in the places where we aren’t fighting a war. It is a critical issue and I look forward to a lively discussion. I thank the witnesses for joining 

us and look forward to your testimony. 

Today, our troops face significant challenges before they ever step foot on the battlefield. I don’t think we can overstate the need to counter violent extremism before 

it becomes violent. It is imperative that we develop a cohesive and effective commuVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
9 

nication strategy for places like Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, but 

I think it’s equally important to engage partners and friends. Our enemies are recruiting vigorously among unlikely even resistant cultures to violent extremist ideology. However, many of these would-be recruits remain susceptible—ironically not 

because of their culture or religion—but because of simple necessity. 

Poverty and hopelessness can be powerful factors in someone’s decision to embrace violent extremism. Violent extremists know that hunger, instability, and the 

lack of an education are ideal conditions for recruiting legions of followers. 

In Africa, partners such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Kenya, and Ethiopia are working 

with us to prevent radical ideology from taking root in communities that have little 

or no history of violent extremist thought. However, people in Africa, Asia, South 

America, Europe, and even the United States, are not immune to the rhetoric or 

the false promises of violent extremism. The United States, its partners and allies 

cannot cede our message of hope, freedom, and security to terrorists. Just as we cannot lose the message war, we also cannot allow their financing to go unchallenged. 

I am deeply concerned about the way terrorist organizations—al Qaeda, 

Hezbollah, and Hamas—are funded. For years, we have known that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and its drug trafficking has financed its domestic 

and regional terrorist campaign, but now there is growing indications that they may 

also help finance other terrorist cells in Latin America—including Hezbollah and 

Hamas. I think it’s critical that we understand how drugs and money fund al Qaeda 

and its affiliates—whether its heroin out of Afghanistan to support the Taliban, or 

cocaine out of Venezuela to Guinea-Bissau to finance al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb in North Africa or terrorists financiers in Europe. Drug trafficking is always promotes or exacerbates other illicit activities: prostitution, human trafficking, 

and gang violence. So, it is vital that we also understand how it may be supporting 

terrorism. 

Again, I look forward to hearing from our panels of witnesses and thank the chair 

for his foresight and leadership in arranging today’s hearing. I look forward to the 

discussion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Mr. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DANIEL BENJAMIN, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Chairman Nelson, Senator LeMieux, 

thank you very much for the invitation to be here today. Thank 

you, in particular, for your interest in what we at the Department 

of State consider one of the premier issues of this period. You have 

my formal statement; let me just summarize some of the points. 

For years, while I was outside the government, I had been arguing strongly that we needed to be doing a better job on countering 

violent extremism (CVE), and had to make it a top priority. Now 

that I have the opportunity to work on these issues as coordinator, 

I have to say, I’m both challenged and more than a little humbled 

by the prospect of doing so. 

It is absolutely essential that we do what we can to undermine 

the al Qaeda narrative and prevent the radicalization of more individuals. We have done a great job at tactical counterterrorism, at 

taking people off of the street and keeping them from harming others, but curtailing the influence of militants and preventing further 

recruitment is obviously where the strategic imperative comes now. 

The primary goal of CVE is to stop those most at risk of 

radicalization from becoming terrorists. There are many different 

approaches for doing this, including social programs, counterideology initiatives, working with civil society to delegitimate the 

al Qaeda narrative, and, where possible, to provide possible alternatives. 

10 

In particular, when we’re talking about that part of the spectrum 

that is closest to violence, closest to being terrorists, we have to 

work from a lot of different angles, and we have to rely on a lot 

of programming where messaging itself may not do the job. So, 

that means that we have to work on capacity-building, on outreach 

to civil society, on education, as well as, of course, always having 

that messaging component. We have to work with host governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), we have to 

work with clerics and other influentials who can have a role in 

communities where we may not have the direct access that we 

have elsewhere. 

Clearly, this requires us, in the U.S. Government, to work across 

boundaries within our departments, and across the interagency, because there are a whole array of organizations that will be involved 

in implementing these programs. 

I consider this mission vital. One of the first things I did after 

being sworn in was to start developing a CVE team, something 

that did not exist in the Office of the Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism (S/CT) before. Last fall, my office convened a 1- 

day interagency summit to examine U.S. Government CVE efforts 

to consolidate lessons learned and to try to bring a little more clarity to the different lanes, as Mr. Reid has discussed. I think we’re 

making progress there. We had very high-level attendance, and we 

were quite happy with the outcome. 

I think we all agree, then and now, that we really do need to understand the dynamics of communities that are at risk. Different 

agencies in the Federal Government have done a very impressive 

job to deepen the government’s understanding, and there’s been a 

lot of research and analysis done, both in the Intelligence Community and in academia. 

Every community, whether long-rooted or part of a new diaspora, 

has a unique political, economic, and social landscape; for that reason, we know that one-size-fits-all programming will not work. 

It’s critically important that our embassies be on the frontline, 

that they be able to tailor programs to the needs of the communities that they’re addressing. Partly for this reason, I’ve spent half 

of this year and a lot of last year on the road, traveling in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Europe to talk about CVE programming. 

You mentioned important social factors. Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan has urged us to address what he calls 

the ‘‘upstream factors’’ and confront the political, social, and economic conditions that our enemies exploit to win over new recruits. 

I think it’s important to understand that we’re talking about two 

dimensions of the problem; on the one hand, those communities 

that are more at risk for radicalization, but we also, more broadly, 

need to beat back the al Qaeda narrative in the broader public because this is an ideology that has broad appeal in many societies, 

even if the large majorities in those societies are not going to engage in violence. So, we need to also have a level of engagement 

with these countries that is based on mutual respect and common 

interests, and it needs to be a very direct kind of communication 

with them, to undermine anyone’s legitimation of violence as a 

means for social change. 

11 

We’re working hard to develop a variety of different CVE programs. One that’s already in its second year is the Ambassador’s 

Fund for Counterterrorism. This typically brings locally targeted 

programs and marries them up with soft-power tools and 

counterterrorism assistance to CVE. We give up to $100,000 per 

grant to embassies for this kind of project. S/CT has requested $15 million in fiscal year 2011 for new CVE 

programming, and we intend to use those funds to focus on hot 

spots of radicalization and recruitment; again, working closely with 

embassies, the intelligence community, and others who can tell us 

about the dynamics of these at-risk populations. We work closely 

with the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public 

Affairs, with the DOS Representative to Muslim Communities, and 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 

Let me just say, we have an excellent relationship with DOD. 

We’re very grateful for Secretary Gates’ leadership in this area and 

his emphasis on fostering a strong partnership between DOD and 

DOS. This cooperation is paying off as we explore new ways to collaborate and innovate on CVE programming. We’re learning how to 

complement each others’ strengths and efforts, and determine 

which CVE efforts are best done by the military and which are best 

handled on the civilian side. We’ve been in discussions with a number of different offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) and the combatant commands to discuss funding issues and 

to discuss how we can improve delivery of programming. 

We’re also working to encourage foreign partners to do more in 

this area. My office hosted a CVE workshop with Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom in early November 2009, as a first step to developing a more 

cooperative CVE approach, and we’ll have a follow-on in May 2010. 

Let me close by making two points. One, as we do this kind of 

work, it’s vital that we adhere to our values. As President Obama 

has said from the outset, there should be no tradeoff between security and our values, and so we’ve moved to rectify excesses of the 

past by working to close the prison at Guantanamo, forbidding torture, and developing a more systematic approach to dealing with 

detainees. All of these will help us undermine the al Qaeda claims 

about the nature of the United States. 

Second, and lastly, I’m optimistic about our ability to make 

progress on CVE. As Mr. Reid said, these are still early days. We 

are going to innovate, and we are going to fail sometimes; but, I 

think there is a broad understanding, as he said, about the strategic nature of this endeavor. I think there is, really, broad understanding, across the executive branch, of the importance of this 

work and just how vital it is for our success against the terrorist 

threat. 

Thank you for your attention, and I’d be happy to answer any 

questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Benjamin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DANIEL BENJAMIN

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member LeMieux, and members of the committee: 

thank you for your invitation to appear before you this morning. 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you, along with my colleagues from the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State’s efforts 

12 

to counter violent extremism overseas, and how we collaborate and coordinate closely in this effort. 

In the past 8 years, the United States has made great strides in what might be 

called tactical counterterrorism—taking individual terrorists off the street, and disrupting cells and operations. But an effective counterterrorism strategy must go beyond efforts to thwart those who seek to harm the United States and its citizens, 

allies, and interests. Military power, intelligence operations, and law enforcement 

efforts alone will not solve the long-term challenge the United States faces—the 

threat of violent extremism. Instead, we must look as well to the political, economic, 

and social factors that terrorist organizations exploit and the ideology that is their 

key instrument in pushing vulnerable individuals on the path toward violence. As 

President Obama succinctly put it, ‘‘A campaign against extremism will not succeed 

with bullets or bombs alone.’’ 

For many years while outside of the government, I have argued that the United 

States has to make countering violent extremism a priority. Now, in my position as 

Coordinator for Counterterrorism, I am both challenged and humbled by the tremendous responsibility of helping develop and coordinate the U.S. Government’s efforts to undermine the al Qaeda narrative and prevent the radicalization of vulnerable individuals. Curtailing the influence of militants is critical to enhancing our nation’s security. The primary goal of countering violent extremism is to stop those 

most at risk of radicalization from becoming terrorists. Its tools are non-coercive and 

include social programs, counter-ideology initiatives, and working with civil society 

to delegitimize the al Qaeda narrative and, where possible, provide positive alternative narratives. 

Successfully combating terrorism necessitates isolating violent extremists from 

the people they pretend to serve. Often, they do this themselves. Time and again, 

their barbarism and brutality have provoked backlashes among ordinary people. 

The indiscriminate targeting of Muslim civilians by violent extremists in Iraq, Pakistan, and elsewhere has alienated populations, led to a decline of support for al 

Qaeda’s political program, and outraged influential clerics and former allies, who in 

many cases have spoken publicly, issuing fatwas against terrorism. 

Of course, we cannot count on al Qaeda to put itself out of business. While the 

group’s atrocities undoubtedly are part of the reason it has failed to mobilize masses 

of people, it continues to have success in replenishing its ranks. So as we look at 

the problem of transnational terrorism, we are putting at the core of our actions a 

recognition of the phenomenon of radicalization—that is, we are asking ourselves 

time and again: Are our words and actions strengthening or diminishing the appeal 

of arguments used by al Qaeda to justify violence against the United States and its 

allies? What more do we need to do to blunt the appeal of this brand of extremism? 

Answering these questions is at the heart of any genuinely strategic approach to 

counterterrorism, because ultimately undermining the appeal of al Qaeda’s rationale 

for violence is essential to help make environments ‘‘non-permissive’’ for terrorists 

seeking to exploit them. In other words, when the terrorists find their immediate 

environments to be hostile to them and their work and fewer places offer them any 

kind of haven, their ability to evade detection will diminish and their numbers will 

shrink. 

We are not there yet. The reality is that the United States confronts a violent 

ideology that holds real attraction for significant numbers of people. At the heart 

of the conflict with al Qaeda is a struggle over narratives. Al Qaeda dispenses an 

account of the world that falsely portrays the United States as a predatory power 

eager to occupy Muslim lands, steal Muslim wealth, and suppress the religion of 

Islam—a notion that President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and their predecessors 

have consistently refuted. al Qaeda and like-minded extremists exploit this perception and argue that the only solution is violence, a message which appeals to a 

small cohort of the alienated, particularly young men. The story has an elegant simplicity and, for some in Muslim communities with grievances, real or perceived, an 

appealing explanatory power. 

Because a variety of social and political factors can affect how people respond to 

al Qaeda, we are working from various angles to discredit its arguments and reduce 

their persuasiveness. Effectively countering the al Qaeda narrative involves capacity-building, outreach to civil society organizations, and educational development, as 

much as it does direct messaging. It involves working through host governments 

and nongovernmental organizations to engage with clerics and other influential 

voices with credibility in local communities. 

With the aid of credible messengers, the United States is trying to make the use 

of terrorist violence taboo and, we hope in the long term, replace the radical narrative with something more hopeful and empowering. President Obama’s effort to 

create partnerships with Muslim communities on the basis of mutual interest and 

13 

mutual respect, as he outlined in speeches in Ankara and Cairo provides a new opportunity to promote a more positive story than the negative one promulgated by 

al Qaeda. 

Because I consider this mission vital, one of the first things I did after being 

sworn in as coordinator was to start developing a Countering Violent Extremism 

(CVE) team, something that previously had not been a part of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. We now have a six-person unit responsible for creating CVE programs based on robust qualitative and quantitative assessments of 

the environment. 

In an effort to consolidate what we in the administration know and to do what 

we could to galvanize the interagency’s work on CVE, last fall my office convened 

a 1-day interagency summit to examine U.S. Government efforts in CVE, identify 

programmatic shortcomings, and make recommendations for creating a sustainable 

strategy going forward. The Summit brought together senior attendees from the 

NSC, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), intelligence agencies, and the Departments of State, Defense, 

Homeland Security, and Justice. Important lessons were shared. For example, all 

were in agreement that our programs are often more effective when implemented 

by host nations, nongovernmental organizations, and local partners. Partnering with 

foreign governments is crucial. These officials will have a better understanding of 

the particular dynamics and influential figures in their communities. Empowering 

these allies also bolsters their will to sustain programs over the long term. 

One recognition that was widely shared at that summit is that we are still in the 

early phases of CVE work. In recent years, we have learned a good deal about the 

phenomenon of radicalization. Various agencies in the U.S. Government have done 

an impressive job to further the government’s understanding. Significant research 

and analysis have been conducted by the Intelligence Community; in fact, we are 

working with the NCTC at the moment to use their intelligence for programmatic 

purposes. We also never hesitate to take advantage of the many studies done by the 

private sector and academia. 

Nevertheless, there is still the need for more work in the social sciences on the 

cluster of issues related to radicalization. Polling and surveys will help inform us 

where radicalization is occurring at the neighborhood level, guide our programming 

decisions and serve as a baseline to measure the effectiveness of our initiatives. 

To successfully develop and implement CVE programs, we must understand the 

dynamics of the communities at risk. Every community, whether long-rooted or part 

of a new diaspora, possesses a unique political, economic, and social landscape. For 

this reason, one-size-fits-all programs are likely to have limited appeal. Instead, our 

efforts must be tailored to fit the characteristics of the intended audience. Thus, it 

is critically important that our Embassies are on the front lines of our CVE efforts 

and that they play a key role in designing CVE programs. They can best identify 

the people in-country who can serve as credible voices and who can successfully implement projects. Partly for this reason, I have spent about half of 2010 and much 

of last year on travel to the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Europe. There I met with 

numerous officials from State and other departments, including DOD, to discuss and 

support Post efforts on CVE and explore ways to elaborate these initiatives. 

Besides working to keep those at risk of radicalization from becoming violent, we 

must also beat back the al Qaeda narrative in the broader public. Framing our 

interaction with the rest of the world, especially with Muslim communities, through 

the lens of counterterrorism can be counter-productive. Engaging mainstream communities around the world is that much harder if our audiences believe we see them 

as part of the problem, rather than as part of the solution, or are only interested 

in using them to get at the small number of violent extremists who actually threaten us. Moreover, we believe that engagement framed with mutual respect and the 

pursuit of partnerships in areas of shared interest actually marginalizes violent extremists by contrasting our positive vision with the terrorists’ commitment to murder, violence, and destruction. 

We must do a better job of explaining U.S. policies to foreign publics and debunking myths about the United States. Building personal relationships and deepening 

existing cultural and economic ties are some of the best ways to dispel 

misperceptions about U.S. interests and motives. Immigrant and youth populations 

should be treated not as threats to defend against, but as communities of potential 

partners who can play a lead role in changing our world for the better. 

We also need to look to what Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan has 

called the ‘‘upstream’’ factors. We need to confront the political, social, and economic 

conditions that our enemies exploit to win over the new recruits the funders and 

those whose tacit support enables the militants to carry forward their plans. The 

President and his team understand well how headline political grievances are exVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
14 

ploited by radicals. That is why this administration is giving so much attention to 

resolving issues like the Arab-Israeli peace process, which create deep antipathies 

against the United States that can be exploited by violent extremists. 

We are working hard to develop a variety of CVE programs. One that is already 

in its second year is the Ambassadors Fund for Counterterrorism. The Ambassadors 

Fund allows Posts to identify local partners and send in proposals to secure funding 

for local efforts. The Ambassadors Fund is an example of a locally-targeted program 

that marries the tools of soft power and counterterrorism assistance to help combat 

extremism. Up to $100,000 per grant is provided to embassies for projects. Beyond this existing funding mechanism, S/CT has requested $15 million in Fiscal 

Year 2011 for a new CVE programming. We intend to use those funds to focus on 

hot-spots of radicalization and recruitment, working with embassies to develop locally-tailored programs that counter the negative influence and influencers driving 

at-risk populations toward violence. We will also work together with the Office of 

the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, with the Office of the State Department Special Representative to Muslim Communities, and 

with USAID to make sure that efforts to engage civil society and counter 

radicalizing narratives through existing programs are focused in the right areas. 

It is efforts like this that we are trying to expand and elaborate. We are working 

more closely with foreign partners and examining how to get governments in Muslim-majority countries to take on this challenge—especially in ways that do not involve just security services. 

We have an excellent relationship with DOD. We are extremely grateful to Secretary Gates’ for his leadership and emphasis on the need to foster a stronger partnership between DOD and the Department of State. Our cooperation with DOD is 

paying off as we explore ways to collaborate and innovate new CVE programming. 

Together we are learning how to complement each other’s strengths and efforts in 

the field, and determine which CVE efforts are best done by the military and which 

are best handled on the civilian side. A number of offices in DOD and the Combatant Commands that fund CVE projects and research have expressed a desire to collaborate with us on new programs and we’ve had fruitful discussions with SOCOM 

about how our offices can work in concert on program delivery. 

We are also working hard to build momentum with our foreign CVE partners. My 

office hosted a Multilateral ‘‘CVE’’ Workshop with Australia, Canada, Germany, 

Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom in early November as a first 

step in developing a more cooperative approach, multilaterally to CVE. Participants 

discussed approaches, target audiences, specific interventions designed to counter 

terrorists’ recruiting efforts, and information sharing. Programs that gave participants insight into the challenges of police work with diaspora communities in the 

UK and Australia generated a lot of interest as possible templates. Delegations 

agreed that initiatives must be adapted to specific communities and even neighborhoods to realize the best chance of succeeding and enduring. Participants also 

agreed there was a gap in knowledge of other countries’ policies and approaches to 

CVE. We view filling that gap as part of our mission, and one step in this direction 

will be a follow-on workshop that is planned for mid-May. 

To help the State Department draw upon the knowledge of one of our key allies, 

we currently have on detail a senior member from the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Counterterrorism Research Group. Through this partnership, we 

hope to gain greater understanding of the UK’s experience with CVE as well as how 

the U.S. Government can create effective, locally-targeted programs and enhance its 

efforts to counter extremist narratives. 

U.S. Government engagement can and should take different forms depending on 

the circumstances of the potential partner. Some organizations with a lack of resources and outside funding will welcome U.S. seed money to hire staff and initiate 

programs. Others may desire capacity and leadership development training to better 

position them to challenge extremist narratives. In other cases, the U.S. Government can simply act as the facilitator by connecting these organizations with third 

parties with whom they can partner with. 

Some potential partners will not want any formal affiliation with the U.S. Government, because they fear it would undermine their legitimacy among constituents. 

In these cases, the U.S. Government can work closely with local, regional, or national governments and third parties, as well as credible regional and international 

organizations, to ensure that the organizations receive the assistance they need to 

deliver targeted, on-the-ground CVE programs. 

Nontraditional actors such as nongovernmental organizations, foundations, publicprivate partnerships, and private businesses are some of the most capable and credible partners in local communities. The U.S. Government and partner nations are 

also seeking to develop greater understanding of the linkages between Diaspora 

15 

communities and ancestral homelands. Through familial and business networks, 

events that affect one community have an impact in the other. 

In closing, let me make two points. First, as we pursue our CVE work and 

counterterrorism more broadly, it is vital that we hew to our values in this struggle. 

As President Obama has said from the outset, there should be no tradeoff between 

our security and our values. Indeed, in light of what we know about radicalization, 

it is clear that navigating by our values is an essential part of a successful 

counterterrorism effort. Thus, we have moved to rectify the excesses of the past few 

years by working to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay, forbidding torture, and 

developing a more systematic method of dealing with detainees. All of these, over 

the long term, will help undermine terrorist claims about the nature of the United 

States. 

Second and lastly, there is reason for optimism about our ability to make progress 

on CVE. While such an effort will not be easy or inexpensive, we are developing the 

capacity to meet this challenge, backed by the talent within the Foreign Service and 

Civil Service communities and among the scholars in our nation and elsewhere. 

Within the foreign policy community and the senior political leadership, there is a 

broad, shared understanding of the vital need to get this right. Undoubtedly, there 

will be some experimentation, and there will be some failures. But with real patience and willingness to learn from our mistakes, I am confident that we can succeed at this strategic level of counterterrorism as effectively as we have in the tactical realm, where we have made genuinely impressive strides. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

General? 

STATEMENT OF LTG FRANCIS H. KEARNEY III, USA, DEPUTY 

COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

General KEARNEY. Chairman Nelson, Senator LeMieux, Senator 

Reed, thanks for the opportunity to be here with my colleagues. 

Let me just state upfront that what they have said, we are largely in agreement with each other, and we work in a complementary 

manner to achieve our objectives. We look to the national implementation of the war on terror and its four pillars, one of which 

is CVE, to nest our 7500-series global war on terrorism campaign 

plan for DOD. The description about CVE, its 3 strategic objectives 

and 12 subobjectives, all fit nicely into the discussions that my 2 

colleagues have mentioned. We recognize that we have moved, really, out of the main effort of attacking terrorists and their capabilities, to CVE as the forefront of the indirect methods that we now 

apply globally and in the two theatres of war to get at fighting violent extremism. 

Our view of the world, not just the theaters of war, would indicate that crime, migration, and extremism all come together to create conditions that allow violence to emerge from those three 

threat streams. 

We work twofold, both as a force provider, largely in providing 

troops that build partner capacity through security force assistance, and in that role, we not only deliver the tactical and technical 

means to assist our partners, but also focus on values, rule of law, 

and working in a way that supports the people, so that it supports 

the counternarrative that we have and underpins the legitimate 

governments in those countries. 

Second, we work as a synchronizer for DOD for the global war 

on terror, and so, we look across the spectrum of what our partners 

do. In CVE, in particular, you’ll find that we have the expanded regional psychological operations (PSYOPs) program, where we have 

up to 25 military information support teams and embassies 

throughout the world working on the mission support plans that 

16 

the Ambassador and his country team have for achieving their objectives in country. 

We have civil-military affairs support elements that, again, are 

working inside of countries globally to achieve a good assessment 

to complement what the country teams have, and bring with them 

the ability to mobilize military capabilities to help in assessing and 

adjusting the conditions, again, that cause crime, migration, and 

extremism to flourish. 

We also are the lead for DOD in countering threat finance, which 

is the fuel that allows the messaging and the message to get out 

on the street to do things, and a small piece of that is our counternarcoterrorism piece. 

But, largely, as we develop for the future, as Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense Reid mentioned, we are looking at how to 

deepen the capabilities of our force in looking at development, diplomacy, and our normal defense tasks as the place where we need 

to get good immersion in understanding the background, cultures, 

language of the affected countries in which we operate. 

I thank you for the opportunity to speak here today, sir, and I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Kearney follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTG FRANCIS H. KEARNEY III, USA 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this 

opportunity to speak with you about U.S. Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) 

role in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). This role is at the core of the command’s mission and purpose, one I’m pleased to present to this committee. 

Over two decades ago, SOCOM was founded to ‘‘prepar[e] Special Operations 

Forces to carry out assigned missions’’ in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). Since then, these forces and their missions changed considerably 

in response to dynamic global conditions and threats. 

Following September 11, the command shifted its role both as a force provider and 

synchronizer of planning against terrorist networks. Initial efforts—under what 

eventually became Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 7500—were largely kinetic activities 

directed against the al Qaeda network and its affiliates. 

Through successful direct action, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) degraded 

the leadership and capacity of these violent extremist organizations. Our forces captured and killed adversaries, frustrating efforts to accomplish their goals to include 

the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. While these direct, sometimes unilateral, actions are essential to national security, by themselves they are not decisive. 

To achieve enduring success requires a broader focus, one which addresses the underlying causes of extremism. Specifically, the focus must include indirect and ideologically-based activities CVE, while building organic capacities toward this end 

among our allies and partners. 

This ‘new normal’ was captured in the publication of the National Implementation 

Plan (NIP) for the War and Terror. The NIP is comprised of four pillars, one of 

which—CVE—underpins the other three: protection and defense of the homeland, 

preventing terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and attacking terrorists and their capacity to operate. 

The current version of Department of Defense (DOD) CONPLAN 7500 mirrors 

this mindset. It reflects the primacy of indirect approaches, both to deter active and 

tacit support for Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) and to erode extremist support for VEO ideology. 

In turn—and echoing our founding mission—we currently see SOCOM’s role in 

CVE as two-fold: as both a force provider and synchronizer of planning. 

As a force provider, we leverage SOF’s persistent presence in over 75 countries 

to conduct high quality, low profile, long-term engagements in Security Force Assistance (SFA). These actions foster trust, and enable partners to directly combat extremist organizations through advising, training and—when authorized and funded—equipping of forces. 

17 

Functionally, this is executed by providing Special Operations Forces to GCCs, 

and—in some cases—authorized via a funding mechanism commonly referred to as 

‘‘Section 1208’’. This mechanism affords the training and equipping of indigenous 

forces, both regular and irregular, in support of ongoing U.S. counterterrorism operations. 

Success is best understood as a two part equation: (1) direct action against violent 

extremists, and (2) the simultaneous preparation of others to face their own security 

challenges. When executed well, the latter reduces or even eliminates the need for 

the former. 

As previously mentioned—and in our role as a synchronizer—SOCOM’s efforts toward CVE are detailed in CONPLAN 7500. This plan—crafted at SOCOM and approved by the Secretary of Defense—is joined with regional, supporting plans and 

programs of the Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands to accomplish 

the CVE mission. As a collective, these plans and programs allow us to work with 

interagency and international partners to synchronize CVE research, planning, operations, and activities on behalf of the DOD. 

Bannered under CONPLAN 7500 is a fundamental belief that extremism cannot 

be physically ‘‘killed.’’ The Command believes in cultivating credible influence to 

build the foundation for change, one which promotes ideologies that reject extremist 

affiliation and action. In tandem, we undercut the resources and recruitment efforts 

of VEOs to limit both their sustainment and freedom of action. 

The Expanded Trans-Regional Psychological Operations Program (ETRP) is the 

mortar in this ideological foundation, one providing a uniform set of objectives available to all GCCs to conduct CVE-centric, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) activities in support of CONPLAN 7500. Within ETRP is a system of checks and balances, an approval process to ensure Department of Defense-conducted PSYOP activities are executed with full awareness and approval of the appropriate Department of State (DOS) representative. This includes U.S. Ambassadors within countries where these capabilities are employed. 

USSOCOM’s program of record, ETRP–Military Information Support Team 

(MIST), provides the resourcing and deployment mechanism for the forces executing 

these operations. ETRP–MIST is currently supporting 25 SOCOM MISTs, units deployed at the specific request of U.S. Ambassadors around the globe. Working closely with and authorized by Embassy Public Affairs and Diplomacy staffs, MIST— 

usually small in number—conduct local information programs via local media in 

service to ETRP and DOS Mission Strategic Plan CVE goals. 

USSOCOM’s Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) provides 

operational planning, analytical, research and production support for all of the Geographic Combatant Commanders. JMISC produces six military-to-military journals, 

one for each GCC, with particular topical emphasis on CVE and regional security. 

In tandem, the JMISC’s four regional influence web sites counter Internet-based 

misinformation supporting extremism, while synchronizing DOD’s web-based messages on CVE topics. 

As a point of distinction, SOCOM remains steadfast in distinguishing between 

DOS diplomacy efforts and DOD-led influence campaigns. While both directly address CVE, our efforts are specifically designed to deter, prevent, and disrupt violent 

extremists. Still, we recognize and appreciate the logic of coordinating and synchronizing these endeavors toward a common objective of reducing the appeal of violent 

extremism. The Command supports the President’s guidance to ‘‘rebalance’’ current 

information and engagement programs to both deconflict authorities and maximize 

outcomes. 

Programmatic efforts to counter ideological foundations of extremism are matched 

by actions to address the factors that sometimes make communities vulnerable to 

violent extremism. The President has called for a New Beginning with Muslims 

around the world, and the positive vision of mutual respect, partnership, mutual interests, and mutual opportunities is a powerful contrast to al Qaeda’s destructiveness. While the military is not the lead in this effort, SOF Civil Affairs teams conduct a diverse set of activities promoting development and goodwill through building 

of infrastructure, job skill training, and the provision of medical, dental, and veterinary care in areas where existing governance structures are unable or unwilling 

provide these services. Again, as with SFA, the focus of Special Operations Civil Affairs is on long-term capacity building within local and national structures. 

