Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 188 / Wednesday, September 29, 2004 / Notices 58221

vehicle or equipment, and its date of 

manufacturer. 

Estimated Annual Burden: For part 

565 and part 567, NHTSA estimates the 

vehicle manufacturers will incur a total 

annual hour burden of 388,750 and cost 

burden of $5,053,750. For Part 541, 

NHTSA estimates the vehicle 

manufacturers will incur a total annual 

hour burden of 607,878 and cost burden 

of $75.68 million. 

Number of Respondents: 1,000. 

Comments are invited on: whether the 

proposed collection of information is 

necessary for the proper performance of 

the functions of the Department, 

including whether the information will 

have practical utility; the accuracy of 

the Department’s estimate of the burden 

of the proposed information collection; 

ways to enhance the quality, utility and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and ways to minimize the 

burden of the collection of information 

on respondents, including the use of 

automated collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology.

Issued on: September 23, 2004. 

Stephen R. Kratzke, 

Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.

[FR Doc. 04–21831 Filed 9–28–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

[U.S. DOT Docket Number NHTSA–2004–

18643] 

Reports, Forms, and Recordkeeping 

Requirements

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Request for public comment on 

an extension of a currently approved 

collection. 

SUMMARY: Before a Federal agency can 

collect certain information from the 

public, it must receive approval from 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB). Under procedures established 

by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995, before seeking OMB approval, 

Federal agencies must solicit public 

comment on proposed collections of 

information, including extensions and 

reinstatement of previously approved 

collections. 

This document describes one 

collection of information for which 

NHTSA intends to seek OMB approval.

DATES: Comments must be received on 

or before November 29, 2004.

ADDRESSES: Comments must refer to the 

docket notice numbers cited at the 

beginning of this notice and be 

submitted to Docket Management, Room 

PL–401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 

Washington, DC 20590 by any of the 

following methods. 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Agency Web site: http://

dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for 

submitting comments on the Docket 

Management System. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Complete copies of each request for 

collection of information may be 

obtained at no charge from Carlita 

Ballard, NHTSA 400 Seventh Street, 

SW., Room 5320, NVS–131, 

Washington, DC 20590. Ms. Ballard’s 

telephone number is (202) 366–0846. 

Please identify the relevant collection of 

information by referring to its OMB 

Control Number.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 

before an agency submits a proposed 

collection of information to OMB for 

approval, it must first publish a 

document in the Federal Register

providing a 60-day comment period and 

otherwise consult with members of the 

public and affected agencies concerning 

each proposed collection of information. 

The OMB has promulgated regulations 

describing what must be included in 

such a document. Under OMB’s 

regulation (at 5 CFR 1320.8(d), an 

agency must ask for public comment on 

the following: 

(i) Whether the proposed collection of 

information is necessary for the proper 

performance of the functions of the 

agency, including whether the 

information will have practical utility; 

(ii) The accuracy of the agency’s 

estimate of the burden of the proposed 

collection of information, including the 

validity of the methodology and 

assumptions used; 

(iii) How to enhance the quality, 

utility, and clarity of the information to 

be collected; and 

(iv) How to minimize the burden of 

the collection of information on those 

who are to respond, including the use 

of appropriate automated, electronic, 

mechanical, or other technological 

collection techniques or other forms of 

information technology, e.g. permitting 

electronic submission of responses. 

In compliance with these 

requirements, NHTSA asks for public 

comments on the following proposed 

collections of information: 

Title: Petitions for Exemption from 

the Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard 

(49 CFR 543). 

OMB Control Number: 2127–0542. 

Affected Public: Business or other forprofit. 

Form Number: This collection of 

information uses no standard forms. 

Abstract: 49 U.S.C. Chapter 331 

requires the Secretary of Transportation 

to promulgate a theft prevention 

standard to provide for the 

identification of certain motor vehicles 

and their major replacement parts to 

impede motor vehicle theft. 49 U.S.C. 

section 33106 provides for an 

exemption to this identification process 

by petitions from manufacturers who 

equip covered vehicles with standard 

original equipment antitheft devices, 

which the Secretary determines are 

likely to be as effective in reducing or 

deterring theft as the identification 

system. Section 543.5 is revised for each 

model year after model year 1996 a 

manufacturer may petition NHTSA to 

grant an exemption for one additional 

line of it’s passenger motor vehicles 

from the requirements of part 541 of this 

chapter. 

