JSOU Report 07-8 Block by Block: Civic Action in Baghdad Bogart
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On the cover. A typical neighborhood (muhallah) in Baghdad, 

15 December 2006. U.S. Army. 

JSOU Report 07-8

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2007

Block by Block:

Civic Action in the

Battle of Baghdad

January–November 2006

Adrian T. Bogart III
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 

University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 

32544. Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 

850-884-2765; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of 

Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 1-933749-05-9
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 

the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy

or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, 

United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint 

Special Operations University.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks, 

October 2005, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicken Turnley

Logistic Support and Insurgency, October 2005, 

Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Dividing Our Enemies, November 2005, Thomas H. Henriksen

The War on Terrorism, December 2005, James A. Bates

Coast Guard SOF, February 2006, Gary R. Bowen

Implications for Network-Centric Warfare, March 2006, 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Narcoterrorism in Latin America, April 2006, 

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future 

Conflict, and Implications for SOF, April 2006, John B. Alexander

Civil-Military Operations and Professional Military Education, 

May 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Blogs and Military Information Strategy, June 2006, 

James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning

2006 JSOU/NDIA SO/LIC Chapter Essays, June 2006

One Valley at a Time, August 2006, Adrian T. Bogart III 

Special Operations Aviation in NATO, September 2006, 

Richard D. Newton

Beyond Draining the Swamp: Urban Development and 

Counterterrorism in Morocco, October 2006, Stephen R. Dalzell

Filling Special Operations Gaps with Civilian Expertise,

December 2006, James F. Powers, Jr. 

Educating for Strategic Thinking in the SOF Community,

January 2007, Harry R. Yarger

The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare and Implications for the U.S.,

February 2007, Thomas H. Henriksen

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project,

March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April 2007

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist

Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.
To the 238 great soldiers who gave their lives during the 

United States (U.S.) 4th Infantry Division’s fight in the Battle

of Baghdad. They came from 9 of the 10 divisions across 

the U.S. Army and fought proudly as one. They fought with 

courage and honor, and they died as warriors, strong and 

true. They serve as an enduring testament to the strength 

of our country and an ever present reminder of the cost of 

freedom. Each and every one is an American hero.

ix

Contents

Foreword ................................................................................xi

About the Author ..................................................................xiii

Acknowledgements................................................................xv

1. Introduction........................................................................ 1

2. The Red Zone ..................................................................... 5

3. The Enemy We Fought....................................................... 25

4. Theory of Civic Action ...................................................... 31

5. From Theory to Practice—the Civic-Action Program.......... 45

6. A Closer Look—Building Essential Services in 

 Operation Together Forward II........................................... 73

7. Conclusions and Insights .................................................. 87

Endnotes............................................................................... 93

References............................................................................ 95

xi

Foreword

This monograph describes one facet of the Battle for Baghdad during the period January through November 2006. 

The story is based on the recollections, notes, and reports 

of the author, who served with the Multi-National Division, Baghdad (MND‐B) as the G9—the principal staff officer responsible for

civic action, Special Operations Forces integration, and counterinsurgency training. In this timeframe MND-B treated civic action as a 

maneuver function inherent to its operations, and it employed taskorganized combat forces to conduct Phase IV (Stability Operations) 

and Phase V (Enable the Civil Authority) in order to achieve U.S. and 

Iraqi military objectives. 

The sources for this report have since been declassified by the

U.S. 4th Infantry Division. This division assumed command of the 

MND-B from the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division on 7 January 2006. The 

3rd Infantry Division had just completed a historic year in Baghdad 

ushering in the elections for the national government to establish 

democracy in Iraq. 

For the MND-B, the mission at hand was to secure Baghdad and 

provide the opportunity for the newly elected government to establish self-rule over the sovereign state of Iraq. To do so, the MNDB counterinsurgency operation assumed two components, security 

operations and civic action. The civic-action program was centrally 

planned with decentralized execution to accommodate the variances in the operational environment throughout the MND-B area of 

responsibility. This report gives a sense of the extensive efforts made 

by the MND-B troops to assist the local population in Baghdad while 

supporting command objectives. The kinds of accomplishments and 

the methods employed provide valuable insight for others who must 

conduct operations in similar circumstances.

On 15 November, the 4th Infantry Division transitioned command and control of MND-B to the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division. Joint 

Special Operations University is pleased to provide LTC Adrian T. 

Bogart’s experiences in the Battle for Baghdad.

Michael C. McMahon, Lt Col, USAF

Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

xiii

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Adrian T. Bogart 

III is a Special Forces officer who

has served in U.S. Army, joint, and 

combined organizations in command and 

staff assignments with special operations 

and general purpose forces. His military 

career started as a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), commissioned upon 

graduation as an infantry officer with his

first tour of duty in a mechanized infantry

battalion in Germany. He left the infantry 

for Special Forces with assignments as a 

detachment commander, company executive officer, and company commander. He

also served as a Special Forces staff officer on the Army Staff and was one of the 

founders of the Department of Defense 

domestic consequence-management capability, building the civil support teams and 

establishing the U.S. Northern Command. 

After his assignments in the Pentagon, 

LTC Bogart was the deputy C9 chief of operations for the Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) 

for Operation Iraqi Freedom serving in Kuwait and Iraq (2002 and 

2003), later moving to 3d Special Forces Group where he served as 

the J5 and chief of staff/executive officer for the Combined Joint

Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), Operation 

Enduring Freedom (2003 and 2004). LTC Bogart served as the G9 of 

the 4th Infantry Division deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07 

(fiscal year 2005–2007). Arriving 5 December 2005 and departing 15

November 2006, he was responsible for Special Operations Forces 

integration, civic action, and counterinsurgency training. His degree 

from VMI is in civil engineering, and he is a graduate of the U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College, Army Force Management 

School, Defense Strategy Course, Joint Forces Staff College, and 

other military schools. 

LTC Bogart at the Crossed 

Sabers Memorial in 

Baghdad’s Green Zone, 

Iraq’s political and 

diplomatic center. 

xv

Acknowledgments 

Those Who Bring Victory, These Quiet Few 

I do not fear an army of lions, if they are led by a lamb.

I do fear an army of sheep, if they are led by a lion. 

— Alexander the Great

This program was executed by some of the most gifted and 

talented combat leaders in the U.S. Army. Through the days 

and nights, across a very lethal battlefield, under extreme

stress and in constant contact with the enemy, America’s soldiers 

provided good governance, essential services, and economic development to a 16,664 square-mile area of operations, encompassing 

four Iraqi provinces, and including the capital city of Baghdad. These 

American soldiers achieved the impossible by building trust and confidence with a people who had long lost all hope for their future.

The success achieved from January to November 2006 during 

the Battle of Baghdad was forged by many officers and noncommissioned officers assigned to the Multi-National Division, Baghdad

(MND-B). These individuals’ personal courage and strength of will 

moved the concept of operations into reality, which came in the form 

of renovated schoolhouses, functioning agriculture cooperatives, 

public works improvements, medical care for thousands, and hundreds of other civic projects. Special acknowledgements follow: 

a. Brigadier General David Halverson, U.S. Army, was the driving force that brought interagency and host national efforts in 

line with the MND-B’s civic-action priorities. His direct guidance to the brigades was the synchronizing catalyst across 

the force. Without his strength, we would have failed.

b. Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Repetski, U.S. Army, was the 

prime mover in understanding the operational environment. 

He brought insight into the inner workings of the Iraqi society 

and was able to make the division see what they did not want 

to see. He is the epitome of the warrior-diplomat. 

c. Lieutenant Christine Kukla, U.S. Army Reserve, was the 

strength of the G9 43-member staff; she kept it going with a 

steady and sure hand. She led the staff towards the success
xvi

achieved. She stood above the rest, a great warrior who 

ensured it all got done.

d. Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. D. Sauers, U.S. Army Reserve, 

was the superb operations chief for civic action. He held 

together the day-to-day operation for a $138 million program 

executed by seven U.S. Brigade Combat Teams and a U.S. 

and Iraqi combined force of 62,000.

e. Major Douglas Davids, U.S. Army, was the main strategist 

behind the division’s civic-action program. He is a leading 

expert in counterinsurgency campaigning and works at the 

doctorate level. Always have a Doug Davids at your side.

f. Lieutenant Colonels Kevin Dixon, John Cross, Matt Elledge, 

Joe Gandara, Troy Smith, Chris Hall, and Chris Pease were 

combat leaders who could surmount the impossible. They 

never wavered in their mission and rose to unmatched brilliance during the heat of the Battle of Baghdad.

g.	 The S9s (Civil-Military Operations officers) were the quiet

professionals who brought victory.

LTC Rick Summers 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)

MAJ Herb Joliat 1st BCT/4th Infantry Division (1/4 ID)

MAJ Jeff Smith 2nd BCT/4th Infantry Division (2/4 ID)

MAJ Jose Acosta 4th BCT/4th Infantry Division (4/4 ID)

MAJ Paul Schmidt 2nd BCT/101st Airborne [Air Assault]

 Division (2/101 AASLT)

MAJ Bren Workman 506th Regimental Combat Team/101st

MAJ John Sottnick Airborne Division (506 RCT/101 AASLT)

MAJ Roland Bennett 1st BCT/10th Mountain Division (1/10 MTN) 

MAJ Philipe Moon 2nd BCT/10th Mountain Division (2/10 

 MTN)

MAJ John Culberson 2nd Brigade, 1st Armor Division (2/1 AD)

h. Lieutenant Colonels Marty Nelson, 448th Civil Affairs Battalion and Bill Woods, 414th Civil Affairs Battalion, the Army’s 

finest Civil Affairs commanders in the force today. These two

officers and their command Sergeants Major lead their great

formations from the front, out on point every day, driving 

their Civil Affairs teams to accomplish the unachievable. 
xvii

Lieutenant Colonels Diana Brown and Neil Aihle took over Operation Holland Light after the death of Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Holland 

who was killed by an improvised explosive device (IED). The narrative 

of Operation Holland Light herein is based on their report. 

The personal commitment, creativity, and astuteness of these 

officers formed the backbone that won the day. They are the greatest

collection of professionals you could ever go to war with and never 

ceased to impress me with their achievements. These were the soldiers 

who fought the Battle of Baghdad block by block, these quiet few.

***

Photographs are from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G9, Public Affairs 

Office, and members of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized).

***

The G9 and brigade S9s, the quiet few who brought success to the 

Battle of Baghdad, 10 November 2006

Bogart: Block by Block 

1. Introduction

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade 

Center, the U.S. Army has moved through its process to 

retool itself to fight an insurgency. This feat has been on par

with transforming the Army prior to and during World War II. From 

1938 to 1945, the Army went from flat-brimmed helmets and wool

uniforms designed for trench warfare to a uniform designed for 

maneuver warfare. We went from biplanes to an Army Air Force with 

pursuit aircraft, long-range bombers, and cargo planes. New rifles,

tanks, artillery, and fielding an army of 16 million all occurred during

this time. Doctrine has changed from an expeditionary force using 

cavalry, infantry, and artillery to an army that used combined arms 

action to defeat its adversaries and then, after liberating enemy territory, assumed occupational duties and exerted military governance. 

With the Global War on Terrorism, the Army has transformed to 

defeat the enemy. The enemy of today, however, is far different than 

the enemy faced during World War II. As such, the focus now is on 

small unit operations vice the Army-wide operations conducted in 

Europe, such as the U.S. Third Army’s fight during the Battle of the

Bulge. Today, we are transitioning from combined-arms action to 

counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. 

In understanding the new way of war, we have changed our doctrine and articulated several approaches or methods to conduct COIN 

operations. The Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM) 3-24 

offers several methodologies such as clear, hold, build, combined 

action, and limited support. These methods can be used together or 

unilaterally, but they are not the only methods. In actuality, COIN 

operations are a combination of strike operations to kill or capture 

the insurgent and civic action to remove 

or reduce the causes of instability. Simple 

enough, right? Well, that is the formula, 

and whether the insurgency is defeated 

or not depends on the balance of the application of a COIN formula: 

COIN operations = strike operations + civic action. 

A COIN campaign or operation is one of the most complex military engagements to be executed. The complexities of the operational 

environment cause confusion. Factors such as the societal structure, 

COIN operations = strike 

operations + civic action. 
JSOU Report 07-8

culture, language, religion, geography, levels of corruption, competency of the host nation government, the extent of the rule of law, 

whose law, the will of the American people to endure the fight, and

hundreds of other undertows make a seemingly impossible situation hopeless. Hence the complexities must be simplified, so the sergeant leading the patrol and the soldier at the point will think before 

they act and know when to kill and when to build. Codifying COIN 

operations as a mix of strike operations and civic action reduces the 

ambiguities that the sergeant and private face every day. If COIN 

operations are not simplified, the officer and noncommissioned officer can become unfocused, and subsequently, mistakes are made. In 

the COIN fight, a tactical error can bring strategic failure.

This monograph examines the Battle of Baghdad as a case study 

for civic action with the intent of contributing to the writings on this 

important topic. The description of operations conducted during this 

fight serve as a playbook for creating a favorable environment for

current or anticipated operations. Also, these kinds of operations 

can gain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for their local 

and national government. This gain can be achieved by assisting 

communities in conducting health, welfare, and public works projects; improving the economic base of the nation; and improving the 

standing of the host country and allied forces with the population.

The details of conducting a civic-action program at the divisional 

and Brigade Combat Team levels of command are presented herein. 

This monograph looks at the Battle of Baghdad during 2006 and the 

civic-action program that provided for the societal underpinnings of 

11 million people in four Iraqi provinces, consisting of 16,664 square 

miles. This area included the capital city of Baghdad, the center of 

gravity of the campaign in Iraq. 

The name “block by block” came from a variety of sources:

a. Epitomizes the strategy for civic action in an urban environment or city by focusing efforts on the neighborhoods, which 

are the core foundation of a city society and the lowest organized congregation of the populace. 

b.	 Reflects on the Iraqi government’s desire to rebuild Iraq

“block by block,” which refers to building construction using 

masonry blocks or bricks. 
Bogart: Block by Block 

c. Delineates how to secure a city using a city block as the geographic reference. We battle-tracked civic action by using the 

muhallahs or neighborhood blocks of the City of Baghdad.

Chapter 2 addresses the operational environment that challenged 

civic actions of the Multi-National Division, Baghdad (MND-B). The 

Baghdad area was the “Red Zone” where every detail of planning and 

every operational move was critical. In any event, a focused enemy 

used to his or their advantage the economic, cultural, and historic 

underpinnings of the struggle. 

Figure 2. 

