Art of War Papers

Survival Through Adaptation:

The Chinese Red Army and the Extermination 

Campaigns, 1927-1936

 Wilbur W. Hsu, Major, US Army

 Command and General Staff College

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The cover photo courtesy of the Library of Congress is that of General 

Dwight Eisenhower giving orders to American paratroopers in England.
Survival Through Adaptation:

The Chinese Red Army and The Extermination Campaigns, 

1927-1936

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College

by

WILBUR W. HSU, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY

M.S., Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, 2011

B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., 1999

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2012-01
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hsu, Wilbur W.

 Survival through adaptation: The chinese red army and the extermination campaigns, 1927-1936 / Wilbur W. Hsu.

 p. cm. -- (Art of war papers)

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Zhongguo gong nong hong jun--History. 2. China--History, Military--20th 

century. 3. China--History--Republic, 1912-1949. I. Title.

 DS775.4.H835 2012

 951.04’2--dc23

 2012039027

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a wide variety of military history topics. The views expressed in this CSI 

Press publication are those of the author(s) 

and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of 

Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, all of them available for downloading, can be found at http://usacac.army.

mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document 

as an official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official 

seal on any republication without the express written permission of 

the Director of CSI.
iii

Abstract

Survival Through Adaptation:

The Chinese Red Army And The Extermination Campaigns, 

1927-1936

by Major Wilbur W. Hsu

This study analyzes the Chinese Red Army from 1927 to 1936 to determine how the Red Army survived attacks from external military forces and 

also successfully overcame the threats to its existence posed by changing 

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies. During this period, the CCP 

attempted to develop, expand, and professionalize the Chinese Red Army 

as a way to defend Communist base areas from a series of Kuomingtang 

(KMT) Extermination Campaigns. Also during these years, changes in 

the CCP leadership often placed the Red Army in dangerous situations by 

underestimating the KMT military threat and overestimating Red Army 

capabilities. This re-examination of the origin and development of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army looks at the Chinese Red Army’s strategy, 

tactics, organization, and training and identifies four themes that helped it 

adapt and survive: a pragmatic strategy focused on long-term success; creating local populace support through adaptation; strong soldier recruiting, 

training, and retention; and a comprehensive officer development system.
iv

Objectives of the Art of War Scholars Program

The Art of War Scholars Program is a laboratory for critical thinking. 

It offers a select group of students a range of accelerated, academically 

rigorous graduate level courses that promote analysis, stimulate the desire 

for life-long learning, and reinforce academic research skills. Art of War 

graduates will not be satisfied with facile arguments; they understand 

the complexities inherent in almost any endeavor and develop the tools 

and fortitude to confront such complexities, analyze challenges, and 

independently seek nuanced solutions in the face of those who would opt 

for cruder alternatives. Through the pursuit of these outcomes, the Art of 

War Scholars Program seeks to improve and deepen professional military 

education. 

The Art of War Program places contemporary operations (such as 

those in Iraq and Afghanistan) in a historical framework by examining 

earlier military campaigns. Case studies and readings have been selected 

to show the consistent level of complexity posed by military campaigns 

throughout the modern era. Coursework emphasizes the importance of 

understanding previous engagements in order to formulate policy and 

doctrinal response to current and future campaigns. 

One unintended consequence of military history education is the 

phenomenon of commanders and policy makers “cherry picking” 

history—that is, pointing to isolated examples from past campaigns 

to bolster a particular position in a debate, without a comprehensive 

understanding of the context in which such incidents occurred. This trend 

of oversimplification leaves many historians wary of introducing these 

topics into broader, more general discussion. The Art of War program seeks 

to avoid this pitfall by a thorough examination of context. As one former 

student stated: “The insights gained have left me with more questions than 

answers but have increased my ability to understand greater complexities 

of war rather than the rhetorical narrative that accompanies cursory study 

of any topic.”

Professor Michael Howard, writing “The Use and Abuse of Military 

History” in 1961, proposed a framework for educating military officers in 

the art of war that remains unmatched in its clarity, simplicity, and totality. 

The Art of War program endeavors to model his plan:

Three general rules of study must therefore be borne in mind by the 

officer who studies military history as a guide to his profession and who 

wishes to avoid pitfalls. First, he must study in width. He must observe the 

way in which warfare has developed over a long historical period. Only 

by seeing what does change can one deduce what does not; and as much 

as can be learnt from the great discontinuities of military history as from 

the apparent similarities of the techniques employed by the great captains 

through the ages....Next he must study in depth. He should take a single 
v

campaign and explore it thoroughly, not simply from official histories, 

but from memoirs, letters, diaries. . . until the tidy outlines dissolve and 

he catches a glimpse of the confusion and horror of real experience... 

and, lastly, he must study in context. Campaigns and battles are not like 

games of chess or football matches, conducted in total detachment from 

their environment according to strictly defined rules. Wars are not tactical 

exercises writ large. They are...conflicts of societies, and they can be 

fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting 

them. The roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the 

battlefield, in political, social, and economic factors which explain why 

armies are constituted as they are, and why their leaders conduct them in 

the way they do.... 

It must not be forgotten that the true use of history, military or civil... 

is not to make men clever for the next time; it is to make them wise forever.

Gordon B. Davis, Jr. 

Brigadier General, US Army

Deputy Commanding General

CAC LD&E

Daniel Marston 

DPhil (Oxon) FRHistS

Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair 

in the Art of War

US Army Command & General 

Staff College
vi

Acknowledgments

This thesis has been a labor of love that could not have been accomplished without the support of key individuals. First, I want to thank Amy 

for your love and support throughout my career, especially through the Art 

of War program. You have graciously put up with the long nights, mountains of books, and esoteric discussions on the intricacies of the Chinese 

Red Army. This study could only have been completed with your unwavering love and support.

To Dr. Bjorge and Mr. Babb. Thank you for your guidance throughout this writing process. Your wisdom properly guided this study from an 

oversized idea to its current, manageable state. Your contribution to my 

education and learning cannot be overstated.

To Dr. Marston. Thank you for selecting me to be part of this amazing 

program, and believing in me. The Art of War program has opened my 

eyes to what a military officer should know and understand as part of his 

profession. To Dr. Stephenson, Dr. Hull, and Dr. Murray. Thank you for 

helping me to learn and grow as an officer. And to Chuck, Chris, Darrell, 

Kevin, Mark, and Tom. Thank you for your patience, comments, and advice throughout this experience, I have learned so much from our discussions, and appreciate all your candor.

Lastly, I want to express my appreciation and gratitude to the Combined Arms Library, the Fung Library, the Harvard-Yenching Library, and 

the Hoover Institution Library for their support and patience during my 

research. 
vii

Table of Contents

Abstract....................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgments.................................................................................... vi

Table of Contents.................................................................................... vii

Glossary .................................................................................................viii

Chapter 1: Introduction....................................................................1

Chapter 2: Late Qing to Early Republican China (1850-1926).......9

Chapter 3: The Chinese Red Army

and the Jingang Mountains (1927-1930) .......................................33

Chapter 4: Li Lisan Line

and First Three Extermination Campaigns (1930-1931) ...............69

Chapter 5: Twenty-eight Bolsheviks

and Final Extermination Campaigns (1932-1934).......................109

Chapter 6: Epilogue .....................................................................149

Chapter 7: Conclusion..................................................................163

Appendix A: Military Organization of Red Army .......................171 

Bibliography ................................................................................177

Maps

China................................................................................................2

Jiangxi-Fujian-Hunan Area............................................................37

First Extermination Campaign.......................................................77

Second Extermination Campaign ..................................................81

Third Extermination Campaign .....................................................85

Fourth Extermination Campaign..................................................115

Fifth Extermination Campaign ....................................................120 
viii

Glossary

CCP Chinese Communist Party

COMINTERN Communist Internatinal

CSBA Central Bureau of Soviet Areas

CWPRA Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army

CY Communist Youth

KMT Kuomingtang [Chinese Nationalist Party]

NRA Nationalist Revolutionary Army
1

Chapter 1

Introduction

China’s meteoric rise to superpower status in the past forty years has 

sparked the interest of academics and policy makers around the world. 

Much scholarly research has been devoted to understanding the history, 

development, and modernization of China’s military since the Great 

Reform and Opening in 1979.1

 Documentation and historical materials 

from these more-recent events remain difficult for foreigners to obtain. On 

the other hand, historical materials from pre-1949 China have been more 

accessible and have led to an increase in a reexamination of historical 

events.2

 With that said, there still remains a dearth of new academic 

research on the development of the Chinese Red Army in its first ten years 

of existence.

This time period is often overlooked in Chinese military history, and 

sometimes seen as an extension of the chaos of the early Republican China 

period. It is sometimes viewed as a period of guerrilla warfare, most likely 

influenced by the recent resurgence in the popularity of Mao Zedong’s 

book of the same name. However, under closer examination, 1927 to 1936 

was a critical time for the Chinese Red Army and its leaders. The Chinese 

Workers and Peasants Red Army, the precursor of today’s Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA), was created and many of the PLA’s cultural 

traditions date back to this early period. Many of China’s leaders took 

part in this crucible experience, influencing their perspective and outlook 

forever. Additionally, while guerrilla tactics were used during this time, 

the Chinese Red Army also adopted conventional military tactics to fight 

the Nationalists. It also created institutions to professionalize its forces, 

even while under severe constraints of war and deprivation. Using primary 

resource materials, classic studies of the period, and recent Chinese 

historical research, this study reexamines one of the most influential times 

in Chinese military history, the Extermination Campaigns.3

Research Questions

This study seeks to answer the following research question: How did 

the Chinese Red Army survive and grow from 1927 to 1936 while under 

constant attack from external and internal threats? In support of answering 

the above question, this study will also examine the following questions:

1. How did different perspectives on the same communist political 

ideology affect tactics and strategy?

2. How did the Chinese Red Army survive the five Extermination 

Campaigns?

3. How were guerrilla and conventional warfare tactics incorporated 

and used within the Red Army? 

4. How did the Red Army create, organize, and train its own forces? 
2

What measures or policies did they employ to compete with the KMT for 

recruits?

Methodology

The primary methodology for this research is the historical analysis 

of key events involving the Chinese Red Army from 1927 to 1936 based 

on both Chinese and English primary and secondary sources. The study 

examines changes and adaptation within the Army through the perspective 

of four different categories: strategy, tactics, organization, and tactics. 

The definition and criteria of these four categories is expanded further in 

Chapter 2. These categories are not meant to be prescriptive or inclusive 

of the changes within the Red Army, and simply provide a framework to 

analyze the Red Army during different time periods.

The study begins with Chapter 2, which provides a historical 

background on the development of military forces in China starting in the 

late Qing dynasty. The review focuses on the challenges the Qing dynasty 

faced in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and its responses to those 

challenges. It also examines the developments of military power within 

early Republican China, specifically looking at the development of the 

warlord armies, the Chinese Nationalist Party, known as the Kuomintang 

(KMT), and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The chapter ends with 

Figure 1: China

Source: Created by author
3

a description and brief discussion of the analytical framework and specific 

categories for analysis.

Beginning with Chapter 3, this study conducts an in-depth analysis of 

three consecutive time periods of the Chinese Red Army. The time periods 

selected for each chapter highlight specific periods of development within 

the Chinese Army and help to highlight specific changes and adaptation 

within the Chinese Red Army. Each chapter begins with a descriptive 

analysis of the greater political and economic environment during that time 

period. It then flows into case studies of specific battles and campaigns. 

The chapter concludes with analysis of adaptations and changes of the 

Chinese Red Army within the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 2.

The first time period examined is 1927 to 1930. This time period is a 

critical time for the Red Army as it struggled to survive in the Jinggang 

Mountains and the Jiangxi Soviet. The time period shows how the crucible 

of multiple threats of extermination while in a hostile environment 

encouraged the Chinese Red Army leaders to adapt and innovate in 

order to survive. Some of the policies and measures adopted in this early 

period would later become cornerstones of the modern Chinese People’s 

Liberation Army. This time period also introduces the reader to the political 

discord within the Communist Party that would remain a constant struggle 

for the remainder of its time in Jiangxi.

The study moves forward to 1930 to 1931 when the Chinese Red Army 

expanded its operations within the Jiangxi Soviet. The conflict within the 

CCP erupted when the Chinese Red Army failed to successfully foment 

urban insurrections, and laid bare a growing disconnect between factions 

inside the party. The defeat led to the fall of Li Lisan, the Shanghai-based 

CCP leader, and Mao Zedong and Zhu De filled the power vacuum which 

helped them to expand Soviet operations within rural China. This period 

demonstrates a growing maturity of the Red Army as it takes concrete 

measures toward professionalization of its military force while it combats 

the Nationalist Revolutionary Army (NRA) Extermination campaigns. 

Chapter 5 examines the two-year period of 1932 to 1934 of the Chinese 

Red Army. During this time, Soviet influence positively contributed 

to the Red Army effort to further professionalize its military force. On 

the other hand, the Soviets also forced the Red Army to adopt a strategy 

and corresponding tactics that were inconsistent with its capabilities. 

The successes and challenges during this time period demonstrate that a 

professional military force is not necessarily the best predictor for success 

in combat. 

The Chinese Red Army’s Long March from 1934 to 1936 is the epilogue 

to this study. It provides a descriptive analysis of the leadership decisions 

and actions taken to preserve the Red Army during its most weakened 

state. The survival of the Red Army protected the institutions, policies, 
4

and traditions that made it successful during the previous seven years for 

future generations to use.

This study uses Chinese primary and secondary sources in support of 

its analysis. The author has attempted to remain balanced and objective 

when using these sources for analysis. Early Mainland China and 

Taiwan source material is often fraught with propaganda and polemics. 

Additionally, much of the primary documents from the period were lost 

during the Long March. What remains of the surviving materials are 

mostly located in different archives around China where access is limited. 

With that said, the study uses the Shi sou zi liao shi gong fei zi liao mu 

lu, (known as the Shih Sou Collection),4

 a 21-reel microfilm collection of 

primary source documents seized during the Jiangxi Soviet period and 

compiled by former NRA commander, Chen Cheng, as a primary resource 

during research. Additionally, translated primary source materials were 

also used in this study, to include Tony Saich’s The Rise to Power of 

Chinese Communist Party, Stuart Schram’s Mao’s Road to Power, as 

well as different autobiographies and memoirs from the time period.5

The lack of access to Chinese archives has forced the author to also rely 

on English and Chinese secondary research works to assist in analysis. 

The use of Western works on China presents its own difficulties. Earlier 

Western historical analysis on China was plagued with an uneven record 

which is sometimes filled with Western ethnocentric bias.6

 The same 

can be said about Chinese secondary sources. On a positive note, more 

modern historical analysis from these two areas has taken a more balanced 

approach, though historians are still subject to their own historiographical 

biases and propaganda.7

 Given these biases, this study deliberately chose 

to use secondary historical research from mainland China to supplement 

its primary source research. These modern studies have greater access to 

primary source materials and documentation only available to a select few 

Chinese nationals. Their research and examination of the Extermination 

Campaigns sheds new light on the subject by examining the subject through 

a different perspective. The author has been cognizant of all potential 

biases during the research process, and has attempted to objectively 

analyze all information. This study uses the pinyin romanization for all 

Chinese terms, except for terms that are better known by their Wade-Giles 

spelling, such as Chiang Kai-shek, Kuomintang (KMT), Sun Yat-sen, and 

Yangtze River. All translations that are not otherwise noted of Chinese 

materials within this study have been done by author and he assumes full 

responsibility for all errors that may have occurred.

Summary of Results

Historical analysis indicates that from 1927 to 1936, the Chinese Red 

Army was successful in adapting its organization and adopting military 

innovations to overcome a series of external and internal challenges to 
5

its existence. The Chinese Red Army’s success against the Nationalist 

Revolutionary Army (NRA) during four Extermination Campaigns can 

be attributed to its successful adaptation of strategy, tactics, organization, 

and training to its unique situation and environment. However, once the 

NRA adapted its own strategy during the Fifth Extermination Campaign 

to neutralize the communist threat, the Chinese Red Army was forced to 

retreat into the Chinese interior. The army’s survival through the Long 

March preserved all the innovation and adaptations, setting the conditions 

for the Chinese Red Army’s revival and eventual victory over the 

Nationalists.
6

Notes

1. For recent research on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, see 

Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 

21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2012); Richard Fisher, China’s Military 

Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Stanford: Stanford 

Security Studies, 2010); David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: 

Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 

2004).

2. For more recent research on the development of the Communist party 

prior to 1927, see Hans J. van De Ven, From Friend to Comrade: The founding of 

the Chinese Communist Party (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 

For more recent research on the Sino-Japanese War, see Stephen MacKinnon, 

Diana Lary, and Ezra Vogel, eds., China at War: Regions of China, 1937-45

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and 

Hans van de Ven, eds, The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the 

Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). For 

more recent research on the Third Chinese Revolutionary War, see Gary Bjorge, 

Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA’s Huai Hai Campaign

(Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2004). Christopher Lew, The Third 

Chinese Revolutionary Civil War (New York: Routledge Press, 2011); Michael 

Lynch, The Chinese Civil War, 1945-49 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010); Odd 

Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 (Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 2010).

3. In this study, the term “Extermination Campaigns” will be used to 

describe five specific Chinese Nationalist military campaigns that occurred 

from 1930 to 1934 to encircle and destroy the communist forces. The term 

Extermination Campaign is synonymous with “Encirclement Campaign.” The 

Extermination Campaign does not included the battles and skirmishes conducted 

prior to 1930, when the Nationalist Revolutionary Army and provincial forces 

also conducted military campaigns to encircle and destroy the communist forces. 

4. Shi sou zi liao shi gong fei zi liao mu lu [Shi Sou Collection] (Stanford: 

Hoover Institution, 1960), microfilm, 21 reels. Hereafter cited as SSC.

5. Tony Saich, The Rise to Power of The Chinese Communist Party

(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Stuart Schram, ed., Mao’s Road to Power, vol. 1-4 

(Armonk, M.E. Sharpe, 1992).

6. Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing 

in the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

7. For more information on the use of propaganda within modern China, 

see Ann-Marie Bradey, ed., China’s Thought Management (London: Routledge, 

2011).
7

Chapter 2

Late Qing to Early Republican China (1850-1926)

This chapter provides a historical background on the development of 

military forces in China from the late Qing Dynasty to just prior to the 

outbreak of the First Chinese Civil War. During the late Qing Dynasty, 

advances in Western military technology, weaponry, and tactics had 

surpassed the Chinese military. Strapped with a bloated, ineffective military 

fighting force, the Qing Dynasty suffered a series of military defeats at the 

hands of more advanced foreign armies. Multiple attempts at reform were 

largely unsuccessful in addressing the structural and cultural impediments 

to developing a strong national military force, and contributed to the fall 

of the Qing Dynasty. The subsequent early Republican era was filled with 

constant war as former Qing military units battled each other for power 

and control. With the help of the Soviet Union, the Chinese Nationalist 

Party was able to raise a professional, loyal military force that would 

become the foundation for future armies in China. 

Late Qing History

Military Developments

The late 19th century saw the decline of the Qing dynasty as conflicts 

with both foreign and domestic adversaries damaged the imperial court’s 

reputation and its ability to rule its people. Domestic problems caused 

by population growth, poor governance, and natural disasters fed public 

discontent. Large population growth in rural China stressed the heavy-tilled 

farmland.1

 Corruption infiltrated all corners of the Qing imperial court, 

degrading the overall economy and enraging the peasants.2

 Alternating 

bouts of floods and droughts brought periods of famine and pestilence 

to China’s interior, killing millions of the population.3

 These internal 

challenges were exacerbated by foreign intervention. Western imperial 

intervention in China almost bankrupted the Qing Dynasty. The British 

introduced opium to Chinese society to help address trade imbalances, 

which led to decreased Chinese labor productivity and a host of medical 

issues. British imperialism in China expanded during the First and Second 

Opium Wars, whereby the British Empire gained favorable terms of trade 

and further access to Chinese ports in Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Tianjin.4

These external and internal disturbances fomented public discontent into 

a series of rebellions against Manchu rule. Three major rebellions, the 

Taiping Rebellion, the Nien Rebellion, and the Muslim Revolts, erupted 

across China creating multiple civil wars.5

In the midst of all the unrest and foreign intervention, the Qing leadership 

entered a period of serious reflection and reform. The combination of civil 

unrest, imperialist intervention, and unequal treaties pushed many Chinese 

bureaucrats to question the relevance of the traditional Chinese model. 

Some members looked to Western models, specifically the importation 
8

of Western technology, to help strengthen the economy and military. The 

death of the Xianfeng Emperor in 1861, the subsequent Xinyou coup, and 

the rise of the Empress Dowager Cixi and Prince Gong as the Prince-regent 

was a catalyst for greater reform. Under Prince Gong’s leadership, the 

Self-Strengthening Movement began as the Qing government instituted 

a series of institutional reforms to restore China to its former greatness.6

One of the major areas of focus was the Qing military. Prince Gong began 

a series of reforms to develop a more capable military force that could 

prevent foreign intervention and maintain stability at home.

By the late 19th century, the Qing military forces, to include the Eight 

Banners Army and the Army of the Green Standard, were ineffective. 

The name Eight Banners Army was first established in 1643, when the 

Manchus first divided its military forces according to banner colors. The 

army actually consisted of 24 armies, divided by ethnicity into Manchu, 

Han, and Mongols.7

 Banner garrisons were stationed along frontier areas 

and population or economic centers, with the primary mission focused 

on preventing and quelling internal disturbances. The Army of the Green 

Standard was created as a paramilitary force stationed in the provinces 

to help maintain domestic order.8 The command and control of these two 

military organizations reflected the political constraints of the period, and 

negatively affected the two armies.

One of the major concerns for the Qing government was ensuring 

imperial loyalty. To maintain loyalty, both armies received imperial 

funding for salaries and allotments.9 Additionally, commanding officers 

at the company level and above were rotated to different units in different 

garrisons to prevent the development of personal loyalties that might 

interfere with imperial loyalties.10 Qing emperors initially maintained 

centralized control of the armies to ensure their subordinate princes 

or governor-generals did not have the “power of the gun.” The central 

imperial court relied on its military forces to enforce many of its edicts 

at the provincial level. However, lack of oversight of the Eight Banners 

Army and the Army of the Green Standard contributed to their decline. 

Over time, the lack of communications with distant garrisons required 

the Qing imperial court to gradually devolve power to the provincial 

level.11 Another factor leading to the armies’ decline was poor leadership. 

The officer accession program did not bring capable officers into the 

force. Those officers in the force abused the system, and over-reported 

personnel accountability numbers to pocket nonexistent soldiers’ income. 

Officer maltreatment of soldiers was commonplace. Army commanders 

also allowed a decadent and sedentary lifestyle to overcome the military 

garrisons around China. Many soldiers were addicted to opium, and often 

had terrible gambling habits.12 The illiteracy rate was extremely high in 

most of the units. The Banners Army or Green Standard units did not train 

for combat operations; instead, they stayed in the garrison for weeks on 
9

end.13 All these weaknesses manifested over years deteriorated the combat 

effectiveness of the armies, and contributed to their inability to protect the 

empire from foreign intervention or internal disturbance.14

While the Eight Banners Army and the Army of the Green Standard 

were unable to put down the different rebellions, other military units 

were instrumental in suppressing internal revolts and orders. Some of the 

more successful Chinese military units, such as the Ever-Victorious Army 

during the Taiping Rebellion, were led by foreign officers trained in foreign 

tactics and equipped with foreign weapons.15 The success of these foreignled units set a precedence for future Qing and Republican China units 

to take a positive view toward Western tactics, training, and weapons.16

Other regional armies established by the Qing, such as the Hunan-based 

Xiang Army led by Zeng Guofan and the Anhui-based Huai Army led by 

Li Hongzhang, were critical in the suppression of the Taiping, Nien, and 

Muslim rebellions. These units’ successes were due in part to their unique 

command and control structure. Unlike the Qing banners armies that were 

beholden to the imperial court, the regional armies leveraged soldiers’ 

traditional Confucian hierarchal loyalties to their own leaders. These 

strong bonds maintained accountability among soldiers and officers and 

increased their combat effectiveness.17 The regional forces also recruited 

locally, changing the ethnic make-up of the army from a predominately 

Manchu force to a Han Chinese force and planting the seeds for ethnic 

nationalism.18 This new type of command and control structure became 

the archetype for the personal armies of warlords in Republican China.19

Qing Military Reform

The Qing imperial leadership, with the help of regional military 

forces, was finally able to suppress the rebellions; however, the incidents 

demonstrated a clear requirement for military reform. Under the auspices 

of the Tongzhi Restoration, Prince Gong, with the help of Li Hongzhang, 

pushed a broad platform of change to the military. The first aspect was the 

modernization of military equipment. The Chinese leadership attempted 

to shore up its weaknesses by replacing outdated equipment with more 

modern Western, especially German, weapons.20 The Qing imperial court 

also authorized the creation of multiple arsenals, with the largest domestic 

arsenal established in Jiangnan in 1865, which used modern machinery 

to manufacture the latest rifles and guns. The development of equipment 

extended to maritime forces as the Qing court attempted to expand its fleet 

with steamships. Other areas of focus were tactics and training. The Qing 

hired German, French, and British advisors to train its officers on Western 

military equipment and employment tactics. Some of these officers were 

dispatched to Germany to attend advanced military training, and later they 

became the training core for their units.21 The training program expanded 

and formalized with the creation of a two military academies; the first one 

in Tianjin in 1885, and later one school near Guangzhou.22 While these 
10

reforms helped to equip and train a more professional force, the impact of 

the changes was limited. 

The Qing court’s attempts at reform were always hampered by 

political calculations, inefficiencies, and nepotism, which hastened 

the empire’s demise. The Qing court was riddled with internal strife 

as Confucian traditionalists and xenophobic bureaucrats stonewalled 

reforms.23 Corruption and graft during the procurement process slowed 

down modernization efforts.24 Reforms that made it to the Eight Banners 

Army and Army of the Green Standard were met with lethargy and inertia.25

Other reforms were directed at the higher quality regional armies, tipping 

the balance of power away from the imperial court toward provincial 

governor-generals, causing controversy.26 While the modernization and 

expansion of the regional forces was constrained by provincial budgets, 

these forces did improve and began to assume the primary defensive 

role from the Army of the Green Standard.27 Because of corruption and 

nepotism, the imperial court failed to deactivate the replaced units from 

the Green Standard, leaving the national force bloated and ineffective.28

These forces continued to drain precious economic resources and 

contributed to the lack of consistent funding for key military investments. 

Li Hongzhang’s personal goal of developing a strong maritime defense, 

especially after the creation of the Beiyang navy in 1882, also diverted key 

resources from the land forces.29

In total, the lack of substantial reforms within the Qing military 

exposed China to multiple foreign-relations crises. In the 1870s, the Qing 

court experienced huge setbacks with Great Britain and the Margary Affair, 

Russia and the Ili Crisis, and Japan and the Mudan Incident near Formosa 

and the Ryukyu islands.30 The challenges continued as the Qing military 

failed to defeat the French in Annam, present-day Vietnam, in 1884 during 

the Sino-French War and later, the Japanese in Korea during the First 

Sino-Japanese War in 1895.31 With continued internal strife in different 

provinces, Qing bureaucrats finally made a concerted push for military 

reforms and changes starting in 1895 to establish better security. Changes 

and reforms that occurred at the provincial levels only served to reinforce 

provincial loyalties over imperial loyalties.32 However, the biggest change 

was the creation of two Western-style military units. These two formations 

were the first to completely adopt Western military reforms in order to 

defend China against future Japanese aggression.33

The first unit was the Self-Strengthening Army, predominately based 

in the Yangtze River area in Southern China. The Self-Strengthening Army 

received its funding through provinces and was led by Zhang Zhidong.34

He believed that the traditional Chinese military model was ineffective, 

and aimed to create a professional military modeled after Western military 

armies. He bucked Chinese tradition and recruited young, healthy, 

and literate peasants from villages near Nanjing to fill his ranks.35 The 
11

soldiers received generous pay, uniforms, room and board as a way to 

retain quality talent. These soldiers were organized into standard modern 

Western brigades, with eight battalions of infantry, two squadrons of 

cavalry, two battalions of artillery, and one battalion of engineers. Zhang 

then employed 35 Prussian officers and non-commissioned officers to 

train the Self Strengthening Army. Prussian officers also initially led the 

units until Chinese officers were trained and ready.36 To ensure the SelfStrengthening Army no longer relied on foreign officers, Zhang created a 

military academy in Nanjing in 1896 modeled after the Prussian military 

school system. All these reforms helped create a 10,000-man divisionplus military force.37 Zhang Zhidong later spread these reforms across 

southern China as he instituted similar reforms when he was transferred 

to Wuchang. 

The Rise of Yuan Shikai

The second unit was the Newly Created Army, based in Northern 

China. Under the lead of Yuan Shikai, the army was expressly created for 

the defense of Beijing and centrally funded by the imperial government to 

ensure loyalty. Unlike the Self-Strengthening Army, the Newly Created 

Army fell in on the foundations of a Chinese military unit undergoing 

transformation. In 1894, the original unit, the Pacification Army, was 

created under the recommendation of Herr von Hanneken, a German 

military adviser to the imperial court.38 The Pacification Army was 

designed initially as a large modern imperial army loyal to the Emperor. 

After the Pacification Army was designated the Newly Created Army 

in 1895, Yuan Shikai took over command and oversaw the training and 

development of the 7,000-man force. The Newly Created Army adopted 

organizational and training policies that were similar to those of the SelfStrengthening Army. Yuan ensured that his soldiers were taken care of, 

received adequate pay, and were even able to send a portion of their pay 

back to the soldier’s home.39 The Newly Created Army’s organization 

paralleled the Self Strengthening Army; consisting of an infantry 

regiment, a cavalry squadron, three artillery battalions, and an engineer 

company. Prussian officers were used as well to train modern tactics, to 

include staff operations, communications, and night maneuvers.40 All in 

all, these reforms helped improve the Chinese military in terms of training 

and capabilities.

However, these initial reforms still failed to address the deep institutional 

and cultural issues within the Qing military system. Political inertia within 

the imperial court continued to slow down many of the reforms. The Qing 

imperial court continued to allow the bloated and inefficient Eight Banner 

Armies and Army of the Green Standard to exist, taking away resources 

and manpower from the other units. The coup against Emperor Guangxu 

in 1896 also put a hold on many reforms. The inertia was also felt at the 

provincial level where military reform was needed. The imperial court had 
12

difficulties enforcing any reforms at the provincial level, demonstrating a 

shift in the balance of power towards provincial leadership.41 The reforms 

also did not address the cultural issues within greater Chinese society that 

affected the military. The education level of the standard soldier was still 

low, even with the higher recruiting standards. The lack of prestige for 

military service within Chinese culture contributed to lackluster recruits.42

The officers who did attend military academies were still small in number 

and they were unable to make a marked difference in the overall army 

effectiveness.43 Some officers could not grasp simple military concepts 

and were unable to properly employ soldiers in battle.44 Other officers 

still maintained the traditional military virtue that solely focused on 

brute strength and courage, and ignored tactical acumen. Lastly, the Qing 

government simply did not have the funds to finance the full modernization 

of its forces. Unfair foreign treaties exacerbated a weak Qing economy, 

which in turn constrained the budget necessary to create a modern army. A 

large proportion of the military budget was spent on foreign arms to meet 

the immediate demand of equipping a stronger army, as well as to satisfy 

the rapacious demands of corrupt Qing officials. This pragmatic choice 

left less money to be invested in domestic arms manufacturing capacity, 

which further fed the dependence on foreign arms.45

In 1901, the Qing military forces had improved greatly, but still 

were an insufficient defensive force. They suffered a humiliating defeat 

at the hands of foreign militaries and local insurgent forces in the Boxer 

Rebellion.46 Finally realizing the critical need for a strong, centrally 

controlled, professional army, Empress Dowager Cixi supported fullscale military reforms. The Empress Dowager abolished the antiquated 

military examination system and charged each province to create its own 

military academy.47 An imperial general staff was created to oversee the 

standardization of military training, equipment, and pay.48 The Army 

of the Green Standard was finally cut by 30 percent to help trim down 

costs and increase efficiencies.49 Among the most dramatic changes was 

the promotion of Yuan Shikai to become the Zhili governor-general and 

Superintendent of the Beiyang Administration, which oversaw the foreign 

and military affairs of North China.50 His promotion further entrenched 

himself and his loyal subordinates into the Qing military structure, and 

allowed him to consolidate greater control while overseeing military 

reforms. Yuan Shikai received authorization in 1902 to use his New 

Army units to form the nucleus around an expanded and modern central 

military force, called the Beiyang Army. He created a military campus at 

Baoding in 1902 to train his forces, which included a staff college, military 

academy, and non-commissioned officer school. Yuan even started sending 

his officers abroad, especially to Japan’s Shikan Gakko to study Western 

military theory.

The other dramatic shift in reforms was the creation of the Central 
13

Commission for Army Reorganization in 1904. Japan’s victory during the 

Russo-Japanese War heavily influenced the Qing dynasty by demonstrating 

that a properly trained and organized Asian army could defeat a Western 

power.51 The commission’s main responsibility was to help recruit and 

train the Qing military forces and help consolidate the myriad different 

military forces that were across the country. The commission set a goal 

for creating a 450,000-man military force made up of 36 divisions by 

1912.52 The Beiyang Army built on Yuan’s and Zhang’s more stringent 

recruiting standards by focusing on finding young, healthy volunteers to 

join the military.53 The forces would be supported by two sets of reserve 

forces, which actually incorporated many of the recently demobilized 

Green Standards soldiers. The Commission also established a four-tier 

officer education system. At the lowest tier was a three-year provincial 

elementary military school designed to impart the basic skills needed for 

an officer. The second tier schools were two-year regional middle schools, 

located in Beijing, Xi’an, Wuchang, and Nanjing. The next two tiers were 

built around the Baoding Military Academy complex, with the military 

academy and staff colleges rounding out the military education system.54

By 1908, the military reforms made the Beiyang Army the most 

capable military force in China. The reorganization created a modern 

combined arms unit with a trained staff that facilitated planning and 

operations. This force was more mobile due to advances in the domestic 

rail networks, allowing the Beiyang Army to mobilize and respond 

quickly.55 Training was improved as well, with the introduction of forced 

marches, field problems and night maneuvers into the Chinese military 

lexicon. Foreign advisers from France, Germany, Great Britain, and 

Japan oversaw the training, helping to coach, develop, and mentor the 

Beiyang Army’s military capabilities. The educated gentry began filling 

the Beiyang officer corps, which coupled with the comprehensive military 

education program, increased the professionalism of the Beiyang army.56

These improvements were not just limited to the Beiyang Army. Most 

of the Self-Strengthening Army troops were absorbed into the Beiyang 

Army; however, Zhang Zhidong continued to be a strong proponent for 

military reforms. He established an officer and non-commissioned officer 

school that employed Prussian instructors to help teach modern Western 

tactics and techniques.57 With that said, there were still some issues. The 

regionalization of military forces hampered the army standardization of 

weapons, equipment and training.58 Imperial-provincial funding conflicts 

also undercut modernization and training, decreasing levels of readiness 

of military units and driving some governments to engage in illicit 

fundraising activities.59

Some of these reforms also actually intensified ethnic and nationalistic 

tensions within society. Military officers studying abroad became exposed 

to nationalist or other radical ideologies.60 Upon their return, these 
14

officers joined local organizations, such as the Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist 

organization, the Tongmenghui.61 Changes in perception to military 

service and a growing nationalistic sentiment pushed more intellectuals 

and educated elite into military service, which increased the revolutionary 

sentiment in the army.62 The military profession was now seen as an 

honorable vocation and a source for national pride for greater Chinese 

society.63 As the Qing military forces improved, a sense of pride and 

patriotism increased in the unit. In response, foreign instructors were 

slowly phased out and replaced by Chinese officers, and by 1908, they 

were predominately absent from major training exercises.64

The strength of the Qing Army began to become a greater threat than 

an advantage for the Qing court. Starting in 1906, the Empress Dowager 

began attempting to consolidate control over the forces. In 1906, four 

divisions from the Newly Created Army were transferred away, decreasing 

Yuan Shikai’s influence and power.65 In 1907, Yuan Shikai and Zhang 

Zhidong were both appointed to ceremonial positions as members of the 

Imperial Grand Council, removing them from direct command of their 

forces.66 Even with his removal, Yuan’s influence over his subordinates 

remained strong. His subordinates were governor-generals of Zhili 

and Manchuria, along with almost all the division commanders of the 

New Army.67 Additionally, the years of Western influence and influx of 

overseas-trained military officers increased nationalistic sentiment in the 

local populace and the military.68 Even worse, the Manchu government 

received most of the blame. Many Han Chinese began seeing themselves 

as being very different from the Manchus and blamed the weakness of 

the Manchu imperial leadership for the poor state of affairs, especially for 

the defeats against foreign intervention. By 1907, many military soldiers 

cut off the Manchu-mandated queue, severing this symbol of Manchu 

rule.69 On top of it all, the Qing economy was hampered by unfair foreign 

treaties, natural disasters, and poor crop yields, resulting in inflation and 

food shortages, which set the conditions for a revolution.70

Transition from Qing Dynasty to Republican China

Yuan Shikai Presidency

The Wuchang Uprising by the Hubei New Army in 1911 started a 

nationalist revolution across China, and ended the Qing Dynasty.71 The 

Qing imperial court never gained full control of its new military forces, 

and its Eight Banners Army and Army of the Green Standard were long 

since ineffective. In an act of desperation, the imperial leaders asked Yuan 

Shikai to come back to national service and restore order. Instead, he 

betrayed the court, supported the revolutionaries, and forced a Manchu 

abdication.72 On February 12, 1912, Yuan was named president of the newly 

established Republic of China. With this new position, Yuan effectively 

brought order to Chinese society and avoided the outbreak of civil war, 

but he still faced immense obstacles. The fractured central/provincial 
15

government relationship that had benefited Yuan in his rise to power now 

was an obstacle to his presidency, as provincial governors and their armies 

were unwilling to submit themselves to central civil authority.73 Provincial 

governor-generals and their regional military units had become stronger 

during the late Qing period, and now wanted concessions and shares in 

the power. Yuan’s attempts in 1912 and 1913 to disband military units 

or reorganize the military under central government control had little 

success.74 By 1913, multiple military organizations of different sizes, 

abilities, and agendas existed at the city, county, provincial, and national 

level, thereby making any consensus impossible.75 The chaos from the 

revolution took its toll on former Qing military forces, as the professional 

officers and soldiers were replaced by opportunists looking to profit from 

the revolution. Yuan Shikai’s feud with provincial leaders continued until 

he suddenly died in 1916, leaving Republican China in a fractured state, 

with multiple military formations scattered around the country vying for 

power and control.

Warlords

The warlord period in early Republican China was the culmination of 

decades of militarism within Chinese society.76 The Qing imperial court 

and Yuan Shikai failed to limit the growth of military power at the local 

and provincial level and contributed to the spread of militarism across 

society. The 1911 Revolution only increased provincial demand for more 

local military forces to reestablish order within Chinese society. By 1928, 

warlords had created hundreds of armies, totaling almost two million 

soldiers.77 With that said, a majority of the power was held by former 

officers who commanded old Beiyang Army, Self-Strengthening Army, 

and other military units. In the absence of a central government apparatus, 

these forces competed with each other for power, wealth and control. 

While the warlord armies varied in size and quality, they all shared two 

basic characteristics. First, a strong relationship existed between the army 

leaders and their subordinates that helped establish a loyal military force. 

The relationships were built on the traditional Confucian hierarchical 

structure, with subordinate officers developing strong loyalties for their 

leaders. Relationships through blood, marriage, and school ties were also 

used to create strong bonds that could weather the turbulent times.78 The 

second characteristic was the occupation and control of land. Territorial 

control was a critical resource for the armies, providing revenue through 

taxation and trade, materials for weapons and subsistence, and peasants 

to fill the soldier ranks. With the control of land came simple government 

responsibilities and powers. Once tied to a government structure, the 

warlord armies had legitimacy to conduct war and collect taxes in support 

of the operations.79

While more territory provided greater revenue, materials, and peasants 
16

for the warlords, those same requirements were first needed to expand 

territory, which created a cycle that prevented any warlord army from 

gaining a distinct advantage. Instead, the warlord armies had to rely on 

alliances and coalitions to defeat any military challenge. The coalitions 

were marked by extreme pragmatism, as allegiances shifted over time 

according to circumstances.80 The alliances were often territorial or 

relationship based. Two major cliques, the Zhilli and Anhui, were based 

on ties to Yuan Shikai that existed in the old Beiyang Army.81 The Fengtian 

clique was created through local personal relationship as Zhang Zuolin 

rose through the ranks in Manchuria. These cliques and alliances of minor 

military units were constantly formed and dissolved based on short-term 

interests in increasing wealth and power, often using war to settle disputes.82

Many armies also exacted taxes from their local areas. Other groups were 

able to finance operations by issuing bonds or receiving foreign loans. 

Illicit activities, such as pillaging and opium sales, also accounted for 

portions of the armies’ revenues.83

To conduct these wars, the warlords needed weapons and equipment, 

and there was no shortage of willing sellers. The United States, European 

countries, the Soviet Union, and Japan were all involved in a brisk arms 

trade during the warlord period, in spite of an arms embargo established 

in 1919. The arms trade ballooned over time. In 1927, more than $100 

million dollars’ worth of foreign weapons entered China.84 The chaos of 

the warlord period hampered domestic weapons production, forcing more 

warlords to rely on outside assistance.85 Often, the arms trade supported a 

certain clique or warlord group that protected key foreign economic and 

trade interests within China, and also helped foreign entities avoid taxation 

and exploitation from the rapacious warlords. The Russians provided 

arms and financial support to both Wu Peifu and Feng Yuxiang’s armies, 

whereas the Japanese backed Zhang Zuolin’s armies in Manchuria.86

Warlords also desperately needed soldiers to fill the expanding ranks 

of their military forces. They used both coercion and financial incentives 

to recruit new soldiers. Many peasants saw military service simply as a 

means to receiving a steady paycheck. Others saw the expansion of military 

forces as a better opportunity for upward mobility within the army.87 Some 

just saw military service as an opportunity to get rich through looting and 

other illegal activities. Some military warlords even used the promise of 

looting in lieu of an actual salary. Once in the army, soldiers’ performances 

were varied greatly. Incidents of atrocities, poor treatment of civilians, and 

shirking of duties were common during this period, and were sometimes a 

result of poor treatment and neglect by superior officers.88

Training during this period was varied. After the 1911 Revolution, 

the formal military education system declined. The Baoding military 

campus remained open until 1923, though its ability to train officers 

suffered after 1911.89 Some warlords supplemented the education system 
17

with their own schools. Feng Yuxiang conducted lectures and discussions 

on military and political indoctrination topics. Yan Xishan created small 

study groups in Shanxi to increase unit discipline and espirit de corps. Wu 

Peifu established his own specialty schools to train his units.90 Even with 

these measures, the military officer remained plagued with issues. Schools 

did not have enough funds, trained teachers, or even a proper curriculum. 

An anti-intellectual culture was also prevalent at the time, as soldiers 

and officers tried to emulate the courage and charisma of the self-made 

warlord general. Issues of gambling and opium use began to resurface in 

some military units.91

All these factors prevented any single warlord from gaining majority 

power within China. Instead, the early history of Republican China was 

marred by a series of warlord conflicts as different cliques shifted alliances 

to gain power and control. A series of different republican governments 

attempted to gain majority control but failed to gain a consensus. The chaos 

and disorder prevented any full-scale economy to develop, negatively 

affecting the quality of life of the average citizen in China. Over time, the 

Chinese people saw the pluralistic model as simply a deadly competition 

for power and unsuitable for Chinese society.92 More and more citizens 

longed for one strong central authority to gain control and rule over the 

country.93 In the early 1920s, the Nationalist and Communist parties 

believed they could fill that role within the country. Both parties began 

searching for a way to create their own military force necessary to establish 

political control within China. 

Nationalists and Communists

Creation of the KMT

Since his brief tenure as President of the Republic of China in early 

1912, Sun Yat-sen struggled to establish a constitutional republic in 

China.94 He and his Nationalist Party, the Kuomingtang (KMT), did not 

have the allies or the military force to back his vision. He was betrayed 

multiple times by warlords who took advantage of his lack of a loyal 

military force. While in exile after the betrayals, Sun gained political 

and financial support from overseas Chinese and secret societies to help 

finance his operations. Even with their support, the KMT still needed more 

financial and technical assistance and fortuitous circumstances to create its 

own modern military force.

The Soviet Union’s involvement with the Chinese Communist Party 

is well documented. In 1922, Lenin saw the potential for revolutionary 

movements in China that could support the Soviet Union’s greater 

communist plans. At the same time, the Soviet Union also supported other 

political and military organizations within China. Pragmatic assessments 

of its national interests contributed to the Soviet shift towards the KMT. 

Since before the Russo-Japanese war, Manchuria and Mongolia had been 
18

areas of economic and security interests for Russia. To ensure that these 

areas remained free from interference, the Soviets initially backed Wu 

Peifu’s warlord armies in order to check the anti-Soviet warlord, Zhang 

Zuolin, and his Manchurian armies. However, Wu’s loyalties towards 

the Soviet Union and communism shifted after his suppression of a 

communist labor strike in 1922, leading the Soviet Union to find a more 

reliable partner.95 While the Soviet Union backed Feng Yuxiang’s clique to 

balance Wu Peifu, it also saw value in the KMT brand and the charismatic 

abilities of Sun Yat-sen.

In January 1923, Adolf Joffe, the Communist International 

(COMINTERN) representative for the Soviet Union, arrived in Shanghai 

and negotiated a new partnership with the KMT that was outlined in the 

Joint Declaration. In exchange for helping the KMT unify the nation by 

training and equipping a KMT military force, Sun Yat-sen agreed to protect 

Soviet interests on the China Eastern Railroad and allow the stationing 

of Soviet forces in Mongolia.96 The introduction of Soviet support for 

the Nationalists was one of key factors that helped raise the KMT and 

Nationalist movement from a symbolic icon to a powerful agent for change 

in China. With the help of pro-KMT Guangxi warlord armies, Sun Yat-sen 

established a base in Guangdong to begin Nationalist operations.

In October 1923, the Soviet Union dispatched Michael Borodin as the 

head of the Soviet mission and political adviser to Sun Yat-sen. Upon his 

arrival, he began a comprehensive reorganization of the KMT to increase 

its productivity and appeal to the masses. Borodin’s initial assessment of 

the KMT was bleak. With his help, the KMT established a provisional 

Central Executive Committee in Guangdong to draft party rules and plan 

a KMT congress in 1924. He also helped to establish a propaganda branch 

to distribute materials to help recruit new members.97 Additionally, the 

KMT instituted some financial reforms that helped to ease some of the 

pressure. Corruption, graft, mismanagement, and bloated bureaucratic 

systems placed enormous strain on the Guangdong economy, and left 

little revenue to support the KMT’s plan to create a military force. The 

actual cost to fund the various Guangdong military forces was half the 

military expenditures budget.98 Tax reforms, issuance of new debts, and 

consolidation of power in the area, helped to fortify revenue streams. 

While the Nationalist government still ran a deficit in its budget, it had 

established a revenue source to supplement Soviet assistance. The revenue 

streams also directly supported the military, taking away any incentive 

to loot or exploit the local populace for financial gain.99 With all these 

reforms, the KMT looked to expand operations outside of Guangdong. 

A KMT office was established in Shanghai, which became a conduit for 

cooperation and coordination with a nascent political group known as the 

Chinese Communist Party.
19

Creation of the Communist Party

The creation of the Communist party was the result of a confluence of 

international and political events that stimulated a group of intellectuals 

to choose a different political path to address the pressing issues of the 

time.100 One of the biggest influences was the strong student reaction to the 

Versailles Treaty’s apportionment of Shandong provincial territory to the 

Japanese. The subsequent May Fourth Movement forced many Chinese to 

begin questioning traditional Chinese thinking and increased the appeal 

of Marxist thought.101 Many Chinese students could identify with Marxist 

theory, relating concepts of class struggle, the oppressed, and exploitation 

to the corrupt and inefficient early Republican Chinese government.102

Different cultural study societies at universities across China began 

discussing these and other communist theories, coming to the conclusion 

of rejecting Sun Yat-sen’s republican ideal for China.103 Communist cells 

began growing in Beijing, Hunan, Chongqing, Chengdu, and even among 

overseas Chinese in Europe. The main hub of communist activity was in 

Shanghai where Chen Duxiu was publishing New Youth.