Finally, the Command simultaneously strikes at the financial center of VEOs, 

serving as the DOD lead in Counterthreat Finance. In close partnership with other 

combatant commanders, the Services, and—as directed—appropriate U.S. Government agencies and international partners, we spearhead DOD efforts to identify, 

track and dry up this flow of capital in the interest of national security. 

18 

With the increasing prevalence of narcotics trafficking as a VEO funding stream, 

the SOCOM Counter Narcoterrorism (CNT) Program provides SOF to GCCs, ambassadors, and other U.S. Government agencies to address the nexus of this crime and 

the terrorism it funds. Recent CNT efforts include SOF-led training and security assistance to partners in Colombia and Panama. 

As a collective, these examples illustrate the unique contributions of the forces 

provided by SOCOM. Our career multidimensional operators and headquarters personnel are individuals equally capable of direct action with precision and lethality. 

They are culturally grounded in their area of responsibility, while diplomatically astute enough to navigate the subtle ideological and social distinctions required for indirect approaches. 

Synchronizing planning on behalf of the DOD for global operations against terrorist networks is a difficult task, where prudent outcomes—direct and indirect— 

come only from prudent strategy. The balance of this approach is the heart of this 

command, and a responsibility we are proud to execute. In speaking on behalf of 

our entire command, we thank you for this opportunity to represent this to you. I 

look forward to answering any of your questions. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Gentlemen, what are you doing to make 

it less attractive for people to be converted to violent extremism? 

Mr. REID. If you will, I’ll start, Mr. Chairman. 

On the front end, we have to take actions to protect ourselves. 

As I mentioned, the way we go about doing that is bringing in more 

and more of our partner nations and involving them in this process 

builds the legitimacy of our actions; this removes the argument of 

‘‘the occupier,’’ ‘‘the global dominator,’’ or ‘‘the hegemon operating 

freely.’’ The more we bring in partner nations and transition them 

into the lead, I think, in the first instance of addressing immediate 

threats is an important step. 

Supporting that is, as Ambassador Benjamin talked about—and 

more in the DOS lane, I believe—is the ideological effort, eroding 

the basis of their violent ideology. The information programs that 

DOD brings into that are in support of enabling the spreading of 

the positive messages and doing a broad range of actions in the 

local areas that separate and isolate the insurgents and the extremists from the local population. Creating security space is an 

important step, but just as important is highlighting and exposing 

the fraudulent aspect of the ideology that they’re spreading and encouraging the local population to stand up for themselves. We have 

to break this cycle. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, let’s take an example, exposing the 

fraudulent ideology. Now, what they’ve done is, they’ve taken the 

Koran and they’ve made it to say something that it isn’t. What do 

you do to get out the message of what the true teachings of the 

Koran are? 

Mr. REID. Again, our part is to create the space for that to happen, to break the intimidation cycle and the dominance cycle over 

those voices that are capable, willing, and credible to speak in the 

communities; getting the district governors, the mayors, other folks 

involved, and allowing them to hold the shuras, allowing them to 

reconstitute the social order that has been fractured through intimidation and everything else that the enemy is doing. That’s 

what we can do, and maybe more on the message side of the effort. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do those local officials know the true 

teachings of the Koran? Or have they been brainwashed into what 

the violent extremist version taught by some of the elements of al 

Qaeda say the teachings are? 

19 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Senator, as with any great religion, there 

are an enormous number of different streams within it. The overwhelming majority of Muslims, obviously, do not embrace a vision 

of their own religion that has violence at its heart. But, nonetheless, we do find it an important task to engage with influential 

leaders, and with clerical leaders in different countries around the 

world, to give them the media tools and to create the political space 

so that they can get that message across. 

I think it’s very important to underscore that the United States 

is not exactly the right megaphone, if you will, for what the true 

message of the Koran is. This is a dispute among Muslims. What 

we want to do is help them fight that fight and underscore the nonviolent message, and delegitimate those who would argue that the 

world is about war and conflict. 

Senator BILL NELSON. For example, it certainly is not a teaching 

in the Koran that Muslims ought to be killing other Muslims. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. No. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, how do you go about countering that, 

Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Of course, we have a wide range of activities. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You said that Americans can’t necessarily 

do it, so what’s the plan of DOS to get that message out? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We’re working with numerous different 

countries to build up their capacity. Most of them have their own 

ministries of religion and have extensive contacts with the clergy 

in their own country. We’re enabling them to do a better job to 

broadcast a message of moderation and to identify those who 

preach violence as being corrupters of the religion. That’s really 

one of our key initiatives is building the capacity in these countries 

to deal with these communications challenges and fight the war of 

ideas. 

Senator BILL NELSON. How do you build that capacity? What are 

you specifically doing with those religious leaders that you mentioned? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. There are a whole array of different 

kinds of endeavors. We may do people-to-people exchanges between 

leaders from Muslim communities in the United States in these 

countries, we support different kinds of conferences, we help these 

countries, especially through the activities of the Under Secretary 

for Public Diplomacy, to strengthen their own ability to run modern communications operations in their governments. There’s really 

a very wide array of different kinds of programming that we can 

do in this area. 

Senator BILL NELSON. General, your troops find a much more acceptable audience in those villages, don’t they, when the 

deradicalization through what we’ve just been talking about, about 

the true teachings of Islam, is taught? Tell us your experience with 

your soldiers. 

General KEARNEY. Senator, there are a lot of great initiatives 

going on right now. One of them is the Community Defense Initiative underway in parts of Afghanistan, where our forces are down 

there, at the lower level, dealing with tribal elders and having a 

conversation with them about not only deradicalization and the teVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
20 

nets of their own faith—we normally don’t have that level of conversation—but we also have a conversation about how to empower 

them to make their own decisions, how to empower them to resolve 

disputes, how to give them back the opportunity to preach their 

version of how they read Islam to the people in their village. That 

varies from village to village to village. 

My experience in Special Operations Command Central, as the 

commander there, with the symposia that we would conduct, 

hosted in Jordan, hosted inside of the Emirates, to moderate nations willing to come forward and speak, is that they want to have 

a conversation on religion and they would bring in folks to talk, at 

the clerical level, to us. But, largely, that conversation for the military is to give them the space, as Assistant Secretary Reid said, to 

allow them to be able to manage their populations in a way that 

they want to and understand. 

But, clearly, they have been infected. As you said, metastization 

has occurred with the al Qaeda message out there, and it gives 

them the space to not be under the pressure of either the Taliban, 

al Qaeda, some other radical, extremist organization that’s influencing the behavior of their populations. They want their opportunity to lead at their level, to set their own tone, their own interpretation. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

those questions. I want to touch back on that very important topic 

in a moment. 

I want to take this opportunity to do something that we don’t get 

a chance to do much here in government, because we’re always 

handling the crisis of the day and the crisis of now, and that is to 

really focus on what the chairman, I think, has done of good job 

of structuring this meeting on, which is emerging threats. 

We know about al Qaeda in Afghanistan; we’re fighting that war. 

We know about al Qaeda in the border regions between Pakistan 

and Afghanistan. We hear stories now and are concerned about al 

Qaeda in the Horn of Africa and other places in Africa and 

throughout Southeast Asia. My preamble is to this question: 

What’s the number-one emerging threat that you see? What’s keeping you up at night? What are you forward-looking at, a threat that 

might be different than the threat that we’re facing today? I’d like 

each of you to try to take a stab at that question. 

Mr. REID. What is particularly concerning—and it relates back to 

the Christmas attempt—is the compactness and maybe the efficiency that they are applying to this process, because it really cuts 

underneath our ability to detect it and do something about it. The 

tighter they compress that, the harder it gets for us. 

As you said, Senator, we know where the pockets are, where the 

franchises are, if that’s a good word—or the affiliates, maybe; we 

watch them. But our ability to understand what they’re doing is 

limited in the first instance by our access to some of these areas— 

and clearly, in the Maghreb area, we have a limited footprint—but, 

given that standoff from which we observe and try to understand 

this, and the sources of information intelligence that go with that, 

we’re still looking through a straw, in many cases. That is a concern. 

21 

At the same time, from that straw, such that it is, we get a lot 

of pieces. I’m sure you see this every day, ‘‘So-and-so is doing this, 

this person is doing this.’’ You don’t know which one is real, or 

which one is going to be the next one. So, we have a sort of broad 

net cast; we have small threads of information. Within all of that, 

the enemy is maneuvering around to really defeat our detection 

and our knowledge system, and our border security systems, as 

well. 

That’s my greatest concern. It leads into some historical work 

about leaderless jihad and these other things. We’re oriented very 

well now to networks and subnetworks, but it’s still a relatively 

hierarchical approach to the problem. When you have yourself a 

radicalized individual, or your lone wolf, or these folks who aren’t 

connected but are enabled by everything the other group is doing, 

they all have pretty good potential to do a significant act of violence against us. That is my answer to the question about emerging threats. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Reid. 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Yes, Senator, two answers. One of them 

is, I think, an elaboration on Mr. Reid’s remarks. As the barriers 

to entry for sophisticated and deadly technologies fall, it becomes 

more and more possible for ever-smaller groups to carry out really 

dangerous attacks, and for individuals themselves to carry them 

out. That is a really difficult problem for us to grapple with because, obviously, the bigger the group, the more chances we have 

for catching it in our intelligence collection and to have some kind 

of insight into it. The smaller the group, the more empowered the 

individual, the more difficult the challenge for us. That is part of 

the reason why I think countering extremist ideologies is so vital, 

because if we can stop them upstream, when they’re becoming 

radicalized, then obviously we have an easier job of it than when 

they’re downstream and getting into all kinds of dangerous activities. That’s one thing. 

The other thing I would point out, which is something that I 

think we don’t pay quite enough attention to, is the fact that there 

are other organizations out there that are looking more al Qaedalike and seem to be interested in playing a global role in terrorism. 

The one that probably keeps me awake most is Lashkar-e-Taiba, 

in South Asia, which, of course, was responsible for the Mumbai 

bombings. The Mumbai bombings and attacks did kill a number of 

Americans. This is a designated terrorist group, and one we take 

very seriously. But, I think we need to build even greater concern 

and greater programming to target this group, because its target 

set looked very much like an al Qaeda target set, and if it decides 

that it wants to wage the global terrorist effort, then that will be 

a real challenge for us; it has a lot more men under arms than al 

Qaeda has. 

So, those, I would say, are the two big concerns. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Ambassador. 

General? 

General KEARNEY. Senator, I worry at night about the decentralization of the ideological message and the ability to mobilize 

without us being able to track this, and I think my two colleagues 

22 

have basically said the same thing. But, our success in eliminating 

leaders in these organizations, and their ability to communicate, 

which are two targeting lines in countering the extremist networks, 

have caused them to leap to operating on their own accord inside 

the intent of the al Qaeda message. So that means you can’t see 

that. 

Mr. Reid has talked about the ability for them to compress the 

timeline. They’ve gained agility because they no longer have to 

have hierarchical approvals. That, coupled with the ability for them 

to get people into the United States and the information that’s on 

the Internet about our weaknesses, our threats, and the ability to 

use tools here that exist, that you don’t need to smuggle in, worries 

me. 

Industrial accidents also worry me. If you just look at our infrastructure and the way we move hazardous materials in the United 

States, we are potentially at great risk for people who are empowered, enabled, and, through knowledge that we have open in our 

society, to be able to take things. 

The last thing I would say is, I worry very much about 

transregional actors who can cause eruptions in their region. As we 

are looking at defending the homeland as one of our key pillars, we 

should watch if something spurs up as a result of Lashkar-e-Taiba 

as they continue to try and trigger some kind of impact between 

Pakistan and India in the region. It’s keeping an eye on the ball 

forward as we protect the ball here at home. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I appreciate all of those answers. I think the 

thing that I want to focus on, that was a common thread through 

what all of you said, is this lifecycle shortening of taking a disaffected person and turning them into a weapon. If you look, it goes 

back to trying to stem the radical ideology in the first place because, hopefully, if there’s no water to put on the growing threat, 

you can stop it before it starts. There has to be that radical ideology. The disaffected person that can now be turned into a threat, 

whether it’s Major Hasan or whether it’s Abdul Mutallab, or now 

we see this arrest of Colleen LaRose, whom they’re describing as 

‘‘Jihad Jane,’’ in Pennsylvania, this ability to take one person and 

very quickly radicalize them. As you said, General, with all of the 

tools that are available and all of the information that’s available, 

to turn them into a weapon, that’s very disconcerting. 

I think the other point I’d like to make on this, Mr. Chairman, 

is that the combination of those disaffected people with nationstates that sponsor terror, I think, is the next thing, and that’s 

something that worries me. It’s one thing to have a tragedy, like 

we had at Fort Hood, which was horrific. It’s another, still, if that 

disaffected extremist gets hooked up with some radicalized country 

that sponsors terrorism and delivers a threat that kills tens of 

thousands of people in this country. 

One thing I’d like to ask you to focus on, and then maybe we’ll 

have an opportunity to speak about it later in this hearing, is the 

potential combination that you might see between these groups and 

state sponsors of terror, whether it’s Iran or in our own hemisphere. What I’m very concerned about is the combination of Iran 

with Venezuela, and the knowledge that we have, that Hamas and 

23 

Hezbollah are trying to set up shop and do have some operations 

in this hemisphere. I ask you to focus on that, as well. 

I’ve talked a lot, Mr. Chairman. I know that Senator Reed probably has some questions, too. We can get back to it. I would ask 

that the three of you focus on that, and perhaps we can talk about 

it in just a bit. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Reed? 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing here today. 

One of the aspects of our response to these threats is the coordination between agencies of the government. I think that’s a perennial challenge for any government against any challenge, any 

threat. 

Let me divide CVE into a couple of different areas. First, there 

are areas we have access to, and then there are denied areas. I’ll 

start with Ambassador Benjamin, and then Mr. Reid and General 

Kearney. Is there a formal division of responsibilities in those 

areas where we have access? Is it led by DOS? Coordinated by 

DOS? Then those areas with nonaccess, is it, by default, led by 

DOD? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Senator, the White House has been paying a great deal more attention to CVE issues in the last year. The 

coordination is being undertaken through the CSG, the Counterterrorism and Security Group, which is, I think, one of the oldest 

interagency groups in the government, and there is now a sub-CSG 

devoted to CVE issues. 

Obviously, on a lot of these issues and on specific endeavors, 

DOS has the lead, but there is a lot of shared responsibility, precisely because, as I think I may have said before you came in, a 

lot of the programming that is going on here is across interagency 

boundaries. This is very much a whole-of-government approach and 

so far, we’ve been quite pleased with the outcome. 

Senator REED. Secretary Reid? 

That has a nice ring to it, by the way. That has a very nice ring. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. REID. Senator, you’re a handsome man, as well, sir. 

Senator REED. Thank you. [Laughter.] 

Mr. REID. The—— 

Senator REED. You’ve said enough. [Laughter.] 

Go ahead. 

Mr. REID. There’s a lot that gets written in the press, sometimes, 

about DOD operating around the world, but, the fact is, again, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, everywhere we’re operating, we’re operating through, with, and in support of, and in coordination with, 

the U.S. Ambassador in every country. There is not a forced-entry 

component to this particular discussion. 

The combatant commanders, obviously, work within their areas 

of responsibility, and they work very closely with the country 

teams, in every instance. We have, and the combatant commanders 

have, their theater security engagement plans, and they are all 

nested with DOS’s strategic plans and the mission-support plans 

that we work to support. So, in terms of who’s leading, in our view, 

we’re supporting in those areas outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

24 

Senator REED. General Kearney, what is your opinion from your 

aspect of it? 

General KEARNEY. Absolutely, sir. I mean, clearly, in our role as 

a synchronizer, we conduct semiannual forums, where we bring together our partners in DOD, our partners in all the interagency, 

and our partners in certain international countries to begin to work 

together to ply the strategy and translate that into operational actions to do that. Out of that comes taskers to different communities 

that largely are accepted by them, in a group way in there, so that 

the lead is identified, largely, by DOS, I mean, in most cases, because it goes through the country team to do things. We support, 

through the geographic combatant commander, the plans that he 

has laid out and that we provide forces for the plans. 

Now, we have certain niche areas where we provide a lot of leadership: counter-WMD, counterterrorism, building partner capacities, security force assistance, and those things; but, it doesn’t 

really matter whether it’s a denied area or a permissive area. We 

really have a government lead that is DOS, in most of those, where 

we have an ambassador; where we don’t have an ambassador, we 

have a country that’s responsible for that—say, Somalia—and we 

work through the Embassy in Kenya, with our partners there. 

So, largely I think there’s good bilateral coordination and multilateral coordination that moves together in regional pockets. If you 

could stitch that together into a better quilt, with stronger thread, 

that probably needs to be where we need to go, sir. 

Senator REED. There’s an area that’s implicit in a lot of the discussion, and that is cyberspace, in terms of countering the message 

and delivering a positive message. Once again, are you comfortable 

that we’ve organized our efforts effectively to deal in cyberspace? 

Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. REID. I think we’re still working, and we’re still learning. 

The challenge in operating in the cyberworld is, you can find many 

examples of well-accepted things that happen in the physical world. 

When you try to draw a parallel of that type of activity, and particularly with defense activities, into the cyberworld, you very 

quickly get into an area that all of the attorneys in all departments 

get very uncomfortable with the legal aspects of DOD involvement. 

On the DOD side, of course, the decision to stand up the U.S. 

Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) has been made; it addresses a defensive need and the full range of challenges there. We’re going to 

move forward and implement that, and strengthen our defensive 

capabilities, while continuing to work in the interagency, across the 

government, to identify where the boundaries are, in terms of 

DOD-led activities. It’s clearly complicated. I would not profess that 

we fully understand, or that we’ve fully solved the problem, but 

we’re applying a lot of energy and effort, and we have a lot of 

smart folks looking at it. It will be, many cases, sort of case-by-case 

and learning as we go about the use of DOD authorities, but also 

about the particular applications and where we get the greatest effect. 

Senator REED. Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I agree with Mr. Reid. This is an enormous challenge with, really, endless implications. If you look at the 

history of terrorism, the Internet is probably the most important 

25 

technological innovation since dynamite, and it’s enormously difficult to deal with all the different aspects. 

We, at DOS, are working very hard on building capacity with our 

partners around the world so that they can deal with all the different manifestations of terrorism that are on the Internet, in 

terms of both spreading the ideology, fundraising, recruitment, organizational logistics, and the like. That is a central part of what 

we do. 

Some of the more defensive issues are nested both at DOD and 

in the intelligence community. Of course, those would probably best 

be discussed in another forum. 

I think that we are still working on how we organize ourselves 

for these things. We’re certainly well out of the starting blocks, but 

the challenges keep multiplying. 

I think that, for us in particular, in the context of this hearing, 

it’s important to note that we are working a lot with NGOs and 

others to ensure that there are lots of contradictory messages to 

the al Qaeda narrative, to the al Qaeda ideology, that are on the 

Web. It’s a challenge to get it in a way that is attractive to those 

who are at risk of radicalization. But, if we are going to master 

this, we’re going to have to master the Internet, I think. 

Senator REED. General? 

General KEARNEY. Without question, it is the domain at which 

competition for the influence of the people is the greatest, has the 

most immediate impact, and has the widest spread. I think it’s 

where we are most nascent. I think we continue to learn, and I 

think it’s a house divided on authorities to provide opportunities to 

counter, opportunities to influence, and opportunities to take apart 

their message and provide an alternate message. I think we are 

working through that, Senator. 

I don’t think that CYBERCOM will be the command that does 

that. They will deal with how we move through and negotiate that, 

and where and what we’re negotiating on. But, the content of the 

message, that is where the conversation is being held. I think we 

need to move with alacrity to lay out the roles in how we’re going 

to do that. We provide a small piece of that in our command, and 

have some technical expertise through our PSYOPs piece, but it 

gets nested in the content of the message, and really is only a multiplier to what needs to be led by policy and the competing narrative, and then walked down into the people who are going to execute the conversations in each one of those different sites on the 

Internet where they are being held on a daily, hourly, and minutely basis. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Some of my proudest moments are seeing 

Americans abroad doing their daily task at a local level, be it a 

lieutenant or a captain using Commanders’ Emergency Response 

Program funds in addition to being a warrior, and helping rebuild 

a community; seeing USAID doing just tremendous stuff; the devotion of our diplomatic corps; and so forth. 

But, once you get above that local level, where Americans are 

really trying to make a difference down there, I get worried about, 

number one, stovepipes—that one organization can’t cooperate, or 

26 

the communication is not there with another—and I worry about 

balance, balance between the military and the civilian agencies as 

we are trying to counter this terrorism. So, would you all address 

those issues of balance and stovepipes, and how do we break them 

down? 

Mr. REID. Sure. Do you want me to keep going first? Do you want 

to go first? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. You’ve done a great job. I’m happy to go 

first, whatever you like. 

Mr. REID. Thank you, Senator. It’s clearly an area where I think 

we have tried just about everything. The flattening of the stovepipes—the cylinders of excellence, other might call them—clearly is 

something we’ve taken on. As you said, it starts off on the ground 

and it tends to work better at lower levels. But, I would say, and 

as you have probably seen at the one-star/two-star levels of command, we have implemented and had the big-tent approach to our 

interagency task forces. In many cases, by invitation, we say ‘‘Come 

on in,’’ and the interagency has done that. If you’ve been out to the 

Jyada in Balad, Iraq, or in Bagram, Afghanistan, those are good 

examples of where we have brought in everyone that was willing 

and able to come, participate, and get involved. It isn’t sort of the 

older model of a liaison officer, an LNO, with a telephone back to 

their headquarters; it’s someone that’s actively involved and part 

of the team, as much as we can possibly do that. 

On the DOD side, and our leaders—one thing that’s occurring, of 

course, is—those that were the lieutenants several rotations, or 

now several years ago, are growing through these ranks; in many 

cases, this new dynamic, this new interagency warfighting, is about 

all they’ve experienced. So, it is unfortunate that this is going for 

so many years, but, in terms of building and rebaselining our understanding of how we operate, I think that is happening. 

As you get further up, I can just say, from our end here, I used 

to be a Special Forces operator, I started the war with General 

Kearney long ago. What I see here in Washington is—and Ambassador Benjamin mentioned it—we have more and more groupings 

where we’re bringing people together. He talked about a subgroup 

on CVE under the counterterrorism group, these types of things. 

We’ve reorganized, in OSD, to have focus on strategic engagement 

and to have the right structures to plug in, here in Washington, 

with the other agencies’ groups and with the multiagency groups. 

That’s the approach we’re taking, and we are always looking for 

more opportunity to do that, to break down those barriers. 

As for the communications effort, I think the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has done a very good job of bringing collaboration forums together on the networked information systems 

at all classification levels. It is very difficult to do, but month by 

month, I have new ways to do my job, to interact in the interagency, that I didn’t have a year ago or 2 years ago. I think that 

is how we’re trying to tackle it on this end, as well. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. First of all, Senator, I agree with you 

completely that it’s really stirring to go out to a mission and to— 

for example, I was just in Nairobi—and to see both the people who 

are doing public diplomacy, the USAID people, and the people who 

are working on the Military Information Support Teams, all talkVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
27 

ing about how they’re dealing with CVE issues. I really do think 

that, at that level, the coordination is quite inspiring and quite 

positive. 

Obviously, in large bureaucracies, stovepiping is a big issue. I 

think one of the solutions is to establish, early on, priorities that 

are shared by the senior leaders. I was really pleased that, when 

we did our summit on CVE, back in November 2009, we did it 

jointly with NCTC and we had everyone at the office director desk 

or assistant secretary level around the table, and there was really 

a great deal of agreement and also an understanding that we can’t 

get this done if we embrace business as usual. 

You need to both have the excellence that’s working at the grassroots bubbling up, but also the insistence from the top that we 

avoid the usual meaningless fights and get things done. 

As for the issue of balancing between civilian and military, again 

that is a work in progress. It’s no secret that our friends across the 

river get a little more, in terms of resources, but we are, as I said, 

grateful to Secretary Gates and his team for emphasizing the need 

for a rebalancing there. We’re also grateful to our DOD colleagues 

for making it clear that they want to get the job done and that we 

should look at how we do this best and not wait for every other reiteration of the very long budget cycle. 

We are working with others around the government to ensure 

that worthy projects get funded and that the counternarrative—the 

CVE mission gets accomplished. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let’s take, for example, what we’ve just 

done in Afghanistan, where we went successfully into this town, 

Marjah. I don’t know the specifics there, but let’s just take town 

X. The military moves in and clears it out; first, you want to stabilize the community. We have to give attention to adequate water; 

we have to show folks how to do crops instead of poppies; we have 

to attend to education of the children; you have to attend to training of people so that they can have a decent living, a gainful employment; and we have to be concerned about their medical care. 

Now, that’s a mouthful, and we haven’t even gotten into protecting the rights of women, okay? To stabilize that community, 

you’re going to have to look at all of that. So, what do we do, General? How do we break down those stovepipes? Do we come in with 

a comprehensive package? Who’s going to coordinate it once you all 

have cleared an area? 

General KEARNEY. Senator, that is a good question. I don’t think 

it’s hard to lay out; it’s just hard to execute. Obviously, before they 

went into Marjah, and any town inside of Afghanistan or Iraq, 

there was an effort to build a phase methodology of security operations, followed after that with an introduction of our partners, 

both from the host nation, our interagency partners, and our international partners, to lay out a plan that, when the security situation was at a threshold, we could begin to work on development, 

governance, and those kind of issues. 

You’ve seen Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). They are 

normally the lead for an area to come in, and they are about to become DOS-led, in almost all cases; they are, in many cases, the 

lead right now. They have a security complement that comes with 

them that allows them to be able to work those things. 

28 

You have Civil Affairs Teams that are in there initially with the 

military security force that’s going in to do the operation, doing 

those forward-area assessments to be able to provide information 

back to the PRTs so that they can begin to do things. 

This has been laid out in a very consistent way under General 

McChrystal’s plans. He is working forward to do things, in a campaign architecture, so we now are robust enough in Afghanistan, 

both in our interagency partnership, our NATO allies, other allies, 

and in our force structure, to be able to do that. 

Not 18 months ago, my son, Captain Kearney, was commanding 

a company in the Korengal Valley, Afghanistan, and he was the 

lone ranger. When he talked to the tribal leadership about their 

lumber business, he was the person bringing things back, and a 

measure was made on whether it was worth investing in that. 

Even though we were there spending human treasure to achieve an 

end state, it wasn’t resourced properly with expertise from our 

partners with funding, and with a campaign methodology that was 

going to get us there. We are moving in the correct direction in Afghanistan as a team effort to do things, and largely that’s because 

we’ve deployed the people to the field to do that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Is this working to CVE? 

General KEARNEY. I think right now it is optimistic, in our view, 

that it can work. I don’t think that we will be the people who determine whether or not this will CVE. It will really be the governments, at the local, tribal, provincial, and national level, that can 

adjudicate disputes for the people, allow them to practice, in their 

own cultural ways, those things that need to be done there. 

But, I will tell you that it’s different in every valley, every regional command, and every country as we do these things. So, the 

approach that’s working in Afghanistan, in Marja, may not be the 

same approach that will work in another portion of that country, 

and clearly is not the approach that will work somewhere else to 

CVE. It is a start in that particular environment. 

Senator, as we counter these narratives, the ‘‘s’’ in narratives is 

huge, plural. They are all different; they are all nuanced; they are 

all ethnically, religiously, and culturally based; and each one requires the same detailed solution at that local level as the architecture to support it does at our level as we bring assets to bear. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Each of you has said, today, that you all 

are ‘‘largely’’ working together. What can we do, in Congress, to 

help you bridge the differences so that you’re not ‘‘largely’’ working 

together, but that you’re more completely working together? 

Mr. REID. I would just emphasize again, Mr. Chairman, the point 

that Ambassador Benjamin has brought up a couple of times. From 

our view, in DOD—and you talked about the balance—the best 

thing you could do for us would be to expand the resources and the 

capacity within the diplomatic side of the house, in DOS. 

We’re arm-in-arm with these folks on the ground, and they’re involved in the fight. They’d like to have more, and we’d like them 

to have more. Whatever could be done to build that up would be 

the biggest thing you could do for us. I know that, working within 

the authorities, all the legislation, and all those things that we 

have, I think we’re pretty comfortable there. The challenge is just, 

as I said earlier, in finding what our role is and where the limits 

29 

are. I don’t advocate that there needs to be a big realignment there 

in this effort, but strengthening the capacity within DOS would 

certainly be a boost for us, as well. 

Senator BILL NELSON. So, Mr. Ambassador, you think there is a 

resourcing and capacity gap? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I do. I agree with Mr. Reid; I think he 

has it right. I think that when we can bring more to the table, that 

always makes things work better. 

