SUMMARY

August 29, 2019

2019COA133

No. 18CA0264, People v. Sharp — Criminal Procedure — New 

Trial — Postconviction Remedies — New Trial Based on Newly 

Discovered Evidence; Attorneys and Clients — Ineffective 

Assistance of Counsel

A division of the court of appeals holds that a defendant 

asserting a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under Crim. P. 

35(c) based on counsel’s failure to file a motion for a new trial must 

prove prejudice resulting from the failure. This means the 

defendant must prove that the trial court would have granted the 

motion. 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA133

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0264

Adams County District Court No. 11CR1307

Honorable Ted C. Tow, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Harley David Sharp,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE 

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS 

Division IV

Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES

Román and Rothenberg*, JJ., concur

Announced August 29, 2019

Dave Young, District Attorney, Michael Whitney, Deputy District Attorney, 

Brighton, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Mallika L. Magner, Alternate Defense Counsel, Crested Butte, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellee 

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2018. 
1

¶ 1 The People appeal the postconviction court’s order granting 

the Crim. P. 35(c)(2) motion of defendant, Harley David Sharp, and 

ordering a new trial. We reverse and remand with instructions to 

reinstate the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed. We 

first conclude that defendant didn’t establish prejudice resulting 

from his trial attorney’s failure to investigate. And we conclude that 

to establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel where counsel 

failed to move for a new trial, a defendant must demonstrate a 

reasonable probability that the court would have granted the 

motion. Prejudice can’t be presumed in this situation, and in this 

case, defendant didn’t establish a reasonable probability that a 

motion for a new trial would have been granted. 

I. Background

¶ 2 The People charged defendant with sexually assaulting his 

daughter between 2008 and 2010 when she was between two and 

five years old. The victim’s great aunt had reported the assaults to 

the department of social services after the victim confided in her 

and spontaneously engaged in aggressive sexual behavior in late 

2010. 
2

¶ 3 At trial, the victim struggled to remember details. But she 

testified that her father had touched her buttocks, touched and 

licked her vagina, and had her touch his penis. The victim’s mother 

testified that one night she woke up and saw defendant touching 

the victim’s vagina while also touching himself. She told defendant 

to stop, but she didn’t report the incident.1 A sexual assault nurse 

examiner (SANE) who examined the victim shortly after the victim’s 

great aunt reported the assaults testified that she didn’t find any 

physical trauma. But according to the SANE, that was a fairly 

typical result for the type of contact the victim and her mother 

accused defendant of engaging in. (The SANE had been told the 

victim hadn’t had any contact with her father for at least two 

months.) She also said that only about four percent of the children 

she has examined for evidence of sexual assault showed any 

physical trauma. 

 

1 At the time of trial, the victim’s mother had pleaded guilty to 

sexual assault and attempted sexual assault relating to the same 

conduct with which defendant was charged, and was serving a 

seven-year prison sentence. 
3

¶ 4 A jury found defendant guilty of sexual assault on a child, 

sexual assault on a child as a pattern of abuse, and sexual assault 

on a child by one in a position of trust. 

¶ 5 At defendant’s sentencing hearing, R.H., a cousin of the 

victim’s mother, spoke with defense counsel’s investigator and 

made some new allegations. R.H. said that the victim had asked 

her “what would happen if I lied?” — a statement R.H. assumed 

meant the victim was lying about her father assaulting her. R.H. 

also told the investigator that, in 2010, the victim’s grandmother 

had offered to pay R.H. to make false allegations of sexual assault 

against the grandmother’s husband (or ex-husband) to get “revenge” 

against him for refusing to pay rent to her. Defense counsel didn’t 

move for a new trial based on R.H.’s allegations. 

¶ 6 A division of this court affirmed defendant’s convictions on 

direct appeal. People v. Sharp, (Colo. App. No. 13CA1761, June 11, 

2015) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). 

