U.S. MARINES IN AFGHANISTAN, 2010–2014

ANTHOLOGY AND ANNOTATED 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

U.S. Marines in the 

Global War on Terrorism
U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2010–2014

Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism

Compiled by

Paul Westermeyer

with Christopher N. Blaker

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Quantico, Virginia

2017
Other Publications in the Series

U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Antholog y and Annotated Bibliography

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Det One: U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Special Operations Command Detachment, 2003–2006

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: Antholog y and Annotated Bibliography

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2005: Into the Fray

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Combat Service Support During Operation Iraqi Freedom

U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2002: From the Sea

U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2009: Antholog y and Annotated Bibliography

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Westermeyer, Paul W., compiler. | Blaker, Christopher N., compiler. |

 United States. Marine Corps. History and Museums Division. Historical

 Branch, sponsoring body.

Title: U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2010/2014 : anthology and annotated

 bibliography / compiled by Paul Westermeyer with Christopher N. Blaker.

Description: Quantico, Virginia : History Division, United States Marine

 Corps, [2017] | Series: U.S. Marines in the global war on terrorism |

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017001961

Subjects: LCSH: Afghan War, 2001- | United States. Marine Corps--Afghanistan.

 | United States. Marine Corps--History--20th century. | United States.

 Marine Corps--Afghanistan--Bibliography. | United States. Marine

 Corps--History--20th century--Bibliography.

Classification: LCC DS371.412 .W475 2017 Z1361.D4 | DDC 016.958104745--dc23
iii

Table of Contents

Foreword ........................................................................................................................................................vii

Preface .........................................................................................................................................................ix

Maps .........................................................................................................................................................xi

Part I: Marineistan, 2010

MV-22 Osprey: Proving Itself in Combat

Corporal Ryan Rholes........................................................................................................................5

Marine Artillery in Afghanistan: 1/11-Every Marine an Infantryman and a Cannoneer

Andrew Lubin.................................................................................................................................11

Operation Steel Dawn II: The Raid on Bahram Chah

Colonel Nathan S. Lowrey, USMCR (Ret)....................................................................................19

“It’s Your Medal”: Read Kyle Carpenter’s Inspiring Speech to Marjah Vets

Hope Hodge Seck.............................................................................................................................41

Interview: Captain Jonathan A. Hutchison

Marine Corps History Division.......................................................................................................45

Part II: Taliban Hunting, 2011

Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan

President Barack H. Obama............................................................................................................63
iv

The Everyday Warfighters: Indefatigable Mission Fidelity in the Modern Toil of War

Ed Darack......................................................................................................................................69

Counterinsurgency as Cargo Cult

First Lieutenant Matthew F. Cancian .............................................................................................77

Interview: First Lieutenant Dennis A. Graziosi

Marine Corps History Division.......................................................................................................83

Interview: Corporal Raymundo Mendez Romero

Marine Corps History Division.......................................................................................................95

Part III: Every Marine a Rifleman, 2012

Regimental Combat Team 6: “India” Company, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines 

Builds Relations in Afghanistan

Ed Galo........................................................................................................................................ 111

First Time, First Firefight—Marine Stays Focused during Combat

Corporal Timothy Lenzo................................................................................................................115

Otis Raible Defines Leadership

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Jernigan..............................................................................................119

Part IV: Advising and Nation Building, 2013

In Time of Transition, Marines Support Afghan Advisors

Sergeant Ned Johnson.....................................................................................................................129

This Is My Life: Marines in Afghanistan

Corporals Austin Long and Paul Peterson.....................................................................................133

Last Marine Infantry Regiment Departs Helmand Province

Sergeant Ned Johnson.....................................................................................................................143
v

Part V: Exiting Afghanistan, 2014

Marines Confiscate Narcotics, Prevent Taliban from Reaping Profits

Corporal Joseph Scanlan.................................................................................................................151

Statement by the President on Afghanistan

President Barack H. Obama..........................................................................................................155

Last Marines Exit Sangin, Afghanistan

Corporal Joshua Young...................................................................................................................161

Part VI: Looking Back

MARSOC in Afghanistan, 2010–14

Dr. Frank L. Kalesnik .................................................................................................................169

Marine Commanders Reflect on 13 Years of War in Afghanistan

Hope Hodge Seck...........................................................................................................................181

Appendices

Appendix A:

Command and Staff List..........................................................................................................191

Appendix B:

Unit List......................................................................................................................................227

Appendix C:

Selected Terms and Abbreviations from Operation Enduring Freedom....................... 244

Appendix D:

Chronology of Events, 2010–14 .............................................................................................250

Appendix E:

Medal of Honor Citation/Presidential Unit Citation..........................................................265
vi

Appendix F:

Selected Sources and Annotated Bibliography.....................................................................267

Index ......................................................................................................................................................283
vii

Foreword

This volume presents a collection of 21 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many aspects of 

the U.S. Marine Corps’ participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2010 to 2014. This work 

is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference to inform both Marines and the 

general public until the U.S. Marine Corps History Division completes monographs covering major 

Marine Corps operations during the campaign. The accompanying annotated bibliography provides 

a detailed look at selected sources that currently exist and should be sufficient until new scholarship 

and archival materials become available.

Additional support for this work came from Leatherneck magazine, Marine Corps Gazette, and the 

Marine Corps Times, all of which gave permission to reprint their articles. Their cooperation made this 

anthology possible. This printing represents as closely as possible the original works as they were published at the time, with minor alterations to the text based on current standards for style, grammar, 

punctuation, and spelling.

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director of Marine Corps History

ix

Preface

In late 2009, President Barack H. Obama determined that the situation in Afghanistan required a surge 

of troop reinforcements. For the U.S. Marine Corps, this meant that the Marine involvement in that 

theater of the Global War on Terrorism would continue to intensify. A Marine expeditionary brigade 

was deployed to Afghanistan in 2009, where the troop surge and increased Marine presence led to the 

Marines taking control of security operations for Helmand and Nimroz Provinces in 2010. The Corps’ 

insistence on autonomy within its provinces led to the nickname “Marineistan.” 

The Marine Corps’ initially sporadic participation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was 

covered in an earlier volume of this series, U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2009: Antholog y and Annotated Bibliography. This new volume in the series covers Marine operations in Afghanistan from the 

surge in 2010 to the end of the drawdown in 2014. During the majority of the period covered in this 

volume, two Marines were the senior American commanders in Afghanistan. General John R. Allen 

commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces Afghanistan from 

18 July 2011 to 10 February 2013. He was succeeded by General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. On 26 August 

2014, Dunford was followed by U.S. Army General John F. Campbell. 

The Marine Corps approached its increased role in Afghanistan with enthusiasm, employing the 

Corps’ traditional expertise in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare acquired through the Banana Wars 

and the Vietnam War as well as lessons learned more recently in Iraq during the al-Anbar Awakening. 

Along with this focus on the application of COIN doctrine, the Marine Corps fielded the Bell Boeing MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor military aircraft, fully replacing the venerable Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea 

Knight helicopters that had been the Corps’ primary medium-lift airframe for troops and cargo. Additionally, the recently created U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 

fully participated in U.S. Special Operations Command’s Afghanistan missions during this period.

In 2010, Marines launched Operation Moshtarak in Helmand Province in an effort to clear the Taliban out of the central part of the province. Combat operations intensified during this period, especially in the Marjah District of Helmand Province, as the Marine Corps pressured the Taliban. At the 

same time, Marines aided in the intensified training that prepared Afghanistan’s military and police 

forces to take over security of their nation. 

Throughout 2011 and 2012, Marine units rotated into Afghanistan and continued to conduct raids 

and patrols throughout the Marineistan provinces, suppressing the poppy harvest and eliminating Taliban caches and sanctuaries. However, in late 2012, the Taliban launched a successful raid on Camp 

Bastion, an airfield and logistics base northwest of Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province, destroying six 

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier IIs and badly damaging two others from Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211). Marine aviation personnel fought back as infantry, a role Marines of this squadron 

last performed on Wake Island during World War II. In the four-hour firefight, all 15 of the attacking Taliban were killed or captured, but Lieutenant Colonel Christopher K. Raible and Sergeant Bradley W. Atwell were killed. 
x

Marines continued COIN and training operations throughout 2013 and 2014, turning over responsibility for security operations to Afghani forces district by district. In May 2014, President Obama 

declared U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan would end in December of that same year. In October 2014, Marines handed Camp Leatherneck in Helmand Province over to Afghan forces, and in 

December, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States “ended” combat 

operations in Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, this act proved premature. Since 2014, the insurgency in Afghanistan has increased, 

and the U.S. Army has redeployed major units there. Marines remained in Afghanistan serving in joint 

operations billets in the training mission. The war in Afghanistan has yet to reach a clean conclusion.

This book could not have been published without the professional efforts of the History Division 

staff. The editors would like to thank Director of Marine Corps History Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, Deputy Director Paul J. Weber, and former Chief Historian Charles D. Melson. Colleagues Dr. Breanne 

Robertson, Douglas E. Nash, and Annette D. Amerman provided unflagging professional advice and 

support. The oral history transcripts included in this anthology were provided by Dr. Fred H. Allison, 

head of the History Division’s Oral History section. Our Editing and Design Branch, led by Angela J. 

Anderson, was instrumental in transforming the manuscript into a finished product, editing the manuscript, and overseeing the production process.

This anthology is organized into six parts: one section for each year and a final section devoted to 

a broader overview of Marine participation in the Afghanistan conflict. This work is not meant to be 

an authoritative history but rather a selected record of Marine contributions to the Afghan war effort 

as captured by the media and other sources. It is intended to be used as a starting point for the general public and academic researchers.

Paul Westermeyer

Marine Corps History Division
xi

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Scale 1:6,900,000

International boundaryProvince (wela ̄yat) boundaryNational capitalProvince (wela ̄yat) capital

0 50 100 150 Miles

0 50 100 150 Kilometers

Afghanistan has 34 provinces (wela ̄yat).

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

*Dilaram District is reported to be administered from Farah Province, 

but the Government of Afghanistan does not recognize its existence.

*

803283AI (G00878) 12-08

 AFGHANISTAN

LAMBERT CONFORMAL CONIC PROJECTION; STANDARD PARALLELS 30°25’ N 37°10’ N

Administrative Divisions

Map 1. Afghanistan provinces, 2008
xii

Map 2: Topographic map of Afghanistan
xiii

Khash Rod

Chakhansur

Chahar Burjak

Washer

Nad ‘Ali

Marjeh

Garm Ser

Dishu

Reg-e Khan Neshin

Kajaki

Musa Qal ‘ah

Nawah-ye Barakzai

Lashkar Gah

Nahr-e Saraj

Sangin

Now Zad

Baghran

Kang

Zaranj

Nimroz

 Province

Helmand

 Province

Map 3: Regional Command-Southwest

Adapted from a Regional Command-Southwest map by Marine Corps History Divsion
xiv

Map 4: Topographic map of Pakistan

xvi
Part I

Marineistan, 2010
2

Gear for Afghan Trip in the Garden by Michael D. Fay.

Marine Corps Art Collection
3

I

n 2009, President Barack H. Obama announced a significant increase in American 

troops for the war in Afghanistan. For the 

U.S. Marine Corps, this meant intensified 

involvement in that theater of the Global War on 

Terrorism. A Marine expeditionary brigade was 

deployed to Afghanistan in 2009. The troop surge 

and increased Marine presence led to the Marines 

taking control of security operations for Helmand 

and Nimroz Provinces in 2010. Marine insistence 

on autonomy within its provinces led to the nickname “Marineistan.” 

In 2010, Marines, fighting alongside British and 

Afghan forces, launched Operation Moshtarak in 

Helmand Province in an effort to clear the Taliban 

out of the central part of the province. Combat 

operations intensified during this period, especially 

in the Marjah District of Helmand Province. At 

the same time, Marines aided in the intensified 

training that prepared Afghanistan military and 

police forces to take over security of their nation. 

In April, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) 

replaced the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade as 

Regional Command-Southwest.

In September, Afghanistan held parliamentary elections for the Wolesi Jirga (House of the 

People), but the outcome was clouded by Taliban 

opposition and internal Afghan government dissension. In November, the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) announced its plans to end 

combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014. On 

21 November, Lance Corporal William Kyle 

Carpenter saved a fellow Marine in combat in 

Helmand Province’s Marjah District, an action 

for which Carpenter was later awarded the Medal 

of Honor.
4

An MV-22 Osprey with VMM-261, 3d MAW (Fwd), from 

Camp Bastion flies over the barren landscape of the Afghanistan desert while performing missions delivering personnel and cargo on 24 April 2010. 

Defense Imagery 273191, photo by GySgt Steven Williams
MV-22 Osprey: 

Proving Itself 

in Combat

by Corporal Ryan Rholes

Leatherneck, August 2010

In early July, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 (VMM-261) wrapped up its first combat 

deployment to Afghanistan, with solid proof that 

the aircraft it flies, the MV-22 Osprey, is ready 

to replace the Corps’ aging fleet of CH-46 Sea 

Knight helicopters as the go-to medium-lift aircraft for maritime forces. 

Getting there has been a long and often controversial progression. 

The U.S. government first realized the need for 

an aircraft capable of vertical takeoff and fast flying 

in the early 1980s and developed the Joint-Service 

Vertical Take-Off/Landing Aircraft Experimental 

[(JVX) aircraft] program in 1981. Bell Helicopter 

partnered with Boeing Vertol and submitted a plan 

for an enlarged version of a Bell prototype. Officials designated the JVX aircraft the V-22 Osprey 

a few years after the initial proposal. 

Pilots completed successful helicopter-style, airplane-style, and sea-trial flights with the Osprey in 

1989 and 1990, but lost two prototypes in the following two years, casting doubt over the program. 

After a year of redesign, the Osprey re-emerged 

with several new safety features and returned to 

the sky. The program progressed without incident 

until another two fatal crashes in 2000 that again 

grounded the revolutionary aircraft. The Corps’ 

5
6

desire for the Osprey proved resilient and the 

“bird” underwent heavy improvements, eventually receiving approval from the Pentagon in 2005. 

VMM-263 deployed with the aircraft for seven 

months to al-Asad Air Base, Iraq, in 2007, where 

it flew more than 2,500 successful missions in alAnbar Province. Although there was skepticism 

that the Osprey’s success in Iraq would translate to 

success in Afghanistan, the aircraft would have a 

chance to prove itself sooner than most expected. 

In 2008, most of the Marines serving with 

VMM-261 had never actually seen an Osprey, 

according to Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Bianca, 

the squadron’s first commanding officer. In 2009, 

the squadron taxied an Osprey down its runway 

at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North 

Carolina, for the first time, and just a few months 

later, the squadron was on its way to war. 

On 6 November 2009, under the command 

of Lieutenant Colonel Bianca, several VMM-261 

Ospreys flew nearly 600 miles in groups of three 

from the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit [22d 

MEU] onboard the amphibious assault ship USS 

Bataan (LHD 5) in the Indian Ocean to the airfield at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. 

Since arriving, the Osprey has filled a myriad of roles. From troop transport and routine 

cargo drops, to participating in clandestine special 

Defense Imagery 273205, photo by GySgt Steven Williams

SSgt John Godwin from Loxfey, AL, serves as a flight equipment technician and aerial observer with VMM-261, where he 

mans an M240G machine gun on the tail of an MV-22 Osprey while flying missions in Afghanistan. 
7

operations drops, the squadron and its aircraft 

missed no opportunity to prove the aircraft’s 

versatility. 

The way an aircraft is used depends on the theater and the needs of the theater commander, said 

Lieutenant Colonel Ivan G. Thomas, the current 

[commanding officer] (CO) of VMM-261. “We 

have been used, very effectively, in a general support role for a lot of the long-range missions that 

require coming in and out of landing zones versus runways. We have been to Bagram, the eastern border with Pakistan, the western border with 

Iran and the southern border with Pakistan.” 

Thomas is an experienced pilot who has flown 

the Sea Knight and the Osprey in operational 

environments. He’s logged missions flying [Boeing Vertol] CH-46E “Phrogs” in Kosovo, Africa, 

Albania, and Iraq. Although a diehard [sic] fan of 

the older aircraft, he readily admits that its replacement is bringing some very useful assets to the 

fight, especially its increased range. 

That increased range is due in part to the aircraft’s ability to fly higher than the CH-46. The 

Osprey’s increased altitude, according to Thomas, 

flying at an average height of 10,000 feet compared 

to the Sea Knight’s average 1,000 feet, “helps 

reduce fuel burn rate and allows pilots an opportunity to fly above bad weather and dust storms.” 

It also keeps the aircraft outside the range of 

small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades 

[RPGs]. And although the Osprey usually soars 

around 10,000 feet, it can reach altitudes of up 

to 25,000 feet. 

However, the Osprey’s ability to level off in the 

clouds is not the only leg up it has on the CH-46. 

The aircraft also is capable of hauling heavier loads 

for longer distances, which means more armed 

Marines or more much-needed cargo delivered 

farther away or to higher mountain posts. “The 

Osprey can fly twice as far, twice as fast and with 

three times the payload,” said Thomas. 

And even those stats may now be outdated. 

Since arriving in Afghanistan, the MV-22 Osprey 

has received a software upgrade and changes to 

operational guidelines that have seriously increased 

its capabilities. The aircraft’s new software boosts 

its already impressive speed from 245 knots to 

between 270 and 275 knots, or more than 300 

miles per hour, while flying straight and level. 

The Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization program now allows Osprey 

pilots to take off at 30 degrees of angle, which 

provides a 50-percent increase over its previous 

20-degree cap. 

Although these changes allow the Osprey to 

Defense Imagery 273208, 

photo by GySgt Steven Williams

Marines board an MV-22 Osprey on 24 April. This is one 

of several groups of personnel whom VMM-261 would 

transport on this day, as the Osprey continues to be a valuable asset for “shrinking the battlespace” by flying faster 

and farther than any assault support aircraft in the region. 
8

get off the ground faster and to cut down on travel 

time between destinations, the increased capabilities have not caused any changes in the squadron’s doctrine. 

“These are great improvements and great capabilities, but it has not dictated that we change the 

way we fly our aircraft. This deployment has really 

validated the training [tiltrotor] squadrons receive 

at Mojave Viper [Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California],” said 

Thomas. “We are definitely going to concentrate 

on and reinforce our techniques, tactics and procedures before our next deployment because they 

have proven effective.” 

The squadron has flown about 30 named missions since arriving in Afghanistan, in addition to 

its daily grind of fulfilling assault support requests, 

all without any serious mishaps. Operating at 

such a high capacity and in such an austere, harsh 

environment also has given the squadron ample 

time to develop and adapt maintenance routines. 

The increased heat, high winds, and fine dust of 

Afghanistan cause increased wear on all types of 

aircraft. The Osprey, which has hundreds of miles 

of wire running through it, has experienced a few 

unique problems there. 

“The MV-22 is fly-by-wire . . . it’s a computer,” 

said Thomas. “Rather than use a push-pull rod 

that might be hydraulically actuated, you are feeding information to a computer that tells flight controls where to go, which means there is a lot of 

communication going through a lot of wires. So 

with the MV-22, there are a lot of wiring issues.” 

VMM-261’s avionics technicians have, in the 

words of their commander, become “experts,” 

with the aircraft’s wiring system. They can quickly 

Defense Imagery 273209, photo by GySgt Steven Williams

With blades turning, Marines load cargo on a VMM-261 MV-22 Osprey in Afghanistan on 24 April, where the Osprey is 

proving its worth in battle. 
9

“shoot” wires, which means they can check wires 

from start to finish for the tiniest breaks and rubs 

that could potentially cause future issues. 

However, the avionics Marines are not the only 

Marines putting in overtime to keep the aircraft 

up. The squadron performs an average of 7,500 

maintenance man-hours each month on its fleet 

of aircraft. It takes the full maintenance team to 

keep this squadron at a high rate of readiness. 

“The real heroes are the Marines who work 

on the aircraft,” said Thomas. “They are the ones 

who figure out how to adapt the maintenance and 

to ensure the aircraft are ready to go.” 

Keeping this aircraft “ready to go” is not as 

easy as it sounds because pilots, even though 

they fly these aircraft well, nonetheless fly them 

hard. 

“One thing I make sure I tell people is that we 

are not babying [the Osprey] at all,” said Brigadier 

General Andrew W. O’Donnell Jr., the 3d Marine 

Aircraft Wing (Forward) commanding general who 

is now in charge of all aviation assets in Regional 

Command (Southwest) [RC-Southwest] in southern Afghanistan. “That aircraft is landing in the 

dustiest zones, it flies at night, it flies in low light, 

and it does everything everyone else is doing, if 

not more, because of its capability.” 

Although the Afghan environment places 

increased strain on the aircraft and causes accelerated engine wear, the problems are not exclusive to the Osprey. “The environment is extremely 

tough on all the gear,” said Brigadier General 

O’Donnell, “whether you’re talking about a generator, an MRAP [mine resistant, ambush protected armored vehicle] or even tents. We have 

these storms come in, constant extreme temperatures and the ‘moon dust’ is taking its toll on 

everything.” 

However, the Ospreys and their crews have 

more than increased maintenance requirements 

to worry about while operating in such a hostile 

environment. 

The Marines of VMM-261 often have found 

themselves on the front lines, dropping North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization forces into hostile 

zones or flying holding patterns above a fray waiting to swoop in with quick reaction forces. 

“Everywhere we go where the threat has dictated, we have had [tactical air] escorts,” said 

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas. “Whether it was 

[McDonnell Douglas] Harriers or [McDonnell 

Douglas F/A 18] Hornets [attack aircraft], [Bell 

UH-1 Iroquois] Hueys or [Bell AH-1] Cobras 

[helicopter gunships], those guys are dedicated 

to observing objective areas prior to our arrival, 

and will clear the zone and provide security for 

us to come in.” 

Afghanistan has been a learning curve for 

the crews and a test for the airframes of the still 

young aircraft. However, it is undeniable that the 

Osprey is performing on par with the other aircraft on the flight line. Although it had a rocky 

beginning, the Osprey has settled into a groove 

and is performing at an exceptional level in one 

of the most rugged and challenging regions in the 

world for tactical aircraft. 

According to Thomas, the Osprey has moved 

beyond being an aircraft oddity in the skies over 

Afghanistan or for that matter anywhere in the 

world and has taken its place as the Corps’ premier medium-lift aircraft. 

Note

Leatherneck 93, no. 8 (August 2010): 42–45. Reprinted with permission. Copyright Leatherneck.

About the Author

Corporal Ryan Rholes was assigned as a Marine 

combat correspondent with 3d Marine Aircraft 

Wing at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan.
10

Sgt Nester R. Hernandez, a field artilleryman, is one of India 

Battery’s provisional mortarmen.

Photo by Cpl Daniel Blatter
11

Marine Artillery 

in Afghanistan: 

1/11-Every Marine 

an Infantryman 

and a Cannoneer

by Andrew Lubin

Leatherneck, March 2011

“We did it all,” said Lieutenant Colonel Adolfo 

Garcia Jr. “The Marines provided 24/7 fire support and conducted full-spectrum COIN [counterinsurgency] operations. We ran convoys, trained 

ANPs [Afghan National Police] and partnered 

with the Kajaki District governor.” 

Garcia commanded 1st Battalion, 11th Marine 

Regiment (Reinforced), on its 10 May–1 December 

2010 deployment to Regional Command Southwest. His artillerymen had perhaps the most robust 

artillery deployment since 1st Battalion, 10th 

Marines, fought at an-Nasiriyah in 2003. Garcia’s 

was a composite artillery battalion with 18 M777 

155mm howitzers and six High Mobility Artillery 

Rocket Systems (HIMARS) supporting two regimental combat teams throughout RC-Southwest 

(Helmand and Nimroz Provinces). 

Garcia split his batteries into platoons, placing 

the powerful howitzers at Firebases Saenz, Zeebrugge, Fiddler’s Green, Edinburgh, Pico, and 

Payne. In all, until Firebase Pico was closed, there 

was Marine artillery on call at all times throughout 

Afghanistan’s Helmand River Valley. But closing 
12

Pico did not reduce available firepower; those 

guns and Marines were converted to a mobile 

battery and initially sent to support 3d Battalion, 

1st Marines, in the Garmsir District before being 

employed in other locations. 

A high point during the deployment was their 

assignment as an integral part of Task Force Highlander for Operation Steel Dawn II, joining 3d 

Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) and 1st Light 

Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. Garcia taskorganized a HIMARS platoon from S Battery, 5th 

Battalion, 11th Marines, and a battery-minus from 

Lima Battery, 3d Battalion 12th Marines, to conduct “shoot and scoots” around the southern city 

of Barham Chah [sic], which had been identified 

as a critical logistics hub through which the insurgents were receiving and distributing munitions 

throughout the country. Large amounts of Taliban supplies were destroyed, for as Garcia said, 

“We shot opportunistically through the length 

[of] the mission.” 

Bravo Battery 

The “Beastmasters” of Bravo Battery split the battery and brought three M777 howitzers to support the Marine infantry battalions clearing the 

Sangin River Valley, while leaving the remainder 

of their tubes at Firebase Fiddler’s Green in order 

to support 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, in Marjah. 

Photo courtesy of Capt Richard Robinson 

Firebase Saenz: Bravo Battery staff, from the left, 1stSgt James R. Telley, 1stLt Benjamin E. Gardner, SSgt Jordan McMahon, Capt Richard M. Robinson (kneeling), GySgt John Clark (kneeling), 1stLt Mark R. Kraus, and SSgt Brian J. Lindsay.
13

Bravo’s effort clearly demonstrated that Marine 

artillerymen today do more than conduct fire 

missions. From Fiddler’s Green, the battery conducted convoy operations and route security, 

civil-military operations and COIN operations 

with the locals. They did this while supporting 

their Marine infantry brothers in 3d Battalion, 

7th Marines, and later 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 

in Sangin with pinpoint accuracy. 

“We also supported the Georgian [Republic 

of Georgia] infantry who fought from the Sangin 

District Center,” said Bravo Battery’s commander, 

Captain Richard Robinson. “They [Georgian 

infantry] were well trained. They understand the 

COIN fight and knew what was the correct round 

for the correct mission.” 

Initially, the Beastmasters shot GPS-guided 

[Raytheon] Excalibur [precision-guided] rounds. 

With an accuracy of less than 10 meters out to 

24 miles, the rounds kept collateral damage to a 

minimum. But in spite of the diverse and demanding nonartillery-type missions, Robinson also is 

very proud of the accuracy the Marines achieved 

when firing conventional high explosive [HE] 

rounds. “We had no short rounds—no missed 

targets. We shot every mission properly regardless of the conditions and the situation. 

“We had some exceptional Marines,” Robinson continued. “Corporal Paul Morales and Lance 

Corporal Andrew Parks each received a battlefield promotion, but frankly most of the Marines 

went ‘above and beyond’ every day.” Sadly, Sergeant Jose L. Saenz III, a Marine in India Battery, 

was included in the above and beyond [category]. 

A vehicle mechanic by military occupational specialty (MOS), he was acting as a provisional infantry squad leader when killed on a mission. The 

Marines renamed a firebase in his honor. 

India Battery 

The expression “every Marine a rifleman” was 

never so evident as with India Battery. Relieving a contingent of British soldiers (C Company, 

3d Battalion, The Rifles) at Firebase Zeebrugge, 

the India leathernecks were tasked with providing security for the five-mile area surrounding the 

Kajaki Dam. Sitting 35 kilometers to the east of 

Musa Qala, the American-built dam (1953) has 

two vital functions: to supply electricity and to 

provide the water to irrigate some 650,000 acres 

of Helmand Province farmland. 

Unlike their fellow cannoneers at Firebases 

Fiddler’s Green, Saenz and Edinburgh, the India 

Btry [Battery] “Redlegs” were not supporting 

any Marine unit other than themselves.*

 As the 

battery commanding officer, Captain Richard 

Stinnett, explained, “Instead of firing to support 

* Redlegs is an historic term referring to the red stripe on 

infantrymen’s pants.

Photo courtesy of Capt Richard Stinnett 

Sgt Jose Saenz shown while on patrol. He was killed in 

action on 9 August 2010.
14

Adapted from a Leatherneck map by Marine Corps History Divsion
15

an infantry battalion, there was just us, operating 

as provisional infantry. There was a South African contractor working for USAID [U.S. Agency 

for International Development] handling security 

for the actual dam, and our mission was to clear 

and control the area surrounding it.” 

Firebase Zeebrugge had been a British base, 

built on the grounds of the prior Afghan king’s 

summer retreat. The permanent buildings were 

helpful. Stinnett commanded a full-strength battery with multiple attachments, including explosive 

ordnance disposal technicians, mechanics, joint 

tactical air controllers, electricians, and even two 

cooks. There were 170 Marines at Zeebrugge. Due 

to the improvised explosive device (IED) threat, 

the base could be resupplied only by air. Truck 

convoys were too dangerous. 

“The Taliban had driven the locals out of 12 

of 14 local villages but let them return during the 

day to farm. So we and our ANPs patrolled two 

to three times daily and began to build a rapport 

with them,” Stinnett explained. As in Nawa, Garmsir, and other villages the length of the Helmand 

River Valley, the constant Marine presence was 

effective, and the villagers began to return to their 

villages and provide intelligence regarding IEDs. 

“We were all infantrymen. Our cooks manned 

the .50-cal. [machine guns] and did overwatch. A 

mechanic, Corporal Jacob Hoag, was our SASR 

[special application scoped rifle] gunner, and my 

Photo by Cpl Daniel Blatter 

Cpl Jacob B. Hoag, India Battery, mans the special application scoped rifle (SASR).
16

FDC [fire direction controlman], Corporal Kenneth Saeger, handled the [FGM-148] Javelin [antitank missile],” said Stinnett. 

His six provisional infantry squad leaders 

were led by cannoneers (MOS 0811), radio operators, and a motor transport technician. “We also 

had two mortar tubes manned by the 0844s, the 

FDCs. Lance Corporal Jonathan Mera and Corporal Adam Skidmore stood out amongst an excellent FDC team,” he said. 

With the regimental “gunner,” Chief Warrant 

Officer 4 Thomas R. Beecher, coming out to provide training, they learned quickly, firing some 

900 HE and illumination rounds from their M777 

howitzers, in addition to the Excalibur rounds. 

The daily patrols put India Battery in regular 

contact with the Taliban, starting the first day when 

the Brits took them out and became embroiled 

in a roiling firefight. “We had 162 engagements, 

ranging from long-distance machine-gun fights 

in the rolling desert terrain to the north, to being 

attacked from tree lines and cornfields in preplanned ambushes in the southern green zone. 

Every IED strike was the beginning of a firefight. 

We were often being fired on from three positions 

and unable to bring in CASEVAC [casualty evacuation helicopter],” said Stinnett. 

Fighting as infantry took a toll. The India Battery leathernecks suffered 27 wounded and four 

killed—heavy losses for an artillery battery. 

“We had good ANPs. They fought hard, they 

fought daily. It helped that they all came from 

this area. The police chief had not seen his home 

in the six years since the Taliban came; he was 

Photo by Cpl Daniel Blatter 

Cpl Matthew Lucas, an India Battery cannoneer, serves as a 

provisional infantryman helping patrol the Helmand River 

near Kajaki Dam.

Photo by Cpl Daniel Blatter 

LCpl Bryant Wahlen, a designated marksman in India Battery, sights in on enemy activity across the Helmand River 

on 28 September 2010, while patrolling Kajaki Dam.
17

motivated to push them out. It looked, by the 

time we left, that we were making a difference,” 

Stinnett added. 

From shooting fire missions with their howitzers, to conducting COIN operations, to supporting their own newly tasked provisional infantrymen 

with their newly tasked provisional mortarmen, 

1st Battalion, 11th Marines, proved that Marines 

can accomplish any mission. 

Note

Leatherneck 94, no. 3 (March 2011): 38–41. Reprinted 

with permission. Copyright Leatherneck.

About the Author

A frequent contributor for Leatherneck, Andrew 

Lubin embedded with Marines in Afghanistan 

during late May–June 2010 and remains in contact with deployed and deploying leathernecks. His 

updates from Afghanistan continue to be available on the Leatherneck website. Additionally, he is 

the author of the award-winning book Charlie Battery: A Marine Artillery Battery Unit in Iraq (2004), 

as well as Keep Moving or Die: Task Force Tarawa at 

An-Nasiriyah (2010).
18

Task Force Highlander’s forward command center on the 

morning of its raid against Bahram Chah on 30 October 

2010 was situated on the northern outskirts of the main 

residential area at the base of a hill in Afghanistan bearing 

an image of the Taliban flag.

Defense Imagery 101030-M-1263P-011
19

Operation Steel 

Dawn II: The Raid 

on Bahram Chah

by Colonel Nathan S. Lowrey, 

USMCR (Ret)

Marine Corps History, Summer 2015

Introduction

While speaking at a May 2003 news conference 

in Kabul, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld declared optimistically that Coalition operations in Afghanistan had “clearly . . . moved 

from major combat activity to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction activities.”1

 Benign neglect over the next three years, 

however, allowed the Taliban to regroup, to adopt 

new tactics, and to expand their insurgency to 

the south and east.2

 A British contingent of the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

assumed command of Regional Command South 

(RC-South) in 2006, but encountered significant 

resistance when it attempted to challenge enemy 

activity in the area, particularly in Helmand Province to the southwest, where the enemy tended to 

operate with near impunity.3

Around the same time—as hostilities in Iraq 

began to decline—Commandant of the Marine 

Corps James T. Conway sought a more active 

role for his Service in Afghanistan.4

 The number 

of Marine expeditionary forces in southwestern 

Afghanistan increased, with the type of deployed 

units growing steadily from a regimental to a brigade and finally to a corps-size presence. Two 
20

months after the arrival of Major General Richard P. Mills and I Marine Expeditionary Force 

(I MEF/Task Force Leatherneck) in April 2010, 

Marines established Regional Command Southwest (RC-Southwest) in Helmand and Nimroz 

Provinces.5

 In addition to allowing senior leaders to focus on smaller geographic areas, the 

new command enhanced the Marines’ autonomy 

and allowed them to maintain an offensive posture while working to extend security throughout the region.

Operation Steel Dawn II—a joint raid against an 

enemy command center and logistics hub in Bahram Chah, Afghanistan, during October 2010—

exemplified I MEF’s aggressiveness as well as the 

operational utility of the Marine air-ground task 

force. Nestled in a remote desert valley among 

the Chagai Hills, Bahram Chah is situated in the 

southernmost district in Helmand Province. Its 

isolation and proximity to the Pakistani border 

provided the Taliban with a safe haven ideal for 

pursuing a wide range of illicit activities. In addition to an al-Qaeda training camp and Taliban 

prison, the area housed facilities for producing 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Bahram Chah bazaar served as a central location for 

smuggling fighters, weapons, ammunition, and 

explosives northward into Afghanistan and for 

moving refined opium, heroin, and other narcotics southward out of the country.6

 Major General 

Mills considered it “a dark and evil place” and 

decided to deny the enemy sanctuary.7

Background

Coalition forces were aware of the town’s notorious reputation and had been raiding Bahram Chah 

on a regular basis for six years. Established by the 

Taliban in the mid-1990s, the town tripled in size 

between 2002 and 2005, with as many as 1,000 

drug traffickers operating in the area on a busy 

day. Coalition forces first confronted the enemy 

sanctuary in May 2005 when the recently established Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF) 

raided the town’s bazaar during a three-day operation to eliminate drug laboratories in southern 

Helmand Province. Although the drug traffickers 

fled to safety across the Pakistani border before 

the raid force arrived, ASNF personnel seized 

250 kilograms of heroin, 2.5 tons of opium, and 

3.5 tons of precursor chemicals used to manufacture heroin.8

The Taliban retaliated four months later by 

ambushing a company-size Afghan National 

Police convoy as it traveled south through a canyon located five kilometers north of Bahram Chah. 

The attack began shortly before nightfall, with 

insurgents firing down from all directions. When 

the fighting ended seven hours later, six vehicles 

had been seized or destroyed and 18 police officers had been killed, including the provincial deputy police chief.9

Not to be deterred, the ASNF raided Bahram 

Chah several times in April 2006. During the first 

operation, the antinarcotics force seized 75 kilograms of opium resin and arrested one suspect. 

During the second operation, the force arrested 

four suspects, seized 1,000 kilograms of opium, 

and destroyed an arsenal of heavy weapons discovered in an underground bunker. A third raid 

resulted in the death of one drug dealer as well 

as the seizure of substantial amounts of heroin, 

morphine, opium, and drug-making chemicals.10

In May 2007, a U.S. electronic surveillance 

unit (Task Force Orange) tracked Mullah Dadullah to Bahram Chah. Released two months earlier 

during a controversial prisoner exchange, Dadullah was a senior Taliban military commander and 

trusted advisor to Mullah Omar, the infamous 

one-eyed Taliban leader. After a small reconnaissance element determined that air strikes alone 
21

were insufficient to ensure Dadullah’s elimination, Afghan special operations forces and 50 

commandos from C Squadron, British Special 

Boat Service (SBS), were inserted by two Royal 

Air Force Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters. 

Although immediately targeted by rifles, machine 

guns, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), the 

assault force maneuvered forward against the 

walled compound’s 20 defenders. After a fourhour firefight, during which the commandos suffered four casualties, the facility was cleared and 

Dadullah killed.11

In October 2008, Afghani, Pakistani, and Arabic militants gathered at Bahram Chah. Coalition 

aircraft struck the group with precision munitions 

during a nighttime raid after ground reconnaissance forces positively identified the insurgents. 

Although an ISAF spokesman said that the target 

had been a small number of Taliban commanders, an Afghan official from Helmand Province 

claimed that two vehicles were destroyed and as 

many as 70 fighters killed.12

Bahram Chah may have escaped the Coalition’s attention in 2009, but southwestern Afghanistan did not. Arriving that spring as a vanguard 

of President Barack H. Obama’s eventual troop 

surge, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade deployed 

to Helmand Province and began clearing operations to break a stalemate that had existed between 

British and Taliban forces for three years. In July 

during Operation Khanjar (Strike of the Sword), 

three Marine battalions pushed south from Camp 

Bastion and occupied key population centers in 

Garmsir, Nawa-I-Barakzayi, and Khan Neshin.

The 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (2d LAR) occupied Khan Neshin and established the Marines’ southern flank in the rural 

Khan Neshin District. Light armored reconnaissance forces continued to patrol the area during 

successive troop rotations, conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations along the lower 

Helmand River valley and interdiction operations 

across the southwest desert. Lieutenant Colonel 

Michael Martin, who commanded 4th LAR in 

December 2009, explained that while he would 

have welcomed an outpost at Bahram Chah, the 

battalion lacked sufficient resources and the town’s 

isolation would have placed his Marines at risk.13

Lieutenant Colonel Scott D. Leonard and 1st 

LAR (Task Force Highlander) assumed tactical 

responsibility for Reg-e Khan Neshin District, 

Helmand Province (Area of Operations Mameluke), in May 2010. Task Force Highlander’s headquarters was located at Combat Outpost Payne, 

situated near the district center in Khan Neshin 

on the northern side of the lower Helmand River 

“fishhook.” Tasked with disrupting enemy operations throughout the region, Leonard assigned 

three of his maneuver companies to sectors of 

responsibility within the battalion’s 750-squarekilometer area of operations; a fourth company 

supported I MEF operations in the Kajaki District to the north.

Alpha and Charlie Companies, commanded 

by Major John R. Bitonti II and Captain Jason T. 

Defense Imagery 101029-M-0000A-001

A light armored vehicle from Task Force Highlander (1st 

LAR) sits outside the Bahram Chah bazaar on 30 October 

2010 during Operation Steel Dawn II.
22

Ford, focused on COIN operations conducted 

along the north and south banks of the lower 

Helmand River. These distributed operations had 

dispersed platoons assigned to areas of responsibility. The Marines patrolled actively to engage the 

populace and secure the region’s thoroughfares, a 

physically demanding and dangerous mission that 

often became kinetic. Ambushes or strikes from 

IEDs buried along the dirt roadways were common and a constant concern. Each Marine company also worked diligently to develop the civil 

infrastructure, local government, and national 

security forces in their sectors.14

Farther south, operating in a more austere and 

sparsely populated area, Captain Adrian B. Haskamp commanded Company B. Lieutenant Colonel Leonard realigned the battalion’s assets to take 

advantage of the armored vehicle’s mobility and 

directed Bravo Company to focus on interdicting 

the enemy’s clandestine transportation routes, or 

ratlines, running through southern Helmand Province. During long-range patrols that lasted up to 

30 days and were conducted more than 100 kilometers from the closest support facilities, the company split into platoons and sections to search for 

contraband and to document the region’s demography. Assisted by intelligence, reconnaissance, and 

surveillance (ISR) assets that helped direct their 

efforts, the Marines detained 21 suspects for questioning, identified two enemy command and control nodes, and seized more than 4,400 kilograms 

of opium, 1,750 kilograms of ammonium nitrate, 

and 70 IED components. The Marines’ presence 

severely restricted Taliban movement and forced 

the enemy to shift its trafficking routes farther 

west and east into the desert.15

During 2010, as Coalition forces expanded their 

influence over southwestern Helmand Province, 

Bahram Chah received a greater amount of military attention. On 22 March, a combined patrol 

operating in Registan District stopped two vehicles transporting 725 kilograms of hashish to the 

enemy transshipment center.16 On 2 June, U.S. 

Air Force aircraft launched a missile and rocket 

at enemy positions that had fired on Coalition 

forces operating near Bahram Chah.17 Then, on 1 

July, Afghan special operating forces and British 

SBS commandos again raided the town’s bazaar.18

In the latter action, commandos were inserted 

via CH-47 helicopters near the village of Haji 

Wakil. They arrived around 0200 hours and, 

shortly after, encountered enemy resistance. Forward progress remained difficult, and the commandos had to maneuver through an orchard 

while being fired on from all directions. The commandos did accomplish their mission, but Royal 

Marine Corporal Seth Stephens was killed and at 

least one other team member wounded during the 

five-hour firefight.19

Although clear evidence of enemy activity 

in Bahram Chah was found, the military operation had been costly. The commando’s ground 

assault force was unable to sufficiently support 

the withdrawal of the raid force, and 1st LAR—

despite being designated the regional quick reaction force—was not contacted when the situation 

began to deteriorate. On 19 September, Coalition 

aircraft launched two rounds of precision munitions at the town’s bazaar, destroying an IED factory and 4,500 pounds of explosives material.20

Planning and Preparation

Lieutenant Colonel Leonard and those from Task 

Force 210 discussed the problems with Bahram 

Chah that summer, but waited until early October to propose a raid of the enemy’s logistics base. 

The proposal was presented to Brigadier General 

Joseph L. Osterman and 1st Marine Division (1st 

MarDiv Forward) staff at Camp Leatherneck.21

During an operational debrief, Leonard and his 
23

British counterpart described the tactical situation 

and pitched the concept for near-simultaneous air 

and ground assaults. The plan called for two companies driving down from the north to screen the 

bazaar from adjacent residential areas to the west 

and east, enabling the commandos to fly in and 

strike the objective.22 By attacking before the Taliban had an opportunity to withdraw southward 

into Pakistan for the winter, Coalition forces could 

delay the production of IEDs and disrupt enemy 

operations into the summer of 2011.23

Around 10 October, 1st MarDiv endorsed the 

concept, adding slides to illustrate the mission 

before submitting it to I MEF (Forward) five days 

later.24 Major General Mills directed the planning 

to continue and forwarded the proposal to the 

ISAF Joint Command (IJC) for approval. In the 

end, the plan took about two weeks to wend its 

way up the chain of command. At some point, 

ISAF briefed the Afghan government, which in 

turn notified the Pakistani government 24 hours 

in advance of the raid, enabling the Pakistani 

Army to withdraw its border position—but this 

may have also alerted the Taliban.25

Most of the deliberate planning and preparations 

occurred at Combat Outpost Payne.26 One of the 

more difficult issues the planners had to address 

was targeting. Although the first 140 kilometers of 

the proposed route to Bahram Chah included open 

desert, the final 20 kilometers involved traveling 

Defense Imagery 140514-M-RD023-096, photo by Cpl Ismael E. Ortega 

Marines with Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, fire the M777A2 howitzer during Exercise Desert Scimitar 2014 

at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, CA.
24

through one of two narrow mountain passes to 

reach the objective. Aware of the region’s recent 

operational history, the Marines knew they would 

have to eliminate the enemy’s defensive positions 

along the pass in advance of the movement. They 

developed the plan according to doctrine, incorporating shaping fires, suppressive fires, and fires in 

support of obstacle breaches. They also observed 

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 398, which 

governed the use of supporting fires in theater. 

Captain Nicolas S. Rapkoch, 1st LAR’s fire support coordinator, spent many evenings in discussion with the battalion lawyer, struggling to 

address the engagement requirements before seeking ISAF approval through the IJC.27

Operation Steel Dawn II would ultimately 

involve “one of the most robust fires packages 

ever executed in Afghanistan,” including a wide 

variety of offensive aircraft: Rockwell B-1 Lancer 

bombers, Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II 

attack aircraft, Lockheed AC-130 Spectre gunships, McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet fighters, and Bell AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters.28

While the IJC may have understood the rules of 

engagement, Captain Rapkoch later complained, 

the command did not necessarily appreciate their 

spirit or intent. The IJC chose to deny some preassault fires against fighting positions associated 

with residential compounds near Bahram Chah 

because the targeting requirement for two corroborating sources of intelligence in habitable areas 

was not met.29

Marine planners understood that dust or thunderstorms could inhibit the use of aircraft, so an 

artillery presence would be necessary to ensure 

an all-weather fire support capability.30 That 

task fell to Lieutenant Colonel Adolfo Garcia Jr. 

and 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. The artillerymen were already well known to 1st LAR—the 

two battalions had worked together during an 

Enhanced Mojave Viper exercise at Marine Corps 

Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, 

California, shortly before deploying. After arriving in Afghanistan in May 2010, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, established its headquarters at 

Fire Base Fiddler’s Green. The headquarters, one 

rocket battery, and three cannon batteries operated eight firing positions distributed throughout I MEF’s area of operations. In addition to 

supporting Regimental Combat Teams 2 and 7, 

the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, had also secured 

a portion of Route 605 in Marjah and conducted 

COIN operations in the Kajaki District.31

Because Bahram Chah was located outside the 

range of the artillery pieces positioned at Combat 

Outpost Payne, artillerymen had to accompany the 

raid force. To facilitate coordination during the 

operation, Lieutenant Colonel Garcia formed an 

artillery group under the command of his operations officer, Major David J. Grabow. This special 

purpose task organization included the battalion’s jump command post; 1st Platoon, L Battery, 

equipped with three 155mm light howitzers; and 

3d Platoon, S Battery, equipped with the High 

Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS).32

In preparation for the raid, S Battery, under 

Captain Jeffrey S. Curtis, conducted test fire ranges 

at Camp Leatherneck on 11 October and then at 

Combat Outpost Payne on 14 October.33 The 3d 

Platoon also performed a route reconnaissance 

to a proposed assembly area to ensure the desert terrain was suitable for supporting the heavy 

HIMARS during travel.34 In the meantime, Captain Bitonti and Alpha Company received a warning order, switched areas of responsibility with 

Charlie Company, remounted their armored vehicles, and embarked on an intense week of refresher 

training and maintenance.35

On 19 October, organizations participating 

in the operation moved toward Combat Outpost 
25

Payne, which served as an initial staging area for 

Task Force Highlander. The 1st Battalion, 11th 

Marines’ communications platoon, under Captain Ronnie L. Creech, began to actively support 

Operation Steel Dawn II, providing the equipment 

and personnel necessary to operate the forward 

combat operations center.36 Lieutenant Colonel 

Leonard issued an operations order to key leaders 

the following day and, on 22 October, the participants reconvened to conduct a detailed rehearsal 

of concepts drill. Majors Matthew Miller and Jon 

A. Custis, the 1st LAR’s operations and executive officers, respectively, walked the participants 

through the operational sequence and corrected 

problems identified during the group exercise.37

Lieutenant Colonel Garcia later noted that “The 

thorough planning and rehearsals conducted 

prior to the raid ensured the seamless integration 

of these elements and refined the command and 

control of the raid force.”38

Alpha and Bravo Companies departed Combat Outpost Payne the next day, heading in opposite directions to conduct interdiction operations 

for five days. As part of Lieutenant Colonel Leonard’s deception plan, the companies intended that 

any Taliban groups monitoring the Marine units’ 

activities would interpret the movements as routine patrols.39 Shaping and reconnaissance operations conducted in support of Steel Dawn II 

(e.g., Operations Steel Dawn I and Press 16) also 

began on 23 October.40 Gunnery Sergeant Aaron 

J. Abrams, Alpha Company’s 2d Platoon sergeant, 

served as Task Force Highlander’s liaison to Task 

Force 210 during Operation Press 16. The British reconnaissance patrol collected information 

on the proposed route, identified enemy observation posts covering the mountain passes, and 

observed activities in and around Bahram Chah.41

On 25 October, Major Custis began to push 

command and support elements south. The intermediary goal was to establish a logistics staging 

area (LSA) about 60 kilometers from Combat 

Outpost Payne.42 Lieutenant Colonel Leonard, 

who considered Bahram Chah the “nexus of all 

bad things . . . happening” in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, spoke candidly to his Marines 

before departing: “We will go into the Bazaar of 

Barham [sic] Chah and say, ‘We’ll come here any 

time we want—you can’t stop us. You don’t get 

to operate with impunity.’ We will tell them, ‘If 

Defense Imagery 140518-M-RD023-077, 

photo by Cpl Ismael E. Ortega 

Marines with Sierra Battery, 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, 

fire the M142 HIMARS during Exercise Desert Scimitar 

2014 at Twentynine Palms.

Defense Imagery 339079, 

photo by Cpl Paul D. Zelner 

A convoy from CLB-3, 1st Marines Logistics Group (Fwd), 

heads to Combat Outpost Payne on 21 October 2010 to 

support Operation Steel Dawn II.
26

you want to come back and rebuild this place, go 

ahead. We will be back in three months’.”43

The LSA was situated in a large wadi (dry stream 

bed) in the middle of the desert, a site specifically 

chosen for its remoteness. Task Force Highlander 

assembled 178 vehicles and 1,100 personnel into 

a raid force in the isolated location without being 

observed. Getting to the LSA was difficult as sand 

dunes and rough terrain hindered the progress of 

the heavily laden vehicles.44 During the weeklong 

operation, for example, one M88 armored vehicle 

crew recovered or repaired 53 vehicles.45

Upon the artillery group’s arrival at the LSA, 

Major Grabow established a command and control node to support other task force elements 

during the operation. The communications platoon from 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, provided 

host services via multiple tactical satellite radio 

networks. Due to its communications capabilities, the artillery command element also fulfilled 

the role of camp commandant.46

Combat Logistics Battalion 3 Marines provided critical assistance to Task Force Highlander 

throughout the operation. Motor Transport Bravo 

Company, under Captain Matthew J. Neely, provided eight pallets of food and 15,000 gallons of 

water as well as fuel, ammunition, and other supplies via combat logistics patrols and helicopter 

support teams. Marines from Landing Support 

Platoon, Headquarters and Service Company, 

off-loaded supplies at multiple sites,47 and the 1st 

Medical Battalion’s Shock Trauma Platoon provided a mobile trauma bay.48

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 also 

Defense Imagery 101021-M-4388Z-004, photo by Cpl Paul D. Zelner 

LtCol Scott D. Leonard, commanding officer of 1st LAR and Task Force Highlander, addresses Marines participating in 

Operation Steel Dawn II at Combat Outpost Payne on 25 October 2010.
27

contributed significantly to the operation, constructing a forward arming and refueling point 

(FARP) near the LSA.49 A Bell Boeing MV-22B 

Osprey from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 (VMM-365), commanded by Lieutenant 

Colonel Craig C. LeFlore, was the first aircraft to 

land at the FARP on 29 October and provided 

assault support during the operation.50 Captain 

Patrick W. Richardson, a Bell AH-1 Super Cobra 

pilot with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369, also operated from the FARP. Richardson later explained that “We were able to spend 

15 minutes in transit, 20–30 minutes to refuel 

and rearm, and get back to support troops on the 

ground.”51 The facility also had on-hand casualty 

evacuation capability.

On 26 October, operating farther south near 

the objective area, Gunnery Sergeant Abrams and 

the British reconnaissance patrol conducted a night 

mortar raid against Bahram Chah. The commandos established two observation posts—situated 

on high ground running along each side of the 

proposed route—and fired at enemy positions 

previously designated as on-call targets. When 

the rounds began to impact, the enemy fired flares 

into the night sky and attempted to flee in vehicles. Abrams reported that numerous headlights 

illuminated a large traffic jam.52

The next day, the reconnaissance patrol rejoined 

Task Force Highlander at the LSA and delivered 

their account to Lieutenant Colonel Leonard. 

Although Leonard had originally intended to follow the western pass through the mountains, the 

patrol reported that the circuitous route would 

take the convoy directly past the city’s main residential area. Shortly before departure, the route 

was changed to the eastern pass.53

Movement to Contact 

The raid was originally scheduled to begin on 

the evening of 28 October, but torrential rains 

resulted in a one-day weather delay.54 Around 

1800 hours the following evening, Task Force 

Highlander formed a column and headed south 

to Bahram Chah.55 The Marines first needed to 

reach the line of departure on the north side of 

Chagai Hills—20 kilometers short of the bazaar—

and then maneuver through the mountain pass to 

arrive at a designated release point by 0700 hours 

the following morning.56 The time requirement 

deepened the Marines’ sense of urgency; if they 

failed to arrive on time, Task Force 210 would 

have to execute its portion of the mission without ground support. Lance Corporal [Adam B.] 

Ramirez, a vehicle driver from Alpha Company, 

later recalled that the Marines had traveled light 

and fast—bringing only water, chow, ammunition, and a one-day pack per man.57

Alpha Company held the lead position in the 

85-vehicle convoy, and Captain Bitonti divided 

the unit into two sections for movement: 2d Platoon with attachments from 3d Combat Engineer 

Battalion, company headquarters, and logistics 

vehicles followed by 1st and 3d Platoons. The 

engineering assets included assault vehicles with 

Defense Imagery 101029-M-4388Z-003, 

photo by Sgt Derek Carlson 

Supplies are offloaded from a Bell Boeing MV-22B Osprey 

with VMM-365 at a remote logistics staging area on 29 

October 2010.
28

rocket-propelled mine clearing line charges and 

a D7 bulldozer and M870 semitrailer for breaching three IED-laden choke points. The battalion’s 

jump command post was next in line, followed by 

Bravo Company and the logistics train.58 Major 

Grabow and the cannon platoon brought up the 

rear, while Captain Curtis and the HIMARS platoon remained at the LSA.59 Major General Mills 

and representatives from several U.S. government 

agencies also accompanied the raid force.60

Working its way south, Alpha Company marked 

the route and relayed situational information to 

the remainder of the convoy. Gunnery Sergeant 

Abrams, who guided the lead platoon, recalled that 

the sky had been clear when the company began 

the road march. However, a solitary black cloud 

followed the Marines, eventually bringing rain, 

thunder, and lightning. During the approach, the 

Marine company had expected to strike numerous IEDs, but none were encountered.61

Task Force 210 approached the objective area 

aboard CH-47 helicopters, relaying position reports 

to Marines as it crossed airborne phase lines. 

When the British were approximately two minutes from the landing zone, at around 1940 hours, 

Task Force Highlander initiated the kinetic portion of the operation.62 A B-1 bomber attacked 

enemy fighting positions and observation posts 

along the Marines’ axis of advance and near the 

commandos’ ingress point. During two passes, 

the bomber struck eight preplanned targets with 

laser-guided 2,000-pound bombs.63

As the convoy reached the north side of the 

Chagai Hills, the logistics train and artillery group 

pulled off the road and established a functional 

firing position in only 15 minutes.64 While Task 

Force Highlander maneuvered along the eastern corridor toward Bahram Chah, the artillerymen shot illumination rounds over the western 

pass in an effort to deceive the enemy on which 

direction the Marines would initiate the attack. 