I will tell you that I was just out holding a regional meeting with 

a number of posts. We were in Athens, and I was talking to people 

from, I believe, Iraq and its neighbors, so lots of countries in that 

region, talking about what we wanted to do in terms of CVE programming, and one of General Kearney’s colleagues, a three-star 

general, was with us, and we realized, after about 20 minutes, that 

he had never been in such a long conversation about such a small 

amount of money. That money was what we were bringing to the 

table. 

We are resource-constrained in this area, and we would really 

appreciate any support. Of course, the long-term political importance that Congress lays on this mission is an enormous boost for 

us, in terms of doing our work. That’s what we look to you for. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I want to turn to Senator LeMieux, but let 

me tell you, it just drives me bats when I hear, ‘‘Well, we have the 

resources to dig a well, but we don’t have the resources to go over 

here and help with education.’’ We have to figure this out, some 

way. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to make a point on a thread that we’ve discussed and that 

the chairman was talking with you about, as well as Senator Reed, 

and then I want to turn to a question on a different topic. 

On information operations, we have not done as good of a job, I 

think, that we could have. I think you said, General, our efforts 

were in the nascent stages, and we’re building on them. 

When I went to Afghanistan at the end of October 2009, I saw 

one of your folks, General, Colonel Craft, who I think now is back 

in, maybe, North Carolina, but he was there, working with the Afghan commandos. We were very impressed with what he was 

doing, where he was setting up these local radio stations, he was 

working with the local governor, and he was getting out the information, so that when the Taliban said, ‘‘The Marines just came 

through and killed a bunch of women and children,’’ which was a 

lie, they were able to get out accurate information quickly and have 

a place where people could get their questions answered. 

It occurs to me, and it occurred to my colleagues on that delegation visit, which was Senator Whitehouse and Senator Burr, that, 

in terms of this kind of marketing—and that’s not the right term— 

or information strategy—the United States of America does this 

better than anyone in the entire world. We get out a communication strategy, whether it’s on a political campaign or to sell goods 

and services, better than anyone in the world. I’ve had this conversation with General Petraeus, and I understand that, in Iraq, 

we actually use some outside folks from Britain to help us. 

30 

But, I would just encourage you to be mindful of the fact that 

there are tremendous resources available to you, outside of the traditional military and government structures, to put in place to help 

sell our message, whether you’re trying to counter the radical interpretation of the Koran, or whether you’re trying to get the information out to people on the ground that we’re doing good things, not 

bad things. I wanted to make that point. 

The question I have for you, and I want you to talk about, is 

Iran. I want you to tell us what your views are of Iran as an 

emerging threat to this country. 

Mr. REID. I’ll go back to, for this discussion, Senator, your question or your comment about the linkages between state sponsors of 

terror, radicalization, and the broader problems we face. When you 

asked that question, the first thing that occurred to me was this 

example of warfare we saw in the 2006 war between Israel and 

Lebanon, in which you had a very strong and very effective 

Hezbollah-armed activity. This falls into this area that we are currently trying to get our arms around; some refer to it as hybrid 

warfare. I agree with you that this is something we should be concerned about because it brings, yet again, another wave of challenges, and it will put us, if we have to face this type of warfare, 

in a position where we will be relearning and applying lessons 

we’ve learned in this broad counterterrorism fight, combined with 

other lessons and other methodologies, some of which maybe have 

not been things we’ve been doing a lot of lately. So, that combination of an unregulated terrorist organization, working at the behest 

of, or in support of, an aggressive state sponsor, is particularly 

alarming for us and what we do about it and how we organize our 

capabilities. I know going forward that there is a lot of ongoing 

work on this to really sink our teeth into what the implications are. 

More broadly, to your question, sir, obviously we’re concerned 

about what’s coming out of Iran, in terms of its nuclear program. 

The administration has signaled a desire to move towards a different approach, a pressure approach. We’re engaging with our allies on what those approaches might look like. I would just add 

that, and where we want to focus that, is really on the bad actors, 

and not do it in a way that affects the majority of Iranian people 

that are not involved in what’s happening with the elites in the regime and their global, sort of, terrorist conglomerate that they’re 

fielding. 

It is absolutely an area of great concern in that regard, as well. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Ambassador? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Senator, there’s no question that Iran 

was, and remains, the number-one state sponsor of terrorism. Its 

support for Hezbollah, for Hamas, and for a number of smaller Palestinian rejectionist groups, remains the main enabler of those 

groups. As a result, it is a primary impediment to achieving peace 

in an absolutely critical region. We remain concerned about their 

efforts to engage in all kinds of destabilization. 

I would make two points in this regard. One is that, I think that 

what we need to recognize that, if Iran continues to thwart the will 

of the international community, and continues with its nuclear program, the prospect of Iranian-backed targeting of U.S. and other 

western interests will rise. I don’t know that we expect them to do 

31 

anything rash in advance of a real confrontation, but we can’t rule 

it out. We are being very vigilant about that. We continue to be 

very concerned about the arming, and the really significant rearming, of Hezbollah since the 2006 conflict. 

I would add one note that I think underscores an advantage that 

we have here, and that is that, as a state, Iran is deterable in a 

way that al Qaeda is not. We can, of course, deter Iran, as they 

have assets, they have territory, and they have all kinds of interests that they want to protect. This has, really, over the last 15 

years, been a major reason why Iran has not been targeting us in 

the way that they did in, say, the early 1980s. I think that the Iranian leadership learned a lesson in that regard about the foolishness of going after U.S. targets. But, the government there has 

been increasingly hard-line and, in some ways, unpredictable, so 

it’s certainly a country that we are watching very, very closely and 

trying to keep close tabs on what they might be up to. 

Senator LEMIEUX. General? 

General KEARNEY. Senator, there is no shortage of effort on our 

part to look at what is clearly the number-one sponsor of state terror, has efforts underway to be able to capitalize on what is going 

on in the world today, and is constantly testing and probing the 

limits of what they can achieve against their regional adversaries 

by holding them hostage with surrogate organizations that work 

for them. These organizations are largely in the Levant in the Middle East, and of course, have tentacles that exist all the way down 

into South—Central America, and again, have the ability to ride on 

the communication lines that migration, crime, and extremism 

have moved on historically. 

The Iranians are a worthwhile adversary. They think, they 

probe, they test, they’re well resourced, and they are people not to 

be taken slightly. But, as Ambassador Benjamin said, they are a 

state and there are things you can do against a state. We have an 

overwhelming capability to take action against them, should the 

United States choose to do that at some point in time, and inflict 

harm on them, their infrastructure, and folks. 

At the same time, there is a rising population of youth who are 

interested in learning, growing, and surfing the Internet. You have 

to balance actions that you might take or consider against what 

you would gain or lose through actions that would reverse a growing population that seems unsettled with the leadership and the direction of their country. That discontent is growing and growing 

over time. 

Iran is a very, very interesting place where policy options, combined with military options, all have to be weighed with great 

measure by our senior leadership here as we plot the way ahead. 

I think there’s a lot of effort underway to think about that, at this 

point, as we look at trying to deter where they are going with their 

nuclear energy program and the potential for weaponization. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, General. 

I think, Mr. Chairman, this really is compelling testimony on 

this topic, because we hear, from the Ambassador and the General, 

that Iran is the number-one state sponsor of terror. 

A point I made earlier, which I want to just talk about for a second before I turn things back over to the chairman, is that I think 

32 

we’re all focused on Iran. We’re all worried about the combination 

of a terrorist, with Iran, delivering a destructive terrorist attack to 

this country, whether it be a chemical weapon or a nuclear weapon. 

That’s something, I know, that’s on your radar screen. 

Where I would ask you also to focus is not just to look east for 

that threat, but to look south, because I am concerned, with President Ahmadinejad visiting Venezuela and President Hugo Chavez 

on multiple occasions, and trying to project Iran’s force into Latin 

America, and its presence, and visiting countries like Brazil, who 

is an ally of ours, and the growing concern about Hezbollah and 

Hamas. We know there are terrorists already in Latin America. We 

know that our allies in Colombia have been fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for several years. We 

learned, this past week, that a Spanish judge has brought forward 

information that he believes that Venezuela, working with Euskadi 

Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and with the FARC, were trying to 

assassinate President Uribe of Colombia, and other Colombian officials. 

I worry, and what keeps me up at night, is that terrorist threats 

could come from the south, with a combination of Iran, Venezuela, 

Hamas, and Hezbollah, to our country. I ask you to be vigilant 

about that, as well. 

I think that, because of all the other problems in the world, we 

have lost our focus on Latin America. To the chairman’s point, we 

have some wonderful people in the military, as well as in DOS, 

who are doing great work down there. But, please keep your focus 

on that, because I think, in terms of emerging threats, we all know 

Iran is the real existential threat, I think, to the Middle East, to 

Europe, and to us. We have to look at dangerous combinations that 

could occur to the south. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you. 

You all have been an excellent panel. The challenge of CVE is 

a challenge of the entire globe. The Christmas Day bomber got his 

training in Yemen. Special Operations has a lot going on in Somalia. There’s a lot going on in Indonesia, the Philippines, in the 

Maghreb. There is no part of the globe that is immune from this, 

so the challenge is significant. 

I want to thank you all for this panel. Let me call up the second 

panel. Thank you very much. [Pause.] 

We want to welcome Douglas Stone, the President and Chairman 

of Transportation Networks International; Scott Atran, the Professor of Anthropology and Psychology at the University of Michigan and the John Jay College of Criminal Justice; and James Forest, the Director of Terrorism Studies and Associate Professor of 

Political Science at the U.S. Military Academy. 

Welcome. [Panelists expressed thanks.] 

Senator BILL NELSON. Your statements will be inserted in the 

record. I want to start out by saying, okay, you’ve heard the U.S. 

Government, what sayeth thou? Who wants to start? 

[The prepared statements of General Stone, Dr. Atran, and Dr. 

Forest follow:] 

Dr. STONE. Sir, I was sitting by Dr. Atran, and I think I would 

like to defer to him. He was taking very good notes on this topic. 

33 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT ATRAN, PROFESSOR OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AND 

JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 

Dr. ATRAN. All right, let me just give you an indication of where 

I come from. I go out into the field and trek with Mujahideen and 

talk to their leaders, or the leader of Jemaah Islamiyah or 

Lashkar-e-Taiba. A couple of months ago, I was with Khaled 

Mashal, the chairman of Hamas Politburo, and Ramadan Shallah, 

the secretary general of Palestian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). I go out I 

talk to the leaders. Then, I go out into the field and talk to the 

kids. I sit with them as they watch the Internet; I talk to suicide 

bombing families and cousins; I’m trying to figure out what they 

do. I’ll talk about Iran specifically in a second. I think that one of 

the great shortfalls in our current approach is that there’s really 

no one out there studying things, in depth, in the field. Many legislators and policymakers think that there are actual studies that 

are publicly available, can be replicated, and can be falsified if 

they’re wrong, not gut-feeling studies, and not from the clandestine 

agencies; there’s really nothing going on out there. So, people don’t 

know, unless it’s after action in theater, after they’ve already blown 

up a place, what really is going on among the kids. I think if your 

committee really wants to be relevant and solve the radicalization 

problem that you pose for yourself, you have to know the pathways 

that lead these young people to violence, so you can know how to 

take them away from violence. Again, I don’t think there’s much 

of anything being done. 

I think we’re fixated on technology and technological success. 

When some guy, who is one of the most reputable men in his country swallows his pride and love to come into an American embassy 

and say his son is being dangerously radicalized, I mean, even a 

moron could pick that up. I think we’re spending billions of dollars 

on widgets, and very little on engaging socially sensitive people 

who know what the dreams and visions of these people are, how 

to leverage nonmilitary advantages, how to create alliances, and 

how to change perceptions; they just are poor at it. 

In the military there are rewards and promotion, as there should 

be, for operational prowess and success in combat. That’s the way 

it should be for fighting and winning battles. But, if, indeed, the 

objective of the U.S. military now is a political mission, as well, to 

democratize, to help democratization, it is not currently up to par. 

There are no rewards or promotions for being socially savvy and 

culturally sensitive or for knowing what is going on among the people. There is just no structure for it. I think this is a terrible, terrible mistake, given the mission that the United States has right 

now. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In last Thursday’s New York Times, there 

was a column by Nicholas Kristof, and he said basically what 

you’ve said, that reports suggest that the U.S. will provide $150 

million in military assistance to Yemen, and it’ll also provide $50 

million in developmental assistance. How much of that assistance 

is going into education, where you can send a kid for $50 a year 

to school? 

Dr. ATRAN. People talk here a lot about things like brainwashing 

and recruitment. I see almost none of that. I see young people 

34 

1Following the hearing, Dr. Atran requested his characterization be clarified to state ‘‘how 

many friends from soccer teams and neighborhoods can go to Iraq.’’ 2Dr. Atran later indicated he intended to cite the New York Police Department rather than 

the Federal Burea of Investigation for success. 3Dr. Atran noted this number should be 90 percent following the hearing. 

4Dr. Atran asked that additional remarks be included after the hearing to elaborate on this 

topic. They are as follows: Significantly fewer [Iranians] are interested in acquiring a nuclear 

hooking up with their friends. You’d be surprised how many whole 

soccer teams 1 can go to Iraq and get themselves blown up. I see 

them hooking up with their friends and going on a glorious mission. There is nothing more thrilling, adventurous, and glorious 

than fighting the greatest power in the world today, and jihad is 

an equal employment employer; anyone can do that. It has to be 

at the level of peer-to-peer relations, not so much talking to community leaders. Even in Afghanistan, you have new guys—23-yearolds, not tribal elders—who are running the opinions of these 

young people. You have to get them where they meet—in their barber shops, in their restaurants—know what’s going on with them, 

and steer their message. This does not happen from the top. 

I’ve found that Salafis and Wahhabis are the only ones I have 

ever encountered in the field who have actually gotten people not 

to do suicide bombings after they have committed themselves to a 

bombing. You can utilize these guys. 

I see confusion. We were with the New York Police Department 

(NYPD) and others in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The NYPD and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have marvelous, marvelous 

programs. I think the FBI’s2 program on deradicalization is probably the best in the world I’ve seen. They’re all over the world. But, 

they’re there in Saudi Arabia with the Prince that is there, and the 

FBI is saying, ‘‘We have to stop the Salafis,’’ when 99 percent 3 of 

Saudis are Salafis, including the Prince. There’s just no cultural 

sensitivity that I can think of. It’s gotten post-talk; after the fact, 

people come in, and then they realize they have to know what’s 

going on, on the ground. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I want to hear from the other two witnesses, but, in essence, then, you say, what we just heard on the 

government panel is just more of the same. 

Dr. ATRAN. You’ve heard it. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You’re saying that the U.S. Government 

really doesn’t understand the concept of violent jihadists. 

Dr. ATRAN. No. I think there are people in the government, quite 

a bunch of people in the government, that do. I think Doug Stone 

understands CVE. He’s not in the government anymore. 

Senator BILL NELSON. It’s too bad that the first panel didn’t stay 

so they could hear this. May we send a transcript to each of the 

first panel? 

Dr. ATRAN. Let me just say one more word on Iran. 

We just finished the study. We have a massive study going on 

in Iran right now. Again, based on fieldwork, what we’re interested 

in is finding out whether the people are committed to acquiring a 

nuclear capability, a nuclear weapon. We find that about 11 percent are in Iran. The more you provide carrots and sticks—that is, 

the more you do material incentives, either for or against—the 

more this 11 percent becomes devoted to trying to acquire a nuclear weapon in Iran.4

35 

weapon, as opposed to nuclear energy, which is now a matter of national identity and pride. 

But at each stage, the regime manages to get the population to go along with media portrayals, 

say, of children who could be cured of cancer with radiation treatments, implying the west 

wants Iranian children to die. We have to learn how to counter these messages in ways the 

Iranian public can latch on to. 

I think the studies themselves can offer very surprising insights 

into what’s going on in these people’s minds in the case of Iran, but 

also in other areas. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Atran follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SCOTT ATRAN, PH.D. 

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member LeMieux, and Senators, I appreciate your letting me, an anthropologist, relate my views on the U.S. Government’s strategy and 

efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalization and the military’s role in 

these efforts. I’ve been with would-be martyrs and holy warriors from Morocco’s Atlantic shore to Indonesia’s outer islands, and from Gaza to Kashmir. My field experience and studies in diverse cultural settings inform my views. 

This an apt moment for such a hearing, given the recent uptick in homegrown 

terror activities, the failed Christmas Day airliner attack, and further rooting of al 

Qaeda’s viral social movement in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, the Maghreb, and the 

worldwide web. 

First of all, there is a deep lack of Field-Based Scientific Research on Pathways 

to and from Political and Group Violence. To be specific: 

• At present, we spend tens of billions of dollars to equip and protect our 

servicemembers, but only fractions of that are spent on understanding the 

pathways to and from violent extremism, which maybe even more important for keeping our country safe and our service men and women out of 

harm’s way. 

• The concept of science-based field research—embedded in potential 

hotspots and open to public verification and replication, with clear ways 

and means to falsify what is wrong—is often misunderstood in Washington. 

Most legislators and policymakers think that we have a great deal of this 

type of research being undertaken and funded. We don’t. 

• If you want to be successful in the long run where it counts—in stopping 

the next and future generations of disaffected youth from finding their life’s 

meaning in the thrill and adventure of joining their friends in taking on 

the world’s mightiest power; if this committee is to be truly relevant in solving the radicalization problem that it poses, then you have to understand 

these pathways that take young people to and from political and group violence. Then, knowing these pathways, you can do what needs to be done. 

• Quality field-based scientific research can help save lives and treasury. 

Here is how it works. At ARTIS Research, for example, and with assistance 

from the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Air Force Research Lab, 

the Army Research Office, the Office of Naval Research and the National 

Science Foundation, we put anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, 

psychologists, mathematicians, and sometimes even physicists and chemists 

into interdisciplinary teams in a conflict region. We then begin to explore 

the nature of the conflict with leaders, community members, and youth. We 

follow up with an experimental design—which allows ready replication of 

initial results or falsification of our hypotheses—to understand pathways to 

and from violence. 

Here are a few of our general findings on recent changes in paths to violent extremism: 

• As ARTIS Policy Fellow Juan Zarate described in his January 27 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, as a result of formidable U.S. military and intelligence efforts, al Qaeda is on the ropes globally, faced with ever dwindling financial and popular support, and drastically diminished ability to hook up with other extremists worldwide, much 

less command and control them for major operations against us. 

• The main security concern no longer comes from any organization, or 

from well-trained cadres of volunteers who typically had some advanced 

education, often in engineering and medical studies. The threat today is 

from al Qaeda—inspired viral social and political movement that abuses religion in the name of defending a purist form Sunni Islam, and which is 

particularly contagious among Muslim youth who are increasingly 

36 

marginalized—economically, socially, politically—and are in transition 

stages in their lives, such as immigrants, students, and those in search of 

friends, mates, and jobs. 

• Economic globalization, which has led to greater access by humankind to 

material opportunity, has also led to a crisis, even collapse, of cultures, as 

people unmoored from millennial traditions flail about in search of a social 

identity. Today’s most virulent terrorism is rooted in rootlessness and restlessness. This gives an opening for embrace by the radical fraternity that 

preaches the jihadi cause, whose oxygen is the publicity provided by global 

media. The Qaeda movement is largely a diaspora phenomenon of people 

who enlist, rather than are recruited, outside their country of origin. 

• The widespread notion of a ‘‘clash of civilizations’’ along traditional historical ‘‘fault lines’’ is woefully misleading. Violent extremism represents a 

crash of traditional territorial cultures, not their resurgence. Individuals 

now mostly radicalize horizontally with their peers, rather than vertically 

through institutional leaders or organizational hierarchies. They do so 

mostly in small groups of friends—from the same neighborhood or social 

network—or even as loners who find common cause with a virtual internet 

community. 

• Entry into the jihadi brotherhood is from the bottom up: from alienated 

and marginalized youth seeking out companionship, esteem, and meaning, 

but also the thrill of action, sense of empowerment, and glory in fighting 

the world’s most powerful nation and army. In an ongoing study for the 

Army, ARTIS Research Director Marc Sageman finds that popular jihadi 

Internet Imams, like Anwar al-Awlaki, are important not because they 

brainwash, command, or even guide others to actions and targets. Rather, 

popular radical Imams serve as ‘‘attractors’’ whose message and presence 

draws into line a searching soul who has already pretty much chosen his 

own path. Major Hassan, for example, sent over a score of email messages 

to Awlaki but received only two back, with no operational implications. 

• Gallup and Pew surveys indicate that perhaps 7 percent of the world’s 

Muslim population—nearly 100 million people—sympathize with jihadi aspirations. But of those many millions, only a few thousands actually commit 

to violence. Our data show that a reliable predictor of whether or not someone joins the Jihad is being a member of an action-oriented group of 

friends. It’s surprising how many soccer buddies join together. 

• The boundaries of the newer terrorist networks are very loose and fluid, 

and the internet now allows anyone who wishes to become a terrorist to become one, anywhere, anytime. More and more, terror networks are intertwined with petty criminal networks: drug trafficking, stolen cars, credit 

card fraud, and the like. This development is in part an unintended consequence of two of our successes: financial policing forced would-be terrorists to rely on local, low-cost, informal, underground methods of financing; 

and disruption of their organizations meant that terrorists would have to 

find new clandestine means for acquiring weapons and managing logistics. 

• Although lack of economic opportunity often reliably leads to criminality, 

it turns out that some criminal youth really don’t want to be criminals after 

all. Given half a chance to take up a moral cause, they can be even more 

altruistically prone than others to give up their lives for their comrades and 

cause. This is one indication—and our research reveals others—that economic opportunities alone may not turn people away from the path to political violence. (Indeed, material incentives, whether ‘‘carrots’’ or ‘‘sticks,’’ can 

even backfire when they threaten core values, as our recent research has 

shown for Israel, Palestine, Indonesia, and Iran). Rather, youth must be 

given hopes and dreams of achievement, and plausible means to realize 

such hopes and dreams. 

• Therefore, a coherent program to counter extremist violence should focus 

on peer-to-peer efforts, not elders trying to teach youth about moderation 

or the Koran. It will take mobilizing the purpose-seeking, risk-taking, adventurous spirit of youth for heroic action. Today, ‘‘Happiness is martyrdom’’ can be as emotionally contagious to kids in a forlorn urban African 

neighborhood or to a lost youth on the Internet as ‘‘Yes, we can.’’ That is 

a stunning and far-reaching development that we must learn to steer in the 

right direction. 

Why present U.S. efforts to counter radicalization abroad fall short: 

• For two main reasons: We are fixated on technology and technological 

success, and we have no sustained or systematic approach to field-based soVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
37 

cial understanding of our adversaries’ motivation, intent, will, and the 

dreams that drive their strategic vision, however strange those dreams and 

vision may seem to us. 

• On the intelligence side, the Christmas Day bombing attempt was a deep 

failing caused, in part, by too great a reliance on technology to the detriment of social intelligence. Computers, and the stochastic models and algorithms they use, are not particularly well suited to pick up the significance of the almost unimaginable psychological effort it took for one of the 

most respected men in a nation to swallow his pride and love of family and 

walk into an American embassy to say that his son was being dangerously 

radicalized. Widgets—for which there are billions of dollars—cannot do the 

job of socially sensitive thinkers—for whom there is relatively little concrete 

support—in creating alliances, leveraging non military advantages, reading 

intentions, building trust, changing opinions, managing perceptions, and 

empathizing (though not necessarily sympathizing) with others so as to understand, and change, what moves them to do what they do. 

• On the military side, career advancement in the armed forces privileges 

operational prowess and combat experience, which are necessary to gain 

victory in battles. But different abilities also may be necessarily for winning 

without having to fight, or for ending a war in Lincoln’s definitive sense of 

destroying enemies by making them into friends. After all, as George Marshall well understood, that is what American efforts at democratization 

abroad are ultimately about. Soldiers continue to be trained and rewarded 

as operators and combat organizers, but they are not as adequately trained 

for the political mission they are now being asked to carry out, which requires cultural and psychological expertise at being social mediators, managers, and movers. As one Air Force General said to me: ‘‘I was trained for 

Ds—defeat, destroy, devastate—now I’m told we have responsibility for the 

Rs—rebuild, reform, renew . Well, I was never trained for that, so what the 

Hell am I supposed to do? Destroy in just the right way to rebuild?’’ 

• A serious problem in our cooperation with intelligence and military counterparts in several countries—for example, Morocco, Egypt, Uzbekistan—is 

that they have trouble even recognizing they have homegrown problems of 

radicalization that are not due to the west or to some nebulous ‘‘Jihad 

International.’’ 

• We’re winning against al Qaeda and its associates in places where 

antiterrorism efforts are local and built on an understanding that the ties 

binding terrorist networks today are more about social connections than political or ideological. I recently argued in the New York Times (‘‘To Beat Al 

Qaeda, Look to the East,’’ December 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 

2009/12/13/opinion/13atran.html) that using knowledge friendship, kinship 

and discipleship has been very successful in Southeast Asia, and shows 

promise for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its January 20, 2010 report on ‘‘Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia’’ 

(http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 

Al%20Qaeda%20in%20Yemen%20and%20Somalia.pdf) also recommends, as 

part of U.S. strategy, the understanding that I outlined, although I believe 

that more research is needed there to support that recommendation. 

At home, efforts by intelligence and law enforcement to counter radicalization 

have been minimally disruptive of society and effective, and could better inform efforts abroad. 

• Success at home is greatly facilitated by the fact that the overwhelming 

majority of Muslim immigrants into the United States, unlike in Europe, 

become rapidly and thoroughly integrated into mainstream American society. Immigrant Muslims generally buy into the American dream and succeed in education, in the economy, and in maintaining a strong, composite 

sense of both Muslim and American identity. 

• The approach of the NYPD, informed by its fine intelligence analysis unit 

and keen sensitivity to the city’s diverse cultural makeup, is exemplary. Recent proposals by the FBI’s Community Relations Unit hold reasonable 

promise for preventing radicalization by building resilience in potential 

hotspot communities. I have asked the FBI to provide a summary of its program to you, and it is has been made available as a handout. 

• Recent community outreach programs in the UK, the Netherlands, and 

Denmark are trying to build resilience within their Muslim communities to 

radicalization, and they are experimenting with a variety of different local 

initiatives to see what works best. A drawback is that in some cases they 

38 

use anti-democratic interlocutors (Salafis and Wahhabis) to reach out and 

bring back would-be jihadis into the nonviolent fold. That has given 

Islamist groups prestige in the community and validated them to some degree. 

• Yet, in some Muslim countries, like Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, Salafi 

and Wahhabi initiatives have been the most effective at drawing young 

Muslims back from violence. 

• Turkey’s approach, like that of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, treats jihadi 

terrorism more as an issue of public health and community responsibility 

than as a criminal or military matter. That approach appears to be producing positive results. 

Involve social scientists, but not in theater: 

• There is a pressing need for fieldwork by social scientists in actual and 

potential conflict zones. There is also compelling case for involving social 

scientists in helping to form cultural and social awareness in the military 

theater. Nevertheless, social scientists should not be directly embedded 

with military units in theater. 

• For example, I do not think that efforts like the Human Terrain System 

experiment in Afghanistan are all that promising. It is the infantry units 

themselves that should be trained before they go in theater to be culturally 

sensitive, and not have to rely on temporarily embedded ‘‘combat 

ethnographers’’ who move from unit to unit, thus undoing the personal connections that may have made them effective with the local population by 

providing medical aid and other needed nonmilitary services. 

• More important for our Nation, such efforts as these, small as they are, 

are potentially quite counterproductive. They only further alienate most social science academics from the military or, indeed, from any involvement 

in U.S. policy decisionmaking that involves projection of power or conflict. 

The military and cultural reality of the terrain may favor having embedded 

social scientists be uniformed and armed (in part, because unarmed Western civilians would more likely draw fire as high-value targets). But the 

possibility that social scientists themselves would have to fire their weapons and perhaps kill local people—indeed, the mere sight of armed and uniformed American social scientists in a foreign theater—is guaranteed to engender academia’s deep hostility. 

• Ever since the Vietnam war, there has been mutual antipathy and antagonism between most academic social science—at least at the outstanding 

universities—and U.S. military operations and military-related policymaking. But unlike the case with the Vietnam war, many social scientists 

today believe that violent extremism is a danger that needs to be dealt 

with. Training and rewarding soldiers for being culturally knowledgeable 

and socially savvy—which goes beyond learning a language or studying a 

checklist of cultural preferences and habits—could be so much more effective for achieving our country’s political and military mission. Moreover, involvement of top social scientists in deliberations such as these, and in publicly transparent field projects, could help heal the divide between some of 

our best thinkers and policymakers and operators. 

A coherent program to counter violent extremism should focus on: 

• Preventing radicalization to violence—especially among youth and the 

next generation. 

• Countering radicalization that has progressed to violence, by decoupling 

the Qaeda movement from the local and cultural grievances and national 

movements that Qaeda tries to co-opt. For example, the Taliban and Somalia’s Islamic Courts, unlike al Qaeda, are interested in their homeland, not 

ours, and all need to be dealt with very differently. 