104

The Soviet Union also looked to China as a possible place to spread 

communism. The Chinese had history of supporting the Bolsheviks, with 

close to 50,000 Chinese serving in the Red Armies during the Russian 

civil war.105 In 1919, the Soviet Union established the Communist 

International (COMINTERN) to help spread communism outside its 

borders, and a year later established its Far Eastern Section. In April 1920, 

the COMINTERN dispatched Voitinsky as its representative in China, 

where he was introduced to Chen Duxiu. With Voitinsky’s help, Chen 

Duxiu expanded his propaganda and organizational operations. In May 

1920, they established a Provisional Central Committee to help coordinate 

operations and help move the movement towards the actual creation of a 

communist party.106 By the middle of 1921, the communist cells expanded 

across China. The First Party Congress was conducted in Shanghai in July, 

officially founding the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).107 The first few 

years were a struggle for the nascent CCP as it attempted to consolidate 

and organize different branches, and gain consensus on a platform for 

issues. One of the major issues was partnership with the KMT.

The First United Front

The proposal for having the communists work within the KMT was 

initially made in July 1922 by Soviet adviser Maring.108 He believed that 

the weak communists groups could only expand their operations through 

partnership with the KMT. He proposed that the Chinese communists 

construct a “bloc within” the KMT, where the communists could maintain 

their independence within the KMT. 109 CCP opposition to joining the 

KMT was strong, until a compromise was struck at Third Party Congress. 

In 1923, the CCP Central committee finally agreed to the “bloc within” 
20

policy, but established certain preconditions. Communists could enter the 

KMT as individuals and accept KMT leadership. Over the next few years, 

the CCP made inroads within the KMT, especially within the Whampoa 

Military Academy. A majority of the political instructors at the military 

school were CCP members, including the head of military instruction, Zhou 

Enlai.110 Overall, the United Front helped to expand the Communist party 

by tapping into the KMT propaganda network and military operations. 

However, the communist party still did not have its own military force. 

The success of the KMT military forces during joint KMT-CCP operations 

in Guangzhou in 1925 reinforced the need for a separate communist party 

army.111 Second, for all its efforts, the CCP had difficulties remaining fully 

independent within the KMT structure. Support from COMINTERN and 

Russian advisers helped the communist cause, especially in creating a 

left-leaning group within the KMT.112 Overall though, both communist 

and nationalist leaders expressed doubts of the long term viability of the 

United Front. 

Creation of the NRA Army

By 1924, the KMT recognized that within China’s political arena, a 

military force controlled by the party was a necessity. The constant shifting 

of alliances and wars between factions made it necessary for the KMT to 

establish a military force. While the creation of a KMT military helped 

to defend against warlords, the explicit goal of the KMT military force 

was to help bring about nationalist revolution, expel Western imperialism 

from Chinese territory, and defeat Japanese aggression.113 Sun Yat-sen also 

saw that a military and national conscription was a means of changing the 

social dynamics within society through discipline and moral correction.114

The creation of a national military force would establish the cohesiveness 

and discipline needed in a modern society to prevent any relapse back 

to the old warlord ways.115 Ultimately, a modern Chinese army would 

reinvigorate pride within the Chinese society, and demonstrate that China 

was not a pariah on the international stage. 

Creating a modern Chinese military force was not that simple, though. 

The warlord culture still permeated across the ranks of the different units. 

When the Russian advisers arrived in China to survey Sun Yat-sen’s 

forces, they were shocked at the abysmal state of affairs. The units were 

untrained with outdated equipment and poor leadership. The Guangdong 

economy and industries were also weak, and did not have the capacity to 

fully support all the necessary reforms.116 The KMT had to rely heavily 

on Soviet technical and financial assistance. Whereas Borodin focused on 

the reorganization of the KMT political structure, the Soviet Union sent 

its best officers to help reorganize the KMT military force along Soviet 

doctrine. Soviet military legends such as A.I. Yegorov, Vasily Bluecher, 

and Georgi K. Zhukov were all assigned to China in the early 1920s to 

help develop the KMT military forces.117 The Nationalists also established 
21

political commissars within each unit to help politically indoctrinate 

soldiers. The political commissar was meant to be a bulwark against any 

negative influences in the unit. They also provided a key role in training and 

educating the soldiers, which would help increase morale and courage.118

In conjunction with these reforms, the KMT First National Congress 

authorized the creation of a new military school to develop junior officers, 

which would serve as the foundation for a new KMT military force.

 This school, Whampoa Military Academy, was established on a 

small island off the coast of Guangdong in May 1924. Chiang Kaishek, a loyal subordinate of Sun Yat-sen and graduate of the Shikan 

Gakko Military Academy in Japan, was designated the superintendent. 

The faculty consisted of Chinese officers who had attended the Shikan 

Gakko, Baoding, or Yunnan military schools.119 There was a handful of 

Frunze Military Academy-trained Russian instructors on the faculty as 

well. The curriculum was a six-month course that covered both political 

and military topics, which was a revolutionary concept at the time. The 

political training was meant to establish discipline, loyalty, courage, and 

espirit de corps within the cadet population.120 Political classes covered 

classes on Sun Yat-sen’s three principles, KMT history, and American 

and European politics and economics. Whampoa instructors incorporated 

Western pedagogical methods by adopting the group conference method 

to encourage all students to participate and discuss political topics.121 The 

military curriculum was primarily infantry-based courses, though it also 

included classes in artillery, engineers, logistics, and heavy weapons. 

Classes on gymnastics, fencing, and Russian were also given. To facilitate 

rapid learning, the instructors often used practical exercises and handson demonstration to improve comprehension.122 By November 1924, the 

first class of 490 students graduated from the course and joined the KMT 

military force. Just prior to graduation, the Soviet Union shipped 8,000 

weapons to Whampoa to outfit the KMT’s new army.

Upon graduation, the new officers joined cadets and faculty to create 

the first model regiment in October 1924. The force was put into action 

very soon after and demonstrated strong leadership, tactical acumen, 

and professionalism. In late October, the Model Regiment suppressed an 

uprising of angry merchants and their private militia forces, collecting 

10,000 Belgian Mauser rifles as part of the spoils. In partnership with 

Yunnan and Guangxi warlord forces friendly to the KMT, the Whampoa 

military defeated Chen Jiongming’s old Guangxi clique military force, 

collecting 12,000 rifles, 110 machine guns, 30 artillery pieces, and eight 

million ammunition rounds. In June 1925, the KMT military force further 

burnished its record by defeating the invading Yunnan and Guangxi 

warlord forces, collecting 16,000 rifles, 120 machine guns, and six 

gunboats.123 These victories, coupled with continued Soviet financial and 

technical assistance, helped create a reliable, dedicated, disciplined, and 
22

loyal military force. The Whampoa force later was the initial part of what 

later became the National Revolutionary Army (NRA), and would become 

the foundation for the expansion of KMT military power. Some of the 

officers trained at Whampoa would also become key leaders within the 

CCP’s military force when it was created in late 1927. 

Analytical Framework Categories

This study will use four factors to analyze the adaption and innovation 

of the Chinese Red Army: strategy, tactics, organization, and training. These 

factors are not meant to hold any predictive value for successful adaptation. 

On the contrary, the factors are only meant to be an objective marker to 

analyze change due to external and internal stimuli. Second, the factors 

are not mutually exclusive; rather they are interrelated and interdependent 

within a complex system. Changes in the external environment often 

directly stimulate change of one specific factor; however, the resulting 

change causes a chain reaction, creating second and third-order effects 

on the other factors. The resultant change may be greater or less than the 

proposed change given the complex relationship of the factors. These 

factors are not an exhaustive list of the possible factors in the adaptation 

cycle of a military unit. Lastly, the observed adaption within this analysis 

construct is not meant to prescribe any normative value to the changes 

within the military unit. 

Strategy

This study employs B.H. Liddell Hart’s definition for strategy as the art 

of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.124

The examination of strategy will include analysis of the overall vision 

and endstate for a nation, party, or military unit, the supported political 

objectives and goals, and the plan for the application of military power 

in pursuit of accomplishing the goals. It will also look at the challenges 

within the process of translating political goals into military action.

Without a concrete strategy, any military organization will aimlessly 

wander in its operations and eventually fail. A strategy provides the overall 

vision that guides actions and operations to effect positive change. It also 

connects political ideas and goals to military operations. In other words, 

strategy helps make war “a continuation of policy by other means.”125

Change in the political environment is the primary stimuli for change 

and adaptation of strategy. New political leadership with a different 

ideological or philosophical view can change the ends, ways, and means 

of a strategy. A change in political goals will affect the sequencing and 

coordination of supporting military operations and engagements. Simply 

a different view on the application of military power can change the way 

a strategy is executed. A strategy is also based on the current conditions 

of the nation, party, or military force, which may limit or delay the 

accomplishment of certain goals. Lastly, external economic, social, and 
23

cultural factors can also constrain the development and accomplishment 

of any strategy. 

Tactics

Carl Von Clausewitz defined tactics as the use of armed forces in the 

engagement.126 He elaborates further, saying that tactics focus on the form 

of the engagements.127 The form is determined by the specific techniques 

and procedures employed by individuals and units used in the engagement. 

For this study, military tactics used in combat operations and political 

mobilization will be examined to identify change and adaptation.

Tactics are the concrete actions taken by individuals and units in support 

of a strategy. A majority of military training is focused on the practice of 

certain tactics, techniques, and procedures in combat. Tactical proficiency 

for soldiers and military units is a critical skill and an important factor in 

determining a unit’s combat effectiveness. Tactics are also specific to a 

given task in a given environment, and are directly affected by the terrain, 

equipment, personnel, and their training level.

Change and adaptation of tactics often occurs with the introduction of 

new technology and equipment to the formation. New weapon systems may 

change how individuals or units move in formation or individually on the 

battlefield. The training and education of soldiers can also determine their 

employment in combat. Highly trained soldiers may be more trustworthy, 

and allow for the application of decentralized tactics on the battlefield. 

Changes in military organizations and formations can also affect tactics, 

changing the sequence of actions and operations or employment of certain 

weapon systems. 

Military Organization 

Military organization is defined as the formation and arrangement 

of individuals and units into larger, functioning, integrated combat units 

within a hierarchal structure. The scope of this analysis will include 

analysis of the recruitment and retention of soldiers, the arrangement of 

tables of organization and equipment for the army, and the development 

of the command and control structure within its hierarchal organization. 

A properly organized military organization transforms individual 

actions into a unified, synergistic effort. It combines strategy and tactics 

into concrete action on the battlefield. The hierarchal structure within 

the military organization serves as a conduit for reports and orders and 

is the link between units of action and their headquarters. It also allows 

facilitates the delegation of tasks and operations which increases the range 

and scope of operations within the battlefield. 

The primary determining factor in shaping the structure of an 

organization is the number of available soldiers. As the size of the military 

unit increases or decreases, corresponding changes are made to ensure 
24

the proper span of control. Technological advances in communication 

equipment can also determine the size of the military organization. To 

leverage new weapon systems’ strengths, a military organization may 

change its formation, sequence, or organization of units. Increased training 

and confidence in unit abilities can also expand or contract the delegation 

of responsibility within an organizational structure. Political imperatives 

and economic conditions can also become an external factor on the 

recruitment and retention of soldiers, changing the organization structure.

Training

For this study, military training is defined as using practice and 

instruction to bring an individual or unit to a predetermined standard of 

proficiency in order to be successful in combat. It includes formal military 

school instruction, informal class instruction, military training exercises, 

hands-on training with combat equipment, and informal discussions and 

debates on military topics. Most times, military training is conducted prior 

to any combat operations; however, it is not uncommon for on-the-job 

training to occur during combat.128

Proper training is a key component to the success and survival of any 

military unit. Proper training ensures that soldiers and officers have the 

necessary skills to react under the enormous stress and pressure of combat. 

Training also facilitates synchronization and coordination of complicated 

operations between individuals and military units. As the scale and size 

of the battle increases, the more important proper synchronization and 

coordination becomes, which also increases the importance of proper 

training. 

Changes to the environment can precipitate adaption within a military 

unit. Employing new military equipment or modern military tactics 

will require instruction and practice. The education and literacy level of 

soldiers and officers can constrain the difficulty and depth of military 

training. Funding for training equipment can also constrain military 

training. Additionally, the amount of key leadership focus on training can 

determine the frequency and quality of military training. Lastly, external 

political and economic factors can also influence the amount of time and 

funding allocated to military training. 
25

Notes

1. For more information on the impact of population growth on food 

supply, see James Lee, “Food Supply and Population Growth in Southwest China, 

1250–1850,” The Journal of Asian Studies 41, No. 7 (1982): 711-746; R. Bin 

Wong, “Food Riots in the Qing Dynasty,” The Journal of Asian Studies 41, No. 7 

(1982): 767-788.

2. For in-depth analysis of the depth of corruption within Qing dynasty 

society, see Bradley Reed, Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in the 

Qing Dynasty (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2002).

3. For more information on famine during this period, see Walter H. 

Mallory, China: Land of Famine (New York: American Geographical Society, 

1926).

4. For more information on the Opium wars, see Peter Ward Fay, The Opium 

War, 1840-1842 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975); 

John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast; the Opening of 

the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); James 

M. Polachek, The Inner Opium War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

1992); Arthur Waley, The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes (Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 1968).

5. For more information on the Taiping Rebellion, see Youwen Jian, The 

Taiping Revolutionary Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); 

Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China; Militarization 

and Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); 

Ssu-yu Teng, Taiping Rebellion and the Western Powers: A Comprehensive 

Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). For more information on the 

Nien Rebellion, see Elizabeth Perry, Rebels and Revolutionaries in Northern 

China, 1845-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980); Ssu-yu Teng, The 

Nien Army and Their Guerrilla Warfare, 1851-1868 (Paris: Mouton Press, 1961). 

For more information on the Dungan/Muslim Rebellion, see Hodong Kim, Holy 

War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-

1877 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar 

Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Seattle: University of 

Washington Press, 1998).

6. The Self-strengthening movement soon became synonymous with the 

Tongzhi Restoration Period, named after the Tongzhi Emperor who nominally 

ruled during this period. The movement encompassed not only reforms, but 

also a fundamental shift from traditional Chinese culture and norms. For more 

information on the Self-Strengthening Movement, see Ssu-Yu Teng and John 

Fairbank, China’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand 

of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-chih restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 1964).

7. Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power: 1895-1912

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 8.

8. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 9.

9. Kwang-Ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, “The Military Challenge: the 
26

north-west and the coast,” in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 11, Late 

Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 2, eds. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu (New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 202.

10. Liu and Smith, “The Military Challenge: the north-west and the coast,” 

203.

11. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 14.

12. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 31.

13. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 17-18.

14. Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928 (Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 1976), 11.

15. For more information on the American and British officers who worked 

with the Chinese during the Taiping Rebellion, see Caleb Carr, The Devil Soldier: 

The American Soldier of Fortune Who Became a God in China (New York: 

Random House, 1995); Andrew Wilson, The “Ever-Victorious Army”: A History 

of the Chinese Campaign under Lt. Col. C. G. Gordon and of the Suppression of 

the Tai-Ping Rebellion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

16. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 28.

17. Liu and Smith, “The Military Challenge: the north-west and the coast,” 

202; Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 32.

18. Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China, 12; Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military 

Power, 33.

19. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 23.

20. Liu and Smith, “The Military Challenge: the north-west and the coast,” 

244.

21. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 40-42.

22. Liu and Smith, “The Military Challenge: the north-west and the coast,” 

266-269; Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 41.

23. Liu and Smith, “The Military Challenge: the north-west and the coast,” 

153-156,172-179, 209-211.

24. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 39.

25. Liu and Smith, “The Military Challenge: the north-west and the coast,” 

208.

26. Liu and Smith, “The Military Challenge: the north-west and the coast,” 

26.

27. Liu and Smith, “The Military Challenge: the north-west and the coast,” 

37.

28. Liu and Smith, “The Military Challenge: the north-west and the coast,” 

30.

29. Edmund S.K. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution: 

The New Army and its Role in the Revolution in 1911 (Vancouver: University of 

British Columbia Press, 1980), 12.
27

30. For more information on the Margary affair, see Shen-tsu Wang, The 

Margary affair and the Chefoo agreement (London: Oxford University Press, 

1940). For more information on the Ili Crisis, see Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Ili 

Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy 1871-1881 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 

1965). For more information on the Mudan Incident, see Edwin Pak-Wah Leung, 

“The Quasi-War in East Asia: Japan’s Expedition to Taiwan and the Ryūkyū 

Controversy,” Modern Asian Studies 17, No. 2 (1983): 257-281; Leonard Gordon, 

“Japan’s Abortive Colonial Venture in Taiwan, 1874,” The Journal of Modern 

History 37, No. 2 (1965): 171-185.

31. For more information on the Sino-French War, see Lloyd Eastman, 

Throne and Mandarins: China’s Search for a Policy during the Sino-French 

Controversy, 1880-1885 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). For more 

information on the Sino-Japanese War, see Edward J. Drea, Japan’s Imperial 

Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press: 

2009); S.C.M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, 

and Primacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2003).

32. Hatano Yoshihiro, “The New Armies” in China in Revolution: The First 

Phase 1900-1913, ed. Mary C. Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 

367.

33. Yoshihiro, “The New Armies,” 371.

34. Roger Thompson, “Military Dimension of the ‘Boxer Uprising’ in 

Shanxi,” in Warfare in Chinese History, ed. Hans J. van de Ven (Leiden: Brill, 

2000), 290.

35. Yoshihiro, “The New Armies,” 371.

36. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 62.

37. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 63.

38. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 13.

39. Yoshihiro, “The New Armies,” 371.

40. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 76-77.

41. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 84.

42. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 56.

43. Edward A. McCord, The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern 

Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 32.

44. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 50.

45. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 100.

46. For more information on the Boxer Rebellion, see Paul A. Cohen, A 

History in Three Keys: the Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth (New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1997); Joseph Esherick, The Origins of the Boxer 

Uprising (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

47. Chuzo Ichiko, “Political and Institutional Reforms 1901-11,” The 

Cambridge History of China, Vol. 11, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 2, John K. 

Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu, eds., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

1980), 384.
28

48. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 133.

49. Ichiko, “Political and Institutional Reforms 1901-11,” 384.

50. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 138.

51. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 16.

52. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 20.

53. Ichiko, “Political and Institutional Reforms 1901-11,” 385.

54. Yoshihiro, “The New Armies,” 373.

55. Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. 

Norton and Company, 1999), 249-251.

56. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 75.

57. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 19.

58. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 240.

59. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 55.

60. Yoshihiro, “The New Armies,” 366.

61. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 77

62. Yoshihiro, “The New Armies,” 375.

63. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 97.

64. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 84.

65. Ichiko, “Political and Institutional Reforms 1901-11,” 385.

66. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 254.

67. Stephen R. MacKinnon, “The Peiyang Army, Yüan Shih-k’ai and the 

Origins of Modern Chinese Warlordism,” The Journal of Asian Studies 32, No. 3 

(1973): 413.

68. Michael Gasster, “The Republican Revolutionary Movement,” in The 

Cambridge History of China, Vol. 11, Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 2, eds. John 

K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

1980), 509.

69. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 79.

70. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 195.

71. For more information on the Wuchang Uprising, see Vidya Prakash Dutt, 

“The Wuchang Uprsings” in Mary Clabaugh Wright, China in Revolution: The 

First Phase 1900-1913, Mary C. Wright ed, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 

1968). For more information on the revolution, see Edwin John Dingle, China’s 

Revolution: 1911-1912: A historical and political record of the civil war (New 

York: Haskell House Publishers, 1972); Joseph Esherick, Reform and Revolution 

in China: the 1911 revolution in Hunan and Hubei (Berkeley: University of 

California Press, 1976).

72. Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 334.

73. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 241.
29

74. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, 236-247.

75. Gasster, “The Republican Revolutionary Movement,” 528.

76. The term warlords is considered a pejorative term for the leaders of 

military units, militias, and armed groups during early Republican China. Edward 

McCord uses the term militarist, instead of warlord, to highlight some of the 

professional aspects of these leaders. See McCord, The Power of the Gun, 24-45. 

This study follows Hans van de Ven’s explanation for the use of warlord as the 

best, albeit imperfect, description for the leaders during this time. See Hans J. van 

de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945 (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 

2004), 72.

77. James E. Sheridan, “The Warlord Era: politics and militarism under 

the Peking government 1916-28,” in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 

12, Republican China 1912-1949, Part 1, John K. Fairbank, ed. (New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 1983), 288.

78. Sheridan, “The Warlord Era: politics and militarism under the Peking 

government 1916-28,” 288.

79. Sheridan, “The Warlord Era: politics and militarism under the Peking 

government 1916-28,” 289.

80. Lucian W. Pye, Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the 

Modernization of Republican China (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 10.

81. Sheridan, “The Warlord Era: politics and militarism under the Peking 

government 1916-28,” 294.

82. Pye, Warlord Politics, 38, 78.

83. Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928, 153-156.

84. Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928, 122.

85. Chi’i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928., 120.

86. Sheridan, “The Warlord Era: politics and militarism under the Peking 

government 1916-28,” 304-306.

87. Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928, 84-87.

88. Diana Lary, Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers, 1911-1937 

(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985), 74-80.

89. Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928, 102.

90. Chi’i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928, 95-96.

91. Lary, Warlord Soldiers, 40-41.

92. Sheridan, “The Warlord Era: politics and militarism under the Peking 

government 1916-28,” 319.

93. Pye, Warlord Politics, 169.

94. For more information on the challenges Sun Yat-sen faced in the early 

Republican China period, see Marie Claire Bergere, Sun Yat-Sen, trans. Janet 

Lloyd (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Harold Schiffrin, Sun Yat-Sen 

and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 2010).
30

95. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 79.

96. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 79.

97. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 81.

98. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 89.

99.. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 88.

100. Hans J van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade: The Founding of the 

Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 

1991), 10. For more in-depth discussion on the creation of the Communist Party, 

see Arif Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1989); Hans J. van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade: the founding of the 

Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 

1991).

101. For more information on the May Fourth Movement, see Chow Tse-tsung, 

The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 1967); Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: 

Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (Berkeley: 

University of California Press: 1990).

102. Jerome Ch’en, “The Chinese Communist Movement, 1927-1937,” in

The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, Republican China 1912-1949, Part 1, 

John K. Fairbank, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 509.

103. van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, 54.

104. van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, 54.

105. James Pinckney Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the 

Chinese Communist Party, 1927-72 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 24.

106. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 28-29.

107. Ch’en, “The Chinese Communist Movement, 1927-1937,” 515.

108. For more information on the United Front, See Tony Saich, Origin of the 

United Front: The Role of Sneevliet (Alias Maring) (New York: E.J. Brill, 1991); 

Lyman Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends the United Front in Chinese Communist 

History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).

109. Saich, The Rise to Power, 32.

110. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 56.

111. van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, 169.

112. Saich, The Rise to Power, 103-104.

113. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 13.

114. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China,, 68.

115. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China,, 69.

116. C. Martin Wilbur, “The Nationalist revolution, 1923-8,” in The 

Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, Republican China 1912-1949, Part 1, ed. 

John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 539.

117. F.F. Liu, Military History of Modern China (Princeton: Princeton 
31

University Press, 1956), 5-6.

118. Liu, Military History of Modern China, 19.

119. Liu, Military History of Modern China, 9.

120. Liu, Military History of Modern China, 10.

121. Jane L. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars (Boulder: 

Westview Press, 1976), 56-58.

122. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars, 57.

123. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 84-85

124. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Faber, 1967), 321.

125. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

1976), 87.

126. Clausewitz, On War, 128.

127. Clausewitz, On War, 132.

128. The Chinese Communist Party maintained a tradition of “learning-bydoing” in both civilian and military occupations. For more information on the 

application of “learning-by-doing” concept in rural industrialization of post-1949 

China, see Christopher Bramall, The Industrialization of Rural China (London: 

Oxford University Press, 2006).

33

Chapter 3

The Chinese Red Army and the Jinggang Mountains

(1927-1930) 

From its arrival in Jinggang Mountains in late 1927 until its migration 

to and expansion of the Jiangxi Soviet in early 1930, the Red Army was 

in perilous state: weak, scattered across the country, poorly equipped, and 

riddled with discipline and morale issues. To push forward the communist 

movement in China, The Fourth Red Army, led by Mao Zedong and Zhu 

De, maintained its core conviction on the critical mass of the peasant 

movement within the Chinese communist movement and at adapting the 

urban-oriented, communist political and military strategies to the realities 

of the rural areas of inner China. The Red Army used guerrilla tactics to 

defend itself against a superior enemy and leveraged its victories to make 

itself stronger with gains in equipment, local support, and new recruits. 

The guerrilla tactics also incorporated political mobilization of the local 

masses as a means to recruit, equip, and sustain itself. Within the army, 

key leaders conducted a series of organizational changes to create unity 

of command and party control over the army. It also adopted different 

methods, to include creating training units and conducting after action 

reviews, to train and develop the peasant force into a legitimate military 

threat. By 1930, the Red Army had survived its most difficult test to date, 

and was ready to expand its operations within China. 

Creation of the Red Army

The birthday of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is celebrated 

on Aug. 1, 1927, the day of the Nanchang Uprisings. The actual creation 

of the Red Army spanned a longer period of time, and was a result of 

military revolts and urban rebellions within Republican China. During this 

period, the dissolution of the United Front coupled with Soviet support for 

communist revolution were key factors in the genesis of a new military 

force and created the foundations for the Chinese army today, the People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA).

Dissolution of the United Front

Since the start of the United Front, ideological conflicts and power 

struggles between the right wing of the KMT, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and 

the CCP, led by Chen Duxiu, increased tensions and led to the eventual 

dissolution of the alliance. Initially, Sun Yat-sen’s charisma while head of 

the KMT allowed the United Front to work relatively well. His untimely 

death in 1925, however, exposed many of the schisms within the alliance. 

The first schism was between Chiang Kai-shek and Soviet influence, 

embodied by COMINTERN adviser Michael Borodin. Chiang viewed 

Borodin’s and the Soviet advisory team’s growing influence within the 

Whampoa Academy as overreach, and became increasingly concerned 

about the politicization of the students, especially their growing sympathy 
34

within the army for communist thought.1 The number of future Red Army 

leaders that filled the ranks of the Whampoa Academy’s cadets and faculty, 

to include Zhou Enlai, the head of Whampoa’s Political Department, only 

substantiated Chiang’s fear. The controversy surrounding the Zhongshan

Incident in March 1926 further fueled his suspicions, and Chiang adopted 

a series of measures immediately to limit the Soviet and CCP influence 

within the National Revolutionary Army (NRA).2

 In 1926, Chiang began 

a campaign to consolidate control by launching the Northern Expedition.3

In April 1927, the Northern Expedition was successful and extended its 

operations into Shanghai. While in Shanghai, NRA troops turned on their 

Communist allies, arresting or killing many communist union members 

who actively helped the NRA to seize Shanghai, effectively purging the 

Communists out of the KMT ranks.4

Surprisingly, the Shanghai massacre did not end the United Front. 

Stalin, through the COMINTERN, remained steadfast about the importance 

of the alliance, and pushed the CCP to continue cooperating with the leftist 

“revolutionary” faction of the KMT. The Wuhan-based leftist KMT5

 faction 

sympathized and even agreed with many of the communist policies. The 

partnership was also opportunistic in nature, as key leaders, such as Wang 

Jingwei, in the Wuhan KMT believed they would receive Soviet financial 

aid in return for partnership with the CCP.6

 Cooperation between the leftleaning KMT and the CCP would only last a couple months. The CCP, 

under COMINTERN direction, continued to foment peasant and urban 

uprisings against the industrialists, local elite, and gentry classes in Hunan 

and Hubei provinces, inciting violent responses from the right-leaning 

KMT faction. In June 1927, the KMT dispatched the Thirty-fifth Army 

to suppress the insurrection and seized control of Wuhan. Once Wuhan 

was under rightist control, He Qian, commander of the Thirty-fifth Army, 

demanded the Wuhan KMT break ties with the CCP. 

During this same time, Stalin grew increasingly frustrated with the 

unreliability of the military effort within the United Front to spread the 

communist movement.7

 To rectify the situation, he outlined four specific 

tasks for the COMINTERN and CCP in his telegram:

1. Confiscate land by the masses from below.

2. Revolutionize the present structure of the KMT by drawing the 

peasant and working-class leaders into its Central Committee.

3. Organize your own reliable army.

4. Establish a revolutionary military tribunal headed by a prominent 

non-Communist Guomindangist to punish counterrevolutionary officers.8

The Stalin telegram provided new Soviet guidance to the CCP and 

gave explicit approval for the creation of the Red Army, directing the 

COMINTERN to create its military force from the “revolutionary workers 

and peasants” and “utilize the students of the school for commanders.”9
35

Wang Jingwei, the left-leaning KMT leader, struggled to maintain peace 

within the United Front until he became aware of a secret telegram from 

Stalin. The telegram outlined the COMINTERN’s plan for subversion, and 

Wang Jingwei dissolved the alliance in July. As a result, COMINTERN 

representatives Borodin and Roy returned to the Soviet Union, and the 

KMT-Soviet partnership ended as well. The United Front did not last long; 

however, it was a portent example of a growing trend of KMT factions and 

groups with sympathies towards the CCP that would turn “Red.”

Urban Uprisings as the Solution

Stalin blamed the failures in Wuhan on the CCP, and directed them 

to take active measures to correct the current situation. Chen Duxiu’s 

leadership as the Chief of the CCP was labeled “opportunist” and he was 

replaced by Qu Qiubai. Stalin still insisted that the KMT was a legitimate 

partner with the CCP and all efforts of the revolution should remain 

under the KMT flag. CCP members continued to work to infiltrate the 

KMT and the NRA. The break pushed the CCP activities and members 

underground. Proactive measures were taken to promote both agrarian 

peasant revolutions and urban insurrections to set the conditions for the 

communist revolution. Besso Lominadze, a confidante of Stalin, replaced 

Borodin and Roy in China to help lead the movement. The new plan 

was to shift the communist movement to the offensive, and combine 

military rebellion, urban insurrections, and peasant movements.10 The first 

opportunity to attempt this new strategy was in August 1927 with military 

units within the KMT Second Front Army.

The Nanchang Uprisings occurred on August 1, 1927.11 The CCP did 

not have its own army and viewed the subversion of KMT army units as 

a quick way to increase its military force. The Second Front Army, led by 

Zhang Fakui, had recently arrived in Nanchang and had many Communist 

members and supporters within its ranks. Among the key members of 

the unit were the Twenty-fourth Division commander, General Ye Ting, 

Twentieth Army commander General He Long, and Chief of Public 

Security in Nanchang, Zhu De. Other officers inside the unit include Liu 

Bocheng, Lin Biao and Li Lisan. The intent of the subversion was to (1) gain 

control of the Second Front Army; (2) convince Zhang Fakui to support 

the communists; and (3) use the military forces to expand communist 

control. Two members from the Central Committee, Zhang Guotao and 

Zhou Enlai, joined Lominadze in Nanchang to help plan and oversee the 

operation. On the day of the uprising, Zhang Fakui was in Guangdong, 

and communist loyal forces disarmed their compatriots and took control of 

Nanchang. The communist forces established a revolutionary committee 

under the KMT banner to oversee the city. The uprising lasted only three 

days. When Zhang returned to Nanchang, he sided with the KMT and 

sent loyal units to suppress the rebellion. The communist forces retreated, 

breaking into two groups. He Long and Ye Ting’s forces moved south to 
36

Shantou. Zhu De’s forces broke from the main body and took a circuitous 

route through Guangdong before arriving in Hunan.

Following the failed Nanchang Uprising, the CCP called an Emergency 

Conference on August 7, 1927, and pushed for continued uprisings within 

the cities, though a new strategy emerged. Stalin and the COMINTERN 

promoted the idea that peasant revolutions would complement the urban 

worker-proletariat movement. Reports of the success of peasant revolts, 

albeit on a smaller scale, had been sent back to the CCP headquarters in 

Shanghai as early as 1926.12 The Central Committee tasked a local CCP 

organizer, Mao Zedong, to create an army from the peasants and incite 

a series of rebellions around Changsha that would spark a nationwide 

movement. He created the First Division, First Army of the Workers 

and Peasants Revolutionary Army, made up of miners from Anyuan 

county and peasants from three counties in Hunan province.13 Mao had 

reservations with the plan,14 but was overruled. On September 8, 1927, 

Mao and the First Division, First Army of the Workers and Peasants 

Revolutionary Army attempted to seize Changsha as part of the Autumn 

Harvest uprisings.15 The uprising failed because a small number of urban 

workers and proletariats appeared to support the insurrection. Within five 

days, the rebels were kicked out of Changsha and the surrounding areas, 

and were forced on the run. During the uprising, Mao was briefly captured 

but managed to escape.16

By late 1927, Moscow and the CCP leadership all realized the urban 

insurrection plan had failed. The failure of the Guangdong Commune 

Uprising17 in December 1927 further demonstrated that point. In response 

to the series of insurrections, Chiang Kai-shek instituted a series of 

Communist repression campaigns in the city, killing or arresting many 

other communist members, with the remainder going underground in the 

cities or fleeing to the rural areas. Most of the armed communist forces 

retreated to the rural areas to evade NRA pursuit. KMT repression of 

communist activities in the city severely hampered communications 

between the Central Committee and its forces, ceding the leadership and 

direction of the party to the military leadership in charge of the guns. 

Qu Qiubai’s short tenure as the CCP Chairman ended as a result of the 

failed uprising and created a power vacuum within the CCP. The entire 

episode demonstrated to key leaders of the CCP the need for a professional 

military force. The masses of workers and peasants could initiate strikes 

and rebellions to take city centers, but a dedicated, professional military 

force was needed to maintain those gains in the face of the NRA.18 That 

much-needed force would emerge from the Jinggang Mountains.

Push for Survival in the Mountains

Retreating communist leaders were forced to adopt pragmatic 

measures to survive in the highlands. Their experiences in the uprising 

reinforced the idea that a strong military force was the necessary push 
37

to create the agrarian-based communist revolution. To develop the 

conditions for revolution, Mao Zedong and Zhu De adapted the Red Army 

and communist policies to the local conditions in order to recruit, sustain, 

and retain loyal soldiers, and began to improve the symbiotic relationship 

between the army, the local populace, and party.

The Journey to Jinggang Mountains

After the collapse of the Autumn Harvest Uprisings, the Workers and 

Peasant Red Army scattered to the rural areas. Mao narrowly escaped 

capture by the Nationalists and linked up with the remnant forces of the 

Workers and Peasant Red Army in Sanwan, Jiangxi province. Many of 

the soldiers were killed, arrested, or had deserted. Less than one thousand 

soldiers remained from of the original force.19 Many of them were simply 

exhausted and homesick. Low morale, lack of a unified mission, and 

conflicting loyalties pervaded the unit, and even worse, some troops 

began to blame Mao for the losses and separation from family. In order 

to counteract these claims and strengthen the remaining forces into a 

cohesive force, Mao held a conference in Sanwan on September 29, 1927, 

Figure 2: The Jiangxi-Fujian-Hunan Area

Source: Created by the author
38

and implemented a series of radical policies to stave off the implosion.20

He reorganized the unit from the 1st Division, Peasants and Workers Red 

Army to the First Regiment,First Division, Peasant and Workers Red Army, 

streamlining the command and control of the unit.21 Second, Mao instituted 

political representatives within each unit to instill the “revolutionary 

spirit” within the soldiers. A political cell was established in each squad, 

a branch at company level, and a party committee at the battalion and 

regimental level.22 Next, he established soldiers’ Soviets within the unit, 

providing “democratic centralism” within the unit. Additionally, Mao spun 

the narrative to his favor, shifting the blame for the uprising failure to the 

collective poor understanding of the revolutionary course within China, 

rather than incompetency among the leadership. Lastly, to appease the 

homesick soldiers, the First Regiment moved back to their native Hunan. 

The Worker and Peasant Red Army initially planned to return to 

Anyuan, the hometown of a large number of soldiers; however, the local 

military forces in the area were too strong for the Red Army to overcome. 

Another option was needed, and quickly. The sick and wounded within the 

unit created a sense of urgency to establish a base area immediately. The 

lack of stable location to medically treat the wounded had a deleterious 

effect on morale.23 The nearby Jinggang Mountain area presented an 

opportune site to laager temporarily,24 especially since one of Mao’s 

former Peasant Movement Training Institute students knew the area well. 

Jinggangshan, meaning Well Ridge mountain, derived its name from 

the five villages around the main city of Ciping: Big Well, Middle Well, 

Little Well, Upper Well, and Lower Well. The mountain is situated within 

the Luoxian range that straddles the border between Jiangxi and Hunan 

province. The mountainous area is also the point where four different 

counties converge: Lingxian, Suichuan, Ninggang, and Yongxin. Its 

location along the county and provincial borders made it a good area for 

defense. Factional and political differences prevented most provincial 

forces from coordinating operations or massing effects in these border 

regions.25 Jinggang’s mountainous terrain also provided natural obstacles 

favoring the defense. The area was remote, away from any major urban 

concentration, county headquarters, and major road networks. The 

mountain’s inhospitable terrain did not invite much industry and shielded 

it from any undue attention. For its remoteness, the area also had some 

strategic advantages. It stood midpoint between Changsha, Nanchang, and 

Guangdong, which allowed the Red Army flexibility to return to the sites 

of the failed insurrections.26 Additionally, the revolutionary movement 

was more mature and developed in the Hunan area, and the Red Army 

could find greater local support for their operations.27 All in all, the 

Jinggangshan mountain area provided a sensible alternative for the Red 

Army to consolidate its forces and start over its operations.

In their weakened state, the Peasant and Worker Red Army could 
39

not simply occupy Jinggangshan by force. The lack of military presence 

in these border regions often made its occupants subject to exploitation 

of roving bandits. The Jinggang mountain region was controlled by two 

bandits, Yuan Weicai and Wang Zuo, and Mao had to employ adroit 

negotiation skills to gain access into the area. Both sides had concerns 

about a new arrangement in the Jinggang mountains. The Peasant and 

Worker Red Army’s biggest concern was the trustworthiness of Yuan and 

Wang. At a meeting in Gucheng, some members of the Front committee 

and representatives of soldier Soviets doubted the revolutionary character 

of Yuan and Wang and believed they were simply bandits.28 Mao, on the 

other hand, argued that the two and their loyal followers were important 

part of the communist movement. For Yuan and Wang, they primarily 

worried about the impact of a new military force effect on the local 

balance of power. The mountain areas outside the cities had a complex 

power arrangement. Bandits and local elites maintained a status quo, and 

any change in power often led to an attack to return an area to a balanced 

state. Additionally, the mountain region had a distinct ethnographic 

population. A significant Hakka ethnic minority population considered the 

Jinggangshan their ancestral land, and the Han settlers were simply guests 

in the area. Ethnic tension between the minorities and the Han remained a 

flashpoint, and any addition of new guests had to be vetted. 

Mao first convinced Yuan Wencai how the partnership would be 

mutually beneficial. In exchange for housing, food, and local support, the 

Red Army would provide weapons, training, and support Yuan and Wang’s 

operations. Mao presented Yuan with a gift of 100 rifles as a symbol of 

the new relationship. Mao later made a similar gesture to Wang Zuo, 

sending him seventy rifles. The issue of a base was settled with the Red 

Army entering Jinggangshan; however, the prickly issue of differentiating 

between a bandit and a revolutionary soldier would remain a thorn in the 

Red Army’s side.

Upon arrival at Jinggangshan, the Worker and Peasant Red Army 

began conducting guerrilla operations and peasant mobilization. On 

October 7, 1927, the Red Army started operations in Maoping, and moved 

across Jinggangshan area to Ciping. While on this march, the Red Army 

passed through Lingixan and Shuikou villages, attacking the local elite 

and their militia, opening up the local jails, and holding mass rallies as 

a way to promote the communist message. On October 22, Mao’s forces 

moved to Dafen, where they were attacked by a local militia. The local 

militia used its knowledge of the local terrain to its advantage and inflicted 

heavy losses to the Red Army. The retreating forces of about 300 rallied 

at Dajing, linking up with Wang Zuo. Wang had yet to meet Mao and 

remained suspicious of his intentions. Fortunately, Mao won him over with 

similar promises of weapons and training for his force. Additionally, Mao 

promised to help Wang against some of his local rivals, which included 
40

Xiao Jiabi. Wang’s forces and the Red Army joined forces in Dajing, and 

seized Shimen. The final stop of the operation was Ciping, and on October 

15, 1927, the Red Army seized the city center. In the span of one month, 

the Red Army established a stretch, albeit tenuous, of territory for a base 

to expand operations. 

With a foothold established, the Red Army expanded its influence in 

the surrounding areas. The Red Army often preyed on local areas where 

government control was weak or in flux. On November 16, the Red Army 

sent a battalion to the west and took Chaling. The success in Chaling 

allowed the Red Army to expand its operations into Suichang in January 

1928. On February 18, 1928, the Red Army got its largest catch with the 

occupation of Xincheng, Ningang County. Within two months of action, 

the Red Army almost doubled its territory and now occupied portions of 

three counties. 

The concrete effects of the Red Army attacks were often temporary. 

It often could not hold the territory it seized during the raids. Traditional 

hierarchies of power remained entrenched in the region. The material gains 

from the attacks were consumed almost immediately.29 Yet the military 

action itself served an important purpose by subverting the legitimacy 

of the traditional governing apparatus. Prior to the Red Army arrival, 

many villages maintained traditional governing system for decades. 

The attacks of the Red Army cracked the illusion of invincibility, and 

demonstrated to the people there was an alternative. Such a breakthrough 

within the psyche of the peasants helped to create greater support for the 

communist movement.30 Additionally, the opportunity presented through 

revolution was an attractive alternative to many peasants. Life for a 

peasant since the fall of the Qing was difficult, to say the least. Natural 

disasters in 1918, 1924, and 1926 destroyed the lands peasants needed for 

subsistence.31 At the local level, exploitation by the powerful or wealthy 

was common. Nationalist attempts at reconstruction were ineffective and 

had little positive impact on the peasantry, leaving them ultimately open 

to communist influence.32

The Arrival of Zhu De to the Mountain

For the most part, Mao was left alone because of the political shakeup within both the Central Committee and COMINTERN in response 

to the multiple failures to sustain the uprising in metropolitan areas.33

Contact with the provincial and regional CCP community still existed. 

Zhou Lu, a member of the South Hunan Special Committee, heard about 

the communist expansion in the mountain areas and came to inspect the 

conditions. While at Jinggangshan, he gave Mao orders to dispatch his 

unit to support Zhu De’s forces in an uprising in Southern Hunan.34

After the failed Nanchang Uprisings, Zhu De and the remnants of his 

forces evaded Nationalist forces and wandered around southern Jiangxi 
41

and Fujian until he linked up with a fellow Yunnan graduate and Nationalist 

army leader, Fan Shisheng. His stay with Fan was temporary once word 

had travelled a NRA unit was harboring fugitive communist forces.35 The 

Communist forces left in January 1928 for southern Hunan to support 

some urban uprisings. Upon their arrival, Zhu De’s capable military force 

became the critical addition to the Hunan communists’ plan. Zhu De was 

augmented by peasants and levies from the surrounding Hunan areas. 

Zhou Lu was also supposed to provide additional forces from Jingggang 

Mountains to support the insurrection. The insurrection started on in late 

January, but it never got off the ground. The urban workers and local 

populace did not rise as originally planned. Instead, local support turned 

against the communists as revolutionary policies were seen as too harsh.36

Additionally, Mao’s forces never made it to Southern Hunan; instead, he 

dragged his feet and stayed in Central Hunan holding rallies and mobilizing 

the local peasant population.37 Recognizing the growing threat within their 

spheres of influence, warlord armies in Guangdong and Hunan banded 

together and pursued Zhu De’s forces. The Red Army and warlord armies 

had a series of engagements along the Jinggang Mountains as Zhu De and 

the Hunan regiments slowly retreated to the Jinggang Mountain base.38

Once Zhu De and Mao’s forces arrived safely in the Jinggangshan 

area, the leadership from the two units retreated to Maoping to hold a 

conference. On May 20, 1928, Zhu De and Mao agreed to establish the 

Jinggangshan Special Committee, with Mao as the general secretary.39

Additionally, the army reorganized the military forces, and established 

the Fourth Red Army, named after the original famed Fourth “Ironsides” 

Army.40 The initial number of forces varied but the consensus estimates 

the force to be between 10,000 and 12,000. The forces consisted of Zhu 

De’s Nanchang Uprising force (later designated Twenty-eighth Regiment), 

Mao’s Autumn Uprising force (later designated Thirty-first Regiment), 

Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo’s former bandit force (later designated Thirtysecond Regiment), and the Hunan Uprising force41 (the Yizhang unit 

remained and was later designated Twenty-ninth Regiment).42 Zhu De’s 

arrival in Jinggangshan also brought in a traditional military mindset that 

assisted in the professionalization of the Red Army. The famous guerrilla 

tactics quote, “When the enemy advances, we retreat; when the enemy 

halts and encamps, we harass them; when the enemy seeks to avoid battle, 

we attack; and when the enemy retreats, we pursue,” is attributed to Zhu 

at the first conference of Maoping, and would remain a guiding principles 

for Red Army action.43

Attacks against the Mountain

The increased strength and size of the Fourth Red Army attracted the 

attention of neighboring Jiangxi and Hunan military leaders. The first set 

of military campaigns against the Red Army was from May to June 1928 

and was led by the Zhu Peide and the Jiangxi provincial military forces. 
42

The first campaign was based out of Yongxin. The Jiangxi government 

dispatched the Twenty-seventh Division to attack the Red Army. With 

one regiment garrisoned at Yongxin as the reserve, the division sent one 

regiment to attack the Red Army stronghold in Nanchang with another 

regiment flanking to the east. The Red Army countered the action by 

stationing one regiment in the mountains to protect the base, one regiment 

to defend the mountain passes, and two regiments to conduct a spoiling 

attack on the flanking Jiangxi regiment. The Red Army regiments destroyed 

the flanking unit, which retreated back to Yongxin. The Red Army pursued 

into Yongxin, destroying the garrison regiment as well. The Red Army 

then effectively maneuvered to the rear of the Jiangxi division, causing the 

remainder of the division to withdraw to Ji’an to avoid complete defeat. 

The Red Army secured Yongxin, established a Worker-Peasant-Soldiers 

government, and expanded the Soviet across the county.44

The second encirclement campaign occurred relatively immediately 

afterward in late May, with the same Jiangxi Twenty-seventh Division in 

the lead. With new reinforcements, theJiangxi Division took back Yongxin, 

and began a slower, more deliberate approach to attack the mountains. Red 

Guard units conducted guerrilla attacks to expose weaknesses for the Red 

Army to exploit, with little success. When the Twenty-eighth Regiment 

left to reinforce a distressed Red Army force in neighboring Chaling 

county, Zhu Peide saw an opening to attack the mountain passes. However, 

the Jiangxi Division did not account for the Red Army’s mobility, as the 

Thirty-first Regiment quickly assumed the Twenty-eighth Regiment’s 

former defensive positions and gave the Jiangxi forces a stiff fight. The 

Twenty-eighth Regiment quickly returned and reinforced the Thirty-first 

Regiment for the advance on Yongxin, seizing the enemy’s rear once 

again. Choosing to survive rather engage in a losing battle, the Jiangxi 

forces retreated back to Ji’an.45

The last encirclement campaign occurred in June 1928 and was a 

combined operation with a Hunanese division attacking from the east. The 

Jiangxi Ninth Division was deployed in combination with the remaining 

two regiments of the Twenty-seventh Division from the previous 

campaigns. The Jiangxi forces conducted a frontal attack up through the 

mountain passes with three regiments. The Red Army first established a 

feint to the east to occupy the Hunanese forces, and then deployed one 

battalion augmented by local guerrilla groups to the western flank of 

the mountain passes. The threat of guerrilla attacks on the eastern flank 

of the Jiangxi forces caused the commander to maintain two regiments 

garrisoned the reoccupied Yongxin as a reserve. Using the mountainous 

terrain to its advantage, the Red Army destroyed one regiment as they 

funneled up to through the passes. The victory brought numerous weapons 

and new soldiers, and the Red Army retook Yongxin.46

At the end of June 1928, the Jinggangshan base area hit its apex in terms 
43

of size. It controlled the entire area of Ninggang, Yongxin, and Lianhua 

counties. It also had control of portions of Ji’an, northern Suichuan county, 

and Anfu city.47 Chiang Kai-shek took notice of the Communists’ gain and 

directed a new campaign against the Communist bandits. 