When Alpha Company approached the first IEDladen choke point, the Marines spotted Taliban 

fighters massing along high ground paralleling 

the canyon. At Captain Rapkoch’s request, the 

cannon platoon began to shoot preplanned preparatory fires against enemy defensive positions, 

shifting in concert with the task force’s advance, 

effectively suppressing the enemy with at least one 

sympathetic detonation and allowing the convoy 

to continue forward. At a second choke point, the 

cannon platoon again suppressed Taliban forces.65

In all, the platoon fired 107 high explosive rounds 

in support of the breaches.66

Task Force Highlander also employed close 

air support to strike the enemy.67 Lance Corporal 

Ramirez recalled the surreal experience of riding 

through the night with bombs exploding near the 

objective, artillery impacting along the ridgelines, 

and illumination rounds drifting downward over 

the western pass.68 Sergeant Stuart R. Sanford, a 

vehicle commander in Bravo Company, similarly 

remembered an “awesome fireworks show” as the 

“artillery was blowing the hell out of everything.”69

The journey south was not without difficulties for Coalition forces. At one point, the trailer 

hauling the bulldozer became stuck and, when 

Marines tried to pull it free, an axle broke. While 

leaders contemplated what to do, a lance corporal 

climbed into the driver’s seat, backed the bulldozer 

off the trailer, and asked “Hey, gunny, which way 

do I go?” The gunnery sergeant pointed south, 

and the young Marine moved out at three and a 

half kilometers per hour.70 On another occasion, 

the combat engineer support element led a convoy down the wrong corridor. When 3d Platoon 

Commander First Lieutenant Michael D. Wright 

realized what happened, he initiated corrective 

action and, on Captain Bitonti’s orders, assumed 

maneuver control of the engineer element.71
29

Progress was swift and Task Force Highlander 

reached its designated release point, a hilltop near 

the southern entrance to the mountain pass, around 

0430. Having arrived two hours before sunrise and 

well ahead of schedule, the Marines received word 

that Task Force 210 was not ready to launch the 

attack and halted the convoy. As Marines established a hasty blocking position and waited in the 

dark, the infrared strobe lights on the antenna of 

the armored vehicles reminded Captain Rapkoch 

of a traffic jam on U.S. Interstate 95.72

Shortly after being inserted about three miles 

southeast of the bazaar, the British commandos 

began to receive small-arms fire. In response, the 

HIMARS platoon fired three GPS-guided rockets into the buildings where the gunfire emanated. Before long, the commandos proceeded 

to secure the perimeter. They established preliminary positions on each corner of the bazaar and 

an observation post on a mountain peak northwest of Bahram Chah; they also marked lanes for 

the armored vehicles to follow. The Marines then 

surged forward.73

Actions on the Objective 

The road sloped down beyond the release point, 

first heading southeast and then cutting sharply 

to the southwest before opening into a threekilometer-wide valley.74 The smaller village of 

Jumakhan was situated to the east, the larger village of Haji Wakil to the west, and the bazaar near 

the middle. When First Lieutenant Sean T. Knapp 

led the engineer platoon forward in the dark to 

breach the entrance to the objective area, the platoon encountered small-arms, machine-gun, and 

RPG fire. First Platoon, Alpha Company, under 

First Lieutenant Jonathan R. Walaski, moved forward to establish a temporary blocking position 

and to provide cover fire; the company quickly 

suppressed the enemy. After the rocket-propelled 

line charges twice misfired, Captain Bitonti pushed 

forward with the mine rollers. Around this time, 

the bulldozer emerged from the pass.75

The Marines 1st Platoon quickly maneuvered 

past the engineers, crossed into the objective area, 

and swung east to establish the assigned blocking position along the southwest side of Jumakhan. Although intelligence had predicted little 

if any resistance from the village of single-story 

adobe dwellings, as soon as the Marines pulled 

into position, they encountered additional smallarms, machine-gun, and RPG fire. The Marines 

again suppressed the enemy with ease.76

With Lieutenant Walaski’s platoon shielding 

the mountain pass exit, the remainder of Task 

Force Highlander was able to flow unimpeded 

into the objective area.77 Alpha Company passed 

through the British lines while skirting along the 

north side of the bazaar and then swung south 

to cordon off the southwest side of Haji Wakil.78

Master Sergeant Curtis C. Gregory, Alpha Company’s operations chief, recalled a relative calm 

at that point, as flashes from the commandos’ 

infrared lights and weapons sights could be seen 

Defense Imagery 101029-M-1842C-002, 

photo by Sgt Derek Carlson 

Artillery illumination and a desert storm light up the night 

sky over the Chagai Hills as Task Force Highlander maneuvers south through a mountain pass toward Bahram Chah 

on 29 November 2010.
30

atop buildings in the bazaar79—good news for 

the Marines, who had been precluded from firing 

their weapons until they passed the British lines.80

Captain Bitonti established a linear blocking position, facing west toward Bahram Chah. 

Lieutenant Michael D. Mitchell’s 2d platoon was 

located on the southern flank in a low-lying, vegetated area near the Pakistani border. The rest of 

the company was situated on higher ground, with 

headquarters in the middle and Second Lieutenant Wright’s 3d Platoon to the north.81

It was dark by the time 2d Platoon pulled into 

position. The enemy could hear, but not see the 

Marines’ armored vehicles. Before long, the Marines 

spotted enemy fighters maneuvering toward their 

position, ducking in and out of buildings and crawling through the brush. The insurgents operated 

individually, as pairs, and occasionally in teams of 

three or four. Most were armed with assault rifles, 

although some carried machine guns and RPGs. 

In one instance, Gunnery Sergeant Abrams’s crew 

killed a pair of fighters who had tried to fire an 

RPG at the Marines. When the enemy fell, another 

fighter picked up the RPG and tried to fire, but 

was also shot. Nearby, Lieutenant Mitchell’s crew 

similarly engaged a fighter armed with an RPG 

who was maneuvering through vegetation about 

75 meters away. The Marines may have killed a 

suicide bomber—a man wearing a vest appeared 

to explode as he ran at their vehicle and was shot.82

The enemy maneuvered like well-trained and 

disciplined soldiers, yet they were obviously unfamiliar with the light armored vehicles’ capabilities.83

In addition to being well armed and impervious 

to small-arms fire, the vehicles had thermal imagery devices that allowed the crews to shoot accurately in the dark at up to 3,000 meters. According 

to Sergeant Sanford, the thermal imaging devices 

made night “as bright as day and so detailed you 

can determine what kind of weapon the enemy 

is carrying.”84 Gunnery Sergeant Abrams also 

acknowledged being able to see the enemy maneuvering through buildings and behind walls.85

After passing through British lines, Captain 

Haskamp established a second blocking position 

with Bravo Company facing south along the north 

side of Haji Wakil. Second Platoon, under First 

Lieutenant Gabriel M. Lavine, was positioned on 

the left flank, with the company executive officer, 

First Lieutenant Charles L. Hostetler, and Headquarters Platoon in the middle. Third Platoon, 

under First Lieutenant Christopher M. Phifer, 

was on the right flank. Each platoon had to carefully observe their sectors of fire, because they 

were unable to see Alpha Company to the southeast. In addition to cordoning off the residential 

area, 3d Platoon was also positioned to cover the 

entrance to the western corridor.86

Shortly after Bravo Company passed the bazaar, 

a vehicle crew spotted and killed three fighters 

armed with RPGs. Once in position, other members of the company engaged small groups of 

fighters who were maneuvering among the buildings and through the bush. First Sergeant Jon D. 

Jerome, unimpressed by the enemy’s lack of situational awareness, was dumbfounded that they 

continued to use paths that the Marines covered 

with automatic weapons.87

Map by author
31

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Leonard situated his jump command post on the edge of the 

objective area, north of the bend in the battalion’s 

L-shaped blocking position, about 800 meters from 

Haji Wakil.88 Major Custis established a multiuse 

point directly behind the objective area, which 

incorporated the casualty collection, maintenance collection, detainee transfer, and combinedoperations coordination points for Task Forces 

Highlander and 210.89 Captain Rapkoch took control of all supporting fires and employed AC-130 

gunships to disrupt the insurgents’ haphazard 

defenses.90 According to intelligence reports, little 

danger of civilian casualties existed because Taliban forces had driven them out [of] the area, and 

the civilians had not returned before the Marines’ 

arrival.91 To prevent accusations of firing across the 

Pakistani border, Marines also used video to capture all weapons fires within the objective area.92

Taliban resistance decreased as dawn broke, 

although isolated individuals and locations were 

targeted throughout the day. In one instance, 

for example, Bravo Company Marines observed 

an enemy spotter using a cell phone to direct 

107mm rocket fire. Marines responded with a 

tube-launched, optically tracked, wireless-guided 

(TOW) missile launched at the building in which 

the spotter was hiding.93

Task Force 210 cleared the bazaar—which measured approximately 400 meters by 700 meters and 

contained about 150 shops—in 12 hours. First 

Lieutenant Buck A. Bradley’s 1st Platoon detached 

from Bravo Company upon entering the objective 

area and assisted the British by providing cover as 

the commandos maneuvered forward, suppressing 

enemy fighting positions and securing high-speed 

avenues of approach.94 The commandos moved 

systematically from west to east and examined 

each of the bazaar’s shops for indications that its 

occupants were contributing to the insurgency. If 

the search failed to find such evidence, the shop 

was left intact. If evidence of illicit activities was 

discovered (e.g., weapons, munitions, or bomb 

making or drug processing materials), the material 

was seized for further exploitation or destroyed 

on site.95 During the clearing operation, commandos killed a suicide bomber before he could detonate his explosives.96

Captain Bitonti and Master Sergeant Gregory coordinated the medical evacuation of two 

Afghan soldiers injured while clearing the bazaar. 

As the two Marines moved toward the bazaar to 

Defense Imagery 379620, photo by SSgt Jeremy Ross 

A 17 March 2011 photo shows the Bahram Chah bazaar, 

which facilitated the movement of enemy fighters, weapons, 

and ammunition into—and drugs out of—Afghanistan.

Defense Imagery 336189

British special operating forces and Marines from Task Force 

Highlander search a compound at one end of the Bahram 

Chah bazaar on 30 October 2010.
32

collect the wounded, a HIMARS rocket struck and 

destroyed a nearby building, but they were uninjured. One of the Afghan soldiers had been shot 

in the hip, and the other had twisted his ankle.97

After transporting the wounded to the multiuse 

point for treatment and evacuation, the Marines 

rejoined Alpha Company.98

Tensions grew throughout the day as a crowd 

of unarmed men gathered on the Pakistani side 

of the border. The men moved about in groups 

of approximately 10–50 individuals and eventually totaled about 500 people.99 Gunnery Sergeant Abrams recalled that the men sat on the 

ground, under trees, on walls, or in compounds. 

They watched the Marines with casual disregard, 

as if they were certain of their safety and waiting patiently for the Coalition forces to leave.100

The prevailing opinion was that the men were 

Taliban reinforcements, assembled from villages 

throughout the region, preparing for a counterattack that failed to materialize after the fatal 

morning defeat.101

Later that afternoon, the Marines were able to 

vent their frustrations over the growing crowd south 

of the border. A large hill mass north of the objective area overlooked Haji Wakil. On one slope, the 

enemy had inscribed “Taliban Pass” using white 

rocks. When A-10 aircraft destroyed the inscription with a 25mm cannon, Captain Bitonti likened 

the scene to “watching the eraser tool on [Microsoft] Paint.”102 The Marines cheered, but the Taliban were “livid, jumping around and slamming 

their fists on the ground.”103 Another slope held 

the image of the Taliban flag with an accompanying inscription; however, a friendly observation 

post was located nearby, and the site was left intact. 

Later that afternoon, insurgent activity escalated, with occasional teams of two enemy fighters 

emerging from buildings to take potshots at the 

Marines. Once night fell, scattered engagements 

of growing intensity occurred across the Marines’ 

frontage.104 Originally, the combined task force 

was to remain in the objective area for a second 

day to clear Haji Wakil, but element leaders reckoned that the most important part of the mission was accomplished and that lingering any 

longer would tempt fate. The Coalition had suffered two casualties by that point, and the force 

had gone without sleep for 36 hours. Moreover, 

Haji Wakil was larger and more complex than the 

bazaar; the plan for Haji Wakil was not as well 

developed; and maintaining command and control would be difficult.105

At the conclusion of the clearing operation, 

1st Platoon, under Lieutenant Bradley, escorted 

Task Force 210 to an extraction point, located 

about four kilometers from the objective area.106

The British were lifted out by helicopter around 

midnight. After confirmation of the commandos’ 

extraction, Task Force Highlander began its own 

move from Bahram Chah. Before leaving, however, the Marines destroyed the Taliban flag on 

the nearby hillside.107

Task Force Highlander returned along the same 

route it had used to enter. The convoy departed by 

echelon, in reverse order of its arrival, while the 

cannon platoon covered its withdrawal with smoke 

rounds.108 The only thing slowing the Marines’ 

exit was the recovery of abandoned, inoperable 

armored vehicles from a platoon that had guarded 

the corridor during the raid.109

The convoy reached the LSA around 0500 

hours on 31 October. Alpha and Bravo Companies quickly established a southward facing screen 

in front of the assembly area.110 While unit leaders participated in an operational debriefing, the 

Marines attended to their vehicles, weapons, equipment, and personal gear, but also found time to 

get much needed rest. The following morning, 

Task Force Highlander began to collapse the LSA. 
33

Over the next two days, the support and then the 

assault elements returned to their home stations.111

The raid on Bahram Chah was considered an 

unmitigated success. While no Marines had been 

injured, official press releases reported that Coalition forces had killed between 15 and 25 insurgents. Reports also acknowledged that those 

numbers did not include dead or wounded fighters that the enemy might have retrieved during 

the prolonged action.112 Other sources, which did 

account for those losses, estimated that the number of enemy dead might have been more than 

70.113 In addition to seizing nearly 27 metric tons 

of ammonium nitrate—enough to arm 2,000 

IEDs—the raid force also recovered 60 cases of 

.50-caliber machine-gun ammunition, 22 IEDs, 

and numerous artillery shells, automatic weapons, 

and assorted ammunition. Drug-related materials 

confiscated included 40 kilograms of opium, 500 

liters of acid, and 2,000 kilograms of precursor 

chemicals used to refine narcotics.114

In November 2010, 3d LAR, under Lieutenant 

Colonel Kenneth R. Kassner, relieved Task Force 

Highlander. As Lieutenant Colonel Leonard had 

Operation Steel Dawn II

In late October 2010, Coalition forces from Regional Command Southwest (RC-Southwest) raided the bazaar at Bahram Chah, which served as a Taliban logistics base along the southwestern 

border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Task Force 210, a conglomerate of British and Afghan special operations forces, comprised the assault element. As the operation’s main effort, 

Task Force 210’s initial mission was to insert under the cover of darkness and seize the bazaar. 

The 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (1st LAR/Task Force Highlander) served as 

the security element. Its role was to conduct a simultaneous road march to Bahram Chah, to 

link up with Task Force 210 at sunrise, and then to secure the objective area by cordoning off 

villages to the northeast and southwest of the bazaar. This would enable Task Force 210 to 

focus on searching for contraband and intelligence rather than fighting off insurgents. 

The support element was primarily drawn from other I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) 

units. It included a platoon from 3d Combat Engineer Battalion, which accompanied Task Force 

Highlander and helped negate obstacles in the convoy’s path. A groupment of light howitzers 

and rocket artillery from 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, eliminated enemy fighting positions along 

the route and in the objective area. Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 3’s Landing Support Platoon and Motor Transport Bravo Company provided food, water, fuel, and ammunition as well as recovered and repaired damaged vehicles during the operation. Marine Wing 

Support Squadron 373 established a forward arming and refueling point. Operating from this 

location, pilots and aircrews from Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466, Marine Medium 

Tiltrotor Squadron 365, and Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 provided logistical, 

medical evacuation, and close air support to the ground forces. Close air support included the 

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232, flying from the Kandahar International Airport, and U.S. 

Air Force Rockwell B-1 Lancer bombers, Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt attack bombers, 

and Lockheed AC-130 Spectre gunships. U.S. Army Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were 

also on hand in case medical evacuations were required. 

The raid was an unmitigated success and, according to Major General Richard P. Mills, commander of I MEF and RC-SW, it had a significant impact on the enemy’s warfighting ability. In 

addition to killing between 15 and 25 insurgents, Coalition forces seized nearly 27 metric tons 

of ammonium nitrate, 60 cases of .50-caliber machine gun ammunition, 22 IEDs, and numerous artillery shells, automatic weapons, and assorted ammunition, as well as 40 kilograms of 

opium, 500 liters of acid, and 2,000 kilograms of precursor chemicals used to refine narcotics. 

No Marines were injured during the operation.
34

prophesized, Coalition forces returned to Bahram 

Chah in March 2011. The 3d LAR spent three days 

in the infamous border town during Operation 

Rawhide II. The Marines destroyed the bazaar, 

killed about 50 insurgents, and sustained minimal casualties.115

At the end of March 2011, Major General Mills 

turned command of RC-Southwest over to Major 

General John A. Toolan. After returning to the 

United States, Mills described Coalition efforts 

to deny sanctuary to the enemy and to “fight him 

on ground of our choosing” as having a “significant impact.”116

In a series of fairly aggressive movements 

up around the Sangin area and south against 

the border in Bahram Chah, we kept pressure on his lines of supply, kept pressure on 

his forces as they really tried to move to find 

areas to rest and relax in. We had some significant gains against him in that way and 

began to see some of his forces begin to 

crumble. As the supply lines were cut, we 

got excellent intelligence that showed us it 

was impacting him in the fighting holes. 

He was running out of money. He was 

running out of equipment, he was running 

out of ammunition. We saw that in things 

like him digging up old IEDs to attempt 

to reuse them on the battlefield. Things he 

would not have done had he had a warehouse full of them sitting somewhere. We 

saw him saving his expended ammunition in 

order to repack his rounds. Things like that 

showed that he was having supply difficulties. We had very good intel that showed his 

subordinate commanders were also selling 

Defense Imagery 379624, photo by SSgt Jeremy Ross 

Marines with 3d LAR scan the hills of the Bahram Chah valley for an insurgent mortar spotter during Operation Rawhide 

II on 16 March. Throughout the four-day raid on the key insurgent trafficking hub on the Pakistan border, insurgent spotters attempted to creep over the hill to call in fire on Marine positions.
35

personal equipment, such as cars in order 

to pay their troops. Again, something he 

would not have done had he had access to 

the resources that he had at one point in 

time. So I think the pressure on him, the 

constant pressure, and the ability to fight 

him on ground of our choosing had a significant impact on his success.117

Epilogue

Despite those gains, Bahram Chah continued 

to serve as a Taliban logistics center in southwestern Afghanistan. One factor contributing 

to the site’s staying power was the enemy’s ability to seek sanctuary in nearby Pakistan. Major 

General Toolan lamented, “. . . it’s like I can’t 

shut the water off, I just keep mopping up the 

floor. If I could turn the water off in Pakistan, 

it would be a lot better.”118 The Pakistani Army’s 

XII Corps was of little help on the southern side 

of the border because its government was preoccupied with a separatist movement in Balochistan, Pakistan. 

Another factor was the aggressive withdrawal of 

American forces from Afghanistan, which began 

in July 2011 and then accelerated in 2012.119 As 

strategic priorities shifted, Task Force Leatherneck focused on training, advising, and turning 

operating areas over to Afghan security forces.120

Major General Charles M. Gurganus, who followed Major General Toolan as commander of 

RC-Southwest, defined success during his tenure 

“as setting the conditions for the Afghans to take 

over their own security, their own government, 

Defense Imagery 268243, photo by Cpl Jeremy Fasci

MajGen Richard P. Mills and SgtMaj Micheal P. Barrett uncase the unit’s colors during a transfer of authority ceremony 

at Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province.
36

and then they have an opportunity to decide what 

to do with it.”121 Afghani Lieutenant Colonel 

Mohammad Rasul Qandahari, who commanded 

an Afghanistan Border Police battalion situated 

along the southern Helmand River, conceded that 

he and his men would need more manpower and 

larger weapons before they could hope to push 

southward into enemy territory.122

Note

Marine Corps History 1, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 6–22. 

Reprinted with permission from Marine Corps History.

About the Author

Colonel Nathan S. Lowrey, USMCR (Ret), is a historian with the Joint History Office. Colonel Lowrey previously served the History Division for a 

number of years as a historian, deputy director, 

and as a member of its Individual Marine Augment (IMA) detachment. He is the author of the 

acclaimed History Division monograph From the 

Sea: U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2002 (2011).

Endnotes

1. Associated Press, “Rumsfeld Declares Major 

Combat Over in Afghanistan,” Fox News, 1 

May 2003.

2. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, 

“Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency 

in Afghanistan,” Orbis 51, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 

72, 81–82, 84.

3. Jeffrey A. Dressler, Securing Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy, Afghanistan Report 2 (Washington, DC: Institute 

for the Study of War, 2009), 7, 33–34.

4. Ann Scott Tyson, “Marines’ Afghanistan Plan 

Sparks Debate,” Washington Post, 12 October 

2007, A-14.

5. ISAF Joint Command-Afghanistan, “Regional 

Command Southwest Stands Up in Afghanistan,” Resolute Support News, 14 June 2010.

6. Dressler, Securing Helmand, 13; I MEF Navy 

Unit Commendation recommendation, 26 July 

2012 (Military Awards Branch [MilAwdsBr], 

Headquarters Marine Corps [HQMC], Quantico, VA); and Sgt Stuart R. Sanford intvw 

with Maj Beth Wolney, 8 February 2011 (Oral 

History Collection [Oral HistColl]). All oral 

history materials cited in this work can be 

found at the Gray Research Center (GRC), 

Quantico, VA.

7. MajGen Richard P. Mills intvw with Dr. 

Kimberly Kagan, 2 May 2011 (Oral Hist

Coll).

8. “Largest Drugs Bazaar Raided,” PakTribune, 

31 May 2005; and Waheed, “Afghan Forces 

Destroy Country’s Largest Drug Bazaar,” 

Afghan Warrior (blog), 5 June 2005.

9. Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Police Chief Says 

Smugglers Helped Taliban with Ambush,” 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 October 2005.

10. “Afghanistan Raids Drug Bazaar Near Pakistan Border,” Voice of America News, 11 

April 2006; Daniel Cooney, “U.S. Warns 

Afghanistan Violence Will Worsen,” ABC 

News, 3 April 2006; and Reuters, “Afghans 

Seize Four Tonnes of Drugs, Arrest Seven,” 

Afghanistan News Center, 12 April 2006.

11. “Special Boat Service Operations—Hunting 

Mullah Dadullah,” Elite UK Forces, 12 May 

2007.

12. “Seventy Taliban Said Killed in Afghanistan,” 

Reuters, 15 October 2008; “Up to 70 Taliban Killed in Afghan Strike: Local Official,” 

Agence France-Presse, 15 October 2008; and 

“70 Taliban Killed in Afghan Strike,” Daily 

Times, 16 October 2008.

13. Sebastian Abbot, “Taliban Sneak Past Marines 

in Southern Afghanistan,” Associated Press, 

16 December 2009.

14. Maj John R. Bitonti II intvw with Col N. S. 

Lowrey, 7 February 2011 (Oral HistColl); Maj 

John R. Bitonti II award, 2 December 2010 

(MilAwdsBr, HQMC, Quantico, VA); and 

Sgt Dean Davis, “Charlie Company Marines 

Travel Far and Wide to Reach Afghan Locals,” 

Marine Corps News, 4 June 2010.
37

15. Capt Adrian B. Hascamp intvw with Col N. 

S. Lowrey, 7 February 2011 (Oral HistColl); 

LtCol Scott D. Leonard intvw with Col N. 

S. Lowrey, 8 February 2011 (Oral HistColl); 

Capt Adrian B. Hascamp award recommendation, 2 December 2010 (MilAwdsBr, 

HQMC, Quantico, VA); and LtCol Scott D. 

Leonard award recommendation, 6 June 2011 

(MilAwdsBr, HQMC, Quantico, VA).

16. ISAF Joint Command Headquarters, “Joint 

Patrol Discovers 725 kg of Hashish,” 22 

March 2010.

17. “June 2 Airpower Summary: KC-135s Provide Fuel Support,” U.S. Air Force News, 4 

June 2010.

18. Thomas Harding, “Special Forces Commando 

Took on Taliban Single-handedly,” Telegraph, 

24 May 2011.

19. Ibid.

20. ISAF Joint Command Headquarters, “IED 

Factory, Materials Destroyed in Southern 

Helmand,” 21 September 2010.

21. Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 

(VMM-365) Command Chronology, hereafter ComdC, October 2010 (GRC, Quantico, VA), Part 2, 3.

22. Leonard intvw.

23. 1stLt Thomas F. Clauss III intvw with Col 

N. S. Lowrey, 7 February 2011 (Oral HistColl); and Capt Nicholas S. Rapkoch intvw 

with LtCol R. S. Sellards, 7 February 2011 

(Oral HistColl).

24. Capt Nicolas S. Rapkoch award recommendation, 27 December 2010 (MilAwdsBr, 

HQMC, Quantico, VA).

25. Leonard intvw.

26. Ibid.

27. Rapkoch intvw.

28. 1st MarDiv ComdC, 16 October–15 November 2010 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), Section 2, 

Fires; and Rapkoch intvw.

29. 1st MarDiv, Task Force Leatherneck After 

Action Report for Operation Enduring Freedom 10.1–11.1, 24 February 2011 (GRC, 

Archives, Quantico, VA), 68.

30. LtCol Adolfo Garcia Jr. intvw with Col N. 

S. Lowrey, 9 February 2011 (Oral HistColl).

31. 1st Battalion, 11th Marines ComdC, 1 May–

21 November 2010 (Marine Corps Heritage 

Center [MCHC], Quantico, VA), Part 2, 6–44; 

LtCol Adolfo Garcia Jr. comments on draft 

ms, 10 March 2015 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); 

and Garcia intvw.

32. Maj David J. Grabow award recommendation, 14 February 2011 (MilAwdsBr, HQMC, 

Quantico, VA); and 1st Battalion, 11th Marines 

ComdC, 35–39.

33. Ibid., 38.

34. Garcia intvw.

35. Bitonti intvw; and LCpl Adam B. Ramirez 

intvw with Col N. S. Lowrey, 8 February 2011 

(Oral HistColl).

36. Garcia intvw; and 1st Battalion, 11th Marines 

ComdC, 23, 25.

37. Leonard intvw.

38. Garcia comments on draft ms.

39. Bitonti intvw; and GySgt Aaron J. Abrams 

intvw with Col N. S. Lowrey, 8 February 2011 

(Oral HistColl).

40. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Part 2, Fires.

41. Abrams intvw; and GySgt Aaron J. Abrams 

award recommendation, 2 December 2010 

(MilAwdsBr, HQMC, Quantico, VA).

42. Maj Jon A. Custis award recommendation, 

15 March 2011 (MilAwdsBr, HQMC, Quantico, VA).

43. Cpl Derek B. Carlson, “Afghan, Coalition 

Forces Kill Insurgents; Seize Drugs, Weapons 

during Raid,” Marine Corps News, 1 November 2010.

44. Leonard intvw; and Maj Jon A. Custis intvw 

with Maj Beth Wolney, 7 February 2011 (Oral 

HistColl).

45. Cpl Paul D. Zellner, “Wrecker Crew Keeps 

Convoy Rolling during Operation Steel Dawn 

II,” Defense Imagery, 13 November 2010.

46. 1st Battalion, 11th Marines ComdC, 13, 23; 

and Garcia intvw.

47. Cpl Paul D. Zellner, “Marines Provide Logistics Support to Coalition Forces during Operation Steel Dawn II,” Defense Imagery, 11 

November 2010.
38

48. Leonard intvw.

49. Carlson, “Afghan, Coalition Forces Kill 

Insurgents.”

50. Image courtesy Defense Imagery (337483) 

in Carlson, “Afghan, Coalition Forces Kill 

Insurgents”; and VMM-365 ComdC, 3.

51. Carlson, “Afghan, Coalition Forces Kill 

Insurgents.”

52. Abrams intvw; and Abrams award. On 23 

and 26 October 2010, Task Force Leatherneck executed dynamic strikes against 

compounds associated with the production 

of IEDs, destroying buildings and their 

contents, according to the 1st MarDiv 

ComdC.

53. Rapkoch intvw; and Abrams intvw.

54. Ibid.

55. Clauss intvw; and MSgt Curtis C. Gregory 

intvw with Col N. S. Lowrey, 8 February 2011 

(Oral HistColl).

56. Rapkoch intvw; and Ramirez intvw.

57. Ibid.

58. Gregory intvw; and Custis award.

59. Maj David J. Grabow intvw with LtCol R. 

S. Sellards, 9 February 2011 (Oral HistColl); 

Garcia intvw; and Grabow award.

60. Leonard intvw; and Mills intvw.

61. Abrams intvw.

62. Rapkoch intvw; Clauss intvw; Abrams intvw; 

and Rapkoch award.

63. Rapkoch award; and Rapkoch intvw.

64. 1st Battalion, 11th Marines ComdC, 25; Rapkoch award; and Rapkoch intvw.

65. Rapkoch award; Garcia intvw; and Leonard 

intvw.

66. 1st Battalion, 11th Marines ComdC, 36.

67. Rapkoch intvw.

68. Ramirez intvw.

69. Sanford intvw.

70. Mills intvw.

71. 1stLt Michael D. Wright award recommendation, 2 December 2010 (MilAwdsBr, HQMC, 

Quantico, VA).

72. Leonard intvw; Bitonti intvw; Gregory intvw; 

and Rapkoch intvw.

73. Rapkoch intvw; Clauss intvw; Abrams intvw; 

Garcia intvw; and 1st Battalion, 11th Marines 

ComdC, 39.

74. Bitonti intvw; and Rapkoch intvw.

75. Mills intvw.

76. Bitonti intvw; and 1stLt Jonathan R. Walaski 

award recommendation, 2 February 2011 

(MilAwdsBr, HQMC, Quantico, VA).

77. Walaski award.

78. Bitonti intvw.

79. Gregory intvw.

80. Abrams intvw.

81. Bitonti intvw; Gregory intvw; and Abrams 

intvw.

82. Abrams intvw.

83. Bitonti intvw.

84. Sanford intvw.

85. Abrams intvw.

86. Sanford intvw; 1stSgt Jon D. Jerome intvw 

with LtCol R. S. Sellards, 7 February 2011 

(Oral HistColl); and 1stSgt Jon D. Jerome 

phone conversation with author.

87. Jerome intvw.

88. Leonard award; Rapkoch intvw; and Jerome 

phone conversation.

89. Custis award.

90. Rapkoch award; and Rapkoch intvw.

91. Jerome intvw.

92. Grabow intvw.

93. Jerome intvw.

94. 1stLt Buck A. Bradley award recommendation, 23 November 2010 (MilAwdsBr, HQMC, 

Quantico, VA).

95. MajGen Richard P. Mills, “Major General 

Richard Mills on Afghanistan” (lecture, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

Washington, DC, 27 April 2011).

96. Clauss intvw; Rapkoch intvw; and Leonard 

intvw.

97. Clauss intvw; Rapkoch intvw; and Leonard 

intvw.

98. Gregory intvw; and Clauss intvw.

99. Bitonti intvw; and Abrams intvw.

100. Abrams intvw.

101. Bitonti intvw; and Leonard intvw.

102. Bitonti intvw.

103. Ibid.
39

104. Abrams intvw; and Gregory intvw.

105. Rapkoch intvw.

106. Bradley award.

107. Bitonti intvw.

108. Clauss intvw; and 1st Battalion, 11th Marines 

ComdC, 36.

109. Rapkoch intvw; and Abrams intvw.

110. Clauss intvw.

111. Leonard intvw.

112. “Officials in Afghanistan Provide Details of 

Operations,” DOD News, 1 June 2010; and 

ISAF IJC Headquarters, “Afghan, Coalition 

Forces Wrap Up Helmand Clearing Operation,” DOD News, 8 November 2010.

113. Leonard award.

114. Carlson, “Afghan, Coalition Forces Kill 

Insurgents.”

115. Sgt Jeremy Ross, “3rd LAR Strikes Key Insurgent Border Hub during Operation Raw Hide 

II,” II MEF Marine Expeditionary Force, 19 

March 2011.

116. Mills intvw.

117. Ibid.

118. Jim Garamone, “Pakistan, Corruption Affect 

South, West Afghanistan,” American Forces 

Press Service, 24 April 2012.

119. CNN Wire Staff, “Afghan Withdrawal More 

‘Aggressive’ than Military Proposed,” CNN 

News, 24 June 2011; Chris Carroll, “As Marines 

Leave Helmand, Focus Turns to Training 

Those Left Behind,” Stars and Stripes, 11 July 

2012; and Dan Lamothe, “Taliban Make 

Gains as Marines Take Backseat,” Marine 

Corps Times, 29 October 2012.

120. Robert Burns, “Afghanistan: Marines to Wind 

Down Combat in 2012,” Huffington Post, 26 

November 2011.

121. Dan Lamothe, “Marine General: Lethal Aid 

Entering Helmand Is Top Concern,” Military 

Times, 18 April 2013.

122. Ibid.
40

LCpl Kyle Carpenter in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

Defense Imagery 140609-M-AB123-006
41

“It’s Your Medal”: 

Read Kyle Carpenter’s 

Inspiring Speech 

to Marjah Vets

by Hope Hodge Seck

Marine Corps Times, February 2015

On 13 February 2010, Marines assaulted the Taliban hub of Marjah in Southern Afghanistan in 

what Coalition leaders would title Operation 

Moshtarak, from a Dari word meaning together, 

or joint. The attack would be the largest military 

operation since the start of the war in Afghanistan nine years earlier. It would take longer than 

expected and take a greater toll in casualties than 

anticipated. 

According to a tally by Marjahveterans.com, 

78 U.S. and British troops would lose their lives 

in Marjah and in support of Operation Moshtarak. But the operation would also be a success. 

Coalition forces ultimately flushed out insurgents 

from their stronghold and returned greater safety 

and stability to the region’s population. 

From the Battle of Marjah also came one of 

the Marine Corps’ greatest stories of heroism out 

of Afghanistan. Medically retired Marine Corporal Kyle Carpenter would receive the Medal 

of Honor for throwing himself on a grenade to 

shield a friend and fellow Marine from the blast 

during the 2010 Marjah assault. 
42

The Speech

On 13 February, the five-year anniversary of 

the launch of Operation Moshtarak, Carpenter 

addressed several hundred Marjah veterans at the 

National Museum of the Marine Corps. Here, as 

accurately transcribed as possible from a recording, is his deeply moving and personal speech: 

With this short amount of time I have to 

speak to you tonight, I couldn’t possibly sum 

up the historical battle of Marjah. 

I am comforted, though, by the fact that 

the men in this room don’t need a summary 

because you were right there beside me. 

You felt the incredible heat of a 100 percent humidity day and the cool waters of 

a muddy canal. You felt the weight of 100 

pounds of gear, ammo and water at your 

back, the weight of knowing as Marines 

we are and forever will be the first line of 

defense for our loved ones, our nation and 

above all, freedom. 

I stand here today extremely proud of 

you all. I’m proud of the job you did in the 

face of what most cannot even fathom. I am 

more than honored to call you friends, fellow Marines and brothers. You stand as an 

example for others and for what’s best for 

not only our nation but the rest of the world. 

The United States military member is a 

beacon of hope in dark places for suffering 

people around the world. Many have paid 

the ultimate sacrifice. Many gave their limbs 

to help people have lives free of oppression 

and full of freedom and prosperity. 

Even though there are dark days and have 

been dark days since our deployment, and 

long nights, remember what [U.S. Army] 

Gen. [George S.] Patton said: “It is foolish 

and wrong to mourn the men who died; 

rather, we should thank God that such 

men lived.” 

Be proud of who you are. Be proud 

of what you did in that country. You are 

alive today and have been blessed with this 

opportunity of life. Don’t waste it. Live a 

life worth living, full of meaning and purpose, and one that will make the fallen who 

are looking down on us proud. 

For the families of the fallen, Blue Star 

families, active duty families, retired, and 

all military families and service members, 

I thank you for your service.*

 You don’t 

*

 The term blue star family references the service flag dating 

back to World War II that was created for families with servicemembers overseas.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 

by Cpl Michael C. Guinto 

Retired U.S. Marine Corps Cpl William Kyle Carpenter 

poses for his official Medal of Honor photo on 18 June 2014.
43

hear enough, “I appreciate your sacrifice 

and what you go through here at home or 

half a world away deployed.” 

To everyone here tonight, I thank you 

for having me. I’m extremely honored to 

stand in front of you and I’m very humbled that you wanted me to speak to you 

here tonight. 

Marines, I’m proud to have worn the 

same uniform as you. 

Never forget that when no one else 

would raise their right hand, you did. You 

sacrificed and became part of our nation’s 

history and our Marine Corps legacy for 

taking part in the historical battleground 

of Marjah. Thank you so much. I really do 

appreciate it.

[Carpenter left the podium, but returned 

a moment later.] 

I really struggled with the idea that I 

would, not have to, but most likely be encouraged to wear my medal. And I say struggled 

because, let me just say that I don’t want to 

wear this. I don’t like wearing this. 

But I do because, you know, if I can 

inform one person of what we do and what 

we’re about, or what we sacrificed over there, 

I do it for that. I wear it for all of you. 

And I just hope that you know that no 

matter where I’m wearing it, it’s not because 

I want to. It’s putting on a good face, trying to attach something good to the Marine 

Corps, to contribute and help people understand our side of life, what we go through, 

what we’re about. And everything we’ve 

done from past generations until now, the 

great job we’ve done to keep our freedom, 

to keep our men alive. 

So I wore it tonight for you. Feel free to 

come up after and touch it, whatever you 

like. It’s your medal.

Note

Marine Corps Times, 16 February 2015, 21. Reprinted 

with permission from the Marine Corps Times.

About the Author

Hope Hodge Seck was a staff writer with the 

Marine Corps Times from 2013 to 2015.
44

MSgt Hector Reyes (left), team chief, Georgia Liaison Team, 

and Sgt Christopher Holm examine the rooftop of a building in a simulated Afghanistan village. Both Marines are 

with 2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company and are assisting with training the Georgian 32d Light Infantry Battalion.

Defense Imagery 310186, photo by MSgt Grady Fontana
45

Interview: 

Captain Jonathan A. 

Hutchison

by Marine Corps History Division

Marine Corps field historian Major Robert F. Williams III interviewed Captain Jonathan A. Hutchison, 1st Brigade air officer, 2d Air Naval Gunfire 

Liaison Company (2d ANGLICO), Marine Headquarters Group, on 7 May 2011 in Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, concerning 

Hutchison’s 2010–11 deployment to Afghanistan. 

The following has been edited from the original transcript for space constraints in this work.

Williams: Would you define what it means to be 

the 1st Brigade air officer in this environment?

Hutchison: For 1st Brigade, we’re kind of partnered with Task Force Helmand so all of our teams 

are with UK advisor units who are supporting the 

ANA [Afghan National Army] within Task Force 

Helmand anywhere from Nad Ali [District] south 

up to Nez north and with one team in the upper 

Garesh Valley supporting an ODO [Organizational Development Office] mission.

So, a lot of what I do is briefing Task Force 

Helmand and its supporting units on what sort of 

American aviation capabilities exist and how we 

can utilize those assets to further support their 

units in the ANA that we’re supporting.

Williams: Now, when it comes to—there’s a 

unique aspect here—again, ALCO’s [air launch 
46

control officer’s] job is always to act as the liaison, a translator, if you will. But, when it comes 

to the UK and the interactions I’ve had with various British air officers, in particular, rotary, specifically. They have a different kind of mentality, 

a different mindset and they’re not used to being 

controlled from a ground controller.

Hutchison: Yes.

Williams: I mean, if there are other aspects . . . 

Hutchison: There are—

Williams: . . . that you could speak to . . .

Hutchison: There is a very distinct dynamic 

where their Apaches [attack helicopters] are used 

to CCAs, close combat attacks, as opposed to a 

close air support mindset. So, there has been quite 

a bit of education process on educating the UK, 

their teams, and their aircrew on how a Marine 

Corps JTAC [joint terminal attack controller] of 

FAC [forward air controller] will operate. Their 

Apaches are definitely used to more of getting 

suggestions or sort of guidance from guys on the 

ground as opposed to actually being positively 

controlled and deconflicted from other assets.*

Additionally, they’re not used to sort of a combined arms type of mentality. They’re used to being 

the only fire support asset on station where they’re 

not having to deconflict themselves from mortars 

and direct fire and that sort of thing. So, there’s 

been a big role in educating them and in teaching 

them that fire support and deconfliction and what 

our teams are actually trying to do for them and 

*

 In this instance, the term deconflict means to reduce the risk 

of collision between aircraft, airborne weaponry, etc., in an 

area by coordinating their movements.

what added benefit they have with actually a FCT 

[fire control team] as opposed to just a JTAC.

Williams: Now, are there other—now, I was going 

to ask to kind of—when you go through the walkthrough of your predeployment and deployment 

experiences if there is a way you could kind of 

comment on some of the touch points with the 

Coalition forces. Granted, you opened up with 

Task Force Helmand. That seems to be the lion’s 

share of your interaction responsibilities here in 

this AO [area of operations], but as we go back 

into some of the predeployment training, again, 

our mentality and our mindset, our culture is 

dramatically different in some regard to some of 

the Services that we’re trying to support, a.k.a. 

the whole point behind ANGLICO in the first 

place. But in this case, the Marine Corps itself has 

grown well outside our traditional boundaries. 

We’re now running a coalition, which is a whole 

different animal.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 

U.S. Marine Corps Capt Johnathan A. Hutchison.
47

So, I don’t know if it’s better to go back and 

walk through some of the predeployment touch 

points, or if you’d like and prefer to just deal with it 

here in the deployment kind of setting, and speak 

to some of the pronounced interactions. 

Hutchison: The issue with predeployment workup 

is I didn’t arrive to the unit until late July. So, the 

only workup I did was out to the [Fort Irwin] 

National Training Center [California]. I went out 

there as the air officer and sort of—that was my 

first exposure to our ANGLICO teams.

So, essentially that workup was only for me to 

find out what the team’s strengths and weaknesses 

were prior to deploying and what we could do to 

turn some of our weaknesses into our strengths 

prior to this deployment. That was all U.S. Army 

with a little bit of Coalition air. But, again, the 

focus was mainly on what our team’s strengths 

and weaknesses were from my perspective.

Following that, the last workup we did was a 

self-contained currency surface and air shoot in 

Camp Lejeune [North Carolina]. Again, that was 

just ANGLICO with some indirect fire assets from 

10th Marines and a Marine squadron down at 

[Marine Corps Air Station] Beaufort [South Carolina]. So, I had very little Coalition interaction 

prior to coming to Task Force Helmand due to 

my late arrival at the unit.

Williams: Well then, coming into the deployment 

itself, once you hit the AO, had you had prior—I 

mean, when you were mentioning your background, 

you mentioned the two [McDonnell Douglas F/A18] Hornet deployments. Was there any opportunity for you to have Joint Forces exposure?

Hutchison: There was, but not UK specific. I 

had done some exercises on the aviation side of 

the house with [the] Thais, with the Singapore 

Air Force, with the Philippines, but not necessarily with the UK and definitely not from a ground 

FAC perspective; always from an air centric perspective. There was a big learning curve once 

we got to Lash[kar Gah], was where I was first 

based out of at the Task Force Headquarters there. 

There was a steep learning curve on getting up 

to speed on how the UK operated and the differences between the UK and the Marine Corps. 

There is a big police training effort out of Lash[kar 

Gah], but that’s also where Task Force Helmand’s 

headquarters is. And when we first arrived, that 

is where 1st Brigade Headquarters was located at.

Williams: Well, given that you had as great an 

opening in terms of the predeployment side of 

the house, you sort of hit the ground running the 

minute you got to Lash[kar Gah]. Are there some 

things you could kind of speak to that would kind 

of define the deployment in this kind of regard? 

Just experiences or little . . .

Hutchison: When we first arrived to Lash[kar 

Gah], I was immediately assigned to go augment 

one of our firepower control teams that was working with a UK-only team in Nez south patrols platoon. So, my first month of the deployment was 

not necessarily in an air officer role for the entire 

brigade. It was spent with a UK maneuver element 

inside of a compound providing them with fire 

support capability. So, from learning how the UK 

operates, actually how their ground forces—that 

was actually very, very beneficial. You spend the 

first month with the maneuver element and got to 

see how their planning process actually works on 

the ground, what sort of concerns a ground commander has, and how his train of thought may be 

a little bit different from a Marine Corps ground 

force commander.

Also got a lot of experience directly working 
48

with UK Apaches. So, I got to see first-hand 

the different information they were looking for 

and different information that they required, as 

opposed to: one, being a Marine aviator, what I 

was expecting to get from a JTAC; and then also, 

from doing the bulk of my workup training with 

Marine assets and what they were looking for from 

me as a JTAC. So, that was extremely beneficial 

to first-hand knowledge there and then, after that 

month, to bring that back and pass that information on to my teams and kind of give some guidance and some TTPs [tactics, techniques, and 

procedures] that I learned while I was out there to 

help further their success for the next six months 

of our deployment.

Williams: One of the interesting things—and 

again, I mention to the room before that I also 

interview our Coalition partners to understand 

more about what they see in terms of the Marine 

experience given they’re a part of it. But, the comments are often that some of our mentality, some 

of our culture is a little hard to take; the “get it 

done” kind of mentality. And the British, especially when it comes to the Marine Corps planning 

process, are approached while the methodology 

makes sense to them, but they have a different 

way that they go about making decisions.

Hutchison: Yes.

Williams: Was there any exposure or interaction you had on that—while you learned how to 

work the UK Apaches, were you also learning a 

little bit of how to work the UK officer and the 

enlisted corps?

Hutchison: Yes. There was a wide or eye-opening 

experience with those guys, seeing their different 

approach to the planning process and some may 

say the lack of approach to a planning process; 

much more laid back, much more, not necessarily “these are the wickets we need to hit during 

the process” as more of a “well, what is our”—

Williams: It’s collegial.

Hutchison: Yeah, exactly. Yes, sir. That’s 100 

percent correct.

Williams: So, how did you react to that? [Laughing]

Hutchison: There’s a lot of, especially in the 

liaison role, is adapting to what they’re looking 

for but also taking the key elements of our planning process and making sure we’re hitting those 

required elements and kind of molding our process to how they’re used to operating and to bring 

out the pluses and minuses of both systems to, in 

the end, ensure that we have a good product prior 

to stepping out the door.

Williams: You mentioned that was one eye-opener. 

I mean, is there a way to describe it or at least put 

it in some kind of longitudinal perspective?

Hutchison: To be honest with you, the entire 

month was pretty eye-opening. I mean it seemed, 

especially from a—from the JTAC perspective, 

prior to stepping out the door, is that there wasn’t 

much of a fire support plan, integrated plan. It was 

more of, “Hey, we’re going to leave tomorrow on 

this and go seize this compound and we’ll just—

we’ll ask for—if we need air, we’ll just come up 

and ask for an immediate request—an immediate, 

priority request for aviation support.” It wasn’t so 

much preplanned targets, integration of surface 

fires. It was more of, “Well, if we need it, we’ll just 

ask for some immediate air support. We’ll figure 

it out from there.”
49

So, getting them to understand the process of, 

“Well, if you tell me, ‘Hey, where are we going? 

What are some of the historical firing points? 

What is the enemy’s composition out there? What 

is the commander’s intent for fire support? What 

are his—what is his target priority list?’ Those 

sort of things. You give me that information, I 

can develop you a much more responsive and prepared fire support plan as opposed to just, ‘Well, 

we’ll figure it out as things sort of happen on the 

battlefield’.” I mean everyone understands that 

no plan survives contact with the enemy, but it’s 

nice to have a plan to deviate from as opposed to 

already going in and planning on deviating.

Williams: And I appreciate you adding some insight 

and some color to that because, well, we’re not trying to denigrate anyone, it’s just we’ve learned an 

approach toward doing business and a key facet 

of the role that you played here is to help translate that back and forth.

Hutchison: Right.

Williams: But sometimes in shaping—the shaping operations of our audience, the UK experience has been very interesting. And they openly 

comment to it.

Hutchison: Right.

Williams: They recognize— I mean I think sometimes they even have fun with this deployment 

to a degree because we’re an easy group to bait.

Hutchison: I would agree with that. They enjoy 

that tremendously.

Williams: [Laughing] But, when it came then 

to—you mentioned the first month was a bit of 

an eye-opener, beyond that point, as you—did you 

get out of the FCT team and then start becoming 

more and more—

Hutchison: At that point, in mid-December, I went 

back to brigade headquarters. At that time, though 

the brigade headquarters was in the process of transitioning from Lash[kar Gah] at Task Force Helmand Headquarters down to where we currently 

are at Camp Tombstone and Shorabak, in support of the 3/215 Corps, Afghan National Army.

Williams: Is it direct support?

Hutchison: It is. Absolutely.

Williams: Now, I’d imagine that’s a dramatically 

different kind of—

Hutchison: That was—it’s dramatically different. In conjunction [with] moving our brigade 

headquarters to Tombstone, we also moved one 

of our SALTs [supporting arms liaison teams], 

SALT Bravo, down to Nad Ali South, with the 

SALT headquarters being at [Forward Operating Base] Shawqat, which is Nad Ali South headquarters. And then two fire power control teams; 

one at Kalang and one at, initially at— They just 

recently located to Samsor, which are—and those 

units are in direct support of the ANA Tolay that’s 

down in Nad Ali South.*

Williams: Now, given that we’ve commented to 

what it’s like to work with the Brits in your capacity, are there some things and some observations 

that you can speak to with respect to getting starting and interacting with the Afghan National?

*

 Within the ANA structure, a tolay is a company-size unit.
50

Hutchison: The Afghan National Army I would 

say that at times has been very frustrating. But, I 

was actually—there has been surprising amount 

of—they’re not as bad as I thought they were going 

to be, for lack of a better word. There are—their 

senior—some of their senior leadership, talking 

about the kandak commanders and tolay commanders, are actually pretty good. And they obviously have a vested interest since this is their home 

country in ensuring the security of their country. 

The issue is we come here for six, seven months, 

maybe a year at a time, where this is their life. So 

I rip out of here in June. They are still going to 

be fighting this fight. So, some of their—when it 

comes across as lazy, is not necessarily, in my opinion, the case. It’s more of, “Well, you’re leaving 

in seven months, but I’m going to be here for the 

rest of my life. So, I am going to take—I’m not 

going to rush to make this happen.” There’s more 

of a, “Well, let’s think this through. Let’s see the 

long-term effects. Let’s see what’s going to happen because when you go home in seven months, 

you’re going to get some R&R and some rest and 

that sort of thing where I’m going to continue to 

be here fighting for Afghanistan.” So, I think that 

often gets misconstrued as laziness, where I don’t 

think that that is necessarily the case.

Williams: Well, I think that’s one of the aspects 

of the COIN doctrine and the COIN fight as a 

whole in that the Marine Corps, while we’re often 

referenced as the enemy, understanding and appreciating the need for—we get—definitely get the 

commander part, but the not commander piece 

has applicability, value, and I think the getting it 

part is often wrapped around our ability to show 

restraint and making sure that any fires that are 

brought to bear are done in an appropriate fashion. I’d like to give you an opportunity to comment to that, if you’d like to.

Hutchison: Yeah, to be quite honest with you, a 

lot of our teams that have—SALT Bravo in particular, who’s down there with the ANA has not 

necessarily been a employment of fires lesson. It 

has been a teaching and mentoring role of the 

ANA, of teaching them fire support, teaching 

them battle tracking, teaching them some combat first aid. All of that in order to make their unit 

and their tolay a little bit more self-sustaining and 

improve their overall readiness and how they’re 

able to support their security of Afghanistan.

So, I’m trying to think off the top of my head. 

I don’t believe that any of our teams that I can 

think of right now have actually connected and 

employed fires in an offensive manner in support 

of ANA-led operation or patrols. It’s been more 

of mentoring and advising. Our kinetic fires and 

employment have been with our teams that are 

partnered with the British maneuver units.

Williams: Are there other challenges that have 

kind of come out in this kind of an environment 

you’d like to speak to, especially given the responsibilities that you had?

Hutchison: Because obviously working with 

the ANA, there’s obviously the language barrier, 

obviously the cultural barrier, some of the differences between the Afghan culture and the religious aspects that they have. 

I can remember one particular incident and—

where a request for a call for fire came in during the Muslim prayer time. And essentially, the 

request was going unanswered because all of the 

ANA mortar men were conducting their Muslim prayer session. So, that was a very interesting 

wide—very interesting time and a learning experience, to be quite honest with you.

At the time, it probably was not handled in the 

best light. But in the long run, I think the message 
51

got across that, while there has to be a balance 

between our religious faith, their Muslim religious faith, and their culture. There’s also some 

of their ANA soldiers that they are supporting 

that are out on the ground and need their help, 

so we can’t just drop everything during our call 

for prayer. We have to still be ready to support 

the guys on the ground.

Williams: Now, I think this culture has kind of 

exposed us to—one, on the Marine side, it’s far 

more expeditionary in nature, which you’re definitely more inclined to participate in. But, it’s 

more familiar.

Hutchison: Speaking of expeditionary, there also 

was another—we did a couple ANA brigade-size 

operations and it was very— We pride ourselves 

in the Marine Corps of being expeditionary and 

mobile and light and fast and all those sexiness. 

But, it was very interesting to see the amount of 

gear that our Marines were carrying compared to 

the average amount of gear that an Afghan was 

[carrying]. He was much more mobile, much more 

light, much more capable of actually going on a 

three- to four-hour patrol, helicopter inserted, 

helicopter extract than the amount of gear that 

our average Marine or British advisor was carrying. So, that was actually pretty eye-opening.

Williams: And the only—well, I was going to say 

as an infantry officer and aviator, coming from 

an aviator, that’s a very interesting comment. But, 

all that facetiousness aside, we have a lot more 

requirements. You know, they have to wear PPE 

[personal protective equipment]. You have to— 

I mean I look at a Marine rifle squad today and 

I don’t recognize half the— They’ve got more 

gear than you can shake a stick at. EM [electronic 

measures] gear. The CID [combat identification] 

threat out of here is considerable and it’s definitely 

telling. But, in interviewing a lot of the Marines 

associated with those foot movements, they put 

more confidence in their eyeballs than they put 

into the—

Hutchison: Yes. And Talons—

Williams: AOs.

Hutchison: And some of it was PPE but a lot of 

it also was quote/unquote comfort items; maybe 

another set of camis or an extra warming layer or 

additional chow or things like that. Where they, 

the ANA, had actually stripped down much more, 

a lot of their comfort items to allow themselves 

to be more mobile and expeditionary, if you will. 

So, that was—that was pretty darned—

Williams: Well, there’s always something that we 

can learn. I mean, we do pride ourselves on being 

able to accommodate more of that than some. But 

I guess it’s always irrelevant for any time.

Hutchison: Right.

Williams: Were there any other challenges that 

presented themselves?

Hutchison: Kind of on that last one of the points 

originally where Friday is an ANA religious holiday so we’re not— There’s not much patrolling. 

Excuse me. Essentially zero ANA patrolling on 

Fridays, which was a learning experience for some 

of our guys who hadn’t been out here before, but 

also for the British advisors. They would come 

up with a patrolling plan, a patrolling matrix that 

would include a patrol on Friday and the ANA was 

like, “No, we’re not doing that. We don’t patrol 

on Fridays.” So, there was a learning experience 
52

there to go like, ‘Hey, the Fridays are their religious holiday.’ We need to respect that. But what 

we can do is we can use this—what they are willing to do is take classes on Fridays? And we can 

use it as a rest and refit and planning day for ISAF 

and Coalition forces to develop the patrolling 

schedule of the following week. Let’s just move 

that and do that all on Friday when the ANA is 

not going to plan on patrolling or any movements 

outside the wire.” So that was initially a big challenge, especially wanting to do operations or things 

of that nature that would maybe span over a 

Friday.

Williams: I haven’t heard anybody else ever comment to that. I mean I have—it hasn’t—conversations that have gone down that road but I can 

see how that could be a—

Hutchison: Yeah, if you go back and just look at 

our historical sitreps [situation reports], you will 

see Fridays are—Friday through Sunday, I would 

say—are generally slow, but Fridays all my guys. 

No patrols, rest and refit, plan the weekly patrol 

schedule, conducted this class or something to 

that effect.

Williams: Now, when it comes to your successor, what kind of issues—and, again, you mentioned that there might be some complexities with 

respect to identifying specifically who your successor would be or exactly the extent of the role. 

But if there was—I mean and had an opportunity 

to speak with, I think it’s 5th ANGLICOALIC. 

Is it 1st ANGLICO?

Hutchison: [The] 1st ANGLICO. I spoke with 

Major Palihchale [sic] who is the 1st Brigade platoon commander. I’ve also spoken with the 1st 

Brigade air officer since I’m kind of dual rolling 

right now, which is actually a buddy of mine that 

I know. And I would say that [is] their biggest 

challenge. One, they’re bringing a few less bodies 

than we are. So, initially, where we had some guys 

in the reserve at the brigade level, their reserve is 

kind of already being eaten up, falling in on some 

of the missions that we’re on, enduring missions 

that we already have.

But additionally, the 4th Kandak is slated to 

take over some battlespace in Lashkar Gah here 

in mid-June. There’s also a couple other Kandaks 

that are slated under the [ANA’s] 3/215 [Artillery] Corps to start taking over some battle space 

shortly thereafter. So, I would say that their biggest challenge, in my opinion, is going to be what 

fire support is required for that battle space that 

the ANA is to now own and the balance between 

teaching fire support and actually providing fire 

support to the ANAs is going to be tricky. In addition, where do you prioritize because ANGLICO 

itself, 1st Brigade, at most I can make 12 teams for 

2d ANGLICO, 1st Brigade. Twelve fixed would 

be the most I could do. Based on their laydown, I 

think their number is closer to 10 fixed. So, we— 

Now we have to figure out where we’re going to 

prioritize, which kandak and which tolay and how 

are we going to be able to provide them with this 

capability with our limited ANGLICO resources. 

And then something that it seems that a lot of 

Task Force Helmand is struggling with is what 

is the mentor/advisor role going to actually look 

like. What is that— How is that capability going 

to flush out and what will the requirement be for 

fire support in an advising role?