¶ 7 Defendant filed a pro se motion (followed shortly thereafter by 

a supplemental motion from newly appointed postconviction 

defense counsel) for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c). He 

sought a new trial based on newly discovered evidence (see Crim. P. 
4

35(c)(2)(V)) — specifically, the information R.H. had given the 

investigator — and alleged that his trial counsel had been 

ineffective in a variety of ways (see Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I)). As now 

relevant, defendant alleged that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by failing to investigate potential witnesses (one of whom 

was R.H.) and by failing to move for a new trial under Crim. P. 33 

after R.H. came forward with new information. 

¶ 8 The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the 

motion. Defendant testified that in late 2007 or early 2008, the 

grandmother picked up the victim from the babysitter and took her 

home to defendant. The grandmother told him that she had seen 

inflammation and green discharge on the victim’s vaginal area after 

picking her up. He said that he “flipped” and took the victim to the 

hospital, where a doctor examined her and didn’t find any 

inflammation or green discharge. He said he told trial counsel 

about the incident before trial, but counsel failed to investigate 

further or to seek information from the hospital where the victim 

had been examined. R.H. testified about her conversations with the 

victim, the grandmother, and the defense investigator. 
5

¶ 9 The postconviction court rejected many of defendant’s claims, 

but found merit in two. First, it found trial counsel’s failure to 

investigate defendant’s assertion that he had taken the victim to a 

hospital to be examined during the same period he was allegedly 

assaulting her was ineffective assistance that prejudiced defendant. 

On this basis, the court vacated defendant’s convictions and 

ordered a new trial. Second, it found that trial counsel’s failure to 

move for a new trial after R.H. came forward was ineffective 

assistance. The court said it did not need to determine whether 

such a motion would have been successful, reasoning that the 

failure to move for a new trial is like a failure to perfect an appeal, a 

circumstance in which the loss of the appellate proceeding 

constitutes the required prejudice. So the remedy for a failure to 

move for a new trial, the court said, would be to restore defendant’s 

opportunity to seek a new trial.2

 

2 The court addressed this issue only as a backstop in case this 

court disagreed with its conclusion on the prior hospital visit issue. 

There would be no point in allowing defendant to move for a new 

trial if this court were to affirm the postconviction court’s ruling 

granting a new trial. 
6

II. Discussion 

¶ 10 The People challenge both of the postconviction court’s bases 

for finding ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree with them as 

to both. 

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 11 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under 

Rule 35(c), a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) counsel’s 

deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). There is a strong presumption that 

counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Id. at 689. To prove prejudice, the defendant must 

show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id. at 694; accord Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 76 

(Colo. 2003) (“[A] reasonable probability means a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”). 

¶ 12 A postconviction court’s ruling on a Rule 35(c) motion presents 

a mixed question of fact and law. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 

1063 (Colo. 2007). We defer to the court’s findings of fact if they 
7

have record support, but we review any legal conclusions de novo. 

Id. These legal conclusions to which we do not defer include “the 

ultimate determinations on Strickland’s performance and prejudice 

prongs.” People v. Sifuentes, 2017 COA 48M, ¶ 16; see People v. 

Newmiller, 2014 COA 84, ¶ 18. 

B. Analysis 

1. Failure to Investigate

¶ 13 The postconviction court found that trial counsel’s failure to 

further investigate the 2007 or 2008 hospital visit met both 

Strickland prongs: (1) it fell below the objective standard of 

reasonableness and (2) “[t]his information, if true, may very well 

have had some impact on the jury’s consideration of the facts.” 

This is so, the court said, because this evidence would have shown

“that during the same time period Defendant was alleged to have 

been perpetrating upon this child, the child was examined by a 

doctor, who had found no signs of physical abuse.” The court 

concluded that “while it is entirely possible that a jury will still 

convict Defendant, the Court finds that the confidence in the verdict 

is sufficiently undermined[.]” 
8

¶ 14 We don’t address the postconviction court’s finding of 

ineffective assistance because we disagree with its ultimate 

determination of prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“[A] 

court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was 

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant 

as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”); People v. Villanueva, 2016 

COA 70, ¶ 66 (“If a court determines that a defendant has failed to 

prove either prong of the Strickland analysis, it may deny an 

ineffective assistance claim without addressing the other prong.”). 