Another series of combined campaigns incorporated the Hunan and 

Jiangxi armies against the Fourth Red Army, and started in July 1928. 

The Hunan Eighth Army forces began its attack from the west through 

Ninggang, whereas the Jiangxi Army deployed eleven regiments from the 

Third and Sixth Army through Yongxin along the eastern border of Jinggang 

Mountains. The Red Army kept two regiments to defend the bases, while 

the Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth Red Army Regiments moved west and 

slipped behind the Hunanese Eight Army rear and conducted raids. At the 

same time, local Red Army militia forces implemented a “scorched earth” 

strategy, removing all food, contaminating water sources, and vacating 

villages in order to deny the enemy forces any supplies. The combination 

of these tactics forced the Eighth Army forces to retreat. With its flank 

secured, the Red Army turned around its forces and moved towards 

Yongxin to attack the Jiangxi regiments. The success of this campaign 

would be overshadowed, though, by the “August Defeat” incident.48

The Red Army had an initial string of victories, especially with its 

recent victory against the Hunanese forces in Ninggang. However, the 

“August Defeat” incident demonstrated how tenuous the situation really 

was. As the Twenty-eighth and Twenty-ninth regiments moved west to 

support the attack against the Jiangxi forces, the regiments abruptly changed 

courses, and headed south towards Southern Hunan, citing orders to assist 

the Southern Hunan Special Committee.49 The two regiments attacked the 

city of Chenzhou, about 200 kilometers from Jinggang Mountains, and 

defeated the local enemy force. However, the Red Army did not pursue 

the retreating forces; instead, soldiers and officers uncharacteristically 

strolled through the streets as if they were civilians once again. Some 

soldiers left to visit families in nearby villages and incidents of looting 

were also reported during that time.50 The enemy reorganized and engaged 

in a fierce counterattack. The Twenty-eighth Regiment withdrew quickly 

with minimal casualties. The Twenty-ninth Regiment did not fare so well. 

The surprise attack exploited the excitement of being home, and the unit 

did not respond quickly enough to retreat before the enemy cut off the only 

bridge leading out of town. The stragglers who survived were incorporated 

into the Twenty-eighth Regiment. The Twenty-eighth Regiment slowly 

made its way back up to the base area, where the remaining Red Army 

forces were in a nasty fight with the Jiangxi military.51

With the two regiments gone from the mountain, a reinvigorated KMT 

force attacked once again. Three regiments of reorganized Hunanese troops 

joined the same eleven Jiangxi regiments. The remaining Red Army forces 

defended the Jinggang mountains by employing every tactic possible 
44

to survive. The Red Army gave up terrain as the enemy military forces 

moved forward to take the mountain base, relying heavily on the recently 

constituted village militias to disrupt and delay the advance. Given the 

shortage of personnel, the Thirty-first and Thirty-second regiments became 

the main defensive force, and retreated to the protection of the high ground, 

and established hasty defensive positions along key routes in order to mass 

fires. The force was actually smaller than reported, since Mao Zedong 

went with one battalion from the Thirty-first Regiment south to escort 

back the Twenty-eighthRegiment.52 Small guerrilla and raid units attacked 

the flanks and rear of advancing forces as the KMT forces attempted to 

attack up the rugged mountain side in the dead heat of summer. After 

repeated failed attempts to scale the mountain, the Hunan and Jiangxi 

forces finally withdrew and the mountain was safe. On September 9, the 

Twenty-eighth Regiment returned safely back to the Jinggangshan. The 

Red Army continued to fight and retake land lost during the campaign. 

By October 1928, they had retaken the Ninggang county, and parts of the 

surrounding Suichuan, Lixing, and Yongxin county, but were never able to 

recover all the territory.53

The last campaign coincided with an economic blockade and the 

arrival of Peng Dehuai’s Fifth Army forces. The Jiangxi and Hunan forces 

adopted an economic blockade tactic, normally used against bandits, to 

deprive the Red Army and its local support network access to the local 

markets in the lowlands. Starting in the fall of 1928, military forces and 

local militia established checkpoints along all routes and trails leading to 

and from the Jinggang mountains. Private militia, manned with soldiers 

intimately familiar with the local area, conducted interdiction patrols to 

capture any blockade runners. The blockade effectively halted local trade 

of goods, such as timber, tea, and tea oil from the mountains. It also stopped 

the importation of medicine, clothing, food, and most importantly, salt.54

The blockade exacerbated local tensions, as the supplies and patience 

were running short. Conditions in the areas began to worsen, with people 

simply subsisting on sweet potatoes and pumpkins. Peng Dehuai’s Fifth 

Army55 arrived in December 1928 and worsened the burden on the area. 

At the same time, NRA forces from Fujian, Jiangxi, and Hunan provinces 

began to surround the mountains and prepare for attack.56

In the face of all these tensions, the Fourth Red Army leadership 

convened a conference at Bailu to discuss their options. The discussion 

focused on how to neutralize the threats looming down the mountain as 

well as how to integrate the new forces. The options were limited. One 

recommendation was to repeat the same tactics used before to isolate 

and attack enemy forces as they moved up the mountain; however, the 

invading forces had adapted as well and had better coordination and larger 

units. The next option was to withdraw to a safer area momentarily, and 

then conduct a counterattack. The economic hardships from the blockade 
45

exacerbated civil-military relations in the mountain areas, and any sign of 

disloyalty to the local populace might end their support for the Red Army. 

The last option was to mount a defense of the mountain range against 

the enemy, which did not allow for any withdrawal route for the 6,000 

soldiers. The council decided to adopt a hybrid solution for the operation. 

The Fourth Red Army would break through the blockade in an effort to 

draw forces away from the mountain area, and at the same time ease the 

logistical demands on the local populace. The Fifth Red Army, which 

was understandably worn thin from its recent march, would remain in the 

mountains and defend the base.57 On January 14, 1929, the Fourth Red 

Army led by Zhu De and Mao, broke through the blockade and headed 

south to Jiangxi. 

The Fourth Red Army’s initial foray into southern Jiangxi was filled 

with challenges. They were initially met with success as the units moved 

south, facing scant resistance as they seized Suichuan and Shangyu, on 

the way to Dayu, Jiangxi province. At Dayu, however, three regiments 

from the Jiangxi Army were waiting, and attacked the unprepared Red 

Army forces, forcing them to retreat north back to the Xingguo-Ji’an area. 

While moving along the snow-covered winter roads, the Red Army found 

little local support in the area. The revolution had yet to reach these areas, 

making logistical and intelligence support difficult at best. The Red Army 

marched for about 30 days, sometimes covering up to 30 miles a day to 

avoid pursuit, all the while taking casualties and losing equipment. The 

Red Army arrived in Dabaidi village, in the Ningdu-Ruijin area, Jiangxi 

province, on February 10, 1929 and had a fierce battle with two regiments 

from the Fifteenth NRA Division. The Red Army routed the force, 

temporarily capturing the two regimental commanders, and gaining about 

800 soldiers and weapons in the process. The victory gave the Fourth Red 

Army well-needed rest after its harrowing escape from the mountains.58

After the Red Army secured its place in Jiangxi, the KMT became 

engulfed in internal strife as Chiang Kai-shek continued his quest to 

consolidate power from regional warlords. These efforts consumed the 

NRA’s attention and resources and left the Red Army to its own devices. 

During this period, Mao and Zhu expanded the Jiangxi Soviet through 

a series of campaigns into West Fujian province. In February 1929, the 

Fourth Red Army incorporated two independent guerrilla regiments into 

its force, and leveraged its new combat strength to expand the Soviet 

area to include Ji’an, Ningdu and Ruijin. In March 1929, the Red Army 

entered Western Fujian and seized Tingzhou. In the wake of the victory, 

the Red Army secured a small arsenal, with more than 2,000 weapons 

and machines guns, plus a clothing factory, providing the army with new 

uniforms. The Red Army also had 3,000 former KMT soldiers transfer over 

to the Red Army.59 Once the Red Army established the Jiangxi Soviet, it 

rapidly accumulated more success in its battles and operations. Red Army 
46

forces continued to conduct guerrilla operations and political mobilization 

in the areas. By April 1929, the Red Army had expanded the Jiangxi Soviet 

to encompass more than 20 counties in Jiangxi and Fujian.60 In light of 

their successes, Mao sent a letter in April 1929 to the Central Committee,61

highlighting the achievements in Jiangxi and Fujian, as well as describing 

the tactics and strategies that led to the Red Army’s success.62 In May 

1929, the Red Army conducted its second campaign into Western Fujian, 

and seized Longyan and Yongding, further expanding the footprint. With 

each campaign, the Red Army gained more soldiers, more equipment, 

more territory, and more money. 

During the early days of the Jiangxi Soviet, one of the major concerns 

was control over the direction of the Red Army. Through the expansion, 

different factions with contrary opinions and directions festered in the 

Red Army. Issues with militarism, warlordism, “adventurism,” and 

“opportunism” continued to pervade the army.63 Additionally, the question 

of the leading role of politics in the Army remained contentious. On June 

22, 1929, the Fourth Red Army held its Seventh Representative Congress 

in Longyan to discuss many of these issues but failed to reach a consensus. 

During the meeting, many of Mao’s ideas of party control of the military 

faced stiff resistance, and his ideas’ unpopularity contributed to his failed 

bid to be the Front Committee secretary-general.64 In the wake of the loss, 

Mao left for Fujian to assist in mass mobilization and became very ill. 

During that time, Chen Yi, representing the Fourth Red Army in Shanghai, 

briefed the Central Committee on the unit’s status and progress. Based on 

the reports, the CCP sent a letter of instruction to the Fourth Red Army in 

September 1929, indicating its full support of political communist control 

of the Red Army and the application of military force to push political 

mobilization as the means to continue the spread of the revolution across 

China.65 Vindicated by the Central Committee support for his ideas, a 

healthy Mao attended the Ninth Representative Congress in Gutian county, 

Fujian province, and issued his famous statement, “On the Rectification 

of Incorrect Ideas in the Party,”66 which outlined his view on the current 

status of the Red Army and his plan to correct those ideas. 

The conference also gave Zhu De and Mao a platform to push for 

centralization of power within the Red Army. With casualties, desertions, 

and new recruits changing the composition of the Red Army, Mao saw a 

need to adjust the organization structure.67 Factional differences within 

the army became more apparent with new recruits. Additionally, the 

conference also addressed the role of the Communist party in the army. 

More education and centralized control was needed to ensure the Red 

Army maintained a unity of effort.68 A more through discussion on the 

specific measures adopted at the Gutian Conference is discussed later in 

this chapter, but in summary, the resolutions from the Gutian conference 

effectively established party control over the Red Army. It also clarified 
47

the critical importance of the Red Army’s dual political and military role 

in supporting political mobilization in the Communist revolution. Lastly, 

the Gutian conference symbolized Mao’s consolidation of power within 

the Fourth Red Army against other factions and set the conditions for 

future actions.

Analysis

Situational Assessment

The myriad of threats of Red Army faced in the Jinggang Mountain 

remained constant throughout the 10-year civil war. The first set of threats 

was external to the Army. Besides the obvious threat of the KMT military 

force, the Red Army also had to contend with the different warlord armies, 

bandits, and militias. The local militias were among the most threatening. 

The communist revolution and land reforms directly threatened the 

interests of the local gentry class, and many of them raised private militia 

to protect themselves. Some militia forces not only defended lands, but 

also attacked Red Army forces, especially in the base areas. Equipped with 

more modern equipment, these forces leverage their intimate knowledge of 

the local area to strike the base areas and disrupt Red Army activities.69 The 

Red Army also had to be prepared for dangers when working with the local 

populace. Jinggang Mountain areas were occupied by the Hakka minority, 

and the communist forces worked to ensure their “guest” status in the area 

remained secure. Prior to leaving Jinggangshan, the ethnic strife flared up 

due to the economic blockade, and was one of the contributing factors for 

the Red Army’s departure.70 Even Han support was not guaranteed in the 

areas. Miscalculations on the extent of revolutionary fervor in the cities 

contributed to the failure of the uprisings in 1927. The locals surrounding 

the route to Ruijin were unsympathetic to the communist cause, and gave 

little support to the fleeing Fourth Red Army. 

The other set of threats came from within the Red Army. The 

biggest internal threat during these first two years was desertions.71

The horrendous conditions and homesickness pushed many soldiers to 

voluntarily leave the army and return home. Conditions at the time were 

extremely tough. At the Jinggang Mountain base areas, food became so 

scarce the soldier’s meals simply consisted of pumpkins.72 The Red Army 

units were also constantly short of the necessary logistical and financial 

resources. The Red Army required a minimum of 50,000 yuan a month to 

survive,73 which was difficult to raise, especially when engaged in almost 

constant conflict. The stark differences in background and culture within 

the disparate Red Army units also led to many internal conflicts. The Red 

Army was an amalgamation of different groups coming together less out 

of common goal, but more out of survival. Many of the soldiers were 

former peasants. Other Red Army soldiers were former KMT or warlord 

soldiers. The bad traditions of the warlord and KMT armies coupled with 
48

the lack of educational background in the rural areas created a boiling pot 

of inappropriate behaviors that decreased morale.74 Under these difficult 

conditions, the Red Army leadership adopted a more flexible strategy in 

order to survive.

Strategy

Initially, the main goal of the Red Army was survival. From the above 

description, the Red Army faced overwhelming circumstances that could 

easily end the unit’s existence. Mao and Zhu De recognized that in its 

current state, the Red Army would lose in a conventional battle against 

a superior army.75 With this understanding, the Fourth Red Army created 

a new political-military strategy in the Chinese rural areas to protect and 

grow the communist peasant revolution. 

The first strategy adopted by Mao was making alliances. Through 

these alliances, the Red Army could increase its forces, gain legitimacy, 

learn about the local area, and expand its territory with little extra work. 

Mao understood that alliances were important, even if they were frowned 

upon by the Central Committee of the CCP. In 1928, a resolution from 

the CCP Sixth Party Congress viewed bandits as a major threat to the 

Red Army and communist organizations, and they should be immediately 

expelled.76 Such an extreme stance ran counter to the reality in Jinggang 

Mountains, and the contributions made by Yuan Wencai, Wang Zuo, and 

the members of the Thirty-second Regiment could not be overlooked. To 

remedy the situation, Mao made no mention of the point in discussions, 

and actually vetoed any plan to attack Yuan and Wang.77

The second strategy was adapting communist policies to the local 

conditions, specifically, altering the targets of the revolution depending 

on the circumstances. The Red Army was more pragmatic than dogmatic 

when it came to fomenting revolution. Contrary to CCP guidance, attacks 

on landlords and rich peasants were limited to those who were disliked 

within the local community.78 The Red Army purposely avoided attacking 

popular landlords or rich peasants since the actions undermined the 

political mobilization and did not engender local support. Instead, the Red 

Army would target its propaganda efforts and negotiations at the popular 

members of the local gentry class to gain their backing. The pragmatic 

viewpoint on strategy became a constant theme throughout the war.

Over time, the strategy changed from survival to slow expansion. 

Mao described the expansion as a series of waves. He saw the systematic 

development of rural Soviets as the way to encircle the cities and create the 

conditions for revolution.79 His grand strategy to expand Soviets in China 

was time and labor intensive. With that said, it also took into account the 

external and internal conditions of the Red Army, and provided a road 

map that could reach their goal. It also required more than the simple 

application of violence and force from the Red Army. Mao realized early 
49

that the Red Army had to have multiple roles in the communist struggle. 

Tactics

To survive and expand, the Red Army had to create a new way to fight 

and defeat superior enemies. The famous quote “The enemy advances, 

we retreat” encapsulated the Red Army practical application of the best 

tactics given the Red Army’s limitations at the time.80 During this period, 

The Red Army combined mobile warfare, guerrilla tactics, and political 

mobilization in its operations as a way to beat the KMT. 

During the Jingangshan and Jiangxi Soviet period, the Red Army 

is most associated with guerrilla warfare. While Mao is known for his 

writings on guerrilla warfare, he admitted that he did not invent this 

style of warfare; rather, it was a product of the collective experiences of 

the Red Army during these formidable times. At a strategic level, Mao 

adopted guerrilla warfare because he understood the weakness of the Red 

Army vis-à-vis his enemies. The purpose of the guerrilla warfare was not 

to gain decisive victory, but rather gain time, supplies, and equipment 

while preserving strength. The guerrilla tactics employed in Jinggangshan 

and Jiangxi remained focused on small-unit tactics, with emphasis on 

scouting, patrolling, cover and concealment, marksmanship, mobility, and 

troop leading. The guerrilla units were normally local militia units, trained 

and sometimes led by Red Army officers, most often political leaders. 

These forces primarily engaged in ambushes, raid, and feints at the rear 

and flanks of the enemy to distract and disrupt enemy operations. The 

Red Army faced immense challenges even before making contact with 

the enemy, and adopting guerrilla tactics was effective in preserving its 

combat power for those specific opportunities for the decisive attack.

While guerrilla warfare is often synonymous with the Red Army, 

its main forces engaged in conventional warfare as the main weapon to 

defeat the KMT and warlord armies. Red Army units did incorporate 

some guerrilla tactics in their operations, but for the most part engaged 

in conventional warfare. The methods of attack were seen as different 

because the Red Army used small-unit tactics that relied on speed, surprise, 

and mobility.81 These functions were not based on a strict following of a 

guerrilla tradition, but rather an acute awareness of their limitations and 

shortcomings. During its battles with the Jiangxi Army, the Fourth Red 

Army used interior lines within the mountains to reinforce weak positions 

and attack the enemy on the flanks and rear. The Red Army also used 

the terrain, weather, and light to its advantage to find, expose and mass 

fires against an enemy’s weakness. The Red Army’s victory in the second 

combined Jiangxi-Hunan campaign against an overwhelming force was a 

direct result of leveraging the restrictive mountain passes to canalize and 

mass fires on the enemy. 

Logistical concerns also limited the Red army’s ability to sustain 
50

protracted battles, thus making quick attacks a more sustainable choice. 

As “guests” in a minority area, Red Army leaders were sensitive to the 

logistical burden it placed on local society, and did not want to consume all 

the resources in the area. The Red Army’s cache was also limited to what 

they could seize after battle. Therefore, the Red Army had to be economic 

and efficient in its use of combat power, and leveraged its size and mobility 

in its attack, and looked for ways to make the most gains from battle. The 

capture of Tingzhou in early 1929 is a good example of good economic 

choices. The Red Army picked up two arsenals and a clothing factory, 

which helped to both increase morale and combat effectiveness of the 

units. Lastly, conventional battles were often conducted at a larger scale. 

Mao discussed how, given the quality of soldiers and training, dispersion 

of forces was a difficult concept.82 Thus, conventional operations with 

stronger command and control through key leaders were the primary mode 

of operations for the Red Army at this time.

Within the Red Army, guerrilla tactics also encompassed political 

mobilization. These tactics represented a new, distinct direction for the 

Red Army. Instead of engaging in strictly conventional military activity of 

fighting, true success of the Red Army during this period was not gained 

on the battlefield, but rather through local society. The new communist 

military model transcended traditional offensive or defensive operations 

and expanded into political mobilization of the masses. These political 

operations leveraged guerrilla warfare tactics as well as political tactics 

not necessarily utilized in conventional warfare.83 The blurring of lines 

between the military and political realm would eventually create a wedge 

within the party in the future. However, during this period the Red Army 

leveraged political mobilization for all its benefits. 

The biggest tangible benefit from political mobilization was the 

creation of an administrative and logistical backbone to support Red Army 

operations. Local support in a village translated into recruitment, supply 

and intelligence networks, and revenue streams. To develop the local 

base, the Red Army refined its peasant mobilization process to increase 

efficiency and meet any shortfalls. It also used guerrilla tactics to disperse 

soldiers to mobilize the masses.84 Political mobilization during this period 

had four major stages in its operation.85

The first stage of the peasant mobilization process was the 

reconnaissance and assessment. Prior to entry into a new town or village, 

the Red Army leadership conducted a hasty assessment of the local 

conditions to determine the mobilization process time.86 Once in the 

village, the Red Army conducted a more in-depth assessment, focusing 

on the following areas: peasant situation, opposition parties’ situation, 

economic conditions, land distribution, geographic conditions, and road 

networks.87 The assessment gave the Red Army commander and political 

commissar a deeper understanding of the local conditions in order to 
51

tailor tactics to the local realities. Based on the assessment, the leaders 

created local elite targeting lists, developed themes for propaganda, and 

established criteria for negotiations. 

The second stage for the Red Army was propaganda dissemination. 

Red Army units created specific propaganda teams, each assigned with 

five soldiers. Each team had two sections, one oratory section and one 

product section, made up of three soldiers and two soldiers, respectively. 

The oratory section was responsible spreading key communist propaganda 

themes by speaking at village marketplaces, center areas, and halls to 

all willing listeners. The products section was responsible for creating 

propaganda products. They went around town and pasted signs and banners 

with communist slogans to increase awareness. Usually within a month, 

the propaganda team held a large mass rally in the central area of the town 

or village to agitate local support for the movement.88 Propaganda themes 

were based on the local assessment. The team tailored specific messages 

to leverage pre-existing social and political wedges in the community. 

Propaganda served three main purposes. First, it helped to recruit new 

members to the Red Guard and Red Army. Mao argued that the primary 

purpose of the guerrilla operations was to help “expand[ing] the Red Army 

and the local armed forces.”89 Second, it helped to elicit support from the 

local populace, especially for Red Army operations. Third, it helped the 

local populace differentiate the Red Army from local bandit groups. In 

the past, some Red Army units did a poor job spreading propaganda, and 

simply posted some banners while passing through villages. Unaware of 

who the armed group actually was or what the slogans actually meant, 

many villagers just assumed the Red Army was just another group of roving 

bandits pillaging the rich in the area.90 The lack of awareness contributed 

to low local support for the Red Army, which made its mission of survival 

and expansion temporarily unfeasible.

The third stage for the Red Army was organizing the people. Once the 

local populace was sufficiently agitated by the social inequalities neatly 

identified by the propaganda team, Red Army leaders made a call for 

action to topple the local government, and pushed the people to organize 

themselves and create a new government. During the overthrow, not every 

bureaucrat was targeted. The Red Army did not always have the personnel 

or experience to replace the local leadership and associated bureaucrats, 

nor were those skills and experiences always present in the local populace. 

Instead of a wholesale execution or imprisonment of the opposition, the 

Red Army used a selective coercion technique of attacking and publicly 

executing key leaders who were often the communists’ most ardent 

opponents.91 The remaining elites whose experience and knowledge of 

a specific field was irreplaceable were kept in place and continued their 

service to the local government. The party cadre would just fill in the 

key member positions in the government that were recently vacated. The 
52

new arrangement allowed the communist party to enact its policies while 

maintaining the technical expertise to institute the new vision. 

The new local apparatus also included the establishment of multiple 

organizations in the towns. Every citizen became a member of at least 

one organization, from the communist party to labor unions. Some locals 

volunteered directly for the Red Army. Many of the volunteers were 

sent on practice missions to collect information to ensure their loyalty 

and reliability.92 Once verified, they would fall in on one of the multiple 

organizations within the Red Army. The Communist Youth organization 

was a feeder unit to the Red Army by training and integrating local 

teenagers and young adults into the Red Army. The Red Guard was a local 

militia group that protected the community, and supplemented the Red 

Army in combat if needed. Guerrilla units or independent regiments were 

paramilitary forces that operated outside their locals areas in support of the 

Red Army. The goal of these organizations was to grow the security teams 

organically at the lowest levels. The local militia, out of self-interest, 

would guard its own village from attack. Those who demonstrated zeal for 

the job would be incorporated into independent guerrilla units and support 

the Red Army. Personnel from these units also entered the Red Army 

and became soldiers. The entire system ensured that the Red Army had 

multiple layers of defense tied into the local community, and supported a 

viable and sustainable military force within the Red Army. 

The last stage in the political mobilization was revenue generation. 

The Red Army did not have any organic industries or trade to rely on 

for revenue, so a large portion of its money came from attacking wealthy 

landowners.93 The main revenue stream came from extorting the wealthy 

locals in the villages. The toppling of landlords and rich peasants was both 

consistent with communist doctrine and also benefited the Red Army’s 

bottom line. It was not surprising that the direct targeting of wealthy elites 

led many locals to believe the Red Army were a group of bandits. A second 

source of revenue for the Red Army came from taxing businesses in the 

cities. This stream was smaller because the Red Army targeted middle to 

large businesses, which were often based in urban areas outside Red Army 

territories. The last and smallest source of income for the Red Army came 

from taxes paid by the local populace.94 Since previous warlords and local 

leaders extorted high taxes from their constituents, the Red Army tried to 

avoid levying taxes on the populace in order to maintain its support in the 

area. 

The proper application of mobile warfare, guerrilla tactics, and 

political mobilization was the key to the success to the Red Army in its 

early phases. Stephen Averill analyzed Mao’s initial tactics in Jingangshan 

and summarized the Red Army’s tactics in five basic steps:

1. Initial lightning attacks on key enemy military forces and county 
53

seats, accompanied by the destruction of official buildings, opening of 

jails and other similar anti-government acts.

2. Appropriation of cash, grain, and other useful property from 

yamens95 and local elites, some of which was kept by the Red Army and 

some distributed to the local populace.

3. Selection of a few local elites as exemplary targets for punishment 

(often execution) at public rallies.

4. Dispersion of Red Army units and CCP cadres into towns and 

villages to proselytize, investigate, and otherwise interact with the local 

population.

5. Re-concentration of forces, accompanied by further rallies 

announcing the formation of Communist-run local governments.96

The Red Army successfully applied these tactics, and variations to 

the core themes, in Jiangxi, Hunan, and Fujian to expand the communist 

revolution and become a serious threat to the KMT legitimacy.

Organization

The Red Army instituted a series of organizational changes to meet 

two needs, establish loyalty and commitment to the Chinese Communist 

Party, and establish a flexible organizational structure that allowed for 

both dispersion of its forces for guerrilla operations and the concentration 

of firepower. Initially, the Red Army applied the Russian and NRA model, 

but changes were needed to adapt to local conditions.97

To increase the political control of the party, Mao instituted a series 

of measures, beginning in Sanwan. The Sanwan reorganization helped to 

establish party rule over the army by establishing party representatives 

and soldier Soviets. The purpose of the political party representatives 

was two-fold. It established equal footing between the army leaders and 

communist party as well equal control of the army units.98 It also gave 

party representatives greater oversight into the issues and concerns of 

the soldiers, especially if it could affect positive change and lower the 

number of desertions and bad behavior. Mao also established soldiers’ 

committee to improve the quality of life and treatment of soldiers in the 

Red Army. Yelling and beating soldiers was commonplace within NRA 

and old warlord army units.99 The democratization was a method to 

reverse decades of poor treatment of soldiers and make the soldiers and 

officer equal.100 Mao believed that the success of the Red Army could be 

attributed to democratization, as the benefits of soldiers committees gave 

Red Army soldiers more courage to be fearless on the battlefield.101 While 

the democratic process could have instilled more courage into soldiers, its 

greater impact within the unit was integrating soldiers into the decisionmaking process. Soldier’s committees empowered them and made them 

part of a team. In turn, they felt more vested in the decisions and operations 
54

of the unit, and led to greater committment on the battlefield. The soldier’s 

committee lasted for only about two years until it began to overshadow the 

control of the party. Mao alluded to some of the growing concerns with 

the committees, using terms such as absolute egalitarianism and extreme 

democratization to describe the errant ways pervading some Red Army 

units.102

The Gutian Conference in December 1929 adopted more initiatives to 

help consolidate military power under party control. Under the resolutions 

adopted at the conference, the Red Army adopted the political commissariat 

system from the Soviet Red Army to place greater control of the army into 

the hands of the political commissar. Beside their special role in political 

training and mobilizing the masses, the political commissars also held 

veto power over military operations, whereas military commanders did 

not have the same power over political operations.103 With this resolution, 

the party seized effective control of the military. Political training was 

still needed to ensure enforcement of this rule. The introduction of 

former KMT forces into the Red Army increased the need for political 

indoctrination. For example, only ten percent of Zhu De’s original force 

were party members.104 Additionally, the Gutian Conference reiterated the 

equality among the soldiers and officers as well as between the military 

and civilians.105 This statement re-emphasized the importance of soldier 

retention, as improvement in quality of life could help decrease desertions, 

especially preventing Red soldiers from joining the NRA. 

Concerns about unity of command and control pushed the Red Army to 

conduct a series of reorganizations of its units. One of the major issues the 

Red Army continued to run into was the uneven distribution of manpower 

across Red Army units. Local area recruitment and casualties all affected 

the personnel numbers in Red Army units, and made assessing, organizing, 

and directing units very difficult. Some companies had less than sixty 

soldiers, others had more than 160.106 In its “Outline of Military Work” 

issued in May 1928, designated the force from the “Chinese Workers and 

Peasant Red Army” to simply the “Red Army.”107 Additionally, it outlined 

a temporary force structure of a 3-5 model. Each squad was made of 

12 soldiers. Three squads made up one platoon, and five platoons were 

assigned to one company. Each battalion had five companies, each regiment 

had five battalions, and finally five regiments were in one division.108 By 

1930, the Red Army had reformatted the organization, and established a 

3-3 reorganization plan.109 Based on a KMT military table of organization, 

the Red Army established the 3-3 model at the company and platoon level. 

Each company had three platoons, with three squads each. Each squad had 

ten soldiers in each unit. At the battalion level and above, there were more 

variations. Battalions varied from three to six companies, and a regiment 

had two to three battalions, with an artillery battery and/or a specialty unit, 

such as engineers, communications, or cavalry.110
55

Training

Mao and Zhu understood the important role of military training for the 

Red Army. The most important purpose of the training was to dismantle 

previous habits and biases and align individual interests with the greater 

good of the party. As discussed previously, the disparate origins of Red 

Army soldiers added personal, institutional, and cultural baggage which 

inhibited the Red Army from becoming an effective fighting force.111

Second, the military training made up for the Red Army’s collective lack 

of experience and knowledge to conduct sustained combat operations. 

While two major groups of soldiers, former NRA soldiers and officers 

and graduates of the Peasant Movement Training Institute, did receive 

some level of formal training, they also received the bulk of casualties in 

the initial fighting. The majority of the Red Army ranks were now filled 

with peasants with little to any combat experience.112 Furthermore, the 

lack of experience at the local Red Guard and guerrilla unit level pushed 

experienced officers away from the front line to lead these units. 

The strategic aim of political and military training was to reduce the 

commitment of Red Army leaders and soldiers to specific Soviet areas. 

By developing a competent and trained local force, the Red Army could 

move outside its borders to expand the regions.113 Additionally, Mao’s 

experience at the Hunan-based Peasant Movement Institute highlighted 

the importance of large-scale military training. The Peasant Movement 

Training Institute’s curriculum was heavily military focused, given that 

the use of force was necessary to overcome local landlords. However, the 

low success rate of the graduates pointed to issues with scale. The number 

of graduates paled in comparison to the number of peasants they had to 

lead, and there were not enough graduates to sustain the efforts of the 

communist movement pre-1927.114

Communist strategy and tactics depended on smalls units and 

disciplined soldiers to properly interact with their leaders and the local 

populace. Given the disparate origins, old military traditions, and 

impoverished upbringing of many soldiers, incidents of theft, assault, and 

property damage were common. Mao and Zhu De took proactive steps 

to increase the discipline of its units by instituting the famous “three 

disciplines and eight points of attention.” Mao initially instituted the three 

disciplines in 1927:115 (1) obey orders in all your actions; (2) don’t take 

anything from the workers and peasants; and (3) when attacking the local 

bullies, turn over [whatever you take from them].116 The eight points of 

attention were initially six when first issued in 1930.117 The points included: 

(1) Put back the doors [you have taken down for bed boards]; (2) put back 

the straw [you have used for bedding]; (3) pay fairly for what you buy; 

(4) return everything you borrow; and (5) pay for anything you damage.118

Mao and Zhu later added two more points of attention: (7) defecate only 

in latrines, and (8) do not steal from captives.119
56

The purpose for these rules was two-fold. The Red Army leadership 

used these disciplines to curb reckless soldier behavior that negatively 

impacted the local populace because the Red Army needed the local 

population to be supportive, not neutral. The Red Army units were 

guests in many villages, often inhabited by both ethnic minority tribes 

and Han settlers. Some soldiers married local women, and became part 

of the community.120 Any offensive behavior jeopardized the army’s 

security, food, recruiting base, and home. Second, the disciplined behavior 

differentiated the Red Army from NRA units, warlord armies, or bandit 

gangs. To prevent local villagers from mistaking the Red Army for another 

gang, Red Army soldiers had to distinguish themselves in both word and 

action. These actions had a strong propaganda effect on both the local 

populace and the NRA. 

Discipline alone did not guarantee success for the Fourth Red Army. 

Military and political training were desperately needed to improve 

effectiveness. The Red Army initially used the NRA and Huangpu Military 

Academy training structure to develop its training methodology. The Red 

Army continued an old NRA training method, known as the “Three drills, 

two talks, and one roll call.”121 The Red Army established training units 

to help develop junior leaders and local cadres. Many of the Red Army’s 

senior leaders were trained at Baoding, Whampoa, and Yuannan military 

schools. Yet at lower levels, the level of military experience was uneven, 

and these training units were one method to cross-level the experience 

across the units to ensure a minimum standard. Mao established the first 

training unit, the Thirty-first Regimental Training Unit, in December 

1927 at Longjiang Academy in Jinggang Mountains.122 Zhu De and Chen 

Yi established a similar unit in January 1928, before their arrival at the 

Jinggang Mountains.123 Initially, military training was quite basic given 

the unit’s lack of experience in conducting military training.124

In June 1928, these units combined to form the Fourth Red Army 

Training Group, and oversaw the training of the Fourth Front Red Army. 

These classes incorporated pedagogical training styles from Huangpu 

Military Academy Shiko Gan Military Academy, and Yunnan Military 

Academy as the basis for its training.125 The arrival of Zhu De’s unit did 

bring more experienced cadre to help in the training efforts of peasants 

and new soldiers.126 During training, Zhu De and Mao Zedong periodically 

gave lectures on specific topics. Commanders from field units were also 

invited to the school to teach courses and lead exercises to ensure the 

curriculum remained relevant.127 The overwhelming majority of students 

were leaders at the company level and below, as well as key cadre 

members of Red Guards at the villages and counties around the Jinggang 

Mountain border areas.128 The first class of 100 students graduated from 

the Fourth Red Army Training Group training in December 1928.129 All 

these measures helped to establish a minimum base of military education 
57

across the Red Army. 

Once in Jiangxi, the Red Army established mobile schools that 

accompanied units to the front lines to continually train its forces. While 

the Jiangxi Soviet remained under continuous threat of attack, the increased 

stability of the new location allowed for the expansion of training for the 

Red Army. The expansion of Red Army forces and increased casualty rate 

created a larger demand a more robust training regimen.130 The pressures 

from the KMT extermination campaigns also made it almost impossible 

to create a normal education system. The Red Army responded to the 

requirement by establishing accompanying military schools.131 On the 

foundation of the training units, the accompaniment schools were created 

to teach a curriculum and program designed for specific military units. In 

June 1929, the Fourth Red Army established its first accompanying military 

school in Changning.132 These schools were unique in two regards. First, 

the schools were not in a fixed location. As the name suggests, the schools 

moved with the unit as they travelled across the area. Second, the teachers’ 

unit maintained a combat role as well and fought as a unit. The Red Army 

still required all its personnel to fight when needed, and the school was no 

exception. The accompaniment school’s curriculum length ranged from 

three months to a year.133 The focus of training remained at the lowest 

levels, with training tasks focused on basic guerrilla tasks. 

While schools were important, for many soldiers the only way to learn 

was from doing. Sometimes conditions did not allow for the training, and 

the students were thrust into combat immediately. Mao stated “to learn 

warfare through warfare—this is our chief method.”134 While Mao touted 

the efficacy of learning by doing, in reality, Red Army soldiers did not 

have a choice.135

The biggest contributor to the practice of learning by doing was the 

adoption of specific measures to complement the process. To simply 

assume that the success of learning by doing through a Darwinian method 

of improvement would be folly. The practice was actually complemented 

by a strong after-action review program. Zhu De is cited for specifically 

importing the practice of after-action reviews.136 After battles, the leadership 

conducted meetings and led discussions on areas of improvement for the 

battle.137 If meetings couldn’t be conducted, the leadership wrote reports 

analyzing the battles and identifying key areas for improvement. This 

self-critical examination helped to modify behavior and improve the 

model of learning by doing. The learning by doing also was directed at 

ensuring the peasant soldier remained engaged in the process. Many of 

these new recruits and junior leaders never received formal education, and 

much of the classes and training were boring. To make sure that classes 

remained interesting, practical exercises were used to maintain interest.138

Lastly, learning by doing melded theory with practice. Instead of simple 

lecture programs, the instructors would incorporate practical exercises 
58

to apply the theory in areas. This tradition had its roots in the Hunan 

Peasant Movement Institute, where practical exercises were conducted 

as well. Practical exercises were in actuality real missions supervised by 

instructors. Students went into villages and organized the local populace 

during exercises to gain a better understanding of how operations were 

conducted.139

Political indoctrination was also a critical part of the training program 

as it helped to increase the education, loyalty, and effectiveness of new 

soldiers. At Sanwan, one of the key initiatives was the establishment of 

political training as part of party control of the army.140 Political training’s 

main function was indoctrination. It allowed members of the Red Army 

to coalesce around a common mission, language, doctrine, and tradition. 

The training also attempted to separate the soldiers from the cultures 

and traditions the army deemed harmful, such as “warlordism, extreme 

democratization, egalitarianism, militarism, individualism, etc.”141 These 

pejorative labels were part of the Red Army’s narrative to limit activities 

associated with divergent traditions. The initial political training curriculum 

covered a range of topics, to include the nature of revolution, principles 

of Marxist-Leninist ideology, roles and responsibilities of a people’s army, 

and social and economic surveys of local areas.142

In terms of political training, the Red Army began to adapt its 

pedagogical methods for political training in order to mass its effects on the 

peasants. Expansion of the military, Soviet territory, coupled with casualties 

from combat, made political training a constant activity to indoctrinate and 

train members of the Red Army. By 1929, the Red Army had established 

seven pedagogical methods to conduct political training: (1) large lectures; 

(2) formal class instruction; (3) informal instruction during formations; 

(4) after-action reviews; (5) literacy classes; (6) mass rallies; (7) soldier 

committees; (8) publication of propaganda periodicals.143 Similar to 

military training, one key pedagogical method was the use of positive 

and negative feedback to correct behavior. Whether in lectures, class 

instruction, or in formation, Red Army leaders used praise to demonstrate 

to their soldiers “correct” behavior. They criticized mistakes made by 

soldiers to identify prohibited activities.144 More subliminal propaganda 

was also used to change political behavior. Initial literacy workbooks for 

soldiers were heavily laced with communist propaganda, emphasizing the 

exploitation of workers and class struggles.145 Slogans, cadences, songs, 

and poems during this period were also filled with propaganda to help 

indoctrinate new recruits and locals into loyalty with the party. 

Conclusion

By the beginning of 1930, the Fourth Red Army had expanded its 

territory from Jinggangshan to Jiangxi, Fujian, and Hunan. An additional 

seven other Soviets scattered across the Chinese interior and demonstrated 

the viability of the CCP. The success of the Red Army was attributed to 
59

the leadership’s ability to adapt communist policies to local conditions. 

Mao and Zhu also created new policies and training programs to develop 

a military force capable of defeating the enemy. Interwoven in all these 

factors was the instinct to survive.146 While the Red Army had established 

a strong base in Jiangxi Soviet, there still were many problems within the 

unit. Mao addressed many of these different ailments, such as militarism, 

extreme democratization, adventurism, and subjectivism in his comments 

at the Gutian Conference. These labels carried both a pejorative meaning 

as well as links to certain political factions and members. While the labels 

were definitely used to gain public support against a certain movement or 

faction, stripping away the political propaganda did not change the core 

issues affecting the Red Army. Issues with desertion, toxic leadership, 

insubordination, failure to follow orders, incompetence, lax enforcement 

of standards, lack of motivation to conduct political operations, abuse of 

power, and uneducated soldiers still remained in the army. The Red Army 

initiated greater political training programs to weed out these problems, 

but they would persist for a long time. Continued conflicts within the party 

would test the Red Army’s ability to adapt while in contact. 
60

Notes

1. For more information on Borodin and his role as a COMINTERN 

Representative, see Daniel N. Jacobs, Borodin: Stalin’s Man in China (Cambridge: 

Harvard University Press, 1981).

2. On March 18, 1926, an NRA naval gunboat, Zhongshan, was anchored 

off the coast of the Whampoa. Nationalist historiography contended that the boat 

captain, a communist party member, was part of a larger conspiracy to kidnap 

Chiang Kai-shek. Communist historiography argued that Chiang and the KMT 

manufactured the claim to attack the Communists and declare martial law. As a 

result of the incident, Chiang instituted punitive measures against the CCP. The 

KMT demanded a list of all CCP members in the KMT and all CCP members 

in top ministry positions were removed. For a balanced account on the incident, 

see Hans J. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945 (New York: 

RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 101-104.

3. For more information on the Northern Expedition, see Donald Jordan, 

The Northern Expedition: China’s Revolution of 1926-1928 (Honolulu: University 

Press of Hawaii, 1976).

4. The NRA was also supported by the Green Gang, a secret society with 

connections to local businessmen who saw the labor strikes as detrimental to 

their business interests. The Shanghai massacre began a general purge of the 

KMT enemies, with between 3,000 to 4,000 CCP members killed; 25,000 people 

were also imprisoned during this time. See Hans J. van De Ven, From Friend to 

Comrade: The founding of the Chinese Communist Party (Berkeley: University 

of California Press, 1991), 193.

5. Within the KMT party, there were marked differences between the 

factions. It was a disparate polity of union leaders, communists, former warlords, 

secret society members, foreign sympathizers, and wealthy entrepreneurs, all 

who created a cacophony of conflicting, separate interests. Unity of effort was 

elusive for the KMT, and many of its decisions were reached through realpolitik 

negotiations among its interest groups. John Schrecker, The Chinese Revolution 

in Historical Perspective (Westport: Praeger Press, 1991), 159.

6. Pengfeng Chi, “The Chinese Army and the Kiangsi Soviet” (Ph.D 

dissertation, George Washington University, 1977), 22.

7. Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question

(Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2003), 249.

8. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, 249.

9. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, 249.

10. John P. Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese 

Communist Party, 1927-72 (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1972), 121.

11. For more information on the Nanchang Uprising, refer to C. Martin 

Wilbur, “The Ashes of Defeat,” The China Quarterly 18 (1964): 3-54; Jacques 

Guillermaz, “The Nanchang Uprising,” The China Quarterly 11 (1964): 161-168. 

Bruce Elleman, Moscow and the Emergence of the Communist Power in China: 

1925-30 (New York: Routledge, 2009), also provides a different perspective on 
61

the Nanchang Uprisings by examining the intraparty struggles in Moscow and its 

effect on the Nanchang Uprising.

12. Mao spent a year observing the revolts, and sent back an extensive 

report that was received with little fanfare. In the “Report of an investigation 

into the Peasant Movement in Hunan,” he argued that the conditions of the 

peasant movement were of such magnitude that they could change the face of the 

communist revolution. Furthermore, the character of the Chinese revolution was, 

contrary to Soviet ideology, instinctively peasant-based. Mao Tse-Tung. Selected 

Works, Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), 21-62. 

13. William Whitson, The Chinese High Command: a History of Communist 

Military Politics, 1927-71 (Westport: Praeger Press, 1973), 28.

14. Mao’s main contentions were two-fold. First, he believed the loyalty and 

quality of his peasant recruiting base was insufficient, and his force should be 

augmented by two military regiments. Second, he disagreed with the continued 

partnership with the KMT, which was in name only, and pushed for the rebellion 

to be led under an independent communist banner. John Rue, Mao Tse-tung in 

Opposition: 1927-1935 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), 75.

15. For more information on the Autumn Harvest Uprising, see Roy 

Hofhejnz, “The Autumn Harvest Insurrection,” The China Quarterly 32 (1967): 

37-87.

16. Supposedly, Mao bribed his Nationalist captors, who were unaware of 

his identity, to release him. He successfully escaped and evaded capture by hiding 

in small villages until he made it back to Sanwan.

17. For more information on the Guangzhou Commune Uprising, see Arif 

Dirlik, “Narrativizing Revolution,” Modern China 23, No. 4 (1997): 363-397; 

Hsiao Tso-Liang, “Chinese Communism and the Canton Soviet of 1927,” The 

China Quarterly 30 (1967): 49-78.

18. John Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985 (New York: 

Harper and Row Publishers, 1987), 232.

19. Chong Kun Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet 

Republic” (Ph.D dissertation, The American University, 1968), 44.

20. Jun shi li shi yan jiu bu. Zhongguo ren min jie fang jun de qi shi nian

[Seventy Years of the PLA] (Beijing: Jun shi ke xue chu ban she, 1987), 49. 

Hereafter cited as Seventy Years of the PLA.

21. The regiment was made of two battalions, three companies, and one 

Specialty Company. The regiment also maintained one training unit and one 

medical unit. Zhongguo ren min ge ming jun shi bo wu guan, Zhongguo zhan 

zheng fa zhan shi [History of the Development of War in China] (Beijing: Ren 

min chu ban she, 2003), 831. Hereafter cited as History of the Development of War 

in China.

22. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 133.

23. Stephen Averill, Revolution in the Highlands: China’s Jinggangshan 

Base Area (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 158.

24. The choice of Jinggang mountain as a communist base area was under 
62

some debate. Most Chinese official histories argue that Jinggangshan was a 

predestined spot for the communists. See Seventy Years of the PLA, 30. Averill 

argued that the Red Army’s occupation of Jinggangshan was never guaranteed; 

rather, it started as a temporary position that developed over time, Averill, 

Revolution in the Highlands, 156.

25. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1.

26. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 156.

27. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 73.

28. Yuan Wencai actually entered the Communist Party in 1926. He was 

considered the more educated and wiser of the two, given his better understanding 

of the communist movement. His group of poor peasants considered themselves 

a local defense force for the area. Wang Cuo on the other hand, was a tailor by 

trade. Considered illiterate and self-indulgent, he often followed Yang’s lead on 

decision. Peter Short, Mao: A Life (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1999), 212-

213. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 163.

29. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 170.

30. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 171.

31. Andrew J. Nathan, “A Constitutional Republic: the Peking Government,” 

in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, Republican China 1912-1949, Part 

1, John K. Fairbank, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 262.

32. John K. Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Cambridge: 

Harvard University Press, 1998), 301.

33. Averrill, Revolution in the Highlands, 190.

34. Zhou Lu’s visit added much conflict to the area. He believed the Red 

Army was in violation of CCP policies by instituting a tolerant and humane 

treatment of landlords and rich peasants in the area, at the time considered a 

“rightist” stance. He also informed Mao and his partners that his membership in 

the party had been revoked due to the failures of the Autumn Harvest Uprising. 

Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 191. 

35. The KMT government found out that Zhu De’s forces were hiding with 

Fan, and they ordered Fan to arrest him. Fan wrote a letter to Zhu De and told him 

to rebel against his forces so they could escape. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 

87. 

36. Averill also believed the strength of the enemy force would have 

overwhelmed the Communist forces, even with the addition of Mao’s units. 

Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 192-195.

37. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 192-194.

38. The movement of the Red Army up the mountainside was slowed by 

both the difficult terrain and the low morale of many of the Hunan peasants units 

raised for the uprising. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 194. 

39. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 93.

40. Agnes Smedley, The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh (New 
63

York: Monthly Review Press, 1956), 229.

41. Many of the Hunanese peasants experienced homesickness while at 

Jinggangshan. Their fighting abilities were also suspect, given their inexperience 

in combat and recent introduction to communist ideology. The lack of logistical 

support for the enlarged group of the combined Zhu-Mao forces in Jingangshan 

did not improve the situation either. In late May into early June 1928, the majority 

of the peasants migrated back home. Those remained were part of a levied forces 

led by Hu Shaohai, and were a cohesive, well-trained unit. Averill, Revolution in 

the Highlands, 196-199. 

42. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands,, 197.

43. Smedley, The Great Road, 229.

44. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 199-200; History of the Development 

of War in China, 840.

45. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 200-201; History of the Development 

of War in China, 840.

46. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 201-202; History of the Development 

of War in China, 840.