Williams: Well, speaking of advising, what advice 

did you throw in their way? You kind of commented [that] the challenge is going to be how do 

you prioritize everything. Given what you know 

now, what advice would you pass on to them?
53

Hutchison: I’ve been— Obviously passing them 

information on the time schedule for when the 

tolays and kandaks are going to take over battle 

space. And we’re tried to get a priority from Task 

Force Helmand and from the 205th Corps on what 

are their priority kandaks. How do they fall out? 

And maybe go from the role of SALT Breeze and 

SALT Bravo again as an example where they’re 

kind of direct support to that kandak that’s down 

in Nad Ali South. Maybe now our SALTs are still 

direct support to the 205th Corps and when the 

commander, General Shirin Shah decides, “Hey, 

3d Kandak down in Nad Ali South, they’re not 

my priority for the next month or so but the 2d 

Kandak is going to be my priority,” so maybe then 

I— Maybe then it’s easier to move my ANGLICO 

support from Nad Ali South over to the 2d Kandak to be able to still provide that support for the 

commander.

Williams: So try and help them problem-solve.

Hutchison: Exactly, and figure out what their priorities are and then maximize our capability based 

on where their priorities are, as opposed to just 

keeping a team with one kandak, maybe they’re 

a little bit more fluid within 205th Corps. That’s 

kind of my recommendation the 1st ANGLICO 

to look at that.

Williams: Now, all in all, what kind of impact—

and this is where I like to at least give you the 

opportunity to comment on the impact to the 

Marine Corps, be it our doctrines, specifics associated with the ANGLICO community and the 

ANGLICO orientation; or if you would like to take 

it so far as the aviation LOS [line of sight], aspects 

of what you see in this environment that might 

be relevant. I’m just looking to try and see—you 

know, coming out of OEF [Operation Enduring 

Freedom]—what kind of touch points do you 

think this is going to have on the Marine Corps?

Hutchison: That’s an interesting question. I 

would say our movement toward the ANA and 

3/215 has gotten us into a position where we can 

better build that relationship with the ANA and 

partner with the ANA for a lasting legacy. But a 

lot of the teams I keep preaching to is there is a 

frustration with some of our teams because they 

came over and, for lack of a better word, wanted 

to smash things and blow things up. But what I 

tell them constantly is you could employ a hundred 500-pound bombs and have very little long 

lasting implications within this COIN fight with 

the development ANA fire support, teaching them 

how to employ their own weapons systems and to 

conduct fire support once the Marine Corps has 

left Afghanistan, and teaching them some of the 

basic combat medical capability. That’s one of the 

big ones that they want to learn, that we all take 

for granted when we go through boot camp and 

predeployment workups and that sort of thing. So, 

teaching them that fire support, teaching them 

that basic medicine, teaching them how to train 

their ANA soldiers is going to have a much longer 

lasting impact than any number of kinetic events 

that you conduct in Afghanistan.

Williams: And you think, in turn, that’s also reinforcing some of these things in our mind as well?

Hutchison: Yes, sir.

Williams: Because I think a lot of the interviews 

I’ve conducted with GC [ground combat] elements, 

somewhat just as support elements as well, but—

and there’s a constant stress on basic fundamentals and the irony of what I was trained to do in 

Iraq or getting killed here.
54

Hutchison: That’s right.

Williams: So there’s a need to focus on the fundamentals and then apply them appropriately in 

the environment you find yourself in as opposed 

to constantly superimposing environments all 

the time.

Hutchison: So, from the air officer or FACT perspective, I tell all our teams it’s brilliance in the 

basics. We go home and you learn—when you 

first start training, it’s a single, maybe even one 

aircraft, maybe a single section of aircraft on station. That’s the only accident you have and you 

work on prosecuting targets with that one aspect. 

But everyone wants to get to this sexy mindset of, “Well, I’ve got mortars. I’ve got artillery. 

I’ve got a section of fixed-wing aircraft. I’ve got 

a section of rotary-wing aircraft. And I’m going 

to bring to bear all the horns of the dilemma on 

the enemy.” And in honesty, there I can think of 

one kinetic event that our teams have had and that 

was probably—that was four months ago where 

we had multiple assets on station. The vast majority of our kinetic events have been a single asset, 

whether it’s a single section of Apaches or mortars 

or indirect or artillery. So, it definitely is brilliance 

in basics and remembering the basic skills that we 

learned, as opposed to trying to make everything 

sexy and very dynamic, if you will.

Williams: Would you mind— I mean, I again, 

when I ask for you to share what you feel like 

sharing, but that multiple fire support asset example, can you expand upon that a little bit, because 

I, again, like yourself, I haven’t seen too many 

instances where—

Hutchison: It was December 30th, one of our 

teams in Nez South partnered with [the] UK only, 

so no ANA element, went out on a helo in-fill. 

Shortly after stepping off the helicopter, there was 

a nonbattle injury. A guy stepped in a canal the 

wrong way and twisted his ankle—knee. Sorry. 

Twisted his knee. So, in the process of getting 

him taken care of and conducting a medevac, 

there were three to four British soldiers inside of 

this canal, which happened to be down the direct 

access of an enemy machine gun mod. So, those 

nonbattle injuries quickly became battle injuries 

with the employment of the enemy machine gun 

down the line.

So, our FST [fire support team] team had immediately got a section of Apaches on station. But 

prior to that section of Apaches coming on station, they were suppressing the target with mortars and other indirect fire assets as well as the 

small-arms guys maneuvering onto the battlefield 

to get into position to engage with small arms 

under this machine gun position.

Also, you had a “Pedro” who had to come on 

station to conduct the medevac and he had—

two Pedros actually—so now, within the short, 

probably 5–10 minutes, you went from a nonbattle injury to our JTAC controlling mortars on 

the machine gun position, a second enemy firing 

position inside of a compound and now opened 

up on the maneuver element.*

 So, he is engaging 

that compound with Apaches and he is trying to 

deconflict both of these to allow the Pedro to 

get into a hasty HLS [helicopter landing site] to 

extract the multiple casualties that we had. That is 

probably the most dynamic 1st Brigade has been 

in in any contact with multiple assets on station.

Williams: It is a very interesting management 

requirement.

* The term Pedro is a nickname/call sign referring to search 

and rescue helicopters.
55

Hutchison: Right. Compounding that is, as we 

touched upon earlier, is now you have a CCA platform who is used to operating as the only show 

in town.

Williams: Oh, so these were British Apaches?

Hutchison: British Apaches operating as CCA 

not wanting to—basically questioning restrictions 

that he’s getting from our JTAC. So, now he’s juggling all of these fire support patrol measures, trying to prosecute targets, talk the Apaches onto the 

compound where we’re getting fire from, and now 

he’s also having to explain the reason why we’re 

putting these restrictions in place and trying on 

the fly [to] teach this UK Apache—

Williams: In the heat of battle.

Hutchison: That, “Hey, man, you’re not— At the 

moment, you are not the only show in town. As 

a matter of fact, you’re not even my most important show in town. And if I need to kick you out 

of the battle space, I will.”

That happened in late December and that 

was actually a very good learning experience for 

myself and also for JHFA, which is Joint Helicopter Force Afghanistan.

And that actually led to me having a meeting 

with their CO [commanding officer] and some 

of their training officers and ultimately going to 

the UK during this deployment to discuss about 

how ANGLICO operates inside a task force element’s battle space, how a FAC is dif—a Marine 

FAC is different than a UK FAC, how a Marine 

close air support asset is different from a UK—

Williams: So you literally went to London or—

Hutchison: I went to Warminster [England] for 

10 days in support of [Exercise] Pashtun Horizon III, which is the brigade staff exercise for 

the commandos that are out here now. And that 

was in February.

Williams: That’s pretty rare. I haven’t heard—

Hutchison: Yeah, that was . . . I was the only 

ANGLICO Marine and there was four or five 

Marines back from the states and then there were 

two, sorry, three guys from the MEB [Marine expeditionary brigade]—one MEB planning section 

that went out there with me. But, they were more 

in the conducting of the exercise from a higher 

headquarters standpoint. I was the only Marine 

that was actually on the Task Force Helmand floor 

in the UK actually talking about deployment issues 

and concerns in real-life ways ANGLICO operates in the battlefield and ways that they could 

improve support for their supporting units.

Williams: Well, that— You’ve been very courteous and then adding this other aspect brought 

out two more points that I had not expected so 

I appreciate the ground that you’ve covered and 

answering and addressing the questions I had prepared coming in. But, as I mentioned before, I’d 

like to give you at least the opportunity to add any 

final comments that you have or any points that 

you’d like to make sure [to] get on an historical 

record before we close the interview.

Hutchison: I think that’s about it, sir. I had wanted 

to touch on the Pashtun Horizon trip like we just 

did. So, no, I’m pretty happy with that.

Williams: And it’s literally called the Pashtun 

Horizon?

Hutchison: Pashtun Horizon III. So, they do
56

—that’s the third and final Pashtun Horizon exercise in the British brigade’s workup. So, that is 

supposed to be where they’re at the run phrase, 

for lack of a better word. And they— What happens is—

Williams: So, that’s like their Enhanced Mohave 

migrant?

Hutchison: Similar, but it’s all staff. There’s no 

actual maneuver elements on the ground. So, there 

is a—there are guys who just—British soldiers 

who just got back from Afghanistan within like 

the last year or so sit in sort of like another building that’s adjacent and they inject scenarios that 

the oncoming Task Force Helmand headquarters 

has to solve. And so, there is a downed aircraft 

scenario. There is an attack on a PB [patrol base] 

scenario. There’s all these sorts of different scenarios that, from a staff standpoint, that they have 

to crack the nut on. But in addition to that, there 

are obviously JFHA [sic] CO is there so that provided me with an opportunity to meet with their 

oncoming CO and give him a brief on ANGLICO’s capabilities and how we operate different 

which has further allowed us to develop a UK 

specific [procedures] for 1st ANGLICO.

So, during 1st ANGLICO’s RSOI [reception, 

staging, onward movement, and integration], they 

will get a representative from JFHA will come and 

talk to them about UK Apaches and how they operate. Their air officer. The first thing their air officer will sit down with Task Force—with JHFA’s 

training officer and they will hash out TTPs and 

discuss differences and he’ll be able to push that 

down immediately to his team as opposed to waiting for two months into his deployment.

Also, the—this is interest, I’m glad we’re having this—the other thing is one of my biggest concerns with our predeployment workup, at least 

from my perspective, is we get ad nauseam ROE 

[rules of engagement] and national caveats tactical directives. But, I always get it and my teams 

always get it from a U.S. officer, U.S. JAG [judge 

advocate general]. Operating at Task Force Helmand, I never get it from a British legal officer or 

from the UK perspective.

So, we’ve worked with the UK leg and they are 

developing a package that 1st ANGLICO will get 

during their RSOI to talk about some of the subtle 

differences and the way the British interpret some 

of these directives and documents. And all— A 

lot of that came from me going to PH [Pashtun 

Horizon] III and discussing these options.

Furthermore, UK’s legal department didn’t 

even realize that they had American fire support 

teams operating in British battle space. So, just 

getting that information out to them and letting 

them know, “Hey, some of your British units and 

some of your ANA that operate in your battlespace 

are actually having fires employed by American 

Marine JTACs.”

Williams: [UK] Brigadier [General] George Norton, when I interviewed him, brought something 

up along this line. It didn’t— I wasn’t tracking on 

what he was describing but I wouldn’t be too surprised if this was very pronounced. I mean it’s one 

thing to be in a Coalition fight. It’s one thing for 

it to be led by a Marine major general. It’s another 

thing for all the other Coalition partners to know 

how to function through that fire.

Hutchison: Correct.

Williams: So, I appreciate you going through 

that example. Is there anything else I’ve got to 

shake you on or—

Hutchison: Well, there’s probably one more—one 
57

more thing it’s brought to light is no one in Task 

Force—shouldn’t say no one. From what I can 

understand is that no one had really thought 

through an unpartnered ANA or ANSF patrol 

who is now out, that’s being supported by a 

ANGLICO JTAC or FAC from a COC [combat 

operations center]. So, we have an ANA patrol 

that’s out with just ANA or just ANP or mixed, 

whatever it might be, all Afghan forces. But, they 

are being supported from a COC with a Marine 

JTAC. What are— What sort of fire support 

capability am I allowed to support [them] with? 

Do I—only in self-defense? Do I have [it] if the 

ground force commander in the COC has it? Can 

I extend that to that ANSF patrol that’s out? Can 

I request immediate for close air support? Can I 

use British or American indirect fire assets to support this patrol?

So, a lot of those questions are currently being 

answered and some documentation’s being developed on that all from ANGLICO being partnered 

with these units and asking these questions on 

what we can and cannot do in support [of] ANA 

inside a task force element.

Williams: I would have thought they’d just been 

viewed as another Coalition force, even though 

it’s the national force.

Hutchison: There is a SOP that’s out that says 

an ANSF patrol by themselves does not necessarily rate close air support or fires outside of 

self-defense. So, we’re just trying to get some clarification on that.

Williams: Any other points? I mean, I’m not 

really that surprised because of the unique nature 

of what ANGLICO is all about. You’re, I’m sure 

during the course of the conversations I’ll have 

with some of the other Marines, things will come 

up like this.

Hutchison: Oh, definitely.

Williams: I mean these are telling moments in 

our history just as prominent as maybe [Major] 

General Richard P. Mills leading Coalition forces 

encounters for the first time. There’s going to be a 

lot of firsts coming out of here and I’m glad we’re 

able to get at least some of this on the record and 

appreciate your comments.
58
Part II

Taliban Hunting, 2011
60

In the Shadow of the Poppy Harvest by Michael D. Fay.

Marine Corps Art Collection
61

Throughout 2011, Marine units rotated 

into Afghanistan and continued to 

conduct raids and patrols throughout 

the Marineistan provinces, suppressing the poppy harvest and eliminating Taliban 

caches and sanctuaries. In March, II Marine 

Expeditionary Force (Forward) replaced I Marine 

Expeditionary Force (Forward) as Regional 

Command-Southwest.

In May 2011, U.S. Navy SEALs raided Osama 

bin Laden’s hiding place in Pakistan, killing the 

al-Qaeda leader. In June, President Barack Obama 

announced the end of the Afghanistan surge and 

the withdrawal of more than 30,000 American 

troops by the following summer. On 18 July 2011, 

Marine General John R. Allen took command 

of the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), 

becoming the senior American commander in 

Afghanistan.
62

President Barack H. Obama addresses soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines at Bagram Airfield, Parwan Province, 

Afghanistan, on 2 May 2011. The president visited Afghanistan to sign a historic agreement with Afghan President 

Hamid Karzai, setting the path for the eventual withdrawal 

of U.S. forces and increased self-governance by the recognized government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Defense Imagery 120502-A-AW125-009
Remarks by the 

President on the 

Way Forward 

in Afghanistan

by President Barack H. Obama

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

22 June 2011

8:01 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. Nearly 10 

years ago, America suffered the worst attack on 

our shores since Pearl Harbor. This mass murder was planned by Osama bin Laden and his alQaeda network in Afghanistan, and signaled a 

new threat to our security—one in which the targets were no longer soldiers on a battlefield, but 

innocent men, women, and children going about 

their daily lives. 

In the days that followed, our nation was 

united as we struck at al-Qaeda and routed the 

Taliban in Afghanistan. Then, our focus shifted. 

A second war was launched in Iraq, and we spent 

enormous blood and treasure to support a new 

government there. By the time I took office, the 

war in Afghanistan had entered its seventh year. 

But al-Qaeda’s leaders had escaped into Pakistan 

and were plotting new attacks, while the Taliban 

had regrouped and gone on the offensive. Without a new strategy and decisive action, our military commanders warned that we could face a 

63
64

resurgent al-Qaeda and a Taliban taking over large 

parts of Afghanistan.

For this reason, in one of the most difficult 

decisions that I’ve made as president, I ordered an 

additional 30,000 American troops into Afghanistan. When I announced this surge at West Point, 

we set clear objectives: to refocus on al-Qaeda, to 

reverse the Taliban’s momentum, and [to] train 

Afghan security forces to defend their own country. I also made it clear that our commitment would 

not be open-ended, and that we would begin to 

draw down our forces this July.

Tonight, I can tell you that we are fulfilling that 

commitment. Thanks to our extraordinary men 

and women in uniform, our civilian personnel, 

and our many Coalition partners, we are meeting our goals. As a result, starting next month, 

we will be able to remove 10,000 of our troops 

from Afghanistan by the end of this year, and we 

will bring home a total of 33,000 troops by next 

summer, fully recovering the surge I announced 

at West Point. After this initial reduction, our 

troops will continue coming home at a steady 

pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead. 

Our mission will change from combat to support. 

By 2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible 

for their own security. 

We’re starting this drawdown from a position 

of strength. Al-Qaeda is under more pressure 

than at any time since 9/11. Together with the 

Pakistanis, we have taken out more than half of 

al-Qaeda’s leadership. And thanks to our intelligence professionals and Special Forces, we killed 

Osama bin Laden, the only leader that al-Qaeda 

had ever known. This was a victory for all who 

have served since 9/11. One soldier summed it 

up well. “The message,” he said, “is we don’t forget. You will be held accountable, no matter how 

long it takes.” 

The information that we recovered from bin 

Laden’s compound shows al-Qaeda under enormous strain. Bin Laden expressed concern that 

al-Qaeda had been unable to effectively replace 

senior terrorists that had been killed, and that alQaeda has failed in its effort to portray America 

as a nation at war with Islam—thereby draining 

more widespread support. Al-Qaeda remains dangerous, and we must be vigilant against attacks. 

But we have put al-Qaeda on a path to defeat, and 

we will not relent until the job is done.

In Afghanistan, we’ve inflicted serious losses on 

the Taliban and taken a number of its strongholds. 

Along with our surge, our allies also increased 

their commitments, which helped stabilize more 

of the country. Afghan security forces have grown 

by over 100,000 troops, and in some provinces 

and municipalities, we’ve already begun to transition responsibility for security to the Afghan 

people. In the face of violence and intimidation, 

Afghans are fighting and dying for their country, establishing local police forces, opening markets and schools, creating new opportunities for 

women and girls, and trying to turn the page on 

decades of war.

Of course, huge challenges remain. This is 

the beginning—but not the end—of our effort 

to wind down this war. We’ll have to do the hard 

work of keeping the gains that we’ve made, while 

we draw down our forces and transition responsibility for security to the Afghan government. 

And next May in Chicago, we will host a summit 

with our NATO allies and partners to shape the 

next phase of this transition.

We do know that peace cannot come to a land 

that has known so much war without a political 

settlement. So as we strengthen the Afghan government and security forces, America will join initiatives that reconcile the Afghan people, including 

the Taliban. Our position on these talks is clear: 
65

they must be led by the Afghan government, and 

those who want to be a part of a peaceful Afghanistan must break from al-Qaeda, abandon violence, 

and abide by the Afghan constitution. But, in part 

because of our military effort, we have reason to 

believe that progress can be made.

The goal that we seek is achievable, and can be 

expressed simply: no safe haven from which alQaeda or its affiliates can launch attacks against 

our homeland or our allies. We won’t try to make 

Afghanistan a perfect place. We will not police its 

streets or patrol its mountains indefinitely. That 

is the responsibility of the Afghan government, 

which must step up its ability to protect its people, and move from an economy shaped by war 

to one that can sustain a lasting peace. What we 

can do, and will do, is build a partnership with 

the Afghan people that endures—one that ensures 

that we will be able to continue targeting terrorists 

and supporting a sovereign Afghan government.

Of course, our efforts must also address terrorist safe havens in Pakistan. No country is more 

endangered by the presence of violent extremists, 

which is why we will continue to press Pakistan 

to expand its participation in securing a more 

peaceful future for this war-torn region. We’ll 

work with the Pakistani government to root out 

the cancer of violent extremism, and we will insist 

that it keeps its commitments. For there should 

be no doubt that, so long as I am president, the 

United States will never tolerate a safe haven for 

those who aim to kill us. They cannot elude us, 

nor escape the justice they deserve. 

My fellow Americans, this has been a difficult 

decade for our country. We’ve learned anew the 

profound cost of war—a cost that’s been paid by 

Defense Imagery 345818, photo by SSgt Michael Sparks 

President Barack Obama makes a surprise visit to Bagram Airfield on 3 December 2010.
66

the nearly 4,500 Americans who have given their 

lives in Iraq, and the over 1,500 who have done 

so in Afghanistan—men and women who will 

not live to enjoy the freedom that they defended. 

Thousands more have been wounded. Some have 

lost limbs on the battlefield, and others still battle the demons that have followed them home.

Yet tonight, we take comfort in knowing that 

the tide of war is receding. Fewer of our sons and 

daughters are serving in harm’s way. We’ve ended 

our combat mission in Iraq, with 100,000 American troops already out of that country. And even as 

there will be dark days ahead in Afghanistan, the 

light of a secure peace can be seen in the distance. 

These long wars will come to a responsible end.

As they do, we must learn their lessons. Already 

this decade of war has caused many to question 

the nature of America’s engagement around the 

world. Some would have America retreat from 

our responsibility as an anchor of global security, 

and embrace an isolation that ignores the very real 

threats that we face. Others would have America overextended, confronting every evil that can 

be found abroad.

We must chart a more centered course. Like 

generations before, we must embrace America’s 

singular role in the course of human events. But 

we must be as pragmatic as we are passionate; as 

strategic as we are resolute. When threatened, we 

must respond with force—but when that force 

can be targeted, we need not deploy large armies 

overseas. When innocents are being slaughtered 

and global security endangered, we don’t have to 

choose between standing idly by or acting on our 

own. Instead, we must rally international action, 

which we’re doing in Libya, where we do not have 

a single soldier on the ground, but are supporting 

allies in protecting the Libyan people and giving 

them the chance to determine their own destiny.

In all that we do, we must remember that what 

sets America apart is not solely our power—it is 

the principles upon which our union was founded. 

We’re a nation that brings our enemies to justice 

while adhering to the rule of law, and respecting the rights of all our citizens. We protect our 

own freedom and prosperity by extending it to 

others. We stand not for empire, but for selfdetermination. That is why we have a stake in 

the democratic aspirations that are now washing across the Arab world. We will support those 

revolutions with fidelity to our ideals, with the 

power of our example, and with an unwavering 

belief that all human beings deserve to live with 

freedom and dignity.

Above all, we are a nation whose strength 

abroad has been anchored in opportunity for our 

citizens here at home. Over the last decade, we 

have spent a trillion dollars on war, at a time of 

rising debt and hard economic times. Now, we 

must invest in America’s greatest resource—our 

people. We must unleash innovation that creates 

new jobs and industries, while living within our 

means. We must rebuild our infrastructure and 

find new and clean sources of energy. And most 

of all, after a decade of passionate debate, we must 

recapture the common purpose that we shared at 

the beginning of this time of war. For our nation 

draws strength from our differences, and when 

our union is strong no hill is too steep, no horizon is beyond our reach.

America, it is time to focus on nation building here at home.

In this effort, we draw inspiration from our 

fellow Americans who have sacrificed so much 

on our behalf. To our troops, our veterans and 

their families, I speak for all Americans when I 

say that we will keep our sacred trust with you, 

and provide you with the care and benefits and 

opportunity that you deserve. 

I met some of these patriotic Americans at Fort 
67

Campbell. A while back, I spoke to the 101st Airborne that has fought to turn the tide in Afghanistan, and to the team that took out Osama bin 

Laden. Standing in front of a model of bin Laden’s 

compound, the Navy SEAL who led that effort 

paid tribute to those who had been lost—brothers 

and sisters in arms whose names are now written 

on bases where our troops stand guard overseas, 

and on headstones in quiet corners of our country where their memory will never be forgotten. This officer—like so many others I’ve met 

on bases, in Baghdad and Bagram, and at Walter 

Reed and Bethesda Naval Hospital—spoke with 

humility about how his unit worked together as 

one, depending on each other, and trusting one 

another, as a family might do in a time of peril. 

That’s a lesson worth remembering—that we 

are all a part of one American family. Though we 

have known disagreement and division, we are 

bound together by the creed that is written into 

our founding documents, and a conviction that 

the United States of America is a country that can 

achieve whatever it sets out to accomplish. Now, 

let us finish the work at hand. Let us responsibly 

end these wars, and reclaim the American Dream 

that is at the center of our story. With confidence 

in our cause, with faith in our fellow citizens, and 

with hope in our hearts, let us go about the work 

of extending the promise of America—for this 

generation, and the next. 

May God bless our troops. And may God bless 

the United States of America.

END 

8:16 P.M. EDT
68

Austere living is just part of the expeditionary nature for 

Marines, and the leathernecks of 3d Squad, 1st Platoon, Fox 

Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, did not live in the lap 

of luxury in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. 

Photo by Ed Darack
69

The Everyday 

Warfighters: 

Indefatigable Mission 

Fidelity in the 

Modern Toil of War

by Ed Darack

Leatherneck, July 2011

“Corporal Adams and his squad are the Marines 

you want to be with,” a sergeant declared to me 

not long after I dragged my gear off a [Sikorsky] CH-53D Sea Stallion at Forward Operating 

Base (FOB) Marjah. “They’ve found more Taliban weapons and explosives caches than anyone 

around here. They find something, from a couple AK[47] magazines to huge stocks of explosives, every day they go outside the wire.” The 

sergeant paused for a second. “They sniff that 

stuff out like hungry dogs. They never come back 

empty-handed.”

I had traveled to RC (SW)—Regional Command (Southwest) in southwestern Afghanistan’s Helmand province—to witness firsthand 

the small-unit Marine Corps infantry experience in remote, austere conditions. After dumping my bags, I walked to the combat operations 

center, wondering where I was ultimately bound, 

to which unit I would attach and for how long I 

would be attached. FOB Marjah, a medium-size 

base on the outskirts of the city of Marjah itself 

and the headquarters for 3d Battalion, 9th Marine 
70

Regiment, might have been as far into the hinterlands of RC (SW) as I would be able to push for 

all I knew at that point. 

The battalion had deployed three line companies—India, Kilo, Lima (with attachments)—

throughout respective locations in the greater 

Marjah region. So I was surprised when one of 3d 

Battalion, 9th Marine’s staff offered me the opportunity, in addition to India, Kilo, and Lima Companies to embed with Foxtrot Company. 

“Fox/2/3,” he responded to my puzzled look. 

“Second Battalion, 3d Marines, temporarily gave 

us Fox [Company] to help in our part of the AO 

[area of operations]. [The] 3/9 covers a large area, 

and while the core region of Marjah is completely 

secure, the outer areas have activity.” I asked 

about Corporal Robert Adams’ squad, the “king 

of caches,” as I had heard another Marine call 

them. Just which squad were they? And could I 

embed with them? 

“Third Squad, 1st Platoon, Fox/2/3, and, 

yes, you can.” The next day, I climbed inside an 

M-ATV (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, All 

Terrain Vehicle, the replacement for the humvee 

in many tactical situations in Afghanistan) and 

passed outside the wire of the base as part of a 

resupply convoy headed to the area’s PBs (patrol 

bases), the smallest, most spartan of the Marine 

outposts in Afghanistan. Those convoys, operated 

by Marines of “Mobile,” serve as the lifeline to 

the troops living in the PBs, dropping off food, 

supplies, mail, troops—anything and everything 

for the infantry Marine. 

With the ever-present potential for devastating IED explosions on the myriad dirt roadways 

interconnecting the small outposts, the Marines 

of Mobile have one of the riskiest jobs in the 

Marine Corps. Mobile Marines, however, have an 

array of technology at their disposal to identify 

and defeat such threats. Despite this, explained 

Photo by Ed Darack

SAW gunner LCpl Steven Lopez, 3d Squad, 1st Platoon, 

Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, patrols the outskirts of Marjah.

Photo by Ed Darack

Squad leader Cpl Robert Adams of 3d Squad, 1st Platoon, 

Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines.
71

Photo by Ed Darack 

SAW gunner LCpl Joey Marshall, 3d Squad, 1st Platoon, Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, hands a SAW to LCpl 

Steven Lopez during a patrol outside the city of Marjah.
72

Corporal Griffin W. Sutherland, “The best defense 

against IEDs is our ability to focus in on telltale 

signs of emplaced explosives with the naked eye.” 

Sutherland described a horrific tragedy that 

had occurred just weeks prior, when a local Taliban sympathizer emplaced an IED made up 

of more than 100 pounds of high explosives 

under a dirt road a few hundred yards from the 

entrance to one of the PBs. One of the man’s neighbors, upon discovering his actions, raced to warn 

an approaching Mobile convoy. But it was too 

late. A local farmer driving a tractor set off the 

pressure-plate trigger, causing an explosion that 

could be felt for miles and instantly killing his two 

children who were riding with him. 

Marines and Navy corpsmen, risking their 

lives by possibly setting off other devices placed 

near the detonated IED (a common tactic), raced 

to save the farmer, who had literally been torn in 

two. By the time a medevac helicopter arrived just 

minutes later, however, he had bled out. The irony 

of the story, Sutherland explained, was that the 

man and his children were related to the Taliban 

sympathizer who had emplaced the IED. “We 

found the tractor’s engine over 300 meters from 

the site of the explosion.” 

IEDs continue to be the greatest threat to both 

local civilians and U.S. and Coalition troops alike 

in Afghanistan, notably in places such as Sangin 

and areas outside of the city of Marjah, both in 

Helmand Province. The very best way to defeat 

IEDs, however, lies not with technology or honed 

tactics aimed at detecting where such devices 

have been emplaced, but by denying the enemy 

the materials to make them in the first place, mitigating the threat completely. 

“I always expect that there is something everywhere we patrol,” Corporal Adams stated soon after 

we met. “If you don’t expect that there is something out there, then you won’t find anything. The 

enemy is good at hiding explosives, rifles, triggering mechanisms, you name it.” 

Adams explained that, for him and his squad, 

the crux of the current fight is smashing the enemy’s destructive capability. Specifics of the enemy’s tactics are not really necessary to explain, 

but, broadly, weapons and explosives come from 

places other than the Marjah region where “runners” cache them for others to use later. “I take 

it as a personal defeat not if an IED goes off, but 

if one even gets made and emplaced,” he said. “If 

one goes off, injuring or killing someone, it’s an 

absolute tragedy.” 

While Corporal Adams’ squad has moved around 

Photo by Ed Darack 

Patrolling and establishing a consistency of presence helped 

the squad in its counter-IED program and its efforts to 

locate weapons caches. Machine gunner LCpl Steven McArthur, Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, contributes 

to that presence in a February 2011 patrol outside of Marjah, Helmand Province.
73

the area’s patrol bases, they called “Typhoon-5” 

home when I joined them. Typhoon-5, or T-5, 

ranks as one of the smallest bases in Afghanistan. Surrounded by mud walls, T-5 has barely the 

footprint of two suburban homesites, maybe 200 

feet by 200 feet total. Most of the Marines there 

sleep in large tents heated by diesel-fueled stoves; 

a few sleep in leaky, single-room mud structures. 

February 2011 saw heavy winter rains that 

flooded most tents and left deep puddles and 

mud everywhere. Night temperatures regularly 

slid below freezing. There are no phones, no 

video games, no morale, welfare and recreation 

resources, and no Internet (so no Facebook). The 

only mirror for daily shaving is one that rocketed 

off an M-ATV that hit an IED. It is shattered, of 

course, but still works—somewhat. 

When I met him, Adams and most of the other 

Marines at the outpost had not showered in 88 

days (not a regular shower, anyway). Despite this, 

they all appeared as if they were on any base back 

home, always clean-shaven with sharply creased 

camouflage utilities. They used ammo boxes filled 

with dirt as weights for PT. Human waste went 

straight into bags, which they burned in a trash 

burn pit inside the perimeter of the base. 

T-5 has no chow hall; food comes in the form 

of MREs, and even the “good” MREs get old 

quickly. Occasionally, Mobile drops off hamburgers and some fresh vegetables like asparagus. But with no refrigerators, what Marines do 

not eat within a day they must burn or rats will 

take care of the leftovers. Cola and root beer are 

always welcome deliveries. Some of the world’s 

most dire poverty surrounds T-5 and, of course, 

the Marines face the potential for mortar, rocket, 

and gunfire from all directions day and night. It is 

a more forlorn, inhospitable to many, nightmarish place than most could ever imagine. 

People who have never been to a Marine outpost 

such as T-5 might imagine the dispositions of 

those who call it home to be dour and enervated. 

To the contrary, for the Marines, T-5 represented 

austerity at its most impressive. There was a lot of 

contagious laughter and jokes when I was there. 

They had a ping-pong table set up in an empty 

mud bunker for the few moments of downtime. 

Every day at T-5, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, proves 

that the Marine Corps truly not just functions, 

but belongs in every clime and place. “We didn’t 

come halfway around the world to take weekends 

off,” Corporal Dustin L. Ivers, one of the squad’s 

fireteam leaders, proclaimed as he cleaned his M4 

[assault] rifle. 

Although just 22 [years old], this is the third 

deployment for Corporal Adams. He had been 

to Afghanistan with 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, 

once before and before that was with the battalion for its last Iraq rotation. During his previous 

Afghan deployment, Adams experienced IEDs on 

an almost daily basis, including one that struck 

a humvee carrying two of his close friends. The 

blast contorted the vehicle so the doors could 

not open. He watched his friends burn to death. 

He is matter-of-fact about such experiences and 

clearly, despite the popular notion that such experiences and memories precipitate dark, emotional 

degradation, it imbues Adams, or “Bert” as the 

other Marines call him, with a level of ardor for 

each mission that he can virtually guarantee they 

will find something, help someone, or both. Of 

course, Adams is not alone in these experiences, 

nor is his spirit insular. All of the Marines of the 

squad share his determination. 

While Adams and the other Marines of 2d 

Battalion, 3d Marines, have honed their instincts 

for seeking out weapons caches, the squad leader 

pointed to one individual as the thrust for all of 

their finds: Lance Corporal Parker Hobbs. Hobbs, a 

Marine Reserve combat engineer from 4th Combat 
74

Engineer Battalion, is the Marine who zeros in on 

the exact location, down to the inch, of caches of 

rockets, grenades, rounds, guns, and explosives. 

He has found about every type of conventional 

warfare implement. 

The specific tactics he employs and his tools, 

while intriguing, are hardly worth noting in light 

of his dogged perseverance. While 3d Squad 

spends roughly equal days patrolling and standing post at T-5, Hobbs ventures outside the wire 

every single day. When 3d Squad stands post, he 

is out with another squad. Anyone who has been 

on a Marine patrol will attest to just how draining they prove to be. For me, joining Marines on 

a single patrol brings enough physical exhaustion and raw terror to last a lifetime—even when 

nothing happens. Hobbs does this virtually every 

day. During one of the rare days he did not venture outside the wire, he told me that he felt not 

relief of having a day of relative safety, but guilt. 

The squad’s patrols typically last between 6 

and 14 hours and sometimes longer than a full day 

when they discover large caches of weapons and 

have to work with disposal technicians. A prime 

aspect of their mission profiles has the Marines 

interacting with locals, often keeping Hospitalman Alber Yovani Amaya-Rivera, their corpsman, busy checking on the medical well-being of 

some Afghans who have never before seen medical specialists. 

The going is never easy on these patrols, and 

they are never typical. Sometimes they move 

through grassy fields, sometimes they are jumping earthen walls, and many times they have to 

leap canals, one of the leading causes of injury for 

Marines in that part of Afghanistan. 

They scan constantly for signs of weapons caches 

in the medium and far distance and always keep an 

eye closer still for hidden pressure plates or other 

IED-triggering devices, as well as for potential 

ambushes. It seems an almost unbearable psychological pressure cooker, thinking that each step, 

each turn of a corner, could bring a tremendous 

concussive blast, a wall of black, then ultimately 

amputation, permanent disfiguration, or death. 

No photograph ever could convey this grinding 

reality. I do not think that any assortment of words 

could adequately either. Marine Corps ethos dictates mission fidelity above virtually all else, and 

these Marines of 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, passed 

outside T-5’s wire day in and day out, without fail 

and without question. If an IED is triggered or a 

rocket-propelled grenade launched at them and 

Marines lose limbs or life, the very next day they 

will be at it again, and again after that and then 

again, month after month. 

And the day after such an attack, if a local 

Afghan, even one sympathetic to the Taliban, needs 

aid, these Marines will do all they can to supply 

that aid. This unglamorous, virtually unseen toil 

is their purpose. This day-in, day-out toil may not 

seem herculean, but these Marines are herculean 

in their resolve and mission fidelity, and they are 

one squad among many throughout the Marine 

Corps who share this resolve. Ask any of them in 

private, and each will tell you that they are nothing special among Marines. 

Patrolling and all that it entails always seems 

to engender unexpected thoughts and curiosities. Toward the end of one patrol where Hobbs, 

Adams, and his leathernecks plucked a number 

of munitions from the landscape, I could not help 

but muse about a subject I do not typically care 

much to ponder: heroics and the definition of a 

“hero.” It is a term uttered frequently, but not often 

with regard to the “plain vanilla,” or “everyday,” 

patrols run throughout Afghanistan, the results 

of which almost never are explained to the general public back in the States. 

We passed back inside the safety of Typhoon-5’s 
75

earthen walls just as a “walk-in” local Afghan 

source approached to give some information to 

a Marine charged with intel gathering. “The Taliban are frustrated so much by the Marines here 

for finding all of their weapons. They know about 

them all the way back in Pakistan. . . . They can’t 

make a single bomb! They are ready to give this 

place up!” 

Yes, heroes. 

Note

Leatherneck 94, no. 7 (July 2011): 32–35. Reprinted 

with permission. Copyright Leatherneck.

About the Author

Ed Darack is the author of Victory Point: Operations 

Red Wings and Whalers—The Marine Corps Battle for 

Freedom in Afghanistan (2010) about two historic 

Marine Corps operations in Afghanistan in 2005 

(undertaken by 2d Battalion, 3d Marines), reviewed 

in the August 2009 Leatherneck. 

Weeks after this embed was over in March 2011, 

Darack learned that the day after he left Typhoon-5 

the Marines of 3d Squad, 1st Platoon, Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, unearthed their 

largest cache yet—more than 200 107mm rockets—larger than the rest of the battalion combined to date. 
76

Focus on their needs, not what we think they need. 

Photo by LCpl Benjamin Crilly
77

Counterinsurgency 

as Cargo Cult

by First Lieutenant Matthew F. Cancian

Marine Corps Gazette, January 2013

We Don’t Get It 

Everything seemed ready for the shura (meeting). 

The cammie net was set up to provide shade, checkpoints were established on the main dirt road, 

and tea had been prepared. Even with the preparations, however, attendance would probably be 

low. Despite millions of dollars in infrastructure 

projects, this area of Sangin, Afghanistan, typically 

had only a dozen locals show up to the bimonthly 

shuras where they could meet with representatives 

of the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) and one member of the nascent district 

council. Even bringing the district governor had 

not increased attendance, and that was disturbing—could he not influence tribesmen two kilometers away from his own compound? At every 

shura, the locals complained that U.S. overnight 

patrols were offensive to their customs and religion. Once, more than 100 locals attended to 

denounce the practice. The human exploitation 

team later reported that the Taliban had organized 

their own shura beforehand to instruct people to 

make that complaint at ours. 

This particular shura of ours, however, bucked 

the trend. A new member of the Afghan interim 

district council came and showed genuine enthusiasm for his work, controlling the discussion and 

talking about practical things the government could 
78

do for the people, such as registering land, getting 

identification cards, and settling minor legal disputes. These services resounded with the locals 

in a way that spending American dollars had not. 

Was this the beginning of effective local governance in this Wild West? Not in American eyes. 

Walking away from the meeting, a Marine officer commented, “Well, that was boring. Another 

shura down, though.” 

“Counterinsurgency” or Cargo Cult? 

Just as Army General David [H.] Petraeus and 

Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency directed, 

Marine battalions had been conducting shuras in 

Sangin since they had moved into the district in 

2010.1

 But, if shuras were being executed as doctrine directed, why was Sangin still littered with 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs)? Why were 

the inhabitants wary, and the Taliban still in control of the population? 

Counterinsurgency is a concept that, to paraphrase Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, “deludes 

the earnest and it imposes on the simple.” Despite 

long experience with counterinsurgency, the Marine 

Corps is still focused on conventional operations, 

and its application of counterinsurgency doctrine 

resembles a contemporary “cargo cult.” Cargo cults 

arose in New Guinea in the wake of World War II 

after tribesmen watched American GIs talk into 

radios, and then marveled that trucks, airplanes, 

and supplies arrived as if by magic. Years after 

the Americans had departed, optimistic tribesmen would talk into long disconnected microphones and build runways hoping that the bounty 

of the past would reappear. If they ran through 

the process just right, they thought, good results 

would follow. 

Our application of counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan is similar. We go through the 

motions of counterinsurgency without focusing 

on what really matters. This leads to a focus on 

process metrics instead of outcome—shuras held 

versus local goodwill, number of partnered operations rather than real relationships built outside 

the wire, dollars spent versus actual popular commitment, IEDs found versus demonstrated local 

security forces’ readiness. The result is an outlook that is ill-suited to deal with the nuances of 

fighting small wars, which depend more on understanding local culture and character than on executing time-tested battle drills. 

This focus on process manifests itself in many 

ways. We count and report dismounted patrols no 

matter whether they have any effect or not, and 

we count numbers of partnered patrols instead of 

actually training—and realistically evaluating—the 

readiness of the Afghan National Security Force 

(ANSF). We count and report dollars we spend on 

infrastructure projects instead of looking at what 

they achieve. Examples of how problems of this 

nature are preventing us from achieving the outcome we desire in Afghanistan will occur to any 

observant Marine. Here are some observations 

from my own experiences. 

Counting Patrols 

It is another evening in Sangin and that means 

another overnighter. The Marines patrol to a 

randomly selected family compound with an 

interpreter and a small contingent of ANSF. As 

expected, the Afghan household head is angry and 

escorts his women to a neighboring compound. In 

a society where even the slightest insinuation of 

sexual impropriety can result in death, it is a reasonable precaution. None of the overnight patrols 

in this area have encountered an IED emplacement (much less actual Taliban fighters), so why do 

the Marines continue to perform these intrusive 

patrols? That the population is the battlefield in a 

counterinsurgency is repeated endlessly in all the 
79

literature. And so the company order reads that 

the platoons will “conduct 24-hour operations in 

order to secure the local population.” But it is a 

lot easier to measure the durations of patrols than 

the effect they have on the population. The consistently negative response displayed by the locals 

gives a good hint as to the latter, if anyone wished 

to see. No matter. We patrol in order to be able 

to report hours spent patrolling. 

The same fixation on the metrics of patrolling 

bedevils our attempts to improve the readiness of 

the ANSF. A major part of this effort consists of 

“partnered patrols,” in which Afghan soldiers are 

supposed to accompany U.S. forces to learn our 

methods and, it is hoped, to be inspired to emulate our professionalism. But there is no attempt 

to judge what, or how much, the ANSF learn. 

What is judged, meaning reported to superiors 

and Marine officers evaluated for, is the simple 

number of such partnered patrols.

Commanders, rationally working the metric, 

try to conduct as many such patrols as they can 

regardless of the quality of ANSF participation. 

An Afghan fireteam will accompany a Marine 

squad, or even a single Afghan policeman will be 

dragged along, chosen because he was the least 

high on hashish that day. The daily tragicomedy 

of partnered patrols as they often work in reality is familiar to every Afghanistan Marine, and 

has even made its way into the newspapers.2

 Positive interactions are possible. In a different area 

of the Sangin District, the Marines patrol to a 

local’s compound in the daytime and find themselves playing the board game Chaka Chaka Punj 

with the inhabitants. While the Marines have 

never played the game before, its similarities to 

Sony soon become apparent. An officer shares 

his discovery with the Afghans that, while Christians believe that Isaac was almost sacrificed by 

Abraham, the Afghans believe it was Ishmael. 

The Afghans are surprised not at the difference, 

but at the similarities. A discussion ensues about 

their attitudes toward IED strikes on locals—a 

discussion, rather than a lecture, by the Americans. A few days later, the locals give the Americans a puppy for their base. 

Money as Metric 

Of the $900,000 worth of projects being run in 

the Sangin area, the civil affairs officer was particularly proud of the school. And why should 

not he be? The next two largest projects were 

roads between American patrol bases for American military use. While the Afghans were quite 

happy with winding dirt roads, the U.S. maneuver commanders wanted straighter lines of communications (regardless of the occupied Afghan 

compounds between them). The concrete structure of the school will certainly stick out amongst 

the mud brick houses of the Pashtuns, although 

not for its size, as it will only have four small classrooms in it. But after four months of work, the 

provincial education official tells the Americans 

that they must spend another $100,000 to install 

electricity in the school or else the Afghans will 

not provide a teacher. Insha Allah (God willing), 

no other “requirements” would be discovered 

before the project was completed. Nevertheless, 

the project is deemed a great success because success is defined in terms of dollars spent. As Bing 

West points out repeatedly in The Wrong War, however, unfocused development funds do not buy 

security. “How we spend is often more important 

than how much we spend.”3

The disconnect between American dollars 

and Third World reaction is hardly new. Indeed, 

the theme of William J. Lederer and Eugene 

Burdick’s 1958 classic novel The Ugly American was 

that American development efforts in Southeast 

Asia were grandiose, but useless to the locals. In 
80

the book, Americans who truly make a difference 

were those who focused on small, incremental 

improvements in the everyday life of the natives, 

such as introducing bicycle-powered water pumps 

and dairy livestock. 

There is rich literature about what makes development effective—that being a focus on recipient needs instead of donor wishes. The Marine 

Corps appears to ignore this. For example, in some 

areas of Helmand Province, small landowners are 

reluctant to grow wheat because, in order to get 

it threshed and milled, they have to pay as much 

as a quarter of their harvest to rich landowners 

to use their mills, which cost around 200,000 

Afghani (USD $4,550). It was proposed to buy a 

few of these machines and put them at the government center for the people to use free or at a 

much-reduced price. Such a service would also 

bind farmers to the government. A $15,000 bill 

for three of them would have been a pittance in 

this context of Marine development expenditure. 

The project, however, was stillborn because it 

was not spectacular enough in dollar amount to 

grab attention. 

The Way Forward? 

Our current approach to many problems in Afghanistan focuses on form rather than substance, processes rather than results, and penalizes efforts 

that focus on substance and results. Any Marine 

can give you examples, and here is mine. First 

Lieutenant Smith is a highly motivated leader of 

a training team. He focuses on developing close 

ties with his ANSF partners, and they respond by 

beginning to conduct independent patrols of the 

area, becoming steadily more proficient and disciplined soldiers. Due to manpower constraints, 

however, he has a corpsman drive a vehicle in 

order to visit his far-flung posts. First Lieutenant 

Jones, on the other hand, believes that working 

with the Afghans is a waste of time and that all 

that “nonkinetic” stuff should be dealt with by 

Photo by Cpl Skyler Tooker 

Are we going through the motions or truly focused on outcomes?
81

someone else. He does, however, report a large 

number of partnered patrols by dragging a handful of resentful ANSF along with each of his 

Marine patrols. You know how these stories end. 

At the end of seven months, Jones leaves his area 

of operations completely unchanged, but has put 

up impressive numbers and receives an excellent 

fitness report. Smith was quietly relieved of duty 

when higher headquarters find out about his violation of the rules concerning the use of corpsmen. Is it surprising that we are breeding a force 

that values gaming the metrics over accomplishment of the mission? 

But how do you reorient a whole military culture to substance and results? The first step is to 

recognize that rule-based management of counterinsurgency can be counterproductive. Lieutenant 

Colonel Douglas J. MacIntyre wrote an excellent 

article calling attention to the problem of making 

good metrics, and had several suggestions that, 

while abstract, are based on good principles: bottom-up assessment, tactical learning, and orientation on the desired endstate.4

Instead of blindly pursuing metrics that look 

good for the “commanders update brief” while 

secretly hoping that we get to pulverize some Talibs, we need to understand the underlying dynamics of counterinsurgency. Few officers have read 

Field Manual 3-24, much less David Galula, David 

Kilcullen, histories of Afghanistan, or accounts of 

Afghan culture. How then can they be expected to 

win an unconventional fight? Units need to integrate education on counterinsurgency into their 

predeployment training to fill this void. Once 

maneuver commanders are more aware of local 

conditions and the lessons learned about other 

counterinsurgency efforts—lessons that have been 

written in blood—they will adapt themselves to 

the demands of the fight and make better decisions, leading to greater success. Mindlessly tallying up partnered patrols and the dollars we spend, 

then expecting success in counterinsurgency, is the 

equivalent of building bamboo air control towers 

and looking hopefully up at the sky. 

Note 

Marine Corps Gazette 97, no. 1 (January 2013): 

50–52. Reprinted with permission. Copyright 

Marine Corps Gazette.

About the Author

First Lieutenant Matthew Cancian deployed as a 

forward observer with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 

to Sangin from March to October 2011. He was 

the executive officer, Headquarters Battery, 1st 

Battalion, 11th Marines.

Endnotes

1. Gen David H. Petraeus, USA, “COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance” 

(memorandum, Headquarters, ISAFAfghanistan, August 2010). 

2. Matt Millham, “Afghans Show Little Progress as Security Hand Off Draws Near,” 

Stars and Stripes, 8 August 2011. 

3. Bing West, The Wrong War: Grit, Strateg y, 

and the Way Out of Afghanistan (New York: 

Random House, 2011), 273. 

4. Douglas J. MacIntyre, “Operational Assessment: Replacing Black Magic with Learning by Design,” Marine Corps Gazette 95, 

no. 6 (June 2011): 17–22. 
82

The Marines with 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, conduct a high 

rate of patrols in an attempt to limit the insurgency’s freedom of movement in this key district. 

Defense Imagery 491110, photo by Cpl James Clark
83

Interview: 

First Lieutenant 

Dennis A. Graziosi

by Marine Corps History Division

Marine Corps field historian Lieutenant Colonel 

Mark Wood interviewed First Lieutenant Dennis 

A. Graziosi, 2d Platoon commander, B Company 

1st Battalion, 6th Marines, on 12 February 2012 

concerning Graziosi’s 2011 deployment to Afghanistan. The following has been edited from the original transcript for space constraints in this work.

Wood: So, when did you go to Afghanistan?

Graziosi: We left in July of 2011. It was 14 July.

Wood: And, where did you go to?

Graziosi: We flew into Sangin [District]. We were 

patrolling, I believe, six days after we left and we 

spent the first couple months of deployment in 

Sangin patrolling the green zone. Originally, we 

had three positions. And then, right before we left, 

we turned over one of the positions to our platoon and two positions before—we turned over 

to 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in preparation for 

Operation Eastern Storm.

Wood: Okay. Can you describe— When you got to 

Sangin, what was the operating environment like?

Graziosi: Initially, it was a huge difference from 

what we were used to. Everything we had trained 

for was pretty much thrown out the window. We 
84

trained for pulling formations, contract drills, 

trying to work the counterinsurgency piece while 

possibly taking gunfire. You go out there and 

everything’s completely different. It was patrolling in a straight line, in Ranger file. Sweeping 

for IEDs; visual confirmation was almost never 

there. Marines may [have] had to have used some 

kind of probing techniques to find an IED after 

they got a metallic hit. It wasn’t kinetic as far as 

firefights goes, but it was extremely kinetic as far 

as the danger in the area; finding IEDs, pressure 

plates, smaller explosives with pressure plates 

usually causing single or double amp. They were 

just— The enemy was emplacing them wherever 

they thought we would travel or they thought the 

people would travel to get to us. So, it was a lot 

different than we had expected. We hadn’t heard 

much about it before we got there. We just knew 

there was a lot of IEDs there, but we didn’t know 

we’re going to Sangin until right before we left. 

We adjusted quickly to the area we were at.

Wood: So, where in Sangin were you?

Graziosi: We were— My positions are right along 

the Helmand River in Sangin in the green zone.*

It stretched just north of the company position 

from the Helmand River the whole way over to 

Route 611, the main MSR [main supply route] 

there in Sangin. They were pretty much all spread 

along the river, trying to provide a blocking from 

coming over across the river into the green zone.

Wood: So, you said there was a lot of IED activity. So what kind of things— You said there were 

strikes and wounded Marines. Was that a pretty 

frequent occurrence?

*

 The green zone, in this instance, refers to the agricultural area 

that runs adjacent to the Helmand River.

Graziosi: No, not so much. We had a lot of IED 

finds. Just in the Marines doing good TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures]. We could have 

had a lot more casualties than we did. We actually only sustained one IED strike while we were 

there with my platoon. There was another one 

right as we were leaving with the new unit that 

was coming in. Those were the only two IED 

strikes that we had while we were there. However, I think we found over 40 IEDs in the area. 

And some of them were old, and I’d say about half 

of them were new. We were basically finding old 

ones that— The British had come in 2006 and 

they pretty much blew up everything. They saw—

established PVs and did patrol. And if they did 

patrol it wasn’t that far, so they— Taliban would 

place IEDs as kind of like a defense and as a result 

we kept finding a bunch of old IEDs and about 

half of them were new.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 

U.S. Marine Corps 1stLt Dennis A. Graziosi.
85

Wood: What do you attribute to being able to 

find most of these, rather than them going off?

Graziosi: I would have to say at the end of the 

day it was good TTPs by the Marines. We had the 

technology, you know, minesweepers, the THOR 

systems.*

 It didn’t really help all the time. When 

it came down to it, it was the squad leaders planning their routes and knowing where they would 

put an IED if they were the enemy. Then, down 

to the actual individual point man who’s sweeping, waiting to hear a metallic hit, taking things 

slow. Had we have rushed or gone into areas we 

didn’t need to go or taken obvious routes every 

single day, I think, maybe it would’ve been a lot 

worse. But as a result, we were able to find taking it slow and not setting patterns, I think, that’s 

without a doubt. When it came down to it, it was 

the individual Marine just doing his job very well.

Wood: What was the COIN [counterinsurgency] 

environment like?

Graziosi: In Sangin, it was unique in that the British had been there in 2006 and there were several 

battalions there before. So, people knew what to 

expect from us. They knew— They saw Americans as powerbrokers that can pass out money. 

Consistently wanting things from us. We immediately stopped that and just worked on building a rapport with them. The counterinsurgency 

there—for our area, worked a lot better in Sangin just because they were used to us being there. 

There was a village just to the south of my position called the Brockside Village. And prior to us 

getting there, it’d been a village that was about 

a hundred percent with Coalition support and 

*

 The THOR system is a man-portable, counter-radiocontrolled IED jammer.

kind of playing both sides of the fence. But just 

through our increased patrol efforts and spending time with them, that ultimately led to our success there. A lot of times us finding the IEDs, the 

locals would point them out to us. And that didn’t 

happen until after we established a relationship 

with them and then anytime an IED was put in, 

they would instantly tell us. They may not know 

exactly where it was, but they would say, “Hey, 

the Taliban was here last night. They were in this 

general area. There’s probably an IED there.” At 

first, we relied solely on our tactics and then, by 

the time we left, it was if someone came in and 

talked to us, we knew there was something in the 

area. If nobody came and talked to us, we felt a 

little more confident in the area.

Wood: What was your focus? Were you focusing 

on the COIN engagement or the tactical side, or—

Graziosi: Me personally?

Wood: Yeah. Yeah.

Graziosi: Me personally, it was tasking my squad 

leaders with the right kind of mission. I didn’t 

want them to focus solely on the people and forget that there was an enemy out there. I wanted 

them to focus on the whole sphere of the conflict we were in so it would be— Whether it’s go 

out, don’t talk to people so much, go establish a 

blocking position or an over watch position, sit 

for a couple hours, let me know what you see and 

then come back. Or, was it go out just to talk to 

the people, establish a relationship with them. 

It was— My focus was constantly keeping them 

focused on a mission; not just walking out every 

day, exposing themselves for no reason. Trying 

to find a mission and intent for them and tying 

it into whatever our goal was. Turn it over to the 
86

Afghans and make the area as safe as possible for 

the next units coming in behind us. So, I would 

say my biggest focus was trying to give them the 

right missions at the right times, focusing on the 

right things.

Wood: How were the Marines? How was the 

morale? How did they feel about what they were 

doing in the Sangin [District]?

Graziosi: That’s an interesting question because 

when it comes to morale, Marines aren’t complaining about something, they’re not—doing their 

jobs. They didn’t like the COIN piece. Marines 

are trained to go in and blow everything up, shoot 

everything and kill the bad guy. This is more of a 

hunt and kill mission. It wasn’t like, “There’s the 

enemy go get him.” It was work with the people—it was almost like— An average Marine 

was— To be a Marine you had to do the regular 

Marine things. You also had to be a policeman. 

You also had to be a politician, to work with the 

people and be able to talk to them. Twenty-oneyear-olds holding shuras with 15 plus people; it 

was almost like they had to put the face on of 

being like many different things at once. So, it 

was very difficult for them. They did outstanding. And at the end of the day, their morale to go 

out—go out of the wire every day was never a 

question about it because if someone when their 

squad was going out, everybody was going out. 

But the morale was a little bit different because 

they want to go out and do the things they were 

trained to do; not go out and win the support of 

the local populace. It’s a little difficult to stomach for everybody.

Wood: Okay. So, you spent about two months in 

Sangin. Can you talk about when you found out 

you were going to be going to Kajaki [southern 

Afghanistan], correct? You know, that whole 

process.