In a final rule published on April 6, 

2004, the Federal Motor Vehicle Theft 

Prevention Standard was extended to 

include all passenger cars and 

multipurpose passenger vehicles with a 

gross vehicle weight rating of 6,000 

pounds or less, and to light duty trucks 

with major parts that are 

interchangeable with a majority of the 

covered major parts of multipurpose 

passenger vehicles. The final rule 

becomes effective September 1, 2006. 

Estimated Annual Burden: 67 hours. 

Number of Respondents: 5.

Issued on: September 23, 2004. 

Stephen R. Kratzke, 

Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.

[FR Doc. 04–21832 Filed 9–28–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

Denial of Motor Vehicle Recall Petition

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Denial of petitions for an 

investigation into alleged defects in 

Firestone Steeltex tires. 

SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the 

reasons for the denial of two petitions 

submitted to NHTSA under 49 U.S.C. 

30162 by the Law Offices of Lisoni & 

58222 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 188 / Wednesday, September 29, 2004 / Notices 

1A ‘‘failed’’ tire is a tire that experiences a major 

component (e.g. tread or casing) separation or other 

event including rapid air-loss while driving.

2This figure does not include letters mailed to 

ODI at the behest of an August 4, 2004 e-mail from 

the petitioners to their clients. To date, ODI is 

aware of 27 such letters, the majority of which 

describe tire failures that were reported in the 

petition, VOQ database, or Firestone property 

damage claim database. All but one of these events 

occurred prior to 2004.

Lisoni of Pasadena, California, 

requesting that the agency commence a 

defect investigation of alleged defects in 

all Firestone Steeltex tires manufactured 

since 1995 and in those Steeltex tires 

installed on ambulances. After a review 

of the petitions and other information, 

NHTSA has concluded that further 

expenditure of the agency’s 

investigative resources on the issues 

raised by the petitions does not appear 

warranted. The agency accordingly has 

denied the petitions. The petitions are 

hereinafter identified as DP04–004 (All 

Steeltex tires) and DP04–005 (Steeltex 

tires on ambulances).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Gregory Magno, Safety Defects Engineer, 

Office of Defects Investigation (ODI), 

NHTSA, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 

Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: 

(202) 366–0139.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Petition Review—DP04–004 and DP04–

005 

1.0 Introduction 

On May 12, 2004 the Law Offices of 

Lisoni & Lisoni (petitioners) submitted 

two petitions requesting that the Office 

of Defects Investigation (ODI) 

commence an investigation of Firestone 

Steeltex tires pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 

30162, and issue a recall order pursuant 

to 49 U.S.C. Sections 30118(b), 30119, 

and 30120. One petition pertains to all 

Steeltex tires manufactured since 1995 

(DP04–004), and the other pertains to 

Steeltex tires on ambulances (DP04–

005). ODI began a technical review of 

DP04–004 and -005 on May 26, 2004 in 

accordance with the provisions of 49 

U.S.C. 30162. During the review, ODI: 

• Analyzed data within its own 

vehicle owners questionnaire (VOQ) 

database; 

• Analyzed early warning reporting 

(EWR) data submitted by all tire 

manufacturers since December 2003; 

• Examined a total of 190 Steeltex 

tires, 21 of which had been installed on 

ambulances; 

• Hired an independent expert to 

examine 89 failed Steeltex tires held by 

Bridgestone-Firestone North American 

Tires (Firestone) at a storage facility in 

Marengo, Indiana; 1

• Requested and analyzed data 

pertaining to Steeltex tire performance 

from Firestone; 

• Analyzed the petition contents and 

additional data requested from the 

petitioners; 

• Witnessed and interviewed the 

petitioners’ consultants during their 

examination of failed Steeltex tires at 

Firestone’s Akron, Ohio technical 

center; 

• Collected ambulance-specific data 

from the Ford Motor Company (Ford), 

primary manufacturer of ambulance 

platforms equipped with light truck 

radial tires over the last ten years; 

• Interviewed 30 of the ambulance 

operators cited in the petitions; and 

• Interviewed a local ambulance fleet 

operator not cited in the petitions to 

better understand approaches to 

ambulance tire usage and maintenance. 