47. History of the Development of War in China, 841.

48. Averill, Revolutions in Highlands, 273-274; History of Development of 

War in China, 841.

49. The Twenty-ninth Regiment was made up of members of the Hunan 

Uprising. The soldiers had recently become more dissatisfied with the revolution, 

especially given their combat fatigue and poor living conditions. Many soldiers 

missed home, and the operation to Hunan was a welcomed respite. Averill 

cited some sources that argued some leaders in the Twenty-ninth Regiment 

the deliberately conducted the Chenzhou operation to get back home. Averill, 

Revolutions in Highlands, 276-278.

50. Averill, Revolutions in Highlands, 277.

51. Averill, Revolutions in Highlands, 276-278; History of Development of 

War in China, 841.

52. History of Development of War in China, 841.

53. Averill, Revolutions in Highlands, 280-288.

54. Averill, Revolutions in Highlands, 308.

55. For more information about Peng Dehuai’s journey to Jinggang Mountains, 

see Peng Dehuai, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: The Autobiographical Notes of 

Peng Dehuai (1898-1974) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984).

56. Averill, Revolutions in Highlands, 320-324; History of Development of 

War in China, 842.

57. Averill discusses some of the issues with the plan, including the 

frustrations within both armies. The Fourth Red Army leadership was not happy 

about abandoning their base, especially Thirty-second Regiment soldiers, who 

were from the area. The Fifth Red Army soldiers felt as if they were being left 
64

to slaughter in a new and unfamiliar territory. The Fourth Red Army transferred 

some key personnel to the Fifth Army, effectively ending the dissension. Averill, 

Revolutions in Highlands, 323-324.

58. History of Development of War in China, 842-843; Yoon, 74-75.

59. There is some differences in the number of soldiers identified as being 

transferred to the unit. Yoon stated 3,000 troops were transferred. See Yoon, “Mao, 

The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 76. Another study quoted 2,000 

soldiers. See History of Development of War in China, 342. Chi identified a total 

of 3,000 soldiers: 1,000 from the defeated unit, and 2,000 peasants organized into 

Red Guard units. Pingfeng Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet” 

(Ph.D dissertation, George Washington University, 1977), 48. 

60. History of Development of War in China, 843.

61. Stuart Schram, ed. Mao’s Road to Power, (4 volumes, Armonk, NY: M.E. 

Sharpe, 1992), Vol. 3, 153-161.

62. The Red Army’s tactics and strategies will be discussed more in depth 

later in the chapter.

63. “Adventurism” was a pejorative term used by the Chinese Communists to 

describe operations and/or activities deemed to be impulsive, risky, or outside the 

scope of the operation. See Snow, Inside Red China, 168. Kwok-sing Li defined 

the Chinese Communist use of “opportunism” in two forms, “right opportunism” 

and “left opportunism.” Right opportunism did not acknowledge changes in 

society that went counter to their position, and instead attempted to return or 

maintain society in its original state. Left opportunism also did not acknowledge 

the objective situation, and instead pursued “fantasy and rash actions.” See Kwoksing Li, comp., Glossary of Political Terms of the People’s Republic of China, 

trans. Mary Lok (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005), 181.

64. History of Development of War in China, 833.

65. History of Development of War in China, 833.

66. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 105-115.

67. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 179-180.

68. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 145.

69. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 217.

70. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 307-311.

71. Seventy years of the PLA, 49.

72. Seventy years of the PLA, 45.

73. Most of the funds went to pay the soldiers’ small stipends, and to 

purchase items and equipment unavailable in the local area. Zhong yang jun shi 

tong xun, [Central Military Report], Vol. 1, (Chinese Communist Party Central 

Military Committee, January 15, 1930), 39. Hereafter cited as ZYJSTX.

74. Seventy years of the PLA, 45.

75. Seventy years of the PLA, 38.
65

76. Saich, The Rise to Power, 362.

77. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 317.

78. ZYJSTX, 38.

79. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 124.

80. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 124.

81. Seventy Years of the PLA, 41-42.

82. Schram, Mao’s Road to Power, Vol. 3, 154.

83. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 29.

84. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 124.

85. ZYJSTX, 38. 

86. ZYJSTX. Normally, the Red Army chose between a short mobilization 

timeline, between five to seven days, and a more protracted mobilization timeline, 

ten days to one month period.

87. ZYJSTX. These assessment areas can be traced back to similar assessments 

taught at the Peasant Movement Training Institute, in which Mao Zedong was 

principal in 1926. See Jane L. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars

(Boulder: Westview Press, 1976), 80. Mao’s “Report on an investigation into the 

peasant movement in Hunan,” is a good example of assessments at that time. See 

Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 21-62.

88. ZYJSTX, 38.

89. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 125.

90. ZYJSTX, 38.

91. Averill, Revolution in the Highlands, 158

92. ZYJSTX, 38.

93. ZYJSTX, 39.

94. ZYJSTX, 39.

95. Yamen is Chinese for a local bureaucrat.

96. Averill, The Revolution in the Highlands, 170.

97. ZYJSTX, 26. 

98. Seventy Years of the PLA, 49-50.

99. For more information on the poor treatment of soldiers in warlord units, 

see Diana Lary, Warlord Soldiers, 49-58.

100. Seventy Years of the PLA, 50.

101. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 82.

102. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 108-111. A resolution from the Gutian 

conference ended soldier’s committees. They were replaced by Lenin clubs, 

which focused more on entertainment and soldier welfare issues, than any political 

indoctrination or training.
66

103. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 185.

104. Averill, The Revolution in the Highlands, 205.

105. Xue, Lianbi, and Zhenhua Zhang, eds. Zhongguo jun shi jiao yu shi 

[History of Military Education in China] (Beijing: Guo fang da xue chu ban she, 

1991), 273. Hereafter cited as Chinese Military Education History.

106. ZYJSTX, 26-27.

107. The four major tasks included: (1) establish a Political Department at 

the regimental level, and a Political branch at the company level; (2) the local 

Soviet government should establish a Political commissar within the military 

units, (3) focus especially on political work; and (4) base military organizational 

structure on military tasks and weapons available. Seventy Years of the PLA, 40.

108. The companies were further designated as musket companies, rifle 

companies, and pike companies. The regiment also had scouts, transportation, 

medical, and special units in the formation. Other special units were specific to 

each regiment. History of the Development of War in China, 829. 

109. Given the difficulty in communications between the Central Committee 

and Front committees, the author cannot confirm if the May 1928 reorganization 

order actually was executed. The information for the 3-3 model comes from a 

Central Military Committee publication in 1930, which does not specifically 

address the 3-5 model. It simply stated that the Red Army based its organization 

off the old NRA model of 3-3. ZYJSTX, 26-27.

110. ZYJSTX, 26-27.

111. Yuan Wei and Zhuo Zhang, eds., Zhongguo jun xiao fa zhan shi [History 

of the Development of Military Schools in China] (Beijing: Guo fang da xue chu 

ban she, 2001), 322. Hereafter cited as Chinese Military School History. Chinese 

Military Education History, 271.

112. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 79-80.

113. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 69.

114. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars, 73-85.

115. There is some conflict on the origin of the three disciplines. Seventy 

Years of the PLA author argued that the disciplines originated after some soldiers 

ate some sweet potatoes they were supposed to help the local Sanwan village 

residents pick. Seventy Years of the PLA, 53. Stephen Averill argued the disciplines 

originated when the Red Army retreated after a defeat. Averill, The Revolution in 

the Highlands, 163.

116. Schram, Mao’s Road to Power, Vol 3, 283.

117. The six points were initially published by Mao in April 1928. Seventy 

Years of the PLA’s author cites the National Red Army Representative Congress 

in May 1930 as the issue date of the Three Rules of Discipline and Six Points 

of Attention. Seventy years of the PLA, 53. Schram cited the issue order date of 

March 21, 1930, in Schram, Mao’s Road to Power Vol 3, 283.

118. Schram, Mao’s Road to Power, Vol 3. 283.
67

119. There is some confusion over one of the points of attention. Schram 

initially cited that the seventh, “Don’t bathe within sight of women,” or eighth 

point of attention was replaced by “do not steal from captives” in 1930. See 

Schram, Mao’s Road to Power, Vol 3, 283. Seventy Years of the PLA’s author cited 

that the original seventh point, “Don’t bathe within sight of women,” was used in 

1931 with local militia training. See Seventy Years of the PLA, 53.

120. Mao married a villager from Jinggangshan, which helped to him to 

improve local relations with the Red Army. Averill, The Revolution in the 

Highlands, 179-181.

121. Every morning, afternoon, and evening, Red Army units would 

conduct drills, which included running, marching, and turning movements. In the 

morning and evening, classes would be given by the leadership, often the political 

representative, on a range of different topics. At night, there would be one final 

roll call, which the leadership reviewed key events from the day and reiterate 

some training points. Chinese Military School History, 323, ZYJSTX, 32.

122. The unit was also known as the Officer training unit. Instructors had 

been trained at Huangpu Military Academy or worked at the Central Military 

Political School, Wuhan Branch. The unit at its height had 150 personnel, manned 

by the standard accompaniment of military instructors, administrators, mess 

officers, quartermasters, and orderlies. The unit was broken down into a political 

team and military team. Each team had two sections, teaching three classes each. 

Chinese Military School History, 322-323.

123. Chinese Military School History, 323.

124. Initial training focused on military movement and positions, such as 

attention, parade rest, and marching in step. Chinese Military School History, 324. 

125. Chinese Military School History, 325.

126. Averill, The Revolution in the Highlands, 197.

127. Chinese Military School History, 325

128. Averill, The Revolution in the Highlands, 215. Chinese Military School 

History, 325.

129. Chinese Military School History, 326.

130. Chinese Military School History, 326.

131. The name for the military school translates literally to “school that 

accompanying a base (suiying xue xiao).” 

132. Chinese Military School History, 328

133. Other tasks included deployment of forces, entrance, expansion, 

reconnaissance, camouflage, ambush, feints, pursuit, positional attack, positional 

defense, movement to contact, retreat, night operations, avoiding strengths to 

attack the weak, and sieges. See Chinese Military Education History, 274. 

134. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 186.

135. ZYJSTX, 35.

136. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 52.
68

137. ZYJTSTX, 32; Chinese Military Education History, 273-274.

138. ZYJSTX, 32; Chinese Military Education History, 274.

139. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars, 79.

140. Chinese Military Education History, 271.

141. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 105-116; Chinese Military Education 

History, 271-272.

142. Chinese Military School History, 323.

143. Chinese Military Education History, 273.

144. Chinese Military Education History, 273.

145. Shi bing ren zi ke ben [Soldier’s Character Reader], Mar 1931, SSC, 

Reel 8:72.

146. Averill, The Revolution in the Highlands, 208.
69

Chapter 4

Li Lisan Line and First Three Extermination Campaigns 

(1930-1931)

As the Chinese Red Army settled into its new surroundings, its focus 

switched to expansion. Its success in Jinggang Mountains and Jiangxi 

Soviet led the Central Committee of the CCP, located in Shanghai, to make 

an inflated assessment of the Red Army’s abilities. In 1930, the Red Army 

incited a series of urban insurrections in Nanchang and Changsha that 

resulted in serious casualties for its units, and ultimately failed to expand 

the communist revolution. Li Lisan, then the CCP party chief and architect 

of the insurrection plan, took the fall for the disaster. While the Central 

Committee reorganized the leadership, the Red Army in Jiangxi Soviet 

took advantage of the independence and lack of supervision to conduct 

its own operations. During the first three Extermination Campaigns, the 

Red Army was still unable to directly engage the NRA in conventional 

warfare due to the NRA’s superior numbers and equipment. Instead, the 

Red Army adopted a mobile defense strategy, aptly named “lure the enemy 

in deep,” to take advantage of its mobility, knowledge of terrain, and local 

support. Guerrilla operations and political mobilization were combat 

multipliers during these three campaigns, as militias and local citizens 

provided intelligence, logistical, and medical support to the main fighting 

forces. Political propaganda also helped to turn some officers and soldiers 

within the NRA forces towards the communist side. The Red Army also 

expanded its training efforts to improve leaders’ and units’ proficiency 

in combat by establishing the Red Army Academy and institutionalizing 

military training within the political indoctrination program. 

Li-Lisan Line

Ideological Underpinnings of Li Lisan Plan

In spite of continued attacks by provincial and NRA forces, the 

communist movement flourished relatively well in the countryside. The 

same assessment could not be made in the urban areas. After the failed 

uprisings in 1927, support for the urban insurrection as the center of the 

revolution was fragmented. In addition, the KMT implemented an anticommunist campaign inside the cities, repressing communist activities and 

driving the movement underground. Additionally, the urban labor unions 

were not very receptive to the communist propaganda. For many of the 

labor unions and urban workers, their focus was on economic initiatives 

rather than political changes.1

 The lack of excitement for the communist 

movement is evident in the party demographics. In 1928, peasants made 

up three-fourths of the Communist Party membership. One statistic stated 

the Shanghai labor union members had dropped from 3,000 to 700 by 

1930.2

In the face of the dreary numbers, the CCP continued to look at the urban 
70

centers as the key to the communist revolution. One of the major reasons 

was philosophical. The Central Committee maintained an unwavering 

belief that the proletariat should carry out urban insurrections as the means 

to incite the revolution.3

 As the head of the CCP Propaganda Department, Li 

Lisan was one of the biggest proponents for the urban insurrection model. 

Since his return from France in 1928, Li Lisan pushed for reestablishment 

of the proletariat as the center of the communist movement, stating “the 

peasantry is petty bourgeois and cannot have correct ideas regarding 

socialism.” He went further to say, “Only a proletarian mentality can lead 

us onto the correct revolutionary road.”4

 Li also maintained a different 

point of view on the education of the proletarian leadership. He took a 

more traditional approach, believing that the proletarian spirit solely came 

from the urban areas, whereas Mao believed through political education, 

the peasants could gain the spirit even though they were separated from 

the cities.5

For Li Lisan, the push for the revolution was also a political power 

move to reestablish central control over the Red Army. He openly pushed 

for the attack and occupation of large cities, rather than the expansion 

and building of rural Soviets.6

 However, his attempts at reinvigorating the 

labor movement in the urban centers did not seem to catch on. Recruitment 

and communist activities within the cities were still weak. His faith in 

the urban movement initially faltered. In a pessimistic letter to Mao in 

February 1929, Li lamented the absence of any revolutionary fervor in the 

cities and felt the revolution’s future was in doubt.7

At the same time, a strong push from the COMINTERN in the middle 

of 1929 helped to reinvigorate the CCP and Li Lisan. The COMINTERN 

continued to stress the urban proletariat as the central theme in the 

communist revolution. In 1929, Stalin believed the communist revolution 

in China was on the rise, citing the economic depression in the United States 

after the market crash in 1929 as evidence.8

 The COMINTERN began 

publishing a series of guidances and measures in February and June 1929 

that gradually reemphasized the urban insurrection line.9

 In September 

1929, the COMINTERN made a specific push for the communists to 

leverage labor unions as means to deliver the revolution to the masses. 

In October, the COMINTERN estimate reached a crescendo, believing 

the revolutionary upsurge had finally started.10 Yet, the COMINTERN 

remained vague on the exact time period for the revolution to begin, and 

subsequent guidance would be more confusing and unclear. Some argue the 

vague and inconsistent guidance left the COMINTERN with a convenient 

escape if the revolution failed.11 Even with all the ambiguity, the CCP took 

the COMINTERN guidance at face value and began preparations to start 

the revolution.

During this time, the Red Army continued to increase in size and 

strength and became the only force able to lead the urban insurrections. The 
71

uninspired showing from the urban labor movements pushed Li Lisan to 

rely more heavily on the Red Army.12 Li planned to gain control of the Red 

Army by establishing central party control over the Army, while dividing 

the forces away from its leaders. In April 1930, the Central Committee 

issued two resolutions for the creation of a General Front Committee to 

lead the urban insurrection effort. The General Front Committee became 

responsible for arming all the peasants, organizing them into Red Army 

units, and deploying them to the urban cities.13 Li also requested Mao and 

Zhu De to come to Shanghai in an attempt to separate them from their 

troops and keep them in the city.14 While Mao and Zhu De never actually 

made it up to Shanghai, the introduction of the General Front Committee 

was the first step in establishing central party control over the Red Army. 

By the beginning of 1930, the CCP overcame any awkwardness after the 

raid on Soviet Union consulates15 and began promoting the COMINTERN’s 

October directive, stating that the rise in the revolutionary tide in China had 

begun. The party reaffirmed that the conditions were “ripe,” though the CCP 

also acknowledged the weakness of the current labor movement, stating 

that the laborers’ “timidity,” party members’ “contempt for the masses,” 

and “negligence” toward organizing the masses were the reasons for the 

poor showing.16 In February 1930, the Conference of Delegates from the 

Soviet Areas convened to “secure the leading role of the proletariat” with 

the urban worker “taking over leadership of the peasant insurrections.”17

The conference also repudiated Mao’s strategy of encircling the cities in 

favor of urban insurrections. The Central Committee directive chastised 

Mao and Zhu De’s forces as still having a “hide-and-disperse view,” and 

pushed for the Red Army to “concentrate and attack.”18

Urban Insurrection Plan

The Li Lisan plan was a counter to Mao’s strategy. Mao promoted a 

slow expansion, focused on land distribution and establishing Soviets, 

rather than any quest for “adventurism” by attacking Changsha.19 Mao 

also pushed for the slow bottom-up expansion of the Red Army, starting 

at the local village militias, then moving to county Red Guard, then 

to local Red Army forces, and finally to main Red Army units.20 Li 

disagreed with Mao’s notion. In his initial guidance to the Red Army for 

the attack, Li criticized Mao’s plan to create independent Soviets along 

the borders areas as erroneous and defeatist.21 He also placed excessive 

focus on concentrating weapons in Red Army units, rather than dividing 

them equally with local militias, which led to a decrease in the combat 

effectiveness of the Red Guard and guerrilla units.22 Lastly, Li complained 

that Mao’s strategy was too slow, stating that “by such tactics our hair will 

be white before the revolution is victorious.”23

Specific planning for the urban insurrection began in early 1930. The 

CCP understood that the revolutionary tide around China was not equal. 

Consequently, the focus was on one or two key provinces and areas to ignite 
72

the revolution. The Red Army planned to conduct a series of insurrections 

in Nanchang and Changsha, with the main target the city of Wuhan.24 The 

communists believed that if Wuhan fell, the revolution could then spread 

to Shanghai, and set off a worldwide chain of revolutionary events.25

Success in the uprisings was based on two key assumptions. The first 

assumption was that the revolutionary fervor was at a necessary level. 

However, looking at the communist demographic data during this period, 

the validity of this assumption was strongly questionable. From 1926 to 

1930, the working class membership in the CCP dropped from 66 percent 

to 8 percent.26 Failure to question this assumption would cause many 

casualties in the future. The second major assumption was that the Red 

Army was capable and ready to arouse an urban insurrection. The Red 

Army had survived the past two years and grown in size. Yet, it still lacked 

the equipment, training, and personnel needed to conduct such an urban 

operation. 

Recent scholarship has shown that the gap between Mao and Li 

Lisan’s thinking was less than Mao later portrayed it to be. From Mao’s 

historiographical perspective, he was against the rule from the start. In 

1938, Mao attacked Li Lisan’s line as being “unaware of the protracted 

nature of the Chinese civil war...consequently, in an attempt to achieve 

a quick nation-wide victory for the revolution, ordered an attack on 

Wuhan...thus committed the error of ‘Left’ opportunism.”27 Additionally, 

the Red Army’s leadership reception was tepid. Zhu De was cautious 

about implementing Li Lisan’s plan, because he understood the strength 

of the KMT and did not want to have his forces destroyed.28 Yet, there 

is evidence that Mao and Zhu De were less skeptical and more willing 

to follow the Li Lisan line. In his letter to Lin Piao, Mao agreed that the 

“proletarian leadership is the sole key to victory of the revolution.”29 He 

later stated: 

At the same time, the development of struggles in the 

countryside, the establishment of the Red political power 

in small areas, and the creation and expansion of the Red 

Army, are in particular the main conditions for helping 

the struggle in the cities at accelerating the revolutionary 

upsurge. It is therefore a mistake to abandon the struggle 

in the cities, and in our opinion it is also a mistake for any 

of party members to fear the development of the peasants 

lest it become strong than that of the workers and hence 

detrimental to the revolution. For the revolution in semicolonial China will fail only if the peasant struggle is 

deprived of the leadership of the workers, and it will never 

suffer just because the peasant, through their struggle, 

become more powerful than the workers. 30 
73

Additionally, Zhu De still understood that his inexperience may cloud 

his judgment, adding, “We had been isolated in the interior for years and 

such information as we had about the national and international situation 

was incomplete.”31

Even with their misgivings, Zhu De and Mao’s apprehensions were in 

the minority, and on June 22, they issued the orders to conduct the attack.32

Before leaving, as a symbol of solidarity to the Party and the mission, the 

entire Red army took an oath of allegiance, known as the Li Li-san oath.33

Execution of the Plan

With full support for the urban insurrection, the Red Army deployed the 

newly designated First Red Army Corps, formerly the Fourth Red Army, 

to attack Nanchang, and the Third Red Army Corps, known before as Peng 

Dehuai’s Fifth Red Army, to attack Changsha.34 Against Li Lisan’s wishes, 

Mao left three army units back at the Jiangxi Soviet to protect the local 

area.35

The Third Red Army Corps was the first to attack, seizing Changsha on 

July 29, 1930. Upon arrival, Peng Dehuai established a Soviet government, 

with Li Lisan as chairman, in absentia.36 The arrival of the Red Army, 

however, did not illicit an urban uprising. Most of locals came outside 

out of curiosity, rather than to support any insurrection. The next day, 

British, American, Italian, and Japanese navy ships sailed up the Xiang 

River to protect the foreign concession areas and their investment.37 The 

naval bombardment coupled with the lack of any urban support forced 

Peng’s forces to retreat from the city on August 3, taking with them money 

and supplies collected during their operations.38 The NRA subsequently 

occupied the city, and began a systematic purging of all the communist 

sympathizers left behind. 

The First Red Army Corps did not fare any better. Zhu De and Mao’s 

forces were to attack Nanchang, but initially sent in only reconnaissance 

forces only into the city on August 1.39 The Red Army made little of any 

progress in the area, determined the mission was untenable, and moved 

to Liuyang, Hunan Province. At Liuyang, the First and Third Red Armies 

consolidated forces into the First Front Red Army, and discussed their 

next move. At this time, support for the urban line was waning. The 

assessment of the situation in Changsha and Wuhan was also grim. KMT 

forces had reinforced the cities, with the NRA setting up a defense in depth 

and obstacles in Changsha. Foreign naval ships were stationed along the 

Yangtze River to provide indirect fire support for an even larger force in 

Wuhan. Zhu De did not believe the Red Army was in a position to conduct 

“positional warfare” against these defenses. 40 Despite Mao and Zhu’s 

opposition, the First Front Red Army proceeded back to Changsha and 

participated in the second attack on September 1, 1930.

The second attack on Changsha was a failure. Against a better-equipped 
74

enemy in strong defensive positions, the Red Army was no match against 

the NRA. Within ten days of fighting and in the face of mounting losses, 

Zhu De and Mao Zedong made a bold decision. Mao gave the withdrawal 

order on September 13, stating that the Li Lisan plan was incorrect, and 

there needed to be a change of plan. A deep divide broke through the army, 

with many of the political commissars objecting to the decision. However, 

the soldiers obeyed orders and the Red Army conducted an orderly 

withdrawal. There was a huge division within the ranks, with a sizeable 

minority, labeled as Li Lisanist or left leaning commissars, calling for a 

another attack on Nanchang. Mao and Zhu De did not believe one was 

feasible, especially against a stronger, fortified NRA force. Instead, Mao 

produced a temporary compromise that won the support of the minority. 

While the reattack of Nanchang was not taken off the table, the force would 

first attack Ji’an. Ji’an was a strategic city centered on the Jiangxi Soviet. 

By capturing the city, the southwestern portion Jiangxi Soviet could be 

joined together and expand the Soviet area.41

On the early morning of October 4, 1930, the Red Army with local 

militia and CY forces moved into Ji’an from three different directions, and 

by nightfall, seized the city. The capturing of Ji’an produced a large influx 

peasant support for the Red Army, with supposedly more than a million 

peasants going to the city in support of the communists.42 Additionally, a 

raid of the KMT headquarters in Ji’an produced secret documents about 

the upcoming NRA extermination campaign. With this new intelligence, 

the Red Army’s focus shifted from the Li Lisan line, effectively ending the 

operation, and turned its focus toward the impending NRA extermination 

campaign.

Aftermath

The collapse of the Li Lisan line created a cascade of intraparty 

struggles over political power, political direction, and military strategies 

that culminated with the Futian Incident. With the failure of the second 

attack on Changsha as evidence of Li Lisan’s ineptitude, Mao began 

attacking Li Lisan to consolidate his own power. At the core, the division 

within the Red Army resulted in two diverging viewpoints, represented 

by Mao’s gradual rural encirclement strategy and Li Lisan’s immediate 

urban insurrection strategy. While retreating from Changsha, Mao and 

Zhu attacked the Li Lisan line, arguing the erroneous policy caused the 

attack’s failure.43 The extreme claim was a shot across the bow inside the 

Red Army and drove a wedge within the army. Political commissars from 

subordinate units decried the act as treacherous acts against the Central 

Committee, whereas peasant soldiers remained loyal to Mao.

 Mao was also confronted with the problem of a power grab with the 

Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee. The recently created committee 

represented an additional layer of left- leaning bureaucracy and control. 

After the failure of the second attack on Changsha, the Jiangxi Provincial 
75

Action Committee leadership attempted to gain control of the Red Army. 

During this time, Mao conducted a rural survey of Xingguo, and while there, 

identified tenuous linkages44 between the KMT funded Anti-Bolshevik 

Corps (AB Corps), a unit of undercover agents charged with sabotaging 

and subverting communist units, and the local Jiangxi Action committee 

and Twentieth Red Army leaders, such as Li Wenlin. Armed with this 

evidence, Mao conducted a huge purge of the Red Army. In November 

1930, Mao arrested 4,000 members of the Twentieth Red Army, to include 

all but two members of the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee, and 

charged them with treason. The purge effectively neutralized any leftleaning threat to Mao’s control, but also created a huge backlash the next 

month.

In December 1930, a battalion of the Twentieth Red Army, led by Liu 

Dizao, marched in and seized the city of Futian. Battalion officers released 

forty recently purged comrades and suspected AB Corps members. The 

renegade group crossed over west of the Gan River and established a rival 

Soviet in Yongyang.45 From this new Soviet, the unit looked to clear their 

names, appealing to the Central Committee of the CCP as well as Zhu 

De and Peng Dehuai. The Twentieth Red Army argued that they were 

wrongfully accused of being AB Corps members. They were actually 

maintaining the strict line of the CCP, and attacked Mao’s policies as 

being false, accusing him of attempting to become a “party emperor.”46

One large group of Twentieth Army members left the Soviet under the 

pretense of attending a peace talk in July 1931.47 Upon arrival, they were 

all arrested. Summary trials commenced, and three of the key leaders were 

summarily executed.48

The Futian Incident failed to gain traction within the CCP, especially 

in light of the COMINTERN and Central Committee condemnation of 

the Li Lisan line and KMT extermination campaigns. The COMINTERN 

and Central Committee scrambled to distance itself from Li Lisan after 

Changsha. Zhou Enlai was sent back from Russia to help clean up after 

the debacle in Changsha as the Central Committee military representative. 

Upon his arrival, he distanced himself and the party from the Li Lisan 

line, which effectively brought the CCP view in congruence with Mao’s 

strategy and helped Mao further consolidate his power.49 In addition, the 

COMINTERN sent a letter to the CCP in November 1930 stating that the 

Li Lisan Line was inconsistent with the COMINTERN guidance and its 

views were “antagonistic” to the greater communist cause.50 Li Lisan was 

recalled to Moscow for questioning in December 1930, where he gave a 

lengthy mea cupla for the botched insurrections. Back in China, the CCP 

leadership would have a difficult time gaining traction until the end of 

1931, when the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks asserted their power over the 

party.

Official CCP history blamed the AB Corps as the main instigator of 
76

the Twentieth Red Army Division revolt at Futian. Further examination 

of the factors leading up to the incident is required to fully understand 

the context of the actions leading up to Mao’s consolidation of power 

while under fire. While the power struggle between Mao and remnants 

of Li Lisan supporters was at the core of the Futian incident, there were 

other factors that were in play.51 The military strategy represented by both 

factions in fact drove one of the biggest wedges within the Red Army. 

Mao and Zhu De’s order to retreat at Changsha challenged many of the 

loyalists within the Red Army, who saw the act as insubordination. With 

communication between the CCP and the Red Army intermittent at best 

during this period, few members knew that the COMINTERN and CCP 

had already denounced the Li Lisan line. Many of the political commissars 

believed the urban insurrection was the correct strategy, and should not be 

changed by Mao or Zhu. Nor did they believe the Red Army should utilize 

the “lure the enemy in deep” strategy. Mao’s opponents were unwilling to 

cede hard-won territory, nor were they willing to leave the local populace 

unprotected. 52 These concerns represent concrete disagreements on 

strategy and tactics, and were further polarized by Mao-Li power politics.

With both Li Lisan and the Jiangxi Action Committee out of the 

equation, Mao remained in sole control of the Red Army. Years later, 

Mao’s purge would be decried by many people as excessive.53 While some 

of the enemies purged were Anti-Bolsheiviks, a majority of them were 

simply obstacles to Mao’s consolidation of power. His choice of brutal 

tactics may also have been influenced the need for expediency. During this 

period of internal strife, the Red Army was engaged in a brutal fight with 

the NRA in the First Extermination Campaign. 

Extermination Campaigns

First Extermination Campaign

The initial Nationalist Forces array was the Ninth Route Army, led 

by the Jiangxi governor, Lu Diping, based out of Nanchang. They were 

augmented by the Sixth Route Army from Hunan, led by Zhu Shaoling, 

and the Nineteenth Route Army, led by Jiang Guangnai. The initial force 

package for the first campaign was 44,000 men, made up of five divisions 

and three air-bombing corps.54 The plan was to encircle the Jiangxi 

Soviets, pressing the communist forces into the mountains and preventing 

them from maneuvering around the NRA force. Once the encirclement 

was complete, the NRA would attack Donggu, Longgang and Dongshao 

to destroy the communist forces. 

After seizing Ji’an, the Red Army leadership, in conjunction with the 

Jiangxi Action committee, held a conference at Luofang on October 25, 

1930, to discuss the strategy in response to the upcoming extermination 

campaign. Initial arguments were for reattacking Nanchang and Jiujiang to 

divert the NRA forces away from the Soviet. Mao disagreed, and proposed 
77

his famous “lure the enemy in deep” strategy. The plan was to give up 

land for time. Initially, Red Army forces would evacuate the western areas 

of the Gan River. While moving east, the Red Army would mobilize the 

local people to raise money, enlist soldiers, and create Red Guard and 

intelligence units. The eastward movement would also invite the NRA to 

Figure 3: First Extermination Campaign

Source: Created by author
78

follow them across the river. As the NRA entered Red Army terrain, it 

would overstretch its logistical lines and expose itself to attack. The Red 

Army would attack the NRA on terrain of its choosing, concentrating its 

firepower on the isolated force. Mao believed that the “lure the enemy 

in deep” strategy was the only feasible way to defeat the NRA. Once the 

enemy was destroyed, the Red Army could attack the urban centers. The 

fortifications in Nanchang and Jiujiang would be unmanned, and the Red 

Army could move directly in and occupy the city.55 With some trepidation, 

the initial strategy of attacking Nanchang and Jiujiang was defeated, and 

the Red Army adopted the “lure the enemy in deep” strategy. 

On November 1, the Red Army began moving forces across the Gan 

river into Ji’an, Xingan, Jishui, Yongfeng, Le’an, Chongren, Yihuang, and 

Nanfeng counties. Within six days of operations, the Red Army collected 

400,000 yuan and enlisted the support of the local populace.56 During this 

time, some members of the Third Red Army Corps, who were originally 

from southeastern area near Ji’an, rose up against Mao’s plan, arguing for 

the occupation of the western Gan River area. Peng Dehuai was able to 

suppress the dissension and by the middle of November, the entire Red 

Army force occupied the eastern bank of the Gan River.57

The NRA followed the Red Army across the Gan River, as predicted. 

On November 18, the NRA moved its forces in three columns: First 

Column occupied Yongfeng and Jishui; Second Column occupied Le’an 

and Yihuang; and Third Column occupied Ji’an. The Red Army continued 

to withdraw as the NRA entered, conducting limited engagements with 

the NRA, inflicting casualties while conserving its own combat power.58

On November 26, the second withdrawal was complete, with Red Army 

forces occupying Donggu, Nanlong, and Longgang.59 The successful 

withdrawal was marred by the Futian incident on December 7. The mutiny 

jeopardized the western flank of the Red Army operation, forcing the Red 

Army leadership to abandon the Donggu and Futian area on December 

15, 1930. The remainder of Third Red Army Corps forces moved to the 

northern area of Ningdu county, occupying the Pingtian and Anfu areas.60

NRA intelligence relayed the Red Army’s internal struggles to the 

KMT leadership, presenting them with a perfect opportunity to attack. 

On December 16, Lu Diping ordered two divisions to encircle and attack 

Donggu. The New Fifth NRA Division and Eighteenth NRA Division 

moved toward the Donggu area. The New Fifth NRA Division was the 

first to enter Donggu. The Red Army withdrew from the city, engaging 

units from the New Fifth NRA Division as it left. A ridgeline separated 

the two NRA divisions as they entered Donggu, with each side unaware of 

the other. Neither side attempted to deconflict locations through wireless 

communications. On December 20, 1930 the Eighteenth NRA Division 

gave the order to attack Donggu, committing fratricide on the New Fifth 

NRA Division for about half a day before stopping the catastrophe.61
79

By the end of December, the KMT forces had absorbed most of the 

Jiangxi Soviet. The northern Jiangxi areas were occupied by late November. 

The Eighteenth NRA Division occupied Donggu, the Twenty-eighth NRA 

Division occupied Futian, and the Fiftieth NRA Division was en route 

to Yuantou. However, the NRA forces were overextended, exposing 

its forces to constant guerrilla attacks. The expanded territory required 

occupation forces as well. Only one-third of the Third Route NRA Army 

forces actually were on the front lines, with the rest of the forces stretched 

across the terrain.62 These forces occupying the surrounded areas had 

difficulties with the local residents. The mobilized local populace were 

uncooperative with the NRA forces and provided little if any information 

or supplies. Instead, the local populace provided important intelligence to 

the Red Army, especially about a pending attack on Longgang.63

Two brigades of the Eighteenth Division planned an attack Longgang on 

December 30. Local intelligence quickly alerted the Red Army leadership 

of the NRA’s plan. The Red Army countered with an encirclement of the 

two brigades, using the mountainous terrain to mass fires and cut off any 

reinforcements.64 On the morning of the December 30, the NRA forces 

entered Longgang, and were effectively encircled by Red Army forces. 

The First Red Army Corps attacked the two NRA brigades, while the 

Fourth Red Army and elements of the Third Red Army Corps blocked 

the Eighteenth NRA Division’s rear, preventing any reinforcements 

from coming to Donggu.65 By the end of the day, the devastation of the 

Eighteenth NRA Division was complete. More than 9,000 personnel were 

captured, to include the division commander, Zhang Huizan, and other key 

leaders.66

With news of the annihilation of the Eighteenth NRA Division, Lu 

Diping ordered a withdrawal of his forces to consolidate and reorganize. 

Tan Daoyuan’s Fiftieth NRA Division moved south toward Yuantou. Upon 

receipt of intelligence reports on January 2, 1931, that the Fiftieth NRA 

Division was moving, the Red Army leadership immediately pursued to 

establish an ambush. On the morning of January 3, the Red Army attacked 

the Fiftieth NRA Division near Dongshao from three different directions, 

causing panic and confusion. The NRA unit disintegrated under the attack, 

with many soldiers dropping weapons and running away. The Third Red 

Army was unable to make it in time to complete the encirclement, and 

many of the Fiftieth NRA Division members escaped. The Red Army 

captured 3,000 personnel, 4,000 rifles, more than forty machine guns, 

and a large cache of ammunition. The defeats at Longgang and Dongshao 

effectively ended the First Extermination Campaign and provided the Red 

Army with valuable equipment, personnel, and experience.67

The destruction of multiple divisions of the NRA yielded weapons 

and equipment the threadbare communist forces needed to continue 

their operations. More than 15,000 personnel were captured, and 12,000 
80

weapons confiscated.68 The victories also validated Mao’s strategy and 

tactics, increasing the confidence of the Red Army. Lastly, these victories 

helped to spread the word of the communist forces strength in the 

region, and began to swing the tide of public sentiment for support. The 

communists sent one strong message with the execution of Zhang Huizan, 

the commander of Eighteenth NRA Division. His head was sent up to 

Ji’an, after his public trial, to serve as a warning.69

Second Extermination Campaign

The defeat during the Second Extermination Campaign forced Chiang 

Kai-shek and the KMT to double their efforts against the Red Army. The 

NRA dispatched four route armies, totaling about 200,000 soldiers, to 

encircle the Jiangxi Soviet.70 The NRA forces were arrayed as follows: 

Fifth Route NRA Army located around Ji’an, Sixth Route NRA Army 

based in Nanfeng; Nineteenth Route NRA Army based in Xingguo; 

Twenty-sixth Route NRA Army based in Le’an.71 This time around, the 

NRA adopted a different strategy, opting for a slower, more deliberate 

approach, conducting steady attacks on the enemy.72

As the Red Army faced a new threat of encirclement, the leadership and 

its members discussed strategy.While Mao’s “lure the enemy in deep” was 

successful in the First Extermination Campaign, it still did not engender 

great support in the subsequent campaign. From March to April, the Red 

Army held four different meetings to determine the next strategy. On March 

18, 1931 the Central Soviet Bureau First Enlarged Conference began 

debate on an alternative strategy of the Red Army. The alternative was to 

completely vacate the Soviet areas because of the NRA’s overwhelming 

numerical superiority. The meeting adjourned without a decision. A month 

later, the CCP Fourth Plenary Session delegation arrived in Jiangxi and 

sat in on the second meeting of the Central Soviet Bureau First Enlarged 

Conference. Some members continued to push for vacating the Jiangxi 

Soviet, this time submitting Sichuan as a new base area. Other members 

presented a different option, arguing for the Red Army to stay, and divide 

into smaller units in order to conduct coordinated attacks to break the 

encirclement and destroy the enemy. This meeting adjourned once again 

without a decision.73

A third meeting occurred a couple days after the second. Acting on the 

advice of Mao, the Red Army leadership invited the military and political 

leadership from the different military units to participate. The idea of 

dividing the Red Army gained traction; however, one caveat was added. 

Instead of immediately dividing the forces, the Red Army should first 

conduct a concentrated attack against the Nineteenth Route NRA Army 

to establish a route out of the encirclement. Mao agreed with the idea, 

though he submitted the Fifth Route Army as the best target. Attacking the 

Nineteen Route NRA Army did not make sense since it had been laagered 

in Xingguo for an extended period of time, had established a strong set of 
81

fortifications, and did not present any weaknesses. Any attack would also 

take time, which would expose the Red Army to attacks by reinforcements 

from the north. The Fifth Route NRA Army, though the largest army out of 

the NRA forces deployed to Jiangxi, had plenty of issues. The Fifth Route 

Figure 4: Second Extermination Campaign

Source: Created by author
82

NRA Army was originally from Northern China and unfamiliar with the 

territory. It also had some issues with morale.74 The meeting reached a 

consensus supporting the “attack first, then divide” strategy, but failed to 

reach an agreement on the target. At a minimum, the decision helped the 

Red Army leadership give guidance and instructions to its subordinate 

units. 

The final meeting was held at the end of April 1931. All the attendees 

from the previous meeting joined the final one to discuss the plan. Mao 

was given the floor to present his view, and he gave an impassioned speech 

in support of his strategy. He argued that the “lure the enemy in deep” 

strategy made the most sense because of three factors: the Red Army; the 

local populace; and the geography. The Red Army and the local populace 

had the experience and resolve to defeat the enemy. These forces could 

leverage their intimate knowledge of the terrain in the Jiangxi area to 

attack the enemy’s weaknesses. Mao outlined a strategy of sweeping east 

across the Soviet, attacking the enemy from Futian to Jianning. The terrain 

and poor communications between NRA units isolated themselves from 

mutual support, and allowed the Red Army to use overwhelming firepower 

to defeat the enemy. Mao’s presentation finally worked, his strategy was 

finally approved, and the Red Army could begin preparations on its attack 

against the NRA. 

During the March-April discussions, the Red Army began withdrawing 

troops from the fringes of the expanded Jiangxi Soviet in anticipation 

of the Extermination Campaign. Starting in late March, the Red Army 

abandoned newly acquired territories in Toubei, Dongshao, Luokou, 

Zhaoxie, Futian, and Tengtian. Forces also withdrew from Yongfeng, 

Le’an, Yihuang, and Nanfeng to Guangchang, Shicheng, and Ruijin to 

increase political mobilization and training in these areas. By April 23, 

the Red Army forces had relocated, with the Third Red Army Corps based 

near Longgang, and the rest of the First Front Red Army forces laagering 

in the vicinity of Ningdu. The Third and Fourth Red Army were stationed 

in the mountains between Donggu and Futian, awaiting orders.75

The NRA forces proceeded slowly according to their new strategy. NRA 

forces had occupied Futian, and were moving east towards Donggu. The 

Fourth Red Army, led by Mao and Zhu, was stationed along the Jiucun 

mountain ridge, overlooking the road leading from Futian to Donggu, and 

was prepared to conduct an attack. On May 11, the Forty-seventh NRA 

Division and the Twenty-eighth NRA Division led the NRA movement and 

walked into an ambush. The attack commenced near Zhongdong five days 

later. The Red Army forces initially rolled boulders from the mountain 

tops, causing serious casualties and confusion. The two NRA divisions 

were taken by surprise and attempted to signal for help, but the Red Army 

cut off all wired communications. Visibility was poor during the attack, 

neutralizing any NRA air support to the distressed troops. The Third Red 
83

Army moved quickly from the high ground and attacked the divisions. By 

the evening of May 17, the NRA forces had been defeated. Five thousand 

guns, fifty machine guns, thirty artillery pieces, and numerous caches were 

confiscated.76

The second battle occurred in Baisha only two days after the Red 

Army’s victory at Zhongdong. The next target was the Forty-third NRA 

Division. The division originally was headed toward Tantou, but upon 

hearing word of the NRA defeat at Zhongdong, it changed direction 

toward Shuinan. The Forty-third NRA Division planned on crossing the 

Xiaolong River near Shuinan to consolidate its forces around defensive 

positions on the northern banks. However, local communist militia groups 

had already secured the bridge, forcing the NRA to move to Baisha. 

On May 19, the Red Army attacked and defeated the Forty-third NRA 

Division at Baisha, collecting more than 4,000 weapons, thirty machine 

guns, and two mountain cannons. Attempts to send NRA reinforcements 

were made. However, elements from the Nineteenth Route NRA Army 

never advanced into Baisha. Instead, they stood on the outskirts, and once 

the NRA division was destroyed, the unit withdrew back to Xingguo.77

These two losses effectively destroyed the Fifth Route NRA Army.78

 The Red Army continued its sweep east, conducting its third battle 

at Zhongcun. Initial orders for the Twenty-sixth Route NRA Army were 

to occupy Nantuan in order to gain the southern flank of the Red Army 

as it advanced east. However, once in the city, its Twenty-seventh NRA 

Division received orders to reinforce NRA positions in Zhongcun, while 

the Twenty-fifth NRA Division remained in Nantuan. Before the Twentyseventh NRA Division could get set, the Third Red Army Corps and 

Fourth Red Army conducted a combined attack and destroyed the NRA 

forces in Zhongcun on the morning of May 22, occupying the city by 

the afternoon. That evening, the Red Army continued to Nantuan and 

destroyed the Twenty-Fifth NRA Division. The remaining NRA forces 

retreated to Le’an and Yihuang. The Red Army captured more than 3,000 

weapons and ten machine guns, effectively eliminating the Twenty-sixth 

Route NRA Army.79

The fourth battle was a pursuit of the Sixth Route NRA Army near 

Guangchang. Hearing of the destruction of the Twenty-sixth and Fifth 

Route NRA Armies, the NRA began withdrawing back to Nancheng. The 

Fifth NRA Division was the last unit attempting to leave Guangchang, 

when it was attacked by the Third Red Army and Fourth Red Army on May 

27. The Fifth NRA Division put up stiff resistance until nightfall when its 

commander was injured. The forces withdrew the next day to Nanfeng, 

ending the fourth battle in the Second Extermination Campaign.80

The last battle occurred at Jianning, Fujian province. The Fourth Red 

Army remained in Guangchang to consolidate gains, with one division 

moving north toward Nanfeng. The Third Red Army Corps and the 
84

Twelfth Red Army moved east and pursued the NRA forces into Jianning 

on May 30. The attack caught the NRA commanders of the Fifty-sixth 

NRA Division completely by surprise. They had yet to make any defensive 

preparations, believing that the Red Army could not travel at such speed 

and quickness. By May 31, the Red Army occupied Jianning, destroying 

an NRA regiment. Along with copious weapons and equipment, the Red 

Army confiscated caches of sorely needed medicine.81

By the end of the two-week campaign, the Red Army had travelled 

more than 300 kilometers,82 captured 30,000 POWs, and confiscated 

20,000 weapons.83 The confiscated equipment was enough to outfit the 

entire First Front Red Army with modern weapons, with the older weapons 

transferred to local militia and guerrilla forces.84 Most of the Red Army’s 

success on the battlefield was based on its leadership, morale of soldiers, 

good intelligence, and its mobility. However, its speed and quickness 

also placed much strain on its logistical and administrative systems as its 

forces were stretched across the Soviet, and away from its home base. 

Expansion of the Soviet grew to almost 5,000 square miles at the end of 

the campaign.85 The upcoming Third Extermination Campaign would test 

the Red Army’s ability to regroup and again move quickly back to its base 

area.

Third Extermination Campaign

In June, First Front Red Army was still in Western Fujian conducting 

operations. Initially, it did not expect the NRA to initiate the Third 

Extermination Campaign so quickly. Instead, the Red Army planned a 

three-phase expansion operation. The first phase was political mobilization 

in Western Fujian, to include Jianning, Taining, and Lichuan. The second 

phase involved the Red Army moving back to southern Jiangxi in order 

to consolidate and strengthen the Soviet rear area. The last phase sent the 

Red Army back to its original base area, with the focus on the Western 

Gan River area to connect the Jiangxi Soviet with the Hunan-Jiangxi 

Soviet.86 The Red Army conducted political mobilization in Western 

Fujian throughout June, raising funds for operations and drumming up 

popular support for the communists. Intelligence reports continued to pour 

in stating NRA forces were already on the move towards Jiangxi to attack 

the Soviet. 

During preparation to counter the Third Extermination Campaign, 

the Central Committee issued guidance in June 1931 for the upcoming 

campaign. The guidance explicitly supported the strategy of the previous 

two extermination campaigns. Specifically, the Central Committee saw 

the mobilization of the local populace for guerrilla operations as a critical 

component to the overall Red Army’s success. For the upcoming mission, 

they stressed the continued political mobilization of the populace. They 

supported small-unit guerrilla attacks on the NRA forces to prevent them 
85

from gaining a stable footing in the area, setting the conditions for the main 

Red Army forces to destroy the enemy. The guidance also pushed for the 

consolidation of the Soviets in the area, to include the Henan-Hubei-Anhui 

Soviet, Hunan-Hubei Soviet, and the Northeast Jiangxi Soviet. The goal 

Figure 5: Third Extermination Campaign

Source: Created by author
86

was to connect the noncontiguous Soviets into one contiguous territory in 

the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi area, as well as establish communications with 

the other Soviets in the north. After issuing the June 1931 guidance, the 

Central Committee in Shanghai suffered a serious setback from the KMT 

communist repression campaign, forcing the leadership underground. Not 

until August 30 did the CCP reestablish communications with the Soviet 

areas. By that time, the Third Extermination campaign was over.87

On June 30, the Red Army leadership finally issued an order to stop 

the expansion and begin preparation for defense against the extermination 

campaign. All local militias, Red Guard, and guerrilla units were activated 

and pressed to conduct mobile defense and guerrilla operations to delay 

the NRA advance. The Red Army immediately consolidated forces and 

returned to the central bases areas in Jiangxi.88 At the time, the Red 

Army had yet to have a break since the beginning of the Extermination 

Campaigns, and its number still remained around 30,000 soldiers.89 This 

new mission was a difficult task given how spread out the Red Army was 

across Western Fujian and Southern Jiangxi, especially with the NRA 

forces scouring the area. 