¶ 15 To show prejudice, defendant had to show a reasonable 

probability that the result of the trial would have been different had 

defense counsel investigated the hospital visit and introduced 

related evidence at trial. See Villanueva, ¶ 67 (A defendant “must 

do more than simply allege that other evidence could have aided his 

defense; he must identify the evidence and demonstrate that it 

would have advanced his defense.”); People v. Pendleton, 2015 COA 

154, ¶ 34 (“[T]he mere possibility that additional investigation 

would have revealed useful information does not establish 

ineffective assistance.”). 
9

¶ 16 We conclude that, for the following reasons, defendant failed to 

meet his burden:

• The SANE who examined the victim in early 2011 

testified that only four percent of over 600 children 

whom she had examined for sexual assault showed 

signs of irritation or trauma. She explained that 

children heal “really quickly” and often the abuse is 

“gentle.” Defense counsel didn’t challenge any of that 

testimony (and defendant doesn’t contend he should 

have).

• The People didn’t allege that defendant had committed 

any acts of penetration or any other forceful acts one 

might expect to cause physical trauma.3

• The first examination of the victim allegedly occurred in 

late 2007 or early 2008. There was therefore only a 

small overlap, if any, between the time of that 

examination and the period covering the charges 

 

3 The People argued and presented evidence of only nonforceful 

touching and licking. The jury made specific findings as to the 

particular acts defendant had committed. All involved “touching” or 

“licking” either the victim’s or defendant’s genitals. 
10

(January 1, 2008, to December 10, 2010). Indeed, the 

evidence strongly points to defendant having committed 

the charged acts in 2010, two or more years after the 

first examination. The victim testified that she was six 

years old when defendant touched her. (She actually 

didn’t turn six until July 5, 2011.) Her mother testified 

that she saw one of the incidents in the summer of 

2010. (She claimed to have seen only that one 

incident.) Defendant testified that he was separated 

from the victim’s mother from July 2008 to August 

2010, he was homeless during much of that time, the 

victim lived with her mother during that time, and he 

had very little contact with the victim during that time. 

And the victim told her great aunt about defendant’s 

acts in late 2010, about the same time the great aunt 

noticed the victim exhibiting inappropriate sexual 

behavior. 

• This wasn’t a typical child sex assault case, where the 

only evidence is the child victim’s testimony. As noted, 

the victim’s mother testified that she once saw 
11

defendant touching the victim while the victim’s pants 

were down. And the mother had pleaded guilty to a 

sexual offense against the victim arising from that 

incident. 

¶ 17 In light of all this, we conclude that the potential evidence of 

the first examination would have had only minimal relevance, and 

virtually no exculpatory value. The nature of the charged conduct 

(supported by both the victim’s and her mother’s testimony) and the 

SANE’s testimony were entirely consistent with any finding of no 

physical trauma. 

¶ 18 Though defendant argues that taking his daughter to a 

hospital for a sexual assault examination isn’t the conduct of one 

who has sexually assaulted his daughter, and therefore evidence of 

that event would have negatively impacted the victim’s and her 

mother’s credibility, he overstates the point. After all, there was a 

potential gap of more than two years between the first examination 

and the acts with which he was charged. 

¶ 19 Defendant’s argument that the evidence would have 

undermined the grandmother’s credibility fares no better. 
12

¶ 20 According to defendant’s testimony at the postconviction 

hearing, it was the grandmother who told defendant the victim may 

have been sexually assaulted by a babysitter, which prompted him 

to take the victim to the hospital in late 2007 or early 2008. So, 

defendant says, had the jury learned that the grandmother had 

accused someone else of sexually assaulting the victim, it might 

have viewed her less credibly. But the grandmother’s credibility 

wasn’t an issue at trial. She didn’t testify, and no one testified that 

the grandmother had ever accused defendant of sexually assaulting 

the victim.4 The only things mentioned about the grandmother 

were that she sometimes babysat the victim and had spoken to the 

victim about defendant after the police arrested defendant.5 

¶ 21 In sum, defense counsel’s failure to investigate the 2007 or 

2008 examination doesn’t undermine our confidence in the 

 

4 The grandmother didn’t testify because defense counsel 

successfully argued she shouldn’t be allowed to do so because her 

presence during the victim’s testimony violated the court’s 

sequestration order. Defendant has never asserted that his counsel 

provided ineffective assistance in making that request. 