Based on this technical review, ODI 

has concluded that the petitions should 

be denied. 

2.0 Background 

Steeltex is a model name applied to 

the majority of light truck radial tires 

sold by Firestone since 1990. Over this 

time period, Firestone has manufactured 

in excess of forty million Steeltex tires 

in three load ranges (C, D, and E), two 

types (all terrain (A/T) and all season 

(R4S, superceded by the R4SII)), and 

twelve sizes at five plants. Steeltex tires 

have been the primary original 

equipment (OE) tire on many of the 

largest passenger vans, sport utility 

vehicles (SUV), pickup trucks, and 

‘‘cutaways’’ (including motor homes 

(RV) and ambulances) sold in that time 

period. Almost three quarters of Steeltex 

tires produced are Load Range E (LRE) 

tires that may be inflated up to 80 psi 

and can carry between 2,500 lb and 

3,400 lb per tire. More than half of 

Steeltex tires are concentrated in three 

sizes: LT225/75R16, LT245/75R16, and 

LT265/75R16. 

Steeltex tires are light truck radial 

(LTR) tires comprised of two polyester 

body plies and two steel belts. Within 

the population of Steeltex tires there 

exist a variety of designs that include 

obvious differences such as tread 

pattern, sidewall configuration, and tire 

size as well as differences in internal 

construction such as cord configuration, 

cord gauge, cord angle, and mold shape. 

LTR tires are distinguished from 

passenger radial (PSR) tires by having 

heavier cord gauges, thicker rubber 

plies, deeper tread depths, and 

substantially higher inflation pressures. 

These qualities enable them to carry 

heavier loads and resist chipping and 

tearing. However, these characteristics 

also increase their sensitivity to usage 

factors such as overload, underinflation, 

and overspeed. This is due chiefly to the 

heat generated by these factors and the 

lesser ability of thicker, heavier tires to 

dissipate this heat. Heat promotes a 

reduction in the material properties in 

all radial tires.

ODI initiated its first investigation 

(PE00–040) of Steeltex tires on 

September 9, 2000. PE00–040 was 

closed on April 9, 2002. The primary 

bases for the decision to close were the 

fact that the tires under investigation 

displayed failure rates comparable to 

those of LTR tires sold by other major 

manufacturers and that many of the 

failures reported were influenced by the 

usage factors cited above. ODI also 

noted that the vehicle type had the 

largest influence on the likelihood of a 

tire failure causing a vehicle crash. 

ODI revisited the question of Steeltex 

tire failures during its technical review 

of a petition (DP02–011) from the Law 

Offices of Lisoni & Lisoni in November 

of 2002. DP02–011 alleged that all 

Steeltex tires manufactured since 1990 

were defective, that ODI had 

undercounted VOQs in its database, and 

that Firestone had deliberately 

understated its failure figures. ODI 

denied DP02–011 on June 16, 2003 on 

the basis that VOQ and Firestone figures 

had changed little since the closing of 

PE00–040 and that the petitions added 

relatively little new data for 

consideration. 

The petitions under consideration 

here allege that all Steeltex tires 

manufactured since 1995 are defective 

and that Steeltex tires used on 

ambulances pose an unacceptable safety 

risk to Emergency Medical Service 

(EMS) operators. Among other things, 

the new petitions contain allegations 

that Firestone cost reduction efforts 

compromised Steeltex tire durability, 

and the petitioners’ assessment from 

their examination of disabled Steeltex 

tires in Firestone’s custody. 

3.0 DP04–004 Analysis (All Steeltex 

Tires Produced Since 1995) 

3.1 VOQs Since the Denial of DP02–011 

During the fourteen months since the 

denial of DP02–011, ODI has received 

294 Steeltex tire failure VOQs, 

approximately three-quarters of which 

reported tread separations.2 Fourteen 

VOQs allege that the tire failure led to 

a crash, of which six involved injuries, 

with no deaths. 

In terms of tire fitment, Class C RVs 

based on cutaway van chassis represent 

the largest share of VOQs received, with 

just under half of the Steeltex tire 

failures reported; however, none of 

these involved a crash or injury. RV 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 188 / Wednesday, September 29, 2004 / Notices 58223

3On February 26, 2004, Firestone announced that 

it would recall approximately 487,000 LT265/

75R16 LRD Steeltex A/T tires manufactured for OE 

fitment on MY 2000–2003 Ford Excursion SUVs. 