• Deradicalizing those who have committed to violence. Although a ‘‘public 

health’’ approach to radicalization would be hard to legally implement in 

the USA, it has been part of the apparent success of the deradicalization 

program initiated by General Douglas Stone in Iraqi prisons, which gives 

families and communities responsibility for keeping former detainees out of 

trouble. In a reversal of the policies that led to the abuses of Abu Ghraib, 

that program has seriously addressed the cultural sensitivities of detainees 

and respect for their persons. 

39 

SUMMARY: DERADICALIZATION, LIKE RADICALIZATION, IS BETTER FROM BOTTOM UP

THAN TOP DOWN

When you look at young people like the ones who grew up to blow up trains in 

Madrid in 2004, carried out the slaughter on the London underground in 2005, 

hoped to blast airliners out of the sky en route to the United States in 2006 and 

2009, and journeyed far to die killing infidels in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen 

or Somalia; when you look at whom they idolize, how they organize, what bonds 

them and what drives them; then you see that what inspires the most lethal terrorists in the world today is not so much the Koran or religious teachings as a thrilling 

cause and call to action that promises glory and esteem in the eyes of friends, and 

through friends, eternal respect and remembrance in the wider world that they will 

never live to enjoy. 

Our data show that most young people who join the jihad had a moderate and 

mostly secular education to begin with, rather than a radical religious one. Where 

in modern society do you find young people who hang on the words of older educators and ‘‘moderates’’? Youth generally favors actions, not words, and challenge, 

not calm. That’s a big reason so many who are bored, underemployed, overqualified, 

and underwhelmed by hopes for the future turn on to jihad with their friends. Jihad 

is an egalitarian, equal-opportunity employer (at least for boys, but girls are websurfing into the act): fraternal, fast-breaking, thrilling, glorious, and cool. Anyone 

is welcome to try his hand at slicing off the head of Goliath with a paper cutter. 

If we can discredit their vicious idols (show how these bring murder and mayhem 

to their own people) and give these youth new heroes who speak to their hopes rather than just to ours, then we have a much better shot at slowing the spread of jihad 

to the next generation than we do just with bullets and bombs. If we can 

desensationalize terrorist actions, like suicide bombings, and reduce their fame 

(don’t help advertise them or broadcast our hysterical response, for publicity is the 

oxygen of terrorism), the thrill will die down. As Saudi Arabia’s General Khaled 

Alhumaidan said to me in Riyadh: ‘‘The front is in our neighborhoods but the battle 

is the silver screen. If it doesn’t make it to the 6 o’clock news, then al Qaeda is not 

interested.’’ Thus, the terrorist agenda could well extinguish itself altogether, 

doused by its own cold raw truth: it has no life to offer. This path to glory leads 

only to ashes and rot. 

In the long run, perhaps the most important anti-terrorism measure of all is to 

provide alternative heroes and hopes that are more enticing and empowering than 

any moral lessons or material offerings. Jobs that relieve the terrible boredom and 

inactivity of immigrant youth in Europe, and with underemployed throughout much 

of the Muslim world, cannot alone offset the alluring stimulation of playing at war 

in contexts of continued cultural and political alienation and little sense of shared 

aspirations and destiny. It is also important to provide alternate local networks and 

chat rooms that speak to the inherent idealism, sense of risk and adventure, and 

need for peer approval that young people everywhere tend towards. It even could 

be a 21st century version of what the Boy Scouts and high school football teams 

did for immigrants and potentially troublesome youth as America urbanized a century ago. Ask any cop on the beat: those things work. But it has to be done with 

the input and insight of local communities or it won’t work: deradicalization, like 

radicalization itself, best engages from the bottom up, not from the top down. 

In sum, there are many millions of people who express sympathy with al Qaeda 

or other forms of violent political expression that support terrorism. They are stimulated by a massive, media-driven global political awakening which, for the first time 

in human history, can ‘‘instantly’’ connect anyone, anywhere to a common cause— 

provided the message that drives that cause is simple enough not to require much 

cultural context to understand it: for example, the West is everywhere assaulting 

Muslims, and Jihad is the only the way to permanently resolve glaring problems 

caused by this global injustice. 

Consider the parable told by the substitute Imam at the Al Quds Mosque in Hamburg, where the September 11 bomber pilots hung out, when Marc Sageman and 

I asked him ‘‘Why did they do it?’’ 

‘‘There were two rams, one with horns and one without. The one with 

horns butted his head against the defenseless one. In the next world, Allah 

switched the horns from one ram to the other, so justice could prevail.’’ 

‘‘Justice’’ (‘adl in Arabic) is the watchword of Jihad. Thunderously simple. When 

justice and Jihad and are joined to ‘‘change’’—the elemental soundbite of our age— 

and oxygenated by the publicity given to spectacular acts of violence, then the mix 

becomes heady and potent. 

Young people constantly see and discuss among themselves images of war and injustice against ‘‘our people,’’ become morally outraged (especially if injustice resoVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
40 

For examples from case studies, see the ARTIS Report : ‘‘Theoretical Frames on Pathways 

to Violent Radicalization: Understanding the Evolution of Ideas and Behaviors, How They Interact and How They Describe Pathways to Violence in Marginalized Diaspora,’’ Report to the Office of Naval Research, August 2009; http://www.artisresearch.com/articles/ARTIS—Theoretical—Frames—August—2009.pdf. 

nates personally, which is more of a problem abroad than at home), and dream of 

a war for justice that gives their friendship cause. But of the millions who sympathize with the jihadi cause, only some thousands show willingness to actually 

commit violence. They almost invariably go on to violence in small groups of volunteers consisting mostly of friends and some kin within specific ‘‘scenes’’: neighborhoods, schools (classes, dorms), workplaces, common leisure activities (soccer, study 

group, barbershop, cafe`) and, increasingly, online chat-rooms.’’ 

A key problem with proposals on what to do about radicalization to violent extremism is lack of field experience with the context-sensitive processes of selection into 

violence within these scenes. To understand and manage the local pathways to and 

from violent extremism requires science-based field research that is open to public 

verification and replicable, with clear ways and means to falsify what is wrong so 

as to better and better approximate what is truly right. 

I and others at ARTIS are at your disposal to work with you on understanding 

how these processes and pathways to radicalization operate in the field in potential 

conflict regions around the world. 

ADDENDUM–1 TO ATRAN TESTIMONY 3–10–10 SAS–ETC HEARING

Understanding Pathways to and from Violent Political Extremism 

Of the millions who sympathize with an extremist cause, only some thousands 

show willingness to actually commit violence. Our research indicates that they almost invariably go on to violence in small groups of volunteers consisting mostly of 

friends and some kin within specific ‘‘scenes’’: neighborhoods, schools (classes, 

dorms), workplaces, common leisure activities (soccer, study group, barbershop, cafe`) 

and, increasingly, online chat-rooms. 

A key problem with proposals on what to do about radicalization to violent extremism is lack of field experience with the context-sensitive processes of selection into 

violence within these scenes. To understand and manage the local pathways to and 

from violent extremism requires science-based field research that is open to public 

verification and replicable, with clear ways and means to falsify what is wrong so 

as to better and better approximate what is truly right. 

At present, we spend tens of billions of dollars to equip and protect our 

servicemembers, but only fractions of that are spent on understanding the pathways 

to and from violent extremism, which maybe even more important for keeping our 

service men and women safe. 

The concept of field based research is often misunderstood in Washington. Most 

legislators and policymakers think that we have a great deal of this type of research 

being funded. We don’t. 

Quality field-based scientific research can help save lives and treasury. Here is 

how it works. At ARTIS we put anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, mathematicians, and sometimes even physicists and chemists into interdisciplinary teams in a conflict region. We then begin to explore the nature of the 

conflict with leaders, community members and youth. This approach allows us to 

build an experimental design—which allows ready replication of our initial results 

or falsification of our hypotheses—to understand the pathways that lead people to 

and from violence. 

ARTIS Research was established because there was a vacuum of capability and 

knowledge within the U.S. Government. The scientists and policymakers at ARTIS 

run the gamut from very conservative to very liberal, but they are joined in a common cause to lessen the threat from political violence, and draw our country and 

armed forces out of harm’s way, by understanding the pathways to political violence 

through interdisciplinary field based scientific research. Talent continues to come to 

us. 

Preventing radicalization is our first endeavor. We can do this by understanding 

the pathways to violence and redirecting susceptible populations with culturally appropriate stimuli in order to channel ambitions into more peaceful enterprises. We 

can understand the stimuli if we imbed field based scientific research within USAID 

and other foreign assistance programs. 

Counter radicalization is our second endeavor. Those who have already radicalized 

must be countered by redirecting persons involved into more peaceful alternative 

pathways. Again, countering radicalization is context-dependent; what works in one 

41 

part of the world may not work in another. Because of the dependent nature of 

radicalization to context, counter radicalization programs must be instructed by an 

intellectual understanding of the environment in which radicalism incubates. 

Deradicalization is our third endeavor. As violent extremists are arrested, captured or interdicted, there should be a formalized program which attempts to 

deradicalize those who have participated in furthering the cause of violent expression. Again, deradicalized programs in others parts of the world can instruct us on 

methods that work in different contexts. 

ARTIS provides a valuable role for the U.S. Government in its approach to prevent, counter and deradicalize those individuals that have fallen prey to an extremist agenda by developing a concrete understanding of pathways to and from politically motivated violence. We perform work with the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Air Force Research Lab, the Army Research Office, the Office of Naval Research and the National Science Foundation. 

ARTIS is at your disposal to work with you on understanding how pathways to 

violent extremism operate in the field in potential conflict regions around the world. 

ADDENDUM–2 TO ATRAN TESTIMONY, 3–10–10 SASC–ETC HEARING

U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation—FBI Outreach to the 

Arab-American, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian Communities 

Since 11 September 2001, the FBI has been developing an extensive program to 

strengthen relations with the Arab-American, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities. The goal of the program is to dispel myths about FBI and U.S. Government policies toward these communities, to build better trust, and to encourage interest in careers with the FBI. 

FBI Headquarters and our 56 Field Offices reach out to the Arab-American, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian Communities in the following ways: 

• FBI Headquarters has established liaison with the national leaders of 

Arab/Muslim American advocacy groups. The Special Agent in Charge and 

the Community Outreach Specialist in our Field Offices have also established liaison with the local chapters of the same groups. 

• FBI Headquarters conducts scheduled bimonthly conference calls and impromptu conference calls with community leaders to discuss specific issues, 

threats, or news reports when they occur. 

• The FBI conducts outreach to media outlets that have access to these 

communities. FBI Headquarters consults with national Arab/Muslim American organizations such as the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) to develop effective communications strategies. 

• FBI Headquarters attends interagency meetings with community leaders 

and components of the Department of Justice on a routine basis. 

• FBI Field Offices have conducted several town hall meetings in the past 

year. Most town hall meetings have local media presence; some have even 

been broadcasted as far as Europe, the Middle East, India, and Pakistan. 

• The FBI participates in conferences of national and local organizations to 

educate members of the community about the FBI. National leaders from 

the community also participate in FBI sponsored events to educate the FBI 

about their culture. 

• The FBI participates in interagency meetings with community leaders to 

discuss current issues or items of interest to the community. 

• The FBI is a member of the Incident Management Team to engage the 

community when incidents involving the community arise. 

The FBI Citizens’ Academy and the Community Relations Executive Seminar 

Training (CREST) programs are key components of our outreach efforts. 

• The Citizens’ Academy is a popular 8 week program designed to give 

community leaders an overview of FBI and Department of Justice policies 

and procedures. The Academy classes are taught by FBI executives and 

senior FBI Special Agents. 

• The CREST is a subprogram of the Citizens’ Academy designed to give 

community leaders an overview of FBI and Department of Justice policies 

and procedures. It is a shorter program conducted in partnership with a 

community group at an offsite location. The curriculum focuses on topics 

specifically requested by the organization requesting the training. The 

classes are taught by FBI executives, senior FBI Special Agents, or subject 

matter experts. 

To date, Citizens’ Academy graduates, CREST graduates, and Multi-Cultural Advisory Committee members have engaged the FBI and provided valuable insight 

42 

into the dynamics of various cultures. The partnerships developed help foster dialogue and continue to bridge gaps in communities where we face the biggest challenges in terms of trust and credibility. The opening of dialogue between the field 

and the various communities has presented the FBI with additional opportunities 

that have resulted in investigative successes for various programs in the field. 

FBI Outreach to the Somali Community: 

FBI Director Mueller recognized that the FBI’s outreach efforts with ethnic and 

minority communities, although engagement existed, could greatly be enhanced and 

inroads to relationship building furthered. These communities, fearful and distrustful of the FBI, had shaped their perceptions of the FBI through rumors within their 

communities and negative images seen on television and in the media. There was 

a disconnect. As a result, in 2009 the Director approved the implementation of a 

pilot program to shape the focus of the FBI’s outreach mission. The Specialized 

Community Outreach Team (SCOT) came to fruition as a way to build an engagement platform between the field offices and all the ethnic communities in their 

areas of responsibility. 

The Somali community provided the first opportunity to implement the pilot program. The highly-skilled representatives of the SCOT deployed to a select number 

of cities that have a high Somali population. They used a laser-point strategy to develop connections with community leaders and organizations that have a pulse on 

their community. These personnel bring a cultural awareness and sensitivity to the 

community and a professionalism that facilitates the first steps of engagement. 

The results were immediate. To date, in meeting with community leaders in the 

cities of Seattle, Columbus, San Diego, and Denver the SCOT has not met any resistance. In fact, the leaders welcomed the opportunity to engage the FBI. By reaching these individuals and ultimately newer members of their community, we can 

help change their opinion of the FBI, planting positive seeds and fostering trust for 

long-term relationships. 

The SCOT’s engagement with the Somali community also played a key role in the 

2009 Presidential Inauguration. A reported Somali threat during the inauguration 

was diffused with the help of the SCOT’s efforts. Having made inroads to community leaders within Columbus’ Somali community, SCOT members reached back, 

sooner than expected, to those key individuals for their assistance. The SCOT advised community leaders about the threat as it pertained to their community and 

that FBI agents would be investigating. The transparency helped allay fears and 

concerns and allowed for those trusted community leaders to spread the word 

through their established oral network. When FBI agents knocked on community 

members’ doors, some of the anxiety was minimized due to the FBI’s proactive outreach posture. Proactive FBI Community Engagement—Countering Violent Extremism Today, the FBI is collectively taking steps to identify areas/communities of 

concern regarding potential violent extremism within the United States. Moreover, 

to establish inroads into these potentially vulnerable communities at the grassroots 

level prior to extremist roots permeating the community and affecting those vulnerable for recruitment. The FBI’s objectives, to name a few, though this proactive approach are as follows: 

• Develop partnerships/relationships with peaceful/mainstream individual 

citizens and organizations that have a voice and high standing within the 

community. 

• Develop communication with local communities to identify emerging 

threats in advance. 

• Assist and/or partner with community based groups/organizations in establishing programs to engage and deter violent extremism. 

• Empower and increase the capacity of local community police divisions/ 

units to engage violent extremism as a Force Multiplier. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Stone, Dr. Forest, do you want to add 

to this? 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS STONE, PRESIDENT AND 

CHAIRMAN, TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL 

Dr. STONE. Sir, I would like to start by placing my own involvement in context. I was the commanding general over Task Force 

134 during the surge; I had responsibility for all of the interrogation and detention in Iraq. 

Senator BILL NELSON. That was in Iraq? 

43 

Dr. STONE. That is correct, sir. I have, however, served a couple 

of years in total between Pakistan and Afghanistan. I do speak 

those languages and have spent a fair amount of time trying to 

study it as a reservist. 

With that, I’d like to pick up on a couple of themes. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Please. 

Dr. STONE. First of all, sir, I’m quite specific about who the 

enemy is, and I refer to them as ‘‘violent Islamists.’’ For them to 

be successful, they must recruit in significant numbers. Sir, when 

the chairman mentioned earlier to the former panel, ‘‘What should 

the cohesive vision be?’’ my answer, sir, would have been to focus 

on reducing recruiting and to make that the single priority 

amongst our entire government effort. Ask yourself the question, 

were it that we did that—whether it be the Armed Forces and how 

they fight, DOS, each agency, and the wonderful work of these 

great Americans—if every effort they did was to limit recruiting, 

sir, outside the continental United States (OCONUS) and inside 

our own country, alone, would that not be the right aligning vision? 

It was said earlier, in the earlier panel, ‘‘You can’t see them.’’ 

That’s not true. 

Senator BILL NELSON. That you can’t what? 

Dr. STONE. You cannot see violent Islamists; you can’t find them. 

That’s not true. Every community they live in knows who they are, 

in general. Our issue is, we don’t know the community, to what Dr. 

Atran points out. 

Terrorism is a warfighting technique. The true enemy are violent 

Islamists, and their effort is an effort to convert the Ummah, the 

greater body of the Muslim religion. I have, I think, sir, 49 speaking engagements. I don’t go to any of them anymore unless there 

are Muslims there and it’s something like a Rotary Club. You know 

why, sir? Because those are the individuals who will make a difference in our country about how our country responds when the 

next effort really goes on in this country. 

My definition of victory has been, for the last 6 years, that this 

ideological war ends when nonviolent Muslims feel empowered and 

cause violent Islamists in their faith to be marginalized. You notice, sir, that I said ‘‘this ideological war’’ and that ‘‘nonviolent 

Muslims must feel empowered.’’ Ergo, sir, our powers of government need to facilitate that end objective, that they are empowered 

and that they cause the violent Islamists amongst them to be 

marginalized. 

We need a national campaign. Little question about it across 

multiple disciplines. I’ve written, in my paper, what some of those 

might be. 

But, I would like to pick up on what was just mentioned and say 

that it’s abhorrent to me that our leadership, fighting in these battles, no matter where they’re at, can’t speak the language, can’t 

read the texts, and can’t argue the arguments in the context that 

the others argue them. 

Sir, in Task Force 134, the way we reduced recidivism was 

through a combination of things, but one of the ways was that we 

had 143 Imams who were able to translate the 80-plus arguments 

against the violent Islamic beliefs and turn those thinking patterns 

around after, sir, they had a basic education to be able to read the 

44 

Holy Koran themselves. It’s appropriate if our leadership should 

understand that, as well. It was true in World War II. We had a 

significant number of German speakers and Japanese speakers. It 

isn’t true now. 

We need to engage in directed efforts to both demystify the 

threat and to disarm it. We need to establish metrics of success 

and new definitions of what winning really means, and new definitions of what fighting really means in an active and engaged problem-solving manner. 

I believe, sir, we have to align with the Muslims of our communities. The United States is a Muslim nation. We have Muslims in 

our Nation. I speak to them, and I’m with them quite frequently. 

They’re as concerned and as engaged, in their own way, but they 

have no aligning understanding of how to do help. They’ll tell you, 

‘‘You need to be involved in cyberspace, you need to be involved in 

community groups, you need to be involved with educators, you 

need to be involved with prison officials, you need to be involved 

with our religious leadership, and you need to be involved with our 

families.’’ Essentially, sir, what we need to do as a country is outrecruit and offer alternate ideologies and different dialogues than 

those that are being offered by the violent Islamists, the Web sites, 

and the places that they go. 

Most importantly, we have to be mindful that every single tactic 

represented by the former group that was sitting here and all of 

those that are out doing the hard work of our Nation’s defense, 

that they not employ tactics that will enhance the ability of the 

enemy to recruit. You must ask yourself each time, ‘‘Is what I’m 

doing facilitating, or not, that recruiting objective?’’ 

Some of these objectives, sir, in tribal warfare, are counterintuitive. In that context, I might even ask you to rethink the desperate act, the terrible act, of September 11. If the real goal of violent Islamic behavior is to convert the Ummah, what was the act 

of September 11? 

So, concurrently, we must demonstrate that whether they’re a 

detainee or a citizen, that we respect the rights of an individual 

and preserve their dignity. 

I write, sir, in my paper, about the three fundamental steps of 

radicalization. They’re not particularly difficult to understand; in 

the question period, if you like, we could discuss them. But, what 

is less studied in our Nation is how to address the radicalization 

process. Critical to our defense is learning who this enemy is and 

how it is that you counter this process, wherever they may attempt 

to recruit, and then to attack this nonkinetic objective with the 

same competency that we use kinetics. 

Along with the Muslim community, we need to create a global 

counterinitiative which results in slowing this radicalization and 

resultant recruiting. This is asymmetrical warfare. It’s a form of 

warfighting, but it requires what we’ve learned in combat when it’s 

been successful and what the great civilian agencies, who were formerly mentioned, practice today; that is, education, alliance with 

Muslim religious leadership, interviews, interrogation, detention, 

direct countering of ideological claims, and the engagement of families. 

45 

For violent Islamists, any rule of law different than God’s law, 

or Sharia, is also violently inconsistent with their belief. At your 

leisure, sir, I would love to speak to that topic as it relates to our 

own Constitution in its thread. 

With that, sir, I would turn it over to your other panelists. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Stone follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. DOUG STONE

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee thank you for inviting me to testify 

before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on the U.S. Government efforts to counter violent extremism. 

I begin my remarks on with the assertion that our Nation faces the constant 

threat of terrorist actions from violent Islamists. 

In an effort to recruit and grow their ideological insurgency within the Muslim 

global community and in an effort focused on ‘‘altering’’ the mainstream ideology of 

the Ummah towards a specific and fundamental orientation, this effort must recruit. 

Indeed to be successful in this effort, they must recruit significant numbers. 

Thus, the asymmetrical use of terrorism, a common precursor tactic in most 

insurgencies, is to establish fear and intimidation in order to change policy, and attract recruits to their cause. Terrorism, as a prolonged tactic, without resulting in 

significant recruiting rarely achieves the ideological objective of the force employing 

the tactic. The reason is that to be effective terrorism must kill civilians in a marquee event, and over time, without winning over that population, the insurgent 

cause is lost. Force of such kind can win, fear and intimidation can prevail, but terrorists, by killing those they want to convert, run a risk of alienating that same population. Tribal in nature, and often in strategic and tactical employment, the terrorists we encounter today understand this risk to recruiting if they kill or offend the 

‘‘wrong’’ members of the community. Therefore, killing American’s in general, is an 

aligning function and helps recruiting. 

It is vital that this subcommittee, our government, and our citizens not alter the 

desired end state but focus all energies on a broad range of existent and new talents 

and techniques to neutralize this threat. I believe there are three precepts to begin 

with: 

1. Identify terrorism as a warfighting tactic. 

2. Identify the true enemy as ‘‘violent Islamists’’. 

3. Identify the true aim of the ideological cause as a ‘‘conversion’’ of the Ummah, 

the body of global Islamic believers. 

By so doing, I hope to answer your question by saying that our national efforts, 

to counter this threat must be focused on, in part, reducing the likelihood of the 

violent Islamists ability to recruit in globally significant numbers. 

I will state my own definition of the desired end state in this ideological fight; 

‘‘This ideological war ends when the nonviolent Muslims feel empowered and then 

cause the violent Islamists within their faith, to be marginalized’’. 

To this end, while our military forces (Active and Reserve, CONUS and OCONUS 

based) must provide for the common defense, we must recognize that other agencies 

are needed, as are nontraditional—perhaps nonexistent—skill sets; new measures of 

success; different alliances; and new approaches that enable precise human intelligence gathering and sound policing techniques in order to thwart the efforts of 

those committed to violent Islamic ideologies and practices. 

To defend ourselves we need a clear, coordinated, and national campaign across 

multiple disciplines—education for our own leadership and citizenry; the constant 

development of new techniques in new populations across many nations. Some of 

those techniques will be comfortable, some hostile, and in ways that tomorrow will 

seem common sense, but today feel odd maybe even threatening. We need to speak 

the languages, read the texts, argue the arguments in context, and engage in directed efforts to both demystify the threat and to disarm it. We need to establish 

metrics of success, new definitions of ‘‘winning’’, new definitions of ‘‘fighting’’, and 

active and engaged problem solving from not just the halls of our Federal Government but from our entire citizenry, rallying them to understand what the threat is, 

and how they can provide for our common defense. 

To gain clear and actionable intelligence that proactively defends our citizens, 

while protecting our rule of law and liberties. We must know the enemy, and know 

and thwart his intentions. Simply put, we must align with those Muslims, who in 

each community can provide clear warning of such intentions. 

46 

This means that we must engage in person and across cyberspace—in community 

groups, with religious leadership, educators, prison officials, and families both within our borders and outside of them where the threat of recruiting might generate. 

We must ‘‘out recruit’’ and offer alternate ideologies, and different dialogues now offered by violent Islamists. More importantly, we must be mindful not to employ tactics that will enhance the enemy’s ability to recruit—as the example of Abu Gharib 

so clearly illustrates. 

Concurrently, we must demonstrate that whether detainee or citizen we have respect for the rights of an individual and preserve their dignity; yet we must accept 

the necessity of killing and capturing those who pose a direct warfighting threat to 

our citizens and national interests. For the mission to succeed these two pillars 

must stand side by side yet remain separate and equal. 

The U.S. Government agency with the greatest funding can usually direct the approach. The Department of Defense (DOD) rightly has a large budget, but to counter 

this challenge, we need to increase resources, both capital and human, in many 

areas of our government, other than DOD in an effort to discover the right balance 

of engagements necessary to counter this threat. 

To recruit, when not practicing the techniques of fear and intimidation, violent 

Islamists have effectively employed radicalization to the cause. Altering the belief 

structure of an individual such that they willingly discard all other forms of belief, 

oaths, family ties and societal norms and choose to willingly participate in advancing the cause of the violent Islamist ideological effort, and to act as a recruiting example, by conducting violent acts of terrorism—including and quite commonly suicide bombings. 

The process of violent Islamic radicalization is reasonably well known, and I over 

simplify by saying that it has three steps: 

1. The West, led by the United States, is engaged in a war against Islam. 

2. Muslims are obligated to defend their religion and there are theological justifications for doing so. 

3. Violence is the necessary means to defend the religion. 

What is less well studied in our Nation, is how to address this radicalization process. Critical to our defense, is learning who this enemy is, how to counter this process wherever it may attempt to recruit, and to attack this non-kinetic objective with 

the same competency that we use kinetics. Along with the Muslim community, we 

need to create a global counter initiative, which results in slowing this radicalization 

and resultant recruiting effort. This is an asymmetrical form of warfighting that requires education, alliance with Muslim religious leadership, interviews, interrogation, detention, the direct countering of ideological claims, the engagement of families, and efforts in economic development as well as teaching the skills of security 

and defense. 

By definition asymmetrical warfighting must engage the sectors of our government charged with foreign policy, justice, protection of our borders, education, humanitarian and relief efforts, outreach to at risk populations to understand what 

programs or tactics are necessary to turn an at risk population into an ally. 

Using kinetics DOD can create room for this type of asymmetrical warfighting to 

be carried out. One cannot exist without the other. This will require a cultural shift 

within the military leadership, our armed forces, and our governmental and nongovernmental partners. DOD and our military forces recognize at all levels that kinetics is not always the best or only answer. Non-military agencies and organizations will need to understand that the threat posed by radical Islamist is real and 

immediate and that kinetics will provide the safe harbor to begin the ‘‘social’’ work 

that must be done. If we are to succeed our citizenry will need to understand and 

support this critical shift to 21st century warfighting. 

Key to this success will be that we find and support those in the Muslim faith, 

in leadership and nonleadership, tribal and nontribal, secular and nonsecular roles 

to counter the narrative of violent Islamists, and to codevelop the full range of techniques and skill sets needed to counter radicalization and recruiting. 

As we sit in the halls that make our laws, across from the other two branches 

of our Government that enforce and judge those laws, I want to remind you that 

for the violent Islamists, that concept—of a rule of law different than God’s Law— 

Sharia, is violently inconsistent with their own belief. There is no need but for 

Sharia, judged by the Ulema, and its basis is the Holy Quran. 

To fail to internalize this reality is to fail to understand the motivations of most 

of these warriors for God. It is also why, at the extreme, this is the battlefield of 

the mind, and as much an ideological battle for the definition of a global citizen as 

it is about which rule of law should be the rule of the land. Violent Islamists believe 

in only one interpretation of that concept. While they are not trying to change our 

47 

Constitution or its foundation, so clearly stated in the Declaration of Independence—the concepts therein must, in their minds, be subservient to Sharia. 

This makes the challenge of this ideological war unique, one that mandates new 

learning by our own leadership and citizenship about a new enemy, by the need for 

the creation of new alliances, by new and clear clarification of goals, by clear knowledge between defensive actions and offensive actions, and in examining the physical 

and ideological borders of our own Nation as we provide for our citizen’s common 

defense, in this, yet another challenge to our revolutionary concepts that all men 

are created equal, under a rule of law, with the freedom to believe as their own 

judgment best guides. 

Again, let me thank you Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee for the 

honor of appearing before you today. I am pleased to answer any questions you may 

have. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Give us your thoughts, Dr. Forest, about 

all of this. What do you think about the government panel? 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I don’t mean to interrupt. I 

mean, this has been fascinating. I have another hearing. Is there 

any way I can just ask a few questions, or should we wait? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Of course, of course. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, one, thanks for having this. 