5 The victim testified that her grandmother talked to her (after she 

had come forward) about getting her father help and had told her to 

“just say the truth.” 
13

outcome of the trial. The postconviction court therefore erred in 

setting aside defendant’s convictions and ordering a new trial. 

2. Failure to Move for a New Trial 

¶ 22 Though we reverse the postconviction court’s decision to set 

aside defendant’s convictions, we also must address its finding that 

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a new 

trial. This is so because the postconviction court ordered that 

defendant be allowed to file a motion for a new trial in the event we 

reversed its decision to vacate the convictions. Such a motion could 

conceivably result in a new trial. Functionally, therefore, the 

postconviction court’s ruling on the failure to move for a new trial 

could have the same effect as a ruling setting aside the convictions. 

We conclude that the postconviction court erred in granting 

defendant relief on this claim. 

¶ 23 The postconviction court concluded that counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to move for a new trial after R.H. 

came forward at the sentencing hearing. The court reasoned that 

R.H.’s assertion that the grandmother had offered to pay R.H. to 

falsely accuse the grandmother’s husband to get revenge against 

her husband and R.H.’s assertion that the victim had said “what 
14

would happen if I lied?” were “potentially exculpatory.” That 

information, the court said, could have affected the jury’s 

assessment of the victim’s credibility and supported “the possible 

defense that [the grandmother] planted the allegations with the 

[victim].” (Emphasis added.) So, the court concluded, trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion for a new 

trial based on this “newly discovered” evidence. 

¶ 24 But the court didn’t find that this evidence met the test for 

granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Indeed, 

the court said it didn’t need to “determine whether a new trial 

would have been granted.” Instead, citing People v. Long, 126 P.3d 

284, 286 (Colo. App. 2005), the court determined that, like the 

forfeiture of an appeal, “the loss of the ability to present an 

argument for a new trial is sufficient prejudice under Strickland.” 

¶ 25 The postconviction court erred in relieving defendant of the 

obligation to show Strickland prejudice. And because defendant 

didn’t establish that the new evidence met the requirements for 

granting a new trial, the postconviction court erred in granting 

defendant relief on this claim.
15

a. Defendant Was Required to Show Strickland Prejudice 

¶ 26 To reiterate, Strickland generally requires a showing that the 

defendant was prejudiced — that is, that there is a reasonable 

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 

different but for counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687-88, 694. Such proof of actual prejudice is necessary 

because of the “strong presumption of reliability” attached to the 

judgment. Id. at 696; see Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 

(2000); People v. Valdez, 178 P.3d 1269, 1278 (Colo. App. 2007). 

¶ 27 Only in very limited circumstances is prejudice presumed. A 

complete denial of counsel falls in this category, United States v. 

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984), as does a complete failure to 

subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, id.

at 659, and a situation in which even fully competent counsel 

couldn’t provide effective assistance, id. at 659-60. 

¶ 28 More specifically relevant to this case, so does counsel’s failure 

to perfect a defendant’s desired appeal. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 

U.S. 470, 483-84 (2000); Long, 126 P.3d at 286-87. In such a case, 

the deficiency “deprive[s] [the defendant] of the appellate proceeding 

altogether.” Roe, 528 U.S. at 483; accord Long, 126 P.3d at 286; 
16

see also Roe, 528 U.S. at 483 (comparing the complete denial of 

counsel, for which prejudice need not be shown, to “[t]he even more 

serious denial of the entire judicial proceeding itself, . . . to which 

[the defendant] had a right”). The upshot is that unlike a case 

where the defendant claims his counsel provided ineffective 

assistance during the appeal, for which the defendant must show 

that he would have prevailed on appeal but for the deficient 

performance, Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285 (unreasonable failure to file 

a merits brief on appeal required showing of actual prejudice); Long, 

126 P.3d at 286, in the circumstance where counsel fails to appeal 

in contravention of a defendant’s wishes, no such showing is 

required. 