Firestone estimated that 297,000 of these tires were 

still in service at that time.

4 It should be noted that no single tire 

manufacturer consistently ranked the highest in any 

of the categories described.

5Smithers Scientific Services of Akron, Ohio 

furnished the expert and issued a report, available 

in the DP04–004 public file.

6Three tire sizes account for the majority of tire 

production and property damage claims, and are 

used on potentially sensitive vehicles such as large 

passenger vans and ambulances: LT225/75R16, 

LT245/75R16, and LT265/75R16.

7 In this case, the term claim refers to lawsuits 

and claims for both property damage and personal 

injury.

8Flex failure is caused by operation at extreme 

levels of underinflation, a condition that was 

identified in some tires by both ODI’s expert and 

the petitioners’ consultants.

complaints largely involved the Ford Eseries dual rear wheel platform using 

LT225/75R16 LRE Steeltex R4S tires.

Pickup trucks accounted for a third of 

the VOQs and half of the remaining 

crash reports while Ford Excursions 

equipped with tires subject to Recall 

04T–003 accounted for a third of the 

crashes, and half of the injuries. 3

Excluding tires subject to Recall 04T–

003, the total known Steeltex failure 

VOQ count now stands at 1,451; of 

which 908 report tread separation. 

Thirty-four VOQs report vehicle 

crashes, of which 28 led to injuries or 

deaths. A total of 51 injuries and 6 

deaths were reported. 

3.2 EWR Data 

ODI began receiving EWR data from 

all major tire manufacturers in 

December of 2003. This includes data 

on production, adjustments, property 

damage claims, and death and injury 

claims and notices. Scrutiny of these 

data earlier this year contributed to 

Recall 04T–003. 

ODI’s analysis has found that, in 

general, Steeltex tire property damage 

claim rates are very close to and in 

many cases below the LTR class 

average, with a number of major LTR 

tire manufacturers having higher claim 

rates. In all cases, for each size of 

Steeltex tires, two or more competitors 

experienced higher property damage 

claim rates. 

ODI also reviewed the death and 

injury claim and notice (collectively, 

‘‘claim’’) data and found that Steeltex 

tires were above the industry average for 

injury-only LTR tire claim rates but had 

some of the lowest fatal LTR tire claim 

rates. With respect to injury claims, two 

major LTR tire manufacturers 

experienced higher rates.4

3.3 Tire Analysis 

To determine whether a pattern of 

failure modes or underlying causes 

existed in Steeltex tires, ODI hired 

Thomas M. Dodson, an expert in tire 

forensic analysis from a prominent tire 

and materials test lab,5 to examine tires 

at Marengo. A total of 89 Steeltex tires 

were randomly selected from within 

each of three tire sizes,6 half of which 

had been examined by the petitioners. 

According to the report issued by Mr. 

Dodson, while tire failure modes 

observed at Marengo appeared similar at 

the macroscopic level, they were quite 

varied when viewed from a close-up 

perspective. The report also stated that 

the numerous different failure modes 

observed did not indicate the presence 

of a common or singular underlying 

cause of failure. Furthermore, the report 

also found that the types of conditions 

and/or appearances observed were 

consistent with the array of modes of 

failure typically seen in tires of 

comparable size and type. Usage factors 

such as road hazards, mounting damage, 

improper repairs, and overdeflection 

figured prominently in Mr. Dodson’s 

observations.

The ODI engineer who participated in 

Mr. Dodson’s examinations of tires at 

Marengo also witnessed the petitioners’

examination of 74 Steeltex tires in 

Akron and observed many of the same 

contributory factors and conditions. 

3.4 Firestone Data 

ODI reviewed thousands of claims 7

received by Firestone over the last ten 

years. After filtering out tires subject to 

Recall 04T–003, misapplications, and 

the most obvious road hazards and flexfailures,8 all Steeltex tire sizes and lines 

show failure rates that are lower than 

those observed in peer LRE tires. The 

four largest LRE tire sizes continue to 

account for 85% of claims and all but 

one of the nonfatal injury crashes that 

occurred in 2002. Tires manufactured in 

1999 account for the highest number of 

claims and of injury crashes.