Sadr City, 

22 July 2006, 

indicative

of Baghdad’s 

infrastructure 

problems, an 

intertwined mix 

of haphazard 

solutions

Figure 1. The Red 

Zone, operational 

environment in 

the MND-B area 

of responsibility

Bogart: Block by Block 

2. The Red Zone

The overarching mistake made during the course of the Global 

War on Terrorism has been misunderstanding the operational environment. During the Cold War, we could template 

a Combined Arms Army, identify where command and control nodes 

were in Soviet formations, and define completely the enemy order of

battle. We studied military history and took staff rides to old battlefields to see how the ground was fought and won during the American Civil War, World War I, and World War II. We took courses in 

the native language of the country we were operating in and moved 

around these forward areas, not as a tourist, but as a resident. We 

took the time and applied the effort to understand how our enemy 

was organized, how he fought; we learned the ground as our own and 

lived the history behind the next war. 

We have not done that well for the Global War on Terrorism, and 

what we continually fail to understand is our enemy. We say that 

the enemy is not organized, yet he issues orders to his soldiers daily. 

We believe no command structure exists, yet the grand emirs, emirs, 

and brigade commanders are in charge and directing their forces. 

We believe the enemy is an undisciplined force, but he wears a standard uniform, has an area command that provides active security 

for the populace, and is proud to be a Mujahideen.1 In addition, we 

believe that he has no set of guidelines to fight by, yet he applies a

1,400­‐year-old jihad doctrine2 and uses our doctrine against us. 

Part of predeployment planning was realizing the necessity of 

understanding the operational environment—for example:

a. Iraqi society, Arabic, local customs, geography, and history of 

a land 5,000-years old

b. Construction of the enemy forces for determining their goals 

and motivations

c. Inner workings of the society for constructing a program to 

move the populace away from the insurgency. 

We had to bury American arrogance and learn Iraqi pride. That led to 

finding ourselves in the Red Zone, which in American terms is best

defined in the novel The Red Zone:

In football, once the offense crosses the other team’s twenty, 

it is called the red zone because every move, every penalty, 


JSOU Report 07-8

every inch, every detail is critical. In a game of violence, 

nowhere is the primal urge to attack and defend more clear. 

Here is where the lust for blood boils most clearly to the 

surface. Here is where the winners are separated from the 

losers, the weak from the strong. Mistakes in the red zone 

are known to cost people their jobs, their careers, and therefore their lives.3

In Baghdad terms, the Red Zone is the unsecured areas of the 

city. The residents tell us the Red Zone is everything outside the 

Green Zone, which is the nickname of the old Presidential Palace 

area of Baghdad, where Saddam Hussein had his government offices.

The Green Zone is a fortified complex where the coalition houses its

political and military headquarters, as well as where the Government 

of Iraq is located. 

The Red Zone is where the Battle of Baghdad was waged. An 

area critical to the war, it is land we would attack and defend and 

where mistakes meant lives. Therefore before entering the Red Zone, 

we first understood the history behind COIN operations, then the

area of responsibility, the enemy order of battle, what the enemy was 

fighting for, and what the citizens of Baghdad wanted. That meant

analyzing the operational environment by narrowing down the strategic view, through an operational “lens” to determine the tactical 

outcomes, and all from the enemy’s viewpoint. 

The History Behind the Insurgency

Studying the history of 20th century insurgencies and of Baghdad 

led to insights that guided planning. 

The average insurgency during the course of the 20th century 

took 14 years from start to finish. Time was on the side of the insurgent, and the center of gravity for the Battle of Baghdad was the 

American people’s will to sustain the fight. As the 4th Infantry Division entered Baghdad, the Global War on Terrorism was in its fifth

year, moving past the duration of America’s involvement in World 

War II. This revealing statistic strains America’s patience and public 

support for the war. Hence, the ultimate factor in fighting a modern

day insurgency is managing perceptions and expectations, for maintaining the public’s will to endure the fight, while the elements of
Bogart: Block by Block 

national power forge ahead to achieve the defeat of the insurgency. 

Time is on the side of the insurgent.

Looking back over the 20th century, we learned that insurgencies 

are defeated by achieving victory at all levels of war and by defeating 

both the insurgent and the insurgency. This methodology focuses on 

winning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war:

a. At the strategic level, COIN campaigns achieved victory when 

all elements of national power were applied. Codified today

as diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements, 

when applied in supporting and supported roles, the insurgency is defeated. Historically, the best way to strategically 

defeat an insurgency is using diplomatic efforts to isolate 

external support to the insurgency, information campaigns 

to discredit the insurgency’s goals, military force to protect 

the populace, and economic development to increase the populace’s quality of life. When the elements were not applied, 

success in defeating the insurgency was fleeting.

b. At the operational level, in order to defeat the insurgency, the 

causes of instability had to be removed or reduced. Whatever 

made the populace move to support the insurgency must be 

identified and addressed. The overall goal is to remove the

support base from the insurgency. In general, 10 percent of 

the populace comprise the guerrilla force, 5 percent are the 

antigovernment subversives, leaving the balance of 85 percent available to support the insurgency. Historically, the 

best way of defeating an insurgency at the operational level of 

war is to win the support of the 85 percent population base 

by giving them what the insurgency is promising. Simply 

put, out-compete the insurgency by giving the people a better 

quality of life and solving their collective problems. 

c. At the tactical level of war, in order to defeat the insurgency, 

defeat the insurgent. This meant focusing on the enemy’s 

order of battle and systematically attacking the components 

by using lethal and nonlethal means. Historically, the best 

way of tactically defeating the insurgent was cutting his 

supply lines or “buying out” his logistics base. 
JSOU Report 07-8

Ian Frazier provided the historic importance of Baghdad in his 

article “Invaders, Destroying Baghdad.” He gives the Arab and Persian names for the city:4

a. Madinat as-Salaam (City of Peace) is Arabic.

b. Bagh (God) and Dad (given) is Persian. 

Baghdad was once the crossroads of the world and was known as all 

that was once great with Islam. Baghdad was revered as the birthplace of civilization and was the epicenter of wealth, power, religion, 

and the Islamic empire. Within 40 years after its founding in 762, 

Baghdad had achieved greatness that would perpetuate itself to 

modern times. Named by its founder Jaffar Al Mansour ( member of 

the Abbassid line of caliphs) as Madinat as-Salaam, Baghdad became 

a seat of poetry, education, and knowledge. During Baghdad’s height, 

it was legended that almost all of the residents could read and write. 

Checkers, chess, and backgammon were commonly played. Greek 

was translated into Arabic. The city was filled with libraries, parks,

bathhouses, and palaces. In fact, the palaces housed the caliphs and 

were constructed of marble, rare woods, jade, and alabaster with 

carpets and wall hangings by the thousand. Its grounds had fountains and interior gardens. Servants sprinkled guests with rosewater 

and powdered musk and ambergris. Arts and sciences flourished—

literature, music, calligraphy, philosophy, mathematics, chemistry, 

history. 

All that was once great about the City of Peace came to an end by 

the hand of Hulagu Khan beginning 29 January 1258. A grandson 

of Genghis Khan, Hulagu concluded his approach on Baghdad from 

the east and began his investment on the outskirts of Baghdad. His 

preparations began with a bombardment, and by 4 February the 

outer wall was breached. On 10 February, Baghdad surrendered, 

after the Caliph Al Musta’sim came out of the city and surrendered. 

The Mongols swept into the city on 13 February, which began a week 

of massacre, looting, and fire; the Mongols killed almost everybody.

For 7 days, the Mongols dominated the city by sacking it, killing an 

estimated 1 million and plundering its gold, jewels, and silver. The 

caliph was imprisoned, and later killed, and the city was occupied by 

the Mongols. The Mongol occupation force was approximately 3,000 

and was tasked to rebuild the city. Little was accomplished; the city 

disintegrated with disease and famine, and decades later the city still 
Bogart: Block by Block 

laid in ruin, with some aspects of the infrastructure only recovering 

in the 20th century. Today the citizens of Baghdad view the American liberation in 2003 as another sacking of Baghdad. 

A final lesson was that we did not follow historical siege typology

when taking the City of Baghdad. The siege is typically organized into 

seven phases:5

a. Approach—lining up for the attack

b. Investment—laying in the siege, the encirclement

c. Preparation—timing and method of determining the assault

d. Assault—the walls are breached and defenses penetrated

e. Dog Fight—the break through, looting, plundering, and 

wanton violence

f. Domination and Occupation—the besiegers take control of 

the city

g. Withdrawal—when the besiegers depart, voluntarily or by 

force. 

Analysis had shown that all we had done to date was the Approach—

skipped the Investment and the Preparation and went right to the 

Assault. The defending units in Baghdad had taken the opportunity 

to flee and go to ground as the coalition moved from the Approach to

the Assault and did not complete an encirclement of Baghdad, which 

would have contained the defending forces and limited the opportunity for the disbanded Iraqi Army to turn into a guerrilla force. We 

were actually still in the siege, and fighting a Dog Fight to gain Domination and Occupation of the city. 

From the history of insurgencies and of Baghdad, the staff gained 

the following insights:

a.	 The typical 14 years from start to finish of an insurgency put

time on the side of the insurgent. A way to use time against 

the insurgent is to complete civic-action projects within 120 

days and that address the immediate needs of the people. 

b. The diplomatic, informational, military, and economic formula was not working. Though the military element of 

national power was in full play, the Department of State had 

not assumed responsibility for the governance and economic 

lines of operation. Concurrently, the lack of a cohesive U.S. 

government information campaign to support U.S. action in 
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JSOU Report 07-8

Iraq created opportunity for enemy propaganda campaigns to 

advance unchecked. 

c. Baghdad had been a sacred city to its residents, and all they 

wanted was to make it great again. Hence the focus was civic 

action not only on immediate needs but a revitalization of the 

city. 

d. We were still in a siege. In fact, the enemy had laid in a counter siege and any civic actions were vulnerable to attack, as 

part of the ongoing Dog Fight. 

Understanding the history behind an insurgency and gaining historic appreciation of battleground led to a focus on the enemy order 

of battle. Though the enemy is organized with grand emirs, emirs, 

area commanders, vanguard forces, foot soldiers and supporters, 

a generic appreciation of the enemy structure included a sufficient

knowledge of the enemy order of battle. Also, understanding the enemy’s organization would lead to understanding their operations, and 

subsequently how to defeat the elements of the insurgency.

The Enemy Order of Battle

In its simplest terms, the enemy in Iraq is codified as the insurgent

and insurgency. By definition, an insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through 

use of subversion and armed conflict (Joint Publication 1-02, DoD

Dictionary of Military Terms). Members of the insurgent force are 

organized along political lines to support political, economic, social, 

military, psychological, and covert operations. As also covered in the 

2006 monograph, One Valley at a Time, the scenario is divided into 

three parts: the guerrilla, underground, and auxiliary.6

The Guerrilla. In JP 1-02, guerrilla is the combat element of the insurgency. Guerrilla warfare is the military and paramilitary operations 

conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. 

In U.S. Army doctrine, the guerrilla is the overt combat element 

of the insurgency. The members of the guerrilla force organize under 

military concepts to conduct military and paramilitary operations. 

See Table 1. Their duties usually include all the overt actions of 

the insurgent organization but may include covert and clandes­tine 

operations. They are usually most active in insurgent-controlled or
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Bogart: Block by Block 

contested areas. However, when the insurgency calls for operations 

in government-controlled areas, the guerrilla may conduct these 

operations. 

Table 1. The Enemy Defined: Guerilla Forces

Level Organization/Location

Global/strategic Front commander/grand emir Iraq-wide

Strategic/operational Subfront commander/emir Baghdad

Operational/tactical Area commander Kararhi I, II and Rusafa I, II

Tactical District commander beladiyahs (boroughs)

Cell leaders hayys (wards)

Foreign fighters: revolutionaries or vanguard city-wide

Indigenous (homegrown) fighters muhallahs (neighborhoods)

Suicide vehicle-born improvised explosive device 

(SVBIED)

Vehicle-born improvised explosive device (VBIED)

Improvised explosive device (IED)

People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP)

Suicide bombers

Surface-to-air missile (SAM) engagers

Indigenous militias specific locations

The guerrilla force tries to gain support for the insurgency through 

propaganda, coercion, and terror. Terrorism is a “weapon system” or 

technique that the guerrilla applies to achieve his goal. If he cannot 

gain active support, he will seek passive support. 

A situation in which a population has become submissive to the 

guerrilla or neutral, siding neither with the insurgency or the government, is an unacceptable state to COIN operations. A people’s 

neutrality is dangerous, and the silence on the part of the populace 

concerning insurgent activities is considered passive support for the 

insurgent.

As U.S. Army doctrine noted the guerrilla has advantages, doctrine also states that he has vulnerabilities. The guerrilla normally 

lacks the personnel and the logistics to intentionally become decisively 

engaged with COIN guerrilla forces. In many circumstances, as found 

in post-World War II doctrine, the proportionality of the COIN guerrilla 

campaign will force the guerrilla’s potential recruiting base to diminish. Effective COIN guerrilla operations will not regenerate followon guerrilla insurgent forces. Hence, the guerrilla’s vulnerability,
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JSOU Report 07-8

open to exploitation, is his source of supply and recruitment. Convince 

the potential recruit not to join the guerrilla, protect the shopkeeper 

so he is not forced into supplying the guerrilla, inflict combat losses,

force the guerrilla deep into untenable sanctuary, or interdict their 

supply lines leads to degrading the guerrilla’s ability to sustain.

Additionally, exploit the guerrilla’s fear of capture. This vulnerability is paramount to a successful COIN guerrilla campaign. First, 

disseminate, through multiple means and sources, the outcome of 

capture. Reinforce that the guerrilla is a criminal; internment will 

mean long (unknown) separation from his family—that is, if he is 

captured, the family will be disgraced publicly and all which the 

guerrilla is fighting for will be lost. Any retribution by the guerrilla

force against the family of a captured guerrilla is also a key vulnerability and subject to exploitation. 

The guerrilla’s operational weaknesses often includes security, 

which requires extensive resources and slows down his responsiveness; bases that are difficult to acquire and operate; and the lack of

technology or the ability to maintain captured high-technology items. 

Another operational weakness may be the lack of sophisticated communications, which could require the guerrilla to spend an excessive 

amount of time preparing to launch an operation. The guerrilla’s 

dependence on popular support suggests a potential vulnerability 

because if that support wavers or is withdrawn, the guerrilla will not 

be able to operate effectively.

The Underground. In Army Regulation (AR) 310-25, Dictionary of U.S. 

Army Terms, the underground of an insurgency is defined as combat

support of the insurgency and a covert unconventional warfare organization established to operate in areas denied to the guerrilla forces 

or conduct operations not suitable for guerrilla forces. 