¶ 29 In Valdez, a division of this court extended this principle to a 

case in which postconviction counsel failed to timely pursue a 

motion under Crim. P. 35(c) as requested by the defendant, 

resulting in the postconviction court deeming the motion barred by 

the doctrine of laches. 178 P.3d at 1273-75. In reversing, the 

division concluded that because counsel’s ineffectiveness had 

caused the defendant to be denied “the judicial proceeding he 
17

sought” — the Rule 35(c) proceeding — the defendant didn’t have to 

show Strickland prejudice. Id. at 1278-80. 

¶ 30 Our takeaways from this line of authority are (1) absent one of 

the situations identified in Cronic, a defendant must show actual 

prejudice unless counsel’s ineffectiveness caused the forfeiture of a 

“proceeding” in its entirety; and (2) a “proceeding” in this context 

means the whole of a discrete phase of a criminal prosecution. In 

Colorado, these discrete phases include (1) a trial proceeding, from 

the commencement of the case to the resolution of all allowed postjudgment, pre-appeal motions in the trial court; (2) an appellate 

proceeding, including at least a defendant’s appeal as a matter of 

right to this court;6 and (3) a postconviction proceeding under Rule 

35(c). 

¶ 31 With these principles in mind, we hold that counsel’s failure in 

this case to file a motion for a new trial didn’t result in the forfeiture 

of an entire proceeding but was, at most, ineffective assistance in 

 

6 We need not decide whether supreme court review, to which, with 

the exception of capital cases, a defendant has no right, constitutes 

a separate proceeding. We observe, however, that in People v. 

Valdez, 789 P.2d 406, 410-11 (Colo. 1990), the supreme court held 

that a defendant who claimed that his counsel should have filed a 

petition for a writ of certiorari after an adverse decision by the court 

of appeals was required to show prejudice. 
18

the course of a trial proceeding. And just as a defendant must

show actual prejudice as a result of deficient performance in the 

course of an appellate proceeding, see Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285; 

People v. Valdez, 789 P.2d 406, 409-10 (Colo. 1990), or in the 

course of a Rule 35(c) proceeding, see People v. Fitzgerald, 973 P.2d 

708, 712-13 (Colo. App. 1998) (court properly denied postconviction 

relief where the defendant failed to show any prejudice caused by 

the previous postconviction counsel’s actions), a defendant is 

required to show prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient 

performance in the course of a trial proceeding, see Bell v. Cone, 

535 U.S. 685, 695-98 (2002) (where counsel didn’t entirely fail to 

subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, 

but merely failed to do so at specific points — by failing to adduce 

mitigating evidence and failing to make a closing argument —

prejudice would not be presumed). 

¶ 32 Consider the analogous circumstance of counsel failing to 

move to suppress evidence. Such a motion, like a motion for a new 

trial, is filed within a proceeding. And granting a motion to 

suppress may result in the dismissal of charges. Yet, the Supreme 

Court has held that a defendant seeking postconviction relief based 
19

on counsel’s failure to file such a motion must demonstrate actual 

Strickland prejudice by proving that the motion would have been 

granted. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (“[T]he 

defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is 

meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the 

verdict would have been different absent the excludable 

evidence . . . .”); accord People v. Terry, 2019 COA 9, ¶ 31; People v. 

Vicente-Sontay, 2014 COA 175, ¶ 23. 

¶ 33 Consider as well the equally analogous circumstance of 

counsel failing to move for a judgment of acquittal. In that 

circumstance, a defendant must also show Strickland prejudice. 

See, e.g., Rivera-Rivera v. United States, 827 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 

2016) (a defendant must satisfy the prejudice prong when seeking 

relief for ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure 

to move for acquittal); Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 442-

43 (Pa. 2011) (the defendant’s ineffectiveness claim failed where he 

did not demonstrate “a reasonable probability that the trial court 

would have granted a motion for judgment on [sic] acquittal”). 

¶ 34 We don’t see any principled difference in this context between 

failing to file a motion to suppress or failing to move for a judgment 
20

of acquittal and failing to file a motion for a new trial. As we see it, 

all such failures are failures within a proceeding, not failures that 

deprive a defendant of “an entire judicial proceeding.” 