ODI also examined Firestone’s 

warranty adjustment data and found no 

signs of a defect trend overall, or in any 

specific tire lines and sizes. 

In summary, the above information 

indicates that Steeltex tires overall do 

not stand out from their peers in terms 

of failure rates, and there are no 

indications of a defect trend. 

4.0 DP04–005 Analysis (Steeltex Tires 

on Ambulances) 

4.1 ODI VOQs 

ODI has received over 100 VOQs 

relating to ambulances over the last ten 

years, 28 of which involve tires, four of 

which reported concerns with valve 

stem durability or accessibility, or 

sidewall cracks. Of the 24 VOQs that 

report tire failures, two involved 

Michelin tires. One of the Michelin 

complaints reported multiple sidewall 

failures that stopped occurring after the 

fleet converted their OE rubber valve 

stems to metal clamp-in valve stems. 

The VOQs that report Steeltex tire 

failures involve Type I and Type III 

ambulances based on the Ford F–350 

and E–350/–450 dual rear wheel 

platforms. Most of these failures 

occurred on the rear axle. None of the 

22 VOQs allege a crash, injury, or death. 

Most incidents took place in 2000 and 

2001, with the most recent incident 

occurring in August 2003. 

4.2 Firestone Data 

Over the last ten years, Firestone has 

received a total of eight claims relating 

to Steeltex tires on ambulances. Six of 

these are claims for property damage 

only, while the remaining two are 

personal injury claims involving a total 

of three injuries, including one death. 

One of the injury claims was dismissed 

because the injury could not be 

substantiated and the LT245/75R16 LRE 

tire involved displayed the classic flex 

failure mode associated with severe 

underinflation, while the other claim, 

involving the death and a non-fatal 

injury, is still open. 

Overall, the property damage claims 

are confined to Steeltex R4S/R4SII tires, 

mostly involving LT225/75R16 LRE 

tires. With the exception of a 

misapplied LRC tire and two failures 

due to extreme underinflation, failure 

times varied from two to five years in 

service. 

4.3 Ford Data 

Ford produced the vast majority of 

LTR tire-equipped ambulance platforms, 

totaling almost 60,000 over the last ten 

years. Dual rear wheel vehicles, which 

were predominantly fitted with Steeltex 

tires, account for two thirds of 

ambulance production, with Type III E–

350/–450 cutaways accounting for 

almost half of overall production. 

Ford informed ODI that it chooses tire 

fitments for ambulance packageequipped vehicles based on the tire’s 

ability to meet speed and load 

requirements. It has further stated that 

it discourages vehicle modifiers that 

convert cutaways into finished 

ambulances from changing the OE tire 

fitments provided by Ford. 

Ford has received sixteen tire-related 

complaints concerning ambulances over 

the last ten years, a quarter of which 

relate to valve stem leakage or tire 

58224 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 188 / Wednesday, September 29, 2004 / Notices 

9Allegations and supporting information were 

provided in three submissions: Petitions DP04–004 

and DP04–005 dated May 12, 2004; a submission 

dated July 20, 2004 that includes video tapes of the 

Marengo tire inspections, copies of VOQs, and 

additional complaint information; and a technical 

report dated July 29, 2004.

10Many of these complaints allege failure modes 

such as flex failures, and impact breaks that are 

different from tread separation—the failure mode 

identified in the petitions. We further note that 

these failures can be caused by many different 

conditions, including usage factors.

11For example, Page 6 of the July 29, 2004 report 

misidentifies (tire) rubber ‘‘reversion’’ as the return 

of vulcanized rubber to its pre-cure state in the 

presence of high temperatures. This conflicts with 

established polymer science that identifies rubber 

reversion as a continuation of the vulcanization 

process, leading to a decline in its desirable 

physical properties. Likewise, statements made on 

Page 8 mischaracterize the reasons for adding 

natural rubber to tires as being its heat resistance 

relative to that of synthetic rubber.

12For example: VOQ # 748972 reported multiple 

tread separations on Michelin LT225/75R16 tires on 

a Ford E–350 RV.

13For example: VOQ # 733402 reported road 

hazard damage to a Wilderness A/T P265/75R16 

tire on a 2000 Chevrolet Silverado.