The losses during the first two extermination campaigns grabbed 

Chiang Kai-shek’s attention. The Generalissimo took over the Third 

Campaign, and brought in his own troops, deploying the Fifth and Sixth 

NRA Divisions to Jiangxi to attack the First and Third Red Army Corps 

of the First Front Red Army. His entire force consisted of two army corps, 

with one army in reserve, and one garrison army.90 The entire force was 

estimated at 130,000.91 In late June, the NRA forces moved into the Jiangxi 

Soviet. By the end of July, it had encircled the entire Jiangxi Soviet, 

occupying Futian, Baisha, Guangchang, and Ningdu. 

Local Soviet citizens and the local militias mobilized to support the 

Red Army and prepare for another round of attacks from the NRA. The 

local Soviets reorganized its militia groups, ensuring that reconnaissance, 

guerrilla, and Red Guard units were equipped and manned. Chinese 

Soviets in border areas established “red” martial law to actively fight 

against enemy surveillance and subversion. The local populace also moved 

out to old battle sites to sweep the areas for equipment and supplies. The 

sweep not only provided additional supplies for the militia groups and the 

Red Army, it also denied the NRA any supplies as they moved through 

the area.92 Even with the encirclement, the local populace continued to 

support the Red Army, providing supplies and food to the tired troops, 

though over time food had to be rationed due to limited supplies.93

The Red Army quickly moved back to the base area. The Red Army 

travelled through Ruijin, then moved west to Xingguo. By July 28, 1931, 

the Red Army had travelled more than 400 kilometers94 to Gaoxing, 

northwest of Xingguo, without being detected. While back in the base area, 

the Red Army still needed to gain the initiative. On July 31, the Red Army 
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conducted a daring breakthrough from Xingguo. The Red Army conducted 

a nighttime exfiltration, moving west to Wan’an before circling back to 

Futian to attack the KMT rear. The Red Army escaped the encirclement, 

but while it headed to Futian, the NRA discovered the Red Army’s plans 

and reinforced the area with a division, as well as capturing Xingguo. On 

August 3, the Red Army stopped short of Futian and occupied areas near 

Laoyingpan and Gaoxing.95

To regain the initiative, the Red Army conducted a series of battles 

against the NRA near Liantang and Huangpi. The Red Army conducted a 

feint in the north with the Thirty-fifth Red Army, the Thirty-fifth Red Army 

Division, Twelfth Red Army, Fourth Independent Red Army Division, and 

Fifth Independent Red Army Division to draw the NRA focus towards the 

west in Wan’an. When the NRA forces moved, the First Red Army Corps, 

the Red Army’s main effort, would attack along the seam in Liangtang, 

and assault through Longgang and Huangpi. On August 6, the Fortyseventh NRA Division entered Liantang as the Fifty-fourth NRA Division 

occupied nearby Huangpi, presenting the Red Army a great opportunity. 

With only a single NRA division in Liantang, the Red Army took advantage 

of the isolation and conducted an early morning attack. The Third, Fourth, 

and Twelfth Red Armies attacked the lone NRA division. One group was 

destroyed, with the remainder of the forces retreating to Longgang. With 

the momentum, the Red Army continued towards Huangpi and attacked 

the Fifty-fourth NRA Division. The division headquarters, unaware of the 

attack, walked straight into the attack, and was decimated. By the end 

of the August 7, two NRA brigades were destroyed. The two divisions 

suffered more than 1,000 casualties and more 3,500 POWs were taken; 

3,000 weapons and fourteen canons were confiscated.96

The Red Army continued its attack on Huangpi. Originally, the plan 

included an attack on Longgang, but nine NRA brigades occupied the city, 

making it a hard target. Instead, the Red Army attacked the Eighth NRA 

Division in Huangpi. On August 11, the Third Red Army distracted NRA 

forces in Longgang by maintaining sporadic contact in order to prevent the 

unit from sending reinforcements. The Fourth and Twelfth Red Armies, 

the main effort, attacked the Eighth NRA Division in Huangpi, while the 

Third Red Army Corps and Seventh Red Division maneuvered to the 

east to cut off any escape route. In rainy, foggy weather, the Red Army 

destroyed four brigades, resulting in more than 1,000 casualties, 4,000 

POWs, and capturing more than 3,000 weapons, eleven artillery pieces, 

one wireless communication set, and a large ammunition cache.97

These three victories in short succession gave Chiang Kai-shek a sense of 

urgency in the fight. The Red Army’s victory at Huangpi revealed its main 

force location to the NRA. Almost immediately, Chiang deployed all his 

forces to surround the Huangpi area, effectively encircling the Red Army. 

For about one month, the Red Army was essentially under siege. In a report 
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sent to the Central Committee after the Third Extermination Campaign, 

the Red Army leadership stated that the siege at Huangpi was the most 

difficult and trying time during the entire Extermination Campaigns to 

date.98 Facing starvation and defeat, Mao and Zhu De hatched a bold plan 

to break out of the encirclement. The Red Army planned to split its force. 

First, disguising the Twelfth Red Army as the Red Army’s main effort, the 

unit would sneak through the encirclement and move northeast to attack 

Le’an and Yihuang, which mirrored the NRA intelligence estimate. The 

remainder of the Red Army, and its main effort would instead move west 

and occupy Xingguo. 

In the darkness of night on August 16, the First Front Red Army, 

minus the Twelfth Red Army, silently slipped through a 10-kilometer 

gap between the First NRA Army Corps and Second NRA Route Army, 

heading towards Xingguo. At the same time, the Twelfth Red Army began 

its march northeast towards Yihuang. An element of the Twelfth RedArmy 

attacked Le’an in an attempt to erase any doubt that the Red Army’s main 

effort was moving northeast. Seizing the chance to destroy the Red Army, 

Chiang ordered the Tenth NRA Division, and the First and Second NRA 

Route Armies to pursue and destroy the Red Army’s main effort. For about 

two weeks, the NRA chased the Twelfth Red Army up and down mountain 

ranges and along narrow and winding passages, to no avail. The NRA forces 

just became more exhausted as they consumed their supplies and were 

subjected to constant guerrilla attacks along the route. In the meantime, 

First and Third Red Army Corps arrived in Xingguo undetected.99 The 

Red Army forces refitted, reconstituted, and reorganized, taking a welldeserved, albeit temporary, respite from battle.

By the end of August, the NRA realized they had been duped, and that 

the Red Army’s main effort was actually in Xingguo. The NRA forces 

turned around and headed west to attack the Red Army. Before the NRA 

could attack the Red Army near Xingguo, two Guangdong warlord 

factions rose against the KMT and established a rival government in 

Guangdong. Out of fear the warlord factions could attack Nanjing, or ally 

with former warlords, Chiang prematurely ended the Third Extermination 

Campaign.100 With the NRA forces withdrawing, the Red Army attempted 

to exploit the situation for further gains, conducting a series of attacks on 

the retrograding forces. On September 7, the Third Red Army and the Fifth 

Independent Red Division attacked the Fourth NRA Corps at Laoyingpan, 

capturing 2,000 POWs, 2,000 weapons, and ten artillery pieces. On 

September 13, The Seventh Red Army encircled the Fourth NRA Corps 

at Fangshiling mountain ranges as the unit attempted to retreat north to 

Ji’an. The Red Army destroyed the Fifty-second NRA Division and one 

brigade of the Ninth NRA Division. The Red Army took more than 5,000 

prisoners, 4,500 rifles, and 200 horses. These successes, however, were 

overshadowed by the Red Army’s defeat at Gaoxing. On September 7, the 
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Fourth Red Army and the Third Red Army Corps conducted a coordinated 

attack against the First NRA Corps. Based on poor intelligence, the Red 

Army did not account for the relative strength of the NRA’s Fifty-second, 

Sixty-first, and Sixty-second Divisions. The two sides engaged in a long 

bloody battle that ended in a stalemate.101

By the end of the Third Extermination Campaign, the NRA suffered 

huge losses. The Red Army destroyed seventeen NRA brigades, with more 

than 30,000 casualties. The Red Army’s losses in comparison were as 

great. The loss at Gaoxing left the Red Army weak and unable to continue 

its attack. Yet, even in its compromised position, the Red Army made 

significant gains from their victory. At the end of the three campaigns, the 

Jiangxi Soviet doubled during that time, reaching almost 50,000 square 

kilometers, covering twenty-eight counties in Hunan, Jiangxi, and Fujian 

provinces.102

Analysis

Situational Assessment

During this two-year period, the Red Army continued to face similar 

external and internal threats to its existence. The NRA replaced the 

provincial and warlord forces as the primary external threat to the Red 

Army. With each Extermination Campaign, the numbers and quality of 

NRA soldiers increased dramatically, with Chiang Kai-shek personally 

leading the third campaign. The NRA also introduced more modern 

technology, such as wireless communications and air power to the 

battlefield. The NRA conducted its first air attack against the Communists 

during the Nanchang Uprising.103 While the addition provided initial 

advantages, the Red Army was able to eventually turn the advantages 

into weaknesses. The NRA actually supplied the Red Army with the 

equipment and the operators to create its own wireless network system.104

Besides increasing the size and technology of the military force, the NRA 

also adjusted its strategies. It took a slower, more deliberate approach to 

encircling and constricting the Jiangxi Soviet, with increasing success. By 

the Third Extermination Campaign, the NRA almost perfected its siege, 

nearly suffocating the Red Army in Jiangxi. These lessons learned would 

pay dividends in future campaigns.

Internal struggles continued to be the biggest threat to the Red Army. 

The Li Lisan line of 1930 highlighted the diverging factions within the 

Red Army. The Red Army split along a philosophical, military strategy, 

and power relations lines. Mao and his faction represented a peasant force 

that promoted a mobile defense strategy geared towards the rural areas. 

Li Lisan staked out a more conservative line with a proletarian force that 

adopted a more direct attack approach aimed at the urban centers. In an 

attempt to win the narrative, each side continued to leverage pejorative 

labels, such as “opportunism,” “adventurism” or “retreatism,” to gain the 
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support of the populace.105 While the political commissars at unit levels 

were split in their allegiances, military leaders instead were often stuck 

in the middle, attempting to hold a professional line. During the Futian 

Incident, the Twentieth Red Army vainly attempted to convince Zhu De 

and Peng Dehuai to turn on Mao and support the more conservative line. 

The divide caused by both the AB Corps purge and subsequent Futian 

incident led to an almost 20 percent reduction in combat strength and 

jeopardized the Red Army’s western flank during the First Extermination 

campaign. Some Red Army leaders got caught up in the personal politics. 

During the first attack on Changsha, a disagreement between Peng and 

Mao supposedly caused Mao to limit Fourth Red Army Corps’ support for 

the Third Red Army Corps.106 Regardless of the political dimensions of 

the Red Army, the struggle for power and control negatively affected the 

Army’s combat effectiveness. 

Besides the internal political struggles, the Red Army still faced the 

same challenges it had faced since its inception. While the measures to 

increase the professionalism of the Red Army helped to improve combat 

readiness, problems of desertion, low levels of education, and unruly 

behavior remained prevalent in the Red Army, especially at the local 

militia level. Incidents of stealing from POWs and the local populace, as 

well as damaging private property were still unfortunate consequences of 

guerrilla operations.107

Another major issue was behavior inconsistent with the revolutionary 

ideal. Some local militia leaders continued warlord traditions, oppressing 

and exploiting the local populace and soldiers for profit and personal 

gain. Incidents of insubordination or failure to comply with orders were 

issues related to local militias’ readiness. Compliance with CCP, Soviet 

government, or Red Army official orders was low among local militias, 

requiring that Red Army advisers to supervise operations. Personnel 

assigned to local militias took away from the combat strength and 

important experience level of frontline Red Army units. Lastly, the quality 

of life of militia soldiers, especially for units in the far flung rural areas 

remained quite low. Many of the soldiers in these units were treated poorly 

by leaders, received shoddy equipment and weapons, and received little if 

any training.108

These negative traditions had a double effect on the Red Army. First, 

the local militia was the reserve force for the Red Army, using combat 

ineffective units to fill key roles, which in turn, adversely affected the 

combat readiness of the entire Red Army. Second, the local militia was the 

recruiting ground for the Red Army, and the continued infusion of poor 

quality soldiers into the army also affected the combat readiness.109

Strategy

As the Red Army expanded and faced a stronger, more professional 
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enemy, it adopted Mao’s “lure the enemy in deep” strategy. The basic 

concept of the strategy is similar to General Matthew Ridgway’s attrition 

strategy in Korea that would be employed on the Chinese Red Army 

almost twenty years later.110 The strategy was based on a mobile defense; 

the goal was not to defend any specific territory, but rather to attack the 

enemy at an advantageous moment on favorable terrain. The Red Army 

ceded Soviet territory to the advancing NRA force, trading space for time. 

On a battlefield of their choosing, the Red Army conducted a massive 

counterattack to destroy the enemy.111 This strategy was a logical transition 

from the guerrilla tactics embodied by Mao’s “they advance, we retreat” 

philosophy.112 It incorporated many of these tenets, specifically; it focused 

on how to effectively conserve its force in order to attack the enemy with 

the greatest amount of combat power.113 In addition to the guerrilla warfare 

tenets outlined in the previous chapter, other key tenets of the “lure the 

enemy in deep” strategy were preparation, isolation, and concentration. 

First, the Red Army’s preparation for the “lure the enemy in deep” 

strategy exceeded the normal military preparation, and focused on political 

mobilization of the population. One major task in the preparation phase was 

fundraising in the Soviet areas. Through land reform and selective attacks 

on wealthy peasants and landlords, the Red Army raised the necessary 

revenues to pay for medicine, fuel, and other logistical and administrative 

costs. One expense that increased with each extermination campaign was 

pocket money for NRA POWs. The Red Army did not have the robust 

logistical structure to support itself, let alone POWs, and often freed POWs 

after battles. NRA officers and soldiers with intelligence value were often 

kept for interrogation; however, most NRA soldiers were allowed to leave. 

The Red Army gave each NRA soldier a small amount of money for travel 

expenses and sent them on their way.114 The pocket money also doubled 

as positive propaganda for the Red Army, demonstrating the communists’ 

magnanimity toward both its enemy and its own soldiers. Besides raising 

funds, the Red Army collected several months’ worth of supplies to support 

its forces. The extermination campaign was basically a siege, and the Red 

Army had to prepare a large cache to survive the initial onslaught. 

The second major task was mobilizing the people. While the Red Army 

may have adopted a “lure the enemy in deep” strategy, its success rested 

on the back of the local populace.115 The Red Army leadership had to 

convince local residents to support a strategy that basically pulled away 

any military protection from their village. Additionally, the strategy called 

for local residents to actively resist NRA occupation of their village, at 

great risk to their lives. From this perspective, it is a bit easier to understand 

why there always was great trepidation in endorsing a mobile defense 

strategy. To alleviate the unease, the Red Army leveraged the democratic 

process to gain support and consensus for the strategy. For the Second 

Extermination Campaign, Mao could only initiate his strategy after two 
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months of debate. The long debate process demonstrated how the Red 

Army gained the people’s support for the plan. Once the people’s support 

was secured, they were organized into different groups.116 Many times, 

locals filled multiple roles in different communist organizations, providing 

logistical and guerrilla support, depending on the unit and operation. These 

local organizations were then integrated and synchronized with the main 

Red Army forces to ensure unity of action throughout the campaign.117

The second key tenet was isolation. As the NRA movement moved 

forward deeper into Soviet territory, its extended lines of communications 

became susceptible to a myriad of different attacks. Local militia groups 

constantly harassed the NRA, especially its rear areas during the night, 

increasing the confusion and instilling fear in the NRA units. Additional 

NRA forces had to be allocated to secure the rear areas, thereby decreasing 

the combat power at the front lines. The guerrilla attacks would draw NRA 

units into disadvantageous terrain or areas. Terrain was also used to isolate 

units. Many NRA units were usually separated from reinforcing units by 

mountain ranges or riverbeds, preventing the establishment of mutually 

supporting positions, and effectively shifting the advantage to the Red 

Army.118

The last tenet was concentration. Once the NRA unit was isolated 

in a battlefield of its choosing, the Red Army massed all its combat 

power to overwhelm its enemy. While the total NRA force consistently 

outnumbered the Red Army during each Extermination Campaign, 

the Red Army leveraged its strategy to create a three-to-one advantage 

over the NRA during battle.119 Mao leveraged terrain to concentrate 

overwhelming power on the enemy, as the principle “ten engages one.”120

Zhu De believed in fighting at a location of his choosing, where he 

could leverage “concentration, surprise attacks, and dispersals, encircle 

and attack.”121 While massing combat power made tactical sense, it also 

had strategic implications. The Red Army needed to mass firepower in 

order to win a quick and decisive battle. The Red Army was incapable of 

sustaining contact for long period of times. The army remained critically 

short of logistical supplies, especially ammunition. Red Army units often 

lived from battle to battle, with each victory providing more supplies. Any 

sustained contact caused a severe strain on its logistical network, leaving 

the Red Army vulnerable. To protect against this weakness, the Red 

Army exercised patience and restraint when choosing battle. Only when 

the opportunity to engage in a quick, decisive battle did the Red Army 

concentrate its forces and overwhelm the enemy. The relative quickness of 

the actual battles fought during the Extermination campaigns demonstrates 

how the Red Army always chose quick battles for survival. 

The “lure the enemy in deep” strategy gave the Red Army the advantage 

it needed to contend with numerically and technologically superior forces. 

Other than the above-mentioned tenets, the Red Army also used specific 
93

tactics in order to gain an advantage on the battlefield.

Tactics

The “lure the enemy in deep” strategy required the Red Army to apply 

certain tactics that focused on taking advantage of any and all favorable 

conditions for a weaker Red Army to emerge victorious. Through 

intelligence, deception, and local support, the Red Army exhausted, 

dispersed, and tripped up the NRA forces, and gave the Red Army the 

advantage on the battlefield. 

One of the key strengths of the Communist defense against the 

Nationalist Extermination Campaign was its ability to collect intelligence. 

The communists would send scouts into the areas to conduct a thorough 

reconnaissance of the Nationalist-occupied villages and towns. A sample 

survey report from 1931 represented some of the thoroughness of these 

reconnaissance actions during that period.122 The survey covered the 

following specific areas: (1) geographical land conditions; (2) waterways 

and river conditions; (3) ethnic minority populations; (4) road networks and 

trafficability, (5) local population and associated demographic information; 

(6) local government structure; (7) local militia structure; (8) local market 

and trade conditions; (9) manufacturing and production capabilities; 

(10) local living conditions; and (11) worker population and their living 

conditions. Key areas to highlight in the survey were the attention to 

details on the militia and workers conditions. The militia survey looked 

at not only government forces, but also “private” forces hired by wealthy 

land owners. It also looked to identify any cleavages or conflicts between 

these forces that could be exploited. For the workers, the focus on was the 

living conditions and status of land distribution. Intelligence reports also 

provided intricate details about NRA fortifications, to include how deep 

trenches and what building materials were used in fortifications.123 All this 

information helped Red Army forces to analyze the weaknesses in these 

cities to gain the local populace support, defeat local militias, and create a 

Soviet government in the area. 

Another key strength of the Red Army was its use of deception. It 

effectively used feints, cover and concealment, and mobility to deceive 

the NRA and create advantageous conditions to conduct an attack. During 

its deception, the Red Army demonstrated the tactical patience required 

for success. During the Second Extermination campaign, the Red Army 

remained concealed outside Donggu for twenty-five days waiting for 

the opportune moment to attack. The Red Army intelligence network 

also provided great insight into the NRA decision-making process that 

allowed it to conduct feints and deception plans that fooled the Red Army. 

Against a superior enemy, the communists leveraged their knowledge of 

the terrain and Nationalist forces tendencies, to develop an operational 

plan that they could mass firepower against an exposed weakness. Lastly, 

the Red Army also understood how to sell a feint to deceive the enemy. 
94

During the Third Extermination Campaign, The Twelfth Army was very 

conspicuous, moving during the day, waving flags, leaving the First and 

Third Red Army Corps designations and markings along the route to trick 

the NRA.124

Guerrilla operations using local support remained very successful for 

the Red Army. The local populace was the first line of defense when the 

NRA came into Red areas. When the Red Army moved out of an area, 

the people would immediately spring into action. All grains, oil, and salt 

were hidden or shipped away so the NRA forces could not use them. 

The inability to forage caused the NRA forces to allocate more forces to 

transport and carry food, rather than conduct combat operations.125 Local 

militia also conducted guerrilla attacks in order to disrupt the NRA. Their 

tasks included harassment, intercepting movement, wearing out the forces, 

conducting ambushes, infiltrating the units, luring the enemy, kidnapping, 

starving the enemy, blinding the enemy, and lastly, conducting surveillance 

on the enemy.126 During the Third Extermination Campaign, guerrilla 

units conducted small-unit spoiling attacks on the flanks of the NRA, 

preventing it from establishing “stable footing.” The attacks annoyed and 

frustrated the enemy, and prevent the NRA from establishing a rhythm or 

gain the initiative.127 Local support was also the critical component in the 

Red Army’s logistical network. Many locals foraged the battlefields for 

equipment. The skill and ability of the local populace to conduct resupply 

operations would pay dividends in the future for the Red Army, especially 

during the Huai Hai Campaign.

Organization

During this period, the Red Army conducted a series of reorganizations 

to centralize control of the Red Army. While the Li Lisan line has 

been panned for leading to the defeat of the Red Army at Changsha 

and Nangchang, some of his policies actually helped to reorganize the 

Red Army into a more professional military organization. Li Lisan’s 

goal was to create large military units within the Red Army capable of 

conducting urban operations and press the revolution.128 His strategy of 

attacking urban areas forced the Red Army to integrate smaller, and often 

scattered, independent units under a single military headquarters.129 The 

reorganization of the Red Armies in 1930 helped to establish a single 

chain of command under the General Front Committee, controlled by the 

Central Committee, rather than Mao.130

In February 1930, the Red Army reorganized into two Red Army Corps. 

The Fourth Red Army, led by Zhu De and Mao, reflagged as the First Army 

Corps. Under the First Army Corps, its subordinate units reflagged as the 

Third Red Army, Fourth Red Army, Twelfth Red Army, Twentieth Red 

Army, and the Twenty-Second Red Army.131 The Fifth Red Army, under 

Peng Dehuai, changed designations at the same time to the Third Red 

Army Corps. Its subordinate units included the Fifth Red Army and Eight 
95

Red Army.132 The First Front Red Army was established before the second 

attack of Changsha, combining the First and Third Red Army Corps, under 

the direction of Zhu De.133 To accomplish this mass reorganization, the 

Red Army standardized many of these new units to establish a base level of 

training, equipment, and personnel. While this action hurt the communist 

movement in the short term by stripping the local areas of its militia, 

it helped to consolidate and organize the Red Army into a professional 

military structure. 

Local forces organizations were also changed to streamline its 

operations. Two sets of organizational regulations were published in 

May 1930 and February 1931 to help standardize the units.134 Before the 

First Extermination campaign, the Red Army held its first United Militia 

Conference. The command structure was set up with bureaus for each 

cardinal direction as well as the center, for a total five bureaus. Additionally, 

the conference divided southwest Jiangxi area into nine combat districts.135

As the scope of the extermination campaign grew, the First Front 

Army also saw an increasing need for a dedicated staff to conduct the 

necessary coordination and synchronization for combat. In 1931, the Red 

Army established a staff section at the First Front Army headquarters to 

coordinate operations, reconnaissance, administration, education, and 

mobilization. The staff also began to produce regulations standardizing 

reporting and orders production within the First Front Army.136

Other organizational changes served to insert political control at every 

military level to ensure compliance with party directives. By 1931, the 

Central Committee established three parallel governing structures that 

integrated with the Red Army. At the top of the structure was the Communist 

Party, which included the Central Committee of the CCP, its Central 

Military Committee, and the newly established Central Bureau of Soviet 

Areas. These organizations provided guidance to the General Political 

department within the Red Army, and helped to guide the Red Army’s 

political mobilization actions. Next was the Soviet government level, with 

the Central Soviet Executive Committee and its Central Revolutionary 

Military Council, chaired by Zhu De, that assisted in guiding and directing 

Red Army actions. In between the Party and the Soviet stood the Red 

Army structure, with the First Front Red Army occupying the center stage 

within the Jiangxi Soviet.137 The supreme headquarters was the Central 

Revolutionary Military Council, and it maintained military control over 

the Red Army.138

The structure built on the foundations of Mao’s concepts and the 

agreements reached at the Gutian Conference reinforced the superior role 

of political power within the Army. Li Lisan then added an additional 

layer in both the government and military by consolidating and funneling 

power to the Central Committee. Most of the Red Army leadership sat on 

two or more committees, and provided their own input to the direction 
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of the Army. The difference in the makeup of each specific committee, 

however, changed the dynamic, as some leaders, especially Mao, could 

not monopolize control of every committee. The consolidation of power 

also helped to tamp down any perceived wayward movements or plans. 

Fear of “guerrillaism,” militarism, and the other erroneous ideologies 

placed a large strain on the Central Committee.139 By consolidating power, 

and leveraging the political commissars at each military level, deviations 

could theoretically be stopped.140

Overall, the series of organizational changes helped to establish 

effective central control over the Red Army, and helped in its overall 

professionalization. However, these changes would also lead to the 

diminishment of Mao’s influence over the Red Army in the future. 

Training

During this period, the Red Army continued to employ the same 

training techniques from the previous period. After each Extermination 

Campaign, the Red Army conducted an after-action review to identify key 

lessons. Zhu De attempted to attend many of these meetings, and found 

these conferences of the “greatest technical and educational value for our 

army.”141 After the First Extermination Campaign, the First Front Army 

conducted a series of conferences, and identified areas of improvement in 

logistics and medical care. It also identified training tasks in marksmanship 

and more rehearsals for pursuit operations.142 Additionally, many of the 

Red Army soldiers and leaders learned from doing, especially in combat 

during the first three Extermination campaigns. The number of combat 

veterans helped to populate the training cadre of the Red Army schools, 

and ensured that the training remained relevant and practical. Many 

officers continued to travel abroad for training, especially to the Soviet 

Union. Starting in 1931, Yeh Qianying, Zuo Zhuan and Xiao Qingguang 

and Liu Bocheng returned from military training, adding greater military 

expertise needed to professionalize the force.143

Building on that experience, the Red Army continued to expand and 

professionalize its military education system. The Red Army’s transition 

from training units to a professional military school system occurred just 

before its departure from Jinggangshan. Its flagship institution, the Red 

Academy, had a complicated beginning because it had to adapt to the 

changing environment. The first Red Army School initially started in the 

middle of 1929, when the Fourth Red Army established it at Jinggangshan. 

Before it could start its first class, NRA forces besieged Jingangshan and 

forced the Red Army School to become an accompanying training school. 

The school staff eventually escaped with the Fourth Red Army. Upon its 

arrival at Western Fujian, the Fourth Red Army, using the accompanying 

school as the foundation, reestablished the Red Army School on December 

1929 at Longyan. Two months later, The Fourth Red Army headquarters 

left western Jiangxi, and the Twelfth Red Army and Western Fujian 
97

Soviet government assumed responsibility for the school in March 1930, 

changing the name to the Western Fujian Red Army School. 

With the initial success of the Jiangxi Soviet expansion, the need for 

military training in the Red Army increased. To meet this demand, the 

Central Committee used the Western Fujian Red Army School to establish 

two centrally controlled Red Army Officer Schools in April 1930.144 The 

First Branch of the Red Army Officer School remained at Longyan, and 

the Third Branch of the Red Army Officer School was opened in Ji’an.145

The first class of the Red Army Officer School at Longyan finally started 

in August 1930 with more than 300 students. The curriculum covered both 

military and political training topics, with two-thirds of training focused 

on military affairs. About 40 percent of the first class of students actually 

passed the final examinations and graduated from the three-month course. 

After graduation, the majority of the students went to serve at the platoon 

and company level within the Red Army, while some graduates went to 

local militia units.146 The second class was selected, but never started class 

because of the First Extermination Campaign, forcing the First Branch 

of the Red Army Officer School to relocate to Hugang. The school was 

designated the Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi Border Red Army School. 

While this military school system provided a basic level of education, 

the Red Army leadership still continued to work toward developing 

a professional military academy. Its first attempt was the Chinese 

Workers and Peasants Red Army School, created in September 1931 out 

of the Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi Border Red Army School, the First 

Front Red Army Central Training Unit, and the Third Red Army Corps 

Accompanying School Unit.147 In October, Mao pushed for something even 

greater, a professional military academy that would develop Red Army 

leaders competent in military and political matters. Using Republican 

China’s Huangpu Military Academy as a model, the Red Army created the 

Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army Central Military and Political 

School, known as the Red Academy, in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province. 148 The 

school’s curriculum expanded the scope of training, and incorporated 

basic education into the military and political training. The academy’s 

primary student population was still lower-level Red Army officers and 

cadre members, developing the basic leadership skills to lead soldiers 

and mobilize the population. While the first class at the Red Academy 

started in December 1931, the school flourished under the guidance of 

Liu Bocheng when he took over in 1932, which will be discussed in more 

depth in the following chapter.

Besides the Red Academy, each Soviet created its own military training 

school to provide training for local cadre and military leaders. The push 

for the localized training began in April 1930, when the Central Military 

Council authorized the creation of local military schools to develop and 

train its leaders.149 By December, the Red Army had five branches of the 
98

Red Army Officer School and two base-area military schools spread out in 

the western Jiangxi Soviet, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet, northeast Jiangxi 

Soviet, Hunan-western Hubei Soviet, and Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet.150

Some of the demand for more professional training was a result of the 

Red Army’s victories on the battlefield. The demand for low density skill 

sets, such as medical and communications, increased as the Red Army 

confiscated modern equipment from the NRA. Wireless communications 

and medical supplies were some of the most valuable caches found after 

battle, and helped to increase the combat effectiveness of the army. In 

response to the new equipment, the Red Army developed specialty schools 

for low-density skills sets. The first two specialty schools developed in 

1931 were the Red Army Communications School and Red Army Medical 

School. 

The communication school started as the First Front Red Army 

Wireless Communication Unit in Donggu in January 1931. The unit was 

built on soldiers and officers with experience on wireless communication 

equipment, along with wireless communications equipment and operators 

captured from the NRA during the First Extermination campaign. The 

inaugural class had twenty soldiers and they were sent straight to the 

field during the Second Extermination Campaign, moving with political 

mobilization teams to establish the Red Army’s communication network 

within the Jiangxi Soviet. By January 1932, three classes had graduated, 

and the Red Army used the graduates to establish the Red Army Wireless 

Communications School.151

The Red Army Medical School stood up alongside the Red Academy in 

Ruijin in November 1931. The first class graduated twenty-five soldiers. 

Initially, the facilities and equipment for the medical school were sparse 

and elementary. The school had very few experienced instructors. The 

students’ educational backgrounds were also very low, making teaching 

difficult. The school lacked books and diagnostic equipment. Given the 

lack of equipment and facilities, many of the students received their 

education out in the field because they were attached to field units during 

class. Despite the initial difficulties, the medical school began to develop 

and expand in the following years. 

Other specialty training was also conducted, though the results were 

uneven. A demand for artillery training grew after the Red Army captured 

cannons during the Second Extermination Campaign. However, scarcity 

of artillery ammunition and mobility challenges of the equipment rendered 

much of the training and units ineffective.152 Engineering training and 

units were a bit more successful. Engineering forces were created around 

a cadre of former miners, who helped establish air shelters against the 

new air NRA threat.153 Engineering training remained limited, leveraging 

existing mining technology to create simple defensive structures. 
99

The Red Army also trained its soldiers and leaders through the 

publication and distribution of periodicals. The Red Army Political 

Department and the Red Academy both led the production of military 

periodicals. The expansion in much of the printing can be attributed to the 

capture of KMT printing presses.154 One example is Wuku, a periodical 

published by the General Political Department of the Third Red Army. 

While the magazines still provided a propaganda value, it also was a great 

medium for professional exchange. Peng Dehuai publicly addressed some 

challenges within his unit in the periodical in order to promote awareness 

and help other units defend against these problems.155 One of the major 

topics during this period was issues of professionalization of the military. 

Issues included commanders shirking training responsibilities for their 

units, or political training, to include reading classes, not being done to 

standard.156 To address these problems, some authors recommended a 

renewed focus on political training for soldiers, commissars, and officers 

to reinvigorate the revolutionary spirit and eradicate this problem from the 

Red Army.157

Training of the local militia was also critical during this period. The 

Communist Youth (CY) organizations trained on offensive and defensive 

tactics, as well air defense. In addition to traditional warfare, the training 

also focused on identifying counter-revolutionary personnel, especially in 

light of the Futian Incident. Another task for the CY was developing ways 

to win over POWs. Specific training focused on developing proselytizing 

techniques to convert NRA soldiers to join the communist fight. Political 

education was part of the curriculum. The CY used plays and newspapers 

to strengthen revolutionary spirit and increase courage. Lastly, the CY 

made sure training was fun, making a big push for playing sports and 

activities in order to both increase physical fitness as well as improve 

morale of the soldiers.158

Conclusion

By 1931, the Red Army had a string of victories over the numerically 

and technologically superior NRA. Leveraging its strengths of mobility, 

intelligence, and deception into Mao’s “lure the enemy in deep” mobile 

defense strategy, the Red Army gained territory, equipment, and most 

importantly confidence with each victory. The Jiangxi Soviet spanned three 

provinces and claimed more than a million citizens. These gains were not 

without costs. The Red Army luckily survived a bitter intraparty struggle 

between two factions on the philosophical, militarily, and political ends of 

the spectrums. The Li Lisan line embodied the urban-centric, conservative 

communist approach that dominated the Central Committee in Shanghai. 

Its plan to incite the revolution through a series of urban insurrections 

failed, and Mao’s rural Soviet strategy prevailed. Remnants of the leftist 

movement still remained in the Red Army, and the AB Corps purge and 

the Twentieth Red Army’s mutiny almost led to the Red Army’s defeat. 
100

The Red Army’s thorough political mobilization of the local peasant areas, 

however, tilted the odds in its favor, as the peasant support helped the 

Red Army beat the NRA in three extermination campaigns. During this 

time, the Red Army continued to adopt professionalization measures, even 

creating its “Red” version of the Huangpu Military Academy. All these 

measures helped to professionalize the main Red Army force. Yet, the 

local militia groups that supported, and often augmented the Red Army 

were still filled with problems. Discipline issues, corruption, and issues 

with compliance were more common than acknowledged. Even worse, the 

future for the Red Army looked more difficult. The KMT had not given up 

on defeating the communists; they simply took a break and would be back 

even stronger. Additionally, unbeknownst to him, Mao’s influence within 

the Red Army and the party was waning. A new group of left-leaning 

communists, known as the Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks, were rising to the 

top of the Communist Party, and would, once again, change the strategy 

for the Red Army and Communist China. 
101

Notes

1. John P. Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese 

Communist Party, 1927-72 (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1972), 162.

2. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 161.

3. William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of 

Communist Military Politics, 1927-71 (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1973), 28.

4. John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition: 1927-1935. (Stanford: 

Stanford University Press, 1966), 138.

5. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 171.

6. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 168.

7. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 143.

8. Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists (Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 1963), 127.

9. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, 128-129.

10. Saich, The Rise to Power, 400-407; North, Moscow and Chinese 

Communists, 130-131.

11. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, 127.

12. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 169.

13. Agnes Smedley, The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh (New 

York: Monthly Review Press 1956), 275.

14. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 144.

15. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 122-124. In April 1929, the Chinese 

Police conducted a raid on Soviet consulates in Northern China, finding 

documents and evidence that the Soviet Union was planning to subvert and 

overthrow the Nationalist government. The incident was part of a greater battle 

for control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was a lucrative venture for 

both the Soviets and the Chinese. The veracity of the documents seized in the 

raid is debated. Nevertheless, the Nationalist government expelled key Soviet 

diplomats, and both sides cut relations. On November 16, 1929, the Soviet 

Union invaded Manchuria to reestablish its dominant role. During this time, Li 

Li-san used the slogan “Protect the Soviet Union,” to demonstrate his hardened 

support for the Russians. 

16. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 133.

17. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 134.

18. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 169.

19. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, 126.

20. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 205.

21. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 206. 

22. Di fang wu zhuang de ce lue zu zhi gong zuo lu xian [Strategy, 

Organization, and Working Line of the local Armed Forces], CBSA Circular, 
102

No. 10, February 1931, SSC, Reel 7:9.

23. Smedley, The Great Road, 274.

24. Wuhan, and three surrounding cities of Hankou, Wuchang, and 

Hanyang, was a regional industrial center on the Yangtze River. Its concentration 

of factories and industries made it essential launching point for the proletariatled urban insurrection. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 206.

25. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, 133.

26. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, 131-132.

27. Mao, Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (New York: International 

Publishers, 1954), 201.

28. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 145.

29. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 122. 

30. Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 122-123.

31. Smedley, The Great Road, 275.

32. Smedley, The Great Road, 277.

33. Smedley, The Great Road, 275.

34. The reorganization of the Red Army will be discussed later in this 

chapter.

35. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 213.

36. Some scholars stated that Peng Dehuai was designated as the chairman. 

See Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 215. 

37. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, 140.

38. Smedley, The Great Road, 277.

39. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 265.

40. Smedley, The Great Road, 278.

41. Shaoqun Huang, Zhong qu feng yun: Zhong yang Su qu di yi zhi wu 

ci fan “wei jiao” zhan zheng shi [Zhong qu Feng yun: the History of the First 

through Fifth Extermination Campaigns in the Central Soviet] (Beijing: Zhong 

gong zhong yang dang xiao chu ban she, 1993), 27. Hereafter cited as ZQFY.

42. Smedley, The Great Road, 280.

43. Smedley, The Great Road, 279.

44. Some scholars see little evidence of the existence of the AB Corps to 

the extent first portrayed by Mao and the CCP. Subsequent examination by the 

CCP concurred that the AB threat at the time was exaggerated. See Stephen 

C. Averill, “Origins of Futian Incident,” in New Perspectives on the Chinese 

Revolution, Tony Saich and Hans J. van de Ven, eds. (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 

1995); Robert Suleski “Futian Incident Reconsidered,” The China Quarterly 89 

(1982): 97-104.

45. Stephen Uhlaney, History of the Chinese Communist Party (Stanford: 

Hoover Institution Press, 1988), 44-45.
103

46. Averill, “Origins of Futian Incident,” 105.

47. Averill, “Origins of Futian Incident,” 106.

48. Uhlaney, History of the Chinese Communist Party, 45.

49. ZQFY, 13-14.

50. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, 142.

51. Stephen Averill argued that one of the factors leading to the Futian 

incident was the local power dynamics in the greater Ji’an area. See Averill, 

“Origins of Futian Incident.” Ronald Suleski also examined the Futian incident 

in Ronald Suleski and Daniel Bays, Early Communist China: Two Studies 

(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969); Ronald Suleski, “The Futian 

Incident Reconsidered,” The China Quarterly 89 (1982): 97-104.

52. ZQFY, 31.

53. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 217.

54. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 129. For a more 

detailed discussion on discrepancies with Red Army numbers, refer to Appendix 

A.

55. ZQFY, 32.

56. ZQFY, 33.

57. ZQFY, 33-34.

58. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 268.

59. ZQFY, 43.

60. ZQFY, 44.

61. ZQFY, 45-47.

62. ZQFY, 47.

63. ZQFY, 51.

64. ZQFY, 51-52.

65. ZQFY, 52.

66. ZQFY, 53.

67. ZQFY, 53-54.

68. ZQFY, 56.

69. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 270.

70. Zhongguo ren min ge ming jun shi bo wu guan, Zhongguo zhan zheng 

fa zhan shi [History of the Development of War in China] (Beijing: Ren min 

chu ban she, 2003), 831. Hearafter cited as History of the Development of War 

in China, 853. Smedley reported the NRA force at 150,000, Smedley, The Great 

Road, 295.

71. Zhongguo jun dui shi zhan shi lu: Zhong ri liang jun xue zhan, guo 

gong liang jun xue zhan, zhong Mei liang jun xue zhan [Record of China’s 

Military Combat: First and Second Sino-Japanese War; the Chinese Civil 
104

War; and First and Second Sino-American Wars (Korean War and Vietnam 

War)], (Beijing: Guo fang da xue chu ban she, 1993), 9-10. Hereafter cited as 

ZGJDSZSL.

72. History of the Development of War in China, 853. 

73. This portion was based off the research presented in ZQFY, 96-101.

74. Smedley, The Great Road, 298.

75. ZQFY, 98.

76. ZQFY, 102-105. Among the captured was the division commander, 

Gong Bingfan, who wore an enlisted soldier’s uniform to conceal his identity, 

and successfully escaped. See Smedley, The Great Road, 297.

77 There is still debate over why the Nineteenth Route NRA Army 

never reinforced the area. Pingfeng Chi argued lack of coordination in NRA 

operations. See Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 133. 

Wheras others believed it was personality conflicts between the commanders 

that prevented any reinforcement. See ZQFY, 105-106. 

78. ZQFY, 105-106.

79. ZQFY, 106.

80. ZQFY, 106-107.

81. ZQFY, 107-108.

82. History of the Development of War in China, 853.

83. ZQFY, 108.

84. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 272.

85. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 272.

86. ZQFY, 123.

87. ZQFY, 120-121.

88. ZQFY, 124-125.

89. ZQFY, 124.

90. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 134; 

ZGJDSZSL, 13-14.

91. Snow, Inside Red China, 179. For more information on the differences 

of numbers for the Red Army, see Appendix A.

92. ZQFY, 122.

93. ZQFY, 127.

94. Mao stated that the Red Army travelled more than one thousand li. 

Mao, Selected Works, Vol. 1, 230. 

95. ZQFY, 126-128. During the Third Extermination Campaign, 

most Chinese sources called the Gaoxing area Gaoxingwei, meaning the 

embankment area near Gaoxing. In terms of geographical proximity and ease of 

understanding, this study uses the city proper name of Gaoxing to describe the 

area.
105

96. ZQFY, 129-130.

97. ZQFY, 130-131.

98. ZQFY, 131-132.

99. ZQFY, 132-133.

100. ZQFY, 134. Pingfeng Chi’s research corroborates this theory that 

the threat from the Guangdong warlord factions prematurely ended the 

Third Extermination Campaign. See Chi, 137. Other scholars argued that the 

September 18, 1931, Japanese invasion of Manchuria, known as the Mukden 

Incident, prematurely caused the end of the Third Extermination Campaign. See 

Chong Kun Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 

Ph.D dissertation (The American University, 1968), 144. Either way, external 

factors caused Chiang Kai-shek to cease operations and return to Nanjing. 

101. Some scholars argue the battle of Gaoxing was a loss for the Red Army, 

blaming Mao and Zhu De for being overzealous in the attack and not sticking 

to its original principles. See Helen Foster Snow, Inside Red China (New 

York: Da Capo Press, 1979), 254. However, Mao and Zhu’s action, taken into 

context, makes more sense. The Red Army had recently refitted, while the NRA 

conducted a fruitless two-week search for the Twelfth Red Army. Additionally, 

the Red Army’s intelligence reports had a history of accurate findings. The Red 

Army also had a history of success conducting pursuits on familiar terrain as 

well. 

102. History of the Development of War in China, 854.

103. Nym Wales, Red Dust (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), 124.

104. The development of the Red Army wireless communications systems 

will be discussed further in this chapter under training.

105. Retreatism is a pejorative term used to describe a conservative military 

strategy that adopts withdrawal in the face of challenge. See Snow, Inside Red 

China, 168. 

106. Peter Donovan, “The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet, 1931-

1934” (Ph.D dissertation, Cornell University, 1974), 54.

107. Di fang wuzhuang de celue zuzhi gongzuo luxian [Strategy, 

Organization, and Working Line of the local Armed Forces], CBSA Circular, 

No. 10, February 1931, SSC, Reel 7:9.

108. Jiangxi di yi ci gong nong bing su wei ai da hui dui di fang wu zhuang 

wen ti de jue yi an [Jiangxi Provincial Workers and Peasant Army First Plenum 

Conference on the Local Militia question], December 1931, SSC, Reel 7:6.

109. Jiangxi di yi ci gong nong bing su wei ai da hui dui di fang wu zhuang 

wen ti de jue yi an [Jiangxi Provincial Workers and Peasant Army First Plenum 

Conference on the Local Militia question], December 1931, SSC, Reel 7:6.

110. For more information on the use of attrition warfare in the Korean War, 

see Carter Malkasian, A History of Modern Wars of Attrition (Westport: Praeger 

Publishing, 2002), 119-186.

111. Jin, Yuguo. Zhongguo zhan shu shi [History of Military Tactics in 
106

China] (Beijing: Jie fang jun chu ban she, 2003), 304. Hereafter cited as History 

of Chinese Military Tactics.

112. History of the Development of War in China, 853. 

113. History of the Development of War in China, 858.

114. Smedley, The Great Road, 289. While many NRA soldiers were 

released, soldiers with specialized skills, such as advanced weapons or 

communications training, were often coerced to join the Chinese Red Army and 

fill in training positions for the Red Army. One method employed by the Chinese 

Red Army was leveraging the CY to subtly persuade captured NRA soldiers to 

join the Red Army. 

115. Seventy years of the PLA, 70.

116. Refer to chapter 3 for a more in-depth description of the different 

military organizations within the Red Army. 

117. History of Chinese Military Tactics, 304.

118. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 270.

119. History of Chinese Military Tactics, 304.

120. Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 134. 

121. Smedley, The Great Road, 288. 

122. See Chi bai qu yu she hui qing kuang diao cha baogao da gang [An 

Outline of a Survey Report on the Social Conditions in the Red and White 

Areas], Front Committee of the Third Group Army, CWPRA, January 1931, 

SSC, Reel 6:21, as a sample report of a Nationalist area.

123. Smedley, The Great Road, 295.

124. ZQFY, 132.

125. ZQFY, 94.

126. ZQFY, 95.

127. ZQFY, 119.

128. Seventy Years of the PLA, 75.

129. Donovan, “The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet,” 29.

130. The General Front Committee measure did not meet its expectations, 

as Mao became the Chairman of the General Front Committee, consolidating his 

power under the new organization. See Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 204-

237. The General Front Committee was dissolved in 1931, and replaced by the 

Central Bureau of Soviet Areas.

131. ZQFY, 372. Donovan’s organizational analysis differed slightly. He 

mentioned the Eleventh Red Army as part of the First Army Corps. Additionally, 

he cited the Twelfth, Twentieth, and Twenty-second Red Armies as attached 

units, rather than organic to the First Red Army Corps. See Donovan, 172-174.

Rue’s organizational chart maintained the Third, Fourth, Twelfth, Twentieth, 

Twenty-first, and Thirty-fifth Red Armies. See Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 

212.
107

132. ZQFY, 372. The designations changed for the Third Army Corps 

subordinate units throughout the first three campaigns. By the Second 

Extermination campaigns, the Corps subordinate units were the First Red 

Division, Third Red Division, Fourth Red Division, and Sixth Red Division. 

See ZQFY, 374, 376. Donovan presented different subordinate units. Instead of 

the Eighth Red Army, the Seventh Red Army was directly subordinate to the 

Third Red Army Corps. The Eight Red Army was an attached unit, rather than 

an organic unit. See Donovan, “The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet,” 

173-174. Rue only included the Eight Army under the Third Army Corps, See 

Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 212.

133. Snow, Inside Red China, 175.

134. Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 164.

135. The First district contained Ningdu, Guangchang, Nanfeng, and Le’an; 

Second District contained Ji’an and the eastern bank of Jishui; Third District 

contained Yongfeng county; Fourth district contained was Xingguo county; Fifth 

District contained Western Bank of Gan River; Sixth District contained Eastern 

Bank of Gan River; Seventh District contained Taihe, Wan’an, and Zhuchuan; 

Eighth District contained Hexi District; and Ninth District contained Southeast 

Hunan. ZQFY, 95.

136. Seventy Years of the PLA, 77.

137. Donovan, “The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet,” 58-61; 

Harrison, The Long March to Power, 202-203; Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition

206-214.

138. Donovan, “The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet,” 58; History 

of the Development of War in China, 864.