Graziosi: We had been hearing rumors ever since 

we left that we were only going to be in Sangin for 

a month or two. And from there, we were going 

to pull out and do a major mission in Kajaki. And, 

for me, that was almost cancerous to our unit; I 

viewed it as [such] because I didn’t want them to 

think that we were just marking time before we 

did our real deployment. I never thought we were 

going to do Eastern Storm. I just thought it was 

too late in the war to do a major operation like 

that. So, I tried to keep everybody focused on— 

Our whole deployment was going to be seven 

months in Sangin. That’s what I went with. That’s 

what I wanted my Marines to go with just so they 

would stay focused on the task at hand. And then, 

I would say about a week and a half before we 

actually pulled out of Sangin, it was a hundred 

percent final. We had heard it was a go, then we 

heard it was a no go. And then it was a possibility that another unit was going to do it not us. So, 

it was constantly going back and forth. But then, 

once we heard 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was 

showing up to relieve us— There was a little bit 

of confusion between how the battalion that we 

were attached to—1st Battalion, 5th Marines—

was going to turn over the battlespace to a lot less 

Marines than they had in the area. Obviously, we 

were a company attached to a battalion, so we had 

a lot of extra presence there. As we pulled out and 

1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was turning over, it 

was just kind of difficult how they were going to 

manage with the less Marines in the area. Once 

they actually started arriving that’s when we knew 

it was a hundred percent.

Wood: So, can you talk about the pulling out and 

what the plan was? What the objectives were?
87

Graziosi: For us, it was trying to give them the best 

turnover that we could. We had marked down all 

of the significant acts that had happened. Everything that was pertinent to the area. We had taken 

pictures of all of the locals. Where they lived, 

what house they were in, all that kind of stuff. We 

just tried to provide them with as much information— In Sangin, too, we did have a good ANA 

[Afghan National Army] source with us. A lot of 

our Marines established good relationships with 

them. We patrolled a lot with them so a turnover 

with them was pretty relevant. Trying to get them 

to do as much of the work as possible and try and 

set them up to do the dangerous things that we 

were doing. Sweeping and walking the point on 

patrol; trying to set them up for success. Trying 

to give them as much information that we had 

gained as possible.

Wood: So, it was a pretty quick turnaround 

from finding out you are actually going to go to 

Kajaki.

Graziosi: Yeah. I mean, you technically could 

have said that we knew about it the whole time, 

but we just didn’t know it was a hundred percent 

until about a week and a half out.

Wood: So, what actually happened, from the time 

you left Sangin [to] the move to Kajaki?

Graziosi: We’d left Sangin. All of our forward 

positions had pulled back to the company position. A lot more secure area, showers and everything like that. I think we had about five days for 

planning; detailed planning, rehearsals, order 

issue, and prep for execution, which wasn’t a lot 

of time at all, and we had just finished doing the 

relief. So, it was a lot of things going on at once. 

And the rest of the time was just spent trying to 

find as much out about Kajaki as possible in a couple days, getting ready to do the actual mission.

Wood: Okay. So, what did it— So, your platoon— 

What was your platoon’s mission?

Graziosi: My platoon was the main effort. Our 

mission was to clear the entire green zone and 

establish a patrol base behind the bazaar of where 

population center was and establish a patrol base 

there. We landed at the same time as their platoons. Stayed out for about five days, and our 

mission was just disruption, patrolling throughout the green zone. It was technically a clearing 

mission, but you can’t really clear that area. As 

soon as you do, if you backfill it instantly in patrol 

bases—we covered too big of an area to actually 

backfill; it was just a major disruption op which 

proved beneficial for us.

Wood: What were some of the highlights of that?

Graziosi: It wasn’t as kinetic as we thought it was 

going to be. They were definitely prepared for us. 

There were a lot of bunkers. We were doing a traditional assault from the roads. We would’ve taken 

a lot more casualties. Even with our scheme of 

maneuver, a lot of moving parts and a lot of deception that was involved with it. They still could 

have inflicted a lot of casualties on us. I would say 

that our success the first 24 hours companywide 

was what made them ultimately leave. The first 

thing that happened to us, we had moved about 

500 or 600 meters through open area and I was 

extremely nervous because there were no compounds for cover. And we just did squad bounding 

over watch. I had four squads in my platoon. We 

just kept bounding squad by squad. Tried to give 

the Marines some kind of rest with heavy packs. 

We had gotten to the first set of compounds and 
88

set one squad up and I pushed up with our fourth 

squad. We had saw a bombed out building. The 

first two Marines up front observed two guys with 

an RPG; was trying to run away and they engaged 

both of them. And I immediately start[ed] rendering aid to them. We had gotten their ICOM 

radios and pulled my interpreter up with me and 

I was listening to them talk and try to get radio 

checks with the two that we had shot. They said, 

“They’re not there. They’re not there. Where are 

the Marines at? I don’t know. We can’t find them. 

We think they’re coming close. Where are those 

other two guys at? I can’t remember their names or 

what their call signs were.” They said, “Go there. 

Bring the machine guns. Prepare for the attack.” 

At that point, I knew that my platoon was 

exposed. We were still trying to move up. I had 

two squads that were still back in the open area 

and then I had one squad forward. And then, one 

squad was actually in one of the compounds. I 

pulled my whole platoon inside the compound—

the two compounds just so we could at least be 

in and cover in case there was actually an attack, 

which there ultimately turned out to be. Once 

we had consulted ADEC [aviation data exploitation capability], there was one squad forward 

with eyes on both of the enemy and eventually 

one was killed instantly. The other one was alive 

until the attack happened; he had died somewhere 

in the process. Instantly we had— As soon as we 

got everybody inside of the building— I remember it almost— Once everybody was inside was 

when it all just started. Set out small arms and 

then pick up machine-gun fire. It was kind of 

difficult to tell who exactly was shooting; it was 

just extremely loud. Then, one of my squad leaders had a position on top of the roof, took some 

accurate rounds—rounds had packaged in front 

of his face. He was kind of dazed for a second. I 

saw his legs go limp. I thought he got shot. We 

pulled him down instantly. Realized he was okay, 

and at that time we had a [M]240 [machine] gunner picked up and was ready to fire. And then, as 

he picked up, it was shooting pretty fast. Almost 

between the rapid and cyclic break, I had eventually put them off. From there, there was a couple of sporadic fire here and there but that was 

part of us taking out a certain number of guys, 

however many it may be. Definitely two killed in 

action. Probably four to six more wounded. That 

mixed in with the company’s success with all of 

the platoons. [The] 1st platoon was in a major 

firefight; 3d platoon had taken some contact up 

to the north. Just our instant success within the 

first couple of hours, I think that just pushed them 

off. They didn’t want to stand up, they knew they 

couldn’t fight us face-to-face. They pulled back 

across the river and waited to cross back again 

and engage us. 

From there, we had done patrolling disruption ops in the green zone. We had found three 

pretty substantial IED cache sites with about 200 

pounds of HME [homemade explosives] total. 

And over all, it was 91 pressure plates, components, some manuals, some pictures, and a bunch 

of other stuff. But after that, we had pretty much 

taken out their supply a lot. We still stayed out 

for about five days and ran out of food and water 

a couple of times. Got some resupplies and then 

ultimately ended up on Patrol Base Pennsylvania 

behind the Kajaki Sofla Bazaar.

Wood: Okay. And does that kind of take you 

through— Well, what happened following that 

through the rest of the deployment?

Graziosi: After that we just did stability operations; hitting counterinsurgency. There was a little 

bit of a lull for a while. Basically, the people were 

starting to move back in. We were quick to get 
89

out there and patrol, and engage and meet them. 

Trying to work with them. What we soon found 

out, based on the intelligence and based on everything that had happened, everybody in that area 

had some kind of ties with the Taliban. It was just 

a huge safe haven area. The people either chose 

to support them, against their will supported 

them, or however the case may be. They were all 

in some way, shape or form, associated with the 

Taliban. And so, when the Taliban came back to 

hit us they had some safe house to always stay at. 

And from there, their TTPs turned into trying to 

front lay a DFC [direct focused charge] IED or 

try to emplace one real quick. 

We had one IED strike outside of a bunker. 

We tried to call an air strike in the bunker but 

there was compounds too close to it. One of my 

Marines tried going into the bunker and they had 

emplaced IEDs outside of them. I think we had 

blown up 15 bunkers at this point and the ones 

out by the river they had placed IEDs in them. 

And one of my Marines stepped on an IED and 

lost a leg. We evac’d [evacuated] him out of there. 

A couple— I’d say about two weeks later, another 

Marine was walking down an area where we had 

known the people; we had seen them, talked to 

them. They were all around the area; Taliban 

just happened to slip a DFC IED. While he was 

crossing the bridge, caught some shrapnel. Urgent 

casualty evac’d him out of there. Two days later 

from there, same thing. We saw, on 10 November, two of my Marines were attempting to cross a 

canal. At this point, we had stopped using bridges 

because we knew they were trying to use them for 

an IED spot. They had front laid an IED. Luckily, the Marines had good dispersion, good standoff. They just caught some shrapnel. They were 

okay. Still urgent casualties. We evac’d them out 

of there, but at the end of the day it was— We’re 

lucky it was just shrapnel and not somebody getting 

killed trying to cross the bridge. After that, we 

had done a major cordon and search on a village. 

I had pushed my whole platoon out. Requested 

support from air platoons to come establish walking positions, and we just basically showed up [at] 

three o’clock in the morning, sat and waited until 

morning prayer, when everybody came outside. 

The Marines were all spread out enough so we 

could see, cover a lot of the area. I think we had 

detained about 10 people that we had intelligence 

on, one of them being a JPEL and a higher-level 

Taliban commander.*

We had done several night raids like that that 

had led to us detaining two Taliban commanders and killing one in [an] engagement across the 

river. The only firefight that we had got in after 

the clear, we had observed what they’re—suspicious individuals moving back and forth between 

the tree line where a bunch of bunkers were. We 

also heard ICOM traffic saying, “We can’t put 

the gun here; the Marines have blown up the 

bunkers. Where should we put them?” So, we 

watched a little bit closely and, simultaneously, 

I sent a squad up. And they had observed— We 

observed them with their—run inside a building. 

Corpsmen searched that building and found some 

IED-making materials. A small cache, compared 

to what we had found. But it was definitely something that was actively being used, which was why 

there was a lot smaller amounts. It wasn’t really 

storage. It was “get-in-and-get-out” usage area. 

All my squad was— One of my squads was out. 

Close to the river, they observed two of the Taliban with weapons across [the] river. And we had 

tied together the screws the team that was trying 

to bring the machine gun in our area. And [we] 

suppressed them—make the suppression with 

*

 JPEL, or Joint Prioritized Effects List, is the list of individuals targeted by Coalition forces.
90

machine guns, called in airstrikes, and got the 

ICOM traffic afterward that the Taliban commander was killed. Never could really confirm 

that, but from what the people said, it was a Taliban commander and about two other guys were 

killed in the airstrikes. After that and a couple 

cordon-and-search missions at night and some of 

our other success that we gained working with the 

people. Everything was quiet for the last month 

and a half, two months, and there was just nothing the Taliban could do at this point. The people 

were with us; they supported us. We had found 

all of their supply routes. Weapons Company had 

pushed across the river, which put some pressure on the Taliban, which ultimately led to the 

suicide bomb that had happened at the bazaar a 

week before my Marines were supposed to leave.

Wood: And that was— Where was that bazaar?

Graziosi: Kajaki Sofla Bazaar.

Wood: What happened with that?

Graziosi: Basically, we had gotten intelligence 

that there was a suicide bomber that was trying 

to come into our area and hit one of the ADP 

[Alternative Development Program] Afghan 

police stations that was close to our base. While 

one of my squads was coming back from patrol 

they were crossing Route 611, which is the main 

road. It also separated both sides of the bazaar, 

and a suicide bomber had been waiting. He drove 

around, came in through a different entryway to 

the bazaar, and blew himself up, trying to just kill 

Defense Imagery 484183, photo by Cpl James Clark

A Marine with 2d Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, provides security during a patrol through the Kajaki 

Sofla Bazaar on 26 October 2011.
91

as many people as he could. Two AUP [Afghan 

Uniformed Police], at the last second, tried jumping on top of him. Those two were killed instantly. 

One of my Marines was killed, another severely 

wounded, and two others urgent casualties that 

we had evac’d. There were countless wounded or 

killed that we could see, and we never got a solid 

number of how many. We evac’d 27 people out of 

my patrol base. I can’t remember the total statistics; I think there were about 10 killed and 20 plus 

wounded that were evac’d either at my position 

or at the battalion position, FOB White House.

Wood: Locals or—

Graziosi: Locals. I’m trying to think here for the 

statistics. I think two AUP were killed, the two 

that were closest. I think there was about 10–12 

local nationals that were killed. About 20 additional 

that were wounded, all local nationals. I had one 

Marine killed-in-action; one wounded severely; 

two other urgent casualties that had taken shrapnel or burns. Four casualties total with my platoon. We just started coordinating evac. I was at 

another platoon position when the actual explosion happened and the vehicle was getting ready 

to come back. I was doing an accountability piece 

. . . some of the weapons, doing a turnover with 

the new lieutenant. I had seen the smoke cloud and 

we’d gotten the [victims] and instantly got calm 

with company. I remember asking our company, 

“Hey, what’s going on? Was that an explosion?” 

And, “We have a mass CAS [close air support] at 

the bazaar. We’re trying to get calm with 2/2,” 

which is my 2d Squad. And I remember talking to 

my squad leader the night before, and I was saying, “Hey, the last couple of days we’ve been out 

on patrol for four to five hours. Being out there a 

little bit longer than we expected. Let’s make this 

quick. Try to change it up a little bit so we’re not 

setting a pattern of being exposed for that long.” 

I looked at my watch and it was exactly two hours 

after they left, so I knew something was bad. It 

was all with them. When I got to— I hopped in 

the vehicle real quick. We were there within minutes. They were still rendering aid when I got there. 

Just looked at what was going on; there was just 

people everywhere. Body parts everywhere. It was 

pretty gruesome. Pretty bad.

Wood: Did you get a sense for what the locals 

thought about that? What I’m trying to get at is, 

did the Taliban get the intended effect?

Graziosi: Yeah. I think their intent was to hit the 

police, as well as us, as well as some of the locals 

that were talking with us. What I thought was 

going to— I think what the Taliban had anticipated on happening was the people were going 

to see that they had the power to do this. They 

were going to back off. They were going to just 

be neutral in hopes that, whenever we did leave, 

they could come back in and retake their area. 

They had wanted the people, not so much to 

support the Taliban; they knew that wasn’t going 

to happen with a suicide bomb. They want us to 

stop being so supportive of us and just be neutral. Back off to the point where they’re not working with us, they’re not talking to us, but they’re 

not hating us. They’re not working against us. It 

couldn’t have backfired worse for them. Unfortunately, when there’s a local national casualty, 

that’s the best thing for Coalition forces so that 

they actually see what the Taliban has the capability of doing to them. The very next morning, I 

held a shura in the bazaar right where it happened 

with the locals. And we just sat down and talked, 

and every single one of them were like, “No we’re 

working with you guys.” Because I don’t think the 

Taliban wanted to have that many local national 
92

casualties. I think they wanted it to be just one or 

two that was talking with us, one or two that was 

talking with the AUP. And the people pretty much 

all came together and said, “We’re done working 

with them. We see what can happen.” We just 

basically tried to exploit it to work in our favor. 

“This is what happens when you help them. This 

is why you should help us and not help them. They 

don’t care about you.” We felt the pain; the sacrifice that we made. We look at the AUP. They had 

lost several and the local nationals lost the most 

out of all of us. Just a significant amount more 

than we did. So, all of us suffered together and it 

was definitely not what the Taliban had intended.

Wood: You mentioned the success of quickly 

establishing supremacy in the Kajaki operation. 

What other successes stand out?

Graziosi: It was half civilian and half militarily, if 

that makes any kind of sense. Half of our tactical 

missions cordon insurgents, it just always seemed 

like we were catching them at the right time. We 

were— Our intelligence that we would get a lot 

of the times we don’t believe it to be a hundred 

percent accurate. Anytime we would [go] to a cordon and search on a building, I would always say, 

“We’re out here. We are searching way more than 

we need to.” And on two separate occasions, that 

helped us out finding some of the guys we were 

looking for. So, a lot of success operationally with 

cordon and search and also the counterinsurgency 

piece. Just really try to exploit the people by showing them that we can establish relationships with 

them; that we can work with them. We used one 

of our landing zones inside of our base as a soccer 

field and the kids would come up and play soccer 

with us. That helped out; build some rapport. We 

built a school just like we did in Sangin where— 

The way I would do it was squad leaders would 

go out and talk to people, “Hey, we want to build 

a school. Come back and let’s have a shura.” They 

come back, and I’d say, “Hey, you know GIRoA 

[Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] is going to build a school here soon. If we 

start, get ahead of the game, volunteer, they come 

and see the progress that we’ve made. Then we 

can get government support.” And people were all 

about it and they started holding classes. I mean, it 

wasn’t anything organized as to what we know is a 

school but it was just mullahs, or elders, somebody 

smart getting in some kind of school. Whether 

it’s in a mosque or outside. Just talking to the kids 

and instantly getting support from battalion. Getting books out and having the kids write in them 

and bring them back to the base to show us definitely helped out. So, our success was half operation and half counterinsurgency with the people.

Wood: What memories stand out to you?

Graziosi: For me, all I can think of was how great 

my Marines performed. I mean, it was just— Everybody says that. Everybody says, “Wait until you’ve 

done deployment to see [what] these guys can do.” 

Until you can see it with your own two eyes and 

you can interact with them every single day; they 

are just constantly impressing you. A lot of times, 

as we see now, you’re having to work through the 

hard things with the Marines, but when they’re 

out there and s——t hits the fan, they’re really— 

They know exactly what to do and they’ll do anything for their brothers. And all of my memories 

stand out is with them, joking around with them, 

watching them joke around, being involved, going 

on patrol with them, hearing them talk, and just 

being beside them as much as possible and trying to take care of them as much as possible. I can 

remember once the suicide bomb happened, by 

the time I got there, everything had been in place. 
93

They had already been doing the right things. The 

only thing they needed from me was to say, “How 

are we getting these guys off the hill? Should we 

wait for our vehicles to come down?” And I knew 

if we had done that it would’ve taken too long. 

Then we may have lost one or two more and we 

were stopping police vehicles. As many people as 

we could fit on these vehicles, I don’t care how 

they get up the hill just get them up the hill. That 

was all I needed to say and instantly they were 

already on top of it. Putting people on the back 

of trucks. Truck after truck getting them up the 

hill. And then, instantly starting triage, first aid, 

the medevac process, establishing security in case 

they were trying to hit one of the birds coming in 

to pick up any casualties. My memory stands out 

of just them knowing just exactly what to do. And 

I would just say their overall attitude. You know 

they didn’t want to do the counterinsurgency. They 

didn’t want to go out and operate with people but 

they would still do it and they would do it to the 

best that they could to the best of their abilities. 

They disagreed with it, they didn’t want to do it. 

No Marine wants to go out and shake hands, they 

all want to go out and get [in] firefights. But at 

the end of the day, they’re going to get their mission intent, they’re going to go out and accomplish it in any way, shape, or form that they can. 

I’m trying to think of anything else that stands 

out. I would just have to say that everything they 

did together and when things got really bad they 

knew exactly what to do. A little bit of encouragement and a little bit of guidance and they would 

just take it and run with it.
94

U.S. Marines patrol near Forward Operating Base Musa 

Qala, Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

Defense Imagery 1037387, photo by LCpl James Mast
95

Interview: 

Corporal Raymundo 

Mendez Romero

by Marine Corps History Division

Marine Corps field historian Lieutenant Colonel 

Mark Wood interviewed Corporal Raymundo Mendez Romero, a fireteam leader with 3d Platoon, 

Echo Company, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, on 

7 June 2012 concerning Mendez Romero’s 

2011–12 deployment to Afghanistan. The following has been edited from the original transcript 

for space constraints in this work.

Wood: When did you all arrive in Afghanistan 

and where was that?

Mendez Romero: We arrived in Afghanistan 

around September—the first week of September.

Wood: That’s good. Yeah, I mean approximate is 

fine. And where was that location?

Mendez Romero: We arrived to Musa Qala [Helmand Province, Afghanistan].

Wood: Musa Qala. Okay. Can you talk about what 

your first impressions were when you got there?

Mendez Romero: When I first got there, it was 

all so fast. It was just one second we were in the 

company FOB [forward operating base] and two 

hours later we were in our platoon FOB.

Wood: Okay. What was the— Did you do any 
96

turnover with the previous unit that was there?

Mendez Romero: Yes. When we got there, the 

platoon that was there, each of their squads took 

each of our squads. We shadowed their squad and 

we went out on patrols with them. They showed 

us which areas were hot, hostile, and then which 

areas were like secured in a way.

Wood: Mmm-hmm. Okay. Where was this? Where 

was your platoon [position]?

Mendez Romero: That was Salaam Bazaar.

Wood: Salaam Bazaar. And is that close to . . .

Mendez Romero: It’s in between Musa Qala 

and Now Zad.

Wood: Okay. All right. So you got there, you did 

the turnover, and what was your basic sense from 

what was going on? Was the environment permissive? Can you just kind of describe the way it was?

Mendez Romero: When we first got there, it was 

hot and there were farmers outside. It looked like 

a normal life for them. And, eventually we started 

like pushing out the patrol base farther out and 

that’s when we started receiving contact.

Wood: Okay. So, let’s just keep moving on from 

there. So you started pushing out about how long 

after you’d been at your POS [position]?

Mendez Romero: I personally— It was fireteam leaders and squad leader, they went out to 

the squad first and we got familiarized with the 

area first. So, that was like in the first two days.

Wood: Uh-huh.

Mendez Romero: And then after that it was 

regularly.

Wood: Okay, regular after the first couple of days. 

Okay. When you went out, you said you saw the 

farmers and kind of doing their regular situation, 

carrying on their life. What were the types of first 

contact that you had with the enemy?

Mendez Romero: The first contacts we had, we 

were talking to locals, to an elderly and eventually we . . . arrested him in a way. And then when 

we were doing the process of arresting him, when 

[the] QRF [quick reaction force] came out, we 

started receiving pop shots from 500 meters and 

out. And then we closed in on the enemy and we 

started receiving contact from another position.

Wood: What happened from there?

Mendez Romero: We had three teams. One team 

was on the south side of the area, then another 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 

U.S. Marine Corps Cpl Raymundo Mendez Romero.
97

team was on the east side of the compound we 

were in. And my team, we started taking contact 

from the north, so we started rushing toward 

the contact and that’s when we received contact 

from the south. And the south team, they started 

engaging the contact. They took out the threat and 

then we— [The] QRF was already there, so they 

pushed out farther and they tried covering [and] 

moving with us to provide support.

Wood: Was that your first time in combat actually being shot at?

Mendez Romero: Yes, it was, sir.

Wood: What stands out to you from that experience? What do you remember thinking?

Mendez Romero: At first, I couldn’t believe it.

Wood: Yeah.

Mendez Romero: It was just like, not a shock, 

but it was just like a surprise. Like real life hitting me. And I embraced it, and I kept moving.

Wood: Okay. So that was just in the first week or so?

Mendez Romero: Yes, sir.

Wood: Right. So how did things go from there 

after that first week?

Mendez Romero: After that first week, we 

started— We would take turns with the other 

squads patrolling.

Wood: Mmm-hmm.

Mendez Romero: They would receive contact, 

sometimes earlier than we did, from like the yardage, which is like 150 meters out. The PB [patrol 

base], they would start receiving contact. And 

we would support, and they just kept going like 

that for a while, and then we eventually closed 

down that PB.

Wood: Mmm-hmm. What was kind of the— 

What was the patrol base like? Just describe what 

was there.

Mendez Romero: The PB was [a] pretty decent 

shape or size. It was like a triangle; it was pretty 

much a triangle and it had c-wire [concertina wire] 

all around it. About 40 yards outside of the PB 

[were] Hescos [barriers], it was c-wire for like a 

bigger security. And then we had three posts on 

each corner of the PB. Well, we had a post on each 

corner, so we had three posts total.

Wood: Yeah.

Mendez Romero: We had an ECP [entry 

control point] and we have our COC [combat 

operations center] and then we had tents for each 

squad.

Wood: All right. And you had tents and what 

was— Were you getting a hot shower or anything like that?

Mendez Romero: We had to— There was these 

bags that you put in water, you’d leave it in the 

sun, and the bags would heat it up on its own, like 

solar power in a way. And after that you would 

take a shower. That’s if you had time.

Wood: Okay. If you had time. What was kind of 

the— During these first few weeks, what was the 

schedule like?
98

Mendez Romero: The schedule was like one 

would be a squad on patrol and a squad on post. 

And then weapons, the weapons detachments, 

they would rotate in and out with us according 

to what we were scheduled to.

Wood: What was your sleep plan like?

Mendez Romero: It depends, sir.

Wood: Yeah.

Mendez Romero: It just depended on your day 

of return.

Wood: Were you all going out at night too?

Mendez Romero: Yes, we did night patrols as well.

Wood: So going out there, you said you had contact. Any particular— You mentioned the one 

incident when you brought in the elder. Any other 

incidents stand out to you from that period?

Mendez Romero: From that period, no, sir.

Wood: Okay. So you closed down the patrol base. 

You’d been there for a while. How long had you 

been there?

Mendez Romero: I would say a month and a half.

Wood: Okay. About a month and a half there. 

What happened from then, after you closed the 

patrol base?

Mendez Romero: We closed PB Salaam Bazaar 

Defense Imagery 273277, photo by Cpl Daniel Blatter

Marines roll through the Salaam Bazaar in Helmand Province. Enemy contact was imminent as they patrolled through the 

known Taliban stronghold.
99

and then we closed another PB at the same time.

Wood: Uh-huh.

Mendez Romero: And then we moved back to 

the company FOB.

Wood: Where was that at?

Mendez Romero: That was located in Musa Qala.

Wood: Okay. So what was your platoon doing 

after you moved back to Musa Qala?

Mendez Romero: As soon as we got back to 

Musa Qala, because our squad was in charge of 

making sure that the PBs were completely like 

flattened out.

Wood: Like demilled [demilitarized]?

Mendez Romero: Yes.

Wood: Is this like a demil process?

Mendez Romero: Yeah, we were in charge of 

that. And that’s when Operation Southern Gambit started.

Wood: Uh-huh.

Mendez Romero: So we got back to the FOB, 

the company FOB, and we got tasked out to do 

security to the west side of the Musa Qala wadi

(or valley).

Wood: Mmm-hmm.

Mendez Romero: Making sure no surprise attacks 

or anything would leak out.

Wood: So you were put out in like a platoon? As 

a platoon or as a squad?

Mendez Romero: Our own squad.

Wood: Were you out there for— Were you patrolling or did you set up a position?

Mendez Romero: We had vehicles. We had two 

four-by MRAPs [mine-restent, ambush protected] 

and a six-by MRAP.

Wood: Okay. Can you describe what you all were 

doing during that time?

Mendez Romero: We would pull security and we 

would stop any vehicle that seemed suspicious or, 

at times, we would just let one go and then stop the 

other one at random. And we would search their 

cars, search the persons, and after that we would 

thank them for their—thank them for helping 

us out and we would let them go, get on with his 

day.

Wood: All right. Anything happen during that 

time that stands out to you?

Mendez Romero: No, not there, sir.

Wood: No engagements or anything like that?

Mendez Romero: No, sir.

Wood: Okay. How long were you doing that with 

your squad?

Mendez Romero: We did that for two days, two 

or three days, sir.

Wood: Okay. From there, what did you all do?
100

Mendez Romero: We went back to the FOB and 

we stood post.

Wood: And you stood post at the FOB. How long 

were you doing that?

Mendez Romero: I want to say a week and a half.

Wood: Okay. And then keep walking through 

what did you do?

Mendez Romero: And then after that platoons 

would rotate out so, again, it was coming to an 

end. And then they set up an Afghan Police PB, 

and we would go there and help them out, do 

patrols out there. And we pushed out south, and 

we kept pushing out south.

Wood: Where was the Afghan Police patrol base, 

PB?

Mendez Romero: It was called the Ugly Hill, sir. 

That was just like probably two clicks [kilometers] 

out from Musa Qala.

Wood: Okay. And how long were you out there 

doing the support for the Afghan Police and patrols?

Mendez Romero: For a week to two weeks at 

a time.

Wood: Okay. What was that like?

Mendez Romero: We had a bond with the Afghan 

Army and the Afghan Police. And we did a pretty 

good job. They would take up quick on how to 

patrol with us. Their formations, they understood 

them. Everything was good. And when we received 

contact, they would help us out. They would listen; when to fire, when not to fire.

Wood: Okay. Any other particular engagements 

or anything happen when you were helping out 

with supporting the police?

Mendez Romero: Yes. We received contact in 

Karaway [Khiraway]. That’s what it was called, 

Karaway. It was probably 10 clicks down south 

from the company FOB. And it was my team 

and another team from our squad going down 

on the west side of the wadi. We started seeing 

suspicious activity on the other side of the wadi. 

We saw spotters. We saw guys peeking in and 

out from the ridgeline. And we started moving. I 

had security and then he picked up and was moving— Excuse me, he had security and I picked 

up and I was moving. And that’s when we started 

receiving contact. And we had [M]240s attached 

to us, so he opened up on the ridgeline, and then 

myself and the other team leader, we opened up 

with [M]203s [grenade launcher] to show a force. 

And contact stopped soon after that. And then 

our squad leader and a platoon sergeant eventually showed up. We organized a movement to 

go check that out, and we searched a couple of 

compounds. We didn’t find anything and we just 

departed from there.

Wood: Okay. So you are supporting— Your 

squad, platoon were supporting [Khiraway] for 

how long roughly?

Mendez Romero: We were just out there patrolling, just expanding our security bubble for a week.

Wood: Mmm-hmm. All right. From there, where 

did you go next?

Mendez Romero: From there, Operation Western Gambit was coming up. We prepared for that. 

My squad was in charge of escorting the main 
101

element, or the headquarters element. And we 

prepared VICs [vehicles]. Other squads prepared 

for helo [helicopter] insertion and other squads 

prepared for like any kind of situation.

Wood: All right. Did you participate in Western Gambit?

Mendez Romero: Yes, I did.

Wood: Can you talk about how that went?

Mendez Romero: It went pretty good. We heard 

it was going to be a heavily hostile environment. 

So we went in prepared. [Pause] I was inside the 

VICs. I was in a four-by at first and then I moved 

over to a six-by. We had security. We provided a 

screen for the other element to move and flank 

them, flank the village. They cleared out and we 

remained like overwatch in a way from outside. 

We had a view of everything. That area was called 

the “Triangle of Guilt.” 

Wood: How long did Western Gambit go for?

Mendez Romero: It didn’t go for too long. It 

went on for maybe two to three weeks.

Wood: And that lasted two to three weeks. And 

so you continued to provide your fireteam, your 

squad provided the security throughout Western Gambit?

Mendez Romero: Yes.

Wood: Any particular incidents, things that stand 

out to you from that time?

Mendez Romero: On our village that we were 

tasked to clear out, it wasn’t— It was mostly 

abandoned and the village next to us that first 

platoon was in charge of clearing out, they were 

receiving heavy contact, but we didn’t see any of 

it. We remained focused on our village in case 

they tried sucking us into that scenario and tried 

surprising us in the other. So we didn’t really see 

any until like the fourth day; we started receiving 

contact from the ridge. But there were little caves 

on the side of the mountain so it was really hard 

spotting them. We didn’t receive any casualties.

Wood: Okay. So that continued through Western— That was pretty much how things went 

with Western Gambit?

Mendez Romero: Yes. And then after we got 

done clearing out all the villages, the headquarters element, they were organizing there again the 

point of security on the PB that there was going 

to be there. And one day, we received a recoilless 

rifle shot. It hit right outside the compound that 

we were in. But we didn’t receive any pop shots, 

and that was it.

Wood: Okay, nothing serious happened from 

what it sounds like. Okay, so you’re probably about 

halfway through your deployment I’m guessing 

now, right?

Mendez Romero: About there, sir.

Wood: Can you continue to talk through some 

of the things that your platoon and squad did?

Mendez Romero: Then after that we came back 

to the FOB and [pause] then we started getting 

ready— Well, we were still on our post pulling 

security on the FOB and we got the notice that 

we were going to do Operation Double Check. 

And we started preparing for that.
102

Wood: All right. And what did you all do in Double Check?

Mendez Romero: In Double Check we went 

into Regay. And we got heloed in, sir. All platoons did. We cleared out— Our platoon cleared 

out the first objective, which our squad was in 

charge of going in and searching. And the other 

squads were in charge of inner and outer coordinates. And we took two elders and two like military age males with us. By that time, it was like 

six in the morning. The sun was just coming up. 

And we were walking to where our headquarters 

was at. And my team, we were in charge of the 

rear, so we started receiving contact. At first, it 

was just pop shots and then eventually they started 

getting closer. We engaged and then we turned 

around and headed back to headquarters.

Wood: Ever find out who was shooting at you 

or anything?

Mendez Romero: We never found out who it was.

Wood: So how long was Double Check for?

Mendez Romero: Double Check, from what I 

know, it took like maybe a month to complete. 

Because we put three posts at first, and then 

one was in Kuchnay Regay and then one was in 

Regay and there was another one, Solzamrabat, 

[Sultan Rabat] I believe. And my squad, we had 

our own position in Kuchnay Regay, which was 

a squad PB. And the platoon, the rest of the platoon was in Regai down south. And second platoon was in charge of Solzamrabat. From there 

we started doing— Well, before the posts were 

finished we stood out in the— Not in the open 

but on top of a hill and we did— That was our 

PB for the moment, for five or six, five to seven 

days. It was a cold, cold experience. Marines were 

sleeping in body bags, anything they can get a 

hold of to stay warm.

Wood: That was roughly what month?

Mendez Romero: That was January. And out of 

that little hill, our platoon called it a Winning Hill; 

from Winning Hill we went to— We were tasked 

out to clear out Objective Charlie, which was three 

to four clicks away. And from those objectives we 

have— From that objective, we have other little 

compounds we had to just touch; like take a look. 

So we took— We stepped out around, I want to 

say, 2000 [that night]. We didn’t get back until 

0500, I believe. It was a long, long night.

Wood: Yeah, I bet. Yeah. Anything else stand out 

to you from that time?

Mendez Romero: The locals were— They understood what we were doing, so they helped us out 

when we went in there and searched. We were 

respectful. They were respectful. And it was just 

a smooth process. We didn’t find anything.

Wood: All right. From there, what was the next 

either operation or what were you doing?

Mendez Romero: From there, I said my squad was 

in Kuchnay Regay, right? On the Kuchnay Regay 

post? And we were doing patrols from there. We 

were in charge of making sure Route Yellow was 

not being IEDs emplaced or anything. So security every morning, every morning like around 

0700 we would go out with the Afghan Police 

and just patrol down the road, making sure nothing unusual or anything. And then from there, we 

would do resupplies to Regay to the south post 

to where the platoon was at just to remain so 
103

the security bubble was strong. And then we did 

what was supposed to be a short patrol with the 

Afghan Police. That was my team and their other 

team that were attached to the Afghan Police. 

And we started taking pop shots. And at first, it 

seemed like nothing, well, from my perspective, 

it was just like pop shots like usual. In a way, you 

get used to it. The other team— We were on the 

west side of the compound; the other team was 

on the east side. And I believe they were taking 

heavy contact and my team wasn’t. And I didn’t 

have a radio at the time. So, they called us over 

and we started receiving— The pop shots started 

picking up and we decided just to start heading 

back and that’s when one of my guys got hit in 

his SAPI [small arms protective insert] plate. He 

just got bruised and we called in air. We dropped 

a 500-pound bomb and we did a PSA [post support activity]. We found rifles, I believe shells, 

mortar shells, pistol mags. We found like hostile equipment. And then we just retreated from 

there, and then that was it for that patrol. Then 

drivers and, I believe, some fireteam leaders, they 

got to go back to the FOB and pick up VICs to 

come start the process of rotating platoons in and 

out, and so we were attached to headquarters at 

the time. We did a patrol down to Regay, and it 

was like a platoon minus, almost a whole platoon 

was there. We started receiving pretty accurate 

fire at first and then it just picked up. We started 

engaging. We couldn’t really maneuver on them 

because they were on the ridgeline. We were on 

the bottom of the hill, so we just tried to do our 

best. We eventually pushed them out. We started 

RTBing [returning to base] and they got us good. 

They like headed back to the ridgeline and all the 

teams were pretty much aligned from the ridgeline so they were just shooting at one team, and 

from that— In case that missed, it just went down 

the line. So it was like— I forgot the word but it 

was pretty heavy contact. No matter what, you 

saw rounds impacting all around you. 

Wood: How long did that last?

Defense Imagery 513838, photo by Cpl Tommy Bellegarde

Marines and Afghan police secure southern Musa Qala and work toward long-term stability during Operation Double Check.
104

Mendez Romero: It felt like forever, but I believe 

like 20 minutes.

Wood: What did you all do to address that situation?

Mendez Romero: My team, we were on the farthest side from the contact, so I made sure my 

team made a screen from any other ambushes or 

anything. And the other teams started maneuvering, started trying to get closer to the contact or 

to the enemy. And eventually they retreated and 

then we just RTBd.

Wood: So that was still part of— Was that part 

of Double Check?

Mendez Romero: Yes.

Wood: Okay. From there, what did you do? More 

activity with Double Check or—

Mendez Romero: We would rotate platoons in 

and out, and we came back one more time. But 

we kept it just really local. Because it was at the 

end of our deployment, so we didn’t want to risk 

it just going out.

Wood: So that was— Double Check was more or 

less at the end of your deployment?

Mendez Romero: Yes. It was two months maybe, 

or a month.

Wood: Anything else happen after Double Check 

that stands out to you?

Mendez Romero: Another platoon got tasked 

out to do another post south of Regai but I don’t 

have too much detail for that.

Wood: Okay. Roger that. That’s good. What about 

your work with the— You said you patrolled with 

the Afghan Police. Can you talk about what it was 

like to work with the Afghans?

Mendez Romero: At first, it was hard to communicate with them. It’s like you explain something to them, and all they do is shake their head 

and say, “Yes, yes, yes.” And then you let them 

do it, and they do the opposite of what you tell 

them. So it was a little hard, communication. And 

then sometimes our interpreters wouldn’t translate right or how would you say? Or probably just 

wouldn’t translate at all. We didn’t know what 

they were saying. But other than that, on patrols, 

they would pick up right. They had good leaders. 

Some of them probably had already worked with 

Marines before, because we would do wedges 

and they would make their own wedge or just follow our trace and help us out; pick out the suspicious activity or just talk to locals and get any 

pointers.

Wood: Did you do anything with the Afghan Army?

Mendez Romero: Yes. That was the Afghan Army 

and the Afghan Police was almost— They were 

pretty much the same. They were good. Good 

help out there.

Wood: What about your interaction with the local 

populace?

Mendez Romero: I didn’t really talk too much 

of elders or anything. But the kids, those would 

be the ones that’d come up to you the most, asking you for pens, candy, chocolate mostly, or your 

sunglasses. And sometimes if you’re not careful, 

they’ll just snatch it off of you and run away.
105

Wood: What did you think? How did they look 

at the Marines?

Mendez Romero: Some of them actually— We 

had a patrol on Regay and kids came up to us and 

they kind of knew English so we kind of like just 

words, little words we would communicate. But 

they said Marines were good and the Taliban was 

no good for them or anything. But they appreciated our help. And then the kids would help us 

sometimes point out the IEDs or whatever there 

would be.

Wood: All right. What were some of the biggest 

accomplishments for you and your unit during 

that deployment?

Mendez Romero: The biggest accomplishment, 

that I believe in, was all my Marines came back 

alive. That was the biggest accomplishment. And 

just the experience. We did everything successfully.
106
Part III

Every Marine a Rifleman, 2012
108

Setting Stakes by Michael D. Fay.

Marine Corps Art Collection
109

By January 2012, the Marine Corps’ reputation was bruised and the Afghan 

War effort was set back when video 

footage emerged of Marines urinating on three Afghan corpses, one of several incidents involving Coalition troops that outraged 

many Afghans and Americans. In February, U.S. 

Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta announced 

the intention to end combat missions in Afghanistan as early as mid-2013 and to assign American 

troops in an advisory role until their withdrawal 

in 2014. On 12 March, I Marine Expeditionary 

Force (I MEF-Forward) relieved II MEF (Forward) as RC-Southwest.

Despite the controversies and announced 

troop drawdowns, throughout 2012, Marine 

units continued to rotate into Afghanistan and 

continued to conduct raids and patrols throughout the Marineistan provinces, suppressing the 

poppy harvest and eliminating Taliban caches 

and sanctuaries. 

In late 2012, the Taliban proved that it was still 

dangerous when it launched a successful raid on 

Camp Bastion, an airfield and logistics base northwest of Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province. They 

killed two Marines, destroyed six McDonnell 

Douglas AV-8B Harrier IIs, and badly damaged 

two other Harriers from Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211). The Taliban fighters were 

all captured or killed in the attack, during which 

Marine aviation personnel fought as infantry, a 

role Marines of this squadron last performed on 

Wake Island during World War II. 
110

An India Company leatherneck pauses briefly to talk with 

village children while patrolling near Sangin.

Photo by Cpl Ed Galo 
111

Regimental Combat 

Team 6: 

“India” Company, 

3d Battalion, 

7th Marines, 

Builds Relations 

in Afghanistan

by Ed Galo

Leatherneck, May 2012

The Marines of India Company, 3d Battalion, 7th 

Marine Regiment, maintain a great relationship 

with the locals in the village outside their patrol 

base near Sangin, Afghanistan. 

They do this through daily security patrols 

throughout the area and by communicating with 

the people. 

“The big thing with today’s patrol [19 January 2012] was talking with the people about their 

farms and animals,” said Corporal Jacob Marier, a 

squad leader from St. Louis [Missouri]. “We asked 

them about what they grow, what type of fertilizer they use, what their most important crops 

are, what their most important animals are and 

about how they get their water for their crops.” 

While Marier and part of his squad were talking to the villagers, other squad members continued to patrol throughout the village. 

“We started going through the city looking for 
112

Photos by Cpl Ed Galo 

Being highly visible on security patrols around a small village near Sangin (top photo), and sitting down to discuss issues 

with villagers as India Company squad leader Cpl Jacob Marier is doing (bottom photo), has gained the confidence of locals.
113

other possible crossing points or choke points to 

watch out for,” said Corporal Mark Yenalavitch, 

assistant patrol leader, from Victorville, California. 

When the Marines conduct patrols, they usually are accompanied by soldiers from the Afghan 

National Army [ANA] as part of the turnover process from American to Afghan security forces. 

“You can see the transfer from the Marines to 

the ANA,” Marier said. “That’s definitely the most 

rewarding part of this deployment. They are definitely showing an improvement from when we 

first got here. They’re working harder, getting better, and taking it more seriously. This shows that 

they’ll be able to handle things when we leave.” 

Note

Leatherneck 95, no. 3 (March 2012): 32–33. Reprinted 

with permission. Copyright Leatherneck.

About the Author

Corporal Ed Galo was a Marine combat correspondent deployed to Afghanistan.
114

Marines with Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 

RCT-6, patrol through Trek Nawa, Afghanistan, on 16 August 

2012. Trek Nawa, an area between Nawa and Marjah Districts, contains known insurgent sites. Weapons Company 

has been involved in numerous firefights since the start of 

their deployment in June 2012.

Defense Imagery 120816-M-PC317-024
115

First Time, First 

Firefight—Marine 

Stays Focused 

during Combat

by Corporal Timothy Lenzo

Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System, 

21 August 2012

Patrol Base Detroit, Afghanistan—It is a moment 

of truth for many Marines—the first time they 

are in combat and their training is put to the test.

When his squad took enemy contact during a 

recent patrol through Trek Nawa [Helmand Province], Private First Class Timothy Workman found 

his moment. “I could hear rounds cracking over 

my head,” said Workman, mortarman [in] Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, Regimental Combat Team 6. “The adrenaline started 

pumping right away.”

This was Workman’s first firefight. A year 

ago, he was standing on the yellow footprints at 

Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island [South 

Carolina] to start basic training, a tradition every 

Marine recruit goes through. Now, with the midmorning sun beating down, he was crouched in a 

ditch, his M16 assault rifle ready. 

Workman and his fellow Marines fought an 

estimated six to eight enemies. The insurgents 

fired from several different positions, shooting 

through small holes in walls several hundred 

meters away. Marines took cover in mud compounds and behind mounds of debris.
116

Workman’s squad split into two units during 

the firefight. Workman, from Peebles, Ohio, went 

with Staff Sergeant David Simons, his platoon 

sergeant, as they moved forward to return fire.

“At one point, I witnessed Workman moving 

up into position to engage the enemy,” recalled 

Simons, from Sidney, Montana. “He fired on 

the enemy, and when the enemy returned fire, it 

allowed us to open up with our machine gun.”

The morning sounds of birds and farmers 

were replaced with the sudden burst of rifles and 

the “rat-ta-tat-tat” of machine-gun fire. An hour 

later, the fight was over and the Marines returned 

to their patrol base.

“Since we’ve been out here, it’s pretty common 

for [the other Marines] to engage in firefights,” 

Workman explained. “These [insurgents] will stick 

around and [fight] for awhile.”

Workman’s company patrols the volatile Trek 

Nawa area of Afghanistan. Trek Nawa is an area 

between the Marjah and Nawa Districts of Afghanistan in Helmand Province.

The Marines engaged enemies in firefights 

ranging from isolated pot shots to three-daylong battles. For Workman, the fighting hit home 

six months before he left for boot camp. In December 2012, his friend’s older brother, Luke, was killed 

while serving near this same area of Afghanistan.

“I had gone to school with Luke’s brother since 

the sixth grade,” said Workman. “At the time [of 

Defense Imagery 656220, photo by Cpl Ed Galo 

Marines with Scout Sniper Platoon and their attachments stood in an over watch position to provide surveillance and gather 

intelligence on the enemy during Operation Helmand Viper.
117

Luke’s death] I had already decided to join, but 

this motivated me to continue the work that Luke 

gave his life for.”

In addition to Luke, Workman said he’s lost a 

couple other friends to the war in Afghanistan.

Despite losing friends to combat, Workman 

remembered his training and focused on his job 

during the fight.

“I was trying to get positive identification on 

the enemy, trying to find where they were firing 

from, looking for spotters and just covering my 

brothers,” said Workman.

Now that his first firefight is over, Workman’s 

platoon will monitor his behavior.

“The main thing we look for is a Marine’s 

mindset after their first time in combat,” Simons 

said. “We are a family, so we can tell when one of 

our brother’s [sic] is acting differently. We watch 

for it and take care of each other.”

Simons said Workman seemed mentally strong 

before and after the firefight. He is proud of Workman and the discipline he showed on the battlefield.

The Marines have more operations planned 

through Trek Nawa and expect more firefights 

before they return to the states.

“I can say there’s nothing else like the Marine 

Corps,” Workman said. “I’ll continue picking my 

sergeants’ and seniors’ brains, trying to be better 

prepared for the next fight.”

Note

This work was originally published by Defense 

Video & Imagery Distribution System, which is 

free of copyright restrictions.
118

LCpl Harrison York, an AV-8B Harrier II Plus maintainer 

with VMA-211, 3d MAW (Fwd), salutes Capt Stephen White, 

a Harrier pilot, as he taxis in to the Camp Bastion flightline on 26 September 2012. The aircraft bears the name of 

LtCol Christopher Raible, the squadron’s commanding officer who was killed during an attack on the Camp Bastion 

airfield on 14 September.

Defense Imagery 120926-M-ZM862-002
119

Otis Raible 

Defines Leadership

by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Jernigan

Marine Corps Gazette, July 2013

First place in the 2013 General Robert E. Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest

A Hero for All Marines

Trained men who will stand and fight are 

never obsolete. It was not the bowman, 

but the long bow, not the cavalryman, but 

the horse, which vanished from the scene. 

Men—the man, the individual who is the 

Marine Corps symbol and stock in trade—

constitute the one element which never 

changes. 

~Colonel Robert D. Heinl, 19621

I was sitting in my air-conditioned office cubicle 

stateside when I heard the news: a Marine squadron commander had been killed in Afghanistan. 

I read the wire and realized that I was acquainted 

with him and familiar with the battlefield geometry. More surprising, but not to Marines, was that 

he was an aviator killed in the ground defense of 

an attack on Camp Bastion in Helmand Province. 

Marine colonel, professor of leadership, and 

recipient of the Navy Cross, the late John Ripley said, “There comes a time in every man’s life 

when he is called to use his unique and special talents.”2

 Saturday, 15 September 2012, was one of 

those times for Lieutenant Colonel Christopher 
120

K. “Otis” Raible, when Camp Bastion’s airfield 

was attacked. Two U.S. Marines were killed, nine 

others wounded; six AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft 

were destroyed, and two others badly damaged. 

Otis was one of the Marines killed. 

Otis was serving as the commander of Marine 

Attack Squadron 211. The squadron was nearing 

the end of its seven-month deployment. Shortly 

after 2200, he was returning from chow after a 

day of flying and heard explosions along the flight 

line. Fifteen Taliban wearing U.S. uniforms and 

armed with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), 

machine guns, and suicide vests breached Camp 

Bastion’s perimeter and began destroying Harriers.3

 Otis immediately checked on his Marines 

in billeting and then, armed only with his pistol, 

hurried to the point of attack. He found that the 

attackers had split into three groups: two focusing on destroying aircraft and the third headed 

to kill Marines while they slept. 

Otis ran through enemy fire across an open 

area 100 yards across and grabbed a handful of 

mechanics, avionics technicians, landing support 

specialists, and bulk fuelers—the usual crew one 

would expect to find on an operating flight line, 

but not the usual crew one would likely find in a 

quick reaction force. However, leadership is mostly 

the same whether applied to airmen or infantrymen, and Otis organized a hasty counterattack. He 

split his small force into two groups. One engaged 

the Taliban headed toward main side Camp Bastion while Otis led eight Marines to engage the 

enemy in a maintenance hangar. 

Otis’ aggressiveness forced the Taliban to 

abandon their attack plan and seek cover, which 

in turn allowed dozens of Marines to escape an 

indefensible position, setting a more secure firing position and limiting the enemy’s advance. 

[Bell] AH-1W Cobras and [Bell] UH-1Y [Iroquois] 

Hueys also stationed at Camp Bastion began to 

take off amidst the flames of burning aircraft. 

While Otis and his team engaged the insurgents 

in the hanger [sic], the airborne helicopters were 

able to use their night-vision equipment to spot the 

enemy and begin “danger close” gun and rocket 

runs.*

 Soon, more Marines arrived at the point of 

necessity and the defense began to have backbone. 

One dismounted helicopter crew fired a [M]240G 

[medium] machine gun at RPG flashes, while other 

Marines engaged the Taliban from a bus normally 

used to transport flight crews to chow. The fight 

raged fiercely for four hours until 14 of the insurgents were killed and the remaining 1 captured. 

*

 According to the Department of Defense’s Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, the term danger close indicates 

that friendly forces are within close proximity of the target 

and the incoming close air support, artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo 

U.S. Marine Corps aviator LtCol Christopher K. Raible.
121

The Marines and their British counterparts spent 

the rest of the night ensuring that there were no 

more infiltrators, but the battle was over. Sadly, at 

some point during the firefight, Lieutenant Colonel Raible and Sergeant Bradley W. Atwell were 

both killed by RPG shrapnel. 

The attack was significant, with the Wall Street 

Journal describing it as “the biggest single-day loss 

of U.S. combat aircraft since the Vietnam War.”4

Major General Charles M. Gurganus, commander 

of Regional Command (Southwest), characterized 

it as well planned, well rehearsed, and “not conducted by a bunch of yahoos.”5

 Reports indicate 

that Otis Raible’s heroic actions and instinctive 

rallying of those few Marines at hand were the 

key factors in establishing an effective defense. 

His quick thinking and aggressive leadership 

kept the enemy from infiltrating throughout the 

base and prevented the night massacre the Taliban had planned. 

Otis’ squadron responded to his death with 

resilience. They fought on after his death, repelling the attack. They used replacement aircraft and 

completed their deployment. One Marine injured 

in the attack told a reporter, “My commanding 

officer never feared death and would want us to 

keep fighting. That’s what he would do.”6

 A sister 

squadron commander said simply, “Otis trained 

them well.”7

 Those two comments are marks of a 

great leader and form perhaps the highest praise a 

commander could receive from his subordinates 

and peers; together they say, “We did well because 

he trained us and led us.” 

Otis’ example illustrates several traits of other 

known leaders. Civil rights leader Martin Luther 

King Jr. believed that the ultimate measure of a 

man is not where he stands in moments of comfort, but where he stands at times of challenge.8

At the key point in the battle, Otis stood where 

all commanders should wish to be—in front of 

their Marines, leading them in repelling a determined enemy. By all accounts, his personal leadership was one of the critical factors in reducing 

the loss of human life. 

Gene Krantz was a flight director for NASA 

[National Aeronautics and Space Administration] 

in 1970 and [was] considered largely responsible 

for the safe return of Apollo 13 after an oxygen 

tank exploded in midflight. In his estimation, “The 

leader has to be unflappable. No matter what is 

going on around you, you have to be cooler than 

cool. You have to be smarter than smart.”9

 Krantz 

could have been talking about Otis Raible at [Camp] 

Bastion. He was calm when others panicked; he 

was organized while chaos swirled around him; 

he acted, and his action inspired others to act. 

That description provides as good a definition of 

leadership as one can find. 

The conduct of the battle certainly adds to the 

legacy of the Marine Corps, validates the training Marine officers get at The Basic School, and 

reinforces the axiom “every Marine a rifleman.” 

But equally importantly, Otis Raible’s last night 

serves as an example to all combat leaders. He did 

not happen into it—he prepared for it. 

Otis, like many commanders, published to 

his subordinates what was important to him. His 

“Commander’s Guidance for Squadron Attack 

Pilots” contained typical themes appropriate to 

aviators: “If flying jets and supporting Marines is 

your passion and your profession, you are in the 

right squadron. If you average one hour per work 

day studying, six months from now you will be 

brilliant. When all else fades away, attack pilots 

have one mission: Provide offensive air support 

for Marines.”10 That last one is interesting because, 

in addition to “providing offensive air support for 

Marines,” Otis clearly was also effective at conducting ground defensive operations with Marines. 

I believe other tenets of his core leadership 
122

beliefs were in action on 15 September. In his guidance, Otis reminded his team, “Keeping things 

‘simple and easy to execute’ will usually be your 

surest path to success.” Otis knew that simplicity is an antidote for the chaos of combat. His 

defensive plan that night was the simplest of all: 

“Run to the sound of the fight, rally the Marines 

you find there, and engage the enemy.” This is 

certainly not the technique to win a fictional tactical decision game, but exactly the right application for the realities of a firefight. 

Otis wrote that it was important to “hire for 

attitude and train for skill.” Clearly, both attitude 

and skill were qualities in abundance during the 

defense of Bastion. Otis demonstrated these traits 

personally, and his squadron emulated him, displaying them collectively. 

Toward the end of his “Commander’s Guidance,” Otis directed his pilots to ask themselves 

this question: How good could I be if I really 

gave this my all? To this I would answer, “Otis, 

you were really good—good enough to save your 

Marines and good enough to serve as an example for the rest of us.” The Marine Corps itself is 

better because of the brief time Lieutenant Colonel Chris “Otis” Raible was in it. Chief Warrant 

Officer 4 Hershel W. “Woody” Williams, the last 

living Iwo Jima recipient of the Medal of Honor, 

expresses it well: “You can be a hero on one day, 

but to be a role model is a lifetime thing.”11

Otis, you are my hero, and a role model to many. 

Note 

Marine Corps Gazette 97, no. 7 (July 2013): 13–15. 

Reprinted with permission. Copyright Marine 

Corps Gazette.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Jernigan commanded 

a battalion in Afghanistan and served as the senior 

American at Camp Bastion from 2008 to 2009.

Defense Imagery 774229, photo by LCpl Uriel Avendano

LtCol Raible’s VMA-211 is based in Yuma, AZ.
123

Endnotes

1. Robert D. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea: The United 

States Marine Corps, 1775–1962 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1962), 542. 

2. Gen James L. Jones, 32d Commandant 

of the Marine Corps, “Birthday Message” 

(memorandum, Headquarters Marine 

Corps, 2001). 

3. Gretel C. Kovach, “Marines Recall ‘Surreal’ Attack at Afghan Camp,” San Diego 

Union Tribune, 6 October 2012. Much of 

the account of how the battle developed 

comes from this article. 

4. Nathan Hodge, “Coordinated Taliban 

Raid Penetrates Base,” Wall Street Journal, 

16 September 2012. 

5. Jim Michaels, “Taliban Trained Inside 

Pakistan,” USA Today, 28 November 

2012, 1. 

6. Kovach, “Marines Recall ‘Surreal’ Attack.” 

7. Ibid. 

8. Joel Comiskey, Leadership Explosion: Multiplying Cell Group Leaders to Reap the Harvest (Houston, TX: Touch Publications, 

2000), 47. 

9. Michael Useem, The Leadership Moment: 

Nine True Stories of Triumph and Disaster and 

Their Lessons for Us All (New York: Random House, 1999), 84. 

10. Christopher Raible, “Commander’s Guidance for Squadron Attack Pilots” (memorandum, Yuma, AZ, 9 December 2011). 

11. Jones, “Birthday Message.”
124
Part IV

Advising and Nation Building, 2013
126

Returning Sniper Fire by Michael D. Fay. 