14 Information concerning C95 was submitted by 

the petitioners to ODI in April 2003 during ODI’s 

technical review of DP02–011. The document 

submitted included a list of 153 potential costreduction recommendations.

15More details concerning these allegations can 

be found in the petitioners’ July 29 technical report.

16One was a general contractor (North East 

Lighting Protection) and one was a state 

environmental agency (Florida Bureau of 

Environmental Response).

17A Kinross EMS representative advised that the 

petitioner has misquoted them. Kinross EMS has 

experienced two Steeltex tire failures, both 

attributed to valve stem extension leakage on its 

vehicles. The crash itself was unrelated to tire 

failure and occurred as a result of driving in icy 

conditions.

misapplication. The sole reported injury 

crash involved a Uniroyal tire failing on 

the right rear position of a MY 1997 

Type II ambulance in 2001. One 

additional crash was reported in 2002 

that involved a patched tire and no 

injuries. 

Review of the failure data reported to 

ODI, Firestone, and Ford indicates that 

Steeltex tire failures on ambulances are 

spread out over a significant period of 

time, and often involve usage factors 

such as misapplication, valve stem 

concerns (as evidenced by the 

complaints regarding valve stem 

durability and access), and road 

hazards. Additionally, analysis 

indicates that Steeltex tires were, until 

2003, the predominant tire used in dual 

rear wheel ambulance applications and, 

thus, uniquely exposed to tire issues 

associated with ambulance operation. 

5.0 Petition Allegations 

The petitioners made numerous 

allegations,9 which primarily restate 

those in DP02–011: that ODI has 

undercounted Steeltex VOQs; that the 

volume of complaints 10 gathered is 

evidence of a safety defect trend; and 

that the subject tires contain 

manufacturing and material defects. In 

contrast to DP02–011, the petitioners 

have now examined a number of failed 

Steeltex tires in Firestone’s custody and 

have characterized their findings as 

evidence that the tires are defective in 

design and manufacture.

ODI has reviewed the materials 

submitted in the petitions and found 

that they do not demonstrate the 

existence of a safety-related defect trend 

or warrant the opening of a defect 

investigation. The petitions allege a 

wide array of defects throughout the 

various sizes, load ranges, and designs 

of Steeltex tires manufactured by 

Firestone since 1995. These include 

inferior raw materials, inadequate 

component gauges, improper splices, 

improper curing, inadequate rubberwire adhesion in the steel belts, and 

various other design and manufacturing 

deficiencies. ODI’s analysis of all of the 

available tire failure data does not 

indicate that the Steeltex tires contain a 

defect condition and certainly do not 

support the petitioner’s claims of such 

a broad range of defects. 

The petitioners did not conduct any 

testing or laboratory analyses to support 

these claims and some of the claims are 

in direct conflict with others. For 

example, the current and prior petitions 

allege that the Steeltex tires contain the 

same defect as the Wilderness A/T tires 

previously recalled by Firestone and 

identify inadequate rubber-wire 

adhesion, as allegedly demonstrated by 

‘‘shiny brass’’ in the belt wire, as one of 

the primary causes. Extensive lab 

analyses of hundreds of Wilderness A/

T tires performed by ODI, Firestone, and 

Ford during the course of EA00–023 

found good steel cord-rubber adhesion 

and that Wilderness A/T tire tread 

separations involved fatigue crack 

growth through the skim rubber 

between the two steel belts, rather than 

at the interface between the rubber and 

steel. Likewise, many of the tires 

examined at Marengo displayed crisp 

multi-level tear patterns in the skim 

rubber, suggesting good steel cordrubber adhesion. The report submitted 

by the petitioners at the end of July 

contains many similar internal 

contradictions and scientific errors.11

The petitioners’ resubmission of 

allegedly undercounted Steeltex VOQs 

contained many of the same errors 

highlighted in the DP02–011 denial: 

Fully one-fifth of these complaints 

involved tires sold by Firestone’s 

competitors,12 non-Steeltex Firestone 

tires,13 contained no failure summary or 

description, or reported conditions that 

were not tire failures such as vibrations 

and rapid wear. In the end, somewhat 

more than half of the original number of 

complaints submitted by the petitioners 

alleged a Steeltex tread separation.