139. According to Gregory Benton, “guerrillaism” is seen as a “pejorative 

term used to describe a military style characterized by indiscipline, a lack of 

strategy or system, and the pursuit of ‘individual heroism’ above corporate 

interest, a way of fighting characterized as ‘peasant.’” See Gregory Benton, New 

Fourth Army: Communist Resistance Along the Yangtze and the Huai, 1938-

1941 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 666.

140. Donovan, “The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet,” 76.

141. Smedley, The Great Road, 292.

142. ZQFY, 90.

143. Whitson, The Chinese High Command, 54-55.

144. Chinese Military School History, 334.

145. The “Futian Incident” prematurely ended the Ji’an Red Army Officer 

School. Most of the teachers were transferred back to the First Front Army 

training unit. See Chinese Military Education History, 276. 

146. During the same time, the Red Army School held a two-week 

Political Commissar Training course and Communist Youth Training course for 

approximately 50 students in order to help local cadre members conduct political 

mobilization tasks. See Chinese Military School History, 335.
108

147. Chinese Military Education History, 278; Chinese Military School 

History, 337.

148. The nickname for the new Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army 

Central Military and Political School was actually hongpu (translates to “red 

harbor”), which was a play on words in Chinese, incorporating the character for 

“Red” in the name, making the name sound very similar to Huangpu Military 

Academy. See Chinese Military School History, 337. In Jane Price’s Cadres, 

Commanders, and Commissars, she called the school Red Army School, and 

called the 1933 Red Army military school for high level leaders Red Academy. 

See Jane L. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars (Boulder, CO: 

Westview Press, 1976), 121-127.

149. Chinese Military School History, 332.

150. Chinese Military Education History, 276-277.

151. Chinese Military School History, 352-353.

152. Seventy Years of the PLA, 86-87.

153. Smedley, The Great Road, 293.

154. Smedley, The Great Road, 292.

155. “Kuo da hong jun” [Red Army Expansion], Wuku [Weapon 

Depository], No. 7 (General Political Department of the CWPRA Third Group 

Army, December 31, 1931), SSC, Reel 7:3.

156. “Yi shi dang nei de yanzhong de cuowu” [Serious mistakes in the First 

Division CCP], Wuku [Armory], No. 7 (General Political Department of Third 

Group Army, CWPRA, December 31, 1931), SSC, Reel 7:3.

157. “Fan dui fu” [Fight against Corruption], Wuku [Weapon Depository], 

No. 8 (General Political Department of Third Group Army, CWPRA, January 

12, 1932), SSC, Reel 7:3.

158. Hong jun zhong shao gong gong zuo da gang [Red Army Communist 

Youth Training Outline], June 20, 1931, SSC, Reel 7:17.
109

Chapter 5

Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks and Final

Extermination Campaigns (1932-1934)

External influences began influencing the KMT-Communist conflict. 

Japanese expansion into China threatened Soviet interests, and Moscow 

looked to the Chinese Red Army as a potential bulwark against Japanese 

interests. From 1930 to 1931, the Red Army was successful in defending 

the Soviet areas against the NRA Extermination Campaigns; however, 

it still suffered from problems with discipline, compliances, and overall 

professionalism. Under the leadership of the new Central Committee, led 

by the Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks, and a new COMINTERN representative, 

Otto Braun, the Red Army adopted a series of initiatives starting in 

1932 to expand and professionalize the Red Army. All Red Army units 

were standardized to establish better command and control. Political 

indoctrination and military training also became more standardized as a 

wave of new manuals was distributed among the Red Army force. The Red 

Army expanded the Red Academy with the creation of the Red Army War 

College for mid-grade and senior officers. Branch schools and specialty 

schools were also established in other Soviet areas to increase competency 

and training level of Red Army soldiers. Political mobilization still 

remained an important part of the Red Army, with the focus remaining 

on the recruitment of new soldiers, though there was a renewed emphasis 

on the urban proletariat in the revolution. The biggest change to the Red 

Army operations was the adoption of Soviet offensive tactics to seek 

decisive battle. CCP leaders mistakenly believed that simply the élan from 

revolutionary fervor would give the Red Army the silver bullet. However, 

these professionalization efforts were not met with commensurate 

investment in weapons and equipment. Coupled with the NRA’s adoption 

of effective counterinsurgency tactics in the Fifth Extermination Campaign, 

the Red Army suffered severe casualties and was forced to conduct a long 

retreat, known as the Long March, for survival. In the end, the new strategy 

failed to deliver the decisive victory sought by the CCP but at the same 

time, the strategy helped to institutionalize key initiatives within the Red 

Army that allowed it to become a more professional fighting force. 

Twenty-eight Bolsheviks

As the Red Army was defeating the NRA in the Third Extermination 

Campaign, another intraparty power struggle was growing within the 

Communist party, with new leadership taking charge of the party. After 

the fall of Li Lisan, a group of students returning from studies in the Soviet 

Union began a systematic operation to gain control of the CCP. This group 

of “Returned Students,” also known as the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks, was a 

group of twenty-something Chinese students, who returned to China with 

the new COMINTERN adviser, Pavel Mif, in 1931. Two key members 

of the group,1

 Qin Bangxian, known as Bo Gu, and Chen Shaoyu, known 
110

as Wang Ming, would later assume key positions of influence within the 

CCP. Many of them had attended Moscow’s Sun Yat-sen University, and 

become acquainted with Mif, then the head rector of the university. The 

school was a breeding ground for ultra-orthodox Stalinist communist 

doctrine.2

 The students of the group were heavily influenced by the Soviet 

models and coalesced around the strict conservative Moscow view. Mif 

saw the group as a “well-disciplined force” and used them to help purge 

out divergent groups within the university.3

 This partnership continued in 

China after they arrived in Shanghai in late 1930.

The Rise of the Bolsheviks

The initial push into power began in September 1930, with the Third 

Plenum. Mif attempted to use the forum to denounce Li Lisan’s plan as 

running counter to the COMINTERN policies, but failed to convince 

the majority of the Central Committee.4

 Mif’s opportunity rose after the 

COMINTERN condemned Li Lisan and recalled him back to Moscow in 

November. At the Fourth Plenum in January 1931, Li Lisan and at least 

eleven of his supporters were ousted from the Central Committee, and their 

positions were filled by Moscow-aligned Communist Party members.5

For the next year, the Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks were engaged in a brutal 

intraparty struggle with other Communist factions, often using coercion 

and violence. Some Communist party members even leveraged the KMT 

to eliminate the opposition and consolidate power.6

 By late September 

1931, the Bolsheviks had effectively destroyed most of the opposition and 

incorporated the surviving members into a Central Committee loyal to the 

Soviet Union. Bo Gu assumed the head of the Central Committee from 

Wang Ming, who returned to Moscow.

Once the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks gained control of the CCP within 

Shanghai, their next target was Mao and the Red Army in the Soviet areas. 

They saw the First All-China Soviet Congress held in November 1931 as 

a perfect opportunity to launch their first attack. Mao, however, was well 

prepared for the initial assault to his power, having gotten word about actions 

in Shanghai from loyal supporters. Before the Central Committee arrived 

in Ruijin, Mao had already emerged victorious from the extermination 

campaigns, suppressed dissension among his own ranks, and established a 

delegation of loyalists within the Soviet Congress.7

 The Bolsheviks failed 

to gain majority within the Congress, gaining only two seats in the Central 

Executive Committee. On the other hand, Mao was elected Chairman of 

the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet, Zhu De was selected as 

the Commissar of War, and other Mao loyalists filled other positions in 

the Soviet government.8

 While the Bolsheviks attempted to gain political 

control over the Red Army, they also employed Zhou Enlai9

 to help break 

Mao’s monopolistic control over the Red Army.10

In early 1932, the CCP pushed the Red Army to expand the Soviet 

territory to a greater scale than ever before. During this period, the Red Army 
111

was also expanding. The successful defense against the Extermination 

Campaigns brought in many former NRA soldiers, some voluntary, others 

forced. One of the biggest reasons for growth came in December 14, 1931, 

when the NRA Twenty-sixth Route Army rebelled against the KMT and 

joined the Red Army. These rebel forces were integrated into the Red 

Army, and were designated the Fifth Red Army Corps. This addition along 

with other recruits increased the First Front Red Army’s strength to around 

70,000.11 With the Red Army growing so large, the Soviet area needed to 

expand in order to support itself and the revolution.

Changes to Red Army Strategy

On January 9, 1932, the Central Committee issued “Resolution of the 

CCP Central Committee on Winning Initial Revolutionary Successes in 

One or More Provinces” outlining a new strategy for the CCP and the Red 

Army.12 The resolution started with an assessment of the current situation 

in China, stating that the combination of an international depression 

negatively affecting the Chinese economy, the Red Army’s growth and 

string of victories from the Extermination Campaigns, and the increase in 

imperial aggression embodied by the Mukden Incident presented a great 

opportunity for the CCP to advance the Chinese revolutionary struggle.13

The resolution then reasserted the primacy of the urban proletariat in the 

revolution, and outlined the strategy for the future.14 Foremost, the party 

must “expand the territory, link up the separated Soviet areas to form an 

integrated Soviet area, and take advantage of the present favorable political 

and military conditions to seize one or two important central cities so as to 

win an initial victory of the revolution in one or more provinces.”15 Based 

on the new strategy, the Red Army conducted a series of offensives to 

expand the Soviet territory and connect the Soviets starting in early 1932, 

targeting southern Jiangxi, to include Ganzhou, Nanchang, and Jiujiang, 

as well Fujian’s Zhangzhou, Fuzhou, and Xiamen.16

The resolution also pushed for a “positive and offensive line,”17

characterizing the former “lure the enemy in deep” strategy as “no longer 

right because circumstances have changed.”18 It directly attacked Mao’s 

strategy as being “right opportunism” that “underestimated” the situation 

and maintained a “pessimistic attitude,” and called upon the party and 

army to must actively guard against these incorrect mindsets.19 It cemented 

the divide between the left-leaning Bolshevik “positive and offensive line” 

and the right-leaning Maoist “lure the enemy in deep” strategy. 

The first target city was Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province. The city linked 

the Hunan-Jiangxi border areas with the Fujian-Jiangxi borders areas, and 

provided a launching station north to Ji’an.20 During a meeting on January 

1932 at Ruijin to discuss preparations, Mao expressed reservations about 

the attack, stating the Red Army did not have the necessary weapons or 

supplies necessary to seize the city.21 Zhu De supported Mao’s view, but 

the Central Military Committee vetoed his measures and continued to 
112

plan for the Ganzhou attack.22 On January 10, the Revolutionary Military 

Committee finally issued the order to the First Red Army Corps, Third Red 

Army Corps, Fifth Red Army Corps, and Jiangxi Soviet Military Regional 

forces to conduct the attack on Ganzhou in February. The KMT was 

well prepared for the attack and conducted preparations for the assault.23

Around February 3, 1932, the Red Army arrived at Ganzhou and encircled 

the city. The next day, the Fifth Red Army Corps, about 20,000 strong, 

conducted the main attack on the East Gate, puncturing the defenses, 

but were repelled. On February 17 and 23, the Red Army conducted two 

additional assaults, expanding the attack to the West Gate and South Gate 

as well, but the Red Army could not gain a foothold. During the siege, two 

NRA brigades reinforced the distressed garrison in Ganzhou just two days 

before the final assault. On March 4, the Red Army conducted its fourth 

assault, and again was repelled. Three days later, the Red Army retired to 

Jiangkou to reorganize after suffering about 3,000 casualties.24

The CCP was undeterred by the loss at Ganzhou, believing that the 

strategy was still correct. The CCP was also bolstered by Japan’s occupation 

of Manchuria, as it signaled the revolution was near.25 At a March 18, 

1932 meeting, Mao again attacked the strategy as being overly ambitious, 

failing to understand the current conditions of the Red Army. He argued 

that it was still premature to use the Red Army to attack the cities. His 

argument fell on deaf ears, and the CCP reorganized the Red Army into 

two route armies. The West Route Red Army, made up of the Third Red 

Army Corps, was responsible for expanding the Soviet areas west of the 

Gan River in the Hunan-Jiangxi area with a focus around Zhuchuan, Taihe 

and Wan’an. The First and Fifth Red Army Corps formed the Central 

Route Red Army. Taking Mao’s recommendations, the Central Route 

Army targeted Southern Fujian for expansion operations, with Xiamen 

as the final target.26 On March 26, the Central Route Red Army occupied 

the Changting area and under Mao’s guidance, conducted the political 

mobilization of the local populace. Seeing little progress in actual military 

action, Zhou Enlai pushed hard for Mao to stop the political mobilization 

and actually engage the enemy by moving south to Zhangzhou.27 The Red 

Army moved its operations south, and attacked the Forty-Ninth NRA 

Division in Fujian province. On April 10, the Red Army seized Longyan 

and destroyed one brigade of the Forty-ninth NRA Division. The Fifth 

NRA Corps attempted to reinforce the Forty-ninth Division, but lost two 

brigades to the Red Army. The Red Army continued its march south, and 

on April 20 took Zhangzhou by defeating the Forty-ninth NRA Division. 

At Zhangzhou, 1,675 prisoners were taken, 2,000 rifles, a couple of 

artillery pieces, 13,000 rounds of ammunition, two airplanes, and more 

than one million yuan. Additionally, supplies of food, salt, and oil were 

also confiscated for the Red Army.28

After the success of Zhangzhou, Mao sent a telegram in late April to 
113

Zhou Enlai requesting the Red Army move back to Jiangxi to focus on 

consolidating and improving operations in the Soviet area. Mao believed 

that the Red Army had made great gains at Zhangzhou, but did not have 

the manpower or support in the area to establish a strong defense against a 

determined NRA force. Instead, the Red Army should conduct minimum 

operations in the Fujian area, such as establishing local militia and guerrilla 

units.29 The CCP ruled against Mao’s recommendation, and on June 5, 

1932, ordered the Red Army to conduct offensive operations against the 

Guangdong military forces near Southern Jiangxi.30 Once completing 

operations in Guangdong, it would move north up the Gan River valley, and 

attack Ganzhou, Ji’an, Zhangshu, and Nanchang, in order to gain the initial 

revolutionary success in Jiangxi province.31 The Red Army reorganized its 

forces, placing the First, Third, and Fifth Red Army Corps under the First 

Front Red Army banner, and then moved into Guangdong. From late June 

into early July, the Red Army conducted offensive operations and seized 

Nanxiong and Shuikou, defeating fifteen Guangdong NRA brigades and 

expanded the Chinese Soviet into Guangdong.32

Even with the string of offensive victories, Mao remained a vocal 

opponent to the plans, constantly submitting his recommendations to the 

Central Military Committee to adjust the attack. On July 25, Mao and 

Zhu De sent a joint communique to the CCP requesting a change to the 

current strategy. Instead of immediately attacking the Gan River cities of 

Ji’an and Zhangshu, the Red Army should conduct clearing operations on 

the eastern part of the valley, focusing on Le’an and Yihuang. Initially, the 

Central Committee was against Mao’s proposal since he represented the 

erroneous “right line.” However, Zhou Enlai intervened and pushed for 

Mao’s proposal given his military experience on the ground.33 In August, 

the First Front Red Army held a conference and confirmed the plan to 

attack Le’an and Yihuang. Shortly after, the Red Army seized the city, 

and defeated the Twenty-seventh NRA division near Le’an, taking 5,000 

prisoners, 4,000 rifles, twenty machine guns, twenty artillery pieces, and 

three wireless communication sets.34

After the victory, the Red Army leadership contemplated its next attack 

to Ji’an. However, after some consideration, Mao sent a communique on 

September 25, 1932, stating that an attack on Ji’an was not prudent given 

the strong enemy presence in the Ji’an area, and instead his units would 

conduct political mobilization operations in the Le’an-Yihuang area.35 The 

Central Committee had had enough of Mao’s insubordination. By this 

time, the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks had gained enough power and began 

stripping Mao of key positions within the Red Army. He was first removed 

from the Military Committee of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas. 

Later, in October 1933, an emergency conference was called at Ningdu to 

discuss future Red Army operations, especially as word came of another 

impending KMT campaign.36 Conference attendees, who included Zhou 
114

Enlai, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Chen Yi, and Liu Bocheng, all confirmed 

that the new offensive line was the Red Army strategy and viewed the 

Red Army as fully capable to switch to offensive operations outside the 

Soviet. Additionally, the party condemned Mao’s conservative military 

strategy as inappropriate and outdated.37 Zhou Enlai saw the Red Army’s 

inaction as procrastination and a sign of Mao’s obstinate attitude toward 

CCP-directed operations. Zhou continued to push for “expanding Soviet 

territory swiftly, engaging the enemy on KMT territory, bringing Jiangxi 

and its neighboring Soviet areas together by force, taking key cities in the 

Gan valley, including Nanchang, Ji’an, Ganzhou, and Pingxiang, so as to 

achieve preliminary successes in one or more provinces.”38

After the Ningdu conference, the Red Army continued its offensive 

operations, expanding its attack on Jianning, Lichuan, and Taining in 

October. In November, the First Front Army seized the Jiangxi county 

seats of Jinxi and Zixi. In the short term, the battlefield successes helped 

the CCP expand the Soviet in the eastern Gan valley, yet at the same time, 

it took away from the Red Army’s ability to prepare for the upcoming 

Fourth Extermination Campaign.39

During these expansion operations, the KMT’s suppression of the 

communists in Shanghai drove the Bolsheviks and other CCP members 

to the Jiangxi Soviet in late 1932.40 Intermittent and insufficient financial 

support from the COMINTERN was another factor driving many of the 

urban communists to the rural areas.41 Their arrival in the Jiangxi Soviet 

added tensions to the command and control of Red Army forces during the 

Fourth Extermination Campaign. The presence of the Central Committee 

also changed the tide of the communist movement, turning many members 

of the party and Red Army toward the left-leaning line. The Maoist 

adaptation of Marxist-Leninist theory was replaced by a more orthodox 

line following COMINTERN policies focused on the greater good of the 

Soviet Union.42 Many of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks moved to different 

Soviets almost soon after their arrival in the Jiangxi Soviet,43 marking the 

beginning of a new phase of Central Committee leadership of the CCP. 

Extermination Campaigns

Fourth Extermination Campaign

Before the start of the Fourth Extermination Campaign in 1933, the 

Red Army from the Jiangxi Soviet conducted expansion operations into 

Fujian and Guangdong. Other Red Army units in other communist base 

areas conducted similar operations in Hunan, Hubei, and Sichuan. The 

Soviet expansion became a large enough threat that Chiang Kai-shek 

refocused his military operations on the Red Army. In April 9, 1932, 

he created the Bandit Suppression Headquarters in Wuhan, placing He 

Yingqin as the commander.44 Starting in June 1932, He Yingqin and a 

force of 500,000 soldiers conducted a brutal encirclement and suppression 
115

campaign against the Hubei-Henan-Anhui and western Hubei-Hunan 

Soviet areas.45 By November 1932, both the Hubei-Henan-Anhui and the 

western Hubei-Hunan Soviet fell. With these two areas completely cleared 

of communist insurgent forces, Chiang ordered He to shift operations to 

the Jiangxi Soviet.

Figure 6: Fourth Extermination Campaign

Source: Created by author
116

In December 1932, Chiang Kai-shek shifted 400,000 soldiers and 

thirty divisions to the Central Soviet operation.46 He even personally 

moved down to Nanchang to supervise the operation, with the forward 

headquarters in Fuzhou. The main force consisted of three columns, 

approximately 150,000 soldiers in twelve divisions, led by Chen Cheng.47

The plan was to build a series of blockhouses as part of an effort to establish 

an economic blockade around the Soviet. Approximately 240,000 soldiers 

were allocated for the blockade, in addition to the main force, which 

brings the total force package to 400,000. Each flank was assigned 70,000 

soldiers, approximately six divisions, to conduct blocking operations in 

the Jiangxi-Guangdong border area and the Fujian-Jiangxi Border area. 

Another 100,000 soldiers were used to conduct anti-guerrilla operations 

in northwest and northeast Jiangxi as well the southeast Hunan-southwest 

Jiangxi border area.48 Once the blockade was set, the NRA would deploy 

the three columns south along separate routes converging on the Red 

Army’s rear for a concentrated attack.49 On the other side of the battlefield, 

the Red Army had expanded its size, and was currently at 70,000 strong.50

The Red Army was based near Lichuan, and consisted of the First, Third, 

and Fifth Red Army Corps, along with the Eleventh, Twelfth, Twenty-first, 

and Twenty-second Red Armies.51

The Fourth Extermination Campaign coincided with the Red Army 

urban offensives. In December 1932, the next target city for the Red Army 

was Nancheng. The Central Committee gave orders to attack, but due to 

NRA reinforcements, the Red Army had to withdraw from the outskirts 

of Nancheng.52 The next closest city for an attack was Nanfeng. Under 

pressure from the Central Committee to continue the urban offensive, the 

Red Army moved south and reached Nanfeng on February 1, 1933 and 

began encircling the city. On February 7, the Red Army besieged the city. 

For approximately one week, the Red Army faced stiff resistance as it 

attempted to break the city’s defenses.53 The NRA quickly dispatched the 

Central Route Army to reinforce the city and conduct a counterattack. With 

the stronger NRA force in the area on February 13, Zhou Enlai ordered the 

Red Army to finally withdraw from the area and moved to Luokou, near 

Huangpi, to reorganize and wait for an attack.54

During the withdrawal, the Red Army set a diversion to allow the main 

body to safely exfiltrate. Using a similar tactic from the Third Extermination 

Campaign, the Eleventh Red Army, pretending to be the Red Army’s main 

force, deceived the NRA by attacking Lichuan.55 Reacting to the attack 

as expected, the NRA moved its three columns to Lichuan in order to 

concentrate fires on the Red Army main effort. While moving to Lichuan, 

the first column, which included the Fifty-second and Fifty-ninth NRA 

divisions, became separated from the other two columns. On February 25, 

the two divisions moved west towards Huangpi along two routes separated 

by a mountain ridge. As they moved, their distance from the NRA Second 
117

and Third Columns became larger, making any mutual support ineffective. 

On February 27, the First and Third Red Army Corps and the Twenty-first 

Red Army used the rainy conditions to conduct a surprise attack on the 

Fifty-second NRA Division. The next day, the Fifth Red Army Corps and 

the Twenty-Second Red Army attacked the Fifty-ninth NRA Division in 

Huangpi. The unit was destroyed, with the commander of the Fifty-ninth 

NRA Division being captured.56 After the victory, the Red Army moved 

back to Luokou to reorganize and prepare for another assault.

After the devastating loss, the NRA reorganized its forces into two 

columns and changed its strategy. Instead of moving in three separate 

columns, the NRA instead concentrated its forces in the center area to 

penetrate the Soviet.57 On March 16, the two NRA columns began its 

advance. The Red Army moved swiftly around, using the Eleventh Red 

Army again for deception operations. The Eleventh Red Army executed 

a feint towards Guangchang, attracting the front column of NRA units 

in pursuit.58 The action separated the two columns by 50 kilometers and 

isolated the rear column’s Eleventh NRA Division near Caotaigang. On 

March 20, the First Front Army conducted a vicious attack near Xuzhuang, 

decimating the division, as well as a unit from the Ninth NRA Division.59

After the battle of Caotaigang, no other major battles occurred in the 

Fourth Extermination Campaign. For the remainder of March 1933, the 

Red Army conducted political operations near Le’an until NRA forces 

moved to Le’an to secure the city, forcing the Red Army to withdraw to 

the base areas.60 In April, NRA forces began to withdraw from the Jiangxi 

Soviet area, ending the Fourth Extermination Campaign.61 The NRA losses 

in the campaign were quite significant. The NRA lost three divisions, and 

10,000 POWs were captured.62 The Red Army collected 10,000 rifles, 300 

new German machine guns and forty artillery pieces.63 Another important 

result of the victory was the apparent validation of the Bolshevik-led 

Central Committee strategy, which silenced Mao and his many supporters, 

who were the strategy’s biggest critics. 

Bolshevik control of the Jiangxi Soviet

With effective control of the Red Army after the Fourth Extermination 

Campaign, the CCP adopted a series of measures to reform the Red Army 

so it could seize large cities in China. First, the CCP attempted to expand 

the Red Army’s overall personnel strength. Starting in February 1933, 

the CCP launched a large recruiting drive to expand the Red Army. In 

addition, it incorporated all local militias into the main Red Army force. 

To pay for the expansion, the CCP adopted a sweeping change to the 

land distribution policy to generate revenue.64 Under the guise of a land 

investigation, the CCP conducted political operations in the Soviet areas 

to complete land distribution in 80 percent of the Soviet area. During 

the distribution, the CCP attempted to raise almost one million yuan.65

Throughout the summer of 1933, the CCP also focused on suppressing 
118

any dissidents and counterrevolutionaries, finding and arresting many of 

its opponents, effectively ending any resistance.66

One of the most famous critics to the Twenty-eight Bolshevik’s 

policies was Luo Ming. In the spring of 1933, Luo Ming, then sectratary 

of the Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi Soviet Committee,67 requested an 

exception to the policy. In his letter, Luo outlined the issues in his local 

area. The revolutionary attitude in the Fujian area was low, and the recent 

heavy recruiting drives and large tax collection had whittled away at the 

morale of the local people. He agreed to continue to support expanding 

the Red Army, but he did not want those units to leave the local area, and 

instead thought that they should stay for local defense. Given these issues, 

he proposed avoiding battle with the NRA forces unless they were forced 

and looked to scale back mobilization operations in his area.68 While Luo 

Ming’s request may have seemed reasonable, his position was similar 

enough to Mao’s “retreatist,” “lure the enemy in deep” strategy, that it 

gave the Bolsheviks an opportunity to leverage the situation. At the time, 

Mao’s influence was still too great, and attacking Luo Ming was in essence 

a tangential approach to weakening Mao’s power.69 The CCP used the 

pejorative term “Luo Ming line” to describe any non-offensive strategy, 

and began a systematic purge of the Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi Soviet 

leadership.70 The “Luo Ming line” became the slogan and term to describe 

any “right” leaning member who was against the Central Committee’s 

strategy. 

In the summer of 1933, the Red Army continued to experience 

many different changes. The Central Committee felt vindicated by the 

successful defeat of the Fourth Extermination Campaign, and continued 

to press the offensive line. The arrival of the Bolsheviks and Otto Braun, 

the COMINTERN military adviser, at the Jiangxi Soviet increased central 

oversight over the Red Army as they began to directly control military 

strategy. On May 8, the CCP passed a resolution separating the Central 

Military Council and the Red Army leadership. Zhu De and Zhou Enlai 

remained in charge of the Red Army; however, Bo Gu gained greater 

control of the military council and controlled the Red Army’s strategy and 

its employment of the military.71 Otto Braun would also play a large role 

in the strategy, leveraging his experience at Frunze Academy to push for 

the offensive. 

The Red Army also reorganized its units to facilitate the execution of 

its new strategies. In June, the CCP divided the First Front Red Army into 

the Eastern Front Red Army and Central Red Army. Bo Gu and Braun 

believed the Red Army forces had sufficient firepower and strength, that it 

no longer needed to have mutually supporting operations, and instead the 

Red Army units could conduct independent operations in separate areas.72

The Eastern Front Red Army consisted of the Third Red Army Corps, and 

was deployed to western Fujian. The Central Red Army, created from First 
119

Red Army Corps, remained in the Central Soviet area.73

 Under the direction of the new Central Military Committee, the 

Eastern Front Red Army conducted expansion operations into Fujian 

after the NRA left the area. Peng Dehuai’s force conducted a three-month 

expedition in Fujian, expanding the Soviet territory, collecting supplies – 

especially salt – and raising funds that helped the Red Army and the CCP 

meet many of its deficiencies.74 Before the Fifth Extermination Campaign, 

the Central Soviet boasted having 60,000 square kilometers covering parts 

of three provinces.75 Focused on the expansion of the Soviet, the Red Army 

did not keep its eye on the KMT as it prepared for another extermination 

campaign. 

Fifth Extermination Campaign

In the late winter and early spring of 1933, the advance of the Japanese 

Kwantung Army deep across northern China temporarily diverted the 

attention of Chiang and the KMT military forces to the north. However, 

they still remained focused on the internal struggle with the Communists. 

Starting in July 1933, the KMT established a review team to examine the 

problems with the previous campaigns in order to identify key lessons 

and areas of improvement. The KMT also established division level 

training units to retrain its units, using the lessons from its assessments 

on how to properly attack the Red Army.76 Additionally, they continued 

to integrate foreign advisers, especially from Germany, to improve tactics 

and strategies. The Germans proposed a more deliberate strategy to attrit 

the Communists in the Soviet. The first step was to establish an economic 

blockade. Raw materials and durable goods could not enter or leave the 

Soviet areas. Rice and salt were two commodities expressly banned from 

transportation. The second step was establishing a series of fortifications, 

basically blockhouses made of concrete, to provide fire support to offensive 

operations in nearby cities. As the NRA cleared areas and moved forward, 

the previous set of blockhouses was abandoned and new ones were built. 

Additionally, along lines of operation, roads were built in the rear areas 

to expedite logistical transports to the front. Some of these strategies had 

been used individually in previous campaigns with varying success. Now, 

the KMT also introduced political reforms that complemented the military 

strategy. Under the slogan, “Thirty Percent Military, Seventy Percent 

Political,” the KMT, with the assistance of NRA forces, revived the baojia

system to create local security teams and new village administrations.77

To accomplish this strategy, the KMT increased the NRA forces 

deployed to Jiangxi. The new force strength was 700,000 broken into four 

areas supported by five air corps.78 The NRA deployed its Northern Route 

NRA Army, consisting of thirty three divisions, along the Jishui, Jinzhi, 

Nangeng, and Le’an front.79 The Southern Route NRA Army, made up of 

eleven Guangdong divisions and one independent regiment, established a 

blocking position along a line connecting the cities of Wuping, Anyuan, 
120

Ganxian, and Shangyou.80 On order, the Southern Route NRA Army 

would move the blocking positions north in coordination with other 

NRA forces to squeeze the Red Army. The Western Route NRA Army 

controlled nine Hunanese Divisions and three independent regiments that 

Figure 7: Fifth Extermination Campaign

Source: Created by author
121

were responsible for blocking enemy forces from moving west of the Gan 

River.81 The Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Region Headquarters was assigned 

eleven divisions and four security regiments to block any Red Army units 

from escaping to Northeast Jiangxi. With all these changes instituted, the 

NRA launched the Fifth Extermination Campaign. 

When the NRA was ready to attack, it was too late for the Red 

Army to begin to prepare for the encirclement. The only positive area of 

improvement was the size of the Red Army. During the summer, the Red 

Army touted the slogan “Million Man Army” to recruit soldiers during 

its mobilization operations. By late October, the Red Army had reached 

100,000.82 However, with that many soldiers, the Red Army required even 

more supplies and equipment. With the Eastern Front Army in Fujian, the 

Central Front Army and the local populace did not start raising revenues 

and hoarding supplies, especially rice and salt, until late August. The lack 

of preparation would have deleterious effects in the future. 

On September 25, 1933, the NRA sent three divisions south from 

Nanchang and attacked Lichuan. Within three days, the city fell, which 

surprised the CCP. The Central Front Red Army fell back and waited 

for the Eastern Front Red Army to rush back from Fujian to reinforce 

their position. On October 6, the Central and Eastern Front Red Armies 

combined forces and conducted a counterattack. The initial attack near 

Xunkou was successful, with the Red Army destroying three NRA brigades. 

However, future attempts were less successful. For two months, the Red 

Army attacked NRA blockhouses at Xiaoshi, Zixi, Huwan Bajiaoting, 

Yuangai Mountain, and Daxiongguan, but each attempt to break the line 

was unsuccessful. Using the concrete blockhouses as pillboxes, the NRA 

concentrated fires from new German machine guns, German artillery 

pieces, and aerial bombs on Red Army formations as they assaulted the 

line. In November 1933, the battles took a tactical pause as the Fujian 

Incident temporarily diverted the KMT’s attention from the Jiangxi 

Soviet.83

On November 20, 1933, the KMT Nineteenth Route Army, in 

conjunction with the Fujian provincial government, rebelled against the 

KMT and set up an independent government.84 The renegade unit had 

initially made a military alliance with the CCP in October. The initial 

agreement included a cease fire between the two sides, opening of economic 

and political dialogue, and the release of political prisoners.85 However, 

after the revolt, both sides failed to meet any of the agreed points. The 

Fujian renegade government did not achieve any of the reforms or requests 

either.86 Members of the Central Committee attacked the Fujian rebels as 

being fakes.87 Other communists, including Mao and Zhu De, maintained 

a more positive outlook towards the rebels. The Red Army even pushed 

forces from the First Front Army to the outskirts of western Fujian, but 

no material support was ever sent to the rebels. The KMT moved quickly 
122

to Fujian and put down the rebellion by January 20, 1934. In response to 

Mao’s alleged support for the alliance, The CCP punished him during the 

summer of 1934, placing him on probation, and effectively terminating his 

influence on the Red Army until the Long March.88

During this same time, the Revolutionary Military Council held a 

meeting to discuss its plan of attack. Braun took to the stage and pushed 

for a strong offense to defeat the KMT. Stating that the golden age of 

guerrilla warfare in China was over, the Red Army must now conduct 

a full offensive against the NRA’s positions. The “lure the enemy in 

deep” strategy was replaced by “defending against the enemy outside the 

Soviet” and the holding of every inch of territory.89 In January 1934, the 

Second All Soviet Congress was held and the Congress passed a series of 

resolutions to focus the Red Army on its upcoming tasks during the Fifth 

Extermination Campaign. The resolutions reiterated Braun’s offensive 

strategy, and attacked the previous Maoist line of “active defense.” The 

CCP adopted a new strategy for the Red Army. Building on the original 

strategy of attacking outside the Soviet, Otto Braun proposed using “short, 

swift thrusts,” which employed repeated infantry assaults to overwhelm 

and defeat the NRA line of blockhouses. He also pushed for the continued 

recruitment of the “million men Red Army” and discussed system of 

conscription to fill its ranks.90

After the Fujian Incident, the NRA restarted operations from the 

Northern Front. The NRA established a line of blockhouses from Lichuan 

to Le’an, and began a methodical clearing operation south towards 

Ruijin with thirty-five NRA divisions.91 Its first target was the city of 

Guangchang, which was halfway between Nanchang and Ruijin. The 

NRA’s Eastern Front also began its movement west. The Fujian incident 

actually benefited the NRA, forcing it to reorganize and move forces to the 

east. The Eastern Route NRA Army was reorganized with the remnants of 

the Nineteenth Route NRA Army, making it a total of fourteen divisions, 

to conduct operations from Western Fujian.92 By March 1934, the NRA 

Northern and Eastern Fronts linked up by Deshengguan, Jiangxi Province, 

and began a coordinated movement towards Guangchang. 

In response to the NRA movement towards Guangchang, the Red 

Army built a series of fortifications and trenches to defend the territory. 

On April 9, the NRA began its attack on Guangchang, deploying Third 

Route NRA Army’s ten divisions from Nanfeng, with artillery and aircrafts 

providing covering fire. The NRA forces moved south along both sides 

of the Xu River leading up to Guangchang. The Northern Route NRA 

Army established blockhouses on one side of the river, before advancing 

and clearing the other side, alternating on each bank as it moved south. 

The operation took about two weeks for the NRA to push down the river 

and reach Guangchang.93 By April 23, 1934, the NRA broke through the 

Red Army’s lines of defense and occupied the high ground surrounding 
123

Guangchang. The Red Army retreated to the city and constructed more 

fortified defenses and trench lines. On April 27, 1934, the NRA conducted 

artillery and air bombardments, breaking the Red Army’s wooden 

fortifications and trench lines. The next day, the NRA invaded the city 

and Guangchang fell, forcing the Red Army to retreat south.94 The Red 

Army lost 5,093 soldiers, approximately 20 percent of the fighting force at 

Guangchang, whereas the NRA only sustained 2,000 casualties.95

After Guangchang, the NRA continued its march from all four 

directions. From the west, Western Front NRA forces occupied both Shaxi 

and Longgang by May 1. On the eastern front, Eastern Route NRA forces 

continued to push through and seized Jianning on May 16. By June the CCP 

felt the pressures of the attacks. The combination of the blockade and baojia

worked to drain away local support for the CCP. The attrition style battle 

also began to decrease the quality of leadership and the level of experience 

in the Red Army. The lines were increasingly filled by inexperienced 

soldiers who, under pressure, often deserted, further degrading the Red 

Army’s effectiveness. The lack of supplies and food further reduced the 

Red Army morale and support for the offensive line among the public. 

Support for the offensive line slowly ended, even within military and party 

publications.96 Magazines began promoting the expansion of guerrilla 

operations to conserve resources. Recruitment campaigns to replenish 

losses made little difference as the superior NRA strategy continued to 

slowly strangle the Soviet and shrink it from seventeen counties to ten.97

In the summer of 1934, the Red Army began to look at new strategies. It 

established a new defensive perimeter from Ninghua to Ningdu to Xingguo. 

In May, the Central Committee held a meeting and decided the current 

offensive strategy was not working, which most likely would require the 

Red Army to evacuate the Soviet. The Committee requested permission 

from the COMINTERN to change strategy, which was approved a few days 

later with the emphasis that the CCP’s main task was to protect the combat 

strength of the Red Army. While the COMINTERN approved the strategy, 

Braun and Bo Gu had a different plan of accomplishing it.98 Instead of 

planning for the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet, they pushed for a 

final struggle, calling for everyone to give their maximum effort to defend 

the Soviet and achieve victory. Besides the change in slogan, the Red Army 

also continued its strong positional defensive strategy, creating wooden 

blockhouses and trenches to defend the territory. The CCP also authorized 

the expansion of guerrilla warfare on all fronts to defeat the NRA.99

The NRA conducted another offensive in July, targeting the city of 

Shicheng, set between Ninghua and Ningdu as its penetration point. The 

two sides engaged in a bitter struggle along this final defense line for about 

a month. In early August, the Red Army delivered a strong counterattack 

against the NRA at the battle of Gaohunao, causing more than 4,000 

NRA casualties. However, the Red Army also suffered large losses and 
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was forced to withdraw to the final defensive line just north of Shicheng. 

At Shicheng, the Red Army held the NRA to a stalemate. Finally, the 

NRA brought up twelve large howitzers to assist in the siege and finally 

broke through the line in August. The city of Shicheng ended up falling 

in October. The defense of Shicheng cost the Red Army 5,000 casualties, 

severely wounding it and forced the leadership to contemplate some drastic 

measures.100 The Jiangxi Soviet was reduced to a small area surrounding 

Ruijin and Xingguo. Given all the casualties and the looming NRA attack 

on Ruijin, the Red Army executed a daring retreat from Jiangxi on October 

10, 1934, ending the Fifth Extermination Campaign, and starting the Long 

March. 

Analysis

Situational Assessment

During 1932 to 1934, the Red Army continued to adopt measures 

to expand and professionalize its forces. While its actions did improve 

the overall effectiveness of the unit, the Red Army was defeated by the 

NRA and forced to retreat from its home base as a result of the Fifth 

Extermination Campaign. Chinese Communist sources continue to blame 

the defeat of the Red Army on the Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks and Otto 

Braun’s faulty strategy; however, the KMT and NRA deserve credit for 

their own adaptation and innovations during this period.101 First, they 

conducted a series of after-action reviews to identify areas of improvement 

within the NRA from the Fourth Extermination Campaign. These lessons 

were incorporated into a greater reform plan led by German advisers, such 

as Hans von Seeckt and Alexander von Faulkenhausen.102 The German 

advisers helped to reform the NRA by focusing on improving the training 

of its general staff, employment of modern military tactics, and acquisition 

of modern military equipment. While the primary goal was to create a 

force able to defeat Japanese aggression,103 these reforms also helped to 

increase the combat effectiveness of the NRA against the Chinese Red 

Army. 

Second, the NRA employed a counterinsurgency strategy that 

complemented its conventional warfare strategy. Starting in 1928, the 

KMT instituted the baojia system which stressed local responsibility for 

security and administration. Similar to other counterinsurgency strategies 

later used in Malaya and Dhofar, the NRA first cleared “Red” areas, 

and then established local administrations loyal to the KMT that were 

protected by a local militia.104 The NRA was able to hold these cleared 

areas and block any Red Army or Chinese Communist infiltration. Many 

residents actually began to provide information and intelligence for NRA 

operations.105 The baojia system also supported the economic blockade 

by providing sentries at the entrances of all the villages, which placed 

tremendous pressure on the Red Army and the local populace. Chiang and 

the KMT government also instituted political reforms under the “seventy 
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percent political, thirty percent military” strategy to incorporate many of 

the disenfranchised Chinese during the Civil War and take support away 

from the communists. These efforts all helped to erode the local support 

necessary for the Red Army to conduct its “peoples’ war.” 

Lastly, the NRA adopted a methodical, patient approach that attacked 

the biggest weaknesses of the Red Army. The Red Army did not have the 

necessary weapons to neutralize the NRA’s consecutive lines of blockhouse 

fortifications. The Red Army also did not have the resources necessary 

to sustain a prolonged battle which the NRA worked to its advantage by 

conducting prolonged operations. The long campaign wore on the Red 

Army much more than it did on the NRA. Additionally, the NRA did 

not fall for any Red Army feints or ruses, and instead when threatened, 

withdrew back to the fortification lines where it held the advantage. Lastly, 

the NRA had a decisive advantage by having its largest deployment of 

forces to date in support of the Fifth Extermination campaign of close to a 

million soldiers. With that said, its adaptation and innovation in the Fifth 

campaign propelled it over the Red Army. 

During the same period, the Red Army continued to face its own 

internal challenge during this time of uncertainty. While the Red Army 

continued to implement measures to reform and professionalize the Army, 

especially under the leadership of the Twenty-eight Bolshevik-controlled 

Central Committee, the basic challenges of soldier quality still pervaded the 

military. Increased political and military training, which will be discussed 

later in the chapter, were for the most part successful at addressing many of 

these issues. However, the gains were quickly neutralized by the crippling 

effects of Red Army expansion and high rate of casualties. The “Million 

Man Red Army” push enlisted mostly uneducated peasant recruits who 

needed intense political training and guidance. Red Army leaders continued 

to deal with low levels of effort and commitment to the political cause, and 

general lack of political understanding of the mission.106 At the same time, 

the new offensive strategy was decimating Red Army units, and many 

new recruits were sent to the line immediately without much training. 

The lack of training and guidance inevitably lowered unit morale, and 

desertions increased. One report argued that the main cause for desertion 

was homesickness.107 By the end of the Fifth Extermination Campaign, the 

Red Army was in a downward spiral where it could not generate the proper 

forces to fill its demand, and instead began sending untrained peasants to 

the line to fight, further degrading its combat effectiveness.108

Strategy

The arrival of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks into the CCP brought 

about many changes to the overall Red Army military strategy. Much 

of the new CCP leadership’s views were influenced by Stalinist Soviet 

ideology. This ideological view greatly differed from both Li Lisan and 
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Mao, though its differences with Mao were more profound and influenced 

by political factors. The ideological differences also created a large divide 

with the application of military tactics. However, the Bolsheviks and Mao 

maintained a similar line on the expansion and training of the Red Army, 

with both sides espousing the critical role of political training in developing 

a strong party army.109 Ultimately, the CCP believed that the Red Army’s 

success depended on the professionalization of the force, as this would 

ensure unity of command, a common understanding of the mission, and a 

strengthened ability to execute its mission.110

The biggest supporter of the Red Army’s professionalization strategy 

was the Soviet Union. Stalin’s interest in the Red Army was motivated by 

both external and internal factors. The Soviet Union perceived a looming 

threat from the Japanese as well as the Germans. Japan, Russia’s long-time 

enemy, increased its presence in China, especially after the 1932 Japanese 

occupation of Manchuria, which directly threatened Russia’s southern 

flank and its national security. The Soviets believed a large, professional 

Red Army, loyal to the Soviet Union, would be a strong bulwark against 

Japanese, and later on, German aggression. The Russian even reopened 

dialogue with the Nationalist government after years of silence to help 

ensure their Chinese flank remained secured.111 For Stalin, the fight for 

control of the Chinese Communist Party was also part of a greater Soviet 

intraparty power struggle with Trotsky. Stalin’s internal struggles with 

Trotsky hardened his communist views, which translated to a hard line 

within the COMINTERN and the new CCP. Through the COMINTERN 

and Bolsheviks, Stalin looked to consolidate his power by purging 

any Trotskyites in China. These Soviet political dynamics inevitably 

influenced the selection of Chinese political and military strategies that 

would negatively affect the Red Army.

On the surface, the Twenty-eight Bolshevik policies were very similar 

to Li Lisan. The two sides placed the urban proletariat as the pivotal 

character in the center of the communist revolution. Both believed that 

the combination of the proletarian revolutionary spirit and modern tactics 

would enable the Red Army to seize victory. They also believed that the 

conditions for the revolution were ready for expansion into the urban 

cities, and that the Red Army must move into the cities to help students 

and workers in the movement. 112 Wang Ming even stated that while the 

attack on Changsha in 1930 was a mistake, he did not believe the failure 

disproved the correct line of attacking urban centers.113

However, after further examination, the differences between the two 

sides were quite stark. Disagreements between the two factions began 

early. In June 1930, Li Lisan censured Wang Ming and Bo Gu and two 

other members of the group for attacking his plan.114 Yet the differences 

were even deeper than simple political warfare. From an ideological 

perspective, the Bolsheviks disagreed with Li Lisan’s definition of the 
127

bourgeois. In Wang Ming’s The Two Lines, he believed all “capitalist 

bourgeois reformers were counterrevolutionary.”115 This interpretation 

expanded the definition to include the rich and middle-class peasants to 

be targeted during land reforms.116 Another difference was the approach to 

attacking the urban centers. The two sides also viewed the role of the Red 

Army differently. Li Lisan maintained that the Red Army would assist the 

urban proletariat uprisings to overtake the cities, whereas the Bolsheviks 

viewed the Red Army as the sole force in seizing the metropolis.117

The differences between Mao and the Bolsheviks were great. Unlike 

Mao, the Bolshevik-led CCP rejected any alliance, pressing for the defeat 

of both the Nationalists and the Japanese.118 In their eyes, there was no 

difference between the two; both were imperialists and an equal threat to 

the Soviet Union and the communist cause.119 At the time, the Mukden 

Incident drove many nationalists and communists to pursue a new united 

front against Japanese Aggression. However, the CCP was expressly 

against it, as it pushed “for the overthrow of the agent of imperialism—

the Guomindang.”120 Even when the Chinese Soviet government declared 

war on the Japanese on April 5, 1932, the party was very particular in its 

handling of the situation, issuing multiple policies denouncing Japanese 

aggression and Nationalist partnerships individually.121

The Bolsheviks also maintained a strong stance against Maoist military 

policy. They believed that an erroneous line of guerrillaism pervaded the 

Red Army, embodied by the “lure the enemy in deep” strategy. Wang Ming 

equated the strategy to an act of “retreat” or “escape.”122 The Bolsheviks 

pushed for a large expansion and professionalization of the Red Army to 

move away from the peasant mindset.123 With the larger force, the Red 

Army could take the offensive, using Soviet offensive tactics to seize the 

urban centers and expand the Soviet.124 Guerrilla warfare was not fully 

disavowed, though it was a task for the local militias in the rear and flank 

areas. Mao had a more pragmatic view on the ability of the Red Army 

soldier.125 He understood that the Red Army did not have the technology to 

conduct these types of battles. Mao also believed that victory in itself was 

not necessarily the most important objective. He saw that the force must 

be sustainable after the victory, and second, spoils must greatly exceed the 

losses.126

In retrospect, the positional warfare and offensive strategy, promoted 

by Otto Braun and the Returned Students, was a poor strategy against 

the NRA. However, at the time, support for the strategy over Mao’s “lure 

the enemy in deep” is quite understandable. The new offensive military 

strategy was based on the assumption that the Red Army was strong and 

capable of conducting attacks against the NRA. While the assessment may 

have been exaggerated, the victories against the Extermination Campaigns 

did bolster the self-esteem of the Red Army. The later success of the Red 

Army in opposing the Fourth Extermination Campaign further proved the 
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capability of the Communist military forces.

The offensive strategy also moved away from the tactic of ceding 

territory, which was always a difficult proposition for the local populace. 