The underground organizes into compartmented cells. Cells are 

formed within various political subdivisions, sectors, or areas, such 

as the U.S. equivalents of counties, towns, and neighborhoods. The 

underground environment may be urban or rural. Underground 

members commit sabotage, intelligence gathering, and acts of deception. They are the political and financial wing of the insurgency and

are the main element focused on subverting the government. The 
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underground supports the guerrilla and the auxiliary at the direction 

of the area commander or resistance front commander. They operate in small cells and are linked to other cells through key leaders, 

intermediaries, or facilitators. The underground operates covertly or 

overtly, uses safe houses to hide insurgents, and will move people 

and supplies along routes and in vehicles to avoid detection.

The Auxiliary. In AR 310-25, the auxiliary is the organized civilian support to the tactical action arm of the insurgents. In unconventional 

warfare (UW), it is that element of the resistance force established to 

provide the organized civilian support of the resistance movement. 

The success or failure of the guerrilla force depends on its ability 

to maintain logistic and intelligence support. The auxiliary fills support functions by organizing civilians and conducting coordinated 

support efforts. The assistance of the civilian population is critical to 

the success of the resistance movement; it provides security, intelligence, and logistic support for the guerrilla force by using civilian 

supporters of the resistance. The auxiliary conducts clandestine support functions by organizing people on a regional, district, or sector 

basis depending on the guerrilla force formation. To sustain guerrilla 

operations, the guerrilla force has numerous needs:

a. Movement support

b. Acquisition of supplies

c. Operational information and intelligence

d. Medical facilities

e. Counterintelligence to establish an outer zone security early 

warning network to detect, if not deter, enemy penetration 

attempts

f. Recruiting support

g. Compartmented communication systems

h. Current information on terrain, weather, civilians, and local 

resources

i. Deception operations support

j. Manufacture and maintenance of equipment. 
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JSOU Report 07-8

Table 2 delineates the composition of the subversive (underground) and logistics (auxiliary) elements of the enemy order of 

battle.

Table 2. The Enemy Defined: the Underground and the Auxiliary

Level Organization/Location

Operational

Underground

Political leaders

Ideologues

Financiers/profiteers

Operational/ Facilitators/black marketeers

tactical Recruits

Tactical IED makers

ERP suppliers

SAM suppliers

Small arms

Tactical

Auxiliary

Intel/early warning

Subsistence

Safe houses

Transporters

Caches

Electromagnetic lines of 

communication (LOCs)

Ground LOCs

With an understanding of how the enemy was constructed, the 

next step was to determine what the enemy wanted and why. What 

were the enemy’s goals and motivations? Why did they care that 

American forces were in Iraq? And why did they now—after the coalition had liberated the country from Saddam’s tyranny—actively 

oppose the coalition’s efforts to rebuild the government, repair the 

infrastructure, and bring Iraq forward as a good neighbor to the 

world community? 

The Enemy’s Goals and Objectives

The predeployment analysis concluded that the enemy sees Baghdad 

as its center of gravity and Baghdad is what they are fighting for.

The global insurgency is led by Al Qaeda and organized into fronts 

of resistance that are active in the U.S., Europe, Russia, Chechnya, 
15

Bogart: Block by Block 

Afghanistan, Turkey, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, Kashmir, Australia, and the Southeast Pacific.

Al Qaeda was in the Red Zone with us. The enemy was also in transition from a guerrilla war to a war of movement as they refined their

organization, built combat power, developed new tactics, attacked in 

organized groups, and equipped and uniformed their guerrilla forces 

into armed militias or as they called themselves—armies (jaysh in 

Arabic).

But why? Why did Al Qaeda see so much importance in Baghdad? 

What do they want? The answer is well documented in the speeches 

and messages from Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda: 

12 November 2002

[U.S. Vice-President] Cheney and [U.S. Secretary of State] 

Powell killed and destroyed in Baghdad more than Hulagu 

of the Mongols. 

18 October 2003

In conclusion, I say to the American people we will continue 

to fight you and continue to conduct martyrdom operations

inside and outside the United States until you depart from 

your oppressive course and abandon your follies and rein in 

your fools. Baghdad, the seat of the caliphate, will not fall to 

you, God willing, and we will fight you as long as we carry

our guns. And if we fall, our sons will take our place.

29 October 2004

We gained experience in guerrilla warfare and in conducting a war of attrition in our fight with the iniquitous, great

power—that is, when we conducted a war of attrition against 

Russia with jihad fighters for 10 years until they went bankrupt, with Allah’s grace; as a result, they were forced to 

withdraw in defeat, all praise and thanks to Allah. We are 

continuing in the same policy—to make America bleed profusely to the point of bankruptcy, Allah willing. And that is 

not too difficult for Allah.

16 December 2004

The most important and serious issue today for the whole 

world is this Third World War, which the Crusader-Zionist 

coalition began against the Islamic nation. It is raging in the 
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JSOU Report 07-8

land of the two rivers. The world’s millstone and pillar is in 

Baghdad, the capital of the caliphate. 

Bin Laden states that the focus on Baghdad is for three reasons. 

First Baghdad and Iraq is the place where Al Qaeda can destroy 

the U.S. and purge the western influence led by America from the

Muslim world. Purging the western influence from the Middle East

will allow for the protection of the Muslim religion. Secondly, the 

focus on Baghdad is for Baghdad’s defense. Baghdad is the capital 

of the Islamic Empire; it was sacked by the Mongols, sacked again 

by the Americans, and it is Al Qaeda’s responsibility to defend the 

capital, in order to reinstate it as the capital of the caliphate that Al 

Qaeda is charged to resurrect. Finally, Al Qaeda wants to reveal to 

the Islamic world the holocaust that the west has brought to one of 

Islam’s treasured cities. 

The assessment was that Al Qaeda sees Baghdad’s occupation by 

the coalition (Domination and Occupation phase of Siege Typology) 

as a crusader siege of Baghdad. Al Qaeda is applying classic guerrilla tactics to break the coalition siege by encircling the encirclers or 

laying siege to the besiegers and have enlisted the active support of 

other Muslims in this fight. Although Al Qaeda has aligned for shortterm gain with a variety of anticoalition forces, a greater issue exists 

below the surface: the internal dynamics of the Iraqi society. 

Muslims are a people steeped in their past. The wars and battles 

in their recent collective memories are those of the Crusades. Iraq, 

however, is a country marred by its present, and that present involves 

the British mandate.7 Underneath it all, what plagues Iraq each day 

is the constant conflict of jockeying between Arab and Persian, being

pro-western or fundamentalist, and the struggle to industrialize or 

keep the land between two rivers agrarian. 

The story of the conflict in Iraq is based on thousands of years

of foreign conquest, domination, and internal struggle in an area 

encompassing the Fertile Crescent. It is a story of a desert people 

moving to the east, meeting with another culture moving from the 

west and converging along the Euphrates River. It is complicated by 

their common belief in Allah but opposed by their divergent interpretation of Mohammed’s succession. More so it is about economics, 

specifically oil production and water distribution.
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Bogart: Block by Block 

Hence, the struggle for control is on to achieve resolution of Iraq’s 

internal struggle. Should Iraq move to a confederation of the Kurdish, 

Sunni, and Shi’a states and transition from a semi-industrial/agricultural society to a 21st century industrial culture integrated into 

the world’s economy, based upon an economic stance as a power and 

water provider for the Middle East and Iran? Should Iraq become an 

Islamic Republic under Sharia law? Should Iraq retain its central government with provinces aligned underneath it, or should Iraq become 

a western democracy? Much more is needed to be considered.

What Does the Citizen of Baghdad Want?

Studying the Red Zone surfaced that the coalition forces did not 

fully understand the operational environment in Baghdad. The focus 

needed to be on understanding the Iraqi society, the language, and 

the culture, local geography such as street names, local customs, 

and how the Baghdad citizen saw coalition forces. The goal was to 

identify the daily abrasion to the very populace the forces were there 

to protect. 

Robert Burns said it best: “O’ would some power the giftie give 

us, to see ourselves as others see us” 8—insight applicable to the 

Battle for Baghdad. The best means found to understand how the 

average Baghdad citizen saw the coalition’s campaign in Iraq was 

from basic atmospherics. The experience of citizens on the streets 

around Baghdad can be very revealing.

When the Americans fire back, they don’t hit the people who

are attacking them, only the civilians, said Osama Ali, a 24-

year-old Iraqi who witnessed the attack [in Baghdad]. This 

is why Iraqis hate the Americans so much. This is why we 

love the mujahideen. New York Times, 14 September 2005.

Baghdad—At dawn, Leith Hassan went to pick up bread for 

the family’s breakfast. Jumping on his red bicycle, the 14-

year-old whizzed down the street, passing the carpet store 

at the corner. Just then, a driver detonated a bomb hidden 

in his car. One red-hot piece of shrapnel severed the boy’s 

left leg. Later, from his hospital bed, Leith tried to reassure 

his father. ‘Don’t worry, Daddy,’ he said. ‘I’ll be OK.’ Leith, 
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JSOU Report 07-8

who had dreamed of becoming a pilot, died that afternoon. 

“Living Under Constant Siege in Baghdad,” LA Times, 28 

September 2005.

Every Muslim should know that his life is not his own; it 

is the property of this violated nation for whom men have 

shed their blood. No other issue should take precedence 

over work for the Umma [community of the faithful within 

Islam]; it is an obligation for every Muslim.9

A summary of the perceptions, experience and expectations of 

the citizens of Baghdad to the American invasion into Iraq can be 

found in a Washington Post article, a portion provided here:

In the chaotic, hopeful April of 2003, Baghdad’s Karrada district was one of those neighborhoods where residents showered flowers on U.S. forces entering the capital...more than

2 years after flowers cascaded onto the arriving Americans,

what’s being thrown on Karrada’s streets has changed as 

well. Mohammed and the neighborhood watched as American soldiers on patrol grew irritated at an Iraqi who had 

left his car in the street to run inside a store on an errand, 

blocking their armored convoy. The Americans took one of 

the empty plastic water bottles they use to relieve themselves...when the Iraqi driver ran out to move his car, an

annoyed American plunked him with the newly filled bottle

and rolled on, Mohammed said. ‘Now in Iraq, every morning 

you kiss them goodbye,’ Jassim Mohammed (age 41) said, 

referring to his wife and children, ‘because you don’t know if 

you will be back or not. Everyone in Iraq does that now.’ 10

Even enemy recruiting films such as the video clip Dirty-Kuffar,11

by Sheikh Terra and the Soul Salah Crew, displayed America as a 

Nazi infidel pillaging the world and corrupting innocence.12

The MND-B public opinion poll of September 2005 identified the

public’s concerns and delineated how the citizens of Baghdad perceived coalition efforts to build a democracy in Iraq:

a. Top three priorities were electricity, security against terrorism, and water.

b.	 Seventy-nine percent had no confidence in the multinational

forces to improve the situation in Baghdad.
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Bogart: Block by Block 

c. Eighty percent reported less than 5 hours electricity each 

day.

d.	 Seventy-eight percent had confidence in the Iraqi Army and

79 in the Iraqi Police.

e.	 Sixty-five percent were dissatisfied with the local government.

f. Popular support for the insurgency was steadily declining; 

only 25 percent expressed confidence in the armed national

opposition to improve the situation in Baghdad.

g. In the prior 6 months, 20 to 23 percent were unemployed.

In the same time frame, the poll was reinforced in September 

2005 interviews of Iraqi military officers in Baghdad; they provided

insight on the causes of instability and suggested how to reverse 

or reduce them. These candid observations were collected during a 

series of unofficial conversations with officers from the Marine Corps

Center for Lessons Learned and the Center for Army Lessons Learned 

mobile training team (MTT) supporting the NATO Training MissionIraq. The statements of the assembled group were related as close to 

verbatim as possible. The method of recording was via notes written 

during the conversations, and the opinions and recommendations 

presented are those of the Iraqi officers only.

Eight of the 11 officers in the assembled group held master’s

degrees. The composition of the group was one major general (retired), 

three colonels, four lieutenant colonels, two majors, and one captain. 

The MTT officers and the Iraqi officers had been working together

daily for over 3 weeks. In the words of one of the Iraqi officers, “we

have opened our hearts to you.” Some of the measurable claims have 

been verified with other agencies working outside the “wire.” Table 3

provides a summary of discussion on six topics. 
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Table 3. Result of Topics Discussion

Topic Result

Political 

issues

Return all employees to previous jobs. [Restated during infrastructure conversations.]

Dissolve all fundamentalist or religious parties. Do not have 

or allow any religious political parties. [Firmly believe in the 

separation of religion and state.]

Remove the outside Iraqis from positions of authority. The 

ones from outside are only here for the money. They are 

here for personal issues and not for the country. These outsiders will leave once they make their money.

Disband the militias so people are not afraid. Every party has 

its own militia, and they cause problems in elections.

If I vote against them, they will kill me. Iraqis are at personal 

risk to remove ‘bad’ people through the election process.

In recent election, they [religious leaders] urged us to vote 

for certain purposes/people. If we did not vote this way, we 

are not religious. They are using religion to control us and 

our vote. We vote in accordance with the desires of our 

religious leader.

Iraqis do not trust the election process or the people running the elections. 

Election and 

the voting 

process

The ballot requires pictures; many Iraqis are unable to read. 

The election official then stands with them to help them 

vote, and they tell them for whom to vote.

Remove the men at the voting places and put in women. 

Women in our society must follow the rules, and men are 

allowed to modify the rules. Make the women swear an oath 

to be fair. There will be a higher level of confidence. There 

must be an international organization that specializes in 

monitoring the fairness of votes—an organization that has 

done it for other countries. It can be multinational. Arabs can 

participate if they are really a part of the organization and 

have worked on other elections.

During the voting (last election), for 3 days, there is curfew. 

It was 10 kilometers from my house to my voting place—too 

far to walk. In the last 2 hours of the last election they 

moved the voting box, but many people could not vote. 

The person who controls the registration list knows who has 

been to vote and who has not. The reason there was such a 

large turnout was because when someone did not come to 

vote, their ballot was filled in for them.
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Topic Result

Election and 

the voting 

process 

(cont.)

The main problem is the person who manages the ballot 

boxes. They have relationships with different organizations. 

The ballot-box minder will decide the vote. Happened in my 

neighborhood. I watched an old lady take a ballot, and she 

could not read or write. She told the man she wanted to 

vote for Allawi, and I saw the minder select someone else 

[chose name from own party].

It is not fair that my vote can be given to someone who I 

did not vote for. This makes it too easy to change what the 

people want.

The system of voting for a list of people supports the religious influence. There should not be a religious list—just 

individuals only.

Resentment exists towards the ex-pats who came back into 

leadership positions. The general feeling is that ‘they were 

dancing in the discos of Europe for 10 years while we were 

here suffering.’ They are not here for the Iraqi people; they 

are here to make their money and leave.