¶ 35 Rule 35(c) itself also supports our conclusion. Subsection 

(c)(2)(V) says that a defendant may seek postconviction relief if 

there exists evidence of material facts, not 

theretofore presented and heard, which, by the 

exercise of reasonable diligence, could not 

have been known to or learned by the 

defendant or his attorney prior to the 

submission of the issues to the court or jury, 

and which requires vacation of the conviction 

or sentence in the interest of justice.

In other words, a defendant may obtain postconviction relief under 

Rule 35(c)(2)(V) based on newly discovered evidence only by making 

essentially the same showing required to succeed on a Crim. P. 33 

post-trial motion for a new trial based on newly discovered 

evidence. See People v. Gutierrez, 622 P.2d 547, 559-60 (Colo. 

1981) (setting forth a defendant’s burden on a Rule 33 motion for a 

new trial based on newly discovered evidence); People v. Gee, 2015 

COA 151, ¶ 73 (same); People v. Muniz, 928 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Colo. 

App. 1996) (holding that the same elements apply to a claim under 

Rule 35(c)(2)(V)). A defendant may not avoid that burden simply by 
21

repackaging his newly discovered evidence claim as one for 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

¶ 36 As noted, the only case the postconviction court cited in 

support of its conclusion was Long. Long, however, involved the 

forfeiture of the entire appellate proceeding. Defendant doesn’t cite 

any case, and we haven’t found one, in Colorado or elsewhere, 

indicating that losing the opportunity to move for a new trial is a 

forfeiture of an entire judicial proceeding such that a showing of 

Strickland prejudice isn’t required. On the contrary, numerous 

cases hold that a showing of Strickland prejudice is required in this 

context. See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 663 F.3d 726, 742-43 

(4th Cir. 2011) (a defendant must show a likelihood of prevailing on 

a motion for a new trial to establish prejudice based on counsel’s 

failure to file such a motion); Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 991 

(9th Cir. 1999) (“[B]ecause the motion [for a new trial] almost 

certainly would have failed, [the defendant] has not demonstrated 

that he was prejudiced by counsel’s refusal to make it.”); Manley v. 

State, 605 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (there is no 

per se entitlement to relief when counsel fails to file a timely motion 

for a new trial); State v. C.D.L., 250 P.3d 69, 80-81 (Utah Ct. App. 
22

2011) (the defendant failed to show prejudice from counsel’s failure 

to move for a new trial because he couldn’t show that he was 

entitled to a new trial).7 For the reasons discussed above, we find 

these authorities persuasive.

b. Defendant Failed to Show Strickland Prejudice 

¶ 37 To show that a motion for a new trial would have succeeded, 

defendant had to show at the postconviction hearing that (1) the 

evidence — R.H.’s testimony about what the victim and the 

 

7 See also, e.g., Ingram v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 736 F. App’x 798, 

801 (11th Cir. 2018) (no deficient performance or prejudice where 

the defendant can’t show he would have been entitled to a new trial 

if his counsel had filed a motion); Weaver v. United States, 793 F.3d 

857, 864-65 (8th Cir. 2015) (the defendant wasn’t prejudiced by 

counsel’s failure to move for a new trial when evidence wasn’t newly 

discovered); Diaz v. United States, 298 F. App’x 858, 859-61 (11th 

Cir. 2008) (newly discovered impeachment evidence was insufficient 

to justify a new trial, so the defendant failed to show that there was

a reasonable probability of a different result had her counsel filed a 

motion for a new trial); Jewson v. Crosby, No. 3:04CV71/MCR/MD, 

2005 WL 1684209, at *7-8 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2005) (unpublished 

report and recommendation) (declining the defendant’s request to

presume prejudice where counsel failed to move for a new trial; loss 

of an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new trial is not a 

forfeiture of an entire judicial proceeding), adopted as modified, 

2005 WL 1692617 (N.D. Fla. June 16, 2005) (unpublished opinion), 

aff’d, 174 F. App’x 529 (11th Cir. 2006); State v. Batek, 638 S.W.2d 

809, 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“The fact of untimely filing [for a 

motion for new trial], by itself, does not compel reversal; it is also 

essential that the defendant show some error by the trial court 

which could have resulted in a successful appeal, had the motion 

been filed on time.”). 
23

grandmother had said to her — was discovered after trial; (2) he 

and his attorney were diligent in attempting to uncover it before 

trial; (3) the evidence would have been material and not merely 

cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the evidence probably would 

have resulted in an acquittal if presented at trial. Gutierrez, 622 

P.2d at 559; see Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(V). He failed to meet that burden. 