The CCP gained more support for its strategy by stating that the Red Army 

was strong enough now to defend the land and take the fight to the enemy, 

which allowed the locals to stay at home. That simple change engendered 

more support for their cause. On the flip side, Mao had a firm grasp on 

the local conditions and understood the negative impact of the Bolshevik 

policies on land redistribution. The Bolshevik position increased the 

burden on a larger share of the local populace and upset the delicate support 

necessary for conducting “people’s war.”127 Mao and his supporters also 

sought to delay and obstruct large recruitment drives, arguing that the 

expansion was not and would be an unnecessary distraction to the local 

populace, who were already busy tending to the fields.128

The Bolshevik offensive strategy was also a more conventional 

strategy than Mao’s mobile warfare concept. At the time, Mao’s “lure the 

enemy in deep” and other mobile warfare strategies were revolutionary 

in China and still had many critics and skeptics. Even after the sound 

defeat of the Li Lisan line, the ability of the Bolsheviks and Otto Braun to 

resurrect a similar platform two years later shows the amount of support 

for a more conventional strategy. 

Tactics

Within the new strategy, the Red Army incorporated old and new 

tactics to attack the enemy. In terms of old tactics, the Red Army still 

relied heavily on its strengths in intelligence collection and deception 

operations to gain an advantage over the NRA. However, with the arrival 

of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks and Otto Braun, the Red Army shifted from 

its mobile defense strategy and began using “short, swift thrusts” as an 

offensive tactics against the NRA blockhouses in the Fifth Extermination 

campaign.

The Red Army continued to leverage some of its advantages from 

previous campaigns. Advances in signal intelligence, especially from 

collecting more wireless communication devices and the establishment of 

training schools, provided the Red Army with detailed knowledge of the 

NRA’s movement during the Fourth Extermination Campaign.129 The Red 

Army also continued to incorporate tactical intelligence into its operations. 

The Red Army continued to use plain-clothed soldiers, and even sent 

double agents into KMT units to collect intelligence and subvert units.130

The level of detail during collection also was a strength of the Red Army. 

An example of the thoroughness of the Red Army tactical intelligence is an 

intelligence report on the KMT Seventy-ninth NRA Division. The report 

analyzed the origin and motivation of the NRA soldiers, and saw that many 

of the soldiers originated from the same area as their commander, which 
129

resulted in strong loyalties.131 This discovery made the unit a less attractive 

target for subversion given the traditional Confucian hierarchal loyalty. 

The Red Army continued to conduct feints and deception operations 

during its operations. The Eleventh Red Army played the main effort on 

two separate occasions, with great effect. Additionally, the Red Army also 

sent fake communications to deceive NRA forces. While near Huangpi, 

NRA scouts “intercepted” a Red Army message, stating that the Red Army 

main forces were in Nanchang. The division units put down their guard 

while in the city, and were ambushed.

The biggest change to Red Army tactics was the introduction of Otto 

Braun’s “short, swift thrusts. ” Lin Biao defined the tactic as “those sudden 

fast raids launched against the enemy who comes out of their blockhouses 

to advance the line of fortifications by a small distance (specifically a 

distance of between 21⁄2 to 5 kilometers or even less). These thrusts are 

launched to wipe out the main enemy forces at a time when the enemy has 

not yet stabilized its foothold.”132 While the tactics seemed straightforward, 

there were key differences in its application, especially between Braun’s 

theoretical concept and Lin Biao’s application. 

First, the end goal of the tactics was very different. Braun’s version 

was used as part of a greater strategy to protect Soviet territory. Instead 

of attempting to gain a decisive victory over the superior-numbered NRA 

forces, the Red Army would defend territory and gain small tactical 

victories that could be transformed into operational and strategic gains.133

Lin Biao, on the other hand, viewed the tactic as one method to “annihilate 

the enemy, or win a victory in the entire battle.”134 His focus and goal was 

enemy-focused, and looked for a method to gain a decisive victory. 

Second, Braun advocated a more deliberate strategy, with the Red 

Army establishing strong points with small groupings of fortifications. 

These zones provided defensive cover from artillery and air, and helped 

to set the conditions for the Red Army to conduct quick attacks against 

the NRA when they were away from the blockhouses.135 During the actual 

attack, Braun believed the Red Army should first fix the NRA on its rear, 

flank, or even front, then conduct an attack to weaken the force in order 

disintegrate it.136 Lin Biao had a very different take on the attack, seeing 

mobility and movement paramount for the Red Army during the thrusts. 

The Red Army’s main defense was its secrecy.137 It would move quietly 

and occupy high ground, only establishing hasty defensive structures for 

air and artillery defense.138 Once the enemy moved into its area, the Red 

Army would encircle the forces, blocking its retreat, and quickly attack the 

enemy flanks before they could builds their fortifications.139

The last major difference was in its view of the pursuit. Braun 

advocated the pursuit, believing that it was the best way to translate a 

tactical victory into an operational or strategic success. On the other hand, 
130

Lin Biao did not believe in the pursuit, because if his tactic was done 

effectively, the enemy would have no avenue to retreat, negating any need 

for a pursuit.140

Overall, the differences in interpretation of the tactics highlighted the 

difficulties in translating theoretical military concepts into application. 

Otto Braun’s offensive concept was based on his own experiences and 

knowledge of Western military traditions. When applied to the Chinese 

battlefield, Lin Biao applied his own experiences to create his own version 

of “short, swift thrusts,” which followed some of Mao’s tactical points. 

Given the Red Army’s situation, Lin Biao pursued a short, decisive victory 

that avoided any protracted battle with the NRA. He leveraged intelligence 

and terrain, especially through reconnaissance, to gain an advantage over 

the enemy. Lastly, his focus remained on the enemy, rather than on securing 

territory, allowing his unit to conduct battle on the best terrain. While the 

localization of the “short, swift thrusts” did not give the Red Army the 

decisive advantage it needed to defeat the NRA, it demonstrated how the 

Red Army continued to adapt ideas to the local conditions to succeed in 

battle. 

Organization

During this period, the Red Army continued to consolidate the 

organization in order centralize control under the Central Committee. The 

Red Army leadership saw some issues with professionalism within the 

Army and insisted that party control was lacking, which led to breakdowns 

in discipline.141 To correct these issues, the Red Army standardized unit 

structures across both the regular Red Army forces and local militia units 

to ensure uniformity across all ranks. These measures were critical in 

supporting the rapid expansion of the Red Army as it raised additional 

forces to fight the NRA in the Fifth Extermination Campaign.

The major reorganization occurred in the summer of 1933. To 

accommodate the push to create the “Million Man Red Army,” the 

Revolutionary Military Committee passed a reorganizational plan for its 

forces. Under the new task organization established in June 1933, the Red 

Army had a total of five Red Army Corps: First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, 

and Ninth Army Corps. First Red Army Corps had the First Red Army 

Division, Second Red Army Division, and Third Red Army Division. The 

Third Red Army Corps had the Fourth Red Army Division, Fifth Red 

Army Division, and Sixth Red Army Division. The Fifth Red Army Corps 

had the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Red Army Divisions.142 In October 

1933, the Seventh and Ninth Red Army Corps stood up as Red Army 

units.143 A sixth Red Army Corps, the Eighth Red Army Corps, was added 

in September 1934.144 Additionally, independent provincial armies were 

designated as Red Army units to increase the ranks. The Fujian Military 

Region’s Nineteen Army and Twelfth Army became the Thirty-fourth Red 
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Army Division (later attached to Fifth Red Army Corps) and First Red 

Independent Brigade, respectively. The South Jiangxi Military Region’s 

Twenty-third Army became the Twenty-second Red Army Division.145

Besides changes to the organizational chart, the Revolutionary 

Military Committee pushed standardization of units across the Red Army. 

Building on the three-three-three system first introduced in 1930, the Red 

Army established complete standardization of its unit structures. From 

the corps level down to platoon level, each headquarters maintained three 

subordinates. In other words, a corps had three divisions, which had three 

brigades, all the way down to platoon level.146 The standardization of the 

unit structure required a cross-leveling of equipment and personnel, and 

during the summer of 1933, the Red Army transferred equipment and 

personnel to ensure each unit was at the prescribed strength. While the 

action helped to establish an equal standard across military units, it also 

served to enforce central control over units. Before 1933, some units had 

more personnel and equipment than other units, giving the commander 

more influence and power. Additionally, certain commanders and 

commissars were able to hide within these units and exert influence while 

remaining out of the Central Committee’s purview.147 By establishing a 

standardized unit structure, the Revolutionary Military Committee and 

Central Committee had greater control and authority over the units by 

breaking old traditional relationships within Red Army units.

 The lack of uniformity also pervaded local militia units within the Red 

Army which resulted in some large disparities. Formations, equipment, 

commands, organizational structures, and regulations were uneven among 

units, which often led to problems with compliance to superior orders. 

In 1932, the Revolutionary Military Committee began standardizing 

independent regiments and local guerrilla units. Some independent 

regiments became Red Army main force units, and were issued Red 

Army equipment and uniforms. Their original equipment was handed 

down to the local militia units, increasing the combat effectiveness of 

both the independent regiments and local militia forces.148 The Red Army 

also established a standard table of organization for the guerrilla units 

and vanguard youths. Guerrilla units also adopted a 3-3-3 organizational 

structure, with each company maintaining three platoons of three squads. 

The vanguard youths used a more flexible structure, where there could be 

three to five platoons in a company, and three to five squads in a platoon.149

All these changes helped to integrate the local militia, guerrilla units, 

CY units, and independent regiments into the Red Army, and make the 

transition into the Red Army main force quicker and easier.

One of the biggest changes in organization was the formalization 

and standardization of logistical units within the Red Army. The drive 

for standardization and professionalization of logistical units became 

more acute after the Third Extermination Campaign. The sheer size of 
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the Jiangxi Soviet required the Red Army to improve its supply depots 

and supply route operations. The Red Army created three types of supply 

depots: central, large, and medium size, with transportation units assigned 

to each depot to help move freight and supplies. Additionally, the Red 

Army established categories for supply routes, designating certain routes 

as main, supplementary, and temporary routes for transport.150 Many of 

the transportation units were either local citizens or local militia units. 

For the battle of Zhangzhou against the NRA’s Fourth Extermination 

Campaign, the Red Army hired more than 10,000 workers to transport 

more than one million kilograms of food and salt.151 The Red Army also 

developed its own weapons and supplies factories within the Soviet. The 

main factory was in Xingguo, which produced weapons and ammunition 

for the Red Army. From 1931 to 1934, the Xingguo factory produced 

more than 40,000 rifles, 200 machine guns, 100 artillery pieces, more 

than four million rounds of ammunition, and six million grenades.152 The 

Red Army also created an import and export business and traded local 

commodities such as bamboo, wood, paper, tobacco, tea oil, tungsten ore, 

and coal in exchange for kerosene, salt, cotton, cloth, and medicine. The 

trade helped raise revenue for the Red Army and provided the Red Army 

with ample supplies of necessary goods. With all these developments, the 

Red Army recognized the importance of logistics, and in June 1933, the 

Revolutionary Military Committee established the Logistics Departments 

at the Central and Front Army level to specifically manage all supplies and 

transportation.153

Training

From 1932 to 1934, the Red Army expanded its military education 

system, providing basic, advanced, and specialty training for its forces. Its 

flagship institution, the Red Academy, led by Liu Bocheng, was a strong 

force in professionalizing the Red Army through its training programs. 

Under Liu’s lead, the Red Academy established a comprehensive 

curriculum to address the educational needs of the junior-level Red Army 

leader. 

The curriculum was a three-month program that ran every day from 

six in the morning to nine at night, covering military, political, and cultural 

classes. Sixty percent of the Red Army officers’ coursework was military 

classes; conversely, 60 percent of political commissars and bureaucrats’ 

coursework was political classes, ensuring both groups received a focused 

education.154 The military classes taught at the Red Academy were 

designed to be a comprehensive overview of key basic tasks that connected 

theory into practice.155 Much of military theory taught in the Red Academy 

was based primarily on Soviet doctrine, though influences from Japan 

and Germany were also present. Specialty classes in communications, 

engineering, and logistics were also created at the Red Academy. Political 

classes at the Red Academy covered topics such as Imperialism in China, 
133

the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Revolution, the class 

struggle, land reforms, military reforms, Soviet reforms, and political 

work.156 Besides classes, the Red Academy used the school newspapers,157

singing, political discussion groups, speeches, and reports for political 

training and propaganda. The cultural classes were basic education classes 

intended to increase the literacy and competency of the students. About 

one-third of the Red Academy students were illiterate when they arrived 

at the school, forcing the Red Army to conduct an intensive educational 

training program. The classes focused on recognizing simple characters, 

progressing to geography and science, then to mathematics. The purpose 

of these classes was to develop within each student the skills to properly 

write letters, formal notes, orders, and reconnaissance surveys.158 An 

example of the development in literacy training is a comparison between 

basic character readers from 1932 and 1934. The reading book used 

initially in 1932, as described in a previous chapter, was mainly focused 

on political slogans and propaganda as a way to indoctrinate new recruits. 

The 1934 edition not only covered political slogans, but also had basic 

characters and classes, such as numbers, cardinal directions, seasons, and 

time. The 49 lessons also covered hygiene, discipline, and government 

organizations. These books were directed at a more basic level training 

the soldiers how to act at the most elementary level, rather than providing 

abstract communist concepts.159

The Red Academy also pushed its curriculum to the greater Red 

Army through publications. In summer 1932, the Red Academy published 

more than 6,000 copies of nine manuals that were distributed across the 

Red Army.160 The Political Department published at least six books for 

distribution.161 It also published periodicals that covered military and 

political topics, giving key Red Army leaders ways to discuss tactics 

and strategies.162 One example in particular is the collection of articles 

published in the Red Battlefield dated June 1933. In the collection, there 

were five translated articles from Germany, Russia, and Japan discussing 

mountain warfare tactics. Zhu De wrote an article covering how to study 

mountain warfare. Other topics in articles included attacking forces in 

defense, pursuit and attacks, withdrawals, feints, and cavalry raids.163

Given the educational background of the students, the Red Academy 

faculty employed different pedagogical methods to gain the highest 

comprehension from the students. Some of its methods were influenced 

by the Soviet Union as the instructors tried to maintain students’ interest 

in the material.164 In May 1932, the Red Academy published guidance 

for teachers. All teachers were required to publish a syllabus and outline 

before class. Teachers were to encourage students to discuss topics during 

review time at night to increase comprehension. Key points on certain 

lessons were to be repeated multiple times to help students remember. 

Class materials should connect theory with current practice. Teachers were 
134

encouraged to use visual aids and models to aid their instruction. Before 

conducting exercises, the class should conduct rehearsals on sand tables. 

During practice, teachers should ask questions to students to stimulate 

thought and test comprehension. Lastly, teachers were directed to help 

students connect all the lessons and practices along the common theme of 

training to ensure maximum comprehension.165

One of the key pedagogical methods of the Red Academy was its 

practical exercises. The employment of practical exercises was twofold. 

First, they helped link the theoretical material taught in class with practical 

application in the field. Second, they also helped to retain the students’ 

attention by maintaining their interest through action. The scope of the 

practical exercises increased over time. Starting with the second class, 

Red Academy students participated in four large military exercises. The 

third class increased the training by conducting platoon level offensive 

and defensive operations, even conducting mock battles. The fourth class 

conducted exercises that incorporated local militias into the operations. 

By the sixth class, the Red Academy students were working Front 

Army level exercises, incorporating military maneuvers, logistics, and 

intelligence into the exercises.166 Another instruction method was using 

guest instructors and lecturers. The Red Academy invited Red Front Army 

and Red Army Corps leaders to discuss their experiences and training to 

help add relevance to the course. Additionally, key Central Committee 

leaders visited the school, to include Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu 

De, to name a few.167

Like the previous training schools, the Red Army Academy students 

and faculty were always prepared to conduct combat operations at a 

moment’s notice, especially during the Extermination Campaigns. The 

Red Army counted on the students and faculty to bolster their combat 

ranks when needed. The school maintained a military organizational 

structure of platoons, companies, and battalions to facilitate command and 

control outside the school.168 The conditions at the Red Academy were 

similar to other schools. The combined deleterious effects of sustained 

combat operations, enemy economic blockades, and few revenue sources 

kept teaching materials and supplies in low supply. With that said, morale 

at the school was reported to be quite high. The Red Academy maintained 

social programs with singing, dancing, games, and performances to make 

up for any material inadequacies.169

By October 1933, the Red Army had graduated six classes with more 

than 11,000 graduates.170 Approximately two-thirds of the graduates 

returned to the Red Army, and about one-third went to local base areas 

to assist in training and administration. Around the same time, the NRA’s 

Fifth Extermination Campaign pushed the demand for more trained officers 

as part of its greater “Million Man Red Army” drive. The CCP increased 

its requirements for the Red Academy, pushing the school to train and 
135

graduate 10,000 officers each year, a tall order given its meager resources. 

To help the Red Academy meet these requirements, the Revolutionary 

Military Council issued “Order Regarding Changes at the Red Academy” 

on October 17, 1933. The order authorized a complete reorganization of 

the Red Army military education system to help meet the training demand. 

First, the Red Academy’s advanced program was changed to create the Red 

Army War College, a school focused on training and developing leaders at 

the brigade and division level. Some members of the sixth class and all the 

students from the Red Academy’s seventh class formed the cadre for two 

new infantry schools.171 The artillery, engineer, machine gun, air defense, 

and anti-armor training units were also detached from the Red Academy 

to create the Specialty Branch School. Lastly, the guerrilla training unit 

within the Academy created its own Guerrilla Training School.

The Red Army War College opened its doors at Ruijin in October 

1933. Its mission was to develop upper echelon Red Army leaders. The 

Red Academy had done a good job at developing lower and middle level 

leaders, and the Red Army wanted to expand to the higher levels in order 

to create a leadership able to meet both present and future challenges. 

The college had three major departments: training department, political 

department, and economics department. Besides these three departments, 

the Red Army War College also maintained a high-command department, 

advanced politics department, general staff department, logistics 

department, advanced marksmanship unit, and survey and map making 

department.172

Initially, the Red Army War College had difficulties in its operations. 

The teaching staff was unprepared for classes, and the curriculum they 

used sometimes was irrelevant to the current fight. Students complained 

that the teachers were often slow to respond to students’ questions, and 

some teachers did not even supervise training. Students were also guilty of 

poor behavior, with many of them arriving tardy or unprepared for class.173

The school graduated three classes during its one year of operation 

with approximately 200 students per class.174 Each class of students 

attended core courses in military and political activities, similar to the 

Red Academy. The military classes included infantry combat regulations, 

squad to brigade level training and basic knowledge, and marksmanship.175

The political classes included how to create political parties, the history of 

social development, and political work within the Red Army.176 Some of 

these classes were taught by senior leaders. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu 

De, Liu Bocheng, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping came to the Red Army 

War College to teach classes.

By August 1934, the pressures from the Fifth Extermination Campaign 

had taken a toll on the college and the fourth class did not start. With the 

Long March looming near, the faculty of the Red Army War College was 

transferred to the Red Army Cadre Unit, and moved with the forces out 
136

of the Jiangxi Soviet in October, effectively ending the short tenure of the 

Red Army War College.

At the same time it established the Red Army War College, the Red 

Army created the Specialty Branch School for its engineers, artillery, 

and machine-gun unit leaders. The instructors came from either of two 

backgrounds. Some instructors received their training from the Red 

Academy and gained practical experience in Red Army units. Other 

instructors were former NRA soldiers who possessed technical and tactical 

knowledge on the specialized equipment.177 Initially, the Revolutionary 

Military Council viewed the program as a very elite school, and started in 

February 1934 to restrict admissions to only the most qualified students. 

However, because of low number of qualified students, the Revolutionary 

Military Committee lowered the standards in June 1934 to gain a wider 

pool of students.178 Because of the overall low educational background 

of the students, the Red Army Specialty Branch School adopted a more 

hands-on instructional approach to overcome any illiteracy obstacles. 

Many of the classes were done outside where the soldiers learned the 

tasks while doing them, in order to keep them engaged, and increase 

comprehension. Specialty equipment was also on short supply, since most 

of it was being used on the front line. The Specialty Branch School did, 

however, have a Krupps artillery piece confiscated during the first attack 

on Changsha. The weapon piece doubled as not only the only artillery 

weapon system available for training, but also as a historical example of 

the Chinese revolution and the Red Army’s path towards modernization.179

In 1934, the Red Army began feeling the strong effects of the 

Nationalist’s new strategy. The Red Army’s ranks increased with new 

recruits as causalities mounted. To ensure that new recruits stayed loyal 

and in place, the Red Army paired old veterans with new recruits. The 

purpose of the policy was twofold. First, the veteran could mentor and 

train the new recruit on tactics he had learned on the field. Second, the 

veteran soldier also filled supervisory role to ensure the new recruit would 

not desert or turn on the Red Army.180

Conclusion

From 1932 to 1934, the Red Army reached its peak in terms of size 

and professionalization, only to be defeated by a superior NRA force. With 

the rise of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks to power, the Red Army adopted a 

more aggressive, offensive strategy. While the strategy would later prove 

to be a poor choice, the strategy pushed a series of reforms that helped to 

professionalize the Red Army. During this period, the Red Army almost 

doubled in size to six army corps. Within the corps and even to the local 

militia groups, all Red Army units were standardized to ensure uniformity 

and centralize command and control. The Red Army also established the 

Red Academy and Red Army War College, as well as specialty schools to 

train and develop its officers. These changes helped the Red Army achieve 
137

victory over the NRA in the Fourth Extermination Campaign and expand 

the Soviet into four provinces. Yet, the NRA also adapted and innovated 

after its loss, and applied a superior strategy against the Red Army. Without 

the necessary heavy weapons or supplies, the Red Army was unable to 

stop the methodical encirclement of the Jiangxi Soviet during the Fifth 

Extermination Campaign. In October 1934, the Red Army made a daring 

escape, retreating from the Jiangxi Soviet to protect its forces and started 

the Long March. While the Red Army was defeated, it was not broken, 

for the foundations for a professional military force were established 

during this time. It was now up to the leadership to survive and live to 

fight another day.
138

Notes

1. There is debate on the actual twenty-eight members of the group. Price 

cited the following names: (1) Qin Bangxian (Bo Gu), (2) Chen Shaoyu (Wang 

Ming), (3) Zhang Qinqiu (Madam Shen Zemin), (4) Zhang Wentian (Luo Fu), 

(5) Chen Changhao, (6) Chen Yuandao, (7) Zhu A’gen, (8) Zhu Zishun, (9) He 

Kechuan (Kai Feng), (10) He Zishu, (11) Xia Xi, (12) Xia Tefu, (13) Li Zhousheng, 

(14) Li Yuanjie, (15) Meng Qingshu (Madam Chen Shaoyu), (16) Shen Zemin, 

(17) Sun Jimin, (18) Song Panmin, (19) Du Zuoxiang (Madam Chen Changhao), 

(20) Wang Jiaxiang, (21) Wang Baoli, (22) Wang Shengdi, (23) Wang Shengyong, 

(24) Wang Yuncheng, (25) Yang Shangkun, (26) Yin Jian, (27) Yuan Jiayong, 

and (28) Yue Sheng, See Jane L. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976), 100. Rue contended that no comprehensive 

list existed, and only identified sixteen members of the twenty-eight. See John 

E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition: 1927-1935 (Stanford: Stanford University 

Press, 1966), 7-8.

2. The two-year program included classes in Russian language and history, 

along with Marxist, Leninist, and Stalinist communist theories. Price, Cadres, 

Commanders, and Commissars, 89-93.

3. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars, 95-96, 100.

4. The majority of the Central Committee disagreed with Li Lisan’s 

policies, but other political considerations and intraparty dynamics prevented 

the wholesale condemnation of the Li’s leftist deviation. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in 

Opposition, 239-240.

5. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 242.

6. Rue gave some anecdotal stories of betrayal between two factions within 

the CCP. One story was that Wang Ming alerted the British Police of a secret 

meeting in Shanghai. Key Li Lisan supporters and enemies of the Twenty-eight 

Bolsheviks were arrested, turned over to the KMT, and executed. Rue, Mao Tsetung in Opposition, 243.

7. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 247.

8. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 249.

9. Zhou Enlai’s role in the fight between Mao and left leaning Communist 

party members remains uncertain. Almost all western scholarship viewed the 

Zhou-Mao relationship as antagonistic, with Zhou leading the charge to push 

forward the “offensive” line and the removal of Mao from positions of power. See 

Pingfeng Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet” (Ph.D dissertation, 

George Washington University, 1977), 145-146; John P. Harrison, The Long 

March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1927-72 (New York: 

Praeger Publishing, 1972), 229; Chong Kun Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the 

Chinese Soviet Republic” (Ph.D dissertation, The American University, 1968), 

219. This argument is most likely based on Gong Chu’s autobiographic account 

of the time in Wo yu Hongjun [The Red Army and I]. The other perspective is 

more conciliatory, seeing Zhou Enlai as a mediator and middleman between the 

two sides during the offensives, with Zhou often supporting Mao’s position once 

presented with the realities of the situation. See Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 
139

251; Shaoqun Huang, Zhong qu feng yun: Zhong yang Su qu di yi zhi wu ci fan 

“wei jiao” zhan zheng shi [Zhong qu Feng yun: the History of the First through 

Fifth Extermination Campaigns in the Central Soviet] (Beijing: Zhong gong 

zhong yang dang xiao chu ban she, 1993) (referred to as ZQFY),175-189.

10. Ilpyong J. Kim, The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the 

Soviets (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 97.

11. Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 160.

12. See Tony Saich, ed. The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party

(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 558-566. 

13. Saich, The Rise to Power, 561.

14. Saich, The Rise to Power, 560.

15. Saich, The Rise to Power, 563. The targeted cities were Nanchang, 

Fuzhou, and Ji’an. The areas needing to be connected were the Jiangxi Soviet, 

Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi, northeast Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, and HunanJiangxi areas. The other Soviet areas to be linked were Henan-Hubei-Anhui 

Soviet, northeast Anhui, east Hubei, Huei-Henan border, upper and lower reaches 

of the Yangtze River, and the Beijing-Hankou Railway. Saich, The Rise to Power, 

564.

16. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 229.

17. Saich, The Rise to Power, 515. 

18. Saich, The Rise to Power, 563.

19. Saich, The Rise to Power, 566.

20. History of Development of War in China, 869.

21. ZQFY, 178.

22. According to ZQFY, Zhou Enlai was empathetic to Mao’s view. He 

even expressed his own reservations when he arrived at the Jiangxi Soviet in 

December, but was overruled by the Central Committee. They ordered the Red 

Army, at a minimum, to attack one city, in accordance with the new strategy. See 

ZQFY, 177-178.

23. ZQFY, 178. Ganzhou city walls were bordered on three sides from the 

Gan River, providing a strong defensive perimeter for the peninsula city. Within 

the walls, the NRA Twelfth Division had two divisions of 3,000 men protecting 

the city, augmented by local and private militias, bringing the total military force 

to about 8,000. Reinforcements of two NRA divisions in Ji’an and twenty NRA 

regiments in Nanxiong were not far away either. 

24. History of Development of War in China, 869; ZQFY, 177-181.

25. Peter Williams Donovan, “The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet, 

1931-1934” (PhD dissertation, Cornell University 1974), 94.

26. Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 220.

27. History of Development of War in China, 870; ZQFY, 183. 

28. History of the Development of War in China, 870; ZQFY, 184.
140

29. ZQFY, 185.

30. ZQFY, 187. Yoon argued that the deployment of the NRA Nineteenth 

Route Army to defend Fujian pushed the Red Army to abandon plans of seizing 

Fujian, and instead conduct offensive operations in Guangdong. See Yoon, “Mao, 

The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 220. 

31. History of the Development of War in China, 870; ZQFY, 187. Harrison 

attributed this quote to Zhou Enlai, prefacing it with, “Chou En-lai charged Kiangsi 

leaders with procrastination in carrying out the Party line and reaffirmed the call 

for [attack],” to support the argument of a Zhou-Mao conflict. See Harrison, The 

Long March to Power, 229. However, the above Chinese Mainland sources do 

not mention any sort of conflict on this specific issue. Rue took a more balanced 

approach, arguing that both sides assisted each other in planning operations, but 

still were divided on the basic strategy. See Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 

251.

32. History of the Development of War in China, 870; ZQFY, 187-189. 

33. ZQFY, 190.

34. History of Development of War in China, 871.

35. History of Development of War in China, 871.

36. There is a discrepancy on the date of the Ningdu Emergency Conference. 

According to Harrison and Rue, the conference occurred in August, 1932. See 

Harrison, The Long March to Power, 230; Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 

253. However, Saich and mainland sources cite October 1932 as the date of the 

conference. See History of Development of War in China, 871; Saich, The Rise to 

Power, xxv.

37. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 230.

38. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 229.

39. History of Development of War in China, 872.

40. Some of the urban communist party members began leaving Shanghai as 

early late 1931. See Harrison, The Long March to Power, 222. Harrison cited that 

the KMT arrested 24,000 Communists and 155,525 radicals during the ten-year 

civil war. They also had penetrated almost one-third of the Communist cells in 

Shanghai in the 1930s. See Harrison, The Long March to Power, 220.

41. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 222.

42. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 257.

43. Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and Zhang Wentian remained in Ruijin. Xia Xi went 

to the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou Soviet. Chen Changhao and Shen Zemin 

went to the Henan-Hubei-Anhui Soviet. Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese 

Communist. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963), 159.

44. Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 220. 

May 1932 is the date quoted in mainland sources for the start of the Bandit 

Suppression Headquarters. See History of Development of War in China, 872.

45. History of Development of War in China, 872. The force included 

provincial KMT forces from Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hunan. 
141

46. History of Development of War in China, 874; Yoon, “Mao, The Red 

Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 229. ZQFY quoted 500,000 as the total 

strength of the NRA force. See ZQFY, 208.

47. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 151. The first 

column had three divisions, the second and third column had four divisions each. 

One division was placed in reserve. See ZQFY, 208.

48. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 151; Yoon, “Mao, 

The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 230.

49. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 151-152, Yoon, 

“Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 231.

50. History of Development of War in China, 874. Refer to Appendix A for 

discussion on Red Army numbers.

51. History of Development of War in China, 874; ZQFY, 219. Chi 

maintained a slightly different task organization, identifying the First, Third, 

Fifth, and Seventh Red Army Corps as the units within the Red Army in Jiangxi 

Soviet. See Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 151.

52. To support the theory that Zhou Enlai did not completely believe in 

the Braun’s offensive plan, Zhou Enlai exchanged telegrams with the Central 

Committee, from December 16, 1932 to February 4, 1933, expressing his 

reservations in attacking Nancheng and Nanfeng. According to this research, 

Zhou Enlai requested to conduct mobile warfare operations in the area, instead 

of attacking the cities; however, he was rebuffed multiple times by the Central 

Committee and forced to attack Nanfeng. See ZQFY, 220-225.

53. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 153.

54. ZQFY, 225.

55. History of Development of War in China, 874.

56. There are two versions to the story of the commander’s capture. The first 

story is that Chen Shiqi, the Fifty-ninth Division commander, and about 100 of his 

men attempted to escape the Red Army after the battle, and became disoriented. 

They found a local guide to help navigate them out of the area. Instead, the guide 

brought the group directly to the Red Army and they were captured. See Chi, “The 

Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 154. The other version stated that 

Chen attempted to contact Li Ming, the Fifty-second NRA Division commander, 

but his telegram was intercepted. His group attempted to flee to Le’an but was 

captured by the Red Army. ZQFY, 230.

57. ZQFY, 231.

58. ZQFY, 231.

59. History of Development of War in China, 874.

60. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 154.

61. The reason for the NRA’s withdrawal from the Fourth Extermination 

Campaign is not certain. One theory is that the losses of three combat divisions, 

especially units especially loyal to Chiang, caused him to end the campaign and 

reorganize. See Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 
142

232. The other theory is that Japan’s takeover of Manchuria and subsequent 

crossing of the Great Wall forced Chiang to focus his efforts on the Japanese, 

rather than the communists. See Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi 

Soviet,” 155.

62. History of Development of War in China, 875.

63. ZQFY, 233.

64. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 259.

65. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 231.

66. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 260.

67. Gregor Benton, Mountain Fires: The Red Army’s Three-Year War in 

South China, 1934-1938 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 132. 

Harrison stated Luo Ming was the acting secretary of the Fujian committee. See 

Harrison, The Long March to Power, 230. Rue identified him as an old Red Army 

commander based in Fujian. See Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 258.

68. Benton, Mountain Fires, 132-133.

69. Benton, Mountain Fires, 133.

70. The purge took down not only Luo Ming, but also Mao’s brother, Mao 

Zetan. Benton, Mountain Fires, 133; Harrison, The Long March to Power, 231.

71. ZQFY, 262-263.

72. ZQFY, 263.

73. History of the Development of War in China, 876.

74. ZQFY, 265-266.

75. History of the Development of War in China, 876.

76. History of the Development of War in China, 875-876.

77. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 163; History of the 

Development of War in China, 876. Baojia is a Chinese form of counterinsurgency 

strategy. Used multiple times during the Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties to prevent 

internal revolt, the baojia system leveraged community relationships to create 

local security forces and civil administrations loyal to the government. For more 

information on the baojia system in Imperial China, see Phillip Kuhn, Rebellion 

and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 

1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). For a detailed study 

of the counterinsurgency techniques employed by the KMT, see William Wei, 

Counterrevolution in China: the Nationalists in Jiangxi during the Soviet period

(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985). 

78. According to Chi, the main body strength was considered to be at 

400,000. See Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 162. Other 

sources have quoted the NRA size to be at one million, with a main body attack 

force of 500,000. The five air corps also consisted of approximately 200 airplanes, 

total. See History of the Development of War in China, 876. Another source stated 

there were fifty-four aircraft in each unit, for a total of 270 aircraft. See ZQFY, 

260. More research is needed to verify the size of the NRA forces during the 
143

Fifth Extermination Campaign, especially how it conducted logistical operations 

to sustain such a large force.

79. History of the Development of War in China, 876. The Northern Force 

included the First, Second, and Third Route NRA Armies, led by Chen Cheng. 

See ZQFY, 260.

80. History of the Development of War in China, 876; ZQFY, 260.

81. ZQFY, 260.

82. History of the Development of War in China, 876. Refer to Appendix A 

for more discussion on troop strength in the Red Army.

83. History of the Development of War in China, 877.

84. One of the reasons for the revolt was that Cai Tingkai, commander of 

the Nineteenth Route NRA Army, and Fujian native and Nationalist leader, Chen 

Mingshu, were upset at Chiang Kai-shek accepting the Tanggu Truce Agreement 

with the Japanese in May 1933. They were against any appeasement of the 

Japanese, and established their own People’s Revolutionary Government. Yoon, 

“Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 257-258. 

85. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 233.

86. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 233.

87. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 261. Harrison pointed out that history 

of disagreements between Fujian leaders and the Communists, dating back to the 

1920s may have contributed to the mistrust between the two groups. Harrison, 

The Long March to Power, 234.

88. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 263.

89. ZQFY, 269.

90. Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 263.

91. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 165.

92. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 165.

93. In October 1933, the NRA had developed a construction plan to establish 

blockhouses on the river banks within nine to fifteen days using four divisions. 

ZQFY, 260. 

94. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 167.

95. History of the Development of War in China, 878. Chi stated that the 

NRA lost 4,000 soldiers during the fight for Guangchang. Chi, “The Chinese Red 

Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 167.

96. Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 165.

97. Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 265.

98. ZQFY, 335.

99. ZQFY, 335.

100. History of the Development of War in China, 878.

101. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 239; Kim, The Politics, 200.
144

102. For more information on the German advisers to the KMT, see F. F. Liu, 

A Military History of Modern China: 1925-1949 (Princeton: Princeton University 

Press, 1956).

103. Hans J. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China (New York: 

RoutledgeCruzon, 2004), 156.

104. For more information on local administration as part of COIN in 

Dhofar, see Walter Ladwig III, “Supporting Allies in COIN: Britain and the 

Dhofar Rebellion,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, No.1 (2008), 62-88; Ian 

Beckett, “The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar, 1965-1975,” in 

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds. 

(Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 175-190. For Malaya, see Riley Sutherland, 

Army Operations in Malaya, 1947-1960 (Santa Monica: RAND, 1964), 112-164; 

Simon Smith, “General Templer and Counter-insurgency in Malaya: Hearts and 

Minds, Intelligence, and Propaganda,” Intelligence and National Security 16, No. 

3 (2001), 60-78; Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: 

The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 1948-60,” in Counterinsurgency in 

Modern Warfare, Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds. (Oxford: Osprey 

Publishing, 2010), 101-118.

105. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 144.

106. Dang tuan sheng wei wei kuo da hong jun zhi ge ji dang tuan bu xin 

[A Letter from the CCP and CY Provincial Committess to all CCP and CY 

Headquarters Concerning Expansion of the Red Army], (CCP and CY Jiangxi 

Provincial Committee, July 28, 1932), SSC, Reel 6:74.

107. The report outlined that most soldiers returned home rather than joining 

another cause. Many of them left their weapons at their fighting position and 

simply walked away. Zhengzhi Gongzuo [Political Work], No. 1, April 12, 1932, 

SSC, Reel 9:55.

108. Many of the peasants who went on the line fought valiantly, and were 

seen as heroic martyrs for the Red Army. With that said, their élan did not make up 

for their lack of training and military skill and did lower the combat effectiveness 

of the Red Army.

109. A more thorough discussion on these topics will be covered later in the 

chapter.

110. Zhongguo gong nong hong jun [The Chinese Worker and Peasant Red 

Army], (General Political Department, CWPRA, July 1932), SSC, Reel 7:1.

111. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 227, 232.

112. Zhongyang su qu zhongyang ju gei zhonggong Jiangxi sheng wei xi, [a 

Letter from the CBSA to the CCP Jiangxi Provincial Committee], February 7, 

1932, SSC, Reel 6:82.

113. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 256.

114. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 238.

115. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 254.

116. Zhongguo gong nong hong jun.
145

117. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 256.

118. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 246.

119. Zhongguo gong nong hong jun.

120. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 232.

121. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 253.

122. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 257.

123. Zhongguo gong nong hong jun.

124. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 248.

125. Shanti Swarup, A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement (Oxford: 

Clarendon Press, 1966), 103.

126. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (New York: International 

Publishers, 1954), 239.

127. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 251.

128. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 251.

129. Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic,” 231.

130. Hong se zhan chang [Red Battlefield], SSC, Reel 9:23. 

131. Bai jun qi shi jiu shi de gai kuang [Situation report on the White SeventyNinth Division], October 26, 1933, Reel 9:17.

132. Saich, The Rise to Power, 629.

133. Chi-hsi Hu, “Mao, Lin Biao, and the Fifth Encirclement Campaign,” The 

China Quarterly 82 (1980), 255.

134. Saich, The Rise to Power, 635.

135. Hu, “Mao, Lin Biao, and the Fifth Encirclement Campaign,” 257.

136. Hu, “Mao, Lin Biao, and the Fifth Encirclement Campaign,” 257.

137. Saich, The Rise to Power, 634.

138. Saich, The Rise to Power, 630.

139. Saich, The Rise to Power, 633.

140. Hu, “Mao, Lin Biao, and the Fifth Encirclement Campaign,” 258.

141. Hong jun wen ti jue yi an [Decision on the Red Army question], April 18, 

1932, SSC, Reel 7:20.

142. ZQFY, 263. Donovan cited that the Fifth Red Army Corps had, in addition 

to its two divisions, a third division, the Fifteen Red Army Division. Donovan, 

“The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet,” 178.

143. ZQFY, 263. According to Donovan, the Seventh Red Army Corps had 

the Nineteenth Red Army Division, Twentieth Red Army Division, and Twentyfirst Red Army Division. No subordinate units were identified for the Ninth Red 

Army Corps in either source. Donovan, “The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi 

Soviet,” 178.
146

144. Donovan, “The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet,” 181.

145. ZQFY, 263.

146. Donovan, “The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet,” 104.

147. Donovan, “The Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet,” 104.

148. Tong yi bian zhi du li tuan you ji dui wen ti [The Question of Unified 

Organizational System for Independent Regiments and Guerrilla Detachments] 

(Political Department of the Jiangxi Military District, March 22, 1932), SSC, Reel 

6.95.

149. Tong yi bian zhi du li tuan you ji dui wen ti.

150. Jun shi li shi yan jiu bu. Zhongguo ren min jie fang jun de qi shi nian

[Seventy Years of the PLA] (Beijing: Jun shi ke xue chu ban she, 1987), 82.

151. The original amount was 20,000 dan. Dan is a Chinese weight 

measurement that is equal to approximately 50 kilograms. Seventy Years of the 

PLA, 83. 

152. Seventy Years of the PLA, 83.

153. Seventy Years of the PLA, 82.

154. Chinese Military School History, 338.

155. Chinese Military School History, 338. The classes focused on six areas: 

(1) tactical training, including individual, squad, platoon, and battalion tasks; 

(2) marksmanship and employment of weapon systems; (3) fortifications and 

camouflage; (4) unit staff and administrative work; (5) simple surveying and 

communications; and (6) command and control/leadership classes, which covered 

unit training, discipline, military etiquette, unit sanitation, and unit culture.

156. Chinese Military School History, 338-339.

157. Price discussed the use of the school newspaper as a strong propaganda 

and training tool within the Red Academy. Called the “wall newspaper,” the 

publication published news of upcoming events and announcements. It also had 

a “red” and “black” list of good and bad students, to promote or curb certain 

behaviors. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars, 120.

158. Chinese Military School History, 339.

159. Hong jun ren zi ke ben [Red Army Character Reader], March 1934,SSC, 

Reel 8:60.

160. The manuals included The Infantry Course, the Artillery Course, Tunnel 

Operations Course, Essentials of Defensive operations, Bayonet Manual, Military 

Weapons Abstract, Explosives Abstract, Employment of Machine Gun Squads 

and Platoons, Summary of Planning Training, Night Warfare, and Handouts on 

Mortars. See Chinese Military School History, 338.

161. The books included Compendium of Red Army Communist Youth 

Training, The Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army, Red Army Education and 

Management, Political Questions and Answers, Land Reforms, and Imperialism 

and China. See Chinese Military School History, 338.

162. The titles included Red Academy Weekly (in 1933, it changed to Red 
147

Academy Life), Revolution and War, and Red Battlefield Collection. See Chinese 

Military School History, 338.

163. Hong se zhan chang hui kan [Collection of the Red Battlefield], June 

1933, SSC, reel 9.23.

164. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars, 118.

165. Chinese Military Education History, 279.

166. Chinese Military School History, 340.

167. Chinese Military School History, 341.

168. Chinese Military School History, 340.

169. Chinese Military School History, 343.

170. The first class had approximately 780 students which grew exponentially, 

reaching almost 4,000 with the sixth class. See Chinese Military School History, 

342-243.

171. The infantry schools were called the First Infantry School, known as 

Pengyang Infantry School, and the Second Infantry School, known as Gonglüe 

Infantry School. See Chinese Military School History, 345.

172. Chinese Military School History, 349. Price stated there were only four 

departments: a command class, an advanced command class, a senior political 

class, and a staff class. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars, 121.

173. “Yi yue lai de the hong jun da xue,” [The First month of the Red Army 

war College], Ge ming yu zhan zheng [Revolution and War], No.2, SSC, Reel 

16:2.

174. Chinese Military Education History, 280.

175. Chinese Military School History, 349. Price differentiated the military 

classes to the specific command class, which focused on military history, strategy, 

staff operations, study of arms, command of unified fighting with various types of 

forces, and building fortifications. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars, 

124. 

176. Chinese Military School History, 349. Price added the following topics 

into the political training: basic tactics, with regulations on irregular skirmishing, 

and basic military knowledge and training from squad to regimental level, 

including skills such as firing a gun, stabbing with a bayonet, and some civil 

engineering. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars, 124.

177. Chinese Military School History, 355.

178. The initial requirements were for applicants to be between the age of 18 

and 30, who were physically fit, politically strong, literate, and self-motivated. 

Each applicant needed to have combat experience, with experience as a squad 

leader in a machine gun unit for a minimum of a year. The new standard deleted 

the literacy requirement. Additionally, if there were not enough applicants, the 

school lowered the combat experience time requirement to six months. Recently 

promoted or inexperienced platoon leaders were also considered. Chinese Military 

School History, 355.
148

179. Chinese Military School History, 356.

180. Hong se she shou [Red Marksman], No. 35, (Political Department of the 

Min-Kan Military District, Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet 

Republic, July 1, 1934), SSC, Reel 6:70.
149

Chapter 6

Epilogue

By late September 1934, the Chinese Red Army was at the brink of 

destruction. The NRA had effectively encircled its base area and had inflicted 

heavy damage on the Communist military force. To avoid complete defeat, 

the First Front Red Army escaped through a gap in the NRA encirclement 

in October 1934 and conducted a year-long strategic relocation through 

China’s mountainous interior. During the travels, the Red Army had a 

battle within its ranks, as Mao Zedong struggled to consolidate power over 

the party and the Army. At the same time, the Red Army survived under 

the most arduous conditions, travelling thousands of miles to finally arrive 

in northwest China in late 1935. There they established a new Soviet base 

area and mounted a Japanese resistance propaganda campaign that caught 

the nationalist undercurrent sweeping across China. A strong desire for a 

united front with the communists against the Japanese instead of continued 

war with a fellow Chinese led Zhang Xueliang to kidnap Chiang Kaishek in Xi’an in December 1936, and demand the creation of the Second 

Chinese United Front against the Japanese forces. To gain his freedom, 

Chiang agreed to the united front, effectively ending the hostilities against 

the Communists and ensuring the survival of the Chinese Red Army. 

The Long March

As the stranglehold of the NRA encirclement became stronger and 

stronger, the Red Army and Central Committee of the CCP looked for new 

strategies to counter the KMT. Some argue that the first discussions began 

in May 1934 after the defeat at Guangchang.1

 With the offensive strategy 

no longer viable, the Red Army entertained alternatives to save it from its 

predicament. One broad strategy was to co-opt the NRA by leveraging 

nationalistic fervor to create a united front against the Japanese. The Red 

Army leadership hoped that by having a common enemy they could gain 

a temporary reprieve from war with the KMT. In July 1934, the Red Army 

attempted this new strategy by deploying the Seventh Red Army Corps 

to western Fujian to join the Tenth Red Army, led by Su Yu.2

 This force 

was designated as the Anti-Japanese Vanguard Column to gain Nationalist 

support; however, the propaganda did not work. The NRA destroyed the 

Red Army Column, killing or executing most of the forces. About 800 

survivors escaped the area and banded together as a guerrilla group under 

Su Yu. They would fight independently until the Second United Front was 

established in 1937 and eventually link up with the New Fourth Army in 

1938.3

 Another breakout occurred on July 23, 1934 when the Sixth Red 

Army Corps, based out of the Hunan-Guangdong border area, moved 

through Hunan and linked up with the Third Red Army, creating the 

Second Front Red Army, led by He Long on October 22, 1934.4

It is unknown if either operation had any effect on the KMT. However, 
150

any diversionary effect had already dissipated by the time the Long March 

started. Mounting costs and continued casualties increased the burden on 

the Red Army, making it difficult to survive in its current location. The 

Red Army needed a new secure location to reorganize, refit, and recruit 

forces. In August 1934, Bo Gu and Otto Braun made the decision in secret 

to abandon the Jiangxi Soviet.5

 The original plan was to move southwest 

toward Hunan to more friendly territory, and link up with the Second 

Front Red Army.6

 While the exact location of the Second Front Red Army 

was unknown, the leadership saw Hunan as the most likely location, and 

planned a route to the area. The rest of the Red Army continued its frenzied 

recruiting campaign, as well as raising money and collecting equipment. 

On the night of 10 October 1934, the Red Army leadership gave marching 

orders to the First Front Red Army. The units moved southwest in two 

columns, with First, Third, Fifth, Eight, and Ninth Red Army Corps.7

 The 

total force was approximately 87,000.8

 For many soldiers, they did not 

know it would be the last time they would see the Jiangxi Soviet. Instead, 

many believed they were on another maneuver to outflank the KMT and 

attack its rear. A force of 16,000, including many injured soldiers such as 

its leader, Chen Yi, was left behind in Ruijin to defend against and delay 

the KMT forces, giving the First Front Red Army enough time to escape 

unnoticed. With this movement, the Long March began.