Infrastructure 

and services

Gasoline is a 4-hour wait, and when I get home there is no 

power or water. Sometimes I go 3 days without water. My 

family washes their clothes in the river because it is there 

[Baghdad].

Destruction in 1991 was much larger, but Saddam was able 

to rebuild because the people who ran the infrastructure 

were still in place.

I do not see any new buildings for Iraqis. All we see is concrete walls all over our cities. Provide us with something as 

simple as paving the roads. 

The U.S. should push the Iraqi government to improve services.

Insurgency Ambassador Bremer disbanding the Iraqi Army and government was a bad thing. Now the salaries [monthly allotment] 

paid to these former Army and employees is not enough, 

they can receive more money from the insurgency.

They have to feed their families.

Question—If Ambassador Bremer had not disbanded the 

military, would there be this insurgency/secular tension? 

Answer—No problem; Iraq would have a different image.

Table 3. Result of Topics Discussion (continued)
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Topic Result

Insurgency

(cont.)

Parties [insurgent groups] are serving outside countries [Iran 

and Syria]. They do not want Iraq to have settlement. If Iraq 

gets settled, they think it will be their turn. They have money, 

authority, and power [from their countries].

Neighboring states [Iran and Syria] want us like this...they 

do not want to see us regain power.

Many Iraqis believe that the U.S. does not want a settled Iraq 

because they want to move the terrorism fight from the U.S. 

to Iraq. We see this in your news.

Most of Iraqi people are threatened by the militias.

Our children want peace.

Education Educated people believe in a more liberal system of government. Uneducated Iraqis are a simple people who follow 

traditional ideas—religious leaders tell them who to elect 

and follow. U.S. must educate the Iraqi people.

The more we educate the people the less problems we will 

have.

Before Saddam we used to have people go to university 

abroad. That has stopped. We need more people to be educated. [This issue was narrowed to before Saddam’s relationship with the western world deteriorated. The point is that 

they want to regenerate the overseas education that once 

existed.]

My brother’s son needs special medical attention. There are 

no special doctors or even teachers. They are either dead or 

have left the country out of fear. [Repeated during infrastructure discussions.]

We need education; our schools and universities have been 

destroyed.

Table 3. Result of Topics Discussion (continued)
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Topic Result

Military 

service

I am a member of the new Iraqi Army and cannot be proud. I 

must hide my uniform. I wear civilian clothes to work. When 

my small child asks me where I work, I tell him I am a school 

teacher.

If I go away for 4 days and my neighbors notice, I will become 

a target.

In north and south Iraq, there is not as much problem with 

being in the military. Problem is in the triangle. In southern 

Iraq, they [members of the Iraqi military] can wear uniforms 

and walk along the street. In Baghdad, I wear civilian clothes 

and have to hide my job even from my relatives.

Mix the new Iraqi Army with the old army to provide us with 

order in the future. They [old Army] will be welcomed in the 

new Army.

We should retire the other [more controversial] groups 

and pay them their pensions or give them civilian jobs [i.e., 

remove incentive to serve insurgency].

If a former officer wants to join the new Iraqi Army, they 

examine his record; if he is a former Ba’ath Party member, he 

is not allowed to join new Iraqi Army...let the Ba’ath Party 

members return.

Assessing these various issues and insights expanded our appreciation of the operational environment in and around Baghdad. This 

understanding was essential as we sought to apply the theories of 

civic action to the January 2006 situation in Baghdad.

Table 3. Result of Topics Discussion (continued)

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3. The Enemy We Fought

The enemy we fought in Iraq in 2006 was ubiquitous and came 

from many directions. The enemy came from several groups 

who are diverse in their beliefs, held varied agendas, and held 

a myriad of objectives. 

In some cases, the enemy 

we faced was the true believer. 

He believes in his religion, his 

tribe, his family, even his country, but what he truly believes 

is that his cause is just. He is 

so firm in his conviction that he

has taken up arms to defend it. 

His beliefs are absolute, and 

the jihad he wages is for an 

eternity. 

In many other instances, 

the enemy we fought was 

the end-state. The variety of 

actors on Iraq’s stage made 

the MND-B area of responsibility a highly complex and very 

lethal operational environment. Throughout the Baghdad, Babil, Karbala, and Najaf 

provinces, the MND-B fought 

Sunni extremists, Shi’a radicals, Iranian subversion, Syrian interference, and Al Qaeda. Groups 

worked together, against each other, in mangled alliances, in separation, or a combination thereof, but over the course of time, each 

entity emerged as a distinct threat that challenged the end-state and 

complicated the operational environment. As the year ended, the 

enemy we fought was the end-state—a conflict to determine the final

outcome or objective(s) of coalition efforts, the newly elected Government of Iraq, the people of Iraq, the competing external factors from 

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria. 

The True Believer

Somewhere a true believer is training 

to kill you.

He is training with minimum food 

or water, in austere conditions, day 

and night. The only thing clean on 

him is his weapon. He doesn’t worry 

about what workout to do—his 

rucksack weighs what it weighs, and 

he runs until the enemy stops 

chasing him. 

The true believer doesn’t care ‘how 

hard it is’; he knows he either wins 

or he dies.

He doesn’t go home at 1700; he 

is home. He knows only the Cause. 

Now, who wants to quit?

 — Unknown source 

 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina
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JSOU Report 07-8

In 2006, as the Battle of Baghdad raged, the enemy manifestation morphed over time. At first the enemy was focused against the

U.S., then at the end of 2006, each other.

The War Against the Occupier. The operational environment that 

existed as the 3rd Infantry Division transitioned authority for the 

MND-B to the 4th Infantry Division on 7 January 2006 was with 

the populace viewing the U.S. as the occupational force. The enemy 

wanted coalition forces removed. The predominant target of enemy 

attacks was against U.S. forces to make losses in personnel and 

equipment great enough to force a withdrawal. All factions focused 

on targeting coalition convoys, routes, and patrols. In the mix were 

secondary attacks against the populace, primarily of Shi’a pockets to 

force an escalation of violence and tumble Iraq into civil war or anarchy. This effort would destabilize the nation, force a greater expenditure by the U.S., and bleed the coalition into bankruptcy. 

At the end of Ramadan in 2005, both Shi’a and Sunni clerics 

made public prayers and speeches acknowledging the breaking of 

the fast. At 1900 on 24 October 2005 during the special Eid Al Fatr 

Figure 3. Baghdad sectarian map

Christian

Mixed Muslim

Sunni

Shi’a

Muslim/Christian

Adhamiyah

Thawra

Kadhimiyah

Nissan

West Rashid Karadah

Mansour

Tigris

River

East Rashid

Rusafa

Karkh
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Bogart: Block by Block 

prayer, Muqtada Al Sadr appeared on TV station Al Hurrah to give 

prayers followed by a speech. He stated that it should be considered an honor for any members of Jaysh Al Mahdi to be captured or 

killed by “occupation” forces—the ultimate form of struggle against 

the “occupiers.” 13

Traditionalism Versus Fundamentalism. In January 2006, when the 

Mujahideen Shura Council was formed, a statement on a jihadist Web 

site announced that Abu Musab Zarqawi had stepped aside as “emir” 

of the council in favor of an Iraqi named Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi.14 The switch in leadership came from the council’s leadership 

discontent with Zarqawi’s targeting of civilians and the seemingly 

indiscriminant level of violence against the Muslim brothers. The 

council wanted killing of the Americans as the primary objective. 

Zarqawi did not; he was on the hunt, and everything was fair game. 

Foreign fighters, vanguard troops had been recruited for the war in

Iraq and arrived for the blind destruction against the coalition and 

the citizens of Iraq. Allied in this offensive were the fundamentalists, 

the true believers who held a singular goal to subjugate the people 

to Islam. 

Along with Zarqawi, the campaign to subjugate the population 

to Islam was on. This second change did not manifest itself until 

March, when a wholesale wave of attacks on the civilian populace 

began to take its toll. Visibly evident was the female citizens’ change, 

throughout the city, from wearing western-style clothing to traditional abayah dress.

The Shi’a Counterattack. After being deposed from the council, Zarqawi commenced an independent action designed to retain his credibility as a grand emir by refocusing efforts against the Shi’as. The 

attacks were effective. So substantial were the assaults, the Shi’a 

organized their army—the Jasyh al Madhi— to defend by counterattacking Al Qaeda and Sunni forces. Zarqawi’s success brought on 

not only the third sea change but also his downfall. Small pockets 

of battlegrounds began to emerge throughout Baghdad. Religious 

hatred exploded one night and stayed that way for the months to 

follow. Hayys (wards) in Mansour, Doura, New Baghdad, and elsewhere throughout the city went into play. Shi’a militias began clearing Sunni areas throughout Baghdad. Sunnis either stayed, fought, 

or fled. The resulting actions started the reconciliation of Sunni and
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JSOU Report 07-8

Shi’a boundaries in Baghdad to establish religious whole neighborhoods in the city. On 7 June, Zarqawi’s terror came to an end as an 

U.S. Air Force F-16 dropped two 500-pound bombs on his position. 

Through the Backdoor. In May and June, the fourth sea change 

emerged as Iranian subversion became quite apparent. There was 

no singular event that marked the Iranian emergence into Iraq, just 

a continuous drumbeat of Iranian influence. Constant reporting of

Iranian agents infiltrating into offices of the newly elected government, visits by Government of Iraq officials to Tehran, and promises of Iranian funding of Baghdad city reconstruction. These are 

examples of several encroachments by Iran into Iraq. In actuality, 

what was occurring was a natural progression of influence based on

a perceived vacuum of power during two periods of time: a) the flux

when the new Government of Iraq was established and b) when Iraq 

could exert its own control of the nation. The Iranian government in 

the interim was exerting influence in order to obtain regional objectives and protect its western flank.

Tribal Warfare. In July, the fifth evolution came. Shi’a counterattacks

became the Shi’a offensive. The task at hand was to clear Sunni 

neighborhoods across Baghdad, for the purpose of solidifying Shi’a 

control of not only the primary city in Iraq but the seat of national 

Iraqi power. A second effort went into action to clear the north to 

south highway between Baghdad and Najaf, Karbala, and Hillah. 

This clearing would ensure that the pilgrimage lines to the Shi’a holy 

places were open and protected and just as important, so were the 

lines of commerce. This fervor took time to build, but by August, was 

gale force. Death squads and death companies ravaged the city with 

assassinations rising as high as 100 each day. The purpose of the 

offensive was to reconcile tribal boundaries.15 Mistaken by many, as 

sectarian violence, it really was a confederation of tribes supported 

externally by neighboring tribes against another amalgamation. This 

phase of the Battle of Baghdad had Sunni Janabi, Zubaydi, and 

Jiburi tribes pitted against a more homogeneous and advanced Shi’a 

tribal structure codified under the Sadr and Badr organizations. Reconciliation was advancing.

Following and sometimes in conjunction with reconciliation was 

federalism. The pinnacle moment came when the Iraqi Council of 

Representatives (CoR) voted for federalism. 
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In the CoR meeting of today, 11 October 2006, a reading 

of the United Iraq Corporation (UIC) draft of the Federal 

Region Formation Law (FRFL) was conducted and followed 

by a vote of passage of the draft. The FRFL passed with an 

uncounted simple majority hand vote. This occurred despite 

the boycott of the session by the Sadr Bloc, Tawafuq, the 

National Dialogue Front, the Fadilah Party, and the Liberation and Reconciliation Front, all of which could muster only 

105 seats of the 138 seats needed to prevent a quorum. It 

appears that deserters of the anti-FRFL front must include 

members of the `Allawi coalition (25 seats) and the Da`wah 

Party (15 seats). The pro-FRFL front managed to attract 33 

deserters from the anti-FRFL front.16

According to the terms of the new Federal Region Formation Law, 

provinces that wish to form a federal region may commence proceedings from the date of passage of the FRFL in the CoR. 

Commencement of proceedings refers to presenting the request 

for formation of the region to the Council of Ministers. This council 

in turn shall refer the request to the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) to arrange a referendum on the request. The FRFL 

states that the region shall form upon approval by a simple majority of members of the electorate of the proposed region who actually 

cast votes in the referendum. Parties who desire to engage in federalist undertakings are now free to do so. The parties who oppose the 

federalist agenda are likely to show extreme anger, quite possibly 

accompanied by violent repercussions, at this defeat.

The future of federalism will play out over the course of 2007, but 

it is now set in motion; and the formation of “Sunnistan,” “Shiastan,” 

and Kurdistan has settled on a firm foundation of Iraqi law.

As reconciliation and federalism progress, expect a final phase

of consolidation where the transition of majority rule will go to the 

reigning Shi’a force. The decision to be made is whether Iraq will be 

ruled by a pro-Iranian Shi’a controlling force or an Iraqi Shi’a power 

in charge. 

The five evolutions of the enemy demonstrated the violent cross

currents that MND-B encontered in 2006. In many cases, each evolution was difficult to predict, and in many cases only understood
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JSOU Report 07-8

after MND-B was well into the fight. In all cases, before launching

any civic-action operation to counter the change in enemy activity, 

the MBD-B G9 staff reviewed the fundamentals. The theory and fundamentals behind civic action are covered in the next chapter. 
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4. Theory of Civic Action

The specific focus of military civic action is to create a 

favorable environment in which to support current or 

anticipated operations and to gain the support, loyalty, 

and respect of the people for their local and national government by assisting communities in conducting health, 

welfare, and public works projects; improving the economic base of the nation and standing of the host country 

and allied forces with the population.

— FM 31-73 Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations

Civic action is designed to reduce or remove the causes that 

fuel the insurgency. The subversion of a government by the 

insurgency is the battle fought to wrestle control of government away from the seated authority by demonstrating to the people 

that their leaders cannot protect them, provide essential services to 

the citizen at large, or offer economic opportunities for a better future. 

The insurgency proposes to offer 

the “oppressed” a “better” future 

and lures the people away from 

the government by undermining 

it. The objective of civic action 

is to synchronize military force 

with interagency and international partners to not only build trust 

and confidence by the people for their government and allies but also

erode popular support for the insurgency. Civic action targets the 

COIN center of gravity.

The center of gravity for a COIN is the populace. Specifically,

three components exist:

a. Tactical center of gravity is the adult population (i.e., 26 years 

old and older)—the antigovernment, neutral, and progovernment population base. 

b. Operational center of gravity is the next generation (16-25 

years old)—the recruiting base for the next wave of insurgents.

The insurgency proposes to offer 

the “oppressed” a “better” future 

and lures the people away from 

the government by undermining it. 
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JSOU Report 07-8

c. Strategic center of gravity are the children (15 years and 

younger), those who will inherit a nation either at peace or 

war. 