This is a very timely topic. 

Dr. Forest, I’ll let you speak in just a moment. 

I’d love to be here for the whole hearing, but I have to leave 

shortly. I’m just a big Doug Stone fan. I knew him as Major General Stone. I’m sure our other two witnesses have a ton to offer this 

hearing as well, but I just want to put on the record the role that 

Major General Stone played in Iraq. 

Camp Bucca was a military prison in the southern part of Iraq, 

in the Shia part of the country, that was being used by the American military to detain Iraqis that we thought were part of the insurgency. A couple of weeks before Doug took over, there was a riot 

in the prison. People had been in that jail in the southern part of 

Iraq, at that time, for a couple of years and never seen, really, a 

human being at all. The Sunnis were beginning to believe that this 

jail was an American prison being operated in collaboration with 

the Shi’a elements of Iraq. It was a nightmare. They literally had 

riots, and it’s just amazing that a bunch of people weren’t killed. 

When General Stone took over, he transformed that prison from 

being an insurgent breeding ground to part of the counterinsurgency success story. He brought in moderate Muslims to talk 

about what the Koran actually meant. He created an education 

program within the prison. I was there, as a reservist, when he did 

all this. The Minister of Education came in and certified the Camp 

Bucca education system as being Iraqi-compliant. In other words, 

if you graduated from the program in Camp Bucca, you were acknowledged by the Iraqi Government as having graduated from an 

Iraqi school system. We were giving people the opportunity to learn 

to read, write, and get a fifth-grade education, which made you eligible for employment with the government throughout Iraq. 

In addition, he created a job training program, where the people 

at Camp Bucca were given job skills, like making bricks. When 

someone was released from Camp Bucca back to Anbar Province, 

where the fight was going on, they had had an opportunity to learn 

from other Muslims what the Koran actually said, they had an opVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
48 

portunity to get an education that made them more employable, 

they had a job skill that was relevant, and they went back to 

Anbar as part of the solution and not part of the problem. Even so, 

there were people within the prison camp that were irreconcilable. 

The very first thing he did was to try to evaluate each prisoner and 

break cells apart. The ones that were on the fence, that planted the 

improvised explosive device (IED) for $500 because they had to feed 

their family, they basically were in a prison system where the radicals controlled the prison. So, he broke those groups apart, making 

sure that the ones that were reconcilable had a chance to come out 

of the prison and be a part of the solution. 

We had 24,000 people at the height of the war. Having those people out of Anbar gave us breathing space, in terms of the surge. 

But, what had been seen as a military prison arbitrarily confining 

Iraqis based on what the Shia Government wanted, became, in the 

eyes of the Sunni politicians, a humane, well-run prison, and he, 

Major General Stone, opened the prison up to all Iraqis and the 

press, including Sunni politicians. The prison got to be so popular 

that when people were released, Sunni politicians would speak. I 

was at one of the ceremonies where we released 150 people; their 

families were there, and it was a very emotional event. 

Finally, Major General Stone instituted a rule-of-law program 

that I worked with him on that made a lot of sense. Every detainee, every 6 months, got to appear before a panel of military officers or noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to make their case that 

they were rehabilitated or shouldn’t be confined. The release rate 

went from 5 percent to 30 percent. People thought there was a way 

out; it rewarded good behavior. The warfighters had a better idea 

of what they were doing; they were less likely to object to a release 

because they saw how the prison was being run. Before then, the 

Marines said no to almost every release because, from their point 

of view, it’s just one more guy to fight. 

Major General Stone, what you did in that prison, I think, was 

one of the key elements of the surge being successful. 

I would just ask a few questions and not take so much of the 

time. 

We now have a problem before us in Afghanistan. We have 1,200 

bed spaces available in the American military prison. We’re not 

going to get any more bed spaces. We had 24,000 people in military 

prison in Iraq, which gave the warfighters some breathing space, 

but we have 800 people and 400 bed spaces in what used to be 

Bagram Air Base Prison. So, when we capture somebody on the 

battlefield, they have to really look hard as to whether or not we 

can confine them in an American military prison because there’s 

just not enough bed space. The Afghan legal system is very immature. You have a real dilemma, from the warfighter’s point of view, 

and that’s one of the reasons I’m working with the administration 

on detainee policy. 

I do believe that Guantanamo Bay is the best-run prison in the 

world right now, but the image of Guantanamo Bay, in the MidEast, particularly, lingers. We need to break that because it is still 

a recruiting tool, even to this day. One problem with Guantanamo 

Bay being open is that our allies will not turn prisoners over to us; 

the politics of them potentially going to Guantanamo Bay makes it 

49 

impossible. Our British allies, our best friend in the entire world, 

have a policy where they won’t turn detainees over to us because 

of the Guantanamo Bay issue. 

My plea to Congress is, let’s look at detainee policy in a rational 

way. Let’s have a way to keep the irreconcilables off of the battlefield. There are 48 people at Guantanamo Bay this administration 

has identified as too dangerous to let go, but will never be going 

to criminal court, for various reasons. That is allowed under the 

law of war. But, there are plenty of people at Guantanamo Bay, 

and other places, that we may turn around. 

What I would recommend to this committee is that, when we 

look at our detainee policy, there has to be a component of detainee 

operations that General Stone implemented in Iraq; we need to do 

more than just be a prison; we need to be an example; it needs to 

be part of the war; we need to open these prisons up to Muslims 

so they can come in and see what we’re doing, just like we did in 

Iraq. 

We need to have programs for the reconcilables, so the recidivism 

rate could potentially go down. In Iraq, it became 1 or 2 percent. 

What Major General Stone did is, if you were released from Camp 

Bucca, someone had to sign for you in Anbar. A community leader 

had to vouch for you. Boy, that really worked. That’s something we 

might want to be looking at as we deal with the detainee policy. 

One last thought. There are more people to capture. We just 

can’t kill everybody because you lose valuable intelligence. Right 

now, we don’t have a jail available to American forces. The Afghan 

prison system is limited in what it can do in taking war on terror 

detainees. If you catch someone in Yemen, the Afghans are not 

going to be very open-mindeded to becoming the American jailor. 

We’re not using Gitmo. President Bush stopped using it for about 

a year before he left. This President, President Obama, hasn’t put 

anyone in Gitmo, and I understand his concerns about doing that. 

But, that’s unacceptable. We need a confinement facility we can be 

proud of that allows the irreconcilable to be held off the battlefield 

as long as they’re dangerous, and allows for somebody who is reconcilable to be turned around; that’s what’s missing here at home. 

It worked in Iraq. My goal is to create that same scenario here at 

home, because we will capture more people in this war. 

So, I would just ask General Stone—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. I just want to say, it sounds like we need 

to hire General Stone as the head of the prison. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I don’t know if he’d do it, but we sure 

need to have his fingerprints on how to do it. 

Now, he went to Afghanistan to talk about how you break out 

the irreconcilables from the reconcilables. I hate that we still don’t 

have this right. This is just so important to me. Pul-e-Charkhi Prison is the main prison in Afghanistan. They had a riot in December 

or so of 2008, wasn’t it, Doug? 

Dr. STONE. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. I went through that prison, as a reservist, 

right after the riot; you could still see bullet holes and damage 

from fire on the walls. In one prison cell, they had a chart of how 

to make an IED. The prison was being run by the Taliban; they 

were conducting operations in the south from the prison. They were 

50 

using cell phones to conduct operations. The number of insurgents 

in the jail was probably the highest percentage of anywhere in Afghanistan. 

We’ve finally broken that apart because General Stone went over 

there, and we’re going to build a new jail. We’re going to try to get 

the hard-core, big ‘‘T’’ Taliban away from the small ‘‘T,’’ and try to 

turn around Afghanistan. 

We need to be doing the same thing for a confinement facility 

here in America, because we need one here, in America, eventually. 

Gitmo has served its purpose, but now it’s more of a problem than 

it is an asset. That’s unfortunate, but that’s a reality. 

General Stone, could you comment on what I just said, and share 

with the chairman how great you are? 

Dr. STONE. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator. 

If you’ll allow me one sea story; it is material to our hearing, sir. 

Sitting in the front row was Colonel Graham and myself during 

the surge. Windows were being blown out in the building that we 

were in, which was the main courthouse. Judges were being intimidated. Twenty-six, I think, or so had been killed, and the remaining ones were still coming under armed guard to serve sentences 

against Iraqis. Then, we watched an intimidation effort against a 

member wilt once the eyes of the public and others were on them. 

The rule of law is so fundamental to how we engage in this global battle that it can hardly be underestimated. Each country, going 

back to the Ottoman Empire and after the split, has its own form 

of rule of law that balances Sharia with a different form. In Pakistan, for example, you can see the two courthouses, on either side. 

What we need to do is understand, in our own government, what 

that means. It does mean, ultimately, imprisonment or detention. 

That leads to the second dilemma. Inside prisons, historically, 

whether you go back to Azam, Sayeb Khatab, or pick your favorite 

leader, you will find that they came out of a prison system. I ask 

you, Senator, to consider my earlier comment. I meant, very specifically, to say OCONUS, as in outside of the United States, but to 

be specific about continental United States, and to consider, as an 

element of the emerging threat, the same picture that I talked to 

you about in warfare as possible here in our country. Perhaps an 

analysis of what the violent Islamic threat—the recruiting efforts 

and the radicalization going on inside of our prison systems at various levels—should consider this a legitimate target of this war. I 

could list a panoply of those kinds of things, Senator. 

I want to thank Senator Graham, both for his service to the 

Country as a colonel—that’s the only position I’ll ever be allowed 

to say—but also to point out how important the concepts of rule of 

law, religious leadership, and engaging are to our country. 

With one last comment, the Muslim religion, the Koran, does not 

have a separation of church and state; it is God’s word. Because of 

that, how you live on a secular and a nonsecular life are merged 

together. Our own rule of law, this being the body that makes the 

law, across the street where they execute it, and the other side of 

the street where they judge it, is foreign, in many ways, to any violent Islamic belief. 

When we say we are being attacked, the question that you need 

to ask is, are we being attacked because of who we are, because 

51 

Westernization is a threat? The answer is yes. Modernization is a 

threat? No. Many, many, many of these individuals are highly competent, in terms of modern techniques. But, what it really is asking 

is the question, Can we, as a people, have a constitution if Sharia 

is the threat against it? That is something that our population 

needs to engage in. 

My last comment would be, to the point that you made, sir, or 

I think it was you, in the last meeting, What should we do? I think 

of all of the agencies and all of the branches in all of the government, this Congress, of anyone who’s in touch with all of our American citizens, should know as much about this threat as anybody. 

They ought to be able to speak, in their own communities, about 

the threat, and be perfectly crystal clear, and engage with the Muslim communities there, because that information will be our defense; their alignment, just as it was in Iraq, just as it can be in 

Afghanistan, will be our defense. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Before I turn to Dr. Forest, and before you 

leave, Senator Graham, did you—any of you—get the impression, 

when I asked the question of the first panel, the government panel, 

about the twisting and distorting of Islam, that they seemed to 

gloss over that and not have an understanding? As a matter of fact, 

there was a specific answer, ‘‘well, there are many complications in 

this religion.’’ 

What do you think, Dr. Stone? 

Dr. STONE. Sir, I think our government leadership is not specific 

enough in it’s definition of the target, the enemy, or who they are. 

There are so few books written on the relationship between the 

U.S. and the Arab world, despite the fact that, frankly, our Navy 

was founded to fight the first fight of an Arab nation. The Marines 

carry a Mameluke sword from the first battle of Tripoli. This history is ancient, as far as our country goes, but the reality is, the 

understanding is just minimal. 

I would ask that all of our leadership speak these languages; 

that they understand, contextually, what is going on. I don’t consider myself an expert, in any way, shape, or form. I’m a electronics executive; that’s what I do. I’m a businessman. I pride myself on making 40 percent of my taxes come back to the government, paying my employees, and hiring more employees. But, I will 

tell you, sir, if I were a businessman, in dealing with this, I would 

not let my employees get away with not knowing the very specifics 

of the people they’re engaging for work. 

The 100,000-foot comment, that it’s all very different and very 

tribal, is true. In our own Nation, we have hundreds of different 

‘‘tribes.’’ 

Senator GRAHAM. May I interject? I think his question is a very 

good one. This concept, that this is a murky problem, that there 

is no distortion, is kind of hard to figure out. General Stone understood that distortion was going on, and he confronted it directly. I 

think that’s your answer: what he did at Camp Bucca was, he put 

people in front of the insurgents and said, ‘‘No, this is what the 

Koran actually means.’’ 

I think that’s what his question, Doug, is getting at, this idea 

that distortion of Islam can’t be dealt with; I reject that. You dealt 

with it in Camp Bucca. 

52 

Dr. STONE. I wholeheartedly reject that thesis. 

Senator GRAHAM. What he’s asking for, I think, is a system that 

we could employ, in our own jails and in our own communication 

strategy, to actually deal with the teaching of Islam. 

Dr. STONE. I mean, Senator, my expectation of our leadership is 

that they know this enemy as crystal clear as they would know any 

enemy that they would ever fight. I would ask—and they’re simple 

questions—does our leadership know this enemy as well as the 

leadership in this country knew, for example, in World War II, the 

two fields that they fought? If the answer to that is yes, then we 

are in good shape. But if the answer to that is no, we are not. In 

my judgment, the only way to engage this enemy is to understand, 

it isn’t the Muslim nation, it isn’t even but a small percent of the 

Muslim nation, and that the individuals who are being attacked 

are as much the Muslim nation as anybody, and that, if we align 

with them, they will filter this out, and they will find them. That’s 

what we found in the detention centers in Iraq, but that’s also 

what you find in many, many communities around the country. I 

think I’ve been to most of them recently. They understand. Our job 

is to help them do that. 

Now, helping them is very different than some other means that 

you could have. I come back to my aforementioned recruiting comment. As a businessman, I don’t manage what I can’t measure. I 

think we need clear measurements around this, and not hyperbole. 

We need to be able to say, as we said in Iraq, what to measure. 

General Petraeus gave me permission to do my program, and trust 

me when I say General Petraeus took the greatest risk in the war 

by: (a) hiring me, and (b) allowing me to make those changes. In 

my judgment, he did. What he said was, ‘‘Tell me what you’re going 

to measure as success.’’ I said, ‘‘Sir, we will take the 10 or 15 percent recidivist rate, and we’ll lower it to 1 or 2 percent.’’ Then, Senator, he put it on the board every 2 weeks to see if I was doing 

it or not. That’s the expectation we should have of our leadership. 

Senator, when you ask the question, if it’s not specifically answered and not specifically measured, I find that unacceptable. 

Senator BILL NELSON. It was not answered this morning. As a 

matter of fact, the subject of this hearing is CVE, and we started 

talking about deradicalization in the first panel. Any emphasis on 

trying to reeducate Muslims about what true Islam is, was minimized in the first panel. You have clearly, by your actions, by your 

deeds, as the head of that prison, shown otherwise. 

Dr. STONE. Sir, if you’ll allow me one comment. I hate to hog this 

mic, I really do. But, the reality is that most of the Muslim nations 

have a high illiteracy rate. What happens when you have a high 

illiteracy rate is that you can’t read your own text. If you can’t really read your own text, then you have to show deference to the individuals who portend to have read it, when they, themselves, likely 

cannot. Therefore, the very precise answer to the former question 

that you asked the panel was, it turns out, if the illiteracy rate is 

what it is, they can’t read the Koran, they have their own political 

agenda, at a tribal level, or a cultural level, then they are going 

to skew the arguments for participation in the Muslim faith, 

whichever direction they want. Sometimes that is towards violent 

Islamic behavior. You were quite precise, the Koran does not call 

53 

for the killing of innocents or Muslims. It’s precisely the opposite 

of that. The 80-plus arguments that we ultimately got out, by taking al Qaeda members, understanding what their arguments were 

and then countering them, some of them turned; some of them gave 

us that, some of us helped, actually, articulate the counternarrative. We turned it, got education started, let them read the 

Koran themselves, facilitated conversations, countered the arguments, and a large percentage backed off the fight. 

Now, it isn’t to say it’s going to work in all cases. It won’t. As 

the Senator said, there are going to be some irreconcilable. As my 

good friends who run the deradicalization programs throughout the 

world will tell you, there are some that will be locked up for life; 

they can never come out. It’s just a fact of reality. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Stone, wouldn’t it be something if our 

American leadership, as represented by the panel, or by others— 

we don’t have to pick on the panel that was here—understood the 

Koran and knew all of the prophets in the Koran, the three most 

important prophets, called messengers, being Moses, Jesus, and 

Mohammed. 

Dr. STONE. Sir, there are many wonderful facts of the religion. 

Jesus is the only prophet before Mohammed permitted by God to 

do miracles. Mary is the same Mary mentioned in the Christian 

faith. Gabriel, the same angel that brought the message to Mary, 

is the same. We could go on and on and on. 

You’re right, sir. But, it is not, alone, enough. What, alone, is 

enough is to engage a conversation and an understanding with our 

citizens in our Country. In this regard, sir, I’m very focused on the 

defense of our own Nation by engaging in a conversation with those 

community members and working with them to find solutions because they will know who the enemy amongst us is. They will 

know, or they will know enough. As Dr. Atran just pointed out, 

somebody’s going to walk in the door and say, ‘‘I’m worried about 

so-and-so.’’ Then we have to have the ears to listen, the heart to 

understand it, and the mind to be able to put in context what it 

is they’re talking about. 

Ultimately, sir, I think you will ask the question, What is our 

biggest concern? I’m prepared to answer that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, well, I’m going to get to that in a 

second, but I want to hear from Dr. Forest. 

You have been very patient, and thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES J.F. FOREST, DIRECTOR OF TERRORISM STUDIES AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY 

Dr. FOREST. Chairman Nelson, thank you. It’s an honor for me 

to be here. 

I’ve prepared some remarks to really address just the military’s 

role in CVE, and the conversation has obviously gone in multiple 

directions from that. I would like to just address a few aspects of 

the military contribution to CVE in this counterideology domain. 

First off, before I speak, I’m proud to represent the Combating 

Terrorism Center. Several of my colleagues there have helped me 

prepare a lot of these remarks that are now in the formal record. 

But, I need to, first and foremost, note that these remarks are my 

54 

own; they do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U.S. Military Academy, the Army, DOD, or any other U.S. Government 

agency. They’re my opinions, only. 

Senator BILL NELSON. We invited you here in your individual capacity, but you are also a professor at West Point. 

Dr. FOREST. Yes, sir. I’m going to address how I teach my cadets 

at West Point the issues of violent extremism that have been addressed today in both panels. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, now, I don’t want you reading your 

comments. 

Dr. FOREST. No. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I want you just talking to us. 

Dr. FOREST. Yes. I’m going to actually pull out, I think, three of 

the most important aspects of my statement. 

Military troops and officers are actually contributing to CVE. The 

case of what we just heard in the prisons is one great example of 

this. Providing the sort of safe and secure spaces within which this 

dialogue can take place is one fundamental aspect that the military 

contributes to the fight against violent extremism. 

The religious aspects of violent extremism is only one aspect. 

There’s a whole other range of violent extremism that we’re not 

talking about, such as the ethno-nationalists, the separatists, the 

leftwing/rightwing groups here, existing in the United States of 

America and other countries, as well. We’re not talking about those 

right now. We’re just talking about the religious—and a specific religion, at that—form of violent extremism. It’s really wrapped up 

in the essence of interpretation of the sacred texts. When you have 

interpreters competing each other for the validity and the credibility of their narrative, you’re going to have this contested terrain 

that we’re now faced with, a largely violent struggle involving a 

very small minority individual group, a population within the Muslim world who have misinterpreted various aspects of the Koran 

and are trying to achieve a political objective drawn on those misinterpretations. 

Coming back to this issue of what the military does, they create 

safe havens for dialogue, counternarratives, and counterideology 

conversations to take place, whether it’s in prisons, or in village 

halls, or even online. These are the sorts of things that the military 

does in terms of CVE. 

A second aspect that was asked, but not really answered in the 

first panel, was, What are they doing to directly combat the ideology itself? For a number of reasons we can’t go into here, there 

are restrictions, huge restrictions, on what the military can do. 

They recognize the problem. They recognize that communicating 

with both populations that have been terrorized, and are being terrorized by these extremists, and the extremists themselves. Both of 

those channels of communication need to be employed, but there’s 

very limited capability and legal authority that they’re authorized 

to follow through in those areas. It’s a necessary sphere of activity 

that, unfortunately, they’re not able to engage as much as they’d 

like. 

I want to really drill down on this very important part, in terms 

of the military versus DOS and other agencies involved in CVE. 

When you’re trying to influence the perceptions, the hearts, and 

55 

1 In preparing this testimony, COL Michael Meese, Head of the Department of Social Sciences 

at West Point, Dr. Assaf Moghadam and Mr. Don Rassler provided insights and assistance for 

which I am most grateful. 2For an extensive review of the various motivations behind terrorist activity, see James J.F. 

Forest, ed., The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (3 volumes; 

Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005) and James J.F. Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism and Insurgency 

in the 21st Century (3 volumes; Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007). 

the minds of our allies and our adversaries, there is no substitute 

for physical presence. We found this out in multiple dimensions, 

whether it’s prisons or wherever we are. Whether we are engaged 

in the Philippines, Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq, wherever we are 

engaged, there is no substitute for physical presence. I think that’s 

really where the rubber meets the road, in terms of CVE. The military troops are there; they’re doing the job of a lot of these other 

agencies because they’re there, and because they recognize the job 

needs to be done. That’s just the military approach; they recognize 

a job needs to be done, and they do it to the best of their ability. 

That’s the second aspect. 

The third aspect comes back to what Secretary Gates has been 

saying for a number of years, that soft-power activities can have 

a lasting impact on diminishing the resonance of anti-government 

messages put forth by these violent extremists. 

These aspects that the military is involved in, that are addressed 

in my formal statement, they’re fundamental and they’re necessary, but they’re insufficient on the part of the military doing 

them alone. The success of our CVE strategy has to involve the entire realm of government agencies. Military forces alone cannot defeat violent extremism, but they are involved across an entire spectrum of activity in support of the struggle that we’re all facing. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Forest follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY JAMES J.F. FOREST, PH.D. 

‘‘THE ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM’’ 

Chairman Nelson, Senator LeMieux, distinguished members of the committee, it 

is an honor for me to provide testimony to you today on our Nation’s efforts to 

counter violent extremism, and specifically the role of the military in those efforts. 

While I am proud to work in the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, and 

several of my colleagues there have helped me prepare this statement,1 I should 

note that these remarks are my own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 

the U.S. Military Academy, the Army, the Department of Defense or any other agency of government. These are my personal views only. 

Characteristics of the Fight 

Let me begin by offering a brief summary of how I view the fight we are in— 

and I use the term ‘‘we’’ in the broadest sense imaginable. First, there are a variety 

of violent extremist ideologies that appeal to a very small percent of the world’s populations, including right here in the United States. These ideologies motivate ethnonationalists and separatists, left-wing and right-wing groups, environmental and 

animal rights extremists, and groups who claim some religious justification for their 

extremist agendas. 

Many things can diminish the appeal of these ideologies—things like good, strong, 

legitimate governance; open, tolerant and inclusive civil societies; widespread economic prosperity; and forces of political and religious moderation. Conversely, the 

opposite of these things may enhance the appeal of violent extremist ideologies— 

things like authoritarian, corrupt, weak governments; severe economic distress; a 

social and political climate of intolerance; and hatreds derived from ignorance and 

mistrust toward different ethnic or religious groups.2

When I teach my cadets at West Point, I stress to them the importance of understanding violent extremist groups, as well as the critical environmental dimensions 

56 

3For example, see ‘‘Deadly Vanguards: A Study of Al Qaeda’s Violence against Muslims,’’ a 

report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (2009), available online at http:// 

ctc.usma.edu, and for ongoing discussion of violent extremist activities see the CTC Sentinel, 

a monthly journal published online by the Center at http://ctc.usma.edu. 4This is a point of special emphasis in Kristin M. Lord, John A. Nagl and Seth D. Rosen, 

‘‘Beyond Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy to Combat Violent Islamist Extremism,’’ Center for a 

New American Security (Washington, DC: June 2009). 5For a thorough analysis of these issues, please see James J.F. Forest, ed. Influence Warfare: 

How Terrorists and Government Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas (Westport, CT: 

Praeger, 2009). 6 A specific example of this, focused on al Qaida, is provided in James J.F. Forest, ‘‘Influence 

Warfare and Modern Terrorism,’’ Georgetown Journal of International Affairs Vol. 10, No. 1 

(Winter/Spring, 2009), p. 81–90. 

where these groups find support, because this is the landscape of challenges these 

future Army officers are going to face when they graduate. We discuss at length how 

humankind is embroiled in a struggle against a range of violent extremists who 

challenge our daily efforts to achieve security, peace and prosperity.3 Civil society 

and religious communities in particular play a central role in this struggle, mostly 

as unwilling and unfortunate victims of a small handful of very misguided and potentially lethal people. 

Defending our Nation from these forces of extremism is a task that falls to many 

elements of the U.S. Government, including the military, and requires foreign partners—especially foreign militaries, intelligence services and police forces—as well as 

civilian experts outside the U.S. Government.4 Since there is little that is appropriate for our military to do to counter the very important domestic, homegrown dimensions of violent extremism, my remarks here will focus on what our men and 

women in uniform are doing overseas—and doing very well—to support the world’s 

long-term fight against violent extremism. 

The Role of the U.S. Military 

Now, I’d like to highlight what I believe to be four of the most important assets 

that our military brings to this fight. 

(1) First, our troops provide improvements in human security, through kinetic action both offensive and defensive; they weaken, disrupt and destroy the safe haven 

and territorial base of the violent extremists. Not only are they doing this in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, but they have been assisting government forces in Colombia, the 

Philippines, Somalia, and many other countries in doing this important work. 

The improving security mission also involves training and educating local military 

and police forces, which our military is doing in nine African countries through the 

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership as well as in places like the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Colombia and even some Caribbean islands, in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan. Another important dimension of the security realm 

involves creating spaces for safe dialogue, healthy commerce, development and civic/ 

political processes in places that have been besieged by violent extremists. Building 

tolerant, inclusive societies is not something done by force, or even through leadership of foreign entities like the U.S. military. It is inherently an indigenous, organic 

process in which our military plays at best a minor but important facilitating role 

by providing these secure spaces for respectful dialogue and exchange of ideas. 

(2) A second essential area of the military effort involves communicating effectively with both terrorized communities and with those extremists who use violence 

to achieve their objectives. This is what I called ‘‘influence warfare’’ in my recent 

book,5 and it is done not only through conventional information operations, but simply by our military’s presence. When trying to influence the perceptions, hearts and 

minds of our allies and adversaries, there is no substitute for physical presence, and 

our men and women in uniform serve a vital function here in helping to understand 

and shape perceptions of security, justice and a brighter future without violent extremism. Countering ideologies is another fundamental aspect of this struggle, because the voices of violent extremists must not go unchallenged.6 Military professionals are engaged in this aspect of the fight not only through local efforts in Iraq 

and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, but also in places like North Africa, 

where the Department of Defense sponsors the popular Magharebia website. Clearly, as part of the broader struggle I’ve described, we must convince violent extremists that their way is a dead end, figuratively and literally. We must make it more 

difficult for extremists to disseminate messages of hate and replace those messages 

with an alternative vision of moderation, good governance and human security. 

(3) A third key area of military effort involves civil affairs and development 

projects. In concert with security, these help improve a population’s perception toward the central government’s ability to effectively and legitimately govern, and 

57 

make them less likely to turn to groups affiliated with extremists who provide alternative government services. Today, military units around the world are assisting 

foreign governments with efforts to improve education, rule of law, sanitation and 

public works, transportation, health services, and good governance. For example, in 

Djibouti, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa is working to build school 

facilities, combat the spread of Malaria, host business and government leadership 

summits, and in general work to strengthen this important national ally. In Afghanistan, our troops have complemented efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the international 

community by digging wells and building other critical infrastructure facilities, and 

helping local government representatives provide free medical care to villages 

throughout the country. These and other so-called ‘‘soft power’’ activities can have 

a lasting impact on diminishing the resonance of anti-government messages spread 

by violent extremists. 

(4) The fourth vital effort I’d like to briefly mention is where our military and intelligence professionals work closely with local government forces to help identify, 

locate, pursue and apprehend individual extremists. These operations take place not 

only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in other countries as well—places like southern 

Somalia, northern Chad, Kenya, Yemen, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colombia, 

among several others. 

Together, these four kinds of effort contribute enormously to our fight against violent extremism. As Secretary Gates has noted on several occasions, the most important military component in this struggle is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how 

well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. Further, the U.S. military’s engagement in these activities helps to undermine the violent extremists’ attempts to establish legitimacy for their ideology of hatred, death, 

and destruction. 

Credibility, rapport, trust, and cultural competence are all vital for the success 

of these military contributions to the fight against violent extremists. To that end, 

the U.S. military should certainly be commended for the dramatic changes we have 

seen in the education provided to soldiers and officers over the last decade. 