Marine Corps Art Collection
127

Marine General John R. Allen, 

commander of the International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

and U.S. Forces Afghanistan and 

senior American commander in Afghanistan, was 

replaced on 10 February 2013 by Marine General 

Joseph F. Dunford Jr.

On 28 February, II Marine Expeditionary Force 

(Forward) relieved I Marine Expeditionary Force 

(Forward) as Regional Command-Southwest (RCSouthwest). Marines continued counterinsurgency 

and training operations throughout 2014, turning 

over responsibility for security operations district 

by district to Afghani forces. 

On 18 June, NATO handed over operations 

to the Afghan military. Marines, along with the 

rest of the American forces still in Afghanistan, 

focused on training missions.
128

1stLt Brent Bonnema with the Afghan National Civil Order 

Police, Kandak 1 Advisor Team, RCT-7, demonstrates firing the pistol while conducting small-arms, live-fire training on 25 April. The Marine advisor team is supported by 

RCT-7’s ANSF liaison cell. 

Defense Imagery 929123, photo by Cpl Alejandro Pena
129

In Time 

of Transition, 

Marines Support 

Afghan Advisors

by Sergeant Ned Johnson

Leatherneck, July 2013

Helmand Province, Afghanistan—The mission 

in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, has forced a 

change from conventional Marine units to smaller 

units who advise Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF). These advisors are formed into Security Forces Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAAT), 

[which are] much smaller than a Marine company. 

Without the standard setup of a battalion, these 

Marine teams require a different type of support. 

Marines serving with the ANSF liaison cell 

with Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7] provide support to the more than 20 teams within 

the RCT’s area of operations. “The Marines in 

the cell are responsible for the initial training 

each SFAAT receives when arriving in Afghanistan, as well as follow-on training throughout the 

team’s deployment,” said Gunnery Sergeant Matthew Lockwood, the cell chief. 

The training includes live-fire exercises involving movement-to-contact drills and shooting under 

stress. The advising mission creates a need for 

more advanced training because the 20- to 30-man 

teams often operate independently. 

“After an assessment of the training package, 
130

Marines added an insider threat training program 

to help prevent green-on-blue attacks against U.S. 

advisors,” said Lockwood.*

 The insider threat training teaches the team members how to better recognize potential threats and dangerous scenarios. 

To establish relationships and build rapport, 

the Marines also visit the SFAATs to ensure they 

are well-equipped and to gain a better understanding of the individual Afghan force being advised. 

“Unless you’re on the ground, you don’t really 

know much about what is actually going on,” said 

First Lieutenant Jeremy Prout, a liaison officer with 

the ANSF cell. “We get out there and see what’s 

working and what’s not.” 

* Green-on-blue attacks refer to attacks on Coalition troops by 

Afghan forces.

The Marines operate as administrative and 

logistic liaisons between the teams and the RCT, 

providing team-specific gear, equipment, and 

even food. At one point, the cell sent more than 

50 care packages to the Marines to provide them 

with snacks and other amenities not available at 

the smaller bases. 

“Along with being liaisons, the Marines in the 

cell also are the ANSF subject-matter experts for 

the RCT,” said Prout. This includes briefing the 

RCT commanding officer on the effectiveness of 

Afghan forces in each district. 

While the idea of advising Afghan forces is 

not new, the liaison cell is. Regimental Combat 

Team 6, which was replaced by RCT-7, operated 

a one-man liaison cell, while RCT-7 operates a 

six-man cell. 

Defense Imagery 948655, photo by Cpl Kowshon Ye

U.S. Marines with Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, RCT-7, patrol through a village during Operation Nightmare 

in Nowzad, Afghanistan.
131

“The one Marine did a great job, but we have 

been able to provide more support [through the 

work of more Marines],” Prout said. 

As the advising mission continues, the ANSF 

liaison cell Marines will continue to assist the teams. 

“We’ve been able to create a great connection 

with the teams,” Lockwood said. “Whenever we 

have visited them, they are always very thankful 

for what we’ve been able to do together.” 

Note

Leatherneck 96, no. 7 (July 2013): 16–17. Reprinted 

with permission. Copyright Leatherneck.

About the Author

Sergeant Ned Johnson was assigned as a combat correspondent with II Marine Expeditionary 

Force (Forward).
132

While on patrol in Helmand Province in late December 

2013, LCpl Patrick Tomassi, a grenadier with 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, sees firsthand the challenges of fighting 

an insurgency. 

Defense Imagery 1146361, photo by Cpl Austin Long
133

This Is My Life: 

Marines 

in Afghanistan

by Corporals Austin Long and Paul Peterson

Leatherneck, March 2014

The war in Afghanistan is the longest sustained 

conflict in American history. For more than 12 

years, Marines have cycled in and out of the country. Most Marines today have never known a time 

when deployments did not loom on the horizon. 

It has become a facet of their lifestyles, and it has 

shaped the people who lived through it. 

Now, as the war in Afghanistan comes to an 

end, four Marines with 1st Battalion, 9th Marine 

Regiment, operating in Helmand Province, share 

a little bit about who they are as members of that 

select community. Their attitudes, leadership styles, 

experiences, and reasons for serving are different. 

They are honest and hopeful, rancorous and rash, 

proud and blunt. Three are combat veterans. One 

is serving his first tour overseas. 

A squad leader, team leader, grenadier, and 

scout leader—they have all weathered enemy fire 

during this deployment. For the most part they 

are where they want to be, somewhere between 

loving their jobs and simply enduring the miseries of deployment. 

Sergeant Bryan W. Early 

Squad Leader 

At 25 years old, this is Sergeant Early’s third 

deployment. He uses his past experiences to lead 
134

his Marines today. A Libby, Montana native, the 

Marines know Early by his natural, happy mood. 

He tries to think of his men as little brothers to 

remind him he is responsible for the lives of other 

people’s sons. He has a wife and a 2-year-old son. 

Q: What thoughts run through your head when 

planning patrols? 

A: The other squad leaders and I sit down and 

focus mostly on the safety of our Marines. When 

we make our plans, we look at all the intelligence 

we have and plan around that while also keeping 

the commander’s intent in mind. 

Q: When you’re going through a firefight, what 

kind of squad leader are you? 

A: I try to be as aggressive as possible. I know 

that’s hard for some people to wrap their heads 

around, but as an infantryman our mission is to 

locate, close with, and destroy the enemy with fire 

and maneuver. So I try to instill that as much as 

possible in my Marines. If I show them that I’m 

scared, then they’re not going to be willing to follow me into that gunfire, but if I’m aggressive and 

happy and I’m the man to step out into the fire, 

then that shows the Marines that [leading from 

the front] concept and makes them more willing 

to follow me. 

Q: Do you approach everything with that aggressive mentality? 

A: Yeah, especially in the Marine Corps. I try to 

be as aggressive as possible. But life outside of the 

Marine Corps, you’ve got to step back and not be 

as aggressive. I’ve tried the aggressive approach, 

Defense Imagery 1146392, photo by Cpl Austin Long 

Sgt Bryan Early, a squad leader with 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, RC-Southwest, directs a Marine where to provide security 

while on patrol in Helmand Province on 19 December 2013.
135

and it normally doesn’t go over well. [Laughing] 

Q: Why are you the first one through the door 

and in front of all the other Marines? 

A: I’d rather be the first one through the door, 

so that if anyone has to take a round, I’d rather 

it be me. You put so much hard work in training 

these guys; you want to give them the opportunities to not only succeed in the Marine Corps, but 

in life. If anyone has to take the bullet, I’d rather 

it be me. This is my third deployment, and I have 

six plus years in the Marine Corps. I’ve already 

had my time. 

Q: How does it feel watching your Marines operate on patrol? 

A: I saw it when we took our first contact [with 

the enemy] that it was muscle memory for these 

guys. They never hesitated or choked, and that’s 

the best feeling to have. 

Q: Do you regret coming into the Marine Corps 

right after high school? 

A: Absolutely not. 

Q: Why is that? 

A: Being a Marine was one of my dreams as a 

small child. My mom has pictures of me when I 

was four or five [years old] walking around in old 

Marine Corps tricolors [utilities] with a pellet gun 

at shoulder arms.*

 [Laughing] 

*

 According to the manual of arms, shoulder arms (right or 

left) is a standing or marching position whereby the weapon 

rests sights up on the shoulder with a hand on the butt of 

the weapon.

Q: What kind of camaraderie do you have with 

your junior Marines? 

A: One of the big things I learned as a junior 

Marine is that you train your Marines like they’re 

your little brothers. Always keep in the back of 

your mind that’s someone’s son. Treat your Marines 

accordingly, and they’ll give you the respect that 

you deserve. If I get hit, I don’t want them running out there to get me just because I’m another 

Marine. I want them running out there to save 

me because I’m Bryan Early. 

Corporal Charles A. Kristel 

Team Leader 

He is blunt and authoritative but also respected. 

Corporal Kristel, a Schenectady, New York native 

was wounded during his previous deployment to 

Afghanistan. A stocky, deep-voiced man of few 

words, many unrepeatable in print. Kristel joined 

the military at the age of 20. After only threeand-a-half years in the Marine Corps, he has elevated himself to a position of leadership through 

strength of will, demonstrated competence, and 

unbending character. 

Q: What were some of the traits you saw in your 

leaders coming up in the Marine Corps that made 

them successful? 

A: I would say doing whatever’s necessary. They 

made a point to do their job in the best manner 

possible and just succeed, as opposed to being 

mediocre because mediocre usually fails. 

Q: You hold a pretty senior position. How did 

you get to that point? 

A: Being awesome at my job. 
136

Q: Did you ever picture you’d be who you are now? 

A: Yeah, this is pretty much who I was before I 

joined. 

Q: What were conditions like during your first 

deployment? 

A: It was a good time. It was considerably more 

miserable than this. Week one, we [moved into] 

a compound and lived in there for four months 

in north Helmand. It rained a lot and was very 

uncomfortable. 

Q: Why do you like working with the infantry? 

A: Well, the infantry is the backbone of the Marine 

Corps. It’s what defines it.

Q: There’s a lot of trust placed in you and other 

noncommissioned officers on patrol. How do you 

earn that trust? 

A: Through my conduct—it should be pretty evident that I know what’s going on. I make a point 

to make it obvious I’m not an idiot. 

Q: Would you say that you’re a confident person? 

A: Confidence lets me know I’m making the right 

choice. 

Defense Imagery 1146379, photo by Cpl Paul Peterson 

Cpl Charles Kristel, a team leader with 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, uses his radio to coordinate with another section of 

Marines during an interdiction and clearing operation in Helmand Province on 19 December 2013.
137

Q: How do you delegate responsibility? 

A: You delegate accordingly. [New Marines] only 

listen to you if they have some modicum of respect 

for you. So you need to distinguish yourself as 

either someone who knows what’s going on or 

somebody who doesn’t. 

Q: How do you share leadership and break up 

responsibility? 

A: We just converse. It’s a matter of what needs to 

be done and who can get it done the best. 

Q: How often do you lead people? 

A: Every day. 

Q: How do you encourage leadership in others? 

A: It’s always said, make them into leaders. People who obviously distinguish themselves as being 

competent, they will naturally grow into leaders. 

It’s not about the people above them. 

Q: If you recognize you’ve got somebody who’s 

a strong leader, what do you do? 

A: Let them do their thing. 

Q: What’s more important, your rank or your personal authority? 

A: Your authority. I’m filling a sergeant’s billet. 

Q: How did you become versed in all those things 

that just seem second nature today? 

A: Well, when I was [new], I just made an effort 

to learn as much as I could so I would be efficient 

as I picked up rank. 

Q: Is there satisfaction for you in leading? 

A: When things go well. 

Lance Corporal Patrick Tomassi 

Grenadier 

An Odessa, New York native, Lance Corporal 

Tomassi cannot seem to stop smiling, even when 

told to. He has been in the Marine Corps for two 

years, and this is his first deployment to Afghanistan. Being the new guy, he is often called on to 

complete miscellaneous projects. His goofy smile 

fades from time to time, but Tomassi’s go-to-it 

attitude and optimism carry him. 

Q: What do you think about being so young in 

the infantry on your first deployment? 

A: I’m 20 years old, I’m in the Marine Corps, and 

my job is very important. I have a bunch of responsibilities on my shoulders. I’ve always been told 

just because you’re younger you can’t do this. But 

out here, we’re proving them all wrong. I’ve got 

17- and 18-year-old friends here holding [rifles], 

running toward gunfire. I’d rather have those guys 

protecting my back than anybody else. 

Q: When you’re going on a patrol, what are some 

of the thoughts going through your mind? 

A: The safety of the guys around me and doing 

my best to assure we return with the same guys 

uninjured. 

Q: What kind of connection do you have with 

the guys you work with? 
138

A: I definitely have a strong connection with all the 

guys. I’ve known these guys since January [2013] 

when I came to 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. We’ve 

been through [extensive] training and all the ups 

and downs of the Marine Corps. 

Q: Do you self-criticize or take critique from others and apply that to the next patrol? 

A: I try to learn from my mistakes and the mistakes of others just so nothing bad happens the 

next time, and I try to use that to better myself 

and the other Marines I’m with. 

Q: What have been your favorite parts on this 

deployment? 

A: Hanging out with the guys and all the experiences 

we’ve gone through. Even if it’s a bad time, it’s 

an experience I’m able to share with the guys. I 

wouldn’t have it any other way. These guys are 

my family. I couldn’t see myself doing anything 

without them. 

Q: What thoughts run through your head when 

you guys get fired at by the enemy? 

A: The first thing is get down [smiling] and then 

try to find out where the fire is coming from. 

Hopefully, we get through this, take down the 

enemy, and get home safe. 

Q: What type of camaraderie do you have with 

the Marines? 

A: Going through the worst times possible has 

Defense Imagery 1146338, photo by Cpl Austin Long 

LCpl Patrick Tomassi remains on alert while on patrol in Helmand Province in late December 2013.
139

brought us close. We were [training in] Bridgeport, 

California, and it was from -15 to 15 degrees, and 

we went through that together.*

 Having to rely on 

each other to survive brought us close. 

Q: Would you take a bullet for these guys? 

A: I’d definitely take a bullet for these guys, in a 

heartbeat. 

Q: Why? 

A: They come before me. Most of these guys have 

a wife and kids. And that’s why I signed up, to 

protect them. 

Q: Could you imagine doing anything else? 

A: I couldn’t imagine doing anything else. I’m 

protecting and serving my country. I’m doing 

what I like to do, and just knowing everyone’s 

back home safe and that I’m here just makes me 

feel a lot better. 

Corporal Dennis Cox 

Scout Sniper 

This is Corporal Cox’s third deployment and his 

second to Afghanistan. The New York City native 

enlisted at the age of 18, inspired in part by the 

events of 9/11. He left for his first deployment as 

a rifleman. Now, at the age of 24, he has returned 

to Afghanistan as a sniper, supporting Marines 

conducting foot patrols in Helmand Province. 

Cox is both serious and relaxed but fun loving at 

the same time. He wants to continue his line of 

work after the military. 

*

 Bridgeport, CA, is the site of the Marine Corps’ Mountain 

Warfare Training Center.

Q: Why did you come into the Marine Corps? 

A: I’ve always wanted to do it. I always wanted to 

do something as far as serving my country. 

Q: Did you ever think of doing anything else? 

A: Not really. 

Q: What’s unique about your job that sets you 

apart from other people? 

A: I have the long gun, and I can see a lot farther. I remember when I did my first deployment 

to Afghanistan I was a [rifleman]. I was like, “I 

can barely see these people. It was like shooting 

at little dots.” 

Q: What about your job do you like most? 

A: Operating. I love being out there. I don’t know. 

It sucks that your boys are out there with you, but 

it’s like brotherhood through misery. It definitely 

helps. You don’t want to go through that experience alone. Not only out here, but even in garrison, you have a lot of stuff you have to deal with. 

You just deal with it together. 

Q: Have you seen yourself grow over the last several years? 

A: Oh yeah, I’ve definitely got[ten] thicker skin. I 

never really changed, just got thicker skin. 

Q: Have you seen how you fit into the bigger 

picture? 

A: [We] definitely instill some fear in the enemy. 

When you can get that close shot to them, and 

they watch [their guy] go down, it’s like, “We got 
140

to back off because these guys can reach out and 

touch me.” 

Q: Could you imagine doing anything else other 

than what you do now? 

A: Not really. 

Q: Have you found the Marine Corps [to be] a 

place you really fit into? 

A: I definitely think I was like this before the 

Marine Corps. I’ve kind of grown, as far as 

dealing with things. You can’t just complain 

about everything. You just have to truck on 

and roll with the punches. It kind of helps 

you in life too. 

Q: Have you had people who inspired you along 

the way? 

A: I’ve had [them] all throughout my Marine Corps 

career. You always take the good things from people and just try and instill them in yourself. If you 

see the bad things, you’re just like, “Hey, I’m never 

going to be like that.” 

Q: What are some of the traits you’ve seen in successful leaders? 

A: [They are] kind of like one of the guys, but 

[they are] firm too. You don’t want to upset them 

because you feel like you let them down, and that 

hurts you more than anything. 

Q: What characteristics make you good at what 

you do? 

A: I don’t know. I’m just me. I’m competent. 

[Laughter] 

Q: What’s it like to go out into the field and perform your mission? 

A: I love operating. Not all [missions] are home 

runs, and you do have some snoozers. It happens. 

But whenever things do go down, I love it. You 

get that adrenaline pumping. 

Q: How do you cope with the unpleasant things? 

A: We just have to vent to each other. We’ll just 

talk to each other. That’s it because our peers are 

all we’ve got out here. 

Defense Imagery 1146368, photo by Cpl Paul Peterson 

Cpl Dennis Cox, a scout sniper with 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 

on his third combat deployment, uses his rifle scope to scan 

distant buildings during an interdiction operation in Helmand Province on 19 December.
141

Q: What kinds of people succeed in the Marine 

Corps? 

A: Like I said, you don’t want to do anything to 

upset them if you’re under them. It’s hard to explain. 

They have to be guys who stand their ground. 

Q: How does the training and experience help 

you distinguish leaders? 

A: We’re going to find out if you’re worthy or 

not. It’s kind of like the Spartans. You need that 

experience because we’re going to find out. Either 

you’re going to go into baby mode or you’re going 

to become a man. 

Q: Have you found fulfillment in your job? 

A: This is what I always wanted to do. It’s definitely 

like a life-achievement goal. It’s one of those things 

where I don’t want to have to think, “I wish I did 

this,” or something. I can grow old and happy 

knowing I made it. 

Authors’ note: the Marines selected for these interviews 

were chosen for their varied experience and leadership roles 

within their unit. None were in the military when the war 

in Afghanistan began, but they will be some of the last 

Marines to see combat in Afghanistan. 

Note

Leatherneck 97, no. 3 (March 2014): 36–40. Reprinted 

with permission. Copyright Leatherneck.

About the Authors

Corporals Austin Long and Paul Peterson were 

assigned as Marine Corps combat correspondents 

with RC-Southwest, Helmand Province. 
142

Col Austin E. Renforth, commanding officer, RCT-7, interacts with Cpl Dunn, an improvised explosive detection dog, 

while visiting with Marines on FOB Musa Qala, Helmand 

Province, Afghanistan.

Defense Imagery 817116, photo by Cpl Alejandro Pena
143

Last Marine Infantry 

Regiment Departs 

Helmand Province

by Sergeant Ned Johnson

Leatherneck, October 2013

Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan—With temperatures reaching 110 degrees or more, Marines and 

sailors with Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT7] closed the final page on a chapter in Helmand 

Province during a casing of the colors ceremony 

at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan, 31 July.*

Over the past several years, regimental combat 

teams turned over their responsibilities to the next 

RCT as the combat mission in southwest Afghanistan continued, but this time was different. With 

Afghan National Security Forces having taken 

control of combat operations throughout Helmand, which has eliminated the need for a Marine 

infantry regimental headquarters, RCT-7 officially 

turned over its responsibilities to Regional Command Southwest. 

Marines with RCT-7 spent the last 10 months 

providing support to ground combat units and 

security force assistance advisor teams and retrograding equipment out of Afghanistan. 

While the RCT will be the last in Helmand 

Province, the Marines recognize they are the 

*

 Casing the colors is a traditional flag ceremony that symbolizes the movement of a unit, typically either at the beginning or end of a deployment.
144

benefactors of the hard work of previous Marines. 

“It’s the progress that’s been made that allows 

us to be the last [RCT]. This is a big day for all 

the regiments who came before us, and if it wasn’t 

for their hard work, we wouldn’t be in this position—to be able to leave,” said Colonel Austin 

E. “Sparky” Renforth, the RCT-7 commander. 

In the fall of 2009, RCT-7 began its first deployment to Helmand Province. Since then, Marines 

with 1st, 2d, 5th, 6th, and 8th Marine Regiments 

have deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. In October 2012, 7th Marine Regiment again deployed and is the only RCT to have 

deployed there twice. 

“I think the [Marines’] endurance and flexibility has impressed me the most,” Renforth said. 

“What the Marines have done is kept their positive attitude the entire time—nothing ever fazed 

them, and it was really impressive to be a part of it. 

“I say all the time, ‘It’s amazing what you can 

do when you don’t care who gets the credit.’ That’s 

what our Marines have lived by, and they all know 

that they made a difference,” he added. 

Renforth and Sergeant Major Scott Samuels, 

the RCT-7 sergeant major, furled the regiment’s 

colors and then cased them, symbolizing that the 

regiment’s mission was complete. “We’ve thought 

the whole time about the legacy that came before 

Defense Imagery 985194, photo by Sgt Lia Gamero

Col Austin E. Renforth (left), commanding officer of RCT-7, and SgtMaj Scott Samuels, RCT-7 sergeant major, furl the 

RCT-7 flag during a casing of the colors ceremony at Camp Leatherneck on 31 July. “We’ve thought the whole time about 

the legacy that came before us and not wanting to let down those Marines,” Renforth said. “We’re proud to have been the 

last regiment.”
145

us and not wanting to let down those Marines,” 

Renforth said. “We’re proud to have been the 

last regiment.”

Note

Leatherneck 96 No. 10 (October 2013): 34–35. 

Reprinted with permission. Copyright Leatherneck.

About the Author

Sergeant Ned Johnson was assigned as a combat 

correspondent with RCT-7, 1st Marine Division.
146
Part V

Exiting Afghanistan, 2014
148

Heavy by Michael D. Fay.

Marine Corps Art Collection
149

Marines continued counterinsurgency and training operations 

throughout 2014. In February, 

II Marine Expeditionary Force 

(Forward) turned RC-Southwest over to Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan (MEB-A). 

In April, Afghanistan held presidential 

elections, followed by a run-off election in 

June. Ashraf Ghani replaced Hamid Karzai as 

president of Afghanistan in an historic democratic transfer of power. In May 2014, President 

Barack H. Obama declared that U.S. combat 

operations in Afghanistan would end in December of the same year. 

On 26 August 2014, U.S. Army General John 

F. Campbell succeeded General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. as commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces 

Afghanistan.

In October 2014, Marines handed Camp Leatherneck in Helmand Province over to Afghan 

forces, and in December, NATO and the United 

States “ended” combat operations in Afghanistan.
150

Leathernecks with 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, conduct a 

security patrol during a mission in Helmand Province on 

5 June. During the previous mission on 29 May, the company discovered a drug lab and removed more than one 

metric ton of narcotics.

Defense Imagery 1402194, photo by Cpl Joseph Scanlan
151

Marines Confiscate 

Narcotics, 

Prevent Taliban 

from Reaping Profits

by Corporal Joseph Scanlan

Leatherneck, August 2014

Camp Bastion, Afghanistan—Nearly a month 

into Afghanistan’s summer fighting season, leathernecks with 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 

continued a series of disruption operations in Now 

Zad District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. 

One of their most successful missions yet 

took place during a 29 May patrol in the district. 

Marines with Bravo Company discovered a drug 

lab that contained more than one metric ton of 

narcotics. Although counternarcotics is not the 

Marines’ primary mission, they removed the discovery from the battlefield and prevented Taliban 

fighters from using profits from the sale of narcotics to purchase weapons, ammunition, and improvised explosive device (IED) materials. 

Under the cover of night, the company inserted 

into Now Zad via [Sikorsky] CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters. 

“I noticed a couple [of] spotters as we were 

moving into the area,” said Corporal Cody Evans, 

a squad leader. 

Spotters often are used to monitor Coalition 

force movements and can aid with targeting. 

“About an hour after we set up our security 

positions, an insurgent fired a rocket-propelled 
152

grenade and it exploded next to my truck,” said 

First Sergeant Michael Grassl. 

The infantrymen began maneuvering into the 

town, and a squad quickly discovered an emplaced 

IED and other IED materials. The leathernecks 

cordoned off the area and within minutes came 

under enemy fire. They tactically maneuvered 

toward the enemy fighters in an attempt to return 

fire, but the fighters retreated before the Marines 

could close the distance. 

“We soon discovered that the enemy fighters 

were maneuvering through underground wells to 

run away after shooting at us,” Corporal Evans said. 

The squad continued to move north through 

the town and ultimately discovered the narcotics 

lab. The leathernecks cordoned off the area and 

came under enemy fire. 

“The enemy definitely valued the narcotics 

lab we discovered,” Grassl said. “They continuously tried to keep us away from the compound 

by engaging us with small-arms fire.” 

Ultimately, the Marines deterred further enemy 

fire and removed the narcotics, concluding the 

operation. 

“Our success is attributed to the Marines and 

their hard work and efforts,” Grassl said. “What 

we accomplished shows that steady tactical patience 

and steady operations pay off. It’s not every day 

that we hit a home run, but it just happened to be 

the right time and the right place.” 

Defense Imagery 1402191, photo by Cpl Joseph Scanlan

CH-53E Super Stallions with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 transporting Marines with 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 

during a mission in Helmand Province to disrupt operations in a known Taliban bed-down location. 
153

With the mission an enormous success, the 

company returned to Camp Bastion before departing to a known Taliban location on 5 June. The 

infantrymen patrolled the area for two days without encountering any enemy fire or IEDs. 

“Between the two operations, we’ve kept the 

insurgency on their toes,” Grassl said. “They 

don’t know why we keep coming up there and 

harassing them, but we’re harassing them to the 

point where they don’t feel safe where they live, 

so they’re on edge.” 

Note

Leatherneck 97, no. 8 (August 2014): 15–16. Reprinted 

with permission. Copyright Leatherneck.

About the Author

Corporal Joseph Scanlan is a combat correspondent in Marine Expeditionary BrigadeAfghanistan (Task Force Leatherneck). 
154

President Obama visits troops in Afghanistan on 26 May 

2014 at Bagram Airfield. Obama thanked the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines for their service. After his speech, 

he shook hands with every member present. 

Official U.S. Air Force photo, courtesy of SSgt Evelyn Chavez
155

Statement 

by the President 

on Afghanistan

by President Barack H. Obama

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

27 May 2014

Rose Garden

2:46 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good afternoon, everybody. 

As you know, this weekend, I traveled to Afghanistan to thank our men and women in uniform 

and our deployed civilians on behalf of a grateful 

nation for the extraordinary sacrifices they make 

on behalf of our security. I was also able to meet 

with our commanding general and ambassador to 

review the progress that we’ve made. And today, 

I’d like to update the American people on the way 

forward in Afghanistan and how, this year, we will 

bring America’s longest war to a responsible end.

The United States did not seek this fight. We 

went into Afghanistan out of necessity, after our 

nation was attacked by al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001. We went to war against al-Qaeda and 

its extremist allies with the strong support of the 

American people and their representatives in Congress; with the international community and our 

NATO allies; and with the Afghan people, who 

welcomed the opportunity of a life free from the 

dark tyranny of extremism. 
156

We have now been in Afghanistan longer than 

many Americans expected. But make no mistake—

thanks to the skill and sacrifice of our troops, diplomats, and intelligence professionals, we have 

struck significant blows against al-Qaeda’s leadership, we have eliminated Osama bin Laden, 

and we have prevented Afghanistan from being 

used to launch attacks against our homeland. We 

have also supported the Afghan people as they 

continue the hard work of building a democracy. 

We’ve extended more opportunities to their people, including women and girls. And we’ve helped 

train and equip their own security forces.

Now, we’re finishing the job we started. Over 

the last several years, we’ve worked to transition 

security responsibilities to the Afghans. One year 

ago, Afghan forces assumed the lead for combat 

operations. Since then, they’ve continued to grow in 

size and in strength, while making huge sacrifices 

for their country. This transition has allowed us to 

steadily draw down our own forces—from a peak 

of 100,000 U.S. troops, to roughly 32,000 today.

[Thus] 2014, therefore, is a pivotal year. Together 

with our allies and the Afghan government, we 

have agreed that this is the year we will conclude 

our combat mission in Afghanistan. This is also a 

year of political transition in Afghanistan. Earlier 

this spring, Afghans turned out in the millions to 

vote in the first round of their presidential election—defying threats in order to determine their 

own destiny. And in just over two weeks, they will 

vote for their next president, and Afghanistan will 

see its first democratic transfer of power in history.

In the context of this progress, having consulted 

Defense Imagery 1631618, photo by CWO3 Benjamin Barr

Marines with Regional Command (Southwest) board a KC-130 Hercules aircraft to depart the Bastion-Leatherneck Complex in Helmand Province on 27 October 2014. The Marines departed following the end of the command’s operations in 

Helmand.
157

with Congress and my national security team, I’ve 

determined the nature of the commitment that 

America is prepared to make beyond 2014. Our 

objectives are clear: disrupting threats posed by 

al-Qaeda; supporting Afghan security forces; and 

giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own.

Here’s how we will pursue those objectives. 

First, America’s combat mission will be over by 

the end of this year. Starting next year, Afghans 

will be fully responsible for securing their country. American personnel will be in an advisory 

role. We will no longer patrol Afghan cities or 

towns, mountains or valleys. That is a task for 

the Afghan people.

Second, I’ve made it clear that we’re open to 

cooperating with Afghans on two narrow missions 

after 2014: training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda. 

Today, I want to be clear about how the United 

States is prepared to advance those missions. At 

the beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 

98,000 U.S.— Let me start that over, just because I 

want to make sure we don’t get this written wrong. 

At the beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 9,800 U.S. servicemembers in different 

parts of the country, together with our NATO 

allies and other partners. By the end of 2015, we 

will have reduced that presence by roughly half, 

and we will have consolidated our troops in Kabul 

and on Bagram Airfield. One year later, by the end 

of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul, with a security 

Defense Imagery 1173510, photo by Sgt Frances Johnson

In one of their final visits to the area of operations, Commandant Gen James F. Amos and SgtMaj Micheal P. Barrett, 

sergeant major of the Marine Corps, speak with Marines and sailors aboard Camp Leatherneck.
158

assistance component, just as we’ve done in Iraq.

Now, even as our troops come home, the international community will continue to support 

Afghans as they build their country for years to 

come. But our relationship will not be defined by 

war—it will be shaped by our financial and development assistance, as well as our diplomatic support. Our commitment to Afghanistan is rooted 

in the strategic partnership that we agreed to in 

2012. And this plan remains consistent with discussions we’ve had with our NATO allies. Just as 

our allies have been with us every step of the way 

in Afghanistan, we expect that our allies will be 

with us going forward.

Third, we will only sustain this military presence after 2014 if the Afghan government signs 

the bilateral security agreement that our two governments have already negotiated. This agreement is essential to give our troops the authorit[y] 

they need to fulfill their mission, while respecting 

Afghan sovereignty. The two final Afghan candidates in the run-off election for president have 

each indicated that they would sign this agreement promptly after taking office. So I’m hopeful that we can get this done. 

The bottom line is, it’s time to turn the page 

on more than a decade in which so much of our 

foreign policy was focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. When I took office, we had nearly 

180,000 troops in harm’s way. By the end of this 

year, we will have less than 10,000. In addition 

to bringing our troops home, this new chapter in 

American foreign policy will allow us to redirect 

some of the resources saved by ending these wars 

to respond more nimbly to the changing threat of 

terrorism, while addressing a broader set of priorities around the globe.

I think Americans have learned that it’s harder 

to end wars than it is to begin them. Yet this is 

how wars end in the twenty-first century—not 

through signing ceremonies, but through decisive blows against our adversaries, transitions to 

elected governments, security forces who take the 

lead and ultimately full responsibility. We remain 

committed to a sovereign, secure, stable, and unified Afghanistan. And toward that end, we will 

continue to support Afghan-led efforts to promote 

peace in their country through reconciliation. We 

have to recognize that Afghanistan will not be a 

perfect place, and it is not America’s responsibility to make it one. The future of Afghanistan 

must be decided by Afghans. But what the United 

States can do—what we will do—is secure our 

interests and help give the Afghans a chance, an 

Defense Imagery 1629687, photo by SSgt John Jackson

Marines from 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, prepare to load 

onto a KC-130 aircraft on the Camp Bastion flightline on 

27 October 2014. The battalion was the final infantry battalion to serve in Helmand Province.
159

opportunity to seek a long, overdue and hardearned peace. 

America will always keep our commitments to 

friends and partners who step up, and we will never 

waver in our determination to deny al-Qaeda the 

safe haven that they had before 9/11. That commitment is embodied by the men and women in and 

out of uniform who serve in Afghanistan today 

and who have served in the past. In their eyes, I 

see the character that sustains American security and our leadership abroad. These are mostly 

young people who did not hesitate to volunteer 

in a time of war. And as many of them begin to 

transition to civilian life, we will keep the promise we make to them and to all veterans, and make 

sure they get the care and benefits that they have 

earned and deserve.

This 9/11 generation is part of an unbroken line 

of heroes who give up the comfort of the familiar to serve a half a world away, to protect their 

families and communities back home, and to give 

people they never thought they’d meet the chance 

to live a better life. It’s an extraordinary sacrifice 

for them and for their families. But we shouldn’t 

be surprised that they’re willing to make it. That’s 

who we are as Americans. That’s what we do.

Tomorrow, I will travel to [U.S. Military Academy] West Point and speak to America’s newest 

class of military officers to discuss how Afghanistan fits into our broader strategy going forward. And I’m confident that if we carry out this 

approach, we can not only responsibly end our 

war in Afghanistan and achieve the objectives 

that took us to war in the first place, we’ll also be 

able to begin a new chapter in the story of American leadership around the world.

Thanks very much.

END

2:58 P.M. EDT
160

Cpl Jeffery Mount, SFAAT 2-215, prepares to depart FOB 

Nolay. SFAAT 2-215 is completing a seven-month deployment as the last advisors in support of the 2d Brigade, 215th 

Corps, ANA.

Defense Imagery 1314844, photo by Cpl Joshua Young
161

Last Marines Exit 

Sangin, Afghanistan

by Corporal Joshua Young

Leatherneck, July 2014

FOB Nolay, Afghanistan—The last Marines at 

Forward Operating Base (FOB) Nolay exited the 

Sangin Valley, leaving the 2d Brigade, 215th Corps, 

Afghan National Army (ANA) in full control of 

the FOB and the surrounding area. 

Marines from Security Force Assistance Advisor Team (SFAAT) 2-215 arrived at Camp Leatherneck following a seven-month deployment in a 

convoy out of Sangin Valley [on] 5 May. On the 

same day, the last leathernecks of 1st Battalion, 7th 

Marine Regiment, departed FOB Sabit Qadam, 

also in Sangin. 

The SFAAT 2-215 Marines and corpsmen 

were part of the last U.S. brigade-level advisor 

team in Regional Command Southwest, which 

includes Helmand and Nimroz Provinces. (The 

British continue to advise the 3d Brigade in central Helmand.) 

Marines preparing to redeploy expressed their 

feelings on leaving the FOB completely in the hands 

of 2d Brigade. “The 2d Brigade has had the torch 

for some time,” said Captain Joseph Dewson, an 

advisor with SFAAT 2-215. “We have been able 

to spend time with them and vested a personal 

interest in their success.” 

Colonel Christopher Douglas, the team leader 

for SFAAT 2-215, kept a “no interference” stance 

with his advisory unit. One of his goals was to 

rapidly allow the brigade to stand on its own with 
162

as little advisory help as possible to ensure its 

capability to defend the Sangin Valley from hostile attacks. 

By adopting that stance, the 2d Brigade has 

developed sustainable “Afghan solutions to Afghan 

problems” and, in turn, has become more confident in its problem-solving ability and ability to 

carry on the mission without coalition assistance. 

Many of the advisors believe the Afghan solutions 

work better than some of the Coalition force solutions used in the past. Although the “no interference” stance was kept, the advisors gave feedback 

to the leaders of 2d Brigade at every opportunity 

to reinforce their actions as well as to provide a 

positive learning environment. 

“I feel honored to have been part of the legacy left by previous Marines and Coalition forces,” 

said Douglas. “I expect to see them continue to 

focus on stability and actively opposing insurgent violence, to dominate and win every fight.” 

For some of the advisors, this was not their 

first time at FOB Nolay. Gunnery Sergeant John 

W. Greene, who was shot in [the] shoulder while 

returning enemy fire during November 2013, 

conducted monthly visits to the base from February 2011 to February 2012 as the division utilities chief for 2d Marine Division. He expressed 

his feelings on finally leaving after his second 

deployment in the area. 

“After being at FOB Nolay on my last deployment where it was all Marines, to now where the 

Afghans run the FOB, it feels good that the ANA 

are doing so well,” said Greene. “The 2d Brigade 

has been running strong, planning hard and executing missions on their own for a while now. 

They’re doing a super job denying the insurgents 

free movement of control.” 

Corporal Robert Santiago, the squad leader 

of FOB Nolay’s security force, nicknamed “The 

Guardians of Nolay,” worked to ensure the base 

was secure at all times. Although his role on the 

base did not allow him to directly advise the 

Afghans, he and his Marines always were present to provide security for the advisors. “It feels 

good to see a positive result from all our efforts 

here,” said Santiago. “I’m expecting to see more 

of the same great work they’ve been completing 

the entire time we’ve been working with them.” 

Major Paul D. Tremblay was the commander 

of Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, on 

FOB Nolay in 2011. He was involved in the major 

clearing operation that secured the upper Sangin 

Valley and the Kajaki District. This deployment’s 

end marks Tremblay’s second full deployment to 

FOB Nolay. 

“I couldn’t be more humbled to have the opportunity to be lucky enough to find myself in this 

position to close the doors and shut off the lights 

on such a prestigious base in Helmand Province,” 

said Tremblay, the deputy team leader, SFAAT 

2-215. “We’ve definitely set a foundation that 

Afghanistan can take the rest of the way forward.” 

The Sangin Valley is a hotbed for nefarious and 

illegal activities. It is strategic in its proximity to 

major corridors, such as Route 1 and Route 611. 

Drug runners and insurgents often travel on 

Route 1, which runs all the way through Afghanistan from Pakistan to Iran. The two routes are 

a crossroads for both trade and drug trafficking. 

Much of the Taliban’s funding comes from the 

profits of the poppy harvests. Black tar heroin is 

extracted from the poppy plants, and the drugs 

are shipped all over the world. 

The Taliban controls much of the heroin trade 

and are dependent on the industry. When the 

weather cools off, the insurgency turns toward 

facilitating the poppy planting. When planting 

begins, fighting almost ceases. 

In 2006, when they first entered the Sangin 

Valley after the resurgence of the Taliban, the 
163

Coalition forces had the lead role in all combat 

operations. During the course of the campaign, 

the lead has steadily been turned over to Afghan 

forces as the Coalition took on an advisory role. 

Success in the region has not come easily. Many 

from Coalition forces and the Afghan National 

Security Forces have paid the ultimate price to 

bring stability to the war-torn area. 

One of the most profound examples that illustrate the 2d Brigade’s eagerness to continue the 

fight and completely make it the unit’s own is the 

changing of the base name. Forward Operating 

Base Nolay now is known as Forward Operating 

Base Hamidullah. 

It was named after Lieutenant Hamidullah, 

who was a platoon commander in the 2d Brigade’s reconnaissance tolay (company). He was 

known for multiple heroics over the years and as 

one of the best platoon commanders and fighters in the 215th Corps. 

“As soon as the brigade’s executive officer 

told me they’d decided to change the name, I got 

excited,” Tremblay said. “It’s proof that we’ve 

done everything we can to set the conditions for 

transition, the effectiveness on how the Afghans 

themselves have accepted the transition and are 

willing to take ownership of it, make it their own 

and take it to the next step and the rest of the way. 

“The Afghans of the 2d Brigade have chosen to name these positions after their heroes 

and warfighters who had a reputation above and 

beyond their individual sacrifice on any particular day,” he continued. “Guys who we would hold 

up on high as an example of honor, courage and 

commitment.” 

Forward Operating Base Robinson also received 

a name change.*

 It now is known as FOB Rahatullah, named after Major Rahatullah, who was killed 

in an operation to disrupt enemy forces in support 

of the 5 April presidential elections. 

Note

Leatherneck 97, no. 7 (July 2014): 12–13. Reprinted 

with permission. Copyright Leatherneck.

About the Author

Corporal Joshua Young was assigned as a combat correspondent with Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade-Afghanistan (Task Force Leatherneck).

*

 FOB Robinson was originally named for SSgt Christopher 

L. Robinson with 2d Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group, 

who was killed in action on 25 March 2006.

Defense Imagery 1164084, photo by Cpl Joshua Young

SFAAT 2-215 provides security during a medical evacuation on an ANA base near FOB Nolay, Helmand Province.
164
Part VI

Looking Back
166

Setting Up a Patrol Base, Nawa District by Michael D. Fay.

Marine Corps Art Collection
From 2010 to 2014, the Marine Corps 

approached its increased role in Afghanistan with enthusiasm, employing the 

Corps’ traditional expertise in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. Additionally, the 

newly created U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special 

Operations Command (MARSOC) fully participated in U.S. Special Operations Command’s 

Afghanistan missions during this period. 

After years of effort, the Corps’ Camp Leatherneck stood as the last American base in Afghanistan. Marines turned the base over to the Afghan 

military in October 2014. Unfortunately, this act 

proved premature. Since 2014, the insurgency in 

Afghanistan has increased, and the U.S. Army has 

redeployed major units there. Marines remain in 

Afghanistan, serving in joint operations billets 

for the training mission. However, the Marine 

chapters of the Afghanistan war have concluded 

as of this writing.

167
168

A MARSOC Marine on patrol in Helmand Province.

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo, courtesy of Cpl Kyle 

McNally
169

MARSOC 

in Afghanistan, 

2010–14

by Dr. Frank L. Kalesnik

From the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism in 2001, special operations forces played an 

increasingly crucial role in military operations across 

the globe. The U.S. Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM) included Air Force, Army, and Navy 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) that performed 

a variety of missions, including civil affairs (CA), 

combating terrorism (CBT), direct action (DA), 

foreign internal defense (FID), information operations (IO), psychological operations (PSYOP), 

special reconnaissance (SR), and unconventional 

warfare (UW). From the beginning of Operation 

Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan (OEF-A), SOF 

contributed greatly to the success of the United 

States and its Coalition partners. 

The Marine Corps began contributing combatant forces to Special Operations Command 

with the establishment of the U.S. Marine Corps 

Special Operations Command Detachment, or 

Det One, in 2003. Deployed to Iraq in 2004 as 

part of the Naval Special Warfare Squadron, Det 

One performed several raids and provided support to both conventional and other special operations units. While not a direct lineal predecessor 

of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations 

Command (MARSOC), Det One, did help pave 

the way for the Marine command’s establishment 

(at Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’s 

insistence) in 2005. MARSOC was initially composed of a headquarters element and the Foreign 
170

Military Training Unit (FMTU), later known as 

the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group 

(MSOAG). These Special Operations Marines 

began deploying for foreign internal defense (FID) 

missions almost immediately, providing training 

and advisory support to friendly military forces 

in countries around the globe. 

Marine Special Operations Command quickly 

added 1st and 2d Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOBs), which were formed by the transfer 

of 1st and 2d Force Reconnaissance Companies. 

With these additional forces, the Marine command prepared to deploy Marine special operations companies (MSOCs), initially with Marine 

expeditionary units (MEUs). The first company 

deployed with the 26th MEU in January 2007, 

subsequently detaching to support OEF-A. These 

companies remained with the Marine expeditionary unit until arriving in theater, at which point 

they came under the control of the theater special operations commander (TSOC) and detached 

from the unit, which they later rejoined for the 

return voyage home. Major General Mastin M. 

Robeson assumed command of MARSOC from 

Major General Dennis J. Hejlik on 24 July 2008, 

and soon decided to keep the companies then 

deployed in Afghanistan in theater, effectively 

ending the deployment of companies with expeditionary units. He explained his reasons in a 2009 

oral history interview:

[T]he minute the MEU would break the 

CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command) 

Defense Imagery 778665, photo by Cpl Kyle McNally

A MARSOC Marine waits in ambush for insurgents during a joint patrol with ANA Special Forces soldiers in Nahr-e 

Saraj District, Helmand Province, on 3 April. Marines with MARSOC’s 1st MSOB recently returned from a nine-month 

deployment to Afghanistan, where they commanded the Special Operations Task Force-West and oversaw one of Afghanistan’s bloodiest regions. 
171

waters, the SOCCENT (Special Operations 

Command Central) Commander would pull 

them into West Afghanistan, and then they 

would depart when the MEU departed; so 

there was a gap of anywhere from fortyfive to ninety days between the companies 

[sic] presence. So in a COIN (counterinsurgency) fight, that’s a disastrous way to 

do business.1

Major General Robeson’s decision allowed companies “employed in Afghanistan . . . to properly 

turnover with the next MSOC and maintain operational continuity.” 

By February 2009, MARSOC established a 

two-company presence in Afghanistan, with 1st 

Marine Special Operations Battalion (MSOB) 

(located at Camp Pendleton, California) and 2d 

Marine Special Operations Battalion (located at 

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina) each providing 

companies as part of a rotating deployment cycle. 

MSOCs included Marine special operations 

teams (MSOTs), which operated from distinct 

locations, usually forward operating bases (FOBs). 

They often partnered with friendly Afghan forces, 

providing training and advisory assistance that 

boosted their partners’ operational capabilities. 

These were classic foreign internal defense missions, in which the 14-man teams worked to 

enhance the capabilities of larger allied units, acting as a combat multiplier that contributed significantly to operational success. 

When the Marine Special Operations Regiment (MSOR) stood up in August 2009, the 

Marine command reorganized to establish three 

Defense Imagery 778653, photo by Cpl Kyle McNally

A MARSOC Marine provides security at a landing zone in Nahr-e Saraj District, Helmand Province, on 28 March. 
172

Marine special operations battalions: two (1st 

and 2d MSOB) focused on OEF-A, while the 

3d MSOB (formed from the MSOAG) provided 

teams for missions in other theaters (and sometimes Afghanistan). An important milestone was 

the deployment of 1st MSOB’s command element 

as Special Operations Task Force 81 (SOTF-81), 

serving as a battalion-level headquarters for special operations forces in Afghanistan in November 

2009. Major General Robeson recalled the circumstances that led to the MARSOC’s deployment of 

its first special operations task force. 

I sat down with Admiral Olson (SOCOM 

Commander Admiral Eric T. Olson) in 

December of 2008, and said it’s not that I 

can’t do this, it’s just that it’s going to be 

very painful, and this has to be something 

that you, no kidding, think is that important for me to pull my command through 

this knot hole. And he looked me dead in 

the face and said, “Unless this breaks your 

Command, you need to do this. I need it 

and, to be candid, you need it more than 

you realize.”2

By the end of 2012, three special operations 

task forces had deployed to Afghanistan. Upon 

assuming leadership of Special Operations Task 

Force-West (SOTF-W), the command element of 

the 1st MSOB was responsible for special operations in Badghis, Farah, Ghor, Helmand, Herat, 

and Nimroz Provinces. At this time, emphasis 

was placed on village stability operations (VSO) 

in which the special operations forces partnered 

with local Afghan police in an effort to provide 

security and foster self-governance at the village 

level. Of particular note was the pacification of 

the Upper Gereshk Valley in Helmand Province, an area described as “the most violent in all 

of Afghanistan.” During this effort, SOTF-W 

coordinated the actions of an international force 

of 14,000 troops that included both conventional 

and special operations units. They also enabled 

Badghis Province to transition to Afghan governmental control, a significant achievement for 

a formerly volatile area.3

From 2010 until the conclusion of MARSOC’s 

participation in OEF-A in October 2014, the command’s 1st and 2d MSOBs continuously deployed 

Marines to Afghanistan as part of special operations task force staffs, with special operations 

companies, and as individual personnel serving 

in a variety of billets. The following list details the 

command’s support of Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan from 2010 to 2014.4

2010

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion

Marine Special Operations Task Force 81 HQ 

(14 October 2009–31 May 2010)

Marine Special Operations Company 811 

(25 July 2009–28 February 2010)

Marine Special Operations Company 812 

(6 January 2010–31 July 2010)

Marine Special Operations Company 813 

(26 August 2010–1 April 2011)

2d Marine Special Operations Battalion

Marine Special Operations Task Force-West HQ 

(31 May 2010–1 February 2011)

Marine Special Operations Company 821 

(18 November 2010–1 August 2010)

Marine Special Operations Company 822 

(14 October 2009–3 June 2010)

Marine Special Operations Company 823 

(30 April 2010–1 February 2011)

2011

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion

Marine Special Operations Company 811 
173

(10 March 2011–30 October 2011)

Marine Special Operations Company 812 

(29 September 2011–1 June 2012)

Marine Special Operations Company 813 

(26 August 2010–April 2011)

2d Marine Special Operations Battalion

Marine Special Operations Task Force-West HQ 

(31 May 2010–1 February 2011)

Marine Special Operations Company 821 

(18 November 2010–1 August 2011)

Marine Special Operations Company 822 

(12 June 2011–1 March 2012)

Marine Special Operations Company 823 

(30 April 2010–1 February 2011)

3d Marine Special Operations Battalion

Marine Special Operations Team 8311 to Marine 

Special Operations Company 811 

(29 June 2011–15 February 2012)

2012

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion

Special Operations Task Force 81.2 

(4 January 2012–1 October 2012)

Marine Special Operations Company 811 

(11 November 2012–7 July 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 812 

(29 September 2011–1 June 2012)

Marine Special Operations Company 813 

(7 June 2012–6 February 2013)

Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Forces Command Brief, 2013 

MARSOC organization.
174

2d Marine Special Operations Battalion

Special Operations Task Force 82.2 HQ 

(1 October 2012–1 June 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 821 

(15 September 2012–15 April 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 822 

(12 June 2011–1 March 2012)

Marine Special Operations Company 823 

(16 June 2012–15 August 2012)

3d Marine Special Operations Battalion

Marine Special Operations Team 8311 to Marine 

Special Operations Company 811 

(29 June 2011–15 February 2012)

Marine Special Operations Team 8323 to Marine 

Special Operations Company 821 

(13 August 2012–15 May 2013)

2013

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion

Marine Special Operations Company 811

(11 November 2012–7 July 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 812 

(7 July 2013–7 February 2014)

Marine Special Operations Company 813 

(7 June 2012–6 February 2013)

2d Marine Special Operations Battalion

Special Operations Task Force 82.2 

(1 October 2012–1 June 2013

Marine Special Operations Company 821 

(15 September 2012–15 May 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 822 

(15 April 2013–15 November 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 823 

(7 November 2013–1 June 2014)

3d Marine Special Operations Battalion

Marine Special Operations Team 8323 

(13 August 2012–15 May 2013)

2014

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion

Special Operations Task Force 81.3 HQ 

(1 February–1 October 2014)

2d Marine Special Operations Battalion

Marine Special Operations Company 821 

(16 May 2014–15 September 2014)

Marine Special Operations Company 823 

(7 November 2013–1 June 2014)

MARSOC’s efforts in Afghanistan had a significant impact on its growth. The Afghan experience shaped the assessment and selection of 

personnel, the evolution of doctrine, and training. The organization of the Marine special operations regiment, the Marine special operations 

support group, and their subordinate battalions 

also evolved significantly during this period. The 

following table of organization provides a snapshot of the command in 2013. 

In an oral history interview conducted in 2015, 

MARSOC Deputy Commander Colonel Joseph 

Marello explained the impact of Afghanistan 

deployments on the command’s maturation as a 

component Special Operations Command:

If you go all the way back to the beginning, 

the concept was that first and second battalions would source what basically was 

a Maritime Special Force to the east and 

west coast MEUs. The FMTU, the Foreign 

Military Training Unit, which became the 

Marine Special Operations Advisory Group 

would do episodic JCETs (Joint Combined 

Exchange Training) and those kinds of missions. Capacity building, enabling kinds of 

missions. But it was Afghanistan and the 

requirements there that drove us to separate from the MEU.5
175

He described how the Afghan experience influenced the command’s organizational structure:

It also drove us to our reorganization, the 

first reorganization really, that got away 

from a company that looked like a Force 

Reconnaissance platoon, and a rifle platoon, and some enablers, to what we have 

today. An MSOC, with four of its teams, 

fully enabled. Now, that was a process that 

occurred over some time, but the first reorganization that established that foundation 

occurred, I wouldn’t say it was because of 

Afghanistan, but just as we were making 

the movement from the MEU to deploying 

Marines directly to Afghanistan. The subsequent reorganization that followed was, 

I would say, almost entirely derived from 

lessons learned from Afghanistan. How to 

build an MSOT, an MSOC, how to enable 

it, and then how to build a Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), a battalion level 

headquarters task force.6

Colonel Marello explained the intensity of the 

command’s Afghanistan commitment:

At that time, in 2011 actually, the focus of 

effort for the command was sourcing forces 

to Afghanistan. It was almost all-consuming. 

At that time, we were maintaining a SOTF 

level headquarters of about 225 Marines, 

just for the headquarters, and then two fully 

enabled MSOCs. For the SOTF headquarters, we would do two battalion rotations 

of seven months each, and then the Army 

would pick up the third, and then we would 

come back again, so we would do two or 

three rotations.7

Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Forces Command Brief, 2013 

Marine Special Operations Company.
176

He observed, “It took just about all the capacity 

of the command to source that.”8

 He also noted:

And along with it, we didn’t have the capacity to source all of the SOTF itself. We also 

relied on the Marine Corps for augmentation. We weren’t fully built at that time. And 

so, going back to the Marine Corps at the 

quarterly synch conferences and confirming our requirements, and then following 

up through Headquarters Marine Corps 

for the actual sourcing, and then receiving 

and integrating a hundred plus Marines in 

each SOTF headquarters, was another sizable effort.9

It is important to recognize that, in addition 

to the critical skills operators from the Marine 

Special Operations Regiment who provided the 

“tip” of the MARSOC spear, the personnel of the 

Marine Special Operations Support Group and its 

subordinate battalions contributed the “enablers,” 

or special operations capabilities specialists that 

gave the spear its shaft.*

 Operational requirements called for additional personnel from outside MARSOC. According to Colonel Marello:

The SOTF headquarters required over 40 

percent augmentation from big Marine 

Corps. So communicators, engineers, generator mechanics, intelligence analysts, you 

name it, the combat support/combat service 

support aspects of the SOTF headquarters 

required significant augmentation.10

The high operational tempo placed strains on 

* The term critical skills operators refers to military occupational specialty 0372 and special operations capabilities specialists

refers to military occupational specialty 8071.

Defense Imagery 778648, photo by Cpl Kyle McNally

Coalition Special Operations Forces members provide security during a two-day presence patrol with Afghan commandos 

from the 9th Kandak in Farah Province on 27 February. 
177

the force. Former Marine Special Operations Support Group Commander Colonel Archibald M. 

McLellan explained:

Intel guys, and communicators, and JTACS 

[joint terminal attack controllers], were getting run at a very cyclic, ragged rate. We 

did not have a good degree of predictability, because we were sending out MSOCs 

and we were sending out SOTFs, and everybody needed everything, and everything 

was a priority. So really, our guys were running at a less than a 1 to 2 dwell to support 

SOTFs and MSOCs as we were growing 

the force during the initial days. It was not 

uncommon to have waivers and not even 

think about deferring training, but actually waiving it just so we could get guys out 

there. When they’d come back from their 

first or second deployment, and they had 

some breathing space, why would you send 

them through the training after they’d had 

all this experience.11

Major General Paul E. Lefebvre served as the 

commanding general of Marine Special Operations Command from 2010 to 2012. In an interview published in Marine Corps Outlook: 2010–2011 

Edition, he explained the SOTF’s function:

A key task for the SOTF is integration. On 

the battlefield we’re on, with the other government agencies operating there—State 

Department, Afghan government and military, our partners from other nations—

the SOTF integrates all those capabilities. 

SOTF means taking a Marine with a good 

understanding of counterinsurgency doctrine and putting him into the nebulous 

condition of ungoverned stations, where 

you want to understand human terrain. 

Marines are uniquely experienced in doing 

that from our OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) operations. And that is the essence of 

what that SOTF is doing.12

The MSOCs subordinate to the task forces 

also performed a command and control function. The following chart depicts their table of 

organization. The base company (four teams and 

the headquarters element) were augmented with 

several support personnel. As the chart shows, a 

fully enabled company (with four teams, each of 

1 Marine officer, 11 Marine enlisted, and 2 Navy 

corpsmen), could well exceed a hundred personnel with the addition of combat service and combat service support Marines. 