The insurgent fights for control of the people, and the government

fights to protect the people. Separate the people from the insurgents

and you win; if you don’t, you will loose.

The civil assessment of enemy intent conducted by MND-B staff 

was that elements of the insurgency would act as follows:

a. Conduct underground activities to foster political discontent 

with the national, provincial, and local government in order 

to continue to subvert the progress of democracy and set conditions for an insurgent selected form of government based 

on Sharia Law.

b.	 Engage in financial activities to support the insurgency, allying with criminal actors.

c. Mostly through coercion, force local nationals to become an 

auxiliary to the insurgency to support the enemy operations 

and give sanctuary.

d. Conduct guerrilla operations against coalition and government security forces to degrade/destroy the people’s trust in 

the government’s ability to protect and provide essential services to the citizen.

e. Transit from staging bases outside of the cities along the 

major and secondary roads to caches sites, then onward to 

safe houses within the city, conduct attacks, link up with 

underground members for payment, and then return outside 

the city.

f. Usher in externally supported government agents and foreign 

fighters who desire to keep the country destabilized, or turn

the host nation into a proxy or annex to the hostile nation.

g. Subjugation of the populace is the means to achieve the enemy’s end state.

Civic action has three goals: a) gain the support of the populace in 

order to disrupt enemy movement and sanctuary, b) divulge the location and disposition of insurgent leaders and forces, and c) degrade 

or eliminate the insurgent logistics base. Civic action removes the 

ability of the insurgent to hide openly amongst the populace and 
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Bogart: Block by Block 

denies or degrades the insurgent access to locally provided supplies, 

provisions, and services. Civic action also allows for coalition, allied, 

and host nation army and police forces to gain local information to 

insert in the precision-strike targeting process.

To conduct an effective civic-action program, the insurgent’s 

advantages must be attacked. The insurgent operates from a “home 

field” advantage, and he knows it. The coalition operates for a defined

time period and will leave, but the insurgent—whether home-grown 

or a foreign fighter—will always be there. Therefore it is difficult to

separate the people from the insurgent, when the people know that 

one day they will face those who make up the insurgency when coalition forces are not present. The same can be said when coalition 

forces conduct only day-time operations and return to base camps 

in the evening, and the people must face the insurgent at night with 

no coalition security. Separating the populace from the insurgents 

when the people fear for both short-term and long-term security is a 

complicated operation that requires much skill.

The purpose of civic action is to turn the people against the 

insurgency in order to reveal the 

enemy’s location, disposition, and 

intent. We want the locals to come 

out and divulge the location and 

disposition of guerrilla forces, the 

underground, and the auxiliary, so we can kill or capture them and 

protect the populace.

The method involves focusing civic action to build and maintain 

civil cooperation by executing short duration civic projects that have 

a high impact on the quality of life for the populace and provide outlets for the people to provide leads and information to civil authorities and security forces. Large-scale, long-term civic action will be 

used to build trust and confidence in local and provincial government and are best managed by a single project office outside the

military, but managed on a streamlined process to ensure completion as promised.

The end state is to influence population centers that are procoalition to stay friendly and provide information leading to the kill 

or capture of guerrilla forces, the capture of underground leaders, 

and the degradation of auxiliary support to the insurgency. Civic 

We want the locals to come out 

and divulge the location and 

disposition of guerrilla forces.
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JSOU Report 07-8

action is conducted in neutral areas to influence them to become

friendly and move hostile areas to becoming neutral.

Every civic action has a military objective and does not seek to 

execute random acts of kindness or supplant the responsibilities of 

the Department of State. Civic action manages the civil side of the 

COIN operation, tailored against the enemy’s order of battle. This 

order consists of the armed insurgent (the guerrilla), the political and 

financial arm of the insurgency (the underground) and the civilian

support to the insurgency (the auxiliary). The overarching construct 

is to separate the guerrilla from the populace (turn the populace 

against him and clear the guerrilla), occupy and reduce the underground (the democratic process), and employ the auxiliary (restoration operations and infrastructure development).

Civic action is centrally resourced with decentralized execution. 

It focuses on identifying the causes of instability, which promulgate 

the insurgency, and high impact, short-term projects and sustainable plans to counter it. Civic action develops protection plans for the 

local population (curfews, local security force support, neighborhood 

watch, and protected zones) and organizes strategies to turn hostile locals friendly (black to white), neutral populations to supportive 

(gray to white), and retain positive support. Additionally, civic action 

is the cornerstone to reduce lower level guerrillas and separate the 

foot soldier from the insurgent’s leadership. Key tenets of civic action 

include the following:

a. Balance strike operations to kill or capture the enemy with 

civic action to build civil cooperation and trust and confidence with the populace.

b. Establish a security environment that facilitates the development of local economies, promotes good and fair governance, 

and the provisioning of basic public services.

c. Separate the guerrilla from the populace by turning the people 

against the insurgency.

d. Facilitate the transfer of battle space to indigenous security 

forces and civil self and independent rule.

e. Support the indigenous political process along basic democratic lines.

f. Support engagement of host-nation leaders, tribes and clerics.
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Bogart: Block by Block 

g. Transition military government functions and civic action 

to the U.S. Department of State internal development programs.

h. Support local and district governments in sustaining the local 

level delivery of basic needs and essential services.

Execution of civic action is both operational and tactical. Operational civic action encompasses support of the Department of State 

and transitioning the economic and governance lines of operation to 

the Department of State, in advance of the security situation becoming passive. Typical operational and tactical actions are shown in 

Table 4. 

Table 4. Execution of Civic Action

Level Civic Action

Operational Engage local, district leaders and populace in obtaining tactical 

objectives.

Support development, maintenance, and exploitation of positive relations between the military and the civil community.

Manage the civil populace and the impact of military operations on the civilian populace.

Gain support from civilian agencies of the U.S. government, 

local, and district governments of the host nation, civilian agencies of other governments, and nongovernmental agencies in 

order to obtain tactical objectives.

Exercise temporary military control of the civilian populace 

in specified areas until control can be returned to local and 

district government authority.

Provide assistance to meet short-term, temporary, and lifesustaining needs of the civilian population.

Provide expertise in civil-sector functions in order to assist 

the local and district government in developing and restoring 

civil-sector capabilities and functions.

Train the host-nation military to plan, train for, and conduct 

military civic action in order to support development of the 

military and build the legitimacy of the government.

Plan, execute, and manage projects to improve quality of 

life and improve government’s ability to govern, specifically 

focused on the governmental functions of public administration, public health, public safety and public utilities.
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JSOU Report 07-8

Level Civic Action

Tactical Secure auxiliary support to the insurgency in order to disrupt 

enemy lines of communication into the cities.

Occupy the underground in order to disrupt fiscal and technological support to the insurgency.

Create a rural auxiliary to divulge guerrilla activity in sector in 

order to disrupt guerrilla movement and sanctuary.

Create a local population base willing to divulge insurgent 

activity in sector in order to disrupt enemy movement, 

resources, and sanctuary.

Focus on ascertaining the location of the underground in order 

to disrupt subversion.

Related civic-action mission sets encompass critical ancillary 

operations such as humanitarian assistance, internally displaced 

person management, consequence management, and interagency 

operations.

Humanitarian Assistance (HA)

HA encompasses short-range programs aimed at alleviating present suffering. This assistance is usually conducted in response to 

natural and human-made disasters, including combat. The assistance provided by military forces is limited in scope and duration, 

and it must not duplicate other forms of assistance provided by the 

U.S. Government. It is designed to supplement and complement the 

efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that have primary responsibility for HA. The assistance includes programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of disasters or other endemic 

conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that 

might present a serious threat to life or result in great damage or loss 

of property. HA operations can encompass both reactive programs, 

such as disaster relief; and proactive programs, such as humanitarian and civic assistance.

Task: Conduct HA operations as short-range programs aimed at alleviating 

human suffering.

Purpose: HA operations are designed to supplement or complement the 

efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies to offset humanitarian 

strife and avert depleting/degrading combat power.

Table 4. Execution of Civic Action (continued)
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HA programs are designed to assist civil authorities in carrying 

out their responsibilities of providing assistance and basic services 

to the local populace. Typical HA tasks are as follows:

a. Execute HA operations according to coordinated plans and 

guidance.

b.	 Employ sufficient combat power to safeguard the populace,

defend the perimeter, escort convoys, screen the local populace, and assist in personnel recovery operations.

c. Assess HA needs, security, food, water, medical, and shelter.

d. Identify HA resources/agencies available to support operations and establish contact and working relationships.

e. Publicize HA plan through local public information operations and tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) assets.

f. Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated 

with HA activities.

Internally Displaced Person (IDP)

An IDP is defined as any person who has left his residence by reason

of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of his own 

country. Any persons or groups of persons who have been forced or 

obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in

particular as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural 

or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (United Nations definition contained in

the guiding principles on internal displacement).17

The staff must determine an appropriate response, with a focus 

on security, food, water, medical care and shelter, accurately moniTask: All units report status of IDPs and camps. 

Purpose: Battle track IDP locations and movement in order to avert any 

humanitarian catastrophe, determine indications of sectarian strife, and build 

a common operating picture of IDPs.
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JSOU Report 07-8

toring friendly and enemy dispositions and notifying appropriate 

units and individuals. Critical IDP tasks are as follows:

a. Identify requirement to initiate IDP operations.

b.	 Plan and deconflict IDP routes, collection points, assembly

areas, and camps and post on operational graphics.

c. Assess IDP needs, security, food, water, medical, and shelter.

d. Coordinate IDP control measures with adjacent units to minimize redundancy and increase efficiency of IDP operations.

e. Publicize IDP plan through local public information operations and tactical PSYOP assets.

f. Execute operational plans for immediate mitigation of political, economic, legal, social, and military issues associated 

with IDP activities.18

Consequence Management (CM)

CM involves actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and 

manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, human-made, or terrorist incidents. 

In general, CM operations can be as complex as deploying a task 

force to specially mitigate the effects of the attack or more direct 

such as providing monetary reimbursement. In general, actions 

for the CM objective are focused on conducting a damage survey, 

determining the immediate needs, documenting the damage, and 

providing an initial mitigation plan. The acronym INDIA (Immediate 

Task: Plan for and execute CM operations as an integrated part of all combat 

operations premission activities. Additionally, CM may involve prepositioning 

supplies, services, resources, and materials to rapidly mitigate any physical, 

psychological, cultural, or emotional damage to the civilian populace. Effective CM operations preempt or deter the discontent of the populace with 

coalition forces and support the people’s confidence in their government’s 

ability to protect them.

Purpose: Prepare for and respond to attacks against the civil populace, 

conduct immediate CM operations in order to return the affected area to 

preattack conditions and mitigate the effects of the attack. Immediate is 

defined as coordinating repairs within 48 hours of the damage.
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Needs, Damage, and Infrastructure Assessment) describes the steps 

required for documenting damage and reporting requirements to the 

next higher headquarters in order to execute any of the following CM 

options:

a. Prepositioned assets mitigating damage at the point and time 

of impact. Repairs must fit the unit’s ability to secure the

location during the CM operation.

b. Claims cards and reimbursement instructions provided to 

the local populace in order to process for damages. Claims 

cards are ideal for CM when the situation does not permit 

lengthy loiter time on the objective or return.

c.	 Contract with a local vendor on an indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract to conduct repairs. The local contractor 

will photograph the damage, provide an estimate, and repair 

the damage as directed by the coalition. This method allows 

for a local entity to conduct follow-on repair without forcing a 

return of coalition forces.

d. If the situation warrants, the commander may constitute a 

task force tailored to mitigate the effects of the attack. For 

attacks against civilian targets by enemy forces, this generally involves coalition forces providing security, transportation, supplies, rubble/debris removal, and the ability to 

repair damage in support of the local government.

e. Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding 

can be used to support CM requirements. The type of support 

available consists of CM packages or local vendor repair. CM 

packages consist of prestocked supplies stored at a Forward 

Operating Base, such as construction supplies for restoration operations.

Interagency Operations

Interagency operations are the most critical part of a COIN campaign. A unilateral military operation means unilateral failure. All 

elements of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and 

economic—should be employed toward defeating the enemy.

Interagency operations can be defined as the coordination, synchronization, and decisions that unify the diplomatic, informational, 

military, and economic efforts into mutually supporting action. In 
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JSOU Report 07-8

other words, interagency operations deconflict U.S. Department of

State governance programs, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) initiatives, and U.S. Information Services (USIS) 

activities with military offensive, defensive, and stability operations. 

Hence, interagency operations become the driving operational level 

consideration in COIN operations. The keys to interagency operations are communications, relationships, and power sharing.

The operations are not resident at the embassy level alone. The 

myriad of organizations that populate the battlefield range from nongovernmental to coalition government groups as well as those within 

U.S. Government agencies, local, provincial, and national government. In order to ensure synchronized operational level COIN action 

by all elements of national power, the U.S. country team serves as 

the standing body to coordinate multiagency, intergovernmental, 

and international efforts.

The method for interface between the tactical unit and the local 

government organizations generally comes through face-to-face 

encounters to capture local needs/requirements—information used 

for needs-based project nominations. At the higher headquarters a 

civic-action group can synchronize project nominations to ensure 

unity of effort and economies of scale. To integrate tactical civic 

action and project nominations with the highest level of the host 

nation, typically a general officer chairs a joint planning commission

that acts as follows:

a. Presents project nominations.

b. Receives updates on project issues and completions.

c. Serves to connect local to provincial government, as well as 

deconflict civic actions with the provincial council, Department of State, industry, and other participants.

Hence, civic action and its subcomponents are the other side of 

COIN. Its driving elements are the military objective, building the 

people’s “trust and confidence” in their government, civil information

that leads to the location and disposition of the enemy, civil cooperation that moves the populace to active or neutral support of coalition 

forces, and coordination of the interagency effort as paramount in 

transitioning the economic and governance activities to the Department of State. 
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Command and Control of Civic Action 

When an insurgency forms, the affected populace is too dispersed 

to be centrally controlled. Local actions can take place to manage 

specific population centers, but the key to subverting an insurgency

comes from widespread civic action. 

For civic action, control is mostly bottom up, with only priorities, parameters, and resources flowing from the top-down. The

higher command and control element, which is not engaged in active 

combat operations, is responsible for establishing priorities for the 

subordinate commands to synchronize the actions across a wide 

enough area to disrupt enemy operations and deny them freedom of 

movement. Parameters are established to delineate the subordinate 

command’s level of authorities and define the limits of their operations, so that the focus of military operations becomes protecting the 

populace. Civic-action projects are distributed to weight the battle, 

Figure 4. Contract resources coordination
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JSOU Report 07-8

systematically destroy, disrupt, or degrade the elements of the insurgency, (i.e., guerrilla, underground, and auxiliary). 