However, despite their many successes, as many have already observed the military efforts in this fight are necessary, but insufficient. Our military cannot and 

should not be at the center of the overall effort to combat violent extremism. While 

there is much that our men and women in uniform are doing very well to support 

this fight, military forces alone cannot defeat violent extremism. In particular, as 

others have already noted, there is a need for greater involvement by non-military 

U.S. Government agencies in two ‘‘soft power’’ related areas of activity I have just 

described: communications, and civil society development. 

In the absence of these other agencies having a physical presence in conflict 

zones, the U.S. military has assumed the lion’s share of responsibility for doing 

what needs to be done. After all, that is to be expected of the military approach— 

soldiers and officers see that something needs to be done, the success of their mission depends on it, so they figure out how to get it done as effectively as they can. 

This is only natural, and it is a vital contribution to the fight against violent extremism—as I noted before, when trying to combat the ways in which violent extremists try to influence a local population, there is no substitute for physical presence. 

Of course, in many cases civilian experts have played a vital role in the success of 

these efforts, especially those serving on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 

Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq. These PRTs have brought together civilians 

experienced in agriculture, governance, and other aspects of development to work 

alongside the military in improving the lives of the local population and helping 

strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the central governments in those countries. 

However, despite many successes, the need is still there for experts from USAID, 

the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Education, and so forth to be more engaged 

in the fight wherever they can. There is so much need for assistance, no doubt there 

is ample room for everyone to contribute meaningfully, including NGOs, IGOs, and 

the private sector. In closing, let me paraphrase something that Secretary Gates 

said a few years ago, something that I discuss often with the cadets I teach at West 

Point. Countering violent extremism requires economic development, institutionbuilding and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, 

providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military 

and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, 

58 

7Secretary Robert Gates, Landon Lecture (Kansas State University) Remarks as Delivered by 

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Manhattan, Kansas, Monday, November 26, 2007. On the 

Web: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1199 

are essential ingredients for long-term success.7 Our military forces are engaged, to 

some degree or another, across this entire spectrum of activity in support of the 

broader fight against violent extremism. But in my view, our long-term success will 

depend on how well the government as a whole works together to defeat violent extremist groups, both at home and abroad. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Stone, you wanted us to ask you one more question. Why 

don’t you restate that question, and answer it, please. 

Dr. STONE. Sir, I thought you were going to ask what keeps us 

awake at night. These great minds, on my left, no doubt, have good 

thoughts on that. I heard what was formerly mentioned. While I 

didn’t disagree with it, I was somewhat surprised by the response. 

Dr. ATRAN. Let me just put that in context with your question 

about the Koran. About 70 percent of the people who join the jihad 

do it outside of their country of origin. They used to be mostly medical students and engineers in the old days; now they’re increasingly marginalized and poor. Not disaffected so much, but flailing 

about for some social identity. There’s no clash of civilizations, 

there’s a collapse of cultures. They’re making connections horizontally. 

Eighty percent, as of about a year ago, of those who joined the 

jihad had no religious education at all. They are sort of born-again 

into it. They find it, and it grabs them when they’re young people 

and motivates them. The important thing is to get them early. In 

a confined space, like a prison, you can sit down with the Imams 

and you can talk to them. Out in the wild, where there people are 

radicalizing, you have to get them, with their friends, to come to 

these different understandings of where Islam can go. There is no 

program out there for that, that I see. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Is it curious that, in the first panel, that 

the word ‘‘madrassa’’ was never uttered? 

Dr. ATRAN. Let me just say something about the madrassas. You 

have 30,000 madrassas in Indonesia. Only 50—and I know each 

one of them—have been involved in the jihad. 

You have, also, tens of thousands of madrassas in Pakistan. 

They’re mostly for the rural poor. They’re good recruiting items for 

the Taliban. Lashkar-e-Taiba doesn’t want to touch them. Why? 

Because just having madrassa education means they’re not going 

to have computer education; they’re not going to be good in languages; they’re not going to be familiar with global positioning systems. Increasingly, Lashkar-e-Taiba wants those kinds of guys, because those are the guys who can meld into Indian society, or Australian society, and get something done. 

The madrassas are a very particular problem. We have to be very 

careful because, in places like Pakistan and Indonesia, they are an 

outlet for the rural poor. It really is only two-tenths of 1 percent 

of the madrassas. We can’t just go off saying, ‘‘Oh, well, it’s the 

Salafis,’’ or, ‘‘It’s the madrassas.’’ We have to be very focused on 

which ones to deal with and how to deal with them. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay, any concluding thoughts? 

59 

Dr. STONE. Sir, I would just offer that the North American Command should be at these kinds of emerging threat meetings. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good suggestion. 

Dr. STONE. There was an orientation, I think, in this hearing, 

looking as if the problem was ‘‘over there.’’ 

Senator BILL NELSON. Right. 

Dr. STONE. I would argue that perhaps that is not the greatest 

threat. 

I would argue, as well, sir, that there’s a very clear distinction 

between Taliban and al Qaeda. They are profoundly different—synergistic, in some respects, but profoundly different. To know the 

difference is to understand the difference in the enemy we fight. 

Dr. FOREST. Sir, if I may, on that regard—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. Yes, please. 

Dr. FOREST. There are a number of things that al Qaeda is actually vulnerable on, beyond the religious dimension, that I think 

could also be exploited in a counterideology narrative program. 

They are worried internally, and we’ve been monitoring this on the 

jihadi Web forums, about their own religious misinterpretations, 

and they’re engaged in a struggle to convince populations in the 

Muslim world that they have a correct reading of the Koran. 

There are also a lot of questions about their strategic competence. There are questions, internally among al Qaeda members, 

that they’re debating, about tactical guidance and about the abilities and capabilities of new recruits. A number of them end up in 

the suicide-terrorism pipeline because they have nothing else to 

offer al Qaeda. There are a number of areas that we could also attack al Qaeda’s narrative. They’re desperate for cash. We see this 

in a lot of their video and audio statements. They lack integrity. 

They fight amongst themselves about preferential treatment given 

to the Saudi and Egyptian members versus the Pakistani or Indonesian members. Of course, the biggest issue that we still have not 

really capitalized on is that they are the only Muslim organization 

in the world that routinely kills women and children and celebrates 

when others kill women and children. They have killed eight times 

more Muslims than Americans, or than infidels, in their attacks 

over the last 9 years. 

I think these are little tidbits of facts which cannot be disputed, 

which can be part of a very strong counternarrative that we should 

push out there. 

Dr. ATRAN. I’ll conclude with just three things. 

I think we have to concentrate on preventing radicalization at a 

peer-to-peer level. Then we have to counter radicalization. One of 

the ways is by decoupling, for example, al Qaeda from the Taliban 

and from the Somali courts. The third step is that we have to 

deradicalize. I think General Stone’s program in Iraq was fantastic. 

The way Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey deal with it is as a 

public health issue. It’s legally very hard to do this here. I think, 

outside of the country, it’s the best bet. I know the FBI wants to 

try something like that here, and I think it would be a really good 

move. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Before we conclude, can you please give 

me your comments on the success, or lack thereof, of the Saudi rehabilitation program? 

60 

5Dr. Atran later revised this number to 150. 

Dr. STONE. Have you been there? [Witness inquiring of the rest 

of the panel.] 

Dr. FOREST. I have not been there, no. 

Dr. STONE. I’ve been there. It’s expensive. It has a lot of money. 

Within the context of that culture, a very specific cultural context, 

it shows both success and promise. 

Bringing in other members from other tribal backgrounds and 

national backgrounds is going to be, by definition, less successful. 

No matter how hard they work, no matter how hard they try, it 

is going to be difficult, for any number of reasons, not the least of 

which is the program mandates family involvement, and you’re not 

going to bring Yemeni family over and treat them. 

So, the answer to your question, sir, is, it is a tremendous step 

forward, I believe, in the Muslim world. Tremendous. To have done 

it, to have initiated it, should be complimented by the entire global 

citizenry. But, to oversell it as a solution for all things, or even that 

the methodologies for all would work, is wrong. I would argue that, 

in my own development of my own system, we used pieces of it that 

surprised me because they turned out to be inordinately effective; 

and we were unable to use other pieces because they didn’t culturally fit. 

The answer to the question, sir, is, it’s very, very hopeful, but it 

is not an answer for all things. We need to learn how they got success, when they get it, and how they get failure, when they get it, 

and they do. 

I would, as my last comment I would make about all of the programs associated with deradicalization, suggest that perhaps one of 

the finest is in Singapore. However, all programs, ultimately, come 

to a realization that some people can’t be released. They just can’t. 

Because they can’t be released, that changes the nature of the 

radicalization and deradicalization work. All of them, sir, have education. All of them, sir, have clarity about what the Koran says. All 

of them have ulema involved with the conversation. Those are effective. All of them, ultimately, bring the families back, one way or 

the other, in the community. That can only be done locally, sir. 

Dr. ATRAN. In places like Morocco or Uzbekistan, or even Egypt, 

although there is some acknowledgement that they have a homegrown problem, at the local level there is not much acknowledgement at all. It’s taken as the normal course of events, and it’s attributed to the jihad international or the west. There is no real 

deradicalization program I know of that’s successful in these 

places. 

Another one that is inordinately successful is in Turkey; not for 

the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), but, in terms of Sunni jihad, 

they’ve basically stopped it and turned it around cold. It’s truly a 

marvelous program. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Are they doing that through the tribe, like 

Saudi Arabia is? 

Dr. ATRAN. No, they do it a little bit differently. It’s the Turkish 

National Police that is in charge of this, which is a fantastic organization. Now they have about 250 5 people doing their Ph.D.s in 

61 

6Following the hearing, Dr. Atran clarified that ‘‘here’’ was intended to refer to Europe. 

places like Colombia University or in North Texas, here in the 

United States. 

What they do is, someone goes to Afghanistan or Pakistan. They 

come back. They’re picked up by intelligence or the police. Word 

gets around the neighborhood pretty fast. Then the Turkish police 

get involved. It’s not like the movie Midnight Express where the 

film treated the Turkish police as horrors. They’re very sophisticated. They come to the family and say, ‘‘Look,’’ just as the NYPD 

does, ‘‘we don’t want a problem, you don’t want a problem. I really 

don’t know who your kid talked to, but what can we do with you 

so that it’s not a problem?’’ Then they work it out, together. They 

give presents at Ramadan. If a sister can’t find a job, they figure, 

‘‘Well, can we help her out?’’ 

The end result is, now they’re getting much too much information from their former jihadis. They’re calling them every day, saying, ‘‘Well, I have a tip there, and I have tip here,’’ and there hasn’t 

been a serious plot since Istanbul, back years ago, in 2003. 

It’s working with the community, with the families. In places like 

Iraq, Afghanistan, it’s working with the tribes. Here,6 it’s working 

with marginal neighborhoods. Again, every country is different. 

Dr. STONE. Senator, this has been bugging me, and I need to say 

it. There is an orientation—and I heard it even in some of the 

questions—that if we were to take in—and this is not the right 

word, but nation-building—and just bring the education, medical 

system, and everything up to par, that that would fix the problem. 

The answer is, it might, but it might not, because this is an ideological problem. So, even the poorest of all poor, if they believe in 

something other than extremism, will not be a threat. 

I would caution that a broad, sweeping statement about doing 

these kinds of things, in generalities, outside the country, or even 

inside the country, are not going to get us where we want to go, 

necessarily. It may work in some specific cases, where it’s exactly 

the right thing to do, but in some cases it’s exactly the wrong thing 

to do, writ large, because it will be taken advantage of by others. 

Coming back to the specificity of really knowing the enemy, we 

have to be so granular in our thinking that we have a specific campaign, not a broad, sweeping one; I think this is absolutely vital, 

sir. 

Dr. FOREST. Sir, while deradicalization programs deserve our 

support, there’s much more that I believe we can and should be 

doing to prevent and counter radicalization in the first place. 

There’s an area of research I’ve been working on, called ‘‘strategic influence.’’ The argument there is that, if we spent as much 

energy, time, and resources on trying to strategically influence 

nonstate actors and the populations that they’re trying to influence 

as we do on strategically influencing other state-based entities, I 

think we’d be, definitely, a lot better off in CVE. 

Dr. ATRAN. Let me just say, we have to have knowledge in the 

field of what’s going on, and we don’t. In Morocco, where five of the 

seven Madrid bombers grew up in the same neighborhood, within 

200 meters of each other. Another 5 within that 200 meters went 

and blew themselves up in Baqubah. They weren’t crazy people; 

62 

they went to the same elementary school, with Mickey Mouse and 

Donald Duck, but they radicalized, listening to chants on the Koran 

from radical Imams and radicalizing one another, as kids do, by 

moving in their parallel universe. You could walk in that neighborhood and anyone could point out to you who was going to go to 

Iraq. You could see how they dressed, and how fast they dressed. 

In Saudi Arabia, it’s very different. In Saudi Arabia, the way you 

pick it up is, who’s not going to the family mosque? Everybody goes 

to the mosque. Everybody’s been going to the neighborhood and 

family mosque for years. So, if they all of a sudden stop going, you 

have a good bet that they’re on their way. 

We have no people out there who know these things. I was walking around with a friend of mine, Marc Sageman—he’s a former 

Central Intelligence Agency field agent—and I said, ‘‘Marc, why 

isn’t there anybody here looking at this? I mean, you could spot 

them.’’ He says, ‘‘You can’t. I mean, agents can’t do that. They have 

to work through the Ambassador; they have to get permission; they 

write reports and do an analysis, but you can’t just go into the field 

and figure out what’s going on.’’ That’s a big mistake. 

Dr. STONE. Senator, suicide bombers in Somalia have come from 

our own United States. I don’t know the mental condition of Army 

Major Hasan. I don’t know his mental state or what was going on 

with him, but what I do know is, he broke an oath to support and 

defend the Constitution, a Hippocratic Oath to do no harm, and ultimately chose another oath. 

The concept of radicalization, however we want to bring it about, 

is here. We need to engage it here, as well as there. 

Dr. ATRAN. Just to take out Major Hasan, he sent 21 messages 

to Anwar al-Awlaki, basically seeking to do jihad. He wanted a 

meaning in life. Awlaki only sent him back two messages, without 

any operational implications. It’s not that the Internet Imams are 

out there, basically, recruiting them, pulling them in. They’re just 

there. 

As one kid in a French prison said when I asked him, ‘‘Why did 

you join the jihad?’’ He said, ‘‘Well, I was walking down the street 

one day, and someone spit at my sister and called her a ‘sal Arab,’ 

a dirty Arab.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, that’s been going on for years and 

years.’’ He said, ‘‘Yes, but there was no jihad to join then.’’ 

So, it’s out there, and people are choosing it, and we have no real 

competition for these messages out there. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What do you think we ought to do to get 

our government more sensitized to the message that you all have 

here? 

Dr. STONE. Senator, I wouldn’t know. I’m a citizen. That’s the 

proudest title I’ve ever had. It’s the only title I really want. I think 

it’s my job to do what I can do as a citizen, period. You are the 

representative of our citizens. I will rely on what I said earlier 

that, this house is dependent on the people. We’re speaking to the 

American people when we’re talking to you. It is, in some respect, 

as their elected representatives, a duty to bring to them the message that I think is very real, about how to defend our Country, 

how to stand behind our Country, how to engage in the protection 

of our Country, in this time, as it has been in every period of time 

before. There’s no difference in this regard. We are defending the 

63 

Constitution and our fundamental belief that is the spirit behind 

the declaration that lifted that Constitution into reality. 

I think it’s the job of our elected representatives, as much as it 

is anything, to get out and to engage them. 

The converse of that will be true. I submit to you, sir, that American citizens, once they understand, with a level of granularity that 

is not hard to communicate to them, they will have expectations of 

this government that far exceed anything this small panel could 

put on the plate for you today. 

My suggestion would be, go to the people and educate them—our 

people, our citizens—and ask them how and what do they think, 

and you will find an unbelievable wealth of patriotism come forth 

to do the right thing for the Nation. 

My answer would be: Go to the people, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The two commanders in that most violent 

part of the world that we’re concentrating on, Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, are General Petraeus and his commander in Afghanistan. 

Dr. STONE. General McChrystal, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You said, General Stone, earlier, that 

General Petraeus understood and supported you and what you 

were doing in the prison in Iraq. Do you think that he sufficiently 

understands what has been presented by this panel today that he 

is trying to apply that in the Central Command area of responsibility? 

Dr. STONE. Sir, there would have been no success in the surge, 

no success in my program, were it not for the leadership of General 

Petraeus. He was a risk-taker, as any great leader will be. He understood the culture and the context of it. 

I have no question in my mind, General Petraeus understands 

this enemy and what he needs to do. I also know that General 

Petraeus is a general, and that this problem is much broader than 

just the leadership of a military combatant commander. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Do you think General McChrystal understands this, as well? 

Dr. STONE. Sir, I’ve had the great honor of serving with General 

McChrystal multiple times when I was in Pakistan, in Iraq, and 

then in Afghanistan, and I would say the same thing for General 

McChrystal. We are challenging those leaders to do things, not just 

in their spectrum of military warfighting, but also by embracing a 

much broader set of resource deployment issues. There’s no question in my mind that the aforementioned leadership know how to 

win this war in the locations they’re serving. 

What I would question is whether or not they have all those resources of the various kinds that they need to get that done. That, 

I don’t know. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The resources that we’ve talked about 

here are the resources of being able to get to young people to get 

them to understand what true Islam is, and not be diverted into 

some extremist form of violence. 

Dr. STONE. That’s a pretty good characterization, sir. 

Dr. ATRAN. Can I just say something about Afghanistan? The 

U.S. military came to Afghanistan with no knowledge of the Afghan people, really. They didn’t know or understand who they 

64 

7The subcommittee notes, and Dr. Atran agreed, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research 

has 56 Nobel Prize-winners mentioned in its most recent documentation, including Secretary of 

Energy Steven Chu. 

were, what being Afghan meant, or how the society worked. 

They’re getting that; they’re forced to get it. 

I think, still, it’s much too halting. We have the Army Human 

Terrain System experiment, for example, where you send out teams 

into Paktia and Helmand Province, with combat ethnographers embedded in infantry units in order to provide nonlethal services, like 

medical services, to a village. They’re very good at making ties. The 

Afghan women especially like women medical officers. But, then 

they’re taken out and put in another infantry unit, so all of the 

local contacts have been lost. 

Even if that worked, I think it would be a disaster for the cooperation with the academic community, the social science community, and the universities in this country. Ever since the Vietnam 

war, there has been a deep antipathy and antagonism between 

military operations and projections of power on the part of policymakers and the academic establishment, outside the political guys 

at the major universities. The idea that there are trained social scientists, with uniforms and armed, and who could be forced to harm 

and kill local people, will alienate American academic community 

entirely and for good. That would be a tragic mistake because, unlike Vietnam, most of the people in the academic community do believe that this problem of extremist violence is a serious problem 

and must be dealt with by the United States. 

We have to be a little better, and more sophisticated, and branch 

out, in terms of who we bring into the field because right now, 

there’s only military guys in the field. There’s nobody else, except 

them and the clandestine services; so you’re getting nothing, in 

terms of reliable knowledge that can be put out in the public, criticized, falsified, and then changed to fit the situation right. That’s 

the way science works. 

Senator BILL NELSON. If you take that suggestion, you’re talking 

about unleashing the civilian agencies of government instead of a 

military agency that has led this effort, out of necessity because 

that’s how we’ve been organized; letting the civilian agencies go out 

and lead this effort. 

Dr. ATRAN. The Air Force Office of Scientific Research has funded 54 Nobel Prize-winners,7 including social scientists. The Office 

of Naval Research, the Air Force Research Office, the Army Research Office, the National Science Foundation, they have, already, 

the ways to go with people into the field. It’s being blocked, okay? 

It’s being blocked at the level of the Surgeon General’s offices, who 

are scared to death that there’s going to be someone out there 

who’s going to be accused of spying, will get hurt, or something like 

that. There is no work being done. The agencies exist, the ways 

exist, and even the funds exist. But the people don’t exist because 

it’s being blocked at a governmental level. I think, if it was 

unblocked, a lot more people, a lot more knowledge, and a lot more 

savvy would be available to the government and the people of the 

United States. 

Dr. FOREST. Sir, this basically reinforces what I said earlier 

about there being no substitute for physical presence when you’re 

65 

trying to influence, and strategically influence, populations in these 

areas. 

Dr. STONE. The colloquial term, sir, is whether or not the environment is permissive or non-permissive. You’ve heard this term. 

There are restrictions for those going to permissive environments 

versus non-permissive. Both of my colleagues on the panel are arguing that we need to recognize that it is not this enemy, that’s not 

how we fight this enemy. You have to have a presence of diverse 

capabilities focused on different skill sets and focused on the very 

specific effort. My argument would be that our focus needs to be 

counterrecruiting, stop the recruiting. Once you stop the recruiting, 

you stop the insurgency. I’m using ‘‘insurgency’’ in a global sense. 

That’s, I think, what these two gentleman were saying. 

Dr. FOREST. On that piece, the military should be recognized for 

doing a tremendous amount of great work. 

Dr. STONE. Absolutely. 

Dr. FOREST. In the last 10 years in developing, training, and educating their soldiers and officers to deal with these kinds of challenges in totally new ways that they never had to before. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Huge difference. 

Dr. STONE. Huge, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. It is very different than when I wore the 

uniform of this country during Vietnam. It is a huge difference. 

These young NCOs and young officers that are out there have suddenly had to learn, right on the ground, things other than being 

a warrior. It’s marvelous. That’s what we tried to attempt to get 

to in this hearing today. I can tell you, the way I will run the next 

hearing, either your panel will be first or all six of you will sit at 

the table together so that we can get that interchange going with 

the existing governmental leaders. 

Thank you for an exceptionally stimulating hearing. We are very 

grateful. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES

1. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Reid and General Kearney, national intelligence 

agencies seem to focus their assistance to the Department of Defense (DOD) in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere on special operators engaged in direct action operations against terrorists and insurgents. Consequently, general-purpose forces and 

Special Operations Forces (SOFs) engaged in indirect activities, including foreign internal defense and population protection, might receive less intelligence support. 

A recent report published by the Center for a New American Security and coauthored by Major General Michael Flynn, the International Security Assistance Force 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Afghanistan, argued that because U.S. intelligence collection efforts have focused overwhelmingly on insurgent groups for direct action, our intelligence has failed to provide the kind of information needed to 

leverage popular support and marginalize insurgencies. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what recommendations do you have for addressing this concern? 

Mr. REID. General Flynn’s report directly addresses one of the fundamental discussions in our approach to Afghanistan, which is how to balance direct action activities with counterinsurgency activities. I understand that he has the respect of 

the Secretary and the senior military command within this building, and this kind 

of candid and critical assessment is a sign of a strong and healthy organization. 

This appraisal enriches what has been a very real and vigorous debate that has 

been taking place within DOD and throughout the government for years. 

66 

Intelligence is key to our success in Afghanistan, and we have clearly faced challenges in gathering and assessing quality intelligence, particularly in support of indirect activities like foreign internal defense. DOD leadership is open to suggestions 

like General Flynn’s about how we can improve intelligence collection so we can improve our efforts quickly and meaningfully. General McChrystal and his team in Afghanistan are keenly aware of weaknesses in our intelligence collection efforts, and 

are working diligently to address them. Within the Department, we are continually 

looking for ways to better support intelligence collection in Afghanistan, whether by 

refocusing counterterrorism efforts to counterinsurgency, or by giving careful consideration to requests for additional resources to augment intelligence collection activities. 

We must continue to be critical of our own progress concerning intelligence collection and its utility in helping to leverage popular support and counter violent extremism. Further, we should support General McChrystal’s request that all troops deploying to Afghanistan are properly trained in the full range of counterinsurgency 

skills, including the use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enablers, 

to accomplish this difficult mission. We are currently working with the Joint Staff 

and the Service Chiefs to institutionalize this type of counterinsurgency training 

throughout the Department. 

General KEARNEY. In general, I agree with and support Major General Flynn’s 

findings in his report ‘‘Fixing Intelligence’’. Our recommendations to address these 

concerns are: 

• Adopt the changes suggested by MG Flynn, which involve reorienting analysts within Afghanistan from the major headquarters to forward field 

units from which they can better collect and analyze population-centric information, and to Regional Fusion Centers where other regional political 

and social information can best be integrated for assessments. 

• Ensure the Services and intelligence agencies adapt their training programs to better train, educate, and prepare analysts for this population-centric focus. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN SUPPORT OF COUNTRY TEAMS

2. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Reid and General Kearney, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) deploys personnel to work with country teams in many priority 

countries where we are not in a shooting conflict, but rather where we are trying 

to stop the spread of extremist ideology. Their mission is to support the priorities 

of the ambassador and the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC) campaign 

plan against terrorist networks. These personnel perform important tasks to augment the embassy’s activities in a variety of areas, including infrastructure development, partner capacity building, and strategic communications. In most cases, these 

special operations personnel serve as force multipliers and increase the effectiveness 

of the embassy in meeting its objectives. However, there have been some limited 

cases where coordination between an ambassador and special operations personnel 

has not been effective. What should be done to make sure the goals and activities 

of special operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned with those 

of the ambassadors they are working under? 

Mr. REID. The activities of special operations personnel are directly aligned with 

the embassy’s efforts in any given country and are conducted in full coordination 

with the Chief of Mission. The Department’s aim is to support and enhance the activities of country teams in our efforts to counter violent extremism. To accomplish 

this, we ensure that communication is open and frequent among special operations 

personnel leadership and the embassy in each country. We work to ensure that our 

deploying personnel are fully aware of the efforts and operations conducted by our 

interagency partners, particularly in areas where DOD is not the lead actor, such 

as in strategic communications and augmenting host nation civil capacity. 

We are currently strengthening coordination between DOD and the Chief of Mission by implementing DOD Directive 5105.75, which established a Senior Defense 

Official (SDO) at every U.S. embassy. Among the SDO’s duties and responsibilities 

is the requirement to keep the embassy informed of DOD operations and positions, 

which further enhances coordination between the Chief of Mission and special operations personnel. 

General KEARNEY. U.S. SOCOM serves as a force provider to execute the roles, 

mission and functions required by the GCC and the Country Team in any specific 

location. The GCCs and Ambassadors do extensive work to define the specific mission and roles. SOCOM ensures that the scope of mission and support is well understood and adhered to by the deploying forces. While methods and timing of execuVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
67 

tion may change over time, the GCCs and Ambassadors control the overall end 

state. 

The process of putting SOF liaison officers in the embassy to coordinate operations has been very successful. SOCOM has a robust country team presence on the 

embassy staff of many priority countries. The most successful venues are those 

where the Ambassador, GCC and the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) 

have early and frequent discussions to synchronize priorities, forces and operations. 

It is inevitable that disagreements or discussions of methods will occur; the GCC, 

TSOCs and the Country Teams will deconflict these instances. 

In those cases where conflicts arise, U.S. SOCOM can assist coordination. U.S. 

SOCOM has a 4-star equivalent Ambassador on staff—in addition to many other 

interagency 1–2 star equivalents—to provide counsel to the staff and components. 

This team coordinates with other agency representatives and with U.S. SOCOM 

support representatives on their agency staffs. The resulting whole-of-government 

approach gives U.S. SOCOM an impressive ability to synchronize key aspects of the 

U.S. Government’s overall strategy and optimize the contribution of each agency’s 

effort. 

3. Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Reid and General Kearney, given the high demand 

for special operations personnel around the world, how is the decision made by 

SOCOM, Department of State (DOS), and the GCCs to deploy a special operations 

team to a certain country and is that decision reevaluated over time? 

Mr. REID. The GCC and DOS (Country Team) coordinates closely on any requirement for SOF and submits a request for a special operations team. Once a requirement for SOF has been validated by the GCC and Joint Staff J–3, the Joint Staff 

J–3 forwards the requirement to U.S. SOCOM or the appropriate sourcing GCC for 

development of a sourcing recommendation. DOD requests official clearance from 

the Chief of Mission before deploying any special operations team, except in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

U.S. SOCOM develops and recommends a sourcing solution to the Secretary of 

Defense through the Joint Staff for approval based on mission, appropriateness of 

the requested force, capability for the mission, availability of forces, and priority of 

the mission as set forth in the Global Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF 

establishes planning guidance related to operations, force allocation guidance, and 

provides a decision model, assumptions, and guidance designed to support force allocation recommendations among competing requests. Additionally, the GEF directs 

DOD to balance near-term operational needs with the need to hedge against potential future threats. 

U.S. SOCOM utilizes the GEF to prioritize both annual and emergent requests 

for forces. U.S. SOCOM’s fiscal year 2011 sourcing recommendation for the 600-plus 

annual requests for SOF was submitted and approved by the Secretary in March 

2010. With each subsequent emergent request for SOF, SOCOM will review global 

sourcing to ensure compliance with the GEF. Additionally, the Joint Staff J–3 reviews all U.S. SOCOM sourcing recommendations prior to submission to the Secretary to ensure compliance with the GEF. This prioritization occurs annually in 

conjunction with the Global Force Management Process and is reevaluated with 

each emergent request for SOF. 