In an interview with The Year in Special Operations: 2012–2013 Edition, Major Andrew Christian 

of MSOC A, 1st MSOB stated:

When we deploy an MSOC, we have about 

105 personnel. But SOCOM realized the 

MSOC can be the HQ [headquarters] for a 

much larger SOF (Special Operations Force), 

so we have taken the MSOC’s headquarters 

and three teams and attached under that 

one Navy SEAL platoon and two to three 

ODAs [operational detatchment-alpha]. 

Additionally, we took a standard unit—

[U.S. Army’s] 1st [Battalion] of the 505th 

Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne [Division]. When you add all those 

attached forces, you have more than 500 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines operating under one MSOC commander, which 

is a substantial capability.13

Major Christian went on to explain the companies’ relationship with the task force:

The MSOC, with those maneuver elements, 

has SOTF-West above us, a battalion-level 
178

unit responsible for the largest chunk of 

real estate in Afghanistan. SOTF-W also 

has a similar company operating further 

west, so it is a larger snapshot of what we 

were doing, with the mission to command 

all special forces in the western section of 

the country.14

MSOC activities during this period were an 

outstanding example of distributed operations. 

Though the 500-man formation described above 

seems large, it was operating across more than 

50,000 square miles of western Afghanistan. As 

such, they were spread widely across key villages 

and engagement areas but were never isolated. 

They were able to maintain robust capabilities 

through the strong, multilayered command and 

control systems of the special operations task force 

and through the complete integration of critical 

enablers into combat formations all the way down 

to the team level. Each team was reinforced with 

at least one joint tactical air controller and a fourMarine intelligence team. The team was connected 

to national intelligence systems. The team could 

be further augmented with explosive ordinance 

disposal and military dog teams, all tied together 

through multiple data and voice communication 

systems. Each of these reinforced teams was capable of independent operations, producing intelligence for others as well as producing and acting 

on intelligence on their own area, while always 

cognizant that their “independent actions” were 

actually being coordinated and synchronized by 

the company and task force commanders to maximize their cumulative effects.15

The versatility of this task-organized special 

operations team was on display as special operations efforts turned to village stability operations (VSOs). Reinforced MSOTs were able to 

enter unsympathetic villages, establish a persistent 

presence there, and begin to turn the tide of popular opinion all the while leveraging critical combat 

support and combat service support capabilities to 

conduct the entire spectrum of SOF operations to 

kinetic F3EAD (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, 

and disseminate) operations to civil affairs and key 

leader engagements. Alone, the reinforced team 

was a potent multifunctional unit. Then, when 

paired with a partner force, the team helped the 

allied force take on significant combat operations 

with confidence and clear expectation of success.16

With MSOC’s Afghan mission complete, the 

concept for its employment changed to one focused 

on subregional alignment. The MSOBs were redesignated as Raider battalions in 2015; now they 

each provide a company to theater special operation commands in Pacific Command (1st Raider 

Battalion), Central Command (2d Raider Battalion), and Africa Command (3d Raider Battalion). 

The companies are fully enabled to perform all of 

MSOC’s core activities, and maintain a persistent 

presence in their assigned subregion. While special operations Marines are not currently deploying 

to Afghanistan, their experience there continues 

to influence their conduct of current operations, 

and will into the foreseeable future.17

Notes

1. MajGen Mastin M. Robeson, MARSOC 

commander, intv w conducted by 

MARSOC Command Historian Cynthia 

Hayden, 9 November 2009.

2. Ibid.

3. Cpl Kyle McNally, “SOTF-West Returns 

from Deployment,” MARSOC Marine 

Corps, 30 November 2012.

4. Frank Kalesnik, MARSOC command 

historian, “MARSOC OEF-A Deployments, 2010–2014” (unpublished unit 

list, 22 September 2015).
179

5. Col Joseph Marello, oral history intvw, 

2015.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Col Archibald M. McLellan, oral history 

intvw, 23 June 2015. 

12. J. R. Wilson, “The State of MARSOC: 

Interview with MajGen Paul E. Lefebvre,” Defense Media Network, 11 November 2010.

13. J. R. Wilson, “MARSOC Year in Review,” 

The Year in Special Operations: 2012–2013 

Edition (Tampa, FL: Defense Media Network, 2013): 36–42.

14. Ibid., 39–40.

15. Gary Oles, MARSOC Deputy G-3, comments to author, 25 August 2015.

16. Ibid.

17. “Concept of Employment” from Marine 

Corps Forces, Special Operations Forces 

Command Brief, 2013.
180

CWO2 James Law, the jump platoon commander and battalion gunner for 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, walks across a 

bridge in Nawa, Helmand Province, while providing security on 22 October 2010. 

Defense Imagery 101022, photo by Sgt Mark Fayloga
181

Marine Commanders

Reflect on 13 Years 

of War 

in Afghanistan

by Hope Hodge Seck

Marine Corps Times, 5 November 2014

It was late 2010, and Sergeant Philip A. McCulloch Jr. was locked into what may have been the 

darkest battle of America’s longest war.

The gauntly thin 22-year-old squad leader for 

Kilo Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, had gotten too used to seeing the men in his unit killed 

by roadside bombs or enemy fire in the Sangin 

Valley, a hotly contested district in Afghanistan’s 

Helmand Province that buzzed with insurgent 

activity. He did not allow himself to feel grief; he 

just got angry.

That anger boiled over when Corporal Tevan 

L. Nguyen, 21 [years old], was killed by an improvised explosive device [on] 28 December [2010], 

shortly before the unit would return home. “Nguyen’s death was the result of treachery,” McCulloch 

said. Taliban representatives had brokered a temporary cease-fire with the unit, surrendering weapons and claiming they had cleared IEDs from the 

area where 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, patrolled.

When it became clear that the deal had been a 

lie, “it was game on,” McCulloch said. “We made 

sure that we went out there and let them know 

they made a mistake. And they paid for it with 

their lives and a lot of blood, a lot.”
182

Just over a week later, McCulloch, fueled by 

his emotion, would earn the Silver Star for exceptional valor in the face of death while leading an 

aggressive six-hour pursuit of the enemy that culminated in a dramatic air assault. When it was 

over, the battlefield was littered with dead Taliban fighters and their motorcycles.

Four years later, McCulloch still feels the loss 

of his brothers-in-arms. But he no longer believes 

the war they fought together was worth the cost 

they paid. As news broke in late October that the 

Marines had concluded their combat operations, 

McCulloch’s skepticism and frustration regarding 

Afghanistan appears to be the rule rather than the 

exception. A half-dozen active-duty Marines who 

spoke with Marine Corps Times are unanimous in 

their belief that it is time for U.S. forces to pull 

out of the country after 13 years of combat. But 

most expressed doubt about the country’s ability 

to sustain progress.

McCulloch stays in touch with his Afghan 

interpreter from Sangin, whom he says receives 

daily death threats now that the Marines have 

pulled out. Despite positive reports about the 

development, improvement, and fighting spirit of 

the Afghan National Army’s 215th Corps, which 

took over for the Marines in Helmand Province, 

McCulloch said he has little faith in their mettle 

based on his own experiences working with them 

in 2010 and 2011. He feels the Marines’ counterinsurgency strategy, with its village shuras, cash 

investments, and focus on building local trust and 

relationships made them less effective at defeating the enemy.

And above all, he believes that no amount of 

time would be sufficient to win a “thousand-year 

war” fueled by intricate Afghan tribal relationships and cultural codes. Before long, McCulloch 

said, it will be like the Marines were never there.

“I give it less than 12 months,” he said.

A Marine sergeant who deployed to Afghanistan in 2012 as part of an embedded training team 

expressed faith in the Afghan troops’ willingness 

and ability to fight the insurgency on their own, but 

said the U.S. forces were hopelessly overmatched 

when it came to effecting lasting change in a country beset by corruption and disarray. “How can 

14 years fix 2,000 years?” he said.

Amid the pessimism and disappointment, former commanders of Marine forces in Afghanistan say that, while the future of Afghanistan is 

a mystery, the Marines have many reasons to be 

proud of their part in this long, hard war. Two 

things, specifically, they all agreed were certain: the 

Marines leave Afghanistan having achieved victory in their mission, and the Corps would never 

be the same for having served there.

Out of Afghanistan

Early in the morning on 26 October, the last 872 

Marines remaining in Helmand Province boarded 

[Lockheed] C-130 [Hercules] jets and left for Kandahar Airfield, a brief stop on their way back to 

the United States. They left behind a few hundred million dollars worth of dusty desert tents 

and hard-shelled structures, all-terrain vehicles, 

and an airstrip. Little remained by way of monument to the tens of thousands of Marines who 

cycled through Camp Leatherneck since 2009, 

when President [Barack H.] Obama ordered a 

surge of 30,000 troops into Afghanistan. The 

neighboring Nimroz and Farah Provinces, which 

had seen hard-fought battles between Marines and 

the insurgency in previous years, had long since 

been turned back over to the Afghans, their bases 

dismantled or handed off.

The first Marine force had swept into Afghanistan just weeks after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center buildings 

and Pentagon. Led by then-Brigadier General 
183

James N. Mattis, who would eventually become 

a four-star commander of U.S. Central Command, 

Task Force 58, was more than 1,000-strong, composed of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit [15th 

MEU], 26th MEU, and other Navy and Marine 

Corps elements.

From ships at sea, the task force would move 

inland on CH-53s to establish Forward Operating Base Rhino, southwest of Kandahar in the 

Registan Desert. They also took control of the 

international airport in Kandahar, assisted with 

security at the U.S. embassy in Kabul, and conducted a variety of reconnaissance missions.

But while the Marine Corps was first on the 

ground in 2001, its work in Afghanistan would 

begin in earnest some seven years later when 

the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit returned to 

Kandahar, then moved into the Taliban stronghold of Garmsir in Helmand Province, a littlepopulated hotbed for insurgent activity in the 

southern reaches of Afghanistan, where poppy 

farming fueled a thriving drug trade. Later the 

same year, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, deployed to 

Helmand and Farah Provinces, waging a pitched 

battle with insurgents from Now Zad to Delaram. 

When the surge hit its stride the following year, 

11,000 Marines joined British troops operating in 

Helmand. As the surge troops established themselves in Helmand and southern Afghanistan, 

this region would become affectionately known 

as “Marineistan.”

“I think we understood going into Afghanistan, when we got that mission, it was really the 

two-fisted fighter,” said Major General Larry D. 

Nicholson, who as a one-star general in 2009 led 

the 10,000 troops who fell under Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan. “We were going 

to go after the Taliban, but we were really going 

to go after the population.” To that end, Nicholson said, the work was complex.

“Where we went, we cleared. Where we cleared, 

we stayed. And where we stayed, we built,” Nicholson said. “We were very determined to go to 

those population centers. It’s a remote area, but 

those population centers, we worked very hard to 

get there and start building, not American trust, 

but [Afghan] trust in their government.”

Marjah and Sangin

Despite the Marines’ focus on civil affairs and the 

tenets of counterinsurgency, it became clear, said 

Nicholson, that they would have to aggressively 

pursue the insurgency deep into its own territory.

“We were reminded constantly, ‘Yeah, the 

Marines are doing okay there [in Helmand]. We’re 

impressed with what the British and Marines and 

Danes and Estonians are doing,’ ” Nicholson said. 

“ ‘But the enemy’s in Marjah. When are you going 

to go there?’ ”

The urban region of Marjah, Nicholson said, 

had all but seceded from the rest of Helmand Province. “They flew a Taliban flag,” he said. “And we 

took that away from them.”

Launched 13 February 2010, Operation Moshtarak was led by 1,500 troops with 1st Battalion, 6th 

Marines, in conjunction with British, Afghan, and 

allied international troops. As the fighting stretched 

on for months, casualty rates climbed. Dozens 

of Marines would ultimately become casualties 

of the Marjah campaign. Progress in the region 

was slow as troops struggled to win the trust of 

local civilians they sought to help.

In May 2010, Army General Stanley A. 

McChrystal, then the commander of all allied 

forces in Afghanistan, called Marjah a “bleeding 

ulcer” on the war effort. The region would ultimately become one of Helmand Province’s success stories, commanders who oversaw the effort 

there said, with Taliban activity quenched, schools 

and markets [were] built and restored, and 
184

recently a peaceful presidential election [was 

held].

But that would not take place, said Lieutenant General Richard P. Mills, former two-star 

commander of Regional Command-Southwest 

[RC-SW] overseeing Helmand, until the Marines 

launched what would be their most difficult and 

costly Afghan offensive yet.

“We took the pressure off Marjah by going into 

Sangin,” said Mills, now the commanding general 

of Marine Forces Reserve. “Sangin was critical to 

the enemy; it was an area the enemy was not going 

to give up. And the minute we went into Sangin, 

the pressure in Marjah was relieved.”

Ultimately, Mills said, sending Marines into 

Sangin was the right decision. But nothing about 

it was easy.

During the 2010 assault on Sangin, 25 members of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, would lose their 

lives. The death toll in Sangin would ultimately 

rise to some 50 Marines and 100 British troops, 

who had held a presence in the Taliban hotbed 

and opium hub even before the Marines arrived. 

But when the Marines finally handed Sangin over 

to members of the 215th Corps this spring, it was 

on the heels of a relatively peaceful primary election. The insurgents, while still active, had been 

pushed to the fringes of the population centers, 

at least for the time being.

“That’s the tough part of being a commander,” 

Mills said. “You hope that the courage and bravery and dedication of those young Marines, that 

they can stick to it, and they did. But every casualty report is tough. They hurt, they hit home. As 

commander, you have to look at the strategic level 

of what you’re trying to do.”

Just a few years later, it was clear, Nicholson 

said, that these Afghanistan campaigns had an 

elite place in Marine Corps history.

“The iconic battles of this last decade have 

been . . . Fallujah, Ramadi, Sangin, and Marjah,” 

he said. “We fought like hell to take those areas.”

Lessons from Afghanistan

The Marine Corps emerges from Afghanistan a 

changed force, due in part to the maturity and 

ingenuity gained from 13 years at war and in part 

from the passage of time.

Afghanistan saw the first major combat mission for the [Bell Boeing] MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, which now is an operational staple for 

the Marines in practically every theater imaginable. 

The Marines also benefited from the M142 High 

Mobility Artillery Rocket System [HIMARS], a 

truck-mounted long-range rocket they had used 

first in Anbar Province, Iraq, but employed more 

heavily in Helmand Province, deploying 400 of 

the powerful rounds by January 2013.

The war also saw the extended use of Marine 

Corps Forces Special Operations Command. MARSOC, which activated in 2006, matured throughout the war. The first deployment of a MARSOC 

company to Afghanistan in early 2007 was a disaster that resulted in as many as 19 civilian casualties and an order from the U.S. Army to return 

home early. But the rule breaking and heedlessness that allegedly marked that first deployment 

[were] soon quelled.

To date, MARSOC troops have earned five 

Navy Crosses for heroism in Afghanistan, [with] 

about a third of those awarded in that time period. 

Mills said MARSOC teams, operating in and 

around Helmand Province, were a force multiplier for the Marines.

“They were operating kind of semi-independently,” he said. “They were able to cover down 

on an area and backstop local security forces. They 

showed the enemy we have the ability to operate 

wherever and whenever we wanted to. And they 

did a tremendous job in combat.”
185

As the mission in Afghanistan progressed, 

the Marines also prioritized cultural training and 

basic language classes, briefing Marines on how to 

relate to Afghan civilians. This included sit-down 

classes and having troops attend shuras at mockAfghan villages staffed by role-players.

Following a surge in deadly insider attacks targeting Marines in 2012 and 2013, the Corps implemented more advanced cultural and language 

integration for senior officers that drilled them on, 

among other things, the tenets of Afghan cultural 

norms. Marines in Afghanistan told Marine Corps 

Times earlier this year that they credited this training with defusing more potential insider attacks.

Nicholson said this cultural learning strategy 

had been critical to success in Marjah.

“We spent an inordinate amount of time trying to understand the human terrain in Marjah. 

We had PhDs helping us try to understand that 

human dynamic,” he said. “The trick now, frankly, 

is, that we don’t lose it. All these skill sets that 

we’ve acquired, don’t let them get away.”

Nicholson is now pushing to rewrite the Marines’ 

Small Wars Manual to incorporate the specific cultural lessons learned in Afghanistan.

The Question of Victory

The war in Helmand Province has felt progressively less like a war since the Marines began 

transferring authority of various regions back 

to Afghan forces more than two years ago. In 

the last 12 months, even the Marines’ adviseand-mentor mission has dwindled to nothing as 

officials encouraged the 215th Corps to operate 

independently. As troops stood guard outside Camp 

Leatherneck with few missions outside the base 

and little formal monitoring of what took place 

in the regions from which they had departed, it 

was a strange way to end a war.

Brigadier General Daniel D. Yoo, the commander

of RC-SW and Marine Expeditionary BrigadeAfghanistan during its last year in Helmand, said 

this lack of action had proven to be one of the 

hardest things for Marines in the war’s final phase.

“We’re very aggressive by nature,” he said. 

“We look for solutions, there’s no doubt about it.”

What had helped to counter this frustration, he 

said, was observing the progress the 215th Corps 

had made since it was created from scratch in 2009 

with a few handpicked leaders from the 205th Corps 

in Kandahar. The Marines helped Afghan troops 

create and man a regional corps battle school that 

equips new soldiers with a higher level of standardized training in Helmand, so the Corps does 

not have to send them to Kabul and risk losing 

them to the bigger city. They also trained Afghan 

tactical air controllers for the Corps’ new fleet of 

[Mil] Mi-17 [Hip-H transport] and Mi-35 [Hind 

E gunship] helicopters.

A visit to the battle school’s firing range makes 

clear that some of the Afghans’ military skills 

remain rudimentary, but Yoo points to Sangin 

as evidence of what their future could hold. Following the Marines’ departure, an intense fighting 

season resulted in heavy ANA [Afghan National 

Army] and civilian casualties. Afghan-held checkpoints changed hands, but Marine officials said 

the troops were ultimately able to regain them 

all. Yoo said a successful outcome in contested 

regions like Sangin might be a brokered peace or 

arranged coexistence between the government 

and Taliban and tribal factions.

“As long as the district centers are open, as long 

as the major lines of communication are open in 

order to provide services, and people can move 

from district center to district center, that to me is 

somewhat stable,” Yoo said. “It’s when, what we 

saw in the past when the insurgents ruled everything to include the local law, that’s when I think 

it’s probably a perspective that there’s failure there.”
186

Did the Marines Achieve Victory 

in Their Helmand Mission?

“Absolutely,” Yoo said.

Like Yoo, Mills said time will prove the longterm effect of the Marines’ efforts and the Afghan 

troops’ ability to sustain the change. “I expect the 

insurgents to test the force that we left behind; I 

think that everybody expects that,” he said. “My 

prediction is that will surge over the next fighting season, and that will be the ultimate decision. 

The next two or three years will be critical.” He 

argued that accomplishments, such as building 

schools, viewed by some Marines to be extraneous to the task of warfighting, were actually crucial 

to the success of Helmand Province. “It showed 

that the insurgents could no longer threaten the 

people into doing what they wanted. That was an 

important metric on our success. Because the Taliban hated education.”

Nicholson said he was cautiously optimistic 

about the future of Helmand, though he said it was 

imperfect and a work in progress. He was proud, 

he said, of what the Marines had done. For the 

country of Afghanistan, he said, the proof of victory is in peace. “A country at peace with itself and 

its neighbors, able to provide for its own security, 

that kind of smells like victory to me,” he said.

Mattis, the legendary Marine commander who 

led the invasion of Afghanistan, declined to speculate on the long-term effects of the Marines’ work 

there, saying he had a variety of reasons for wanting to remain silent on the topic for now. But he 

offered a statement of appreciation for the work 

of the Marines nonetheless.

Defense Imagery 1631686, photo by Sgt Dustin D. March

BrigGen Daniel D. Yoo (left) and SgtMaj Douglas E. Berry (right) walk toward a hangar after arriving at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, on 27 October 2014. The Marines transitioned to Kandahar after the end of RC-SW operations in Helmand Province. 
187

“General Mattis might have said the Marines 

are no better friend and no worse enemy,” he said, 

“but it was the lads in the infantry and the engineers who proved it beyond a doubt.”

Note

Marine Corps Times, 5 November 2014. Reprinted 

with permission. Copyright Marine Corps Times.

About the Author

Hope Hodge Seck was a staff writer with the 

Marine Corps Times from 2013 to 2015.
188
Appendices

191

Appendix A:

Command and Staff List

2010

International Security Assistance Force, Regional Command-Southwest 

[ISAF RC-SW]

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade [2d MEB]

Commanding General: BGen Lawrence D. Nicholson

Deputy: Col George S. Amland

Chief of Staff: Col William P. McLaughlin

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Ernest K. Hoopii

G-1: LtCol John W. Bicknell Jr.

G-2: LtCol Scott T. Derkach

G-3: Col Michael P. Killion

G-4: Col Christopher B. Edwards

G-6: Col Allan M. Faxon Jr.

Command Element

2d MEB Headquarters Group

Commanding Officer: LtCol Christopher L. Naler

Marine Ground Combat Element

Regimental Combat Team 2 [RCT-2]

Commanding Officer: Col P. J. Kennedy

1st Battalion, 2d Marines [1st Bn, 2d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael A. Manning

Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7]

Commanding Officer: Col Randall P. Newman

2d Battalion, 2d Marines [2d Bn, 2d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John E. McDonough

1st Battalion, 3d Marines [1st Bn, 3d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol James M. Baker
192

3d Battalion, 4th Marines [3d Bn, 4th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Martin F. Wetterauer III

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Calvin A. Worth

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brian S. Christmas

3d Battalion, 10th Marines [3d Bn, 10th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Todd R. Finley

4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [4th LAR]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael S. Martin

Marine Aviation Combat Element

Marine Aircraft Group 40 [MAG-40]

Commanding Officer: Col Kevin S. Vest

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Regiment 2 [CLR-2]

Commanding Officer: Col John W. Simmons

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [I MEF (Fwd)]

Commanding General: MajGen Richard P. Mills

Deputy: BGen George P. R. Norton, United Kingdom-Afghanistan [UK-A]

Chief of Staff: Col Kevin F. Frederick

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Micheal P. Barrett

G-1: LtCol Edward A. Garland

G-2: Col Steven M. Hanson

G-3: Col Barry J. Fitzpatrick Jr.

G-4: Col John C. Malik

G-6: Col Nicholas S. Chapman, UK-A

Command Element

2d Radio Battalion (Forward) [2d Radio Bn (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew G. Rau
193

8th Communication Battalion (Forward) [8th Comm Bn (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael B. Schweighardt

2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [2d ANGLICO]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Leland W. Suttee

Marine Ground Combat Element

Regimental Combat Team 1 [RCT-1]

Commanding Officer: Col David J. Furness

2d Battalion, 1st Marines [2d Bn, 1st Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew S. Reid

3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Benjamin T. Watson

2d Battalion, 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kyle B. Ellison

2d Battalion, 3d Marines [2d Bn, 3d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John W. Evans Jr.

Regimental Combat Team 2 [RCT-2]

Commanding Officer: Col P. J. Kennedy

1st Battalion, 2d Marines [1st Bn, 2d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael A. Manning

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jeffrey C. Holt

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brian S. Christmas

2d Battalion, 9th Marines [2d Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol James R. Fullwood

Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7]

Commanding Officer: Col Randall P. Newman
194

1st Battalion, 3d Marines [1st Bn, 3d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol James M. Baker

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Clay C. Tipton

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [1st LAR]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Scott D. Leonard

4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [4th LAR]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael S. Martin

1st Reconnaissance Battalion [1st Recon]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael J. Mooney

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [3d MAW (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen Andrew W. O’Donnell Jr.

Assistant Commander: Col Eric K. Fippinger

Chief of Staff: Col Shaun L. Sadler

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Anthony A. Spadaro

G-1: Maj Kristin L. McCann

G-2: LtCol George J. David

G-3: Col Jack P. Monroe

G-4: LtCol James A. Coler

G-6: LtCol Robert K. Maldonado

Marine Air Control Group 38 (Forward) [MACG-38 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas J. Dodds

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Douglas V. Glasgow

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 [HMH-362]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas A. Pecina

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brendan Reilly
195

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 [VMFA-122]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John A. Bolt

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (-) [VMGR-252 (-)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Brent A. Johnson

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 [VMM-264]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jeffrey P. Hogan

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 [VMM-365]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Craig C. LeFlore

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Daniel T. Lathrop

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 [MALS-16]

Commanding Officer: LtCol James C. Carroll III

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas M. Fahy

2011

9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan [9th AETF-A]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 [VMAQ-1]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Chandler P. Seagraves

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 3 [VMAQ-3]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Marty A. Moore

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 [VMAQ-4]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Marlin C. Benton

International Security Assistance Force, Regional Command-Southwest 

[ISAF RC-SW]

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [I MEF (Fwd)]

(January–March 2011) 
196

Commanding General: MajGen Richard P. Mills

Deputy: BGen George P. R. Norton, UK-A

Chief of Staff: Col Kevin F. Frederick

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Micheal P. Barrett

G-1: LtCol Edward A. Garland

G-2: Col Steven M. Hanson

G-3: Col Barry J. Fitzpatrick

G-4: Col John C. Malik

G-6: Col Nicholas S. Chapman, UK-A

Command Element

2d Radio Battalion (Forward) [2d Radio Bn (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew G. Rau

8th Communication Battalion (Forward) [8th Comm Bn (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael B. Schweighardt

2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [2d ANGLICO]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Leland W. Suttee

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Forward) [1st MarDiv (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen Joseph L. Osterman

Chief of Staff: Col Robert F. Castellvi

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Phillip A. Fascetti

G-1: Maj Daniel C. Hench (until March 2011)

LtCol Keither R. Moore

G-2: LtCol Jeffrey H. Hauser

G-3: Col Robert L. Gardner

G-4: Col William B. Spahn

G-6: LtCol Richard J. Bordonaro

Regimental Combat Team 1 [RCT-1]

Commanding Officer: Col David J. Furness

Executive Officer: LtCol Robert K. Schwarz

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Bryan K. Zickefoose
197

Regimental Combat Team 2 [RCT-2]

Commanding Officer: Col P. J. Kennedy

Executive Officer: LtCol Steven J. Grass

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj G. W. Young

2d Battalion, 1st Marines [2d Bn, 1st Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew S. Reid

2d Battalion, 3d Marines [2d Bn, 3d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Christopher G. Dixon (until December 2011)

 LtCol Charles R. Cassidy

3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jason L. Morris

1st Battalion, 8th Marines [1st Bn, 8th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Daniel T. Canfield Jr.

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John D. Harrill III

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Farrell J. Sullivan

3d Battalion, 9th Marines [3d Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol David W. Hudspeth

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [3d LAR]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kenneth R. Kassner

2d Reconnaissance Battalion [2d Recon]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Lawrence K. Hussey

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [3d MAW (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen Andrew W. O’Donnell Jr.

Assistant Commander: Col Eric K. Fippinger

Chief of Staff: Col Shaun L. Sadler

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Anthony A. Spadaro
198

G-1: Maj Kristin L. McCann

G-2: LtCol George J. David (until January 2011)

Maj Ryan C. Shaffer

G-3: Col Jack P. Monroe

G-4: LtCol James A. Coler

G-6: LtCol Robert K. Maldonado

Marine Air Control Group 38 (Forward) [MACG-38 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas J. Dodds

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Douglas V. Glasgow

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 [HMH-362]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas A. Pecina

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 [HMH-461]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Scott W. Wadle

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 [HMH-463]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Peter S. Gadd

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brendan Reilly

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 [VMFA-122]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John A. Bolt

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (-) [VMGR-252 (-)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Brent A. Johnson (until January 2011)

 Maj Scott M. Koltick

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 [VMM-264]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jeffrey P. Hogan

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 266 (Reinforced) [VMM-266 (Rein)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Romin Dasmalchi

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 [VMM-365]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Craig C. LeFlore
199

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Daniel T. Lathrop

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 [MALS-16]

Commanding Officer: LtCol James C. Carroll III

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas M. Fahy

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [II MEF (Fwd)]

(March–December 2011) 

Commanding General: MajGen W. John A. Toolan Jr.

Deputy Commander: BGen Nicholas Welch, UK-A

Chief of Staff: Col Lawrence E. Killmeier Jr.

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Michael F. Jones

C-1: Col Mary A. Augustitus*

C-2: Col Dave W. Burton

C-3: Col Norman L. Cooling

C-4: Col Jeffrey M. Reagan

C-6: Col David W. McMorries

Command Element

1st Battalion, 23d Marines [1st Bn, 23d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol R. Todd Zink

1st Battalion, 25th Marines [1st Bn, 25th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brian O’Leary

2d Intelligence Battalion (Forward) [2d Intel Bn (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Joseph Gross

2d Radio Battalion (Forward) [2d Radio Bn (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew G. Rau

* In the U.S. military, the commanding officer’s rank determines whether the staff sections are designated by a G or an S. 

Organizations commanded by generals have G staffs. Other organizations have S staffs. Two exceptions are joint commands, 

which contain forces from multiple Services, and are designated with a J, and combined commands, which contain multinational forces and are designated with a C. 
200

8th Communication Battalion (Forward) [8th Comm Bn (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael B. Schweighardt

1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [1st ANGLICO]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brian T. Bruggeman

2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [2d ANGLICO]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Leland W. Suttee

Marine Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Division (Forward) [2d MarDiv (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen Lewis A. Craparotta

Chief of Staff: Col Andrew H. Smith

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Joseph D. Shaw

G-1: LtCol Keith F. Moore

G-2: LtCol Robert J. Plevell (until July 2011)

Col Richard E. Anders

G-3: Col Kenneth M. DeTreux

G-4: Col Kyle J. Nickel

G-6: LtCol Dudley R. Griggs

Regimental Combat Team 1 [RCT-1]

Commanding Officer: Col David J. Furness

Executive Officer: LtCol Donald Wright

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Bryan K. Zickefoose

Regimental Combat Team 5 [RCT-5]

Commanding Officer: Col Roger B. Turner Jr.

Executive Officer: LtCol Peter Wilson

Regimental Combat Team 8 [RCT-8]

Commanding Officer: Col Eric M. Smith

Executive Officer: LtCol Steven G. Luhrsen

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj David L. Jobe

2d Battalion, 1st Marines [2d Bn, 1st Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew S. Reid
201

3d Battalion, 2d Marines [3d Bn, 2d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Christopher G. Dixon (until December 2011)

 LtCol Charles R. Cassidy

1st Battalion, 3d Marines [1st Bn, 3d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Sean M. Riordan

2d Battalion, 3d Marines [2d Bn, 3d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John W. Evans Jr.

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew J. Palma

2d Battalion, 4th Marines [2d Bn, 4th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol William H. Vivian

1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas B. Savage

3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jason L. Morris

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol George S. Benson

2d Battalion, 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew T. Morrissey

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Daniel A. Schmitt

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Seth W. B. Folsom

1st Battalion, 8th Marines [1st Bn, 8th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Daniel T. Canfield

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John D. Harrill III
202

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Farrell J. Sullivan

1st Battalion, 9th Marines [1st Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Tyler J. Zagurski

2d Battalion, 9th Marines [2d Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael S. Styskal

3d Battalion, 9th Marines [3d Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol David W. Hudspeth

1st Battalion, 10th Marines [1st Bn, 10th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jeffrey C. Smitherman

1st Battalion, 12th Marines [1st Bn, 12th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Sean S. Charney

2d Combat Engineer Battalion [2d CEB]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Andrew M. Niebel (until April 2011)

 LtCol Eric R. Quehl

3d Combat Engineer Battalion [3d CEB]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John P. Sullivan Jr.

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [1st LAR]

Commanding Officer: LtCol George C. Schreffler III

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [3d LAR]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kenneth R. Kassner

2d Reconnaissance Battalion [2d Recon]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Lawrence K. Hussey

3d Reconnaissance Battalion [3d Recon]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Travis L. Homiak

Marine Aviation Combat Element

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [2d MAW (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen Glenn M. Walters
203

Assistant Commander: Col Russell A. C. Sanborn (until May 2011)

Col Ben Hancock

Chief of Staff: Col Ben Hancock (until May 2011)

Col Mary J. McGregor (until June 2011)

Col James L. Parker

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Henry A. Prutch II

G-1: Maj Harry L. Gardner

G-2: LtCol Jeffrey S. Stimpson

G-3: Col Jefferson L. DuBinok

G-4: Col Mary J. MacGregor (until May 2011)

LtCol Tyson B. Geisendorff

G-6: Maj Luke L. Fabiunke

Marine Air Control Group 28 (-) [MACG-28 (-)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas P. Bajus II (until September 2011)

 LtCol John R. Siary

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 [HMH-363]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Mark S. Revor

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 [HMH-463]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Peter S. Gadd

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 [HMH-464]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Alison J. Thompson

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brendan Reilly

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267 [HMLA-267]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew T. Mowery

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 (-) [HMLA-369 (-)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Ian R. Clark

Marine Attack Squadron 223 [VMA-223]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas D. Gore

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 [VMFA-122]
204

Commanding Officer: LtCol John A. Bolt

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 513 [VMFA-513]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Peter N. Lee

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (-) [VMGR-252 (-)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Scott M. Koltick (until July 2011)

 Maj Walter J. Butler

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 162 [VMM-162]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael S. Ducar

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 [VMM-264]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jeffrey P. Hogan (until April 2011)

 LtCol Brian G. McAvoy

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John B. Barranco

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Daniel T. Lathrop (until April 2011)

 LtCol Mikel R. Huber

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 3 [VMU-3]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Timothy G. Burton

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 40 [MALS-40]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Clarence T. Harper III (until July 2011)

 LtCol Russell A. Blauw

Marine Wing Support Squadron 272 [MWSS-272]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Dale R. Kruse

Marine Logistics Combat Element

2d Marine Logistics Group (Forward) [2d MLG (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen Michael G. Dana

Chief of Staff: Col Mark R. Hollahan (until October 2011)

Col Kenneth D. Enzor

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj William T. Stables
205

G-1: Maj Michael D. Porter (until August 2011)

Capt Paul W. Steketee (until October 2011)

Maj Beth S. Canepa

G-2: Maj Matthew D. Regner

G-3: Col David W. Maxwell

G-4: Maj Robert J. Livingston Jr.

G-6: Maj Joseph D. Broome (until August 2011)

Maj Donald J. Barnes

Combat Logistics Battalion 1 [CLB-1]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brian H. Kane (until November 2011)

 Maj Jason A. Gaddy (from November 2011)

 LtCol Michael W. Stehle

Combat Logistics Battalion 3 [CLB-3]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Henry W. Lutz III

Combat Logistics Battalion 6 [CLB-6]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Ralph J. Rizzo Jr.

Combat Logistics Battalion 7 [CLB-7]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Craig P. Barnett

Combat Logistics Battalion 8 [CLB-8]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael E. McWilliams

7th Engineer Support Battalion [7th Eng Spt Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Daniel H. Dubbs

8th Engineer Support Battalion [8th Eng Spt Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Christopher G. Downs

9th Engineer Support Battalion [9th Eng Spt Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Scott A. Baldwin

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Support Battalion [MAGTF Spt Bn] 

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kevin R. Scott (until September 2011)

 LtCol David S. Gibbs
206

2012

International Security Assistance Force, United States Forces-Afghanistan 

[ISAF USF-A]

9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan [9th AETF-A]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 [VMAQ-1]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Chandler P. Seagraves

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 [VMAQ-2]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Adam L. Musoff

International Security Assistance Force, Regional Command-Southwest 

[ISAF RC-SW]

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [II MEF Fwd)]

(January–March 2012) 

Commanding General: MajGen John A. Toolan

Deputy Commander: BGen Nicholas Welch, UK-A

Chief of Staff: Col Lawrence E. Killmeier Jr.

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Michael F. Jones

C-1: Col Mary A. Augustitus

C-2: Col Dave W. Burton

C-3: Col Norman L. Cooling

C-4: Col Jeffrey M. Reagan

C-6: Col David W. McMorries

Command Element

1st Battalion, 25th Marines [1st Bn, 25th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brian O’Leary

2d Intelligence Battalion [2d Intel Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Joseph Gross

2d Radio Battalion [2d Radio Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew G. Rau
207

8th Communication Battalion [8th Comm Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael B. Schweighardt

5th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [5th ANGLICO]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kendall A. Martinez

Marine Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Division (Forward) [2d MarDiv (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen Lewis A. Craparotta

Chief of Staff: Col Andrew H. Smith

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Joseph D. Shaw

G-1: LtCol Keith F. Moore

G-2: Col Richard E. Anders

G-3: Col Kenneth M. DeTreux

G-4: Col Kyle J. Nickel

G-6: LtCol Dudley R. Griggs

Regimental Combat Team 5 [RCT-5]

Commanding Officer: Col Roger B. Turner Jr.

Executive Officer: LtCol Peter C. Wilson

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Ernest K. Hoopii 

Regimental Combat Team 6 [RCT-6]

Commanding Officer: Col John R. Shafer

Executive Officer: LtCol Bradley C. Weston

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Jamie A. Deets

Regimental Combat Team 8 [RCT-8]

Commanding Officer: Col Eric M. Smith

Executive Officer: LtCol Steven G. Luhrsen

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj David L. Jobe

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew Palma

2d Battalion, 4th Marines [2d Bn, 4th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol William H. Vivian
208

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol George S. Benson

2d Battalion, 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew T. Morrissey

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Seth W. B. Folsom

1st Battalion, 8th Marines [1st Bn, 8th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kevin C. Trimble

2d Battalion, 9th Marines [2d Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael S. Styskal

2d Battalion, 11th Marines [2d Bn, 11th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Joseph T. Allena Jr.

3d Combat Engineer Battalion [3d CEB]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John P. Sullivan Jr.

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [1st LAR]

Commanding Officer: LtCol George C. Schreffler III

1st Reconnaissance Battalion [1st Recon Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brian L. Gilman

Marine Aviation Combat Element

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [2d MAW (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen Glenn M. Walters

Assistant Commander: Col Ben Hancock

Chief of Staff: Col James L. Parker

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Henry A. Prutch II

G-1: Maj Harry L. Gardner

G-2: LtCol Jeffrey S. Stimpson

G-3: Col Jefferson L. DuBinok

G-4: LtCol Tyson B. Geisendorff

G-6: Maj Luke L. Fabiunke
209

Marine Air Control Group 28 (-) [MACG-28 (-)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John R. Siary

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 [HMH-363]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Mark S. Revor

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 [HMH-464]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Alison J. Thompson

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Ian R. Clark

Marine Attack Squadron 223 [VMA-223]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas D. Gore

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 [VMM-365]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Craig C. LeFlore

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John B. Barranco

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 40 (Forward) [MALS-40 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Russell A. Blauw

Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 [MWSS-371]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael B. Prosser

Marine Logistics Combat Element

1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward) [1st MLG (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen John J. Broadmeadow

Chief of Staff: Col Stephen D. Sklenka

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Antonio N. Vizcarrondo Jr.

G-1: Maj Beth S. Canepa (until February 2012)

Capt Alexandra L. Cole 

G-2: Capt Keith S. Crim

G-3: Col William B. Pitman

G-4: Maj Rugithi D. Meelarp

G-6: Maj Donald J. Barnes (until February 2012)

Maj Donald A. Hudson
210

Combat Logistics Battalion 1 [CLB-1]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael W. Stehle

Combat Logistics Battalion 4 [CLB-4]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Adam L. Chalkey

9th Engineer Support Battalion [9th Eng Spt Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Scott A. Baldwin

MAGTF Support Battalion [MAGTF Spt Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol David S. Gibbs

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [I MEF (Fwd)]

(March–December 2012) 

Commanding General: MajGen Charles M. Gurganus

Deputy Commander: BGen Stuart R. Skeates, UK-A

Chief of Staff: Col Timothy W. Fitzgerald

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Harrison L. Tanksley

C-1: Col James P. Rethwisch

C-2: Col Timothy J. Oliver

C-3: Col Jeffrey D. Tuggle

C-4: Col Jeffrey Q. Hooks

C-6: LtCol Roger D. Standfield

Command Element

1st Intelligence Battalion [1st Intel Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Dawn R. Alonso

1st Radio Battalion [1st Radio Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Ahmed T. Williamson

9th Communication Battalion [9th Comm Bn]

Commanding Officer: Maj Joseph T. Dellos

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Forward) [1st MarDiv (Fwd)]

Commanding General: MajGen David H. Berger
211

Chief of Staff: Col Ronald A. Gridley

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Terry L. Jones

G-1: LtCol Jerry R. Morgan

G-2: LtCol Michael W. Taylor

G-3: Col Jeffrey T. Conner

G-4: Col Thomas B. Eipp

G-6: Col Joseph A. Cabell

Regimental Combat Team 5 [RCT-5]

Commanding Officer: Col Roger B. Turner Jr.

Executive Officer: LtCol Minter B. Ralston IV

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Alberto Ruiz

Regimental Combat Team 6 [RCT-6]

Commanding Officer: Col John R. Shafer

Executive Officer: LtCol Bradley C. Weston

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Jamie A. Deets

Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7]

Commanding Officer: Col Austin E. Renforth

Executive Officer: LtCol Brian W. Neil

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Scott A. Samuels

1st Battalion, 1st Marines [1st Bn, 1st Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael J. Targos

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew J. Palma

2d Battalion, 5th Marines [2d Bn, 5th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jason S. D. Perry (until December 2012)

 LtCol Timothy M. Bairstow

2d Battalion, 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew T. Morrissey

1st Battalion, 7th Marines [1st Bn, 7th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol David P. Bradney
212

2d Battalion, 7th Marines [2d Bn, 7th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Donald J. Tomich

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Seth W. B. Folsom

1st Battalion, 8th Marines [1st Bn, 8th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kevin C. Trimble

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Edward J. Healey

2d Battalion, 9th Marines [2d Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael S. Styskal

3d Battalion, 9th Marines [3d Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Carl E. Cooper Jr.

2d Battalion, 10th Marines [2d Bn, 10th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Phillip M. Bragg

2d Battalion, 11th Marines [2d Bn, 11th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Joseph T. Allena Jr.

1st Combat Engineer Battalion [1st CEB]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Andrew M. Niebel

3d Combat Engineer Battalion [3d CEB]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John P. Sullivan Jr.

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [1st LAR]

Commanding Officer: LtCol George C. Schreffler III

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [3d LAR]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Mark H. Clingan

1st Reconnaissance Battalion [1st Recon Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brian L. Gilman
213

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [3d MAW (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen Gregg A. Sturdevant

Chief of Staff: Col Jeffrey P. Davis (until May 2012)

Col Richard T. Bew

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Rodolfo J. Arrieta

G-1: Maj Karen B. Brockmeier (until August 2012)

Capt Steven D. Harvey

G-2: Maj Ryan C. Shaffer (until August 2012)

Capt Karen R. Reyes

G-3: Col Christopher A. Keane

G-4: Col Wayne R. Steele (until June 2012)

Maj Peter E. Dahl (until August 2012)

LtCol Jose M. Lopez

G-6: LtCol Robert K. Maldonado

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Forward) [MACG-38 (-) (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Scott A. Gondek (until September 2012)

 LtCol John C. Lewis

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jay M. Holtermann

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 [HMH-362]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Christopher H. Oliver

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 [HMH-363]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Mark S. Revor

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 [HMH-466]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Joseph K. Decapite

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Garret R. Hoffman

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Ian R. Clark
214

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 469 [HMLA-469]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Stephen J. Lightfoot

Marine Attack Squadron 211 [VMA-211]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Christopher K. Raible (until September 2012)

 Maj John F. Havener (until September 2012)

 LtCol Troy M. Pehrson

Marine Attack Squadron 223 [VMA-223]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas D. Gore

Marine Attack Squadron 231 [VMA-231]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Shawn R. Hermley

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) [VMGR-352 (-)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Daniel R. Campbell (until July 2012)

 Maj Drew R. Hess

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 [VMM-161]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Eric M. Gillard

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 [VMM-365]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Craig C. LeFlore

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John B. Barranco

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Mikel R. Huber (until September 2012)

 Maj Jeremy G. Hall

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 3 [VMU-3]

Commanding Officer: Maj Daniel Lindblom

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (Forward) [MALS-16 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Raymond E. Barnett (until August 2012)

 LtCol Jason S. Guello

Marine Wing Support Squadron 273 [MWSS-273]

Commanding Officer: LtCol William S. Kohmuench
215

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Seth L. Ocloo

 Maj Gregory K. Butler

Marine Logistics Combat Element

1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward) [1st MLG (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen John J. Broadmeadow

Chief of Staff: Col Stephen D. Sklenka

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Antonio N. Vizcarrondo Jr.

G-1: Capt Alexandra L. Cole (until Jul 2012)

Maj Brian J. Brauer

G-2: Capt Keith S. Crim

G-3: Col William B. Pitman

G-4: Maj Rugithi D. Meelarp

G-6: Maj Donald A. Hudson

Combat Logistics Battalion 1 [CLB-1]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael W. Stehle

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 [CLB-2]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Denise M. Mull

Combat Logistics Battalion 4 [CLB-4]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Adam L. Chalkey (until November 2012)

 LtCol Travis T. Gaines

Combat Logistics Battalion 5 [CLB-5]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Robert T. Meade

1st Maintenance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st Mnt Bn (-)(Rein)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Christian D. Richardson

8th Engineer Support Battalion [8th Eng Spt Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Ferdinand F. Llantero

9th Engineer Support Battalion [9th Eng Spt Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Scott A. Baldwin
216

2013

9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan [9th AETF-A]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 [VMAQ-4]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Tommy D. Cornstubble

International Security Assistance Force, Regional Command-Southwest 

[ISAF RC-SW]

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [I MEF (Fwd)]

(January–February 2013) 

Commanding General: MajGen Charles M. Gurganus

Deputy Commander: BGen Stewart R. Skeates, UK-A

Chief of Staff: Col Timothy W. Fitzgerald

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Harrison L. Tanksley

C-1: Col James P. Rethwisch

C-2: Col Timothy J. Oliver

C-3: Col Jeffrey D. Tuggle

C-4: Col Jeffrey Q. Hooks

C-6: LtCol Roger D. Standfield

Command Element

1st Intelligence Battalion [1st Intel Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Dawn Alonso

1st Radio Battalion [1st Radio Bn]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Ahmed Williamson

9th Communication Battalion [9th Comm Bn]

Commanding Officer: Maj Joseph Dellos

Marine Ground Combat Element

Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7]

Commanding Officer: Col Austin E. Renforth

Executive Officer: LtCol Brian W. Neil

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Scott A. Samuels
217

2d Battalion, 7th Marines [2d Bn, 7th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Donald J. Tomich

3d Battalion, 9th Marines [3d Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Carl E. Cooper Jr.

2d Battalion, 10th Marines [2d Bn, 10th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Phillip M. Bragg

2d Combat Engineer Battalion [2d CEB]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John C. Osborne Jr.

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [3d MAW (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen Gregg A. Sturdevant

Chief of Staff: Col Richard T. Bew

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Rodolfo J. Arrieta

G-1: Capt Steven D. Harvey

G-2: Capt Karen R. Reyes

G-3: Col Christopher A. Keane

G-4: LtCol Jose M. Lopez

G-6: LtCol Robert K. Maldonado

Marine Air Control Group 28 (Forward) [MACG-28 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Darry W. Grossnickle

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jay M. Holtermann

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 [HMH-461]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Nicholas A. Morris

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Garrett R. Hoffman

Marine Attack Squadron 211 [VMA-211]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Troy M. Pehrson
218

Marine Attack Squadron 231 [VMA-231]

Commanding Officer: LtCol S. R. Hermley (until June 2013)

LtCol M. P. Quinto (from June 2013)

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (-) [VMGR-252 (-)]

Commanding Officer: Maj James C. Paxton III 

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 [VMM-161]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Douglas C. Sanders

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 3 (Forward) [VMU-3 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Daniel E. Lindblom

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 40 [MALS-40]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Ryan G. Goulette

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 (Forward) [MWSS-373 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Gregory K. Butcher

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 [CLB-2]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Denise M. Mull

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [II MEF (Fwd)]

(February–December 2013) 

Commanding General: MajGen W. Lee Miller Jr.

Deputy Commander: BGen Paul A. E. Nanson, UK-A

Chief of Staff: Col James Bright (until June 2013)

Col Barry J. Fitzpatrick Jr.

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Paul A. Berry

C-1: LtCol Maureen Murphy

C-2: LtCol Vernon Williams (until July 2013)

LtCol Andrew J. Weis

C-3: Col James E. Donnellan

C-4: Col Michael H. Oppenheim

C-6: LtCol Raul L. Salcido
219

Command Element

2d Law Enforcement Battalion [2d LEB]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Eric W. Young

Marine Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Regiment [2d Mar]

Commanding Officer: Col Daniel M. Sullivan

Executive Officer: LtCol David M. Fallon

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Paul T. Archie (until December 2013)

SgtMaj James M. Boutin

Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7]

Commanding Officer: Col Austin E. Renforth

Executive Officer: LtCol Brian W. Neil (until May 2013)

 LtCol Christian M. Rankin

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Scott A. Samuels

3d Battalion, 4th Marines [3d Bn, 4th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jeffrey R. Kenney

2d Battalion, 7th Marines [2d Bn, 7th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Donald J. Tomich

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Daniel J. Wittnam

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kevin E. Clark

3d Battalion, 9th Marines [3d Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Carl E. Cooper Jr.

1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st CEB (-) (Rein)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Andrew R. Winthrop

2d Combat Engineer Battalion [2d CEB]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John C. Osborne Jr.

3d Combat Engineer Battalion (Forward) [3d CEB (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brian M. Dwyer
220

Marine Aviation Combat Element

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [2d MAW (Fwd)]

Commanding General: BGen Gary L. Thomas (until December 2013)

Commanding Officer: Col Scott S. Jensen (from December 2013)

Assistant Commander: Col Kevin M. Iiams (until April 2013)

Col John C. Vara (until May 2013)

Col Scott S. Jensen (until December 2013)

LtCol Thomas P. Bajus II

Chief of Staff: LtCol Thomas P. Bajus II (from November 2013)

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Lisa K. Nilsson

G-1: Capt Kerrissa A. Sterns

G-2: LtCol Fred W. Bista (until July 2013)

Capt Tristan J. Young

G-3: Col John C. Vara (until July 2013)

LtCol Mark E. Van Sike

G-4: LtCol Paul R. Milne

G-6: Maj Randall G. Turner (until July 2013)

Maj Miguel A. Guerra

Marine Air Control Group 28 (Forward) [MACG-28 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Darry W. Grossnickle (until July 2013)

 LtCol Charles E. Smith

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jay M. Holtermann

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 [HMH-461]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Nicholas A. Morris

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [HMH-462]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jacob M. Matt

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167 [HMLA-167]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Shawn J. Hughes (until August 2013)

LtCol William J. Bartolema (until December 2013)

 LtCol Robert B. Finneran

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Garrett R. Hoffman
221

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Tres C. Smith

Marine Attack Squadron 231 [VMA-231]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Shawn R. Hermley (until June 2013)

 LtCol Michael P. Quinto

Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Scott C. Mitchell

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (-) [VMGR-252 (-)]

Commanding Officer: Maj James C. Paxton III (until July 2013)

 Maj Ryan C. Pope

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 [VMM-161]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Douglas C. Sanders

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 165 [VMM-165]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kurt J. Schiller

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 [VMM-264]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Douglas C. Sanders

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 (Forward) [VMU-2 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Philip M. Raymond

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 3 (Forward) [VMU-3 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Daniel E. Lindblom

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 40 [MALS-40]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Ryan G. Goulette (until July 2013)

 LtCol William C. Gray

Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 (-) (Forward) [MWSS-271 (-)(Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Erik L. Aubel

Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 (Forward) [MWSS 372 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Maura M. Hennigan
222

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Regiment 2 [CLR-2]

Commanding Officer: Col Dwayne A. Whiteside

Executive Officer: LtCol James B. Stone IV (until March 2013)

LtCol Christopher D. Hrudka (until July 2013)

LtCol Brian W. Mullery

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Lannette N. Wright (until July 2013)

SgtMaj Roger F. Griffith

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 [CLB-2]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Denise M. Mull (until June 2013)

 LtCol William C. Stophel

2014

9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan [9th AETF-A]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 [VMAQ-4]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Tommy D. Cornstubble

International Security Assistance Force, Regional Command-Southwest 

[ISAF RC-SW]

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [II MEF (Fwd)]

(January–February 2014) 

Commanding General: MajGen Walter Lee Miller Jr.

Deputy Commander: BGen Paul A. E. Nanson, UK-A

Chief of Staff: Col Barry J. Fitzpatrick

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Paul A. Berry

C-1: LtCol Maureen Murphy

C-2: LtCol Andrew J. Weis

C-3: Col James E. Donnellan

C-4: Col Michael H. Oppenheim

C-6: LtCol Raul L. Salcido

Command Element

2d Law Enforcement Battalion [2d LEB]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Eric W. Young
223

Marine Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Regiment [2d Mar]

Commanding Officer: Col Daniel M. Sullivan

Executive Officer: LtCol David M. Fallon

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj James M. Boutin

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Daniel J. Wittnam

1st Battalion, 9th Marines [1st Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Corey M. Collier

1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st CEB (-)(Rein)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Andrew R. Winthrop

Marine Aviation Combat Element

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [2d MAW (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: Col Scott S. Jensen

Assistant Commander: LtCol Thomas P. Bajus II

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Lisa K. Nilsson

G-1: Capt Kerrissa A. Sterns

G-2: Capt Tristan J. Young

G-3: LtCol Mark E. Van Sike

G-4: LtCol Paul R. Milne

G-6: Maj Miguel A. Guerra

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) [MACG-38 (-)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kevin R. Korpinen

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [HMH-462]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jacob M. Matt

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Tres C. Smith

Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Scott C. Mitchell
224

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) [VMGR-352 (-)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Ryan C. Pope (until January 2014)

 Maj Casey D. Shea

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 165 [VMM-165]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kurt J. Schiller

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 (-) [VMU-2 (-)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Philip M. Raymond

Marine Air Logistics Squadron 70 [MALS-70]

Commanding Officer: Maj Luke T. Watson

Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 (Forward) [MWSS-372 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Maura M. Hennigan

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Battalion 6 [CLB-6]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brian W. Mullery

Combat Logistics Battalion 7 [CLB-7]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Sidney R. Welch

Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan [MEB-A]

(March–November 2014) 

Commanding General: BGen Daniel D. Yoo

Chief of Staff: Col Bruce W. Barnhill

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Douglas E. Berry Jr.

C-1: LtCol Heather J. Cotoia (until April 2014)

LtCol Zachary T. Schmidt

C-2: LtCol Larry M. Jenkins

C-3: Col Anthony M. Henderson

C-4: Col Douglas R. Patterson

C-6: LtCol Kelly K. Hastings

Command Element

1st Radio Battalion (Forward) [1st Radio Bn (Fwd)]
225

Commanding Officer: Capt David M. Miller (until May 2014)

 1stLt Paul J. Kapavik

9th Communication Battalion (Forward) [9th Comm Bn (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Tara J. Kipfer (until June 2014)

 Capt Matthew Knopp

1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [1st ANGLICO]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Brian E. Russell

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Regiment [1st Mar]

Commanding Officer: Col P. B. Baumgarten

Executive Officer: LtCol P. N. Ash (until June 2014)

LtCol R. M. Hoyle

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj R. Robinson

1st Battalion, 2d Marines [1st Bn, 2d Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Bradley C. Weston

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Daniel J. Wittnam

1st Battalion, 9th Marines [1st Bn, 9th Mar]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Corey M. Collier

1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st CEB (-)(Rein)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Andrew R. Winthrop

2d Combat Engineer Battalion [2d CEB]

Commanding Officer: LtCol John C. Osborne Jr.