The basic premise of civic-action operations is that the lower echelon of command is where the decisive operation occurs. The key 

leaders are platoon and squad leaders, and the fight is over the populace. In fact, the operational environment is far too complex and localized for an overarching mechanism to synchronize small-unit action. 

Deliberate operations and targeting coordinated at the divisional level 

and transmitted through the plans and orders process is an institutional impediment. Division staffs tend to divert staff energy to try to 

“mass nonlethal effects” to coordinate a ribbon-cutting ceremony at a 

refurbished school for an infantry company. A division staff’s focus is 

96 hours and out for planning and resource allocation, not 96 hours 

and in for resource management. What is needed is the higher headquarters front-loading manpower, funding, equipment, and enablers 

to conduct the operation, then sustain the effort.

The other prevailing reason why civic action is a tactical fight

supported by operational resources and sustained by strategic purpose is the composition of the populace. Areas of economic stress and 

humanitarian need produce the guerrilla fighter. The underground is

very effective in convincing the “have nots” that they can be a part of 

those who “have,” but only by force of arms. The demographics of the 

combat zone demonstrate that only 2 to 3 percent of the populace 

are affluent, 20 to 35 percent are middle class, and the remaining

68 to 72 percent are lower class (the “have nots”). Baghdad’s considerable middle class prior to the war has diminished—been killed, 

sought refuge outside the city, or is in some form of hiding.

With such a divergent and expansive populace, the optimal way 

to remove the home-field advantage from the insurgent is to work in

their backyards and conduct wide-area warfare. An example is commissioning a series of civic actions, based on the needs of the locals, 

targeted into the area where guerrilla forces are bound to operate 

(the dead space), which is usually the lower income, impoverished 

areas. In general, the intensity of the insurgency is proportional to 

the expanse of the neglected populace. As demonstrated during the 

Battle of Baghdad, one dead space were several hayys (wards) in the 

Rashld beladiyah (borough) in the east side of Baghdad. A lesson 

learned for clear-and-build operations in areas such as Rashld was 

that one combat arms battalion can clear a 24- to 36-square-kilome-
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ter urban area consisting of two- to three-floor residences, and one

Brigade Special Troops Battalion is required for the build phase. 

The overarching command agent for civic action is the commanding general or the commanding officer. The commander of the higher

headquarters interfaces with his subordinate commanders and 

articulates the prioritization, parameters, and resources available for 

his field commanders to execute the civic-action program. The commanding general or commanding officer in many cases will appoint

his deputy as the primary command group official responsible for

direct oversight of civic action. The staff proponent or principal staff 

agent responsible for the day-to-day management of civic action at 

the division level is the assistant chief of staff, G9, while at the Brigade Combat Team and battalion level is the S9.

The greatest control mechanism available for civic action is 

money. Cash rents loyalty, and paid friendship leads to friendly 

action; in fact, the more money spent in a single area, the greater 

the friendship. Such concepts, discussed thus far, guided our civicaction planning and operations throughout 2006. 

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5. From Theory to Practice—the Civic-

 Action Program

Closing in on Baghdad involved putting research and theory 

into practice. The Red Zone analysis—the intelligence preparation of the operational environment—had served its purpose:

a. Determined the causes of instability, anticipated prior to 

deploying for Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07

b. Derived why the enemy was focused on Baghdad.

c. Divulged what made the populace side with the insurgency.

d. Determined what the religious, historic, cultural, and economic undertows were beneath the surface. 

Arriving in Baghdad further refined the assessment due to finding a codification of the causes for instability. A lesson learned was

that the behavior of American soldiers toward the citizens of Iraq 

was abrasive. The overflow of Forward Operating Bases and the force

protection measures in and around Baghdad had made the city not 

only walled but under siege. No connectivity between the District and 

Nahia Advisory Councils to the Baghdad Provincial Council existed, 

hence no continuity of government or people’s representation. The 

infrastructure lacked in many areas and was failing throughout. The 

U.S.-sponsored reconstruction projects were causing huge discontent with the populace because all the promises made for electricity, 

fresh drinking water, functioning sewer systems, and a new landfill

were not kept—far from completion or would never be completed.19

The institutions of the U.S. Government had settled in, and progress 

was severely hampered as American bureaucrats used peacetime 

procedures and practices to manage 

a COIN campaign. Another discovery 

was a great inability to keep up with 

the flow of information being received

by a multitude of sources and an 

ever painful compulsion to place local 

action in American terms, vice understanding how the indigenous populace thought and accepting why 

they did what they did for their reasons, not ours.

...progress was severely 

hampered as American 

bureaucrats used peacetime 

procedures and practices to 

manage a COIN campaign. 
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JSOU Report 07-8

Entering the Battle of Baghdad also meant reevaluating the plan. 

The developed action scheme had a specific task and purpose for

civic action. The task was to develop “trust and confidence” of the

people with their government or to improve the quality of life to lift 

the populace up to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. The core reasons 

behind the civic-action program were to build civil information, leading to the location and disposition of the enemy, and civil cooperation 

in support of coalition forces achieving the command’s objectives. 

The purpose of the program was to deny the enemy the populace, 

which we considered to be the center of gravity.

Major Doug Davids took the lead in validating assumptions and 

ensuring the plan of action could achieve the task and purpose in 

the operational environment. He set forth on an area-wide survey 

to determine the core tenets of the civic action. He went to Babil, 

throughout Baghdad, and worked interagency integration. Davids 

derived the themes of the civic-action plan following 4 out of the 

16 governmental functions.20 From his survey the civic-action plan 

transitioned to a civic-action program.

MND-B planned and executed a civic-action program for a 62,000 

combined force consisting of 27 U.S. and Iraqi brigades engaged in 

active COIN operations. The program formed the day-to-day underpinning for a population consisting of 11 million civilians across a 

16,664-square-mile area and served as the primary force to stabilize the MND-B area of responsibility. The program also consisted of 

1,044 completed or ongoing projects at a total value of $138 million, 

executed by seven U.S. Brigade Combat Teams. Components of the 

MND-B civic-action program were included in the following activities, 

most of which are further detailed herein:

a. Operation Glory Light, the main effort for the division’s COIN 

operation in January, centered in south Baghdad

b. Operation Willing Eagle, the permissive entry by the Ministry 

of Electricity to validate that the off-limits Yusufiyah Power

Plant was a key enemy base of operations

c. Operation Baghdad Is Beautiful, the city-wide cleanup program

d. Operation Harvest Light, the date-palm spray campaign in 

support of the Ministry of Agriculture
47

Bogart: Block by Block 

e. Operation Together Forward II, the infrastructure rehabilitation in focus area throughout Baghdad 

f. One Civil Affairs company to the Baghdad provincial reconstruction team (PRT) and another to the Babil PRT with lieutenant colonel (O5) liaison officers

g. Command oversight on civic action, ensuring that the commanding general, deputy commanding general, support, and 

chief of staff had full visibility of the expenditures, face-toface engagements, and societal impacts of the division’s civicaction program 

h. Reporting and command oversight of the CERP, revamping 

by implementing the weekly civic-action group—the Brigade Combat Teams providing direct accountability to the 

division’s deputy commanding general, support, and chief of 

staff via the Command Post of the Future 

i. Reconstruction reporting, converting to the Iraqi Reconstruction Management System with 3,423 total records for fiscal

years 2005 and 2006. 

Measures of success for MND-B’s civic-action program in the economic development effort included the date-palm spray campaign, a 

Figure 5. R3 

Water Treatment Plant, 

Muhallah 329, 

Baghdad, 

22 July, COL 

Tom Vail and 

LTC Chris 

Hall, 506th 

Regimental 

Combat Team
48

JSOU Report 07-8

$750 million economic impact that contributed to a 21-month low 

in unemployment, and the opening of 65-80 percent of local business in the focus areas. Success occurred in improving governance 

with interagency synchronization, building local government agencies, and then connecting local-to-provincial government leaders. 

The cost was $12.55 per person.

What follows is a synopsis of civic-action programs—a description of a wide range of initiatives taken to engender civil cooperation in Baghdad in 2006. Through these actions, information about 

insurgent forces was obtained, infrastructure was refurbished, and 

increasing civil authority was transitioned to local governments.

Operation Glory Light

Soldiers from the 6th and 9th Iraqi Army (IA) Divisions, supported 

by MND-B soldiers, conducted operations to gain control of a terrorist stronghold south of Baghdad. The operation began in the early 

morning hours of 2 March, when the soldiers of 3rd Battalion, 1st 

Brigade, 6th IA Division and 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 

2/101 AASLT air assaulted into the Sadr-Yusufiyah area. Following

the air assault, the soldiers were attacked by indirect and smallarms fire. They also discovered a roadside bomb.

Soldiers from the 6th and 9th IA Divisions then moved into position to clear, search and secure roads and houses in the town. From 

5-6 March, the 9th IA Division uncovered nine weapons caches, 

consisting of 131 mortar rounds, nine 50-mm mortars, 17 rockets, 

two rocket-propelled grenade launchers, six AK-47 rifles, two BKC

machine guns, and a large amount of bomb-making materials. The 

operation lasted for 1 week.

Figure 6. An IA soldier 

stands guard during the 

search of a house as part of 

the combined operation with 

coalition forces; U.S. Navy 

photo by photographer Mate 

2nd Class Samuel Peterson
49

Bogart: Block by Block 

The purpose of Operation Glory Light was to deny terrorists 

sanctuary and preempt enemy attacks in the Baghdad area. The key 

tasks were as follows:

a. Conduct focused on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to accurately determine enemy disposition prior 

to execution.

b. Control routes that anti-Iraqi forces can use to withdraw from 

or reinforce.

c.	 Mass sufficient lethal combat power with the main effort to

allow for a decisive overmatch of any enemy force.

d.	 Use fires to reduce enemy resistance before committing

ground forces.

e. Secure LOCs into the objective area to maintain resupply and 

casualty evacuation operations by ground as a viable option.

f. Provide the enemy with multiple simultaneous problems; do 

not allow him to focus on a single axis of operations.

g. Be prepared to continue offensive operations south of Sadr Al 

Yusifiyah.

h. Conduct combined operations with Iraqi forces and maintain 

an Iraqi face on publicized operations.

i. Simultaneously conduct civic action and CM to mitigate the 

alienation of local nationals not involved in enemy activity.

Operation Glory Light established a Civil Military Operations Task 

Force that reopened two schools, treated 200 locals in medical operations, distributed 3,000 pounds of HA food, executed 10 localized 

projects at $1.7 million, discovered four caches, and moved a hostile 

qada (county of a governorate) to a neutral stance. Units conducted 

leader engagement and civic-action operations simultaneously with 

offensive operations to provide immediate CM and enhanced support 

for Iraqi Government and security forces, to include medical and 

veterinarian operations.

Civic-action teams conducted mitigation throughout the operation as well as assessment of public utility needs. Work was initiated 

on CERP projects in the Sadr Al Yusufiyah area. The civic actions

included these activities: 

a. Engaged in Shakariya, leading to reopening of two schools 

(16 Feb).
50

JSOU Report 07-8

b. Combined interagency, Iraqi Police, and civic-action mitigation in Mahmudiyah of anti-Iraqi forces rocket attack (2 Feb).

c.	 Assessed emergency and essential services in Yusufiyah (28

Jan to 2 Feb).

d. Developed scopes of work for courthouse and two schools in 

Yusufiyah (1-2 Feb).

e. Developed scope of work for the Civil Military Operations Center 

in Mahmudiyah and traffic control points along routes.

f. Conducted key leader and populace engagement in Zaidon 

area to determine attitudes.

g. Coordinated Iraqi engineer assistance on civil military operations.

h. Assessed Mahmudiya City Hall and other possible projects 

for upgrade (24 Jan).

i. Distributed 3,000 pounds of food, 300 pounds of children’s 

clothing, and 1,000 copies of the Baghdad Now newspaper to 

residents.

j. Treated over 200 patients for minor injuries and illnesses via 

2/101 AASLT. 

k. Assessed two schools, health clinic, water treatment facility, 

and a power substation for possible CERP project upgrades.

l. Coordinated water pipe repair through Nahia water minister.

The combined operation with 1st Brigade, 9th IA Division; the 

4th Brigade, 6th IA Division; and the 2/101 AASLT led to the discovery of 26 roadside bombs, two vehicle-borne IEDs, and 15 weapons caches. The operation also involved seven engagements with the 

enemy, resulting in the detention of 16 suspected terrorists, two terrorists killed, and one wounded. Foreign fighters and insurgent leaders in Sadr Yusifiyah were killed or captured, the enemy organization

in the Euphrates River Valley was disrupted, enemy supplies and 

equipment were captured or destroyed, and U.S. forces exerted control over the avenues of approach into and out of Sadr Yusufiyah.

Operation Tigris Waves

In March, elements of MND-B conducted Operation Tigris Waves to 

transform the town of Tarmiya, located approximately 15 kilometers 

north of Baghdad, from an enemy sanctuary to a place that self rules 
51

Bogart: Block by Block 

and does not actively support enemy activity. The operation was a 

textbook balance of strike operations and civic action that isolated 

the populace from the insurgency, created an internal capacity to 

govern and protect the citizens, and transitioned authority to civil 

control. 

The plan for the operation had five phases that focused on isolating, occupying, and securing Tarmiya; providing civic action; and 

transferring to civil control. 1/4 ID was to secure the objective—prevent anti-Iraqi forces activity in Tarmiya from influencing Baghdad

and eventually transfer security of Tarmiya to the local authorities, 

allowing coalition forces to maintain tactical over watch.

Key tasks were as follows:

a. Conduct continuous engagement with both civic leaders and 

the people to gain their trust and confidence.

b. Isolate Tarmiya—no one moves in or out of Tarmiya without 

our consent.

c. Occupy patrol bases inside Tarmiya with coalition and Iraqi 

Army forces to create a 24/7 presence.

d. Inject quick turn, high impact essential services projects 

that employ local contractors to help the average citizen of 

Tarmiya.

e. Create a wedge between the citizens of Tarmiya and the enemy 

through a combination of positive and negative reinforcement 

means.

f. Neutralize enemy once separated from the citizens of 

Tarmiya.

g. Establish an effective, fully manned Iraqi Police force that 

can secure Tarmiya.

The desired result included enemy forces cleared from the environs of Tarmiya, Iraqi Police assumption of security for the people of 

Tarmiya; Iraqi Army and coalition forces vacated patrol bases inside 

Tarmiya; and an end to the isolation of Tarmiya.