DP04–004 Exhibits E and F contain 

information concerning the petitioners’

tire examinations at Marengo. While the 

petitioners used former Firestone 

employees as consultants, they applied 

forensic condition codes that are not 

used by Firestone and in many cases do 

not accurately describe a disabled tire 

condition. Many basic mistakes were 

made, including the misstatement of the 

DOT code or consumer’s name in almost 

a third of the records. 

The petitioners make numerous 

references to the C95 cost reduction 

program 14 conducted by Firestone in 

the mid 1990s as evidence of 

unacceptable reductions to Steeltex tire 

quality.15 Firestone has stated that many 

of the recommendations cited by the 

petitioners were never implemented. 

The petitioners have attempted to link 

Firestone’s search for lower cost 

materials to a labor dispute at a carbon 

black supplier from which Firestone 

buys relatively little material. The 

petitioners also allege that lighter steel 

cords were used, reducing steel cordrubber adhesion; yet ODI has observed 

signs of strong steel cord-rubber 

adhesion in most of the Steeltex tires 

that it examined. The petitioners have 

alleged that process times were 

shortened leading to undercure of 

Steeltex tires, and that such tires would 

fail early in service, but we note that 

failure data show that these tires 

generally fail well into their service 

lives, on average after three years of use, 

and halfway through their tread life.

DP04–005 alleges that Steeltex tires 

endanger ambulance operators and 

contains two references to press reports 

of patients dying as a result of 

ambulance tire failures, 41 signed 

statements from EMS companies, and 

additional contact information 

contained in Exhibits A and B. 

ODI has found significant 

inconsistencies in this information. For 

example, one of the alleged fatal 

ambulance crashes involved a Type II 

ambulance that left the road and rolled 

over. Closer investigation found that 

that there was no evidence of a precrash tire failure, and that the vehicle 

was in fact fitted with Michelin tires. 

Two of the complainants that filed 

signed statements included in DP04–

005 were not EMS services and did not 

operate ambulances;16 the vehicle crash 

experienced by the Kinross EMS was 

not caused by a tire failure;17 and fully 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 188 / Wednesday, September 29, 2004 / Notices 58225

18 In these instances, complainants reported valve 

stem leakage, vibration, bulges, and irregular wear.

19Based on these and other operational and 

maintenance issues identified in dual rear wheel 

tire applications during the course of this review, 

NHTSA plans to conduct outreach activities to the 

EMS and RV communities in an effort to improve 

vehicle/tire loading and tire pressure maintenance 

conditions.

one third of the EMS services contacted 

by ODI did not experience a tire failure 

while driving.18

6.0 Discussion 

In determining whether to open a 

defect investigation into a product, ODI 

typically considers a number of factors, 

dependent upon the alleged defect and 

component at issue. The decision 

whether to re-open an investigation into 

Firestone Steeltex tires was based on 

consideration of a number of matters 

identified during the course of the 

technical review. These considerations 

were discussed at length above and 

include such items as the number and 

trend of owner complaints, claims and 

adjustment data, the number and 

severity of injury claims, and evidence 

of a possible source and mode of failure.

Standing alone, no one factual 

consideration was dispositive. For 

example, the fact that the adjustment or 

property damage claims rates for 

Steeltex tires may have been comparable 

to or lower than competitor tires, was 

but one factor. Other information was 

considered as well, such as the number 

and severity of injury incidents 

associated with the tires, and the variety 

of failure conditions observed during 

ODI’s tire examinations. 

As noted in the denial of DP02–011, 

the subject Steeltex tires represent an 

immense and diverse population of tires 

that are used in the harshest LTR tire 

applications. The data continue to show 

that the rate of Steeltex tire failures is 

similar to that of other tires in similar 

uses. 

The petitioners’ data and VOQs show 

that Class C RVs, representing a 

relatively small segment of vehicles that 

use Steeltex tires, account for the largest 

share of recent failures, but a very small 

share of the crash numbers. Class C RVs 

are an especially severe LTR tire 

application because, by design, they 

operate very close to the tires’ rated 

capacities, are subject to tire pressure 

maintenance concerns, and accumulate 

mileage at a lower rate than most other 

vehicles equipped with LTR tires. 