Marine Aviation Combat Element

Marine Aircraft Group 26 [MAG-26]

Commanding Officer: Col Patrick A. Gramuglia

Executive Officer: LtCol Michael K. Van Nest

Sergeant Major: SgtMaj Mark F. Gonzales

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) [MACG-38 (-)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kevin R. Korpinen
226

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [HMH-462]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Jacob M. Matt

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 [HMH-466]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Timothy A. Sheyda

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Tres C. Smith

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 467 [HMLA-467]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Matthew R. Sale

Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Scott C. Mitchell

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) [VMGR-352 (-)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Casey D. Shea

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 [VMM-261]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Kelvin W. Gallman

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 (-) [VMU-1 (-)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Peter Y. Ban

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 (-) [VMU-2 (-)]

Commanding Officer: Maj Philip M. Raymond

Marine Air Logistics Squadron 70 [MALS-70]

Commanding Officer: Maj Luke T. Watson

Marine Wing Support Squadron 274 (Forward) [MWSS-274 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Sean C. Killeen

Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 (Forward) [MWSS-372 (Fwd)]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Maura M. Hennigan

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Battalion 7 [CLB-7]

Commanding Officer: LtCol Sidney R. Welch
227

Appendix B:

Unit List

U.S. Marines in Operation Enduring Freedom

2010

International Security Assistance Force, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

[ISAF USF-A]

Special Operations Task Force-West

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion [1st MSOB]

Marine Special Operations Task Force 81 HQ (14 October 2009–31 May 2010)

Marine Special Operations Company 811 (25 July 2009–28 Feb 2010)

Marine Special Operations Company 812 (6 January 2010–31 July 2010)

Marine Special Operations Company 813 (26 August 2010–1 April 2011)

2d Marine Special Operations Battalion [2d MSOB]

Marine Special Operations Task Force-West HQ (31 May 2010–1 February 2011)

Marine Special Operations Company 821 (18 November 2010–1 August 2010)

Marine Special Operations Company 822 (14 October 2009–3 June 2010)

Marine Special Operations Company 823 (30 April 2010–1 February 2011)

International Security Assistance Force, Regional Command-Southwest 

[ISAF RC-SW]

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade [2d MEB]

Command Element

2d MEB Headquarters Group

9th Communications Battalion [9th Comm Bn]

1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]

1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [1st ANGLICO]

4th Civil Affairs Group [4th CAG]

Marine Ground Combat Element

Regimental Combat Team 2 [RCT-2]

1st Battalion, 2d Marines [1st Bn, 2d Mar]

Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7]

2d Battalion, 2d Marines [2d Bn, 2d Mar]

1st Battalion, 3d Marines [1st Bn, 3d Mar]
228

3d Battalion, 4th Marines [3d Bn, 4th Mar]

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 10th Marines [3d Bn, 10th Mar]

5th Battalion, 11th Marines [5th Bn, 11th Mar]

4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [4th LAR]

2d Combat Engineer Battalion [2d CEB]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

Marine Aircraft Group 40 [MAG-40]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367 [HMLA-367]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 40 [MALS-40]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 [MALS-16]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 24 [MALS-24]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26 [MALS-26]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 29 [MALS-29]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 39 [MALS-39]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 [MWSS-372]

Marine Attack Squadron 231 [VMA-231]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 [VMM-261]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Regiment 2 [CLR-2]

1st Dental Battalion [1st Den Bn]

7th Engineer Support Battalion [7th Eng Spt Bn]

Combat Logistics Battalion 6 [CLB-6]

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [I MEF (Fwd)]

Command Element

I MEF Headquarters Group

3d Battalion, 25th Marines [3d Bn, 25th Mar]

9th Communications Battalion [9th Comm Bn]

1st Radio Battalion [1st Radio Bn]

1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [1st ANGLICO]

2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [2d ANGLICO]

5th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [5th ANGLICO]

3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [3d LAAD BN]
229

Marine Ground Combat Element

Regimental Combat Team 1 [RCT-1]

2d Battalion, 1st Marines [2d Bn, 1st Mar]

3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Mar]

Regimental Combat Team 2 [RCT-2]

1st Battalion, 2d Marines [1st Bn, 2d Mar]

2d Battalion, 2d Marines [2d Bn, 2d Mar]

3d Battalion, 2d Marines [3d Bn, 2d Mar]

3d Battalion, 9th Marines [3d Bn, 9th Mar]

1st Battalion, 3d Marines [1st Bn, 3d Mar]

2d Battalion, 3d Marines [2d Bn, 3d Mar]

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]

1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]

3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]

2d Battalion, 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

2d Battalion, 9th Marines [2d Bn, 9th Mar]

Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

3d Battalion, 4th Marines [3d Bn, 4th Mar]

1st Battalion, 8th Marines [1st Bn, 8th Mar]

1st Battalion, 10th Marines [1st Bn, 10th Mar]

3d Battalion, 10th Marines [3d Bn, 10th Mar]

1st Battalion, 11th Marines [1st Bn, 11th Mar]

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [1st LAR]

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [3d LAR]

4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [4th LAR]

1st Reconnaissance Battalion [1st Recon]

2d Reconnaissance Battalion [2d Recon]

3d Reconnaissance Battalion [3d Recon]

1st Combat Engineer Battalion [1st CEB]

2d Combat Engineer Battalion [2d CEB]

3d Combat Engineer Battalion [3d CEB]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [3d MAW (Fwd)]

Marine Air Control Group 38 (Forward) [MACG-38 (Fwd)]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]
230

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 [HMH-362]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 [VMFA-122]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 [VMFA-232]

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (-) [VMGR-252 (-)]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 [VMM-261]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 (Reinforced) [VMM-264 (Rein)]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 [VMM-365]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 [MALS-16]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 274 [MWSS-274]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward) [1st MLG (Fwd)]

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 [CLB-2]

Combat Logistics Battalion 3 [CLB-3]

Combat Logistics Battalion 5 [CLB-5]

Combat Logistics Battalion 6 [CLB-6]

1st Maintenance Battalion [1st Maint Bn]

1st Supply Battalion [1st Sup Bn]

7th Engineer Support Battalion [7th Eng Spt Bn]

8th Engineer Support Battalion [8th Eng Spt Bn]

9th Engineer Support Battalion [9th Eng Spt Bn]

MAGTF Support Battalion [MAGTF Spt Bn]

2011

International Security Assistance Force, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

[ISAF USF-A]

Special Operations Task Force-West

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion [1st MSOB]

Marine Special Operations Company 811 (10 March 2011–30 October 2011)

Marine Special Operations Company 812 (29 September 2011–1 June 2012)

Marine Special Operations Company 813 (26 August 2010–April 2011)

2d Marine Special Operations Battalion [2d MSOB]
231

Marine Special Operations Task Force-West HQ (31 May 2010–1 February 2011)

Marine Special Operations Company 821 (18 November 2010–1 August 2011)

Marine Special Operations Company 822 (12 June 2011–1 March 2012)

Marine Special Operations Company 823 (30 April 2010–1 February 2011)

3d Marine Special Operations Battalion [3d MSOB]

Marine Special Operations Team 8311 to Marine Special Operations Company 811 

(29 June 2011–15 February 2012)

9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan [9th AETF-A]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 [VMAQ-1]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 3 [VMAQ-3]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 [VMAQ-4]

International Security Assistance Force, Regional Command-Southwest 

[ISAF RC-SW]

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [I MEF (Fwd)]

Command Element

I MEF Headquarters Group

3d Battalion, 25th Marines [3d Bn, 25th Mar]

2d Radio Battalion (Forward) [2d Radio Bn (Fwd)]

8th Communication Battalion (Forward) [8th Comm Bn (Fwd)]

2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [2d ANGLICO]

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Forward) [1st MarDiv (Fwd)]

Regimental Combat Team 1 [RCT-1]

 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [2d Bn, 1st Mar]

2d Battalion, 3d Marines [2d Bn, 3d Mar]

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]

2d Battalion, 9th Marines [2d Bn, 9th Mar]

3d Battalion, 9th Marines [3d Bn, 9th Mar]

Regimental Combat Team 2 [RCT-2]

3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]

1st Battalion, 8th Marines [1st Bn, 8th Mar]

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [3d LAR]

2d Reconnaissance Battalion [2d Recon]
232

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [3d MAW (Fwd)]

Marine Air Control Group 38 (Forward) [MACG-38 (Fwd)]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 [HMH-362]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 [HMH-461]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 [HMH-463]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 [VMFA-122]

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (-) [VMGR-252 (-)]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 [VMM-264]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 266 (Reinforced) [VMM-266 (Rein)]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 [VMM-365]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 [MALS-16]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward) [1st MLG (Fwd)]

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 [CLB-2]

Combat Logistics Battalion 3 [CLB-3]

Combat Logistics Battalion 8 [CLB-8]

1st Supply Battalion [1st Sup Bn]

8th Engineer Support Battalion [8th Eng Spt Bn]

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [II MEF (Fwd)]

Command Element

II MEF Headquarters Group

1st Battalion, 23d Marines [1st Bn, 23d Mar]

1st Battalion, 25th Marines [1st Bn, 25th Mar]

2d Intelligence Battalion (Forward) [2d Intel Bn (Fwd)]

2d Radio Battalion (Forward) [2d Radio Bn (Fwd)]

8th Communication Battalion (Forward) [8th Comm Bn (Fwd)]

1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [1st ANGLICO]

2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [2d ANGLICO]

Marine Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Division (Forward) [2d MarDiv (Fwd)]

Regimental Combat Team 1 [RCT-1]
233

 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [2d Bn, 1st Mar]

1st Battalion, 3d Marines [1st Bn, 3d Mar]

2d Battalion, 3d Marines [2d Bn, 3d Mar]

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]

1st Battalion, 9th Marines [1st Bn, 9th Mar]

3d Battalion, 9th Marines [3d Bn, 9th Mar]

Regimental Combat Team 5 [RCT-5]

1st Battalion, 3d Marines [1st Bn, 3d Mar]

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]

2d Battalion, 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]

1st Battalion, 9th Marines [1st Bn, 9th Mar]

2d Battalion, 9th Marines [2d Bn, 9th Mar]

Regimental Combat Team 8 [RCT-8]

3d Battalion, 2d Marines [3d Bn, 2d Mar]

 2d Battalion, 4th Marines [2d Bn, 4th Mar]

3d Battalion, 4th Marines [3d Bn, 4th Mar]

1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]

3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

1st Battalion, 8th Marines [1st Bn, 8th Mar]

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

1st Battalion, 10th Marines [1st Bn, 10th Mar]

1st Battalion, 12th Marines [1st Bn, 12th Mar]

2d Combat Engineer Battalion [2d CEB]

3d Combat Engineer Battalion [3d CEB]

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [1st LAR]

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [3d LAR]

2d Reconnaissance Battalion [2d Recon]

3d Reconnaissance Battalion [3d Recon]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [2d MAW (Fwd)]

Marine Air Control Group 28 (-) [MACG-28 (-)]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 [HMH-363]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 [HMH-463]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 [HMH-464]
234

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267 [HMLA-267]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 (-) [HMLA-369 (-)]

Marine Attack Squadron 223 [VMA-223]

Marine Attack Squadron 513 [VMA-513]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 [VMFA-122]

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 513 [VMFA-513]

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (-) [VMGR-252 (-)]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 162 [VMM-162]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 [VMM-264]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 269 [VMM-269]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 3 [VMU-3]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 40 [MALS-40]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 272 [MWSS-272]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

2d Marine Logistics Group (Forward) [2d MLG (Fwd)]

Combat Logistics Battalion 1 [CLB-1]

Combat Logistics Battalion 3 [CLB-3]

Combat Logistics Battalion 6 [CLB-6]

Combat Logistics Battalion 7 [CLB-7]

Combat Logistics Battalion 8 [CLB-8]

7th Engineer Support Battalion [7th Eng Spt Bn]

8th Engineer Support Battalion [8th Eng Spt Bn]

9th Engineer Support Battalion [9th Eng Spt Bn]

MAGTF Support Battalion [MAGTF Spt Bn]

2012

International Security Assistance Force, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

[ISAF USF-A]

Special Operations Task Force-West

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion [1st MSOB]

Special Operations Task Force 81.2 (4 January 2012–1 October 2012)

Marine Special Operations Company 811 (11 November 2012–7 July 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 812 (29 September 2011–1 June 2012)
235

Marine Special Operations Company 813 (7 June 2012–6 February 2013)

2d Marine Special Operations Battalion [2d MSOB]

Special Operations Task Force 82.2 HQ (1 October 2012–1 June 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 821 (15 September 2012–15 April 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 822 (12 June 2011–1 March 2012)

Marine Special Operations Company 823 (16 June 2012–15 August 2012)

3d Marine Special Operations Battalion [3d MSOB]

Marine Special Operations Team 8311 to Marine Special Operations Company 811 

(29 June 2011–15 February 2012)

Marine Special Operations Team 8323 to Marine Special Operations Company 821 

(13 August 2012–15 May 2013)

9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan [9th AETF-A]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 [VMAQ-1]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 [VMAQ-2]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 3 [VMAQ-3]

International Security Assistance Force, Regional Command-Southwest 

[ISAF RC-SW]

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [II MEF (Fwd)]

Command Element

II MEF Headquarters Group

1st Battalion, 25th Marines [1st Bn, 25th Mar]

2d Intelligence Battalion [2d Intel Bn]

2d Radio Battalion [2d Radio Bn]

8th Communication Battalion [8th Comm Bn]

5th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [5th ANGLICO]

Marine Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Division (Forward) [2d MarDiv (Fwd)]

Regimental Combat Team 5 [RCT-5]

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]

2d Battalion, 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

2d Battalion, 9th Marines [2d Bn, 9th Mar]

Regimental Combat Team 6 [RCT-6]

 2d Battalion, 4th Marines [2d Bn, 4th Mar]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

1st Battalion, 8th Marines [1st Bn, 8th Mar]
236

Regimental Combat Team 8 [RCT-8]

 2d Battalion, 4th Marines [2d Bn, 4th Mar]

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

2d Battalion, 11th Marines [2d Bn, 11th Mar]

3d Combat Engineer Battalion [3d CEB]

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [1st LAR]

1st Reconnaissance Battalion [1st Recon Bn]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [2d MAW (Fwd)]

Marine Air Control Group 28 (-) [MACG-28 (-)]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 [HMH-363]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 [HMH-464]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Marine Attack Squadron 223 [VMA-223]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 269 [VMM-269]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 [VMM-365]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 40 (Forward) [MALS-40 (Fwd)]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 [MWSS-371]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward) [1st MLG (Fwd)]

Combat Logistics Battalion 1 [CLB-1]

Combat Logistics Battalion 4 [CLB-4]

9th Engineer Support Battalion [9th Eng Spt Bn]

MAGTF Support Battalion [MAGTF Spt Bn]

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [I MEF (Fwd)]

Command Element

I MEF Headquarters Group

1st Intelligence Battalion [1st Intel Bn]

1st Radio Battalion [1st Radio Bn]

9th Communication Battalion [9th Comm Bn]

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Forward) [1st MarDiv (Fwd)]

Regimental Combat Team 5 [RCT-5]
237

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]

2d Battalion, 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]

2d Battalion, 9th Marines [2d Bn, 9th Mar]

Regimental Combat Team 6 [RCT-6]

 1st Battalion, 1st Marines [1st Bn, 1st Mar]

2d Battalion, 5th Marines [2d Bn, 5th Mar]

 1st Battalion, 7th Marines [1st Bn, 7th Mar]

 2d Battalion, 7th Marines [2d Bn, 7th Mar]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

1st Battalion, 8th Marines [1st Bn, 8th Mar]

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7]

 1st Battalion, 1st Marines [1st Bn, 1st Mar]

 2d Battalion, 7th Marines [2d Bn, 7th Mar]

3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]

3d Battalion, 9th Marines [3d Bn, 9th Mar]

2d Battalion, 10th Marines [2d Bn, 10th Mar]

2d Battalion, 11th Marines [2d Bn, 11th Mar]

1st Combat Engineer Battalion [1st CEB]

3d Combat Engineer Battalion [3d CEB]

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [1st LAR]

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [3d LAR]

1st Reconnaissance Battalion [1st Recon Bn]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [3d MAW (Fwd)]

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Forward) [MACG-38 (-) (Fwd)]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 362 [HMH-362]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 [HMH-363]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 [HMH-466]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 469 [HMLA-469]

Marine Attack Squadron 211 [VMA-211]

Marine Attack Squadron 223 [VMA-223]

Marine Attack Squadron 231 [VMA-231]

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) [VMGR-352 (-)]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 [VMM-161]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 [VMM-365]
238

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 3 [VMU-3]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (Forward) [MALS-16 (Fwd)]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 273 [MWSS-273]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward) [1st MLG (Fwd)]

Combat Logistics Battalion 1 [CLB-1]

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 [CLB-2]

Combat Logistics Battalion 4 [CLB-4]

Combat Logistics Battalion 5 [CLB-5]

1st Maintenance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st Mnt Bn (-) (Rein)]

8th Engineer Support Battalion [8th Eng Spt Bn]

9th Engineer Support Battalion [9th Eng Spt Bn]

2013

International Security Assistance Force, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

[ISAF USF-A]

Special Operations Task Force-West

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion [1st MSOB]

Marine Special Operations Company 811 (11 November 2012–7 July 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 812 (7 July 2013–7 February 2014)

Marine Special Operations Company 813 (7 June 2012–6 February 2013)

2d Marine Special Operations Battalion [2d MSOB]

Special Operations Task Force 82.2 (1 October 2012–1 June 2013

Marine Special Operations Company 821 (15 September 2012–15 May 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 822 (15 April 2013–15 November 2013)

Marine Special Operations Company 823 (7 November 2013–1 June 2014)

3d Marine Special Operations Battalion [3d MSOB]

Marine Special Operations Team 8323 (13 August 2012–15 May 2013)

9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan [9th AETF-A]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 3 [VMAQ-3]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 [VMAQ-4]
239

International Security Assistance Force, Regional Command-Southwest 

[ISAF RC-SW]

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [I MEF (Fwd)]

Command Element

I MEF Headquarters Group

1st Intelligence Battalion [1st Intel Bn]

1st Radio Battalion [1st Radio Bn]

9th Communication Battalion [9th Comm Bn]

Marine Ground Combat Element

Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7]

2d Battalion, 7th Marines [2d Bn, 7th Mar]

3d Battalion, 9th Marines [3d Bn, 9th Mar]

2d Battalion, 10th Marines [2d Bn, 10th Mar]

2d Combat Engineer Battalion [2d CEB]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [3d MAW (Fwd)]

Marine Air Control Group 28 (Forward) [MACG-28 (Fwd)]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 [HMH-461]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Marine Attack Squadron 211 [VMA-211]

Marine Attack Squadron 231 [VMA-231]

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (-) [VMGR-252 (-)]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 [VMM-161]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 3 (Forward) [VMU-3 (Fwd)]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 40 [MALS-40]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 (Forward) [MWSS-373 (Fwd)]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 [CLB-2]

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [II MEF (Fwd)]

Command Element

II MEF Headquarters Group

2d Law Enforcement Battalion [2d LEB]
240

 2d Radio Battalion [2d Radio Bn]

8th Communications Battalion [8th Comm Bn]

2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [2d ANGLICO]

Marine Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Regiment [2d Mar]

Regimental Combat Team 7 [RCT-7]

3d Battalion, 4th Marines [3d Bn, 4th Mar]

2d Battalion, 7th Marines [2d Bn, 7th Mar]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]

3d Battalion, 9th Marines [3d Bn, 9th Mar]

1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st CEB (-) (Rein)]

2d Combat Engineer Battalion [2d CEB]

3d Combat Engineer Battalion (Forward) [3d CEB (Fwd)]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [2d MAW (Fwd)]

Marine Air Control Group 28 (Forward) [MACG-28 (Fwd)]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 [HMH-461]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [HMH-462]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167 [HMLA-167]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Marine Attack Squadron 231 [VMA-231]

Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311]

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 (-) [VMGR-252 (-)]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 [VMM-161]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 165 [VMM-165]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 [VMM-264]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 (Forward) [VMU-2 (Fwd)]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 3 (Forward) [VMU-3 (Fwd)]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 40 [MALS-40]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 (-) (Forward) [MWSS-271 (-) (Fwd)]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 (Forward) [MWSS 372 (Fwd)]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Regiment 2 [CLR-2]

Combat Logistics Battalion 2 [CLB-2]
241

2014

International Security Assistance Force, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

[ISAF USF-A]

Special Operations Task Force-West

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion [1st MSOB]

Special Operations Task Force 81.3 HQ (1 February–1 October 2014)

2d Marine Special Operations Battalion [2d MSOB]

Marine Special Operations Company 821 (16 May 2014–15 September 2014)

Marine Special Operations Company 823 (7 November 2013–1 June 2014)

9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan [9th AETF-A]

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 [VMAQ-4]

International Security Assistance Force, Regional Command-Southwest 

[ISAF RC-SW]

II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [II MEF (Fwd)]

Command Element

II MEF Headquarters Group

2d Law Enforcement Battalion [2d LEB]

2d Radio Battalion [2d Radio Bn]

8th Communication Battalion (Forward) [8th Comm Bn]

2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [2d ANGLICO]

Marine Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Regiment [2d Mar]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

1st Battalion, 9th Marines [1st Bn, 9th Mar]

1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st CEB (-) (Rein)]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) [2d MAW (Fwd)]

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) [MACG-38 (-)]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [HMH-462]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311]

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) [VMGR-352 (-)]
242

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 165 [VMM-165]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 (-) [VMU-2 (-)]

Marine Air Logistics Squadron 70 [MALS-70]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 (Forward) [MWSS-372 (Fwd)]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Battalion 6 [CLB-6]

Combat Logistics Battalion 7 [CLB-7]

Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan [MEB-A]

Command Element

MEB-A Headquarters Group

1st Radio Battalion (Forward) [1st Radio Bn (Fwd)]

9th Communication Battalion (Forward) [9th Comm Bn (Fwd)]

1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [1st ANGLICO]

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Regiment [1st Mar]

1st Battalion, 2d Marines [1st Bn, 2d Mar]

1st Battalion, 7th Marines [1st Bn, 7th Mar]

3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

1st Battalion, 9th Marines [1st Bn, 9th Mar]

1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st CEB (-) (Rein)]

2d Combat Engineer Battalion [2d CEB]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

Marine Aircraft Group 26 [MAG-26]

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) [MACG-38 (-)]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [HMH-462]

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 [HMH-466]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 467 [HMLA-467]

Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311]

Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) [VMGR-352 (-)]

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 [VMM-261]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 (-) [VMU-1 (-)]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 (-) [VMU-2 (-)]

Marine Air Logistics Squadron 70 [MALS-70]
243

Marine Wing Support Squadron 274 (Forward) [MWSS-274 (Fwd)]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 (Forward) [MWSS-372 (Fwd)]

Marine Logistics Combat Element

Combat Logistics Battalion 7 [CLB-7]
244

Appendix C:

Selected Terms and Abbreviations 

from Operation Enduring Freedom

ABP Afghan border police

ABV (M1) Assault Breacher Vehicle

ACE Aviation Combat Element

al-Qaeda “The base”; an international militant Islamic terrorist organization 

ANA Afghan National Army

ANGLICO Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

ANP Afghan National Police

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

AOR Area of responsibility

ArCent U.S. Army Forces Central Command

ARG Amphibious Ready Group

ASNF Afghan Special Narcotics Force

AT Antiterrorism

AUP Afghan Uniformed Police

BLT Battalion Landing Team

burka A loose enveloping garment worn by some Muslim women to cloak their 

faces and bodies in public places 

CAAT Combined Antiarmor Team

CAG Civil Affairs Group

CAS Close Air Support

CATF Commander Amphibious Task Force

CEB Combat Engineer Battalion 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component Command

CFACC Coalition Forces Air Component Commander

CFMCC Coalition Forces Maritime Component Command 

CFSOCC Coalition Forces Special Operations Component Command 

CG Commanding general 

CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force 
245

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

CLB Combat Logistics Battalion

CLF Commander Landing Force 

CLR Combat Logistics Regiment 

CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center 

COP Combat outpost

COIN Counterinsurgency

ComdC Command chronology 

ConPlan Concept of operations plan

CSAR Combat Search and Rescue

CSTC Combined Security Transition Command

CVN Aircraft carrier, nuclear (fixed-wing aircraft)

CVW Carrier Air Wing

D-Day Day on which operations are scheduled to commence

DASC Direct Air Support Center

DOD Department of Defense

DON Department of the Navy 

EODMU Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit

ESB Engineer Support Battalion

ETT Embedded Training Team 

FAC Forward Air Controller

FAC(A) Forward Air Controller (Airborne)

FARP Forward arming and refueling point

fatwa Islamic religious ruling

FDC Fire direction center

FET Female Engagement Team

FOB Forward operating base 

GBOSS Ground-based operational surveillance system

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

GMTI Ground moving target indicator

GRC Gray Research Center 

H-Hour Hour when operation is scheduled to commence

HESCO A multicellular wall system manufactured from wire mesh and lined with a 

heavy-duty material then filled with earth to provide a semi-permanent barrier for military installations
246

HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

HMH Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

HMLA Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

HMM Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle or humvee 

HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps

IED Improvised explosive device

IO Information operations

IJC ISAF Joint Command

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISCI Interim security for critical infrastructure

ISI The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan) 

ISR Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JDAM Joint direct attack munition

JIC Joint Intelligence Center

jihad Holy war waged as an Islamic religious duty 

JPEL Joint Prioritized Effects List

JSTARS Joint surveillance target attack radar system 

kandak Afghan National Army Battalion 

LAAD Low altitude air defense

LAR Light armored reconnaissance battalion

LAV Light armored vehicle

LTD Laser target designator

LHA Landing helicopter assault (general purpose amphibious assault ship)

LHD Landing helicopter dock (multipurpose amphibious assault ship)

LD Line of departure 

loya jirga Traditional meeting of tribal elders to solve problems

LPD Landing platform dock (amphibious transport dock)

LPH Landing platform helicopter (amphibious assault ship)

LSA Logistics support area 

LSD Landing Ship, Dock (amphibious assault ship)

LVS Logistics vehicle system 

MACG Marine air control group

MACS Marine air control squadron
247

madrassa Islamic religious school

MAG Marine aircraft group

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

MALS Marine aviation logistics squadron

MarCent U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command 

MARSOC Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command

MARCORSYSCOM Marine Corps Systems Command 

MAW Marine aircraft wing

MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MCHD Marine Corps History Division

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade 

MEF Marine expeditionary force

MEU Marine expeditionary unit

MICLIC Mine-clearing line charge

MLG Marine logistics group

MPF Maritime prepositioning force

MRAP Mine-resistant, ambush protected

MSOB Marine special operations battalion

MSOC Marine special operations company

MSOT Marine special operations team

MSSG Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) service support group 

MTVR Medium tactical vehicle replacement 

mujahideen Those who wage a jihad; holy warriors

mullah Male religious teacher or leader who is schooled in Islamic law 

MWHS Marine wing headquarters squadron

MWSS Marine wing support squadron 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NavCent U.S. Naval Forces Central Command 

nm Nautical mile

NMCB Naval mobile construction battalion 

ODA Operational detachment alpha

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

OP Observation post

OSC–A Office of Security Cooperation–Afghanistan 

PA Public affairs

Pashtunwali A way of life and system of customary laws that stress honor above all else 
248

PB Patrol base

PR Public relations

PRT Provincial reconstruction team 

QRF Quick reaction force 

RC Regional command

RC-Southwest Regional Command-Southwest

RCT Regimental combat team 

RIP Relief in place

RPG Rocket-propelled grenade 

Sangar Used by British forces to describe a watchtower 

SASR Special application scoped rifle

SAW Squad Automatic Weapon

Seabee U.S. Navy construction battalion 

SEAL Sea, air, and land (U.S. Navy Special Operations force) 

SFAAT Security Force Assistance Advisor Team

sharia Islamic law

shura A town hall-style council of decision making by consultation and deliberation

SIPRNET Secret Internet protocol router network 

SOC Special operations capable

SOF Special operations forces (generic)

SPMAGTF Special purpose Marine air-ground task force 

SORTS Status of resources and training system 

SWAN Support wide area network 

Taliban “Seekers, religious students”; an Islamic-based, Afghan political military organization that emerged during 1994 and that ruled large parts of Afghanistan 

from 1996 to 2001 

TF Task force 

TIC Troops in contact (with the enemy)

TTF Theater tactical force

TOA Transfer of authority

TOW Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile 

UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle

UN United Nations

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 

UNSC United Nations Security Council
249

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

USF-A United States Forces-Afghanistan

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USNS United States naval ship

USO United Service Organizations

USS United States ship 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

VMA Marine attack squadron

VMAQ Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron 

VMFA Marine fighter attack squadron 

VMFA(AW) Marine all-weather fighter attack squadron 

VMGR Marine aerial refueler transport squadron 

VMM Marine medium tiltrotor squadron

VMU Marine unmanned aerial vehicle squadron 

wadi A valley, ravine, or channel that is dry except in the rainy season
250

Appendix D:

Chronology of Events, 2010–14

2010

13 February Operation Moshtarak, an offensive on the Afghan town of Marjah meant to eliminate the last Taliban in central Helmand Province, begins. This offensive is, up 

to this point, the largest joint operation in the war in Afghanistan. It is heavily 

publicized by ISAF in an attempt to demonstrate improvements in the Afghan 

National Army (ANA) and is meant to assess whether Afghan forces are capable 

of keeping peace in their country.

12 April The 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (a.k.a. Marine Expeditionary Brigade–

Afghanistan [MEB-A]) transfers authority to I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (I MEF [Fwd]).

12 June Operation New Dawn, an extension of Operation Moshtarak, is launched by 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and ANA forces with the goal of 

forcing insurgents from areas between Marjah and Nawa in Helmand Province. 

23 June Gen Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, is relieved of his post as commander of U.S. 

forces in Afghanistan as a result of a controversial article in Rolling Stone in which 

he criticized the Obama administration. President Obama nominates Gen David 

H. Petraeus, USA, to replace McChrystal.

18 September The Afghan parliamentary election is held to elect members to the Wolesi Jirga 

(or House of the People). 

20 September Northern Helmand Province is transferred from British control to that of the 

U.S. Marines. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, is the first Marine unit to replace 

British troops, deploying to Sangin, Helmand Province, and engaging Taliban 

insurgents. 

October The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, relieves 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in Sangin. The 

battalion immediately begins conducting aggressive operations against Taliban 

insurgents.

November Representatives from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries 
251

sign an agreement to return responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan 

forces by the end of 2014. This declaration concurs with the planned drawdown 

of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and schedules a transition process between American forces and Afghan security forces to begin in July 2011.

21 November During a firefight with enemy insurgents in a small village in Marjah District, 

Helmand Province, LCpl W. Kyle Carpenter shields a fellow Marine from the 

detonation of a hand grenade, shielding the Marine from the blast but enduring 

severe wounds. For his courage, Carpenter is awarded the Medal of Honor.

27 December The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, relieves 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, in Marjah. 

28–29 December Marines of 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, conduct Operation East River, a partnered 

rehearsal drill that reveals the capabilities of ANA and Afghan Uniformed Police 

(AUP) forces in Nawa District, Helmand Province. 

2011

January Marine Special Operations Charlie Company works to establish two village stability operation positions in the Upper Gereshk Valley in Helmand Province and 

northern Farah Province. Multiple operations conducted by these Marines aim 

to decrease Taliban insurgents’ freedom of movement, as well as increasing the 

local populace’s freedom of movement and improving their connection to district and provincial governments.

6 January The Pentagon announces that it will send 1,400 Marines to southern Afghanistan to build on security gains there. 

14 January Marines from 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and ANA forces conduct Operation 

Godfather, an attack on the Taliban stronghold at Durzay, which is one of the 

last remaining strongholds in Garmsir District, Helmand Province. This operation concludes major fighting in Garmsir.

16–20 January Marines of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, conduct Operation Jalut (Goliath), in which 

more than 300 Marines and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) mass against 

insurgent forces in Marjah. Marine engineers quickly build a bridge and road in 

support of interim security for critical infrastructure (ISCI). 

February–March Focusing on the drug harvest of the poppy fields in Southern Helmand, Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) targets the processing centers and transportation assets used to produce heroin from the poppy crop. 
252

1 February Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 (HMH-461) relieves HMH-361 (-) at 

Camp Bastion in Helmand Province. 

6 February RCT-8 relieves RCT-2 at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Delaram in Delaram 

District. 

8 February The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, relieves 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, in northern 

Marjah. 

16 February Elements of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, conduct Operation Sulaiman in coordination with ANSF and Marines from 2d Battalion, 3d Marines. This action prevents the enemy from conducting operations in support of a spring offensive. 

17 February Marines of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, conduct Operation Savage Wing, which 

clears suspected insurgent fighting, storage, and travel lanes near Camp Delaram 

2. The Marines rely on indirect fire and supporting assets from 1st Battalion, 10th 

Marines, in execution of this operation.

17–20 February Marines of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, conduct Operation Red Hawk to disrupt 

enemy caches and the improvised explosive device (IED) production and emplacement network. This operation turns out multiple weapons caches and enemy activities, resulting in numerous small-arms engagements and enemy casualties. 

21–24 February Marines of 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, execute Operation Steel Curtain, which 

clears Barakzai Village in southeastern Trek Nawa and establishes new forward 

patrol bases from which Golf Company conducts counterinsurgency operations. 

March Marine Special Operations Alpha Company relieves Marine Special Operations 

Charlie Company in Afghanistan.

9 March The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) (3d MAW [Fwd]) conducts a transfer of 

authority with 2d MAW (Fwd) at Camp Leatherneck in Helmand Province.

10 March HMH-463 relieves HMH-362 at Camp Bastion in Helmand Province. 

16 March The 1st MarDiv (Fwd) conducts a transfer of authority with 2d MarDiv (Fwd) at 

Camp Leatherneck. 

Marines of 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (3d LAR) begin Operation Rawhide II in the southern Helmand River valley, where interdiction succeeds 
253

in denying weapons, narcotics, and trafficking routes to the enemy insurgency. 

The operation continues until the battalion is relieved in May. 

17 March The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, relieves 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, in Musa Qala 

and Now Zad Districts, northern Helmand Province. 

21–30 March Elements of RCT-1 execute Operation Watchtower II, a Coalition-led action meant 

to disrupt the enemy’s abilities to conduct a spring offensive. Coalition and ANSF 

troops work together to conduct multiple targeted clearing and disruption missions, which increases the ANSF’s ability to operate with minimal mentorship or 

supervision.

26 March The II MEF (Fwd) assumed command of Regional Command-Southwest 

(RC-Southwest).

11 April The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, relieves 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, in Sangin 

District. 

23 April–9 May Elements of RCT-1 conduct Operation Harvest Moon in Helmand Province. 

This action disrupts enemy attempts to finish the poppy harvest, hinders the final 

preparations for the enemy forces’ summer offensive, and facilitates the capture 

of key enemy personnel.

1 May Osama bin Laden is killed during Operation Neptune Spear, a U.S. Navy SEAL 

raid on his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, nine-and-a-half years after his 

role in orchestrating the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. 

His death prompts U.S. policy makers to reevaluate the conduct of the war, as 

President Obama is scheduled to announce in June 2011 the withdrawal of the 

American surge troops sent to Afghanistan in December 2009. 

6 May The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, relieves 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, in Garmsir 

District. 

7 May Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 3 (VMU-3) relieves VMU-2 in Helmand Province.

15–17 May Marines of 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, conduct Operation Talai Ghar (Keyhole), 

which denies insurgents sanctuary in the Salaam Bazaar area of southern Now 

Zad District.
254

19 May The 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (-) (Rein), relieves 1st Battalion, 10th Marines (-) 

(Rein), to provide artillery support to the 1st MarDiv in Helmand Province.

21–24 May Elements of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, conduct Operation Audible, dispatching 

Alpha Company and a reinforced combined antiarmor team (CAAT) platoon to 

the Kartaka and Bartaka areas west of the Helmand River to engage insurgents 

there. 

22 May The 2d LAR relieves 3d LAR at FOB Payne in Helmand Province and continues conducting Operation Rawhide II in the area.

23 May Marine Attack Squadron 513 (VMA-513) relieves VMA-122 at Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan, after the two squadrons fly a series of mixed selection combat sorties together.

30 May–1 June Marines of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, support Afghan efforts to register voters 

for district community council elections through key leader engagements, messaging support, and security for election routes and facilities. More than 600 voters are registered with no security incidents. 

7 June The 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, relieves 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, in Nawa District.

22 June President Obama announces a plan to withdraw 33,000 troops from Afghanistan 

by the summer of 2012. His administration faces continuous pressure from policy makers and the public to reduce the American presence in Afghanistan. 

1 July Marine Special Operations Team 8311 of Kilo Company, 3d Marine Special Operations Battalion, deploys to Afghanistan to conduct combat operations.

15 July Marine Special Operations Golf Company (Rein) relieves Marine Special Operations Foxtrot Company in Farah Province and begins conducting village stability operations. 

18 July Gen David Petraeus hands over his duties as commander of U.S. and NATO 

troops in Afghanistan to Gen John R. Allen, USMC.

20–21 July Elements of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion and the 7th Engineer Support Battalion conduct Operation Street Without Joy II as a part of counterinsurgency 

efforts in Helmand Province. 
255

1 August Ramadan begins. Marines of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, execute Operation Ramadan Mubarak, covering daytime patrols while ANSF troops increase nighttime 

patrolling. Additionally, the Marines continue peace and reconciliation mosque 

projects in each company area of operation (AO) and regularly join ANSF and 

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) partners for Iftar 

dinners (concludes daily Ramadan fast).

7 August The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, relieves 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, in Helmand 

Province. 

17 September The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, relieves 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, in Musa Qala 

and Now Zad Districts.

13 October The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, relieves 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, in Sangin 

District. 

23 October The 3d Combat Engineer Battalion (3d CEB) relieves 2d CEB in Helmand 

Province. 

11 November VMA-223 relieves VMA-513 at Kandahar Airfield. 

15 November The 1st LAR relieves 2d LAR in Reg-e Khan Neshin District, Helmand Province.

17 November The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, relieves 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, in Garmsir 

District. 

19 November The 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) (Rein), relieves 1st Battalion, 12th Marines 

(-) (Rein), to provide artillery support to the 1st Marine Division in Helmand 

Province.

25 November Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James F. Amos, visits Marine Tactical 

Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 (VMAQ 1) at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, to 

announce that the squadron has been named the recipient of the 2011 Secretary 

of Defense Maintenance Award. 

6–15 December Marines of 1st LAR conduct Operation Eagles Hunt, an ANSF-led clearing and 

eradication action within the western portion of Reg-e Khan Neshin District. 
256

2012

January–March Elements of 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, support operations led by ANSF in Nawa 

District, Ghazni Province, and begin transferring positions from Coalition forces 

to ANSF command.

2–13 January Marines of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, conduct Operation Double Check, which 

clears the southern Musa Qala wadi area of Taliban influence and allows for the 

building of AUP posts throughout the AO.

15–28 January Elements of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, conduct Operation Dynamic Arch in the 

Sangin District, where Marines deny the enemy safe havens and expand ANSF 

influence in the area. 

20 January Video footage of Marines urinating on three Afghan corpses, believed to be those 

of Taliban insurgents, enrages Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and produces mixed 

reactions in the United States. 

22–27 January Elements of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, support ANA forces during Operation Da 

Tunder Zeghelwol, a clearing action in Garmsir District. 

26–31 January Elements of 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Fwd) conduct Operation Lion’s Den 

I in Ghorak District, Kandahar Province, resulting in the capture of detainees, 

multiple insurgents killed and wounded, and the reduction of enemy weapons 

caches.

February Marine Special Operations Team 8311 of Kilo Company, 3d Marine Special Operations Battalion (3d MSOB), returns to the United States from combat operations 

in Afghanistan.

1 February The 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, relieves 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, in Helmand 

Province.

1 February–

15 May Elements of RCT-5 conduct Operation Harvest Moon alongside Afghan police 

forces in southern Helmand Province. This action continues to hinder the insurgent poppy cultivation and the spring harvest, dealing a severe financial blow 

to the insurgency. Afghanistan’s National Interdiction Unit destroys more than 

25,000 pounds of narcotics, confiscates numerous weapons, and detains more 

than 25 suspected traffickers across the battle space.
257

2 February U.S. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta announces the Pentagon’s plan to end 

combat missions in Afghanistan as early as mid-2013 and assign American troops 

to an advisory role until their withdrawal in 2014.

12–23 February Elements of 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Fwd) conduct Operation Lion’s Den 

II in Kajaki District, resulting in the capture of detainees, multiple insurgents 

killed and wounded, and the reduction of enemy weapons caches.

15 February Marine Special Operations Golf Company relieves Marine Special Operations 

Hotel Company in Herat City, Herat Province, and begins operations in nine different locations. 

15 February–

16 March The 1st LAR (-) (Rein) conducts Operation Highland Thunder, a battalion-level 

operation intended to disrupt insurgent activity while expanding ANSF’s presence westward across the battalion’s AO.

17–19 February Marines of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, conduct Operation De Gham Payela alongside ANSF units. This operation is a series of coordinated actions meant to disrupt enemy operations in Garmsir District.

25 February The 1st MarDiv (Fwd) relieves 2d MarDiv at Camp Leatherneck.

March–April The 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, transfers a number of forward operating bases in 

Garmsir District to ANA control as a part of the Marines’ mission to cede responsibility of the area to their Afghan counterparts.

4 March Marines of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, assist ANSF soldiers in redistributing their 

forces across the entire Sangin District. This action expands ANSF influence and 

provides security for the population of Sangin.

12 March The II MEF (Fwd) transfers authority over RC-Southwest to I MEF (Fwd) at 

Camp Leatherneck.

17–23 March Elements of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, conduct Operation Dawn of Hope, in 

which four separate platoon-level aerial assaults disrupt enemy operations in the 

Safar and Durzay areas. 

19 March The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, relieves 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, in Helmand 

Province.
258

28 March–5 May Marines of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, launch Operation Zema Pa Sar Ma Tera, 

a battalion-level action that successfully disrupts insurgent activity in Helmand 

Province through the use of aerial assaults, CAAT platoon operations, and various interdiction missions.

11 April The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, begins operations in the Sangin Valley.

23 April The 1st CEB relieves 3d CEB in providing combat engineer support to Task Force 

Leatherneck.

May The 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, focuses its efforts on the impending harvest season. A concentrated effort, Operation Blue Magic, is begun to prevent tax collectors, smugglers, and traffickers from influencing the local population. The Marines 

employ a biometric surge, increased night patrolling, and continuous disruption 

operations in the immediate area surrounding Kajaki District. 

15 May In accordance with the drawdown of forces in Helmand Province, 2d Battalion, 

6th Marines, assumes responsibility over Garmsir District from 3d Battalion, 3d 

Marines. Also on this day, 3d LAR relieves 1st LAR, and Marine Light Attack 

Helicopter Squadron 469 (HMLA-469) relieves HMLA-369 at Camp Leatherneck.

16 May–15 June Marines of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, conduct company-size air assault operations throughout the Sangin Valley against Taliban insurgents. 

17–19 May Marines of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, conduct Operation Sangin Moshtarak 

Naweed in the Sangin Valley. This action is the largest air assault operation in 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) history, with more than 440 Marines and 

ANA soldiers participating and more than 20 Marine and Coalition force aircraft 

participating. 

23 May–9 June Operation Branding Iron is executed by 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Rein), in the 

Gandumereze and Zamindawar areas of Helmand Province. This action engages 

the enemy’s communication and logistics capabilities affecting the surrounding 

Musa Qala and Kajaki areas.

26 May The 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, relieves 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, in Helmand 

Province.

22–27 June Marines of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, spearhead Operation Jaws D5, a multiorganizational air and ground operation to cordon and search Qaleh ye Gaz, Helmand 
259

Province, which is a known hotbed for enemy activity. There are multiple smalland medium-arms firefights and several IED strikes that require seven air medical evacuations on the first day alone. After 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, counters 

unprecedented casualties with multiple aviation, armor, and artillery counterattacks, the assault Charlie and Delta Companies are extracted to friendly lines.

July Marine Special Operations Team 8313 of Kilo Company, 3d MSOB, deploys 

to Afghanistan and attaches to Hotel Company, 2d MSOB, to conduct combat 

operations.

5–21 July Elements of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, conduct heliborne assaults in support of 

Operation Branding Iron II, which aims to disrupt the enemy’s capabilities in the 

districts of Musa Qala and Kajaki.

17 July Marines of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, conduct Operation Doubledown, a partnered heliborne raid intended to disrupt insurgent operations throughout the battalion security area and allow ANSF forces to expand their area of influence in 

1st Battalion, 1st Marines’ area of operations.

15 August HMH-361 relieves HMH-466 (-) (Rein) at Camp Bastion, Helmand Province. 

30 July–

2 September Marines of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, conduct 

operations in Khwaja Aziz, Helmand Province, as a part of the larger Operation 

Helmand Viper. Partnered heliborne raids disrupt insurgent operations in security areas, remove Taliban leaders and high-valued enemy targets from within the 

battalion’s AO, and allow ANSF forces to expand their area of influence in the 

region. 

September–

December Marine Special Operations Team 8313 of Kilo Company, 3d MSOB, returns to 

the United States from combat operations in Afghanistan.

14 September Fifteen Taliban insurgents dressed in U.S. Army uniforms breach the perimeter at 

Camp Bastion. They attack Marine fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft with automatic 

weapons and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), destroying six McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II planes and badly damaging two others. The attack lasts several hours and ends with 14 insurgents killed and 1 captured by Camp Bastion’s 

quick reaction force. Marines suffer two killed in action, one of them being LtCol 

Christopher K. Raible, commanding officer of VMA-211. This firefight marks 
260

the first time the Marine aviators of VMA-211 have fought as infantry since the 

Battle of Wake Island in December 1941.

2 October The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, relieves 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, in Sangin 

District. 

20 October The 2d CEB relieves 1st CEB in Helmand Province.

November Marine Special Operations Alpha Company relieves Marine Special Operations 

Charlie Company. Marine Special Operations Team 8321 of Kilo Company, 3d 

MSOB, also deploys to Afghanistan.

1 November Combat Logistics Regiment 2 (CLR-2), CLR-15, and additional Army and Navy 

construction units begin Operation Golden Gate, which facilitates the construction of the Sangin Bridge over the Helmand River. Marines of 2d Battalion, 7th 

Marines, provide security support for the project.

18 November HMLA-169 relieves HMLA-469 at Camp Bastion in Helmand Province. 

2 December The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, conduct an aerial assault raid force mission in the 

Bari Desert, Helmand Province, to target a known narcotics lab. The mission 

concludes with one Marine killed in action and another wounded in action.

2013

1 January The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, supports Operation Tethys, a joint GIRoA, Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), and ISAF project to develop Afghan 

capacity to repair Helmand Province’s canal system.

2 January Operation Harakat Tah Cham-Too Shai (Prepare to March) commences with 

ANSF units in the lead and Marines of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and Weapons 

Company, Operational Reserve Force, RCT-7, in direct support. 

15–18 January Marine advisors of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, accompany ANA soldiers into battle 

against enemy insurgents during Operation New Hope, which is meant to bring 

peace and stability to Kajaki, Helmand Province, and its surrounding areas.

26 January CLR-2 relieves CLR-15 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. 

5–18 February RCT-7 and CLR-2 conduct Operation Dynamic Partner, a retrograde action with 

the purpose of extracting equipment and personnel from Village Stability Platform 
261

Shurakay in Helmand Province to facilitate its demilitarization. VMA-231 flies 

in direct support.

19 February HMH-461 relieves HMH-361 at Camp Bastion. 

25 February The 2d MarDiv (Fwd) transfers authority of Task Force Leatherneck to 1st MarDiv 

(Fwd) at Camp Leatherneck.

27 February–

8 May Marines of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, support the Afghan National Interdiction 

Unit in Operation Psarlay Taba, which results in the seizure of more than 21,500 

pounds of various forms of suspected opium in Marjah, Helmand Province.

28 February The II MEF (Fwd) relieves I MEF (Fwd) at Camp Leatherneck. 

1 April The 2d Law Enforcement Battalion arrives in Afghanistan to begin patrol operations in the vicinity of Camp Leatherneck. 

2 April Elements of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, begin turning over various forward operating bases to Afghan counterparts, following the scheduled relief in place and 

transfer of authority as dictated by the growing responsibility of Afghan troops 

for the security of their country. 

21 April The 3d CEB relieves 2d CEB in Helmand Province. 

24 April VMA-311 relieves VMA-231 at Camp Bastion. 

28–31 April ANSF leads Operation Aoqab se Hasht (38 Eagle) to push Taliban insurgents out 

of Sangin District.

May RCT-7 conducts Operation Khaspeska (Nightmare) with the Afghan Territorial 

Force 444. This action sees aerial raids into known Taliban safe havens and command and control nodes in the Now Zad and Washir Districts of AO Tripoli.

12 May VMU-3 relieves VMU-1 at Camp Leatherneck.

15–19 May Operation Eagle Peak is conducted by 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, and elements 

of CLR-2, which enables the 6th Afghan Border Police (ABP) to provide medical treatment and evacuation in Taghaz, Southern Helmand, and allows the ABP 

to conduct operations against Taliban insurgents in the region.
262

18 May HMLA-167 relieves HMLA-169 at Camp Bastion. 

19–20 May Operation Gridlock sees RCT-7 and ANSF patrols disrupt enemy freedom of 

movement in the vicinity of Ghorak, Kandahar Province.

23–27 May Marines from 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, and 3d CEB, partnered with soldiers 

from the 42d Georgian Light Infantry Battalion, to conduct Operation Thunderstruck, which demilitarizes Patrol Base Lazika in the Musa Qala District, Helmand Province, and reinvests combat power within AO Tripoli. 

24–25 May Marines conduct Operation Blackmax for recovery of a Bell UH-1Y Venom helicopter from HMLA-167 that experienced a hard landing near FOB Robinson in 

Helmand Province.

18 June NATO forces hand over the responsibility of Afghanistan’s security to Afghan 

forces. U.S. forces still in-country shift from an advisory position to a focus on 

training Afghan troops and conducting special counterterrorism operations. 

4 August Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 165 (VMM-165) relieves VMM-264 at Camp 

Bastion. 

21 October The 1st CEB relieves 3d CEB in Helmand Province.

16 November VMU-2 relieves VMU-3 at Camp Leatherneck. 

25 December Gen Amos, Commandant; SgtMaj Micheal P. Barrett, sergeant major of the Marine 

Corps; Gen Joseph F. Dunford Jr., commander ISAF; and Medal of Honor recipient Sgt Dakota L. Meyer conduct a Christmas Day visit and serve a holiday meal 

to troops at Camp Leatherneck.

2014

January–May Elements of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, conduct operations of the Cameron Falls 

series in Nad Ali District, Helmand Province. The Cameron Falls series of operations is intended to disrupt Taliban threats against the Bastion/Leatherneck 

Complex. 

4 February The 2d MAW (Fwd) conducts a transfer of authority with 3d MAW (Fwd) at 

Camp Leatherneck.
263

5 February The II MEF (Fwd) turns authority over RC-Southwest to Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade–Afghanistan at Camp Leatherneck.

17–19 February Gen Amos and SgtMaj Barrett conduct a visit to Camp Leatherneck, where the 

Commandant discusses the future of the Marine Corps after OEF.

22 February Operation Alcatraz is successful as Marines from 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 

and soldiers of the ANSF detain four known Taliban low-level commanders and 

destroy an IED in Shingazak, Marjah District, Helmand Province. This strengthens the local populace’s confidence in ANSF’s ability to protect them. 

15 March The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, relieves 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in Helmand 

Province.

10 May The 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, relieves 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, in Helmand 

Province.

15 May HMLA-467 relieves HMLA-339 at Camp Leatherneck.

17 May VMU-1, Alpha Detachment, relieves VMU-2 (Fwd) at Camp Leatherneck.

19 May BGen Daniel D. Yoo, commanding general of RC-Southwest, visits VMU-1 at 

Camp Leatherneck to observe a Boeing Insitu RQ-21 Blackjack unmanned aerial vehicle demonstration flight and receive a brief on its capabilities. 

27 May President Barack Obama announces that U.S. combat operations for OEF will 

end in December 2014 and that all U.S. forces will be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2016.

5 April Afghan presidential elections are held.

24 April The 2d CEB relieves 1st CEB in Helmand Province.

14 June Afghan presidential election runoff is held.

19 June Operation Watkins, a battalion-level operation into southern Showal, begins. 

Conducted by 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, this action is meant to disrupt the flow 

of lethal aid throughout southern Showal by closing on the enemy and conducting interdiction missions along key avenues of approach.
264

26 October The United States ends combat operations in Afghanistan after 13 years of fighting, handing over Camp Leatherneck to Afghan forces.

28 December NATO officially ends combat operations in Afghanistan.
265

Appendix E:

Medal of Honor Citation

The President of the United States in the name of Congress takes pleasure 

in presenting the

MEDAL OF HONOR to

Lance Corporal William Kyle Carpenter

United States Marine Corps

For service as set forth in the following

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while 

serving as an Automatic Rifleman with Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, Regimental Combat 

Team 1, 1st Marine Division (Forward), I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom on 21 November 2010. Lance Corporal Carpenter was a member of a platoon-sized coalition force, comprised of two reinforced Marine 

rifle squads partnered with an Afghan National Army squad. The platoon had established Patrol Base 

Dakota two days earlier in a small village in the Marjah District in order to disrupt enemy activity and 

provide security for the local Afghan population. Lance Corporal Carpenter and a fellow Marine were 

manning a rooftop security position on the perimeter of Patrol Base Dakota when the enemy initiated 

a daylight attack with hand grenades, one of which landed inside their sandbagged position. Without 

hesitation and with complete disregard for his own safety, Lance Corporal Carpenter moved toward 

the grenade in an attempt to shield his fellow Marine from the deadly blast. When the grenade detonated, his body absorbed the brunt of the blast, severely wounding him, but saving the life of his fellow Marine. By his undaunted courage, bold fighting spirit, and unwavering devotion to duty in the 

face of almost certain death, Lance Corporal Carpenter reflected great credit upon himself and upheld 

the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Barack H. Obama

President of the United States of America
266

Presidential Unit Citation

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE-AFGHANISTAN

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For outstanding performance in action against enemy forces from 29 May 2009 to 12 April 2010, in 

support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan conducted the most holistic counterinsurgency campaign since the Coalition presence in Afghanistan 

began in 2001. Operating in three separate and austere provinces that had been bereft of government 

efficacy for years, the Brigade constructed expeditionary bases and air fields, and struck decisively at 

the heart of the Taliban insurgency with Operation KHANJAR in July 2009. Cities and hamlets across 

the region, from Now Zad to Khan Neshin, resumed regional commerce and schooling for children, 

and participated in national elections. Concurrent with kinetic fighting, the Brigade engaged tribal, 

religious, and government leaders with population-centric civil-military operations that synchronized developmental efforts across 58,000 square miles of battle-space. In February 2010, Operation 

MOSHTARAK reclaimed Marjah, a strategic agricultural hub and narco-terrorist safe haven in the 

Helmand River Valley. Together with thousands of Afghan National Security Forces, the Brigade tangibly improved the geo-political landscape of Southwestern Afghanistan. By their outstanding courage, 

aggressive fighting spirit, and untiring devotion to duty, the officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian 

employees of Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan reflected great credit upon themselves and 

upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

For the President

Ray Mabus

Secretary of the Navy
267

Appendix F:

Selected Sources and Annotated Bibliography

(Selections in bold type appear in this anthology.)

Published Sources

Ansary, Tamim. Games Without Rules: The Often Interrupted History of Afghanistan. New York: PublicAffairs/Perseus Book Group, 2012.

Author provides a history of Afghanistan and argues that its major political, social, 

and cultural developments come from internal struggles rather than foreign invasions 

or interventions. 

Ballard, John R., David W. Lamm, and John K. Wood. From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The U.S. at War 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012.

Examines American strategy during the Afghan and Iraqi Wars, discussing how political decision making and poor counterinsurgency tactics hampered American efforts 

in both wars.

Blackard, Mark. Killing Sheep: The Righteous Insurgent. Kearney, NE: Morris Publishing, 2012.

The experiences of a former narcotics agent sent to Afghanistan to track terrorists, 

weapons builders, and drug smugglers are presented in this uncensored wartime 

thriller.

Bolger, Daniel P. Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. New York: 

Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014.

Drawing from past experiences as a troop commander in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

LtGen Bolger, USA, argues that the United States could have won its wars had it not 

been for faulty intelligence, decision making, and strategy and an inability to understand the enemy. 

Chamblin, Joseph and Milo Afong. Into Infamy: A Marine Sniper’s War. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015.

A memoir from one of the Marines charged in the Afghanistan urination video 

scandal.

Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 

2012.

A Washington Post war reporter offers firsthand accounts of the Afghanistan War after 
268

President Barack H. Obama’s 2009 troop surge, noting that mistakes on every level—

government, military, and societal—have failed Afghanistan.

Clement, Jeff. The Lieutenant Don’t Know: One Marine’s Story of Warfare and Combat Logistics in Afghanistan. 

Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2014.

Author remembers his service in Afghanistan as a lieutenant with Combat Logistics 

Battalion 6, leading support missions across dangerous territory and facing insurgents 

in battle.

Dyer, Lucas A. A Battle Won by Handshakes: The Story of Alpha Company 1/5. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2014.

Author shares his experiences in Afghanistan, where he and his men realized that the 

best way to achieve success was to band together with their Afghan counterparts and 

work together to drive the Taliban back.

Fairweather, Jack. The Good War: Why We Couldn’t Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan. New York: Basic 

Books, 2014.

War correspondent uses interviews, archived materials, and personal experiences to 

detail the entire Afghan War (2001–14) and argues that the righteous intentions of 

American interventionism eclipsed what otherwise could have been a “good war.” 

The United States can help to restore peace in Afghanistan only when it understands 

the country’s limitations.

Franzak, LtCol Michael, USMC (Ret). A Nightmare’s Prayer: A Marine Harrier Pilot’s War in Afghanistan. 

New York: Threshold Editions, 2010.

Author provides a compelling story describing combat operations and individual experiences as executive officer of Marine Attack Squadron 513, “The Flying Nightmares,” in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003. 

Folsom, LtCol Seth W. B., USMC. Where Youth and Laughter Go: With “ The Cutting Edge” in Afghanistan. 

Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015.

The commander of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, describes his battalion’s training and 

2011 deployment to Sangin District in the Helmand Province, Afghanistan. 

Gall, Carlotta. The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014. Boston: Mariner Books, 2014.

Embedded reporter argues that, because Americans failed to understand their enemy 

in the Global War on Terrorism, the Afghan people suffered the tragedy of war while 

Pakistan was truly to blame. 
269

Golembesky, Michael, and John R. Bruning. Level Zero Heroes: The Story of U.S. Marine Special Operations 

in Bala Murghab, Afghanistan. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2014.