The civic action for Operation Tigris Waves was Support to the Civil 

Administration, specifically the establishment of civil control in the

city. On 25 March, coalition forces met with local leadership at the 

Tarmiya Qada meeting to set the conditions for Iraqi Army and U.S. 

withdrawal from Tarmiya. The main focus was to establish a strong 

functioning police force that can secure Tarmiya for the public.
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JSOU Report 07-8

With Operation Tigris Waves in high gear, the 1st Brigade, working with Iraqis, conducted a medical operation (MedOp) in Tarmiya 

to remove or reduce local support for the insurgency. The goal was 

to improve the standard of living—offering a better future affecting 

strategic, operational, and tactical centers of gravity. With 375 local 

nationals receiving treatment, the Tarmiya clinic asked coalition 

forces to plan other MedOps in the future.

Operation Harvest Light

Operation Harvest Light, the date-palm spray campaign in support 

of the Ministry of Agriculture, was the first time the celebrated Iraqi

date-palm orchards had been sprayed in 3 years. Date production 

had been a significant economic and cultural event for Iraq. At one

time, date palms were their second largest export, generating millions 

of dollars into the Iraq economy. Producing approximately 30 percent 

of the world production in the 1960s, Iraq’s dates were considered 

top quality. Consequently, the crop was a source of national pride for 

Iraq, and a productive crop promoted economic stability, generated 

revenue, provided jobs, and brought families back together.

Years of war and neglect reduced the number of palms from 30 

to 15 million. Iraq has steadily lost its world market share to other 

countries. Because an infestation of the Dubas bugs will severely 

damage the crop if left untreated, the Ministry of Agriculture wanted 

to conduct aerial pesticide chemical spraying of about 75,000 

hectares of date-palm trees in Baghdad, Babil, Diyala, Najaf, Wasit, 

Figure 7. AN-2, 

Colt contracted 

to conduct aerial 

spraying—focus 

on the farmer and 

deny the enemy 

the dead space
53

Bogart: Block by Block 

and Karbala governorates, plus 75,000 hectares of wheat fields in

Ninawa governorate beginning in mid-April.

The mission for MND-B was to support the Government of Iraq, 

Ministry of Agriculture aerial spraying of date-palm crops from 

about 20 March to 18 May in areas within Baghdad, Babil, Najaf, 

and Karbala provinces. The date-palm spray campaign was a MultiNational Corps, Iraq (MNC-I) wide civic-action project supported by 

the MND-B. It was the largest single economic impact and influence

operation that the division conducted in 2006. The key tasks for 

MND-B were as follows:

a. Coordinate with MNC-I for the contract resources to spray 

the MND-B area of operations.

b. Organize the MND-B staff to support the operation and 

synchronize public affairs, PSYOP, logistics, and security 

actions.

c. Clear air space and inform ground units of the spray schedule.

d. Organize search and rescue, as well as recovery assets in 

case a contract aircraft was downed.

e. Obtain Government of Iraq approval to support the Ministry 

of Agriculture.

f. Coordinate political support in four provinces for the datepalm spray campaign.

g.	 Coordinate with the agriculture offices in four provinces.

h. Coordinate spray concentrations, locations, and chemical 

types across 208 square miles.

i. Conduct lateral coordination with adjoining divisions to 

transfer assets to their control in order to continue with the 

national date-palm and wheat crop spraying.

j. Monitor, report, and adjust spray operations. 

The conduct of the operation was difficult. The date-palm spray

campaign season is from 1 to 30 May in the Baghdad, Babil, Najaf, 

and Karbala provinces. MND-B and the Ministry of Agriculture 

(director generals of agriculture) synchronized spray zones, pesticide usage, and public information. At the same time, MND-B provided discreet project management in support of the Government of 

Iraq appearing to run the program. The target area (Baghdad, Babil, 
54

JSOU Report 07-8

Karbala, and Najaf) was about 43,000 (of 60,000) hectares of date 

palms and 100,000 hectares of wheat found throughout the Iraqi 

theatre of operations. 

The contractor used Moldavian MI-2 helicopters and AN-2 Colt 

aircraft operated by English-speaking Turkish and Moldovan pilots 

to conduct the spraying. The contractor provided three fuel trucks. 

On about 20 March the contractor moved the six partially disassembled helicopters via truck, along with their three fuel trucks, aircrews, and logistics personnel from Turkey to the civil airport in Irbil. 

After the helicopters were reassembled and the proper Multinational 

Force-Iraq (MNF-I) approved avionics were installed, the contractor moved the aircraft in pairs to different airfields for conducting

spray operations. Some of these airfields served as overnight sites,

and some were to be used as logistics resupply locations. To track 

the progress of the spraying, transponders were installed on the

Figure 8. The rural COIN strategy
55

Bogart: Block by Block 

aircraft for recording their flight patterns. Here were the results of

the effort:

a. Sprayed 54,450 hectares (134,548 acres or 210 square miles), 

which is 3.4 times larger than the District of Columbia (61.4 

square miles)—specifically about 8.6 million palm and 8.6

million citrus trees (17.2 million total)

b. Killed an estimated 4,083,750,000 Dubas bugs, which Ministry of Agriculture sources said was a 75 percent infestation

c. Anticipated 651,412 tons of dates for the year’s crop, 261,165 

tons of citrus 

d. At $120 per ton for dates and $110 per ton for citrus, estimated $110.9 million wholesale crop

e. Estimated export value up to $121.4 million wholesale based 

on the world average export price for dates, which translated 

into a potential of $562 million retail crop at five times wholesale

f. Based on two farmers per hectare, estimated that the operation employed approximately 108,500 from July to October to 

work the date and citrus crop.

Figure 9. Aerial view of rural area
56

JSOU Report 07-8

The Ministry of Agriculture personnel were pleased with the 

effort. In Najaf date-palm spraying was well received, and full credit 

was given to the Ministry of Agriculture. Farmers had been warned 

to place a yellow flag high up in trees for areas that should not be

sprayed to protect things like bee hives and fisheries, a worthwhile

precaution.

In Taji, both Sunni and Shi’a were asked what they thought about 

date-palm spraying, and the answer was that they too were pleased. 

The people knew it would benefit them, suggesting that Iraq’s agriculture should be one of the most important priorities of the new 

government. As for Babil, the locals were satisfied that spraying

was finally happening again, yet unsure who was responsible for

making it happen—the combined forces or the Government of Iraq. 

In contrast, the populace in Karbala was aware of the Government of 

Karbala’s involvement in putting up obstacles to the spraying. That 

government’s animosity and noncooperative attitude was expressed 

at that time towards coalition forces. Nevertheless, the spraying was 

conducted in support of the local farmers. 

During the operation, MND-B had received indicators that spray 

zones along the Euphrates

River in the vicinity of Taji 

were unsafe for aircraft due 

to enemy activity. The G9 

informed the Ministry of Agriculture office that until the

security situation permitted, 

the spray aircraft would not 

fly the Taji spray boxes. As a

result, the Ministry notified

the tribes and local governments in the area not to attack 

the spray aircraft or military 

aircraft accompanying them, 

so the areas could be treated. 

Because the temperature was 

Figure 10. Letter from Ministry 

of Agriculture to MND-B
57

Bogart: Block by Block 

increasing, it was only a matter of days before the Dubas bug larva 

would mature and the eggs would hatch. A letter was written on 12 

May from the Ministry of Agriculture to MND-B confirming that the

aircraft would be safe.

The end result was that Operation Harvest Light built governance 

through economic development. In addition to widespread popular support with the farmers, trust and confidence were instilled in

the provincial government’s ability to serve its citizens. From Taji to 

Najaf, the local, provincial, and national governments were working 

for the people. The Ministry of Agriculture’s office calculated pesticide concentrations and designated the spray areas. Officials from

the Karbala and Tarmiya director generals of agriculture flew with

the pilots to show them where to spray. District leaders informed 

the farmers of the spraying and governors and mayors were directly 

involved.

In summary, Operation Harvest Light served two purposes:

a.	 Being an influence operation, it moved guerrilla fighters outfrom

underneath the date-palm groves where they cached weapons 

and explosives and from which they would stage forces. 

b. Being an economic development program, the part-time guerrilla fighter was focused away from jihad against coalition

forces to the date-palm trees. 

Operation Baghdad Is Beautiful

Beginning in June, MND-B commenced Operation Baghdad Is Beautiful, a $5.2 million city-wide program for civic cleanup, consisting 

of 43 projects that reduced IED emplacement is in some areas up to 

six-fold and disrupted the IED network. The overall purpose of the 

campaign was to elevate citizen trust and confidence in their provincial government. The idea was to mitigate the constant reminders of 

Figure 11. 

Civic-action 

cleanup program
58

JSOU Report 07-8

war by removing rubble, excess wire, and barriers to demonstrate 

that the city was returning to prewar conditions. This migration was 

achieved in three ways:

a. Removing trash piles that could foster the spread of disease, 

therefore removing unsightly trash.

b.	 Reducing vector populations and demonstrating the benefits

of clean neighborhoods to the local populace.

c. Reducing available concealment for emplacement of IEDs, 

thereby protecting the populace from attacks.

The project involved 15 areas in Al Karadah district, 3 areas in 

Babel district, 12 areas in Al Riyad district, 23 areas in Muhallah 903 

district, and 7 areas in Al Jameea district. The desired result was to 

achieve a clean highway system in Baghdad with road markings and 

signs posted according to international standards. Designated city 

streets were to be clean and curbs painted, streets marked, and traffic and street signs emplaced. In addition, designated parks, medians, and the entrance to Baghdad International Airport were to be 

landscaped.

The local government designated 60 sites for cleanup, and work 

started on 29 May and concluded on 28 June. The actual work period 

was 21 days, and each day was 10 hours (total 73,500 hours). The 

contractors, local Iraqi companies, supplied transportation to and 

from sites, water, and soda at no cost to the workers. The average 

number of workers employed was 350 a day, and their average pay 

was $10 a day with supervisors getting $30 to $50, infusing approximately $75,180 in the short term. 

The results achieved from the Karadah Peninsula cleanup effort 

included providing much needed jobs and contracts to Iraqi citizens, plus making a considerable dent in the detritus of war. The 

contractor hauled an average of 60 loads a day, utilizing 20 trucks 

and numerous loaders. The total number of loads hauled was about 

1,200. Based on the number of loads, 11,345 tons of waste, trash, 

debris, barriers, and wire were removed. 

Operation First Light

Operation First Light was directed by the commanding general of 

MNC-I in response to the default of a U.S. reconstruction project to 

build 142 primary health-care clinics. The background on the failed 
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Bogart: Block by Block 

U.S. reconstruction project is best described in an extract from the 

Washington Post article.21

BAGHDAD – A reconstruction contract for the building of 

142 primary health centers across Iraq is running out of 

money, after 2 years and roughly $200 million, with no 

more than 20 clinics now expected to be completed, the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers says.

The contract, awarded to U.S. construction giant, Parsons 

Inc., in the flush, early days of reconstruction in Iraq, was

expected to lay the foundation of a modern health-care 

system for the country, putting quality medical care within 

reach of all Iraqis.

Parsons, according to the Corps, will walk away from more 

than 120 clinics that on average are two thirds finished.

Auditors say the project serves as a warning for other U.S. 

reconstruction efforts due to be completed this year.

Brig Gen William McCoy, the Army Corps commander overseeing reconstruction in Iraq, said he still hoped to complete all 142 clinics as promised and was seeking emergency 

funds from the U.S. military and foreign donors. “I’m fairly 

confident,” McCoy said.

Figure 12. Al Thalith primary health-care clinic
60

JSOU Report 07-8

Coming with little public warning, the 86 percent shortfall 

of completions dismayed the World Health Organization’s 

representative for Iraq. ‘That’s not good; that’s shocking,’ 

Naeema Al Gasseer said by telephone from Cairo. ‘We’re not 

sending the right message here. That’s affecting people’s 

expectations and people’s trust, I must say.’

Six of the 49 clinics in the MND-B sector were between 90-99 

percent complete. It was the Corps commander’s directive to monitor

and assist with security, and if required, construction and sustainment support to open these six clinics, as the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers completed the primary health-care clinics.

Operation First Light commenced on 21 May with Brigade 

Combat Teams conducting discreet site surveys, followed by a permissive survey to validate the level of completion. The teams would 

liaison with the clinic director and determine when the construction would be complete; whether any work was left undone; whether 

any medical staff and supplies were on hand; status of the services, 

water, electricity, and sewage to the site; and whether any obstacles 

remained in opening. 

Coordination by the division with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ensured that the medical supplies and equipment were purchased and installed and the construction would be completed with 

Ministry of Health acceptance soon thereafter. 

The strategy behind opening the primary health-care clinics 

was a forcing function of government. The projects were resurrected 

(after the Parsons pullout) and with the six clinics opening, the Corps 

commander wanted to ensure that the Ministry of Health was able 

to open, staff, and sustain the facilities. Over time, the six facilities 

opened and began seeing between 200 to 300 patients daily. This 

was the opening surge to areas that had not had local medical care. 

After a week or so, the clinic directors and the Ministry of Health 

asked coalition forces not to show up at the facilities because such 

visits would present a security or retribution risk to the clinic.

The Al Hurriya primary health-care clinic was the last one to open 

from the original six and that was on 27 September. The Ministry of 

Health has committed to providing medical staff and security personnel to these clinics as well as essential services that included water, 

fuel, and Class VIII medical supplies. Though other clinics remained 
61

Bogart: Block by Block 

to be opened, Operation First Light demonstrated that medical care 

could be provided at the local level, even when the Government was 

reluctant to do so. 

Operation Freedom Light

In order to recognize the formation of the new Government of Iraq, 

MND-B conducted a large-scale release of approximately 3,000 

detainees during June. This operation became a release program 

that would reintegrate detainees back into the civil society over the 

next several months. 

The first release marked a milestone toward democratic rule and

building a viable part of the Iraqi legal system in a new Iraq. The first

Operation Freedom Light was staggered over a 5-day period, with the 

Prime Minister or select political/religious leaders participating in all 

of the releases.

To determine which detainees to release, a board reviewed 6,500 

records that produced approximately 3,000 low risk individuals for 

release. Information about all detainees was entered into a database 

in order to identify repeat offenders if detained again. In June the 

recidivism rate was 5.5 percent according to unit data.

The concept of operations had buses escorted from the detainment facility to a release point in Baghdad. A central transportation hub, the Bus Station, was the avenue for released detainees to 

return to their homes. A reception team, to include Vice President 

Hashemi or local leadership officials, spoke with the detainees at

the station to initiate the reintegration 

into the society. All detainees released 

were required to take an oath of allegiance to Iraq, the constitution, and 

foreswear all violence, after which the 

individual was released, generally to 

family members attending the release 

ceremony. The release was acknowledged by the Government of Iraq as an 

important part of due process.