General KEARNEY. The GCC and DOS normally coordinate requirements for SOF 

prior to submitting a request for a special operations team. Once a requirement for 

SOF has been validated by the GCC and Joint Staff J–3, the Joint Staff J–3 forwards the requirement to U.S. SOCOM for development of a sourcing recommendation. 

U.S. SOCOM develops and recommends a sourcing solution to the Secretary of 

Defense, through the Joint Staff, based on: mission, appropriateness of the requested force/capability for the mission, availability of forces, and priority of the 

mission as set forth in the Department’s Guidance for Employment of the Force 

(GEF). The GEF provides planning guidance related to operations and force allocation. The Joint Staff J–3 reviews all U.S. SOCOM sourcing recommendations, prior 

to submission to the Secretary, to ensure compliance with the GEF. 

U.S. SOCOM utilizes the GEF to prioritize both annual and emergent requests 

for forces. This prioritization occurs annually in conjunction with the Global Force 

Management Process and is reevaluated with each emergent request for SOF. U.S. 

SOCOM’s fiscal year 2011 sourcing recommendation for the 600-plus annual requests for SOF was submitted and approved by the Secretary in March 2010. With 

each subsequent emergent request for SOF, SOCOM will review global sourcing to 

ensure compliance with the GEF. 

68 

EMPOWERING LOCAL CREDIBLE VOICES

4. Senator BILL NELSON. Ambassador Benjamin, empowering civil society and elevating the voices of key local leaders is often put forward as one of the key components of an effective strategy to counter violent extremism (CVE). Ironically, as we 

have sought to establish better ties with key local actors and nongovernmental organizations in dangerous and difficult environments, our embassies around the world 

have been moved out of city centers into safer neighborhoods that often prevent 

greater outreach to the local community. How can the United States rectify this dilemma? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We recognize that the location of some of our embassies 

and consulates, dictated by security concerns, does make interaction with local populations more challenging. However, regardless of the location of their embassy or 

consulate, U.S. embassy officials are working actively to identify credible local leaders who can discredit violent extremist narratives and develop targeted counterradicalization programs. 

Our diplomats understand that local credible and influential individuals are best 

suited in their own communities to challenge extremist messages and prevent the 

radicalization of vulnerable or alienated individuals. 

5. Senator BILL NELSON. General Kearney, what, if any, programs is SOCOM currently executing to empower local voices against violent extremism? 

General KEARNEY. U.S. SOCOM has no specific program being executed to empower local voices against violent extremism. However, U.S. SOCOM supports other 

combatant commanders, primarily U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. 

Strategic Command (STRATCOM) (through their Joint Information Operations 

Warfare Center), in their efforts to identify, amplify, and/or empower local voices. 

Such support ranges from activities and programs executed by deployed forces in 

support of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and U.S. Forces-Iraq; Military Information Support Teams (MISTs); and planning, intelligence, research and analysis support provided by U.S. SOCOM’s Joint Military Information Support Command. U.S. SOCOM 

also provides support to amplify key communicators countering violent extremists 

utilizing the Trans-Regional Web Initiative and the Regional Magazine Initiative. 

6. Senator BILL NELSON. Ambassador Benjamin, Mr. Reid, and General Kearney, 

how do we ensure that we do not compromise these credible local voices in our effort 

to CVE? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Enhancing engagement with and outreach to civil society 

in at-risk communities needs to be a central part of the U.S. Government’s evolving 

CVE strategy. With regard to Muslim communities, local credible and influential 

Muslims are best suited in their own communities to challenge extremist messages 

and prevent the radicalization of vulnerable or alienated individuals. 

In order not to compromise such credible local voices, U.S. Government engagement can and should take different forms depending on the circumstances of the potential partner. Some organizations with a lack of resources and outside funding 

will welcome U.S. ‘‘seed’’ money to hire staff and initiate programs. Others may desire capacity and leadership development training to better position them to challenge extremist narratives. In other cases, the U.S. Government can simply act as 

the facilitator by connecting these organizations with other third parties with whom 

they can partner. 

Credible voices have their own sense of self-preservation: some potential partners 

will not want any formal affiliation with the U.S. Government, because they fear 

it could undermine their legitimacy among constituents. In these cases, the U.S. 

Government would work closely with and through local, regional, or national governments, as well as credible regional and international organizations to see that 

their voices are amplified. 

Mr. REID. The security and legitimacy of credible local voices are paramount to 

our efforts to CVE. The role of trusted local voices in marginalizing insurgents 

means that these individuals often become the target of terrorists and insurgents. 

For this reason, it is often very difficult to recruit credible voices to speak out. Fortunately, many of these credible voices have their own internal security provided by 

host nation security forces. The Department works with these security forces to augment their ability to provide security and reduce corruption in their ranks that 

could compromise the safety of a credible voice. By training host nation security 

forces to improve their ability to protect these individuals, we also are able to encourage other potential local voices to stand up and be heard. 

The Department has long supported the proposition that having a U.S. Government face on every message may not be the most effective means for transmitting 

69 

our message and believes that those credible voices are significantly more effective 

at relaying messages to their local audiences than DOD could be. We are very cognizant of the fact that this credibility would be immediately marginalized if they 

are seen to be partnering with the military. Protecting reputations is important and 

specifics as to how we accomplish this goal is better discussed in another forum. 

General KEARNEY. Discretion is paramount when trying to amplify, propagate, 

bolster, and build credible voice networks. One approach to safeguard credible voices 

is to use surrogates and interlocutors as intermediaries to build relationships with 

these particular individuals. 

7. Senator BILL NELSON. Ambassador Benjamin, Mr. Reid, and General Kearney, 

how are community leaders and reputable voices identified by your departments? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Embassies in countries where violent extremism has 

taken root are working hard to identify community organizations and neighborhood 

activists who possess a nuanced understanding of the local drivers of extremism, 

can convey the most powerful counter-narratives, and can develop tailored counterradicalization programs. 

At the State Department in Washington, in support of these embassy efforts, we 

are approaching this from many perspectives, including from the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public 

Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Office of the Special Representative to Muslim 

Communities, regional bureaus, and USAID. 

The Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism has a field-driven program called the Ambassadors Fund for Counterterrorism, which enables our 

foreign missions to identify local partners for community based CVE projects and 

funds each of them with up to $100,000 in micro-grants. Projects are focused on 

challenging extremist narratives, empowering moderate voices, enhancing support 

for law enforcement efforts, and engaging at-risk youth, among others. In fiscal year 

2009, we funded 17 Ambassadors Fund programs. 

In addition, the Department’s Special Representative to Muslim Communities has 

met with civil society leaders at the grassroots level in 21 countries to discuss a 

range of pressing issues, including CVE efforts. Focusing particularly on young people, she is working to create partnerships with civil society actors who are pushing 

back against violent extremism and she is seeking to connect them to like-minded 

thinkers. In these efforts the Department is increasingly using online and mobile 

technology to empower credible Muslim voices that can provide an alternative, positive counter-narrative. 

Mr. REID. DOD works through the local government and security forces of respective nations to select community leaders and reputable voices that will advocate for 

the interests of the local population. Along with DOS, DOD takes cues from the 

local population’s civilian and security force structures to identify and augment the 

community leaders’ capacity to effectively represent the opinions and needs of their 

publics. We work to enable and empower leaders chosen by their communities because these individuals already carry credibility and respect among the people they 

are representing. Leadership that is chosen organically by the underlying population 

ultimately better strengthens civilian capacities and security efforts, so is crucial in 

our efforts to CVE. 

More specifically, in Afghanistan, DOD and interagency personnel work with Afghan National Security Forces and other Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan officials; attend shuras, conduct key leader and religious leader engagements; consult nongovernmental organizations and other actors with longtime presence in local communities; and conduct patrols and engage in conversation directly 

with the local population. This engagement and identification of local leaders involves close coordination with DOS, which leads interagency efforts in communicating with international populations. 

Further, DOD works with our interagency partners to continually assess the 

progress and integrity these community leaders display through their work to build 

civilian capacity against violent extremism. It is our goal to help ensure that these 

community leaders and voices truly represent the needs and interests of their public. Accordingly, we place significant trust in the local community’s chosen leadership and reputable voices but also stay vigilant in regard to signs of corruption. 

General KEARNEY. U.S. SOCOM does not execute a specific ‘‘credible voice’’ program, but supports other combatant commands, primarily U.S. CENTCOM and U.S. 

STRATCOM (through their Joint Information Operations Warfare Center), by providing intelligence analysis and cultural expertise in support of their ‘‘credible voice’’ 

programs. Our experience indicates that local commanders and forces deployed in 

the operating environment are best postured to identify community leaders and reputable voices. 

70 

8. Senator BILL NELSON. Ambassador Benjamin, Mr. Reid, and General Kearney, 

how could the identification of and support for community leaders be improved? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. The Department could expand small grant programs for 

civil society organizations working to counter violent extremism. A lack of resources 

often inhibits the genuine efforts of neighborhood activists and community organizations. Many require ‘‘seed’’ money to hire staff and rent office space. Additionally, 

U.S. Embassy staff could collaborate with local authorities and organizations specializing in training to create capacity-building packages and courses for identified 

partners. It is important to keep in mind that not all organizations possess the capabilities or political will to effectively deliver local programs. Many will need capacity and leadership development training to better position them to work with individuals vulnerable to radicalization. 

Mr. REID. The identification of and support for community leaders could be improved in a number of ways. First, and perhaps most importantly, we must be able 

to more effectively communicate with local populations and security forces. This requires increased language and cultural capabilities throughout our entire force, not 

just in civil affairs or Special Operations. Investment in our personnel to learn Dari, 

Pashto and Urdu, as well as other strategic languages, is imperative in developing 

our abilities to better understand the needs of a foreign population and who best 

can lead it. Speaking and listening skills must be emphasized at all levels in the 

force so as many DOD personnel as possible can communicate with host nation citizens. 

The Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (APH) program, which develops language, regional and cultural expertise in military and civilian personnel throughout multiple 

U.S.-based and deployed assignments, serves as an excellent example for how to institutionalize regional and cultural understanding throughout the Department. 

Also, the Department can strive to strengthen relationships with interagency 

partners like DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and 

also the U.N. and reputable nongovernmental organizations with a history of 

achievement in that community. Other examples of how we can better identify legitimate community leadership and reputable voices include improving populationcentric intelligence capabilities and better organizing community-level project committees when conducting Commander’s Emergency Response Program and other 

projects. 

More broadly, we can continue to promote more accountable leadership and governance within our partner nations. As these governments gain legitimacy and 

power through competence and minimized corruption, they can become those leaders 

or help identify other community leaders. 

General KEARNEY. Identification of and support for community leaders are best 

done at the local level and can be improved by establishing persistent presence in 

selected areas of interest. We must understand the environment, culture and people 

within a designated area to truly understand who the key influencers or ‘‘credible 

voices’’ are at the local, as well as regional level. 

Additionally, identification and support for credible voices could be improved by 

better collaboration and information sharing between U.S. Government agencies and 

departments, particularly with respect to open source information and intelligence. 

An interagency process which oversees the identification and use of credible voices 

to ensure the synchronization of individuals and the objectives they support would 

mitigate duplication and prevent conflicting efforts. 

DE-RADICALIZATION AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMS IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES

9. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Stone, Dr. Atran, and Dr. Forest, the Saudi rehabilitation program, under the Saudi Ministry of the Interior, has reportedly had nearly 

300 men complete the program, and nearly 80 percent of these have returned to living their lives normally. Other predominantly Muslim countries have also instituted 

deradicalization programs, though one very significant exception is Yemen. In your 

view, how important are rehabilitation programs like the one in Saudi Arabia in addressing violent extremism in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Dr. Stone did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

Dr. ATRAN. My discussions in Riyadh with Saudi officials as well as detainees in 

the rehabilitation program indicate that the Saudi initiative seems to be effective 

although perhaps prohibitively expensive for other countries. The key to its success 

are the two talented, prime movers of the program: Dr. Saad al-Jabri, special advisor to the Minister of the Interior, and Dr. Abdal Rahman al-Hadlaq, of the Police 

Academy and director of the rehabilitation program. Unlike many senior officials in 

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other countries with whom I’ve talked about radicalization and de-radicalization 

(Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Pakistan, etc.), al-Jabri and al-Hadlaq do not attribute 

radicalization to the nebulous forces of ‘‘international jihad,’’ ‘‘brainwashing,’’ a 

‘‘criminal mind’’ or even primarily to American actions in the Middle East and elsewhere, but maintain that the problem is primarily one of public health, especially 

involving social networks of youth who seek out family but mostly friends to find 

faith and meaning in life that promises adventure and glory. 

As al-Jabri said to me: 

‘‘We created Bin Laden’s reputation and now we are obliged to destroy 

it. It is not an easy matter to convince our young people, and for them to 

convince one another, that what was right and good at one time [in fighting 

the communists in Afghanistan] is bad for everyone now.’’ 

This degree of self reflection and self criticism, which is key to overcoming past 

mistakes and succeeding, is uncommon 

The Saudi rehabilitation program operates on several levels: bringing in family 

networks for support and assurance, and shoring up supportive peer groups that reject violence, providing educational forums for discussions of ideas (about personal 

grievances, religion, world politics, etc.) and work-study programs that could provide 

future forms of expression (e.g., art, poetry) and employment. However, the expense 

associated with this intensive, multi-pronged, and personalized effort far surpasses 

any other de-radicalization or de-criminalization program that I’ve encountered. 

For the most part, the emerging wave of jihadi wannabes that are inspired by al 

Qaeda’s viral social movement tends to be poorer, less educated and more marginal 

than the old al Qaeda or its remnants. It relies to a greater extent for financing 

and personnel on pre-existing petty criminal networks because large-scale financing 

is easily tracked. The Saudi Ministry of Interior conducted a study of 639 detainees 

through 2004, followed by a newer study through 2007. For example, from 2004– 

2006 Saudi forces killed over 100 perpetrators of terrorist events in the kingdom. 

Of the remaining 60 who were captured and imprisoned, 53 have been interviewed. 

Nearly two-thirds of those in the sample say they joined Jihad through friends and 

about a quarter through family. A closer look at other terrorist groups reveals strikingly similar patterns of self-radicalization based on almost chance encounters within pre-existing local circles of friends and kin. Marc Sageman analyzed Qaeda networks through 2003 and found that about 70 percent join through friends and 20 

percent through kin. 

The newer Saudi sample bears this out. Compared to the earlier sample, the 

newer wave tends to be somewhat younger (and more likely to be single), less educated and less financially well off, less ideological, and more prone to prior involvement in criminal activities unrelated to Jihad, such as drugs, theft and aggravated 

assault. They are much more likely to read jihadi literature in their daily lives than 

other forms of literature. They tend to look up to role models who stress violence 

in Jihad, like the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, than to those who justify and limit 

violence through moral reasoning, such as the late Abdullah Azzam. A majority 

come to religion later in life, especially in their early twenties. In the older cohort 

there was little traditional religious education; however, the newer cohort tends to 

be less ideologically sophisticated and especially motivated by desire to avenge perceived injustices in Iraq and now Afghanistan and Pakistan. (When I asked detainees in Saudi Arabia who had volunteered for Iraq why they had, some mentioned 

stories of women raped, the killing of innocents and desecrations of the Koran, but 

all mentioned Abu Ghraib). 

Across, North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, our research teams find 

similar patterns developing among socially marginalized youth. 

Dr. FOREST. Sir, to my understanding Yemen has had for several years a 

deradicalization program—the ‘‘Committee for Dialogue’’ initiative—as does Northern Ireland, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and many other countries. In 

my opinion, the very best expert on the topic of deradicalization programs is Professor John Horgan, the Director of the International center for the Study of Terrorism at Penn State University. In assessing these programs, and their central, 

common effort to influence an individual’s movement away from terrorism, Horgan 

notes that there is broad confusion about the terminology used, the objectives these 

programs seek to achieve, and the kinds of evidence (or lack thereof) to indicate an 

individual has truly adopted a system of beliefs, values and thoughts in which the 

rejection of terrorism is permanent. Drawing lessons from the diversity of such programs around the world may be informative and useful, but in my view sponsoring 

a program of this type in Iraq and Afghanistan should be seen as a small portion 

of a much broader, full-spectrum effort to combat violent extremism, an effort that 

is proactive, and seeks to diminish the resonance of violent extremist ideologies, 

72 

counter the illegitimate extremist narratives with facts and counternarratives that 

are culturally and contextually relevant. At the end of the day, our ultimate goal 

here should be to make all ‘‘deradicalization programs’’ completely unnecessary. 

10. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Stone, Dr. Atran, and Dr. Forest, are there steps 

the U.S. Government could be taking to encourage the establishment of 

deradicalization programs along the Saudi model in other countries? Are there variations or alternatives to the Saudi model that you believe would be appropriate in 

some nations? 

Dr. Stone did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

Dr. ATRAN. Something similar to the program instituted among detainees in Iraq 

by Doug Stone shares many productive aspects of the Saudi program, including involvement of family and peer support groups, and help in finding alternative sources 

of inspiration and employment. The model would seem a ‘‘natural’’ for the detainee 

situation in Afghanistan (where current internment procedures only seem to contribute further to radicalization to violence). 

Turkey and Indonesia countries where de-radicalization, and containment of 

radicalization seem to be working and to provide promising models for use elsewhere. In Turkey, the National Police has taken the lead. Like the Saudis, they 

tend to see the problem in terms of social and public health, rather than as a criminal or military matter. For example, if someone is tracked returning from Afghanistan or Pakistan, national police agents visit the families with the message: ‘‘we 

don’t want your son to turn on his friends but if there is violence there will be trouble for everyone; so let’s see what we can do together to prevent that.’’ Police follow 

through with in trying to find employment for the person and even for other family 

members, assistance with medical problems, and opportunities for religious and 

technical education. The police also systematically also give assistance with food or 

other gifts at Ramadan. The result is that jihadi terrorism has virtually ceased in 

Turkey (with some police station chiefs complaining that former jihadis are now 

coming to them with too much advice and information). 

The Kurdish problem is different however, and here the National Police are at 

loggerheads with the army over how to deal with potentially violent Kurdish youth. 

The army tends to deal with the problem as a military and criminal matter, whereas the National police seek to apply the public health model they have so far successfully used against jihadis. In Diyarbakir, for example, the National police paid 

out of their own pockets (with no government money) to set up computer training 

facilities with marginalized youth, and helped set up supportive chat rooms where 

everyone could discuss issues that concerned them (with the police openly and productively participating). 

Although less expensive than the Saudi program, the Turkish National Police effort is unusual in terms of the high levels of education and motivation among its 

leading personnel. Over 150 senior police agents in the last few years have gone on 

to graduate training in the United States, ranging from masters and Ph.D. programs in criminal justice at the City University of New York and Rutgers, to the 

PhD program in anthropology at Columbia University, International Relations at 

the University of Texas, and so on. Unless other countries are committed to such 

intense educational investment, it is unlikely that they could emulate Turkey’s deradicalization program. 

In Indonesia, too, the police have taken the lead in a generally successful deradicalization program. General Tito Karnavian, the head of Strike Force 88, which 

has tracked and killed some of the world’s most wanted terrorists (Azhari Husin in 

2005, Noordin Top in 2009, Dulmatin in 2010), has been a prime mover in getting 

former Jemaah Islamiyah leaders and foot soldiers, such as Nasir Abas (former JI 

leader of Sulawesi and Philippines) and Ali Imron (one of the four convicted October 

2002 Bali bomb plotters), to work with their erstwhile colleagues, communities and 

networks to help turn them away from violence. Results have led both to the 

undoing of planned plots and to increased rejection of violence by would-be jihadis. 

In December 2009, General Karnavian told me: 

‘‘Knowledge of the interconnected networks of Afghan Alumni, friendship, 

kinship and marriage groups was very crucial to uncovering the inner circle 

of Noordin.’’ 

It is by understanding how terror networks naturally form – through kinship, 

friendship, discipleship, and the like (and not through top-down recruitment, cells, 

command-and control organizations)—that the best results against their further development have best been obtained, both in terms of derailing plots in preparation 

and in re-routing potential terrorists away from violence. 

73 

Based on my field research, I argued for just such a strategy in a New York Times 

oped (‘‘To Beat Al Qaeda, Look to the East,’’ December 12–13, 2009). A January 10, 

2010 report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee titled, ‘‘Al Qaeda in Somalia: A Ticking Bomb,’’ suggested (p. 6) that a strategy similar to the one outlined 

in my oped could be profitably applied to Yemen to take down terror networks. 

But the broader lesson, I believe, is that: 

The best strategies for undoing terror networks, both in terms of disrupting operations in the short term and de-radicalizing personnel in the 

long term, is to co-opt the very same social and psychological processes that 

lead to successful formation of terror networks in the first place. 

A final observation in this regard: the only consistently successful people and 

groups I have witnessed who have convinced committed jihadis to abandon violence, 

including suicide terrorism, are committed Salafis themselves, especially those who 

belong to the same social networks as the jihadis. 

[To be clear: ‘‘Salafi,’’ or ‘‘purist,’’ refers to vast groups of people in the Sunni Moslem world, including near all Saudis, many Yeminis, Egyptians and Jordanians, and 

tens of millions of others. Like ‘‘Christian fundamentalism,’’ there is nothing inherently violent about Salafism. But there is a small group of ‘‘Takfiris’’ (those who 

‘‘withdraw’’ from religious compromise and ‘‘excommunicate’’ and target fellow Moslems who do) that piggybacks Salafism, just as there is a small group of ‘‘Supremacists’’ that piggybacks Christian fundamentalism. In general, Saudi ‘‘Wahabis’’ are 

Salafis who are committed to the Saudi state, just as Calvinists were committed to 

the Swiss state. It offends millions in the Moslem world when Jihadis and Takfiris 

are conflated with Wahabis and Salafis]. 

Dr. FOREST. As indicated in my response to Question #9, these programs may be 

informative and useful, but my strong preference is for a less reactive, and more 

proactive, approach to countering violent extremism. 

11. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Stone, Dr. Atran, and Dr. Forest, what are your 

reactions to the suggestion of Jessica Stern, a Harvard Law School lecturer, who 

wrote in Foreign Affairs earlier this year that deradicalization programs should resemble anti-gang programs rather than a war effort? 

Dr. Stone did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

Dr. ATRAN. Gangs and terror groups have much in common, and Dr. Stern (with 

whom I am currently working on a National Science Foundation Project) is right 

to suggest that the way police, academics and others are beginning to understand 

and deal with gangs can profitably be used for terror networks (Phil Mudd and 

Marc Sageman have had a similar view of dealing with susceptible youth ‘‘from the 

bottom up,’’ that is, in terms of working with self-organizing peer groups). Again, 

this places the emphasis on public health, rather than criminal behavior or military 

threat, which seems right to me. 

Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference between gangs and ideologically or religiously-motivated terror groups. And that is commitment to a moral cause, however 

misguided, which gives such groups a willingness to sacrifice personal self-interests, 

including life, limb and treasure. This willingness to sacrifice, in turn, makes such 

groups much more resistant to materially superior forces, such as most armies and 

police, which are much more dependent on maerial incentives and reward structures. 

Under uncertain or constantly changing conditions, relatively fluid and flat networks that are self-organizing, decentralized and overlapping—like terrorist or drug 

networks, financial or black arms markets, or information webs of the Google or 

Wikipedia kind—tend to outperform relatively rigid, centralized and hierarchical 

competitors. Hierarchies are structured so that the bottom layers (workers) perform 

day-to-day tasks and the upper layers (management) plans for the long term. But 

in a rapidly changing world, large management structures set up for long-term 

maintenance of their organization’s position in a predictable world often cannot compete with smaller, self-motivated and self-correcting systems that can more readily 

innovate and respond when opportunities or challenges arise. 

In the case of terrorist networks, the heightened burden of surviving and maintaining security under sustained attack from law enforcement and counterterrorism 

might be expected to put a fatal break on efficiency and innovation. But the interlocking relations of trust and familiarity inherent in the organic bonds of friendship, 

kinship and neighborhood make these networks highly resilient to local failures and 

to predatory attacks from the outside. Of course, criminal gangs and groups, like 

the Mafia and the Latin American drug cartels, also have these sorts of resilient 

networks. Again, though, terrorist networks often have something more: commitVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
74 

ment to a transcendent cause, which allows for greater sacrifice than is usually possible with typical reward structures based on material incentives (and my interviews and studies of jihadis across the world indicates that this commitment is quite 

often sincere and steadfast). In the Jihad, even petty criminals come to transcend 

any usual motives for gain. They see a way of becoming part of something grand 

rather than small, and willingly give up their lives for a greater cause. No gang or 

criminal enterprise quite compares. 

Dr. FOREST. Professor Stern is one of the world’s foremost experts on religious and 

other forms of terrorism. What she suggests in that article reinforces my own arguments about the critical need to strategically influence whole communities, not just 

the armed combatants who are targeted for kinetic operations by military and law 

enforcement. Effective programs require a healthy mix of psychology, sociology, political science, economics, anthropology and several other disciplines; a sophisticated 

understanding of ideologies and the reasons they resonate (or do not resonate) 

among specific populations and communities; and a solid understanding of how and 

why our enemies succeed or fail when trying to influence those communities with 

their extremist messages. 

EMPOWERING CREDIBLE LOCAL VOICES

12. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Stone, Dr. Atran, and Dr. Forest, empowering credible local voices sounds easy on its face, but it is truly a complex effort that must 

be done carefully. Given your experience on these issues, how would you recommend 

the U.S. Government undertake an effort to identify and empower credible local 

voices in the Middle East, South Asia, or Africa? 

Dr. Stone did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

Dr. ATRAN. Thus far, I see little awareness or acknowledge of relevant local voices. 

The focus is often on political, military and community leaders. But the critical relationships are peer-to-peer and mostly orthogonal to such leadership. 

Furthermore, the emphasis is on providing a ‘‘moderate’’ or ‘‘true’’ message of 

Islam. But youth is not inclined to listen to moderation. A thrilling and daring call 

to adventure, heroism, and glory is demonstrably more appealing, especially to those 

on the margins of society already in search of personal and social significance. 

As for there being a ‘‘true’’ version of Islam, or any other religion, this—at least 

from the standpoint of scientific inquiry into the historical development and psychological interpretation of religion—can never be more than a matter of opinion, which 

is a most dubious basis for policy. Religions have no fixed meanings (no statement 

has a propositional content with logically or empirically verifiable truth value), 

which is what allows them to survive over time and in such varied contexts (see 

In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion, Oxford University 

Press). Rather, religious canons, utterances, rites and so forth are inherently opentextured so as to allow widely different, and even contradictory, meanings to be attached to given behaviors and events as different circumstances may warrant. 

Again, a key to successfully using religion to end its abuse unto violence, is to make 

creative use of the inherent flexibility and openness of religious insights, and especially to help allow youth to explore this for themselves. One of the prime ingredients in the success of al Qaeda’s message is its claim that present religious authorities speak lies and that more ancient religious authorities directly speak to, and empower, each individual to choose the right path (much as Luther told the people to 

reject Catholic authority and go personally and directly for guidance in life to the 

teachings of Christ). We must beat al Qaeda at its own game, and not by going 

backwards and sideways to moderate Imams, lessons in Quranic exegesis, and the 

like. 

Dr. FOREST. Perhaps the most important aspect of this question involves the U.S. 

Government’s willingness to sponsor initiatives that it does not take credit for. As 

an example, philanthropic foundations, nongovernmental organizations, others in 

the private sector could receive substantial grants from the United States to sponsor 

communication and community engagement efforts that identify and empower local 

voices. Messenger matters here as much as the message. 

13. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Stone, Dr. Atran, and Dr. Forest, can identifying 

and empowering local voices be done without compromising the individual’s credibility because of their association with the U.S. Government? 

Dr. Stone did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

75 

Dr. ATRAN. There is no need to have local voices directly identified with the Government of the United States. In the present atmosphere, this would be an unnecessary and weighty handicap for many potentially good people in many bad places. 

Leave it to the people in place to decide when, where and how any association with 

the U.S. Government should be made public. 

A mark of success would be to have current adversaries, such as those who identify with the Taliban or Hamas (who are interested less in global jihad against ‘‘the 

far enemy’’ than in their own homeland), be publicly associated with U.S Government peacemaking efforts, assuming enough common ground could be found to 

make such efforts worthwhile. 

Dr. FOREST. Yes; see my response to Question #12. 

14. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Stone, Dr. Atran, and Dr. Forest, is there any CVE 

effort underway today that you feel is effective or noteworthy? 

Dr. Stone did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

Dr. ATRAN. Unfortunately, I cannot judge any noteworthy accomplishments 

abroad that have probable stable and sustainable effects in the desired direction. 

Various programs aimed at empowering women in Afghanistan are laudable but I 

cannot ascertain how effective they might be in the long term (unless tolerated and 

eventually accepted by presently hostile tribal groups). 