The initial few days of the Long March were quite peaceful. The Red 

Army avoided any major engagement with NRA forces and navigated 

through a gap in the encirclement quite easily. Earlier, Zhou Enlai had 

negotiated a truce with the Guangdong and Guangxi warlords participating 

in the Extermination campaign, helping the Red Army gain safe passage 

through the area.9

 Meanwhile, the remaining Red Army forces in Ruijin 

fought tenaciously against the NRA, which helped conceal the reality that 

the main body had already absconded. Up until November 8, Nationalist 

newspapers reported the Red Army had been all but destroyed.10 The First 

Front Red Army moved at night, travelling along small trails to avoid aerial 

detection and attack. The formation of forces was the First and Ninth Red 

Army Corps on the left flank, the Third and Eighth Red Army Corps on 

the right flank, the leadership and logistical units in the center, and the 

Fifth Red Army Corps providing rear guard.11 The Red Army hired porters 

to help carry its heavy equipment, to include printing presses, X-ray 

machines, and its money. Other porters helped transport litters that carried 

the injured and key leaders. Some of the Red Army leaders, to include 

Zhou Enlai, were sick or injured during this time, though others, like Mao, 

rode in litters to rest during the day after long night-planning sessions. 

By mid-November 1934, the NRA discovered the Red Army had 

escaped the encirclement to the west and began its pursuit. From the 

Red Army’s movement, Chiang and the NRA leadership deduced that 

southern Hunan was the Red Army’s most likely destination and deployed 
151

troops in pursuit. The Red Army continued to rapidly move west, hoping 

to cross the Xiang River before the NRA forces arrived. On November 

27, 1934, the Red Army arrived at Daoxian and attacked the NRA 

blockhouses protecting Xiang River crossings. The Red Army was able 

to quickly reduce the blockhouses, and began flowing forces across the 

river. However, its central column, bogged down by heavy equipment and 

injured soldiers, did not keep pace with the rest of the Red Army, and 

lagged behind. On November 28, the NRA attacked the rear elements of 

the Red Army before it made it to the Xiang River. For five days, the Red 

Army fought a ferocious rear-guard action as it attempted to disengage its 

forces from the NRA and cross the river. By December 2, 1934, all the Red 

Army forces had made it across the Xiang River, though at a cost. The Red 

Army lost more than two divisions from the Third and Fifth Red Army 

Corps. After the Xiang River crossing, just over 30,000 soldiers remained 

in the force.12 Additionally, much of the Army’s heavy equipment and 

books were abandoned along the route in order to lighten its load.13

After the Red Army made it across the Xiang River, it continued to 

avoid any pitched battles with the NRA. The difficult battle at the Xiang 

River changed the Red Army in different ways. Desertions increased as 

soldiers realized the movement was an exodus from Jiangxi. Porters for the 

heavy equipment were leaving at night as well, especially after carrying all 

the equipment up and down the mountains along muddy trails.14 The Red 

Army attempted to move north multiple times to link up with He Long and 

the Second Front Red Army, only to find the routes blocked by the NRA. 

The Red Army switched plans instead, and continued west to Guizhou 

in order to reach Sichuan and link up with the Fourth Front Red Army 

and set up a new Soviet.15 Once at Liping, Guizhou province, the Red 

Army leadership decided on December 18 to head north towards Zunyi 

in order to reach Sichuan.16 Guiyang, the provincial capital of Guizhou, 

was the original target destination, but the city was reinforced by seven 

NRA divisions. Zunyi, on the other hand, seemed like a better target. It 

was the second largest city in the province, and only guarded by Guizhou 

provincial forces. On January 1, 1935, the Red Army began movement to 

Zunyi, crossing the Wu River under heavy fire from Guizhou provincial 

forces. Within the three days, the Red Army completed the river crossing 

and moved toward Zunyi. On January 7, the Red Army attacked Zunyi, 

which fell two days later. Once Zunyi was captured, the Red Army began 

its normal recruiting drive, gaining 30,000 recruits to expand its ranks. It 

also buried or abandoned much of its heavy equipment to make it more 

mobile. The Red Army originally hoped to stay in the area for an extended 

period of time to refit, reorganize, and recruit forces. The Central Cadre 

Unit’s Red Army Medical School staff took advantage of the break and 

held a one-week course to help train soldiers on basic first aid.17 However, 

local conditions prevented any long-term stay. The major crop in the area 

was opium, which was good for bartering but could not sustain the Red 
152

Army. The city’s location along a bend in the river also limited the Red 

Army’s escape routes if the NRA were to attack the area.18 Given these 

conditions, the Communist leadership held a conference to discuss its 

military strategy.

The conference, which convened on January 15, 1935, became a 

critical turning point in Communist history.19 In attendance were members 

of the Politburo: Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Zhou Enlai, Luo Fu, 

and Bo Gu. Liu Bocheng, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Peng 

Dehuai, and Otto Braun were in attendance as well.20 The main discussion 

of the meeting was the failed military strategy used against the Fifth 

Extermination Campaign. Bo Gu and Zhou Enlai first spoke and both 

apologized for the poor strategy, and accepted blame for the problems. Mao 

followed with a blistering attack against the strategy’s “leftist” deviation, 

denouncing the use of the “short, swift thrusts” tactics and the failure to 

unite with the Fujian Nineteenth NRA Army. The meeting went on for a 

three more days, with most of the Red Army leadership denouncing Bo Gu 

and Otto Braun’s failed strategy and throwing their support towards Mao. 

By the end of the meeting, most of the key CCP and Red Army leaders 

effectively distanced themselves from the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks. Mao 

became the CCP’s de facto leader, even though he was not elected to any 

new leadership post in Zunyi.21 A major change was the dissolution of the 

triumvirate leadership council of Bo Gu, Otto Braun, and Zhou Enlai. Zhu 

De and Zhou Enlai were placed in charge of the Red Army and then the 

Red Army began moving towards Sichuan to link up with the Fourth Front 

Red Army.22

The Red Army departed Zunyi with its four army corps: the First, 

Third, Fifth, and Ninth Red Army Corps, though all dramatically smaller 

than before. The First Front Red Army’s total strength was approximately 

35,000 soldiers.23 It moved north through Tongzi, picking up gold and 

opium to help it purchase food and supplies later in the journey.24 The 

First Army Corps, led by Lin Biao, continued ahead as the Red Army’s 

lead unit searching for a pass to cross the Yangtze River. As the First 

Army Corps attempted to secure a crossing near Chishui, the remainder 

of the Red Army became engaged in a pitched battle with a Sichuan NRA 

army force near Tucheng. The battle became so intense that Mao recalled 

Lin Biao and his First Army Corps to help with the fighting. The Red 

Army eventually broke contact on January 29, 1935 and abandoned its 

plans to cross the Yangtze River. Instead the Red Army moved west to 

Zhaxi, Yunnan province, to escape NRA forces. The Red Army gained 

only a temporary reprieve as more NRA forces moved west into Sichuan 

covering all possible river crossing sites along the Yangtze. With few 

options available, Mao proposed a daring new plan on February 7. The 

Red Army would split up and head back east into Guizhou as separate 

columns to confuse the NRA. It would then reunite its forces and head 
153

southwest into Yunnan and find a safer crossing point over the Yangtze.25

In accordance with this plan, the Red Army executed a series of feints, 

diversionary attacks, and other deception operations that confused the NRA 

leadership and even some of its own leadership. Mao sought to confuse 

the NRA in order to create an opening where the Red Army could escape 

into Yunnan and cross the Yangtze River in the Jinsha river area. The Red 

Army began moving east and gained victories over the NRA, such as at 

Loushan Pass where the Red Army gained about a division’s worth of 

personnel and equipment from the NRA. The Red Army continued east 

and captured the city of Maotai, picking up even more gold and opium 

for bartering.26 In March 1935, Mao was appointed political commissar of 

the Red Army, with Zhu De as the commander in chief. Mao’s leadership 

position was further reinforced when he was selected to the triumvirate 

Military Council with Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang.27 Mao now began 

a deception operation, deploying the Ninth Red Army Corps north as a 

feint to the Yangtze River to reinforce NRA intelligence estimates. Chiang 

believed that all this erratic movement signaled the Red Army was ready 

to make its final fight. He moved his NRA headquarters to Guiyang and 

deployed almost all the Guizhou NRA forces up to the Yangtze River area 

to encircle and destroy the Red Army. The NRA deployment opened a 

north-south corridor in Guizhou for the Red Army to turn south toward 

Guiyang. With most of the NRA forces along the Yangtze, Guiyang was 

defenseless. Mao preyed on these fears, sending more Red Army units 

on a feint toward the provincial capital. Chiang scrambled NRA forces 

from Yunnan to help defend Guiyang, opening yet another corridor for 

the Red Army to escape. The Red Army exploited the corridor, moving 

with lightning speed into Yunnan. The Red Army employed a similar feint 

tactic used in Guiyang, deploying units from the First Red Army Corps 

to threaten Kunming. Since the Yunnan main force was still in Guiyang, 

this forced the Yunnan government to divert its frontier and militia forces 

to secure the capital, which opened one last corridor for the Red Army to 

escape through a crossing at the Jinsha River.28

By April 1935, the Red Army had completed one of its boldest 

maneuvers, escaping the NRA forces by conducting an end around into 

Yunnan. Even with the maneuver, the Red Army still needed to cross over 

the Yangtze. One segment of the Yangtze River that flows from Tibet 

through Yunnan to Sichuan is known as the Jinsha River, and provided 

excellent crossing points for the Red Army. On April 29, Mao designated 

three crossing spots for the Red Army. The First Red Army Corps was 

to cross in the north at Longjie. In the center, the Third Red Army Corps 

was to cross at Hongmen. The Central Cadre Unit was to take the south 

crossing point at Jiaopingdu. Meanwhile, the Fifth and Ninth Army Corps 

were to conduct rear-guard operations and cross at the closest crossing 

point. While the First and Third Red Army corps had trouble securing the 
154

crossing spots, the Central Cadre Unit secured seven boats, established 

security on both sides of the river, and began a ferrying operation that 

would take nine days. The First and Third Red Army Corps abandoned 

their crossing points and also moved to Jiaopingdu. The Third Red Army 

Corps crossed on May 7 and the First Red Army Corps crossed the next 

day. The Fifth Red Army Corps continued its rear guard, and then sped 

across the Jiaopingdu crossing on May 9.29

Once in Sichuan, the haggard troops of the Red Army began 

questioning what was next. The Red Army had been travelling for almost 

nine months, with little rest and at an enormous cost. The Red Army now 

numbered about 25,000 soldiers, and much of its heavy equipment lay 

abandoned and scattered along its western retreat route. The Red Army 

attempted to take Huili, but failed as the Twenty-fourth NRA Division 

mounted a strong defense against the invasion.30 Outside the city, the Red 

Army leadership held a conference on May 12 and decided to continue 

moving north through Sichuan and cross the Dadu River in order to link 

up with the Fourth Front Red Army.31

The Red Army began moving through the Yi minority area. The Yi 

people despised the Han, and attacked Red Army stragglers, stealing their 

weapons and clothes, and left many to die. Fortunately, Liu Bocheng and 

his vanguard unit of the First Red Army Corps negotiated a truce with the 

Yi, gaining safe passage in return for equal land rights and treatment after 

the war was won.32

On May 23, the Red Army reached Anshunchang along the Dadu 

River. The initial attempt to cross the river by ferry was thwarted by a 

strong NRA defense on the far shore. The Red Army only mustered 

three boats which were insufficient to support a crossing. The Red Army 

leadership decided on May 27 to take a risk and sent troops north to seize 

the Luding Bridge, an iron-chained suspension bridge along a relatively 

inaccessible trail in the mountain passes that crossed the Dadu River. In a 

daring feat, the Fourth Regiment, Second Division, First Red Army Corps, 

led by Yang Chengwu, marched almost 100 miles in less than three days to 

secure the bridge. Fighting against a defending NRA brigade along sheer 

cliffs, the Fourth Regiment moved quickly and seized the bridge under 

constant fire. Only eighteen of the eighty-two men who made the final 

assault survived.33 Because of their actions, the Red Army was able to 

avoid the main KMT force and crossed the Dadu River, finally settling in 

Hualingping for refitting operations.

The trials for the Red Army continued after crossing the Dadu. The 

leaders of the First Front Red Army still did not know where the Fourth 

Front Red Army was located. One possible area was directly north behind 

the Jiajin Mountains. Mao decided to avoid the more convenient eastern 

and western routes to avoid detection from NRA forces or ambushes from 

Tibetans, and instead moved the Red Army along a central walking trail 
155

through the Jiajin Mountains. For most Long March survivors, the Jiajin 

leg of the Long March was the most grueling and difficult.34 The Red 

Army soldiers fought the hunger, cold, thirst, avalanches, and the altitude 

as they attempted to traverse the snow-capped mountain tops with little 

more than the clothes on their back. On June 12, the first units of the Red 

Army arrived at Danwei at the northern foot of the Jiajin Mountains. On 

June 14, the rest of the Red Army came down from the mountain and 

linked up with Li Xiannian, a liaison officer from the Fourth Front Red 

Army. Approximately 10,000 soldiers survived the cold and made it down 

the mountain. 35 Fortunately, they had linked up with fellow Red Army 

comrades and could take another well-deserved rest.

The First and Fourth Front Red Armies finally linked up at Lianghekou 

on June 18, 1935. The Fourth Front Red Army faired remarkably better 

than the First Front Red Army. The Fourth Front Red Army had originated 

in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet, and moved to the Shaanxi-Sichuan 

border before finally resettling in northwest Sichuan in March 1935.36 Its 

forces were at almost 80,000, well above the First Front Red Army. Some 

First Front Red Army soldiers looked with awe and envy at how fat the 

soldiers and horses were in the Fourth Front Red Army.37 On June 26, the 

two front armies’ leadership met to discuss the future movements of the 

Red Army.38 Mao proposed that the Red Army move north to Gansu, and 

then head east toward Ningxia, with the eventual destination of Mongolia 

to establish communications with the Soviet Union. Zhang Guotao had 

a different plan, proposing to go west instead of east, toward Xinjiang 

and connect with the Soviet Union through the Central Asian Republics. 

Underneath the debates of military direction, there was also political 

maneuvering as both Mao and Zhang attempted to assert control over the 

Red Army. In the end, both sides were cordial, and a unified strategy and 

command were established. The Red Army would move north to southern 

Gansu to establish a Soviet along the border areas. Zhang Guotao was also 

appointed vice-chairman of the Military Council. On June 30, the First 

Front Red Army moved north into the Grasslands, with Zhang Guotao and 

the Fourth Front Red Army following one day behind.39

The Lianghekou meeting never settled any political disputes between 

the Zhang and Mao factions, and the conflict grew with time. On the surface, 

Zhang continued to press for the Red Army to move west to Xinjiang. At 

the same time, Zhang worked hard to recruit key leaders from the First 

Front Red Army to his side, to no avail. Mao remained resolute with the 

agreed plan to go to Gansu and took precautionary measures against any 

Zhang subversion. The conflict came to a head at a conference in Maoergai 

on August 6. The Red Army arrived at Maoergai the day before to rest 

and refit the troops, and discuss the future of the Red Army. One version 

of the story states that Mao held the meeting in the adjacent town of 

Shawo, and secured the meeting location before Zhang’s arrival. As the 
156

only representative from the Fourth Front Red Army on the Politburo and 

Central Committee, Zhang planned to introduce more representatives to 

the council in order to increase his influence, but they failed to get past 

security.40 Zhang became furious at the political power play. Another 

version stated the exact opposite. The meeting occurred at Zhang’s own 

Eleventh Red Army Division headquarters under the watchful eye of his 

loyalist soldiers to ensure no subversion by Mao and his loyal First Front 

Army. Either way, no known agreements were brokered at the meeting. 

A second meeting was held on August 20 at Maoergai and a brokered 

settlement was made. The Red Army remained under the command of 

Zhu De, but was divided into two columns. The Right Column consisted 

of the First and Third Red Army Corps, led by Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai 

respectively. It also received the Thirteenth and Fourth Red Armies from 

the Fourth Front Army. Mao, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and Otto Braun would 

travel with the Right Column. The Left Column had the rest of the Fourth 

Front Army, with the addition of the Fifth and Ninth Red Army Corps. 

Zhang Guotao and Liu Bocheng were in charge of the Left Column, and 

Zhu De travelled with the force. The two columns would travel north, 

skirting the Grasslands, with the Left Column moving toward Aba and the 

Right Column moving toward Baxi. Once both sides agreed on the plan, 

they began movement on August 23 into the Grasslands.41

In the Grasslands, the Red Army faced conditions as arduous as those 

in the mountains. This was another minority area and this time the Tibetans 

were as unforgiving as the Yi had been, attacking and killing many of 

the stragglers. There was limited food to forage for in the Grasslands and 

many of the Red Army soldiers did not know which plant species were 

edible. Water supplies were limited because much of the water sources 

were stagnant and polluted. The Red Army ended up eating wheat kernels, 

which wreaked havoc on the soldiers’ digestive systems. The situation was 

worse for the trailing elements as vanguard troops turned the dirt trails 

into muddy pits and left no food behind for foraging. The Right Red Army 

Column made it to Baxi on August 27. The week-long trek took its toll; 

the Third Red Army Corps lost 400 soldiers on the march through the 

Grassland.42 The Left Column moved a bit slower, and arrived at Aba 

about a week later. 

Once outside the grasslands, the Red Army faced another internal 

struggle that jeopardized its retreat. On September 3, Zhang Guotao sent 

a wireless message to Mao and the Right Column stating that his forces 

were stationed at Aba and the White River, north of Aba, was impassable. 

Mao pressed Zhang to abide by the Maoergai decision, and he even offered 

more troops to help cross the river. Zhang politely refused the aid. On 

September 9, Mao found out about a secret message Zhang sent to his aide 

in the Right Column. Zhang wanted the Right Column to move back south 

through the Grasslands to reunite the two columns and convene a meeting 
157

to discuss a new strategy, with intentions to begin an intraparty struggle 

for power.43 Out of fear that Zhang would use his superior numbers to 

force his strategy on the rest of the Red Army, the First and Third Red 

Army Corps left Baxi undetected and continued north to Gansu. The 

approximately 8,000 strong force arrived at Ejie, and held an emergency 

conference. The Red Army consolidated and reorganized its forces as the 

Anti-Japanese Vanguard Force of the Red Army to help garner support 

from the local populace. It also published a “Resolution Concerning the 

Mistakes of Comrade Zhang Guotao” that reprimanded his actions, but 

did not expel him from the Communist party.44 On September 14, the 

Red Army continued its movement north and seized the Lazikou Pass, 

defeating two entrenched battalions guarding the pass. 

Zhang Guotao and his Fourth Front Army went the opposite direction, 

moving south toward Chengdu. Zhang was furious once he discovered 

Mao and his loyal Red Army forces left unannounced. However, he did 

not pursue them, and instead turned his troops around and pushed toward 

Chengdu. The Fourth Front Red Army gained initial victories in October 

1935 over the NRA at Baoxing and Tianquan, and was within 60 miles of 

the Sichuan provincial capital. Chiang Kai-shek responded to the threat by 

pouring more than eighty NRA regiments to defend Chengdu. The NRA 

launched a counterattack at Baizhang, decimating the Fourth Front Red 

Army. Its forces retreated in disarray all the way back to Ganzi, western 

Sichuan province, and would remain in the area until it linked up with the 

Second Front Army in June 1936.45

While the Fourth Front Army moved south to Sichuan, the Red Army 

made the final leg of its difficult journey. On September 21, 1935, Mao 

and the Anti-Japanese Vanguard arrived in Hadapu, a Han city in Gansu 

province. The soldiers at rejoiced being surrounded by their own ethnic 

group and took a few days of rest. While in the city, Mao and other Red 

Army leaders discovered that a Soviet led by Liu Zhidan, a friend of Mao 

Zedong, actually existed in northern Shaanxi, and supported the Twentyfifth and Twenty-sixth Red Armies. Ten days later, the Anti-Japanese 

Vanguard departed Hudapu and quickly moved west to avoid NRA 

Muslim cavalry units and link up with its comrade units in Shaanxi. On 

October 19, 1935, Mao linked up with the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth 

Red Armies, and settled near Wuqi.46 The remnants of the First Front Red 

Army had survived its year-long, 6,000-mile journey with approximately 

4,000 soldiers. 

Xian Incident

Once in the relative security of Shaanxi, the Red Army returned to 

its old political mobilization strategy to gain resources, recruits, and 

spread the communist revolution. The First Front Red Army moved east 

on February 5, 1936 to conduct political mobilization operations. During 

the next two months, the Red Army defeated seven provincial divisions, 
158

capturing more than 4,000 soldiers. It also recruited 8,000 new soldiers, 

collected $300,000 in new revenue, and added twenty Shanxi counties 

to the new Soviet.47 In May, the First Front Army moved west for a twomonth operation, collecting more than 2,000 rifles and 400 horses. The 

operation expanded the Soviet into Gansu and Ningxia. However, these 

operations were eventually defeated by the NRA forces, forcing the Red 

Army to relocate from Wuqi to Bao’an in June 1936.48 In October 1936, 

the Second and Fourth Front Armies finally reached Bao’an and completed 

the Long March for the Red Army. With all three Red Army units united 

again, the Red Army War College reopened and resumed teaching 

operations in Dengjiaqiao, with Liu Bocheng eventually returning to head 

the College.49 The Red Army military school also opened its doors for 

training in Tai’erwan.50

During this same time, the Red Army began to focus on the growing 

Japanese aggression. In late December, the Red Army received word from 

the Soviet Union that Stalin wanted a United Front with the Nationalists to 

fight the Japanese forces. On December 15, 1935, the CCP Politburo held 

a meeting and issued the Wayaopao Resolution, effectively calling for a 

united front with the Nationalists to resist to Japanese aggression.51 From 

December 1935 forward, the Red Army leadership began reaching out to 

different nationalist groups to gain support for the united front against the 

Japanese. In January, the Red Army established communications with the 

warlord militias in Northeast China. They gained the interest of Zhang 

Xueliang, the commander of the Northeast Army and son of the famous 

warlord Zhang Zuolin. The two sides continued discussions and by late 

summer 1936, the Red Army had established an informal nonaggression 

pact with the Northeast Army leader.52 Coincidently, Chiang Kai-shek also 

appointed Zhang Xueliang in charge of the next Extermination Campaign. 

The new Extermination Campaign was headquartered out of Xi’an, and 

Chiang flew up to the city twice to discuss the strategy. At the first meeting 

in October, Zhang Xueliang refused to attack the Communists. The 

second meeting was set for December 7, 1936. During the interim, public 

sentiment supporting Japanese resistance and anger at the Nationalist 

government continued to grow more fervent. 

Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Xi’an on December 4, 1936 and met with 

Zhang Xueliang. Zhang again requested that Chiang stop attacking the 

Communists and focus on the Japanese. Chiang refused, and stated that 

if Zhang did not comply with orders to begin the Sixth Extermination 

Campaign on December 12, he would be removed as commander.53 On 

December 12, Zhang Xueliang’s bodyguard kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek 

and held him as a prisoner for two weeks. During the two weeks, intense 

negotiations circled around what to do with Chiang. Zhang presented 

Chiang with eight demands for governmental reform, cessation of attacks 

again the Communists, and a united front against the Japanese.54 Mao and 
159

Zhu De initially pressed for Chiang’s execution, though the COMINTERN 

pushed for a more moderate stance, calling for the release of Chiang in 

exchange for agreement on the United Front.55 On December 25, Chiang 

Kai-shek was released, and in exchange he agreed to the creation of the 

Second United Front, ending the ten-year civil war within China between 

the Communist Red Army and the Nationalist Revolutionary Army.

From 1934 to 1936, the Red Army escaped extinction by enduring the 

most difficult of conditions and travelling across some of China’s most 

difficult terrain to escape the NRA and provincial forces. Mao Zedong 

maneuvered the politics within the Red Army, coming out of the conflict 

as the supreme leader of the CCP and the Red Army. The Communists also 

benefited from the difficulties within the NRA and KMT leadership. The 

Red Army leveraged Chiang’s inability to fully control his subordinate 

warlords and their military units to avoid unnecessary battles. When the 

Red Army finally reached Shaanxi in late 1935, the Long March survivors 

were not only hardened by the harrowing experience, but also carried all 

the lessons and experiences from the successes of the previous campaigns. 

In the relative security of the new Soviet, the Red Army expanded its forces 

and resumed its training and mobilization operations. As result of the 

Xi’an incident, the existential threat from the NRA was extinguished. The 

Red Army had survived its most difficult test to date and would continue 

its development into the professional military force that would eventually 

defeat the NRA and overthrow the KMT government.
160

Notes

1. John P. Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese 

Communist Party, 1927-72 (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1972), 242.

2. Harrison E. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, (New York: 

Harper & Row, 1985), 52.

3. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 242.

4. Jun shi li shi yan jiu bu. Zhongguo ren min jie fang jun de qi shi nian

[Seventy Years of the PLA] (Beijing: Jun shi ke xue chu ban she, 1987), 121.

Hereafter cited as Seventy years of the PLA.

5. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 242.

6. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 60. Garavente questioned 

the logic of the destination of Hunan, as it would provide little if any security, and 

actually increase exposure to the NRA. He argued that the most likely destination 

was Sichuan, with Hunan serving only as a link up point with the Second Front 

Red Army. See Anthony Garavente, “Commentary: Solving the Mystery of the 

Long March, 1934-1936” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 27, No. 3 (1995): 

58-61.

7. Seventy years of the PLA, 122.

8. Garavente, “Commentary: Solving the Mystery of the Long March,” 58.

9. Salisbury argued that the Long March was delayed until October because 

the negotiations took longer than expected. See Salisbury, The Long March: The 

Untold Story, 63. 

10. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 66.

11. Seventy years of the PLA, 122.

12. Seventy years of the PLA, 123.

13. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 96-104.

14. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 88.

15. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 110.

16. Seventy years of the PLA, 123.

17. Yuan Wei and Zhuo Zhang, eds., Zhongguo jun xiao fa zhan shi [History 

of the Development of Military Schools in China] (Beijing: Guo fang da xue chu 

ban she, 2001), 361. Hereafter cited as Chinese Military School History.

18. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 114-118.

19. There is controversy over the actual date of the conference, with 

previous research indicating the Zunyi Conference occurred on 6-8 January 1935. 

See Benjamin Yang, “The Zunyi Conference as One Step in Mao’s rise to Power: 

A Survey of Historical Studies of the Chinese Communist Party,” The China 

Quarterly, No. 106 (1986): 236-239.

20. A total of eighteen participants were at the conference, with two 

non-participating attendees: Wu Xiuquan, Otto Braun’s interpreter, and Deng 

Xiaoping, a recorder for the Central Committee. See Salisbury, The Long March: 
161

The Untold Story, 121; Yang, “The Zunyi Conference,” 241.

21. Yang, “The Zunyi Conference,” 248-249.

22. Yang, “The Zunyi Conference,” 250.

23. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 127.

24. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 145.

25. Seventy years of the PLA, 125.

26. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 155-162.

27. Yang, “The Zunyi Conference,” 259.

28. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 163-174; Seventy years of 

the PLA, 125.

29. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 177-187.

30. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 189.

31. At the meeting, Lin Biao criticized Mao for being reckless with the Red 

Army’s fast pace movement. In response, Mao chastised Lin Biao, saying “You 

baby, what the hell do you know.” The rebuke signaled the growing strength of 

Mao as he continued to consolidate power within the Red Army. Yang, “The 

Zunyi Conference,” 260.

32. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 198.

33. The surviving members all received a new linen tunic, a notebook, a 

fountain pen, an enamel bowl, an enamel pan, and a pair of chopsticks. Salisbury, 

The Long March: The Untold Story, 230.

34. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 239.

35. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 231-241.

36. Seventy years of the PLA, 126.

37. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 244.

38. Seventy years of the PLA, 128.

39. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 245-252.

40. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 260.

41. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 253-262.

42. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 271.

43. Seventy years of the PLA, 129.

44. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 281-282.

45. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story, 314-317.

46. Seventy years of the PLA, 131.

47. Seventy years of the PLA, 133.

48. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 267.

49. Chinese Military School History, 283.

50. Chinese Military School History, 362.
162

51. Tetsuya Kataoka, Resistance And Revolution in China: The Communists 

And the Second United Front (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 

30. 

52. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 267.

53. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 268.

54. Harrison, The Long March to Power, 268.

55. Kataoka, Resistance And Revolution in China, 43.
163

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This study examined the Chinese Red Army during the period of 

1927 to 1936 to identify key adaptations and innovations that were critical 

in its survival. Given the historical documents and academic material 

available, the research attempted to present an objective analysis of the 

conditions and factors affecting the Red Army during this time period. 

The product of this work is a story of a military force growing, adapting, 

and improving over time while under constant threat and pressure. With 

concerns about China’s recent military build-up on the rise, this study 

offers a reexamination of the origin and the early development of the 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army within a historical context, and hopes 

to contribute to a more complete and deeper understanding of China and 

its military forces. 

Evaluating the Adaptation and Development

of the Chinese Red Army

Chapter 2 outlined the four categories within the study’s analytical 

framework designed to answer the following question: How did the Chinese 

Red Army survive and grow from 1927 to 1936 while under constant attack 

from external and internal threats? Through the examination of the army’s 

strategy, tactics, organization, and training during three discrete time 

periods, this study assessed change and innovation within the Chinese Red 

Army. It concluded that the applied analytical framework was effective in 

demonstrating that the Chinese Red Army was successful in adapting its 

organization and adopting military innovations to overcome a series of 

external and internal challenges to its existence. From the analysis, four 

broad themes emerge to describe how the Chinese Red Army was able to 

survive and grow during 1927 to 1936. 

Pragmatic Strategy Focused on Long-term Success and Survival

When developing strategy, one key element to design is the complete 

and honest assessment of a unit’s capabilities, limitations, and the local 

conditions. The success of the Chinese Red Army’s adaptation was its 

understanding of its own capabilities and limitations, as embodied by 

the pragmatic strategy of “lure the enemy in deep.” The army could have 

easily followed the Soviet military doctrinal model, especially given the 

experiences and education of the Whampoa graduate contingent of Red 

Army officers. Yet in the face of formidable criticism of “guerrillaism,” 

“flightism,” and “retreatism,” the Chinese Red Army leadership, especially 

Mao Zedong, adopted an attrition-based strategy that shifted the focus from 

securing terrain to destroying the enemy.1

 The Red Army could not defeat 

the NRA face to face, and instead adopted a military strategy that combined 

guerrilla and conventional warfare. The strategy and tactics took advantage 

of the Red Army’s strengths while at the same time exposing the weakness 
164

of the enemy. The army prepared extensively for battle by conducting 

detailed reconnaissance in order to understand the enemy’s weakness. 

Armed with that knowledge, the Red Army used maneuver, terrain, and 

deception to isolate and gain superior firepower over the enemy, as seen in 

the Extermination Campaigns. The Red Army also demonstrated patience, 

temporarily sacrificing terrain or time now to gain the advantage later. 

The Red Army also continually adapted its organizational structures to its 

soldiers’ and leaders’ capabilities in order to ensure proper span of control 

during operations. The establishment of the 3-3-3 model and assigning key 

leaders to guerrilla elements were both examples of measures based on a 

realistic understanding of the army’s military limitations and an adaptation 

to those conditions. Another pragmatic strategy was the establishment of 

alliances. The Chinese Red Army leadership constantly made deals and 

treaties with bandits, warlords, and minorities in order to gain security 

or protection. While the agreements may have gone against communist 

doctrine of the time, they were critical in protecting the Red Army and 

helped to drive a bigger wedge between those groups and the KMT. 

Gaining Local Populace Support through Adaptation

Political mobilization played an instrumental role in the development 

of the Red Army during this time period. The Chinese Red Army leadership 

adapted communist policies in order to secure popular support in the rural 

areas with great success. Instead of targeting specific classes of people, 

such as landlords and rich peasants, the Chinese Red Army used selective 

targeting to minimize alienation while still gaining the necessary revenue 

and support. Certain popular landlords were not purged, though coercion 

was used to gain their support. Middle-class peasants were also allowed to 

coexist in the Soviet areas. Additionally, the Chinese Red Army instituted 

the three disciplines and eight points of attention out of pragmatic concerns 

about preventing hostilities toward Red Army operations. All these actions 

worked together to turn local support toward the communists. In return, the 

Red Army gained valuable intelligence, logistical support, protection, and 

revenues from the local populace. Villagers would provide information on 

NRA movement and assist in resupply operations during the Extermination 

Campaigns. These actions would become the foundation for Red Army 

logistical operations, and would later pay dividends in later campaigns. Yet 

the local populace’s biggest contribution to the Red Army was volunteers 

to join its military force. 

Strong Soldier Recruiting, Training, and Retention System

The Chinese Red Army was essentially a volunteer force and required 

an adjustment in policies and training procedures to properly develop and 

train the force. The Red Army’s main force was built on the foundation of 

the various guerrilla units, Red Guard, and CY groups. Those volunteers 

who showed promise and were willing to leave the local area were moved 

from local security detachments of the Red Guard to the guerrilla units 
165

or the Red Army. This system pushed interested volunteers instead of 

uninterested citizens into the military ranks, which helped to increase the 

moral quality of new recruits. Once in the ranks, the Chinese Red Army 

focused on training soldiers. Political indoctrination helped instill loyalty 

within the Red Army. It also served a critical function of increasing literacy 

and education of the soldiers. It helped soldiers learn how to read and do 

basic skills needed in their jobs as well as in their regular lives. Additionally, 

the Red Army adjusted pedagogical methods to the soldiers, making sure 

esoteric lectures on military theories were limited, and more hands-on 

application was used to gain practical experience and keep attention spans 

from wavering. All these methods helped train and develop the Red Army 

force and increased the soldiers’ morale, which was important for retention. 

Desertion was one of the Red Army’s biggest concerns, and the army took 

proactive measures to improve soldiers’ quality of life as part of retention. 

The introduction of Soldier Soviets during the Sanwan reorganization was 

meant to develop consensus and buy-in within the army ranks. While the 

Soldier Soviets went away eventually, the group discussions and debate 

prior to operations remained as a way for soldiers to participate in the 

entire planning process. Leaders also avoided beating or berating soldiers 

to show respect and decrease desertions. In terms of benefits, Red Army 

soldiers were given pocket money, their families received special benefits, 

and food and shelter was usually provided; all tangible benefits to the 

soldier. Through these initiatives, the Red Army developed a solid military 

force capable of conducting independent combat operations. 

Comprehensive Officer Development System

With a dedicated military force and a supportive local populace, the 

Red Army required a competent officer corps to execute its pragmatic 

strategy. From its humble beginning in the Jingang Mountains, the 

Red Army always focused on training and developing its leaders to be 

successful in battle. This approach initially started with the establishment 

of small training units. As the Red Army became more established, it 

expanded the units into mobile schools, and culminated with the creation 

of the Red Army Academy and Red Army War College to train and develop 

its junior and senior officers. The Red Army also created specialty schools 

to develop certain skill sets needed in the military force to include artillery, 

engineer, communications, and medical services. The army also leveraged 

the political propaganda system to discuss and debate military concerns 

and issues as well as disseminating new tactics, which was critical for 

the cross-leveling of information across the army. The officers also led 

after-action reviews to help increase their understanding of operations and 

gain valuable lessons from their experience. The Red Army attempted to 

use every opportunity to develop and train its forces so it could overcome 

the numerical and material advantages of the KMT and succeed on the 

battlefield. 
166

Significance of the Findings

The significance of this study is that it presents a re-examination 

of this neglected time period in early Republican China history. The 

preceding analysis demonstrated that the push for professionalization 

and modernization within the Chinese Red Army began earlier than 

many have acknowledged. Some scholars have viewed the Second SinoJapanese War as a critical period for the development of the Red Army.2

While the army’s development and expansion during the Sino-Japanese 

war was critical to its later success in the Third Chinese Revolutionary 

War, the foundations for its growth were based on the adaptations and 

innovations created from 1927-1936. For Mao and other Red Army leaders, 

professionalization of the Red Army was always a long-term goal. In 1928, 

Mao outlined his view, stating, “unless we have regular armed forces of 

adequate strength...we certainly cannot create an independent regime, let 

alone an independent regime that lasts long and develops daily.”3

 From its 

inception, the Red Army leaders adopted policies, instituted measures, and 

created institutions to help expand and professionalize the military force 

as a means of party power.

This analysis also supports the concept that a constrained Red Army 

should not be viewed in a negative manner. The pressures from war, lack 

of time, space, and resources constrained its ability to fully adapt to its 

challenges. With that said, these constraints also inspired innovation and 

forced the Chinese Red Army to create new ideas, adjust policies and 

measures, and experiment with new concepts for its strategy, tactics, and 

training methods. Red Army leaders adopted a more pragmatic attitude 

towards combat. The use of surprise, maneuver, deception, and night 

operations were developed out of necessity. Forces were used only when 

the long term benefit outweighed the costs. Such pragmatism only began 

to ebb after its success against the first three Extermination Campaigns. 

While it is impossible to know whether or not the Chinese Red Army 

would have still followed the same development track if it had had access 

to more resources, it is evident that the lack of resources spurred adaptation 

and innovation. Credit also must be given to the KMT. The Chinese Red 

Army’s successes against the first four Extermination Campaigns moved 

Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT up the Clausewitzian ladder toward total 

war. In the Fifth Extermination Campaign, Chiang mobilized sufficient 

national will and resources necessary to successfully combat the Red 

Army. It is uncertain that any Red Army adaptation or innovation could 

have overcome this KMT change. 

Lastly, this study provides a unique analytical framework to understand 

the development of an insurgent group into a professional military force. 

Before 1927, the Chinese Communists were a rival political party without 

a military force. The Nanchang and Hunan uprisings in 1927 changed 

the party into communist insurgent movement and began its push for a 
167

professional military force. The study outlined the Chinese Red Army’s 

roadmap for the development of an insurgent military force operating in a 

specific historical context. The same analytical framework could be used 

on other insurgent forces to gain a better understanding of its development. 

This study, however, does not provide any prescriptive solutions to combat 

an insurgent force. Instead, broad lessons on the counterinsurgency can 

be gained by examining the KMT efforts, especially its use of the baojia 

system in the Fifth Extermination Campaign.4

Points for Consideration

These four themes should not be misconstrued as prescriptive principles 

for the development of any military force. Rather, these themes are simply 

meant to help the reader understand how internal factors contributed to the 

overall development of the Red Army. These factors do not highlight the 

other external factors that also played a role in the Red Army’s success. 

First, the themes do not capture the large role the warlord armies and 

Japanese Army played in the greater Extermination Campaigns. Before 

the Fifth Extermination Campaign, the NRA had to contend with not only 

the Chinese Red Army, but also different warlord armies and an invading 

Japanese Army. During the Extermination campaigns, Chiang Kai-shek 

and the NRA forces continually battled with other warlord armies as the 

KMT attempted to consolidate power and control over China. Selective 

loyalties of warlord army leaders were a detriment to the KMT as they 

helped the Chinese Red Army multiple times, culminating with Feng 

Yuxiang’s actions during the Xi’an incident. Japanese intervention was 

another critical factor in the success of the Red Army. The Third and 

Fourth Extermination Campaigns ended prematurely in part due to the 

KMT’s response to Japanese attacks. The Japanese threat was a larger 

factor in pushing Chiang to accept the terms of negotiations at Xi’an.

Additionally, the limitations of the Chinese Red Army during this 

period cannot be understated. The strategy, tactics, and equipment of the 

Chinese Red Army never placed it in a superior position to gain a decisive 

victory over the NRA. Its success was its ability to survive the barrage 

of constant attacks. Additionally, its influence was limited to the rural 

areas. The Chinese Red Army could not extend its influence outside the 

Soviet areas, nor could it enter the urban areas even after several attempts. 

Second, the success and failure of any military force is also predicated 

on its political leadership. The change in the political leadership of the 

CCP had both positive and negative effects on the Chinese Red Army. 

While the professionalization and modernization efforts increased under 

the leadership of the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks, the Chinese Red Army also 

adopted a military strategy and tactics inconsistent with its capabilities and 

limitations. The Red Army’s defeat at the Fifth Extermination Campaign 

demonstrates that the adoption of the four themes to develop the Red Army 

still did not guarantee success. 
168

Further Research

This research on Extermination Campaigns has identified other topics 

concerning the Red Army’s development that merit further examination. 

The first topic is a more comprehensive analysis of the Red Army’s military 

culture during this early period. The examination of the Red Army’s 

organizational structure and training programs in this study only provides 

a tangential explanation of the Red Army’s culture. More comprehensive 

research on the military culture of the Red Army during this period could 

provide a revised understanding of the origin and evolution of the modern 

PLA military culture. Another area of research focuses on the operational 

art of the Red Army during the Extermination Campaigns. Analysis 

of the Red Army operations at the operational level may yield a better 

understanding of how its leadership and staff functioned to translate the 

strategy into specific engagements. 

A second line of research would be the expansion of the scope of this 

study to include the Second Sino-Japanese War, and even the Third Chinese 

Revolutionary War. The survival of the Chinese Red Army after the Long 

March did not guarantee success for the Communists. The Red Army still 

faced stiff challenges from a more technologically-advanced Japanese 

Army. Additionally, relations with the KMT were still tenuous even at the 

height of the Second United Front, creating another threat to the CCP and 

the Red Army. Using a similar analytical framework utilized in this study, 

an in-depth descriptive analysis could be done on the adaptation of the 

Chinese Red Army through the creation of the People’s Republic of China. 

The last topic for further research is a reexamination of Mao’s theories 

on guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare, and protracted war. Recent studies 

on counterinsurgency have led to revival in interest in Mao’s military 

theories. Yet this interest does not include a deeper understanding of 

the historical context in which Mao created and developed his views. 

Continued research and analysis of the Extermination Campaigns and 

Sino-Japanese War in support of a reexamination of Mao’s theories may 

lead to a deeper understanding of the historical context and origins of his 

famous writings.
169

Notes

1. “ Flightism” is a pejorative term used by the Chinese Communists. 

Similar to “retreatism,” flightism is used to describe what Mao called “only 

retreat, never advance” mentality during military operations. See Stuart Schram, 

ed., Mao’s Road to Power Vol. 4 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 373.

2. Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power 

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 49; Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in 

China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949 (Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 1978), 276.

3. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, Vol. 1 (New York: International 

Publishers, 1954), 66-67.

4. For more information on the baojia system in Imperial China, see Phillip 

Kuhn, Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and 

Social Structure, 1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). For 

a detailed study of the counterinsurgency techniques employed by the KMT, see 

William Wei, Counterrevolution in China: the Nationalists in Jiangxi during the 

Soviet period (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985). 

171

Appendix A

Military Organization of Red Army

First Extermination Campaign Red Army Table of Organization

First Front Red Army

First Red Army Corps Third Red

Army Corps

Third Red Army Fifth Red Army

Fourth Red Army Eight Red Army

Twelfth Red Army

Twentieth Red Army

Twenty-second Red Army

Source: Shaoqun Huang, Zhong qu feng yun : Zhong yang Su qu di 

yi zhi wu ci fan “wei jiao” zhan zheng shi [Zhong qu Feng yun: the 

History of the First through Fifth Extermination Campaigns in the 

Central Soviet] (Beijing: Zhong gong zhong yang dang xiao chu 

ban she, 1993), Appendix 1.

There is discrepancy on the actual size of the force numbers. 

Chi’s source for the force numbers is from the KMT official 

account, Gong fei zhan shi (Extermination Campaign History). See 

Pengfeng Chi, “The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 

(Ph.D dissertation, George Washington University, 1977), 129. 

Mao stated the communists had 40,000 armed soldiers against 

100,000 nationalist troops. See Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, 

Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), 227. One 

plausible explanation is that the NRA sent reinforcements into the 

area around December 1930, increasing the number to 100,000.
172

Second Extermination Campaign Red Army Table of 

Organization

First Front Red Army

First Red Army Corps Third Red Army 

Corps

Independent 

Units

Third Red Army First Red Army 

Division

Thirty-fifth Red 

Army

Fourth Red Army Third Red Army 

Division

Twelfth Red Army Fourth Red Army 

Division

Sixth Red Army 

Division

Source: Shaoqun Huang, Zhong qu feng yun : Zhong yang Su qu di 

yi zhi wu ci fan “wei jiao” zhan zheng shi [Zhong qu Feng yun: the 

History of the First through Fifth Extermination Campaigns in the 

Central Soviet] (Beijing: Zhong gong zhong yang dang xiao chu 

ban she, 1993), Appendix 3.

Third Extermination Campaign Red Army Table of Organization

First Front Red Army

First Red Army 

Corps

Third Red Army 

Corps Independent Units

Third Red Army First Red Army 

Division Seventh Red Army 

Fourth Red Army Third Red Army 

Division

Thirty-fifth Red 

Army

Twelfth Red Army Fourth Red Army 

Division

Fourth Independent 

Red Army Division

Sixth Red Army 

Division

Fifth Independent 

Red Army Division

Source: Shaoqun Huang, Zhong qu feng yun : Zhong yang Su qu di 

yi zhi wu ci fan “wei jiao” zhan zheng shi [Zhong qu Feng yun: the 

History of the First through Fifth Extermination Campaigns in the 

Central Soviet] (Beijing: Zhong gong zhong yang dang xiao chu 

ban she, 1993), Appendix 5.
173

There is dispute over the number of soldiers. Snow follows 

Mao’s estimate of 300,000. See Edgar Snow, Red Star Over 

China (New York: Grove Press, 1968), 179; ZQFY, 137; and Mao, 

Selected Works, Vol. 1, 230. Whereas other scholars estimated the 

numbers at 130,000, based on Taiwanese historical records. Chi, 

“The Chinese Red Army and the Kiangsi Soviet,” 135.

Fourth Extermination Campaign Red Army Table of 

Organization

First Front Red Army

First Red 

Army Corps

Third Red 

Army Corps

Fifth Red 

Army Corps

Independent 

Units

Seventh Red 

Army Division

First Red 

Army 

Division

Thirtyeighth 

Red Army 

Division

Eleventh Red 

Army

Ninth Red 

Army Division

Third Red 

Army 

Division

Thirty-ninth 

Red Army 

Division

Twelfth Red 

Army

Tenth Red 

Army Division

Fourth 

Red Army 

Division

Twenty-first 

Red Army

Eleventh Red 

Army Division

Seventh Red 

Army 

Twenty-second 

Red Army

Jiangxi Fourth 

Independent 

Division

Jiangxi Fifth 

Independent 

Division

Source: Shaoqun Huang, Zhong qu feng yun : Zhong yang Su qu di 

yi zhi wu ci fan “wei jiao” zhan zheng shi [Zhong qu Feng yun: the 

History of the First through Fifth Extermination Campaigns in the 

Central Soviet] (Beijing: Zhong gong zhong yang dang xiao chu 

ban she, 1993), Appendix 7.
174

Yoon noted the difficulty in fixing the correct number of soldiers 

n the Red Army during the Fourth Extermination Campaign, 

stating the number as 40,000, 65,000, or 70,000. See Chong Kun 

Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet Republic” 

(Ph.D dissertation, The American University, 1968), 159-160.

Fifth Extermination Campaign Red Army Table of Organization

First Front Red Army

First Red 

Army Corps

Third Red 

Army Corps

Fifth Red 

Army Corps

Seventh Red 

Army Corps

First Red 

Army Division

Fourth 

Red Army 

Division

Thirteenth 

Red Army 

Division

Nineteenth 

Red Army 

Division

Second Red 

Army Division

Fifth Red 

Army 

Division

Fifteenth 

Red Army 

Division

Twentieth Red 

Army Division

Sixth Red 

Army 

Division

Thirtyfourth 

Red Army 

Division

Eighth Red 

Army Corps

Ninth Red 

Army Corps

Unassigned or Independent 

Subordinate Units 

Third Red 

Army Division

Twenty-first 

Red Army 

Division

Fourteenth 

Red Army 

Division

Twenty-third 

Red Army 

Division

Twentysecond 

Red Army 

Division

Twenty-fourth 

Red Army 

Division
175

Source: Shaoqun Huang, Zhong qu feng yun : Zhong yang Su qu di 

yi zhi wu ci fan “wei jiao” zhan zheng shi [Zhong qu Feng yun: the 

History of the First through Fifth Extermination Campaigns in the 

Central Soviet] (Beijing: Zhong gong zhong yang dang xiao chu 

ban she, 1993), Appendix 9.

Yoon stated the Red Army strength during this campaign to be 

150,000. See Yoon, “Mao, The Red Army, and the Chinese Soviet 

Republic,” 251. Donovan cited 80,000 as the Red Army strength 

during the summer of 1933. See Peter Williams Donovan, “The 

Chinese Red Army in the Kiangsi Soviet, 1931-1934” (Ph.D 

dissertation, Cornell University, 1974), 109.

177

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