Additionally, the independent tire 

failure expert ODI retained to examine 

an assortment of failed Steeltex tires 

was unable to find evidence of any 

specific type or mode of failure in the 

tires. His examination concluded that 

the tires demonstrated evidence of a 

wide variety of failure modes, all of 

which were consistent with the failure 

modes typically seen in tires of 

comparable size and type, regardless of 

manufacturer. 

With regard to ambulance 

applications in particular, tire 

examinations and interviews conducted 

by ODI, and surveys conducted by 

Firestone have uncovered evidence of 

significant tire maintenance concerns 

(many of which also apply to RVs). ODI 

examined 21 ambulance tires and found 

many of the same conditions observed 

at Marengo, including flex failures and 

unrepaired road hazards. The dual rear 

wheel arrangement on many 

ambulances often renders the inner 

valve stem inaccessible, making it 

difficult to assure that proper pressures 

are maintained. Up to a third of the 

vehicles surveyed by Firestone 

evidenced substantial underinflation of 

their tires. This is especially significant 

because, like RVs, ambulances operate 

very close to the maximum carrying 

capacity of their tires most of the time.19

7.0 Conclusions 

Based on ODI’s analysis of 

information submitted in support of the 

petitions, additional complaint and 

claims information gathered since the 

DP02–011 denial, and its examination of 

failed Steeltex tires, it is unlikely that 

NHTSA would issue an order for the 

notification and remedy of a safetyrelated defect in the subject tires at the 

conclusion of the investigations 

requested by the petitioners. Therefore, 

in view of the need to allocate and 

prioritize NHTSA’s limited resources to 

best accomplish the agency’s safety 

mission, ODI is denying the petitions to 

reopen the Steeltex investigation. ODI 

will continue to monitor the 

performance of these tires for any signs 

of an emerging defect trend.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30120(e); delegations 

of authority at CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

Issued on: September 24, 2004. 

Kenneth N. Weinstein, 

Associate Administrator for Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 04–21786 Filed 9–28–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs 

Administration 

Pipeline Safety: Hazards Associated 

With De-Watering of Pipelines

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs 

Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory 

bulletin. 

SUMMARY: On June 21, 2004, the 

Research and Special Programs 

Administration’s Office of Pipeline 

Safety (RSPA/OPS) issued Advisory 

Bulletin ADB–04–01 to owners and 

operators of gas and hazardous liquid 

pipelines to consider the hazards 

associated with pipeline de-watering 

operations. This advisory bulletin was 

originally issued jointly with the 

Department of Labor’s Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA) as Safety and Health 

Information Bulletin SHIB 06–21–2004. 

Operators are strongly encouraged to 

follow the recommended work practices 

and guidelines to reduce the potential 

for unexpected separation of temporary 

de-watering pipes.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Richard Huriaux, (202) 366–4565; or by 

e-mail, richard.huriaux@rspa.dot.gov.

This document can be viewed at the 

OPS home page at http://ops.dot.gov.

The original advisory bulletin issued by 

OSHA can be viewed at http://

www.osha.gov. General information 

about the RSPA/OPS programs may be 

obtained by accessing RSPA’s home 

page at http://rspa.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The OSHA Allentown and WilkesBarre Area Offices recently investigated 

two fatalities that occurred in 

conjunction with de-watering processes 

associated with newly constructed gas 

pipelines. In both cases, the temporary 

de-watering piping violently separated 

from its couplings, striking and fatally 

injuring employees. In one instance, the 

separated section of pipe was thrown 45 

feet from where it had been attached to 

the temporary de-watering valve. OSHA 

determined that a major contributing 

factor to both of the accidents was 

temporary de-watering pipelines that 

were not adequately secured to prevent 

the piping from moving or separating. In 

one case, the failure occurred at a pipe 

coupler that was not being used within 

the safe tolerances established by the 

manufacturer. 

After a pipeline is laid, a hydrostatic 

test is conducted to ensure its integrity. 

Hydrostatic testing may also be 

conducted during the service life of the 

pipeline to evaluate its operational 

integrity. The hydrostatic test consists of 

pumping water into the pipeline, 

pressuring up the line to specified test 

pressures, and holding that pressure for 

a discrete period of time in accordance 

with applicable regulations and 

guidelines, including regulations