NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESSIE C. ROBERTS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

DANNY SAMUEL, 

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 20-56365 

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-04002-JLS-DFM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 9, 2023

Pasadena, California

Before: WATFORD and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and MURPHY,** District 

Judge.

Jessie Roberts appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

I

Roberts “visited three different car dealerships” in California “over two 

consecutive days” and “tried, with varying degrees of success, to steal a car from 

each dealership.” People v. Roberts, 2017 WL 4112240, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as 

provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Stephen Joseph Murphy III, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 31 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

18, 2017). At two of the dealerships—a Toyota dealership in Glendale and a 

Chevy dealership in Lancaster—Roberts drove away while an employee of the 

dealership was still in the car with him. Id. at *1–*2. A jury eventually convicted 

Roberts on several counts, including two that required a showing of specific 

intent—namely, (1) carjacking in violation of California Penal Code § 215(a), for 

the incident at the Chevy dealership; and (2) kidnapping for carjacking in violation 

of California Penal Code § 209.5(a), for the incident at the Toyota dealership. 

After his convictions were affirmed on direct review, Roberts filed for habeas 

corpus relief from the California state courts, asserting, inter alia, that his counsel 

had been ineffective in failing to investigate and present a mental-state defense to 

the specific-intent charges. After the state courts denied relief, Roberts filed a 

federal habeas petition that included this ineffective assistance claim. The district 

court denied the petition. We granted a certificate of appealability limited to the 

question whether Roberts’s “trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 

and present testimony from mental health experts concerning whether appellant 

lacked the specific intent to commit carjacking and kidnapping during the 

commission of a carjacking.”

II

Roberts argues that, because the various state-law procedural grounds on 

which his state habeas corpus petition was denied by the Los Angeles Superior 
3

Court and the California Court of Appeal were all patently erroneous, the 

California Supreme Court’s subsequent summary denial of his petition must be 

understood as resting on the merits rather than on those flawed state-law 

procedural grounds. See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1196 (2018) (noting 

that the presumption that the state supreme court relied on the same ground as the 

lower state courts may not apply “where the lower state court decision is 

unreasonable”). On that basis, Roberts concedes that the deferential standards of 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) apply to our review 

of the California Supreme Court’s rejection of his ineffective assistance claim on 

the merits. The State agrees with that latter proposition, and we proceed on the 

same basis.

Where, as here, “a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an 

explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden” under AEDPA requires him to show 

that “there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington 

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011) (emphasis added). We therefore “must 

determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, 

the state court’s decision; and then [we] must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added). 

We must, in other words, affirm the denial of habeas relief unless we conclude that 
4

the California Supreme Court’s summary rejection of the merits of Roberts’s

ineffective assistance claim was erroneous, under any possible theory, “beyond any 

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103.

To establish an ineffective assistance claim, a criminal defendant must show 

that “counsel’s performance was deficient” and that “the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

Here, Roberts argues that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient because 

counsel failed to investigate or present “a mental state defense to the specific intent 

requirements of the charged crimes.” To establish prejudice with respect to this 

claim, Roberts had to show that it was “‘reasonably likely’ that the result would 

have been different” had the mental health evidence Roberts submitted with his 

state habeas petition been presented at trial. Richter, 562 U.S. at 111 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). Although the “reasonably likely” standard “does not 

require a showing that counsel’s actions ‘more likely than not altered the 

outcome,’” the “likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just 

conceivable.” Id. at 111–12 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). Assuming 

arguendo that Roberts’s trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to investigate 

and present such a defense, we hold that the California Supreme Court nonetheless

could reasonably have concluded that Roberts was not prejudiced thereby. 

The jury instructions in this case—which no party contends were legally 
5

erroneous—provided that “[t]he Specific Intent required for the crime of 

Carjacking is the intent to deprive the other person of possession of the vehicle 

either temporarily or permanently.” See People v. Magallanes, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

751, 756 (Ct. App. 2009). The jury instructions further explained that “[t]he 

Specific Intent required for the crime of Kidnapping for Carjacking is the intent to 

facilitate the commission of Carjacking.” See People v. Medina, 161 P.3d 187, 

191–92 (Cal. 2007). The California appellate courts have held that a kidnapping 

“facilitate[s]” the commission of a carjacking if, inter alia, it “make[s] it easier to 

take the victim’s car” or is intended “to effect [an] escape . . . or to remove the 

victim to another place where he might less easily sound an alarm.” People v. 

Perez, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 378–79 (Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted). However, 

the intended escape need not be successful or well-planned: “An escape attempt 

that is poorly thought out is still an escape attempt.” Id. at 379.

Roberts’s petition presented evidence indicating that he suffered from 

serious mental illness, including auditory hallucinations and delusional thinking. 

According to this evidence, his delusions included “magical” thinking about “the 

physical characteristics and attributes of vehicles,” which influenced “the cars that 

he chose to take.” Although this evidence strongly supports the view that his 

motivation for committing the crime of carjacking was influenced by his mental 

illness, the California Supreme Court could reasonably conclude that it would not 
6

have altered the jury’s assessment of his ability to form the specific intent to 

deprive the Chevy dealership “of the vehicle either temporarily or permanently.” 

That is, the state high court could reasonably conclude that Roberts’s actions at the 

Chevy dealership demonstrated an ability to form and execute a plan to take a 

car—indeed, he said during that incident, “All I want is a car.” Roberts, 2017 WL 

4112240, at *1. 

Likewise, with respect to the kidnapping for carjacking at the Toyota 

dealership, the California Supreme Court could reasonably conclude that Roberts’s 

mental health evidence would not have altered the jury’s determination that 

Roberts intended his kidnapping of the dealership employee to facilitate the 

carjacking. The trial evidence showed that Roberts requested a test drive with the 

Toyota employee; that once in the driver’s seat, he drove away from the dealership 

at a high rate of speed; that he initially ignored the employee’s requests to slow 

down, pull over, and let him out; and that it was not until they had traveled 10

blocks that Roberts finally pulled into a parking lot and allowed the employee to 

leave. Roberts, 2017 WL 4112240, at *1. The California Supreme Court could 

reasonably conclude that, although Roberts’s delusional thinking concerning cars 

influenced his desire to take one, his behaviors nonetheless confirmed that he was 

able to form the specific intent to continue driving with the employee in the car in 

order to facilitate the carjacking. In reaching such a conclusion, the California 
7

Supreme Court would not have erred “beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.

AFFIRMED.