Following U.S. Marine Special Operations Team 8222, this book depicts a major operation to isolate and destroy the Taliban stronghold Bala Murghab.

Goodavage, Maria. Top Dog: The Story of Marine Hero Lucca. New York: Dutton Adult, 2014.

This title provides a wartime biography of canine Marine Corps hero Lucca during 

both tours in Afghanistan and Iraq. The author includes examples of battlefield bravery and the relationships that developed between Lucca and her Marine handlers. 

Johnson, Robert. The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight. New York: Oxford University Press, 

2011.

This book examines the development of armed conflict in Afghanistan during the 

twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, including examples of resistance to political 

oppression, foreign influence, and armed intervention. 

Kaplan, Fred. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War. New York: 

Simon & Schuster, 2014.

Journalist describes how David Petraeus and a group of soldier-intellectuals revolutionized the U.S military for the twenty-first century, which had the unfortunate side 

effect of giving politicians more temptation to wage wars. 

Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2009.

The author offers a thoughtful cross-examination of current “small wars” in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and other countries, and the overarching Global War on Terrorism. This 

book argues that America’s contemporary foreign policies are blurring local struggles 

and global campaigns together and therefore hindering its ability to handle individual 

crises. 

Kummer, Maj David W., USMC. U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2009: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2014.

This text offers an anthology of sources detailing U.S. Marine Corps operations and 

experiences in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009. 

Lowrey, Col Nathan S., USMCR. U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001–2002: From the Sea. Washington, DC: 

Marine Corps History Division, 2011.

This monograph tells the story of Marine expeditionary operations in Afghanistan, its 

involvement in the Global War on Terrorism, and how Marines and sailors acquired a 

major role in Operation Enduring Freedom against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. 
270

Malkasian, Carter. War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier. New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2013.

Author offers an account of Garmsir, a small community in Helmand Province, and 

its experiences with the Taliban and NATO troops during the Afghanistan War.

McChrystal, Gen Stanley, USA (Ret), Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell. Team of 

Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World. New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015.

This book discusses how Gen McChrystal restructured the Joint Special Operations 

Task Force to meet the threats of insurgent groups in the Middle East. 

Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq. New Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, 2010.

This source provides an analysis of American counterinsurgency strategies since the 

Civil War, offering case studies of successful plans that could serve as a model for 

current COIN operations. 

Nordeen, Lon. AV-8B Harrier II Units of Operation Enduring Freedom. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 

2014.

The third volume on USMC Harriers in combat, this book highlights the experiences 

of Harrier pilots in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Obama, Barack H. “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan.” Speech 

at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, 1 May 2012.

This presidential speech to the nation addresses the United States’ efforts in Afghanistan and the strategies of the Obama administration designed to bring the war to an 

end. 

———. “Remarks by the President to the Troops at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan.” Speech at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, 25 May 2014.

This presidential speech to troops stationed in Afghanistan acknowledges their role in 

preparing Afghan military forces to take the lead in securing their country and reiterates that America’s war will be over by the end of the year.

———. “Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan.” Speech at the White 

House, Washington, DC, 22 June 2011.

In light of recent successes of the troop surge in Afghanistan, this presidential speech 

to the nation announces a July deadline for a drawdown of forces.

———. “Statement by the President on Afghanistan.” Speech in the White House Rose Garden, Washington, DC, 27 May 2014.
271

This presidential speech to the nation addresses the progress of America’s drawdown 

and scheduled withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. 

Panetta, Leon. Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace. With Jim Newton. New York: 

Penguin Books, 2014.

This source offers the professional and personal biography of Defense Secretary Leon 

E. Panetta and his experiences in political offices during the Global War On Terrorism, 

including his role as CIA director leading up to the death of Osama bin Laden.

Robinson, Linda. One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare. New York: PublicAffairs, 2014.

Following special operations elements in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring 

Freedom, the author provides a testimony to the capabilities and limitations of these 

small, specialized units.

Sileo, Tom, and Col Tom Manion, USMC (Ret). Brothers Forever: The Enduring Bond between a Marine and 

a Navy SEAL that Transcended Their Ultimate Sacrifice. Boston: Da Capo Press, 2014.

This book tells the story of two brothers, one a Marine and the other a Navy SEAL, 

their personal experiences at the U.S. Naval Academy, and combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Streatfeild, Richard. Honourable Warriors: Fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan—A Front-line Account of the 

British Army’s Battle for Helmand. South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword Military, 2014.

The author, having served as a major with the British Army in Afghanistan, offers 

a personal account of day-to-day operations and combat against the Taliban in Helmand Province. 

Walling, Michael G. Enduring Freedom, Enduring Voices: US Operations in Afghanistan. Oxford, UK: Osprey 

Publishing, 2015.

This book offers a collection of personal experiences of men and women serving in 

Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, supplementing oral histories with 

additional research on the Afghanistan War. 

West, Bing. One Million Steps: A Marine Platoon at War. New York: Random House, 2014.

Embedded journalist provides the story of a rifle platoon during the closing days of 

the war in Afghanistan, as the Marines disregard an impractical strategy and instead 

continue the fight against a dangerous enemy. 

———. The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan. New York: Penguin Random 

House, 2012.
272

Former Marine, assistant defense secretary, and embedded journalist Bing West offers a definitive history of the war in Afghanistan, proposing that the United States 

remove its troops, stop spending billions of dollars, and allow Afghan forces to fight 

for themselves. 

Woodward, Bob. Obama’s Wars. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011.

This book provides a close look at the Obama administration during the war in Afghanistan, highlighting its decision making on issues of foreign policy and the complicated relationships between politicians, military officials, and civilian leaders on every 

level of government.

Zinni, Gen Tony, USMC (Ret), and Tony Koltz. Before the First Shots Are Fired: How America Can Win or 

Lose Off the Battlefield. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014.

The authors argue that America needs to reexamine its response to international crises and how it conducts military operations, drawing on history to support proposed 

alternatives.

Articles

“It’s Not the Artillery’s Fault.” Marine Corps Gazette 97, no. 3 (March 2013): 40–43.

The author analyzes after action reports from Operation Enduring Freedom, arguing that rifle platoons need better organic weapons if they are to successfully combat 

insurgents in Afghanistan.

Avitt, Andrew S. “First Female Advisor Prepares for Afghanistan Deployment.” Leatherneck 94, no. 2 

(February 2011): 46–47.

This article proposes the advantages and disadvantages of deploying a female advisor 

to Afghanistan, as many Afghan men view women differently than their American 

counterparts. 

Betik, Bart A. “Aviation in the Mountains.” Marine Corps Gazette 94, no. 9 (September 2010): 41–43.

The author discusses how challenges presented by Afghanistan’s mountainous and 

cold weather environment affect predeployment training and operations for Marine 

aviators.

Brill, Arthur P., Jr. “The Corps and the Way Ahead: General James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps.” Leatherneck 95, no. 11 (November 2012): 16–20.

Gen Amos discusses the future of the Marine Corps in light of its withdrawal from 

Afghanistan and the end of Operation Enduring Freedom.
273

———. “Outcall with the CMC: Gen Amos Led the Corps during Tough Times on and off the Battlefield.” Leatherneck 97, no. 10 (October 2014): 36–41.

Interviewer speaks with Gen Amos about his tenure as 35th Commandant of the 

Marine Corps before Amos cedes his post to Gen Joseph F. Dunford Jr.

Butler, LtCol Glen. “Wherever the President May Direct.” Marine Corps Gazette 95, no. 11 (November 

2011): 56–60.

This article offers commentary on the role of the Marine Corps as America’s forcein-readiness and how that role will be influenced by operational changes, drawdowns, 

and budget cuts in the post-Operation Enduring Freedom era. 

Cancian, 1stLt Matthew F. “Counterinsurgency as Cargo Cult.” Marine Corps Gazette 97, no. 

1 (January 2013): 50–52.

Author describes modern-day “cargo cults,” as influenced by Marine Corps conventional operations and counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan. 

Carroll, LtCol Patrick, USMC (Ret), and Terry Walker. “Victory in Afghanistan.” Marine Corps Gazette 

94, no. 7 (July 2010): 22–25.

This editorial encourages Marines to teach Afghan police “critical combat skills” that 

go above what is taught by the Kabul Police Academy, so that the police have a clear 

advantage over insurgents while patrolling in southern Afghanistan. 

Cranmer, 1stLt Valerie J. “Not Our Father’s War.” Marine Corps Gazette 99, no. 2 (February 2015): 

87–90.

Accepting the shift from conventional to unconventional warfare, the author argues 

that Marines need to emphasize training for small wars, ethnic conflicts, and humanitarian operations during their predeployment periods.

Darack, Ed. “The Everyday Warfighters: Indefatigable Mission Fidelity in the Modern Toil of 

War.” Leatherneck 94, no. 7 (July 2011): 32–35.

The embedded journalist follows a mobile Marine squad on its search for improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs) near a small patrol base in Afghanistan. 

Davis, Dean. “‘Charlie’ Company Marines Travel Far and Wide.” Leatherneck 93, no. 8 (August 2010): 14.

This article discusses the daily life of patrolling that goes on in Afghanistan, covered from the viewpoint of Charlie Company, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance 

Battalion. 
274

Dressler, Jeffrey. “Operation Moshtarak: Preparing for the Battle of Marjah.” Backgrounder (11 February 2010).

This Institute for the Study of War publication analyzes the Battle for Marjah in Afghanistan, which was the largest Marine-Afghan joint operation since 2001. 

———. “Operation Moshtarak: Taking and Holding Marjah.” Backgrounder (2 March 2010).

In this second installment of “Operation Moshtarak,” the author describes the course 

of the battle and its priority for security and governance in Helmand Province. 

———. “Will the Marines Push Into Northern Helmand?” Backgrounder (10 June 2010).

This article debates whether American and British troops will use the momentum 

gained during Operation Moshtarak to move next into the districts of Kajaki and 

Sangin in northern Helmand Province.

Elfers, Maj Mark W. “Irregular Warfare and the Marine Corps.” Marine Corps Gazette 97, no. 3 (March 

2013): 53–55.

The author argues that Marines need to practice irregular warfare, which has replaced 

the Cold War as the most significant security challenge of the era, to successfully 

combat the Taliban in Afghanistan and terrorist groups worldwide. 

Eikenberry, Karl W. “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan: The Other Side of 

the COIN.” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 5 (September/October 2013): 59–74.

In light of a troop drawdown, this article explores how the strategy of counterinsurgency re-emerged in America’s wars against terrorism and offers opinions as to how 

the United States will continue its fight in spite of military withdrawals and budget 

reductions. 

Galo, Ed. “Regimental Combat Team 6: ‘India’ Company, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines Builds 

Relations in Afghanistan.” Leatherneck 95, no. 3 (March 2012): 32–33.

Following a company of Marines in Afghanistan, the reporter discusses how conducting joint patrols with soldiers from the Afghan National Army (ANA) helps the 

Marines build positive relationships with allied troops and locals.

Garamone, Jim. “General Dunford Assumes ISAF Command in Kabul, Afghanistan.” Leatherneck 96, 

no. 4 (April 2013): 32.

This article covers the change in command at the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, as Gen Dunford assumes command from Gen John R. 

Allen, USMC.

Gordon, Thomas J., Jim G. Gruny, Michael L. Muller, William J. Nemeth, Wendell B. Leimbach Jr., and 
275

Brendan M. Rodden. “Marine Armor in Afghanistan.” Marine Corps Gazette 94, no. 10 (October 2010): 

69–72.

These authors describe the use of tanks and other armored vehicles in irregular warfare and note that the M1A1 Abrams tank could be an enormous help to Marine airground task force commanders in Afghanistan. 

Haas, Cody. “In Every Clime and Place: Marines Patrol and Provide Security around Camps Bastion 

and Leatherneck.” Leatherneck 97, no. 11 (November 2014): 12.

This article follows a forward-deployed Marine infantry battalion as it concludes operations at Camps Bastion and Leatherneck before turning the area over to the Afghan National Security Forces. 

Hayden, H. T. “Winning Hearts and Minds.” Marine Corps Gazette 94, no. 6 (June 2010): 34–37.

President Obama authorizes a troop surge in Afghanistan, maintaining that the mission of American armed forces is to prevent the Taliban from overthrowing the 

Afghan government and to keep al-Qaeda out of the country. 

Harkins, Gina. “After Action.” Marine Corps Times, 1 April 2013.

A description of Sgt Robert W. Richards Article 32 hearing concerning the urination 

video.

Hlad, Jennifer. “Hearing Concludes for Marine Accused of Urinating on Taliban Bodies.” McClatchyTribune Business News 19 March 2013.

This article describes the results of several hearings on the urination video as well as 

comments from the battalion commander.

Jernigan, LtCol Michael. “Otis Raible Defines Leadership.” Marine Corps Gazette 97, no. 7 

(July 2013): 13–15.

This article provides a description of the Marine response to the Taliban assault on 

Camp Bastion in 2012, which resulted in the destruction of several AV-8B Harriers 

and the deaths of LtCol Christopher “Otis” Raible and Sgt Bradley W. Atwell.

Johnson, Frances. “In Every Clime and Place: I MEF (Forward) Reactivates for Historic Afghanistan 

Deployment.” Leatherneck 96, no. 12 (December 2013): 16.

The author covers the upcoming deployment of the I Marine Expeditionary Force 

(I MEF Forward) to Afghanistan’s Helmand and Nimroz Provinces in Regional 

Command-Southwest (RC-Southwest).

———. “In Every Clime and Place: ‘Tango’ Btry Still Providing Artillery for Forces in Afghanistan.” 

Leatherneck 97, no. 8 (August 2014): 14–15.
276

This article describes a composite artillery battery, composed of both M777A2 

155mm howitzers and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), operating 

in Afghanistan. 

Johnson, Ned. “Camp Shorabak, Afghanistan: Radio Check: Marines Train Afghan Soldiers and Improve Communication Skills.” Leatherneck 96, no. 9 (September 2013): 15–16.

Following a signals kandak, which is structured like a Marine Corps communications 

battalion, the author covers the actions of Afghan radio operators and data specialists 

who train with Marines to improve communication between units.

———. “In Every Clime and Place: Civil Affairs Marines Advise the Progressing Afghan Government.” Leatherneck 96, no. 8 (August 2013): 20–21.

Civil Affairs Detachment, Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7), contains 11 Marines 

who work with the RCT command and assist local government officials in Helmand 

Province, Afghanistan. 

———. “In Time of Transition, Marines Support Afghan Advisors.” Leatherneck 96, no. 7 

(July 2013): 16–17. 

This article documents a transitional period in which Marines turn from a role of 

conventional warfighters to that of advisors for Afghan National Security Forces.

———. “Last Marine Infantry Regiment Departs Helmand Province.” Leatherneck 96, no. 10 

(October 2013): 34–35.

This article covers the final action of RCT-7 as it prepares to leave Afghanistan, its 

author arguing that successful operations in Helmand Province allow RCT-7 to be the 

last unit of its size in the country. 

Katz, David. “The Marine Corps in Afghanistan.” Marine Corps Gazette 94, no. 6 (June 2010): 42–44.

The author comments on the current state of Marine operations in Afghanistan in the 

summer of 2010, noting that President Obama and American policy makers will face 

another big decision in terms of selecting a strategy for troops to implement against 

Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents. 

Lamothe, Dan. “Staff NCOs Face Courts-Martial in Video Urination Scandal.” Marine Corps Times, 

8 October 2012.

This article describes the charges presented against two staff sergeants in the urination video case.

Lombardo, Tony. “Dunford Hands Off Command in Afghanistan.” Marine Corps Times, 26 August 

2014.
277

This article covers the change in command at the International Security Assistance 

Force in Afghanistan, as Gen John F. Campbell, USA, assumes command from Gen 

Dunford.

Long, Austin. “In Every Clime and Place: Helmand Province, Afghanistan: Operation Pegasus II Nabs 

Bomb-Making Materials.” Leatherneck 97, no. 1 (January 2014): 12–13.

Marines of 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, on a patrol to search for weapons caches and 

IED materials near Camps Bastion and Leatherneck.

Long, Austin, and Paul Peterson. “This Is My Life: Marines in Afghanistan.” Leatherneck 97, 

no. 3 (March 2014): 36–40.

With the war in Afghanistan reaching its end, two journalists interview four Marines 

serving with 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, about their experiences in the Marine Corps 

and operations during numerous deployments to Afghanistan. 

Lowrey, Col Nathan S., USMCR (Ret). “Operation Steel Dawn II: The Raid on Bahram Chah.” 

Marine Corps History 1, no. 1 (Summer 2015): 6–22. 

This article describes certain combat operations in Helmand, Afghanistan, conducted 

in October 2010.

Lubin, Andrew. “ ‘Arty’ in Afghanistan–‘We’re Here to Shoot’.” Leatherneck 93, no. 1 (January 2010): 38–42.

The Marine artillery battalion of 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, is tasked with supporting fire missions and providing mobile fire support in Helmand Province. This article 

describes its leadership, subordinate batteries, and achievements since deploying with 

Task Force Leatherneck.

———. “I MEF (Fwd): First into the Fight!.” Leatherneck 93, no. 2 (February 2010): 24–26.

This article announces the forward deployment of the I Marine Expeditionary Force 

(I MEF) to Afghanistan, adding a sizeable force of infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, 

combat engineer, civil affairs, aviation, and support units to Afghanistan in augmentation of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade. 

———. “The Advisor Training Group: Making Afghanistan ‘Transition’ Successful.” Leatherneck 95, 

no. 12 (December 2012): 26–28.

This piece describes the role of Marine advisor training groups and how their training 

prepares them to advise their Afghan counterparts in high-stress situations, such as 

ambushes, IED explosions, civil disobedience, and medical evacuations. 

———. “Marine Artillery in Afghanistan: 1/11–Every Man an Infantryman and a Cannoneer.” 

Leatherneck 94, no. 3 (March 2011): 38–41.
278

Following the individual batteries of 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, the author covers 

the many actions of Marine artillerymen in Afghanistan, including patrolling, running 

convoys, training local policemen, and advising local leaders. 

———. “The New ‘Strategic’ Combat Correspondent in Afghanistan.” Leatherneck 94, no. 9 (September 2011): 48–50.

This article describes the influence of new policies and modern technologies on embedded media coordinators, broadcast and press editors, combat cameramen, and 

public affairs specialists in Afghanistan. 

Malkasian, Carter, and J. Kael Weston. “War Downsized: How to Accomplish More with Less.” Foreign 

Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012).

With the United States withdrawing from Afghanistan, the authors propose an alternative to a costly strategy of counterinsurgency—counterterrorism—which relies 

heavily on special operations forces to conduct operations against terrorist leaders 

rather than seeing troops work alongside the Afghan people. 

McNulty, Andrew J. “A Return to Instability.” Marine Corps Gazette 97, no. 1 (January 2013): 53–56.

The author foresees a return to instability after the United States has withdrawn from 

Afghanistan, arguing that the Afghan people rely on American troops for security, 

economic development, and reconstruction after long years of Taliban rule. 

Ostroska, Jessica L. “In Every Clime and Place: Southern Afghanistan: I MEF (Forward) Deploys to 

Afghanistan for the Last Time.” Leatherneck 97, no. 3 (March 2014): 13.

The author describes I MEF’s deployment to RC-Southwest for the last time in January 2014. 

Owen, Jonathan, USMCR. “Border Security.” Marine Corps Gazette 96, no. 4 (April 2012): 44–48.

This article comments on the failure of American counterinsurgency in Afghanistan 

after 10 years of fighting and blames this failure on poor border security, which otherwise would prevent terrorist insurgents from entering Afghanistan. 

Peterson, Paul. “Armored Vehicle Drivers: Seeing the World through Their Eyes.” Leatherneck 96, no. 

11 (November 2013): 16–17.

LCpl Morgan Almazan describes her experiences as a motor vehicle operator with 

Combat Logistics Regiment (CLR-2) at Camp Leatherneck, acknowledging the closeness of her truck crew and the danger of their surroundings. 

———. “Marine Turret Gunner in Afghanistan Says Job Keeps Him Going.” Leatherneck 96, no. 12 

(December 2013): 19.
279

LCpl Kevin Dunseith discusses his responsibilities as a turret gunner with CLR-2 in 

southwestern Afghanistan. 

Rholes, Ryan. “MV-22 Osprey: Proving Itself in Combat.” Leatherneck 93, no. 8 (August 

2010): 42–45.

This article describes the technological specifications of the Bell Boeing MV-22 Osprey and its operational history in Afghanistan with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 from 2009 to 2010.

Scanlan, Joseph. “In Every Clime and Place: Marines Confiscate Narcotics, Prevent Taliban 

from Reaping Profits.” Leatherneck 97, no. 8 (August 2014): 15–16.

This article follows the progress of Marine units tasked with locating and destroying 

caches of narcotics in Afghanistan that are a major source of Taliban funding. 

Schoback, Capt Nicholas. “Warfighting: A Leadership Guide.” Marine Corps Gazette 98, no. 2 (February 

2014): 13–15.

The author explores the strategy of warfighting and the relationship between officers 

and their Marines, questioning how these elements will be affected as the Corps leaves 

Afghanistan and how a generation of Marines will influence a new era.

Seck, Hope Hodge. “Afghanistan Vet Pens Novel about War.” Marine Corps Times, 1 March 2015.

The author interviews Silver Star recipient Capt Elliot Ackerman about writing a fictional novel on the Afghan War, Green on Blue, and why he chose to dedicate his work 

to two Afghan soldiers with whom he served in combat.

———. “After Base Handoff, Last Marines Depart Afghanistan.” Marine Corps Times, 27 October 

2014.

This article announces the transfer of Camp Leatherneck in Helmand Province from 

Marine control to that of Afghan National Security Forces, signifying the end of Marine operations in Afghanistan. 

———. “His War Story.” Marine Corps Times, 13 April 2015.

SSgt Joseph W. Chamblin discusses his plan to write a memoir following the Afghanistan urination case.

———. “ ‘It’s Your Medal’: Read Kyle Carpenter’s Inspiring Speech to Marjah Vets.” Marine 

Corps Times, 16 February 2015.

On the five-year anniversary of the beginning of Operation Moshtarak, Medal of 

Honor recipient Kyle Carpenter offered an encouraging speech to Marine veterans of 

the campaign.
280

———. “Marine 1-Star: Signs of Taliban Fractures in Afghanistan.” Marine Corps Times, 16 January 

2015.

BGen Daniel D. Yoo, who last commanded Marines in Afghanistan, offers a confident analysis of the ANA’s ability to combat the Taliban and dissuades rumors that 

ISIS is recruiting men in Helmand Province. 

———. “Marine Commanders Reflect on 13 Years of War in Afghanistan.” Marine Corps 

Times, 5 November 2014.

The author speaks with six active-duty Marines about their thoughts on the war in 

Afghanistan. Although the Marines agree that American forces should withdraw from 

Afghanistan after 13 years of fighting, they are not confident in the ability of their 

Afghan counterparts to maintain security and improvement. 

———. “MARSOC Corpsman to Receive Silver Star.” Marine Corps Times, 19 March 2015.

HM1 Kevin D. Baskin, USN, is awarded the Silver Star for administering aid to a 

wounded Marine under enemy fire while attached to Marine Special Operations Team 

8224 in South Zereko Valley, Afghanistan. 

Vasgerdsian, Ed. “Portrait of a Wounded Warrior: The Story of Staff Sergeant Jason Pennock.” Leatherneck 96, no. 8 (August 2013): 34–38.

This article follows a wounded Marine off the battlefield and into the hospitals for a 

number of corrective surgeries. SSgt Jason M. Pennock was wounded during a firefight in Helmand Province, where Taliban insurgents ambushed a team of ANA soldiers and Marine reconnaissance advisors. 

Wilkes, John. “MALS-31 ‘Stingers’ Support Operation Enduring Freedom.” Leatherneck 96, no. 4 (April 

2013): 17.

The author follows an all-volunteer detachment of Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 31 (MALS-31) as it deploys to Helmand Province in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Yarbrough, Bobby J. “Gimlet-Eyed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles See It All for Marines.” Leatherneck 96, 

no. 5 (May 2013): 13–15.

This article discusses the functions of the Marines’ unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 

and describes how aerial surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence is crucial to 

maneuver elements on the ground. 

———. “The Green Zone: Security and Stability Are Staples in Kajaki, a Former Taliban Stronghold.” 

Leatherneck 96, no. 6 (June 2013): 8–9.

The journalist explores the relationship between Marine advisors and soldiers of the 
281

ANA as the security of Kajaki, once a Taliban stronghold, becomes the ANA’s responsibility. 

Young, Joshua. “Last Marines Exit Sangin.” Leatherneck 97, no. 7 (July 2014): 12–13.

This article depicts one example of the transition in Afghanistan, as Marine advisors 

leave Sangin to their Afghan counterparts. Forward Operating Base (FOB) Robinson 

is renamed FOB Rahatullah as it is placed under ANA command.

———. “Security, Voter Safety Top Priorities as Afghans Prepare for Elections.” Leatherneck 97, no. 4 

(April 2014): 10–11.

The combat correspondent reports on the results of a shura (a meeting between Afghan district leaders to discuss various issues) as Afghanistan prepares to transfer the 

power of its presidency for the very first time.

283

— A —

Abrams, Aaron J. (GySgt), 25, 27–28, 30, 32

Adams, Robert (Cpl), 69–70, 72–74

Afghan border police (ABP), 261–62

Afghan National Army (ANA), 45, 49–54, 56–

57, 87, 113, 160–63, 170, 185, 250–51, 

256–59, 260, 265, 274, 280–81

4th Kandak, 52

205th Corps, 53, 185

215th Corps, 160–63, 182, 184–85

Afghan National Police (ANP), 11, 20, 57

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), 57, 

78–81, 128–31, 143, 163, 251–53, 253, 

255–57, 259–63, 266, 275–76, 279

Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF), 20

Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), 91–92, 251, 

256

Aircraft, Afghan

Mil Mi-17 Hip-H, 185

Mi-35 Hind E, 185

Aircraft, other countries

Boeing CH-47 Chinook, 21–22, 28

Aircraft, U.S.

Bell Boeing MV-22 Osprey, ix, 4–10, 27, 

184, 279

Bell AH-1 Cobra, 9, 24, 27

Bell UH-1 Iroquois (Huey), 9, 120

Bell UH-1Y Venom, 120, 262

Boeing Insitu RQ-21 Blackjack (UAV), 

263

Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight, ix, 5, 

7

Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt 

II, 24, 32–33

Joint-Service vertical takeoff/landing 

(JVX) aircraft, 5

Lockheed AC-130 Spectre, 24, 31, 33

Lockheed KC-130 Hercules, 156, 158, 

182

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II, 

ix, 9, 109, 118, 120, 259–60, 270, 

275

McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, 9, 

24, 47

Rockwell B-1 Lancer, 24, 28, 33

Sikorsky CH-53 Super Stallion, 151–52, 

183

Sikorsky CH-53D Sea Stallion, 69

Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk, 33

al-Anbar Awakening, ix

al-Asad Air Base, Iraq, 6

Allen, John R. (Gen), ix, 61, 127, 254, 274

al-Qaeda, 20, 61, 63√65, 155–57, 159, 269, 

275–76

Alternative Development Program (ADP), 90

Amaya-Rivera, Alber Yovani (HM, USN), 74

an-Nasiriyah, Iraq, 11

Apollo 13, 121

Area of operation, U.S. military, 21, 24, 46–47, 

51, 70, 81, 129, 255–57, 259, 261

Mameluke, 21

Tripoli, 261–62

Army, U.S. units

1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry 

Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, 177

101st Airborne Division, 67

Artillery, U.S.

.50-caliber machine gun, 33

M777 155MM howitzer, 11–12, 16, 23, 

276

High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems 

Index
284

(HIMARS), 11–12, 24–25, 28–29, 

32. 184, 276

Ratheon Excalibur precision-guided 

rounds, 13

Atwell, Bradley W. (Sgt), ix, 121, 275

Awards, U.S. military

Medal of Honor, 3, 41–42, 122, 251, 

262, 265, 279

Navy Cross, 119, 184

Presidential Unit Citation, 266

— B —

Badghis Province, Afghanistan, 172

Baghdad, Iraq, 67

Bagram, Afghanistan, 7, 67

Bagram Air Base, 62, 65, 154, 157, 255, 270

Bahram Chah, Afghanistan, 18–39

Balochistan, Pakistan, 35

Banana Wars, ix

Bases, military in U.S.

Fort Irwin National Training Center, 

CA, 47

Marine Air Ground Combat Center 

Twentynine Palms, CA, 8, 23–25

Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC, 

47

Marine Corps Air Station New River, 

NC, 6

Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC, 

47, 171

Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, 

CA, 171

Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris 

Island, SC, 115

Beecher, Thomas R. (CWO4), 16

Bell Helicopter, 5

Bianca, Anthony (LtCol), 6

bin Laden, Osama, 61, 63–64, 67, 156, 253, 271

Bitonti II, John R. (Maj), 21, 24, 27–32

Blue star families, 42

Boeing Vertol, ix, 5, 7

Bradley, Buck A. (1stLt), 31–32

Bridgeport, CA, 139

Britain, military,

C company, 3d Battalion (The Rifles), 

13

Royal Air Force, 21

Special Boat Service (SBS), 21

Brockside Village, Afghanistan, 85

Burdick, Eugene, 79

— C —

Campbell, John F. (Gen, USA), ix, 149, 277

Campbell-Bannerman, Henry, 78

Camps, military in Afghanistan

Bastion, ix, 4, 6, 21, 109, 118–21, 151, 

153, 158, 252, 259–62, 275, 277

Delaram, 2, 252

Leatherneck, x, 22, 24, 35, 45, 143–44, 

149, 157, 161, 167, 182, 185, 

252, 257–58, 261, 263–64, 275, 

277–79

Shorabak, 49, 276

Tombstone, 49

cargo cult, 77–81, 273

Carpenter, William Kyle (Cpl), 3, 41–43, 251, 

265, 279

Chaka Chaka Punji, 79

Chagai Hills, Afghanistan, 20, 27–29

Christian, Andrew (Maj), 177

Coalition in Afghanistan, 19–23, 28, 32–34, 41, 

46–48, 52, 56–57, 64, 72, 85, 89, 91, 

109, 130, 151, 162–63, 169, 176, 253, 

256, 258, 265–66

“Commander’s Guidance for Squadron Attack 

Pilots,” 121–22

see also Raible, Christopher

Conway, James T. (CMC), 19

counterinsurgency (COIN), ix–x, 11, 13, 17, 

21–22, 24, 50, 53, 77–81, 84–86, 88, 
285

92–93, 127, 149, 167, 171, 177, 182–83, 

252, 254, 270, 273–74, 278

Cox, Dennis (Cpl), 139–41

Creech, Ronnie L. (Capt), 25

Curtis, Jeffrey S. (Capt), 24, 28

Custis, Jon A. (Maj), 25, 31

— D —

Dadullah, Mullah, 20–21

Delaram, Afghanistan, 183, 252

Dewson, Joseph (Capt), 161

Districts/villages, Afghanistan

Garmsir, 12, 15, 21, 183, 251, 253, 

255–58, 270

Khan Neshin, 21, 255, 266

Kajaki, 11, 21, 24, 86–87, 162, 257–60, 

274

Musa Qala, 13, 95–96, 99–100, 103, 

253, 255–56, 258–59, 262

Nad Ali, 45, 49, 53, 262

Nawa, 15, 114, 116, 180, 250–51, 254, 

256

Nawa-I-Barakzayi, 21

Now Zad, 96, 151, 183, 253, 255, 261, 

266

Sangin, 13, 34, 72, 77–79, 83–87, 92, 

111, 161–63, 181–85, 250, 253, 

255–58, 260–61, 268, 274, 281

Douglas, Christopher (Col), 161–62

Drugs

heroin, 20, 162, 251

opium, 20, 22, 33, 184, 261

seized, 20, 22

Dunford, Joseph F., Jr. (Gen), ix, 127, 149, 262, 

273–74, 277

— E —

11 September 2001 (9/11), 64, 139, 155, 159, 

182, 253

Early, Bryan W. (Sgt), 133–35

Evans, Cody (Cpl), 151–52

Exercises, military

Desert Scimitar 2014, 23, 25

Enhanced Mojave Viper, 8, 24

Pashtun Horizon III, 55–56

— F —

Fallujah, Iraq, 184

Farah Province, Afghanistan, 172, 176, 182–83, 

251, 254

Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 78, 81

Firebase, U.S. military, 

Edinburgh, 11, 13

Fiddler’s Green, 11–13, 24

Payne, 11, 21, 23–26, 254

Pico, 11–12

Saenz, 11–13

Zeebrugge, 11, 13, 15

see also forward operating bases, U.S. 

military

Ford, Jason T. (Capt), 21–22

Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU), 169–70, 

174

Forward arming and refueling point (FARP), 27, 

33

Forward operating bases (FOB), U.S. military

Hamidullah, 163

Marjah, 69

Nolay, 161–63

Rahatullah, 163, 281

Rhino, 183

Robinson, 163, 262, 281

Sabit Qadam, 161

Samsor, 49

Shawqat, 49

White House, 91

— G —

Galula, David, 81

Garcia, Adolfo, Jr. (LtCol), 11–12, 24–25
286

Garesh Valley, Afghanistan, 45

Georgia, Republic of, 13, 44, 262

Gereshk Valley, Afghanistan, 172, 251

Global War on Terrorism, ix, 3, 169, 268–69, 

271

Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan (GIRoA), 62, 92, 255, 260

Grabow, David J. (Maj), 24, 26, 28

Grassl, Michael (1stSgt), 152–53

Graziosi, Dennis A. (1stLt), 83–93

Greene, John W. (GySgt), 162

Gregory, Curtis C. (MSgt), 29, 31

Guardians of Nolay, 162

Gurganus, Charles M. (MajGen), 35, 121, 210, 

216

— H —

Haji Wakil, Afghanistan, 22, 29–32

Hamidullah (Lt, ANA), 163

Haskamp, Adrian B. (Capt), 22, 30

Heinl, Robert D. (Col), 119

Hejlik, Dennis J. (MajGen), 170

Helmand River, 16, 21–22, 36, 84, 254, 260

Helmand River valley, 11, 15, 21, 252, 266

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 

(HIMARS), 11–12, 24–25, 28–29, 32, 

184, 276

Hoag, Jacob B. (Cpl), 15

Hobbs, Parker (LCpl), 73–74

Hostetler, Charles L. (1stLt), 30

Hutchison, Jonathan A. (Capt), 45–57

— I —

Improvised explosive device (IED), 15–16, 20, 

22–23, 33–34, 70, 72–74, 78–79, 84–85, 

88–89, 103, 105, 151–53, 181, 252, 259, 

263, 273, 277

Indian Ocean, 6

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR), 22

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 

ix, 19, 21, 23–24, 52, 61, 77, 127, 149, 

191–226, 250, 260, 262, 274, 277

Iran, 7, 162

Iraq, ix, 6–7, 19, 53, 63, 66, 73, 158, 169, 184, 

267, 269, 271

ISAF Joint Command (IJC), 23–24

Ivers, Dustin L. (Cpl), 73

Iwo Jima, Japan, 122

— J —

Jerome, Jon D. (1stSgt), 30

Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), 174

Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL), 89

Joint-Service Vertical Take-off/Landing Aircraft 

Experimental Program, 5

Jumakhan, Afghanistan, 29

— K —

Kabul, Afghanistan, 19, 157, 183, 185

Kajaki Dam, Afghanistan, 13, 16

Kajaki Sofla Bazaar, 88, 90

Kandahar, Afghanistan,

Airfield, 182, 186, 254–55

International Airport, 33, 183

kandak, 50, 52–53, 276

2d Kandak, 53

3d Kandak, 53

4th Kandak, 52

9th Kandak, 176

Kilcullen, David, 81

King, Martin Luther, Jr., 121

Knapp, Sean T. (1stLt), 29

Krantz, Gene, 121

Kristel, Charles A. (Cpl), 135–37

Kushne Regai (sic), Afghanistan, 102

— L —

Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan, ix, 52, 109

Lavine, Gabriel M. (1stLt), 30
287

Lederer, William J., 79

Lefebvre, Paul E. (MajGen), 177

LeFlore, Craig C. (LtCol), 27, 195, 198, 209, 214

Leonard, Scott D. (LtCol), 21–22, 25–27, 31, 33, 

194

Libya, 66

Lockwood, Matthew (GySgt), 129–31

— M —

MacIntyre, Douglas J. (LtCol), 81

Marello, Joseph (Col), 174–76

Marier, Jacob (Cpl), 111–13

Marine Corps, air units

wings

Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW)

2d MAW, 202, 208, 219, 

223, 233, 236, 240–41, 

252, 263

3d MAW, 4, 9, 12, 118, 194, 

197, 212, 217, 229, 

232. 237, 239, 252, 263

squadrons

Marine Attack Squadron (VMA)

VMA-122, 254

VMA-211, ix, 109, 118, 120, 

122, 213, 217, 237, 

239, 260

VMA-223, 203, 209, 214, 

234, 236–37

VMA-231, 214, 217, 220, 

228, 237, 239–40, 261

VMA-311, 221, 223, 226, 

240–41, 261

VMA-513, 234, 254–55, 268

Marine Fighter Attack 

Squadron (VMFA)

VMFA-122, 195, 198, 203, 

230, 232, 234

VMFA-232, 33, 230

VMFA-513, 204, 234

Marine Heavy Helicopter 

Squadron (HMH)

HMH-361, 194, 198, 213, 

217, 220, 229, 232, 

237, 239–40, 252, 259, 

261

HMH-362, 194, 198, 213, 

230, 232, 237, 252

HMH-363, 203, 209, 213, 

233, 236–37

HMH-461, 198, 217, 220, 

232, 239–40, 252, 261

HMH-462, 220, 223, 225, 

 240–41

HMH-463, 198, 203, 

232–33, 252

HMH-464, 203, 209, 233, 

236

HMH-466, 33, 152, 213, 

225, 237, 259

Marine Light Attack Helicopter 

Squadron (HMLA)

HMLA-167, 220, 240, 262

HMLA-169, 194, 198, 203, 

213, 217, 220, 230, 232, 

234, 239–40, 260, 262

HMLA-203, 234, 267

HMLA-339, 263

HMLA-367, 228

HMLA-369, 27, 33, 203, 

209, 213, 220, 223, 

225, 230, 234, 236–37, 

240–41, 258

HMLA-467, 226, 263

HMLA-469, 213, 237, 258, 

260

Marine Medium Tiltrotor 

Squadron (VMM)

VMM-161, 214, 218, 221, 

237, 239–40
288

VMM-162, 204, 234

VMM-165, 221, 223, 240, 

242, 262

VMM-261, 4–9, 226, 228, 

230, 242, 279

VMM-263, 6

VMM-264, 195, 198, 204, 

221, 230, 232, 234, 

240, 262

VMM-266, 198, 232

VMM-269, 234, 236

VMM-365, 27, 33, 195, 198, 

209, 214, 230, 232, 

236–37

Marine Wing Support Squadron 

(MWSS)

 MWSS-271, 221, 240, 

MWSS-272, 204, 234

MWSS-273, 214, 238

MWSS-274, 226, 230, 243

MWSS-371, 209, 236

MWSS-372, 221, 224, 226, 

228, 240, 242–43

MWSS-373, 26, 33, 195, 199, 

214, 218, 230, 232, 

238–39

Marine Corps units, U.S.

command units

Africa Command,

3d Raider Battalion, 178

Central Command 

(CENTCOM), 170

2d Raider Battalion, 178

Marine Corps Forces Special 

Operations Command 

(MARSOC), ix, 167, 169–70, 

174, 177, 184

Pacific Command,

1st Raider Battalion, 178

Special Operations Command 

Central (SOCCENT), 171

U.S. Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM), 167, 

169

expeditionary forces

Marine Expeditionary Force 

(MEF)

I MEF, 3, 20–21, 23–24, 

33, 61, 109, 127, 192, 

210, 216, 228, 231, 

236, 239, 250, 265, 275, 

277–78

II MEF, 61, 109, 127, 149, 

195–96, 199, 206, 218, 

222, 232, 235, 239, 

241, 253, 257, 261, 263

task forces

9th Air and Space Expeditionary 

Task Force-Afghanistan, 195, 

206, 215–16, 222, 231, 235, 

238–39, 241

Special Operations Task Force 81 

(SOTF-81), 172–74, 227, 234, 

 241

Special Operations Task Force 82 

(SOFT-82), 174, 235, 238

Special Operations Task ForceWest (SOTF-West), 170, 

172–73, 227, 230–31, 234, 

238, 241

Task Force 58, 183

Task Force 210, 22, 25, 27–29, 

31–33

Task Force Helmand, 45–47, 49, 

52–53, 56–57

Task Force Highlander, 12, 18, 

21, 25–29, 31–32

Task Force Leatherneck, 20, 35, 

163, 258, 261, 277

Task Force Orange, 20
289

divisions

Marine Division (MarDiv)

1st MarDiv, 22–23, 196, 

210, 231, 236–37, 252, 

254, 257, 261

 2d MarDiv, 200, 207, 

232–33, 235, 252, 257, 

261

brigades

Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

(MEB)

2d MEB, 3, 21, 191, 227, 

250

MEB-Afghanistan, 149, 

183, 185, 224, 242, 

250, 263, 266, 277

groups

Marine Special Operations 

Advisor Group (MSOAG), 170, 

 172

Marine Special Operations 

Support Group, 174, 176–77

regiments

1st Marines,

1st Battalion, 114–15, 211, 

237, 259

2d Battalion, 193, 197, 200, 

229, 231, 233, 251, 253

3d Battalion, 12, 193, 229

2d Marines,

1st Battalion, 158, 191, 

193, 225, 227, 229, 

242, 263

2d Battalion, 191, 227, 229

3d Battalion, 201, 229, 233, 

253, 255

3d Marines,

1st Battalion, 191, 194, 

201, 227, 229, 233, 

253–55

2d Battalion, 68, 70–75, 

193, 197, 201, 229, 

231, 233, 251–52, 254

3d Battalion, 180, 193, 201, 

207, 211, 229, 233, 

235, 237, 255–58

4th Marines

2d Battalion, 95, 201, 207, 

233, 235–36, 255–57

3d Battalion, 192, 219, 

228–29, 233, 240, 

261–62

5th Marines,

1st Battalion, 86, 201, 206, 

227, 229, 233, 253, 255

2d Battalion, 211, 237, 

257–59

3d Battalion, 13, 181, 184, 

197, 201, 229, 231, 

233, 250, 252–53

6th Marines

1st Battalion, 12, 82–83, 

90, 162, 183, 192, 201, 

207, 228–29, 233, 236, 

255–56

2d Battalion, 193, 201, 208, 

211, 229, 233, 235, 

237, 251, 256, 258

3d Battalion, 12, 192–93, 

201, 228–29, 233

7th Marines,

1st Battalion, 150, 152, 

211, 237, 242, 258–60, 

263

2d Battalion, 183, 211, 216, 

219, 237, 239–40, 260

3d Battalion, 13, 83, 86, 

111–13, 194, 201, 208, 

212, 219, 222, 225, 

229, 233, 235–37, 
290

240–42, 250, 255–57, 

263, 268

8th Marines,

1st Battalion, 197, 201, 

208, 212, 229, 231, 

233, 235, 237, 253, 

256, 258

2d Battalion, 130, 197, 201, 

219, 231, 233, 240, 

252, 255, 261

3d Battalion, 197, 202, 212, 

231, 233, 237, 258

9th Marines

1st Battalion, 132, 134, 

136, 138, 140, 202, 

223, 225, 233, 241–42, 

254, 262–63, 277

2d Battalion, 193, 202, 208, 

212, 229, 231, 233, 

235, 237, 252, 261, 265

3d Battalion, 197, 202, 212, 

216, 219, 229, 231, 

233, 237, 239–40, 

251–52, 260

10th Marines,

 1st Battalion, 11, 47, 202, 

229, 233, 252, 254

2d Battalion, 212, 217, 237, 

239

3d Battalion, 192, 228–29

11th Marines

1st Battalion, 17, 24–26, 

33, 229, 278

 Bravo Battery 

 (Beastmasters), 

 12–13, 23

2d Battalion, 208, 212, 

236–37, 255

3d Battalion, 277

5th Battalion, 12, 25, 228

 S Battery, 12

12th Marines

1st Battalion, 202, 233, 

254–55

3d Battalion

 India Battery 

 (Redlegs), 13

 Lima Battery, 12

Marine Special Operations 

Regiment (MSOR), 171–72, 

174, 176

regimental teams

Regimental Combat Teams (RCT)

RCT-1, 193, 196, 200, 229, 

231–33, 251, 265

RCT-2, 24, 191, 193, 197, 

227, 229, 231

RCT-5, 200, 207, 211, 233, 

235–36

RCT-6, 111–13, 115, 130, 

207, 211, 235, 237

RCT-7, 24, 129–30, 143, 

191, 193, 211, 216, 

219, 227, 229, 237, 

239–40, 276

RCT-8, 200, 207, 233, 236

expeditionary units

Marine Expeditionary Units 

(MEU)

15th MEU, 183

22d MEU, 6

24th MEU, 183

26th MEU, 170–71, 183

battalions

1st Medical Battalion, 226

Combat Engineer Battalions 

(CEB)

1st CEB, 212, 219, 223, 

225, 229, 237, 240, 

242, 258, 260, 262–63
291

2d CEB, 202, 217, 219, 

225, 228–29, 233, 

239–42, 255, 260–61, 

263

3d CEB, 27, 33, 202, 208, 

212, 219, 229, 233, 

236–37, 240, 255, 258, 

261–62

 4th CEB, 74

Combat Logistics Battalion 

(CLB)

CLB-1, 205, 209, 215, 234, 

236, 238

CLB-2, 215, 218, 222, 230, 

232, 238–40

CLB-3, 26, 33, 205, 230, 

232, 234

CLB-4, 210, 215, 236, 238

CLB-5, 215, 230, 238

CLB-6, 205, 224, 228, 230, 

234, 242, 268

CLB-7, 205, 224, 228, 230, 

234, 242, 268

CLB-8, 205, 232, 234

Light Armored Reconnaissance 

Battalions (LAR)

1st LAR, 12, 33, 194, 202, 

208, 212, 229, 233, 

237, 256, 273

2d LAR, 21, 197, 202

3d LAR, 197, 202, 212, 

229, 231, 233, 237, 

252, 254

4th LAR, 192, 194, 228–29

Marine Special Operations 

Battalions (MSOB)

 1st MSOB, 170–74, 227, 

230, 234, 238, 241

 2d MSOB, 170–74, 227, 

230, 235, 238, 241

3d MSOB, 173–74, 231, 

235, 238, 254, 256

Raider battalions

1st Raider Battalion, 178

2d Raider Battalion, 178

3d Raider Battalion, 178

companies

Air Naval Gunfire Liaison 

Company (ANGLICO)

 1st ANGLICO, 200, 224, 

227–28, 232, 242

2d ANGLICO, 44–45, 193, 

196, 200, 228, 231–32, 

 240–41

5th ANGLICO, 207, 228, 

235

Force Reconnaissance 

Company

 1st Recon, 170

 2d Recon, 170

Marine Corps Outlook: 2010–2011 Edition, 177

Marine Forces Reserve, 184

Marineistan, ix, 3, 5–59, 61, 109, 183

Marjah, Afghanistan, ix, 3, 12, 24, 41–43, 69–72, 

114, 116, 183–85, 250–52, 261, 263, 

265–66, 274, 279

Martin, Michael S. (LtCol), 21, 192, 194

Mattis, James N. (BGen), 183, 186–87

McChrystal, Stanley A. (Gen, USA), 183, 250, 

270

McCulloch, Philip A., Jr. (Sgt), 181–82

McLellan, Archibald M. (Col), 177

Mendez Romero, Raymundo (Cpl), 95–105

Mera, Jonathan (LCpl), 16

Miller, Matthew (Maj), 25

Mills, Richard P. (LtGen), 20, 23, 28, 33–35, 57, 

184, 186, 192, 196

Missiles and rockets

107mm rockets, 31, 75

FGM-148 Javelin antitank missile, 16
292

tube-launched, optically-tracked, 

wireless-guided (TOW) missile, 31

Mitchell, Michael D. (Lt), 30

MREs (meals, ready to eat), 73

Morales, Paul (Cpl), 13

mullah, 92

Musa Qala, Afghanistan, 13, 94–96, 99–100, 

103, 142, 253, 255–56, 258–59, 262

— N —

Narcotics, 20, 33, 150–53, 253, 256, 260, 267, 

279

see also Afghan Special Narcotics Force, 

drugs

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA), 121

Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures 

Standardization program, 7

Naval Special Warfare Squadron, Det One, 169

Navy, U.S.,

SEALs, 61

New Guinea, 78

Nez, Afghanistan, 45, 47, 54

Nguyen, Tevan L. (Cpl), 181

Nicholson, Larry D. (MajGen), 183–86, 191

Nimroz Province, Afghanistan, ix, 3, 11, 20, 

161, 172, 182, 275

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), x, 

3, 9, 64, 127, 149, 155, 157–58, 250–51, 

254, 262, 264, 270

Norton, George (BGen, UK), 56, 192, 196

— O —

Obama, Barack H., ix–x, 3, 21, 61, 63–67, 149, 

155–59, 182, 250, 253–54, 263, 265, 

268, 270, 272, 275–76

O’Donnell, Andrew W., Jr (BGen), 9, 194, 197

Olson, Eric T. (Adm), 172

Operations, U.S. military

Alcatraz, 263

Aoqub se Hasht (38 Eagle), 261

Audible, 254

Blackmax, 262

Blue Magic, 258

Branding Iron, 258

Branding Iron II, 259

Da Tunder Zeghelwol, 256

Dawn of Hope, 257

De Gham Payela, 257

Double Check, 102–4, 256

Doubledown, 259

Dynamic Arch, 256

Dynamic Partner, 261

Eagle’s Hunt, 255

Eagle Peak, 261

Eastern Storm, 83

East River, 251

Enduring Freedom (OEF-A), vii, ix, 

53, 144, 169–70, 172, 177, 

227–43, 258, 263, 265–66, 

269–73, 280

Godfather, 251

Golden Gate, 260

Gridlock, 262

Harakat Tah Cham-Too Shai (Prepare 

to March), 260

Harvest Moon, 253, 256

Helmand Viper, 259

Highland Thunder, 257

Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 177

Jalut (Goliath), 251

Jaws D5, 255

Khanjar (Strike of the Sword), 21, 266

Lion’s Den I, 256

Lion’s Den II, 257

Moshtarak, ix, 3, 41–42, 183, 250, 266, 

274, 279

Neptune, 253

New Dawn, 250

New Hope, 260
293

Nightmare, 130

Press 16, 25

Psarlay Taba, 261

Ramadan Mubarak, 255

Rawhide II, 34, 252, 254

Red Hawk, 252

Sangin Moshtarak Naweed, 258

Savage Wing, 252

Southern Gambit, 99

Steel Curtain, 252

Steel Dawn I, 25

Steel Dawn II, 12, 19–39

Street without Joy II, 254

Sulaiman, 252

Talai Ghar (Keyhole), 253

Tethys, 260

Thunderstruck, 262

Watchtower II, 253

Watkins, 263

Western Gambit, 101

Zema Pa Sar Ma Tera, 258

Osterman, Joseph L. (BGen), 22, 196

— P —

Pakistan, 7, 20–21, 23, 30–32, 35, 61, 63–65, 75, 

162, 253, 268

Pakistani Army

XII Corps, 35

Panetta, Leon E., 109, 257, 271

Parks, Andrew (LCpl), 13

Pashtun, 79

Pashtunwali, 247

Patton, George S. (Gen, USA), 42

patrol bases (PB), Afghanistan

Dakota, 265

Detroit, 115

Lazika, 262

Pennsylvania, 88

Typhoon-5, 73

Pentagon, 6, 182, 251, 257

Petraeus, David H. (Gen, USA), 78, 250, 254, 

269

Phifer, Christopher M. (1stLt), 30

poppy, ix, 61, 109, 162, 183, 251, 253, 256

see also drugs

Prout Jeremy (1stLt), 130–31

Provinces, Afghanistan

Farah, 172

Farah Ghor, 172

Helmand, ix–x, 3, 11, 13, 19–22, 25, 45, 

72, 80, 95, 109, 115–16, 119, 

129, 133, 139, 141, 143–45, 

149, 151, 161–62, 172, 181–86, 

250–65, 268, 270–71, 274–77, 

279–80

Kandahar, 25, 256, 262

Nimroz, ix, 3, 11, 20, 161, 172, 182, 275

Provinces, Iraq

al-Anbar, 6, 184

— Q —

Qandahari, Mohammad Rasul (LtCol, Afghan 

Border Police), 36

— R —

Rahatullah (Maj), 163, 281

Raible, Christopher K. (LtCol), xi, 119–23, 213, 

260, 275

Raider battalions, 178

Ramadi, Iraq, 184

Ramirez, Adam B. (LCpl), 27–28

Rapkoch, Nicolas S. (Capt), 24, 28–29, 31

Regay (Regai), Afghanistan, 102

Regional Command-South (RC-South), 19

Regional Command–Southwest (RC-Southwest), 

Afghanistan, 3, 9, 11, 20, 33, 61, 69, 

121, 127, 143, 161, 184, 191, 195, 206, 

216, 222, 227, 231, 235, 239, 241, 253, 

275

Registan Desert, Afghanistan, 183
294

Renforth, Austin E. (Col), 144–45, 211, 216, 219

Richardson, Patrick W. (Capt), 27

Ripley, John, 119

Robeson, Mastin M. (MajGen), 170–72

Robinson, Richard (Capt), 12–13

Route 1, 162

Route 611, 162

Rumsfeld, Donald H., 19, 169

— S —

Saeger, Kenneth (Cpl), 16

Saenz, Jose L., III (Sgt), 13

Salaam Bazaar, Helmand Province, 96, 99, 253

Samuels, Scott A. (SgtMaj), 144, 211, 216, 219

Sanford, Stuart R. (Sgt), 28, 30

Sangin River valley, 12

Santiago, Robert (Cpl), 162

Security Forces Assistance Advisor Teams 

(SFAAT), 129–30

SFAAT 2-215, 161–62

Shah, Shirin (Gen, ANA), 53

Ships, USS

Bataan (LHD 5), 6

shura, 77–78, 86, 91–92, 182, 185, 281

Simons, David (SSgt), 116–17

Skidmore, Adam (Cpl), 16

Small arms

AK47, 69

M4 assault rifle, 73

M16 assault rifle, 115

M203 grenade launcher, 100

M240 machine gun, 88, 100, 120

Small Wars Manual, 185

Solzamrabat (sic), Sghanistan, 102

Stephens, Seth (Cpl, Royal Marine), 22

Stinnett, Richard (Capt), 13, 15–17

Sutherland, Griffin W. (Cpl), 72

— T —

Taliban, ix, 3, 12, 15–16, 19–23, 25, 28, 31–33, 

35, 41, 63–105, 109, 120–21, 151–53, 

162, 181–86, 250–51, 256, 258–59, 

261–63, 266, 268–71, 274–76, 278–81

Taliban Pass, 32

Task forces (TF), U.S. 

TF 58, 183

TF 81, 172, 227

TF 81.2, 173, 234

TF 81.3, 174, 241

TF 82.2, 174, 235, 238

TF 210, 22, 25, 27–29, 31–33

Helmand, 45–47, 49, 52–53, 55–57

Highlander, 12, 21, 25–29, 31–33

Leatherneck, 20, 35, 258, 261, 277

Orange, 20

West, 172–73, 227, 230–31, 234, 238, 

241

Wrong War, 79, 271–72

Thomas, Ivan G. (LtCol), 7–9

THOR system, 85

Tomassi, Patrick (LCpl), 137–39

Toolan, John A., Jr. (MajGen), 34–35, 199, 206

transfer of authority, 252, 261, 263

Trek Nawa, Afghanistan, 115–17, 252

Tremblay, Paul D. (Maj), 162–63

Triangle of Guilt, 101

— U —

Ugly American, 79–80

Ugly Hill, 100

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 263, 280

U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), 15

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 170–71, 

178

U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USF-A), ix, 61, 127, 

149, 227, 230, 234, 238, 241

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), ix, 167, 169
295

— V —

vehicles, U.S. military

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicle (HMMWV or humvee), 70, 73

Mine resistant, ambush protected 

(MRAP), 9, 99

Mine resistant ambush protected all terrain vehicle (M-ATV), 70, 73

Vietnam War, ix, 121

village stability operations (VSOs), 172, 178, 

251, 254

— W —

Wake Island, ix, 109, 260

Walaski, Jonathan R. (1stLt), 29

Wall Street Journal, 121

Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in 

Bethesda, 67

West, Bing, 79, 272

West Point, U.S. Military Academy, 64, 159

Williams, Hershel W. (CWO4), 122

Williams III, Robert F. (Maj), 45–57

Wolesi Jirga (Afghanistan’s House of the 

People), 3, 250

Wood, Mark (LtCol), 83–93

Workman, Timothy (Pfc), 115–17

World Trade Center, 182

World War II, ix, 42, 78, 109

Wright, Michael D. (1stLt), 28, 30

— Y —

Year in Special Operations: 2012–2013 Edition, 177

Yenalavitch, Mark (Cpl), 113

Yoo, Daniel D. (BGen), 185–86, 224, 263, 280
History Division

United States Marine Corps

Quantico, Virginia