In the United States however, efforts by the NYPD to engage potentially susceptible communities, including Muslims in detention, appear to be quite effective. (In 

the U.K., outreach efforts by the Metropolitan Police are also noteworthy and effective). 

The FBI’s recent community-outreach efforts to Somali immigrants and other potentially susceptible groups are also most noteworthy. 

I would recommend that the Departments of Defense and State pay closer attention to these efforts at home when planning abroad. 

Dr. FOREST. Yes; I’ve been impressed with Maghrebia and other online efforts of 

the DOD that seek to engage communities of interest without feeling the need to 

focus discussion or perspectives in a particular direction. Open debate and sharing 

of information, particular irrefutable facts (like the Combating Terrorism Center’s 

report that used data from Arabic news sources to show that al Qaeda has killed 

eight times more Muslims than infidels) are powerful tools in countering violent extremism. Other, more noteworthy and effective efforts I’m aware of are all non-governmental, like the Radical Middle Way in the United Kingdom, popular moderate 

preachers in Egypt, Jordan, et cetera. Here in the United States, Professor Jarret 

Brachman is more knowledgeable about such efforts than anyone I know of, and his 

blog (jarretbrachman.net) has become a very popular and important forum for monitoring and engaging violent extremists—again, nongovernment sponsored. 

REVIEW OF U.S. EFFORTS

15. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Stone, Dr. Atran, and Dr. Forest, what is your view 

of the collective efforts of the U.S. Government, such as with Voice of America, 

Alhurra, or ongoing capacity-building efforts, to CVE messages and ideology today? 

Dr. Stone did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

Dr. ATRAN. The information the Voice of America and Alhurra provide is useful 

and the fact that representatives of the likes of the Taliban and Hamas are sometimes given voice in these media means that they cannot be so readily dismissed 

as mere propaganda instruments. Nevertheless, the focus should be less on ideology 

and more on how matters of faith and friendship are embedded in supportive social 

networks. Socially disembodied discussions of ideology and religion have demonstrably little effect on people’s thinking and behavior unless those people were already inclined in the direction of those discussions. 

While similar efforts were effective in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, it was 

because people were unhappy with the regimes they were forced to live under and 

with the messages imposed upon them. This is not the case today. There is a massive, media-driven global political awakening concerned with hopes for the future, 

but also with injustices that are perceived to prevent realization of those hopes. 

Here, ‘‘Yes, We Can’’ and ‘‘Happiness is Martyrdom’’ more or less freely compete, 

independent of political regimes and national boundaries, for anyone who cares to 

tune in. Our current programs suggest little awareness of these developments, much 

less an ability to steer or master them. Thus, we presently lack the long-term means 

76 

for detecting or deciding who in the future among the world’s youth will likely become our friend or our foe. 

Dr. FOREST. (1) Capacity building in foreign communities should be the highest 

priority; as Secretary Gates said in 2007, ‘‘the most important military component 

in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable 

and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves.’’ I would extend this 

to include how we enable and empower our state and non-state, nongovernmental 

allies to engage the enemy in the ideological battlespace. (2) We need to do much 

more online; as noted in my responses to other questions here, we need to have a 

more proactive, less reactive mindset. DOS’s efforts to debunk conspiracy theories 

about the September 11 attacks is just one small example of a much broader, and 

necessary, ‘‘shaping perceptions’’ effort in support of the fight against violent extremism. (3) We need to have a better understanding, at the local, micro-level, of why 

violent extremist ideologies resonate in specific communities; with that knowledge, 

we then need to explore ways in which we can diminish the factors that sustain ideological resonance. 

16. Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Stone, Dr. Atran, and Dr. Forest, what areas of the 

U.S. Government’s CVE efforts are in most need of our attention and how would 

you address these shortcomings? 

Dr. Stone did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files. 

Dr. ATRAN. I have not seen any evidence of a stable, long-term CVE effort, promoted by the U.S. Government that promises stable, long term rewards (apart from 

Gen. Stone’s Iraq mission). As indicated in my response to the previous question, 

many efforts that I have seen in the field are irrelevant: given over to the wrong 

people with the wrong ideas. 

In addition, precious little meaningful, field-based scientific research has been carried out to evaluate efforts. For the most part, evaluation measures and indicators 

are concocted in Washington according to previous formulae used to give and get 

grants and contracts. Consider, for example, measures employed by USAID, which 

typically involve about 15 ‘‘indicators.’’ But what is their real-world relevance? In 

Morocco, for example, USAID’s support of local governance initiatives to empower 

women and youth presently does not assess the extent to which women and youth 

may be really empowered. The fact that 12 percent of women, by the King’s decree, 

are now entering local governing councils is a meaningless statistic in itself. To 

what extent are these women networking with one another across governing councils, with women in positions of power in business (there are increasingly many), 

or in other ways that could truly change their structural role and power base in society? 

As for youth, enumerating the number of government ‘‘Youth Houses’’ (maisons 

de jeunesse, dar al-shabab) created is pretty meaningless, and even misleading. To 

what extent to these youth spontaneously bring others form their neighborhoods, 

families and peer groups into new forms of social discourse and organization? (In 

fact, I have found in the field that the youth in the Youth Houses are often left to 

their own resources, and some even radicalize in them). A better course would be 

to think of how youth in the United States become empowered and apply that 

model: of Silicon Valley, of creative internet networks, of spontaneous peer-to-peer 

relationships and productions. At present about 60 percent of Moroccan youth are 

functionally illiterate. Yet, many are fascinated by the internet and are spontaneously developing an ersatz language to communicate among themselves (called 

charbiya, written in Arabic, with some French, Spanish and English words and 

sayings). Rather than promoting this spontaneous, potentially productive, means of 

expression and interaction which appeals to youth because it is their creation, authorities either ignore it or try to stifle it because they cannot control it. 

Recently, someone who served with the U.S. Afghan mission for some years asked 

if I would be willing to help evaluate U.S. success in winning hearts and minds. 

The first thing I asked her was: ‘‘Do the Afghans you’re in contact with accept 

Americans as guests, and do the Americans act as if they were guests?’’ A bit startled, she answered, ‘‘of course not, we’re here because we have to be.’’ I then asked, 

‘‘Do they act as if they are the hosts and masters?’’ She didn’t respond at first, so 

I gave her this scenario: ‘‘Surely you must have seen or heard about accidents on 

the road involving a U.S. military vehicle colliding with some Afghan’s donkeydrawn cart. What happened? Do the American military personnel come out of the 

vehicle and try to help the poor fellow?’’ Her answer: ‘‘Never. They leave the scene, 

those are the rules of the engagement; any Afghan knows where to find us to lodge 

a complaint or make a claim.’’ I told her that I’d bet my bottom dollar that al Qaeda 

77 

doesn’t behave that way, because they understand what it means to be a guest, and 

that’s one good reason why they survive among the Pashtun tribes. 

In sum, the U.S. Government might do well to care less about what is religiously 

moderate or true, and not focus almost exclusively on economic and employment opportunities, but rather help more to provide peer-age heroes and ambitions that 

speak to youth’s creative energy and idealism, sense of adventure and mission, and 

need for friendship and belonging. 

Dr. FOREST. (1) Institutional capacity and leadership is critical; we are still suffering the negative impacts of the demise of the once-vital U.S. Information Agency. 

The U.S. DOS is unable to meet the ‘strategic influence’ needs of the world’s superpower with its limited resources. (2) Some potential efforts to engage the enemy and 

its online propaganda, ideological influence efforts are constrained by policies, bureaucratic politics, and legal restrictions like the Smith-Mundt Act. These things 

should be looked at carefully, in the hopes of finding creative ways to overcome such 

constraints. (3) Much more could be done to educate the public about the true nature of our enemies, their objectives, and most importantly, their vulnerabilities. Al 

Qaeda is on the defensive far more often than we acknowledge; we should make a 

more concerted effort to help Americans and the world understand why. (4) Similarly, there is a dire need to educate the media about who are the most influential 

voices in the Muslim world, both extremist and non-extremist; influential media outlets should take more responsibility for understanding why these voices are influential, and work to raise our collective understanding to a new level. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

17. Senator REED. Ambassador Benjamin, Mr. Reid, and General Kearney, we are 

often told that the quality of interagency coordination is dependent on the personalities involved. Interagency coordination seems to work best out in the field within 

our embassies, but back in Washington, it can become more stovepiped. Do you believe more formal arrangements are necessary to facilitate interagency coordination 

at higher levels within departments and agencies? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. In an effort to galvanize and coordinate the interagency’s 

work on CVE, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism convened a oneday interagency summit in October 2009 to examine U.S. Government efforts in 

CVE, identify programmatic shortcomings, and make recommendations for creating 

a sustainable strategy going forward. The summit brought together senior attendees 

from the NSC, NCTC, USAID, intelligence agencies, and the Departments of State, 

Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice. 

The administration has taken significant steps to bolster formal arrangements 

that facilitate interagency coordination and has created a new NSS-led interagency 

working group on CVE that meets every three weeks. Several other fora exist for 

interagency coordination related to CVE, including: 

• NSC’s Weekly Strategic Communication IPC. Chaired by the NSS’ Global 

Engagement Directorate. Regular participants include State and DOD. 

• Bi-weekly ‘‘Small Table Group’’ at the National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC). Regular participants include State, DOD, the CIA, and NCTC. 

• The Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC). GSEC is specifically 

chartered to support the NSC’s Global Engagement Directorate. 

• Monthly CVE Interagency Coordination Group (ICG). Chaired by the 

Global Engagement Group at NCTC, this is a senior working level meeting 

to coordinate both domestic and overseas CVE work. 

We also have an excellent relationship with the Department of Defense (DOD), 

which informs new CVE programming. Together we can complement each other’s 

strengths and efforts in the field, and determine which CVE efforts are best done 

by the military and which are best handled on the civilian side. A number of offices 

in DOD and the combatant commands that fund CVE projects and research have 

expressed a desire to collaborate with us on new programs. 

Mr. REID. Formal arrangements enhance existing informal interagency efforts to 

collaborate and communicate with each other. As the members of this subcommittee 

well know, section 1054 of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act directs 

DOD, DOS, and USAID to establish a panel focused solely on making recommendations to improve interagency communication on national security matters. The 

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), currently being written, 

is certain to include several recommendations to improve U.S. Government coordination. After the QDDR process is complete, Secretary Gates has stated that he will 

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work with Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Shah to ensure that DOD, DOS, and 

USAID agree on the formation of this advisory panel. 

With regards to U.S. Government coordination on CVE efforts specifically, the 

issue is not whether we need more formal arrangements to help with interagency 

coordination; rather, the challenges that exist are with the efficacy of the existing 

fora. CVE in particular has an abundance of venues for the interagency to meet, 

discuss, coordinate, and deconflict plans and programs at the strategic level. The 

National Security Staff (NSS) chairs several meetings, including several subCounterterrorism Security Group meetings specifically involving CVE, the Strategic 

Communications Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), which routinely touches upon 

CVE issues, and the Domestic Radicalization IPC which focus solely on ensuring 

that violent radicalization does not become an issue within our own borders. In addition, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) chairs several CVE specific 

meetings monthly that bring foreign and domestic-focused agencies together to discuss and coordinate CVE programs. 

We can, and must, do a better job of making these existing fora more effective 

and results-oriented. The challenge is that while we all agree that efforts to deny 

terrorists the next generation of recruits are of the highest priority, obtaining the 

requisite long-term funding, policy support, and dedicated resources to undergo and 

assess long-term projects is a government-wide problem. Until dedicated funding 

and manpower is afforded to long-term projects that may be successful in convincing 

someone that violence is not an acceptable option , we will be limited in our ability 

to effect sustainable change. 

General KEARNEY. I agree that interagency coordination is often ‘‘at its best’’ 

when focused teams ‘‘forward’’ come together in our embassies on common efforts 

and that unfortunately ‘‘stove-piping’’ does often occur in Washington. My experience has been that written procedures are the best way to reduce the influence of 

personalities in attempting to improve interagency coordination. These written procedures need to be concise, recognize the cultural differences existing in our U.S. 

Departments and Agencies, and authoritative in nature to unify efforts. Creating 

more formal arrangements can be useful only if the organizations are given the statutory and budgetary authorities to act with effectiveness. One technique successfully used in the Intelligence Community, law enforcement community, and other 

places in government is the ‘‘task force’’ concept. Small groups of subject matter experts brought together to focus on a set of well-defined tasks has proven successful 

(e.g., Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)). This concept does not always require additional legislation. U.S. SOCOM is experienced at forming, contributing to, and coordinating with various governmental task forces and we find that the key to success is an in-depth knowledge of the problem-set, senior interagency leader participation, and a robust community of interest with ‘‘flattened collaboration’’ at the participant level to prevent ‘‘stove-piping.’’ 

18. Senator REED. Ambassador Benjamin, Mr. Reid, and General Kearney, how 

would or should such arrangements for interagency coordination be structured? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism believes that enough formal arrangements already exist that help facilitate high-level 

coordination and communication among the agencies and departments working on 

CVE issues and programs, including: 

• NSC’s Weekly Strategic Communication IPC. Chaired by the NSS’ Global 

Engagement Directorate. Regular participants include State and DOD. 

• Bi-weekly ‘‘Small Table Group’’ at the National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC). Regular participants include State, DOD, the CIA, and NCTC. 

• The Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC). GSEC is specifically 

chartered to support the NSC’s Global Engagement Directorate. 

• Monthly CVE Interagency Coordination Group (ICG). Chaired by the 

Global Engagement Group at NCTC, this is a senior working level meeting 

to coordinate both domestic and overseas CVE work. 

Mr. REID. Presidential Policy Directive 1 from February 13, 2009 organizes the 

current National Security Council system and sets forth the process and structures 

for interagency coordination. In the case of CVE, the administration has set up several fora to discuss and coordinate this topic. Standing committees include but are 

not limited to the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG), the sub-CSG on CVE, 

the Strategic Communications Interagency Policy Group (IPC), the Domestic 

Radicalization IPC. Various regional IPCs also periodically meet to discuss CVE 

issues within their respective areas of responsibly. The administration has also reaffirmed the NCTC’s legislated responsibility to coordinate strategic operational 

planning for all counterterrorism issues, to include CVE and Global Engagement. 

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The Department supports how the administration has chosen to structure the U.S. 

Government’s interagency coordination mechanisms and continues to actively support the development and efficacy of those forums to ensure that our national objectives are obtained. 

Further, in a recent letter to the leadership of the House Committee on Armed 

Services, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and House Subcommittee on State, 

Foreign Operations and Related Programs, Secretary Gates described how a more 

formal coordination mechanism between DOS, DOD, and USAID could be structured. In compliance with Section1054 of the 2009 National Defense Authorization 

Act, DOD, DOS, and USAID will establish a panel focused solely on making recommendations to improve interagency communication on national security matters. 

The format of this panel will be largely dictated by recommendations made in the 

QDDR, which is currently being written. 

General KEARNEY. The structure for effective interagency coordination, whether 

in a statutorily created agency like the National Counterterrorism Center or ‘task 

force’’ construct, should keep in mind the principles that U.S. SOCOM has found 

useful in its Interagency Task Force: 

• seeking out subject matter experts with an in-depth knowledge of the 

problem-set, 

• senior interagency leader participation, and 

• developing a robust community of interest with ‘‘flattened collaboration’’ 

at the participant level to prevent ‘‘stove-piping.’’ 

Identifying the key stakeholders in the interagency process on any given subject 

is critical as these are the decisionmakers who can move an initiative forward or 

kill it in its tracks. 

19. Senator REED. Ambassador Benjamin, Mr. Reid, and General Kearney, U.S. 

Africa Command (AFRICOM) has engaged in counter-radicalization work in East 

Africa in some cases by deploying civil affairs personnel to engage local populations 

in typical development activities. Some have criticized the DOD for this type of outreach as the militarization of development work, whether in AFRICOM or elsewhere. Do you believe civil affairs-type outreach in non-combat environments like 

Africa and Latin America is better suited to civilian agencies, or do you believe the 

military’s outreach is an essential piece of winning hearts and minds? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Each U.S. department and agency involved in CVE work 

possesses its own areas of expertise and resources. But all share a common goal: 

challenging violent extremist messages, supporting individuals vulnerable to 

radicalization, and constraining the environment where violent extremists operate. 

Interagency cooperation is critically important to attaining that goal, regardless of 

the location of the CVE activities. CVE work is extraordinarily complex, especially 

in under-governed areas, and we need to acknowledge the challenging nature of coordinating efforts among the various agencies involved. 

In some locations, civilian agencies are best placed and suited to assume ownership of U.S. Government activities. In other locations, coordinated by the Chief of 

Mission, the Department of Defense can help to fill the void when there may not 

be enough civilian personnel in a country to conduct these programs and assessments. 

Mr. REID. Civilian agencies in the U.S. Government such as DOS and USAID certainly have the expertise and capabilities to successfully carry out certain civil affairs-type outreach. DOD supports these agencies with resources and expertise. In 

certain instances, civil affairs assets have the capability to deploy to and operate 

in areas that would initially be difficult for civilian agencies to reach. In all cases, 

we seek to transition development tasks to civilian agencies as soon as security conditions permit. 

Civil affairs outreach is often a means to foster communication between the U.S. 

Government and partner nation governments in advance of a crisis or humanitarian 

disaster. COCOM commander shaping operations are closely coordinated with and 

approved by the Chief of Mission. Utilization of civil affairs assets, and combining 

them with MIST programs, is one part of the overall theater engagement strategy 

of the respective GCC. The specific relationship between DOD and each country varies depending on a host country’s needs, but the outreach is nonetheless essential 

in assisting host nations in a variety of ways that they identify. 

General KEARNEY. Civil Affairs and Civil Affairs—like outreach in non-combat environments is both desirable and necessary as part of a broader, integrated approach, to building partner capacity in isolated, austere and often uncertain environments. U.S. SOCOM sees this type of outreach as a critical component to an 

overall U.S. Government strategy that exploits the comparative advantages of both 

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the uniformed and civilian assets. Civil Affairs type programs are a critical supporting and enabling capability that enhances the U.S. image and bolsters stability 

and credibility in the host nation government. 

Civil Affairs and similar programs conducted by DOD are some of the tools that 

the U.S. country team can use in their efforts to build host nation government legitimacy through the development of capabilities and capacities. By bolstering their legitimacy in the eyes of their people, the host nation government can win the competition for sovereignty, preempt existing violent extremist organizations (VEOs) 

from gaining a stronger foothold, and preventing incursion by future VEOs. 

While the idea of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is important, the concept of hearts 

and minds is not about ‘liking the United States’ or overt support to U.S. presence 

in a specific country. Rather, the concept is to influence populations to believe that 

supporting their legitimate government is in their best interest—economically, politically, socially—and that legitimate government can and will succeed against 

those forces of instability. ‘Hearts and minds’ is a function of building partner governance capability and capacity to win the competition for sovereignty and establish 

influence and control. Civil Affairs type outreach is an important tool in building 

such host nation capabilities. 

20. Senator REED. Ambassador Benjamin, Mr. Reid, and General Kearney, how 

do you believe we should ensure that there is adequate coordination between DOD, 

DOS, and USAID within our embassies to ensure that military outreach fits into 

the chief of mission’s strategic plan for the country? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. The Chief of Mission (COM) in a given country is responsible for interagency coordination within the Embassy. The COM is best placed to 

weigh the various factors involved, adjudicate among possibly competing interests, 

and determine the best mix of activities to be effective in his or her host nation. 

Additionally, interagency coordination in Washington can resolve broader issues and 

ensure that appropriate guidance is provided to our embassies abroad. 

At the regional level, there are a variety of coordination mechanisms. One key example is the State political advisors (POLADs) and USAID senior development advisors (SDAs) embedded at regional military combatant commands. They typically review and are in a position to provide guidance about the commands’ messaging efforts and program proposals. 

Mr. REID. One way we can ensure that DOD, DOS, and USAID coordinate appropriately is through formal channels, based on recommendations from the interagency advisory panel established in section 1054 of the Duncan Hunter National 

Defense Authorization Act of 2009. Also, we can continue to ensure that military 

outreach activities are conducted in full coordination with the Chief of Mission. 

DOD’s aim is to support and enhance the activities of country teams in our efforts 

to CVE. To accomplish this, we ensure that communication is open and frequent 

among DOD representatives and the embassy in each country. We work to ensure 

that our deploying personnel are fully aware of the efforts and operations conducted 

by our interagency partners, particularly in areas where DOD is not the lead actor, 

such as in strategic communications and augmenting host nation civil capacity. In 

general, the vast majority of country teams coordinate well, and the ambassadors 

in these countries have created an environment of collaboration and sharing that 

ensures all actors bring their respective authorities and capabilities to the table. 

General KEARNEY. A key focus area of U.S. SOCOM’s Strategic Plan is the SOF 

operator and the development of the Operator’s ability to fulfill the myriad defense, 

diplomatic, and developmental roles required in whole-of-government approaches. 

We emphasize the building of mechanisms to effectively mesh DOD activities with 

the diplomatic and development efforts of interagency partners, especially at the 

country team level. We develop language, regional/local expertise, and diplomacy 

skills in our personnel. When deployed, we build long-term trust with populations, 

local/regional officials, and foreign security forces. We strive to understand strategic/ 

regional/local interests and how they affect governance and security in order to assist in local development programs that are integrated with broader interagency efforts. Finally, we balance the application of direct and indirect skills to achieve optimal effect. As an extension of an Ambassador’s country team, the SOF Operator is 

expected to use his unique skills in close coordination with interagency partners to 

achieve the Embassy’s goals. 

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

21. Senator REED. Ambassador Benjamin, Mr. Reid, and General Kearney, one of 

the common criticisms of indirect CVE missions, such as the media campaigns and 

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civil affairs projects, is that the effectiveness of the activity is difficult to measure 

and, as a result, the entire activity is called into question. Please explain how your 

respective organization measures the effectiveness of your CVE activities. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. CVE work is primarily about preventing violence or the 

support of violent action, and measuring the absence of violence or conflict presents 

a significant challenge. Nevertheless, it is critical to understand the effect our programs are having on target communities and to be able to measure that effect in 

a meaningful way. Prior to supporting CVE programs, it is imperative to assess and 

understand the drivers of violent extremism for the program area. Establishing a 

baseline that identifies the push and pull factors, as well as integrating rolling assessments, is key to measuring the programs’ effectiveness against the identified 

drivers of violent extremism. 

Therefore, we will work closely with our interagency partners on using existing 

tools to measure behavioral and attitudinal change as they relate to the countryspecific extremism drivers. An assessment of the radicalization risk and extremism 

drivers will be conducted before beginning new programs in any country. The assessment results will guide programming and serve as a baseline to measure the 

programs’ effectiveness. 

We also coordinate with partner nations to understand how they develop and use 

program metrics. 

Mr. REID. Proving or measuring whether an activity has effectively countered violent extremism is incredibly challenging, because we are essentially faced with trying to prove a negative. Nevertheless, we work with our interagency partners and 

outside experts to attempt to assess the effectiveness of our CVE activities. Based 

on targeted programs developed by academic partners, we are able to have confidence that our programs have some measure of their intended effect. Due to the 

difficulty in measuring the effectiveness of CVE activities, resources are applied at 

the outset of a program to utilize the best minds in social psychology, anthropology, 

and sociology to create initiatives that, due to the unique cultural and political factors involved, stand the best chance on having the intended effect. 

Every CVE program is measured differently, but we do tend to look to behavioral 

and attitudinal change through polling results, even though we know that data is 

far from perfect. It is important to note that CVE activities are not conducted independently of other theater shaping operations, but are a component of COCOM activities in each area of responsibility and country team priorities in each nation. Accordingly, the specific success of a certain CVE activity is often more appropriately 

judged based on the overall success of the entire operation and whether we achieve 

our objectives in that region. 

General KEARNEY. We don’t measure the effectiveness of CVE activities very well 

at this time, but are working to improve both our capability and process for doing 

so. 

In its current form, we have a very basic approach to measuring the effectiveness 

for CVE activities. As an initial step, we attempt to establish a ‘baseline’ of the civil 

domain and indentify critical (civil) vulnerabilities, the ‘drivers of conflict.’ With this 

understanding of the domain and vulnerabilities, we then develop, prioritize and 

synchronize CVE objectives with the GCC, the Theater SOCOM, the U.S. Embassy 

and the host nation. Based on these coordinated CVE objectives, we next develop 

coordinated ‘action plans’ to reduce, mitigate, or eliminate those vulnerabilities; 

these plans identify ‘benchmarks’ to be used for the measurement of progress and/ 

or reassessment. During the execution of the CVE activities, we collect information 

within the civil domain and measure the progress of those actions against the previously developed benchmarks. Feedback from analysis of the measurements drive 

an assessment of what is working and what isn’t, and continually steers follow-on 

efforts toward the desired objectives. 

The key to this process is the development of functional benchmarks and ‘sustaining/rolling’ assessments against an accurate baseline to continually inform and 

refine the execution of CVE activities. 

ACCESSING DENIED AREAS

22. Senator REED. Ambassador Benjamin and Mr. Reid, Yemen and Somalia are 

often referred to as failing or failed states. From a CVE perspective, they present 

very different and unique challenges. In Yemen, the United States and the international community enjoy access to the country and its people. However, in Somalia, 

the United States and the international community have very limited access to the 

country and its people. Please explain how the United States can engage in the critVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:31 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63687.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ical task of countering the influence and activities of violent extremists in denied 

areas, like Somalia. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. The U.S. Government remains committed to advancing 

the Djibouti Peace Process and supporting Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to bring security and stability to all of Somalia. Central to this effort 

are actions that help build the TFG’s capacity to counter al-Shabaab’s narrative and 

influence. The Department is unable to operate directly in Somalia, but assists the 

TFG in challenging al-Shabaab in myriad ways, including: 

• Strengthening the TFG’s strategic communications and public outreach 

capabilities by providing $350,000 to help the Ministry of Information get 

Radio Mogadishu back on the air with expanded reach. 

• Encouraging the TFG through public diplomacy efforts to build alliances 

with clans and groups that would further legitimize and broaden its geographic reach. 

• Providing employment and skills training for 7,500 youth in Somalia 

through USAID’s Somali Youth Livelihood Program. 

• Additionally, the United States remains the largest provider of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, having provided more than $150 million in 

food aid and other humanitarian assistance to help the people of Somalia 

in fiscal year 2009. 

Speaking more broadly, what we are doing in Somalia is what we are doing in 

many other countries—building capacity. Consistent diplomatic engagement with 

counterparts helps build political will for common counterterrorism objectives. When 

there is political will, we can address the nuts and bolts aspect of capacity building. 

The United States has obligated approximately $185 million worth of training, 

non-lethal equipment, and logistical support to the African Union Mission in Somalia, of which $15 million was recently reimbursed by the United Nations. The U.S. 

Government has also obligated more than $23 million of Title 22 Peacekeeping Operations funding to provide in-kind support to the TFG, including equipment and 

supplies to support regional training efforts, and a limited amount of weapons and 

ammunition. We are addressing the state insufficiencies that terrorism thrives on, 

and we are helping invest our partners more effectively in confronting the threat. 

Mr. REID. The most difficult issue in conducting CVE in denied areas is being effective without having a DOD footprint in the region. However, we strive to CVE 

in denied areas by using the COCOM Voice programs. These programs CVE using 

media such as regional magazines, newspapers, radio, and television broadcasts. In 

some areas, web-based programs also may be the optimal method. 

23. Senator REED. Ambassador Benjamin and Mr. Reid, what agency should take 

the lead in CVE activities in denied areas? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. The U.S. Government as a whole—and the Department 

of State in particular—is realistic about what it can achieve on its own to counter 

violent extremist ideologies. Limiting the U.S. footprint and letting partner nations 

lead—and have ownership - is often crucial to long-term success. To ensure that efforts are sustainable, the U.S. Government is working to build capacity in host governments and strengthen local networks that oppose violent extremism. 

The U.S. CVE approach in under-governed areas must truly be a whole-of-government effort. No single agency or department will be able to tackle successfully the 

complex and interweaving issues that result in the radicalization of vulnerable or 

alienated individuals. In some circumstances, the U.S. military will be best positioned to take the lead on programmatic efforts; in others, the Department of State 

or USAID should spearhead the U.S. approach. Sustained engagement and coordination are critical to increasing the U.S. Government’s chances of success. 

Mr. REID. The 2008 National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror clarifies 

lead and supporting roles for CVE. State is the ‘‘lead’’ on 9 of the 12 CVE subobjectives. DOD is listed as a Partner on 10 of the 12, but is not listed as the interagency 

lead on any of the sub-objectives. There is no distinction between denied or permissive environments. 

DOD works in close consultation with the U.S. Chief of Mission, who leads U.S. 

Government efforts to CVE outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department is always open to, and often seeks, input and advice from our DOS, USAID, Intelligence 

Community, and other interagency colleagues on efforts to CVE. 

83 

For Washington-based interagency coordination efforts, the NSS is currently the 

lead. The NSS is chairing several interagency groups that involve CVE directly or 

other efforts that impact our CVE initiatives. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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