¶ 38 Initially, we reject defendant’s argument that the 

postconviction court “implicitly” found all of these factors save 

whether he could have discovered the evidence through the exercise 

of reasonable diligence before trial. The court specifically said that

it need not determine whether a motion would have been 

successful, and its order doesn’t include an express finding on any 

of the required elements. Nor, contrary to defendant’s assertion, 

does the record of the postconviction hearing establish all of the 

required elements. 

¶ 39 First of all, defendant knew of R.H. before trial. Though he 

testified that he told his attorney about R.H. before trial, the 

postconviction court found him not credible on that point. 

Defendant’s failure to tell his attorney of a potential defense witness 

of which he was aware is, by itself, enough to defeat any newly 
24

discovered evidence claim. Cf. People v. Gallegos, 187 Colo. 6, 10, 

528 P.2d 229, 231 (1974) (“Clearly, evidence within the defendant’s 

knowledge before trial does not constitute newly discovered 

evidence.”). 

¶ 40 Second, the evidence that the victim asked R.H. “what would 

happen if I lied” may have been of some impeachment value, but 

not enough to be of “consequence to the outcome.” Farrar v. People, 

208 P.3d 702, 707 (Colo. 2009) (The evidence “must be of sufficient 

consequence for reasons other than its ability to impeach, or cast 

doubt upon, the evidence already presented at trial. It must be 

consequential in the sense of being affirmatively probative of the 

defendant’s innocence, whether that is accomplished by helping to 

demonstrate that someone else probably committed the crime; that 

the defendant probably could not have committed the crime; or 

even that the crime was probably not committed at all.”) (citations 

omitted). 

¶ 41 To the contrary, when R.H.’s testimony is read in context, it is 

more likely that the victim (if she said this at all) was wondering 

whether she should lie by saying defendant hadn’t assaulted her. 

On this issue, R.H. testified in full as follows: 
25

And on the drive home one day we were talking 

about her dad. And the conversation got 

brought up that he was going to be going away 

to get some help. And I asked [the victim] — I 

said, well, why do you think your daddy needs 

help. And she said well because he did bad 

things to me. And I said are you sure. What 

kind of things did he do to you. And she said, 

well, just bad things, I don’t know, just bad 

things. And so then the conversation went on 

and at the end of the conversation she said, 

well, what would happen if I lied.

R.H. questioned the victim’s stated desire to get “help” for her father 

and whether the victim was sure her father had done “bad things” 

to her. This could have been perceived by the victim as pressure 

not to testify against her father. All in all, the exchange was 

ambiguous. 

¶ 42 Defendant doesn’t explain how R.H.’s testimony about the 

grandmother’s offer to pay R.H. to lie about having been assaulted 

by the grandmother’s husband would have been admissible. 

Because the grandmother didn’t testify, and because the 

grandmother’s statements to R.H. would have been offered for their 

truth, R.H.’s statements would have been inadmissible hearsay at 

trial. See CRE 801, 802. And because there was no evidence of any 

discussion between the victim and her grandmother about 
26

defendant’s touching of the victim (or anything else) before the 

victim’s outcry, any assertion that the grandmother’s effort to enlist 

R.H. in a scheme to falsely accuse the grandmother’s husband 

raised the possibility that the grandmother had similarly attempted 

to influence the victim would have been utter speculation. It 

therefore wouldn’t have been relevant even if it wasn’t inadmissible 

hearsay. See CRE 401, 402 (irrelevant evidence is inadmissible).

¶ 43 In sum, we conclude that there isn’t a reasonable probability 

that defendant would have been granted a new trial had counsel 

brought the motion. It follows that defendant isn’t entitled to move 

for a new trial.

III. Conclusion

¶ 44 We reverse the order and remand the case to the district court 

to reinstate defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence. 

JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE ROTHENBERG concur.