This civic action was a classic 

reintegration program. It was succinct 

and efficient. The difficult part was the

Figure 13. Bus Station, public 

transportation for released 

detainees
62

JSOU Report 07-8

security operation, but the impact was that the Government of Iraq 

was able to demonstrate that the legal system was working and a far 

stretch from how Saddam would release detainees.

Operation Black Light

Operation Black Light commenced after a wave of terrorism hit Baghdad in May. The mission was to validate claims from open sources 

that religious-based killings were occurring. The methodology was 

to track morgue data, relate the findings to ongoing operations, and

determine their effectiveness. With this information, an in-depth 

analysis surfaced ways to mitigate the effects of terrorist activity. 

Moreover, with the official data from the morgue, incorrect information about killings frequently found in the media was exposed. 

Statistics published by the Baghdad Provincial Council indicate 

that terrorists were mainly targeting civilians, a likely cause for unrest 

and decreased stability. The primary terrorist methods were assassination (72 percent), IEDs (15 percent), mortars/rockets (6 percent), 

and car bombs (2 percent). With the exception of assassinations, markets and main streets were where most of the violence occurred. 

Shootings comprised 94 percent of assassinations. Most victims 

were blindfolded and/or hands tied, which suggests execution-style 

murders (49 percent). Of the assassinations, 46 percent were targeted against civilians (rather than military, political, or religious 

leaders), which suggests the purpose was to intimidate.

Car bombs were targeting civilians in popular gathering places, 

such as the market and the main street. These attacks were primarily used to cause instability in a specific area; the focus was to turn

local residents against the police by placing doubt in their minds 

regarding police capabilities. Additionally, police were a primary 

Figure 14. Assassination 

numbers for May 2006 

by type (1,105 total)

Burned: 7, 1%

Shot: 1049, 94%

Eyes Removed: 1, 0%

Beheaded: 6, 1%

Choked: 42, 4%
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Bogart: Block by Block 

target for terrorist shootings. In using car bombs, the terrorists’ main 

tactic was using abandoned vehicles (vs. those of suicide bombers); 

because many such vehicles were in Baghdad, leaving another one 

on the street was not likely to draw attention. Moreover, it is more 

difficult to recruit people willing to die for the cause.

The average time of day for the terrorist activities was between 

0900 and 1200, perhaps because of local residents gathering and 

shopping before the heat of the day. As for IEDs and shootings, most 

patrols started around 0900, and they can only vary their routes a 

finite amount of times.

The MND-B G9 coordinated a secure process of receiving monthly 

reports from the Baghdad central morgue statistics in order to conduct analysis and data verification. The data collected proved valuable in establishing a benchmark for evaluating overall operational 

effectiveness of MND-B and tracking mortality trends due to violence 

and disease. In addition, the information was used to verify related 

data, which was made public, and to document site-visit reports.

The ongoing analysis for Operation Black Light revealed that the 

security situation within MND-B was complex and fluid. Through

September, deaths due to violence reached an all-time high, the 

nine-month total being 12,454. The morgue data suggested that four 

events contributed to the high death toll:

a. February bombing of the Samarra Mosque was the event that 

precipitated the 6-month increase in sectarian violence. 

b. New Iraqi Government emerged in May as a Shi’a-dominated 

organization, leaving the Sunni’s nothing but token power and 

the effect of increasing sectarian activity. The Shi’a-dominated 

Government asserting itself caused a struggle for power. 

Figure 15. Terrorist 

acts for May 2006

by type (1,443 total)

Assassination, Known 

Victims: 614, 43%

Fires: 72, 5%

Mortars, IEDs: 219, 15%

Rockets: 86, 6%

Car Bombs: 

33, 2%

Assassination, Unknown 

Victims: 419, 29%
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JSOU Report 07-8

c. Once the coalition removed Abu Musab Al Zarqawi in June, 

Al Qaeda had reason to demonstrate their ability to operate 

without Zarqawi and began conducting increased sectarian 

operations, compounding the violence. 

d. Operation Together Forward II in August was designed to 

minimize sectarian activity in the focus areas of operation but 

resulted in an unintended consequence of pushing sectarian operators into the outskirts and nonfocus areas around 

Baghdad, thus increasing sectarian activity in these otherwise quiet regions. 

As the death rate dramatically increased, the obsolete equipment, understaffing, and poor operating procedures of the morgue

overwhelmed the facility. The central morgue was designed to hold 

36 sets of remains, six in each of the six refrigerated storage units. 

However, reporting indicated that not all of the storage units functioned, resulting in the original capacity becoming diminished. The 

morgue personnel reported receiving 8,000 bodies over the previous 6 months, an average of 44 bodies a day. The monthly morgue 

reports obtained by MND-B related similar numbers. Most equipment in the morgue was about 30 years old with the exception of 

newer computers and monitors. While reportedly 12 pathologists 

were on staff, many may have been part time. The facility was poorly 

managed, and the workflow was not orderly. Observers speculated

Figure 16. 

IEDs for 

May 2006

by targets 

(219 total)

Main St: 31, 14%

Coalition

 Convoy: 

 40, 18%

IP Patrol: 58, 26%

IA convoy: 8, 4%

Civilian Houses: 14, 6%

Oil Pipeline: 1, 0% Mosque: 5. 2%

Waterline: 2, 1%

Gas Station/Tanker: 2, 1%

Convoy: 1, 0%

IP Checkpoint: 2, 1%

IA Base: 1, 0%

Restaurant/

Bakery: 4, 2%

Worker’s Waiting 

 Station: 2, 1%

Civilians: 31, 14%

Liquor Stores: 3, 1%

Commercial Shops: 9, 4%

Court: 1, 0%

University: 1, 0%

Politician: 3, 1%
65

Bogart: Block by Block 

that the morgue had not been cleaned in years, and no efforts had 

been made to maintain the facility.

Poor management, pressure from sectarian factions to not accurately report the level of violence, inadequate facilities, and under 

staffing affected the accuracy of the monthly central morgue reporting of deaths, resulting in significant under estimates regarding

fatalities. Minor short-term gains in accuracy can be achieved by 

conducting civic-action projects to upgrade and improve the morgue 

operations. Nonetheless, the morgue data was an essential source of 

information to track the effectiveness of ongoing operations that are 

aimed at curtailing sectarian violence. 

Operation Bright Light

The history of Iraq is a history of the nomad. Arabs throughout the 

history of the land have been desert dwellers moving from one wadi 

to the next, looking for water and feed for their livestock. Eventually, nomads moving from the west came upon the Euphrates and 

the Tigris, settling along their banks and building the Iraq we know 

today. However, the sense of the nomad remains and the average 

Iraqi is very mobile. They travel on pilgrimages, for work, to visit 

friends and family, and when they are in danger.

Throughout 2006, MNF-I believed that movement of groups 

of Iraqis from threatened areas was an indicator of civil war. The 

assessment was that in fact it was not an indicator of civil war, but 

displacement was occurring to realign areas by religious affiliation.

It was also an indicator that the Iraqi middle class was fleeing the

country. The MND-B began an exhaustive effort to track and validate 

reports of displaced civilians. The highest numbers that the division 

could validate in Baghdad, Karbala, Babil and Najaf provinces was 

about 54,132. Out of a population base of 11 million, the division 

understood that 0.5 percent of the population was displaced primarily due to security reasons. As a comparison, New York City (which 

has a resident population of 8 million) has about 33,000 homeless 

or 0.4 percent of the population. Regardless, the MND-B took measures to prepare a contingency operation to conduct IDP (Internally 

Displaced Person) management.

During the course of July through September, Shi’a militias and 

political arms moved into Sab Al Bor, north of Baghdad, an area
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JSOU Report 07-8

generally populated by Sunni families. Applying the Hezbollah model, 

the Office of Muqta a Sadr moved on the populace. The template was

to influence the populace with charity, such as schools and clinics,

and move them to the Shi’a side.22 Visible signs of the Sadr movement 

incursion into Sab Al Bor were the posting of Muqta posters throughout the town.

In September, the Sunnis counterattacked. Shi’a pockets were 

mortared, forcing a displacement of some 3,000 Shi’a out of Sab Al 

Bor and into Kadhamiyah. On 7 October, MND-B through the 3rd 

Battalion, 1st Brigade, 6th IA Division confirmed the location of two

IDP camps in Kadhamiyah. Camp 1 in Muhallah 425 (block number) 

had at least 1,200 people, and Camp 2 in Muhallah 427 had 600 

people.

The Kadhamiyah District Advisory Council chair, Sheik Hassan, 

also verified that families had relocated into the area. His basis was

the number of people registering for government allotment coupons, 

kerosene, propane, and food supplements.

The Sab Al Bor displaced persons presented death threat letters 

from the Omar brigade, targeting Shi’a for helping the Army of Muqta 

and the “infidels.” The MND-B mission was to provide HA in order

to mitigate the impact on the beladiyah (borough) of these displaced 

civilians and alleviate any human suffering. Specifically, the MNDB wanted to curtail any further escalation of displacement and as 

accommodations become more cramped, curtail any health issues. 

Operation Bright Light went into the planning phase on 11 

October and was implemented 3 days later. In order to keep the HA 

operation low key, coalition forces maintained minimal visibility and 

maximum support. Support services would be contracted out, and 

the Iraqi Army would be tasked for security and quality control on 

the services provided by the local contractors. Some of the important 

tasks were as follows: 

a. Determine locations and quantities of relief supplies available.

b. Coordinate with the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.

c. Coordinate with the Iraqi Army to distribute HA.

d. Find local contractors to provide and deliver relief supplies 

such as generators, fuel, food, water, bedding, and latrine 

facilities. Additionally, provide milk, baby formula, diapers, 
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Bogart: Block by Block 

and infant/family care items such as toys, soccer balls, and 

school supplies for an estimated 20 percent of the camp population.

e. Coordinate with Brigade Combat Teams to conduct reconnaissance, and atmospherics.

f. Conduct face-to-face engagements with local leaders.

g. Conduct MedOp with tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) 

teams and tactical PSYOP teams support.

The 2/1 AD attended the Kadhamiyah District Advisory Council 

meeting to confirm local government support and visited the two

camps on 10 October. The commander of the 1/4 ID also visited the 

camps. A summary of the conditions follows:

a. Camp 1 had 736 people, and their one drinking water point 

had low pressure. One family lived in each tent, and sanitary 

facilities were minimal, consisting of one small building and 

one lavatory. The immediate needs of Camp 1 were sanitary 

facilities, food, drinking water, kerosene, and blankets. 

b. Camp 2 had 600 to 700 people living and sleeping on the 

floors of the hallways and classrooms. Lavatory facilities were

minimal. The immediate needs of Camp 2 are sanitary facilities, drinking water, food, cots, blankets, and kerosene.

The Iraqi Army and the Kadhamiyah District Advisory Council assembled and delivered relief packages on 14 and 15 October. 

Random checks of the area were scheduled during 16-21 October, 

and 2/1 AD and the 6th IA Division were to conduct a formal survey 

on 22 October. However, after the 1/4 ID commander returned from 

his visit to Kadhamiyah and met with the Sab Al Bor leadership, he 

closed down all civic-action projects in the area due to the attacks 

and the displacement. 

By 18 October, 80 percent of the displaced persons had left the 

camps. By 22 October, Camp 1 was closed and by 28 October, Camp 

2 was closed. The IDPs had returned to Sab Al Bor, the attacks had 

stopped, and it was safe to return. Later the civic-action projects 

restarted.
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JSOU Report 07-8

Operation Austin Light

The purpose of Operation Austin Light was to facilitate communications and cross-talk techniques and procedures for training and 

incident command between various Baghdad first responders. The

City of Austin sent two deputy police chiefs and an assistant fire

chief as trainers for the Rashid and Karhk Baghdad Fire Departments in incident management. 

The focus was establishing incident command and providing 

Iraqi emergency management services with the tools to become selfsustained and the foundation to work toward building a long-term 

capability for responding to emergencies: 

a. Apply technical rescue capability.

b. Establish a perimeter control.

c.	 Suppress fire.

d. Provide incident command structure.

e. Provide secondary device sweep.

f. Establish a triage area.

The results were that representatives of the East and West Baghdad fire departments attended the exercise and left with a better

understanding of the importance of coordinating the various emergency services.

Figure 17. Operation 

Austin Light, 15–16 

October 2006, Adnon 

Palace inside the 

Green Zone, Baghdad. 

Participants included 

the Karkh and Rusafa 

Fire Departments, the 

City of Austin Police 

Department, the City 

of Austin Fire Department, and MND-B. 
69

Bogart: Block by Block 

Operation Holland Light

Student discontent with the government fosters an insurgency. In 

the Global War on Terrorism, radical students have in some cases 

become the Al Qaeda revolutionaries. Educated in madrassas across 

the world, religious students are filled with fundamentalist fervor to

overthrow the apostate governments of the Middle East who have 

aligned with the U.S. Once indoctrinated, the students depart their 

madrassas to conduct jihad, and where they are found are the dead 

spaces. Rural areas provide safe havens for the insurgency. The 

enemy travels to and from the farmlands to the cities and conduct 

their attacks. They seek places in the countryside to hide themselves 

(using the hospitality of the farmer as they move from town to town) 

and weapons (in caches under palm groves and along irrigation 

canals). These are classic insurgent tactics.

In conjunction with the Brigade Combat Teams operating in rural 

areas, MND-B put together several programs to build civil cooperation in order to divulge the location and disposition of anti-Iraqi 

forces and the insurgency. If the enemy uses the agriculture belts for 

his staging bases, how do coalition forces separate the guerrilla from 

the populace?

After his arrival in Iraq, LTC Daniel Holland led the initiative for 

MND-B to establish a rural COIN program. On 18 May, his vehicle struck an IED, and he was killed instantaneously. Operation 

Holland Light was named in his memory and serves as an umbrella 

for the various agriculture development programs designed to win 

the farmers and defeat the enemy. The purpose of the operation was 

as follows:

a. Facilitate the gathering of information from farmers.

b. Execute short duration civic-action projects that have an 

impact on the populace and turn the people against the 

insurgency in order to reveal the enemy’s location, disposition, and intent.

c. Build lasting ties between and foster civil cooperation with 

government officials.

d.	 Enhance the legitimacy and influence of the local and national

governments.

e. Strengthen local and national economies.
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JSOU Report 07-8

To accomplish these tasks, the operation sought to facilitate the 

veterinary, agricultural, and medical efforts in concert with local 

officials. The effort was focused in the Abu Ghraib and Mahmudiyah Qadas areas with the goal of separating the local people from 

insurgency. Civil action was used to create a favorable environment 

in which to support current and anticipated operations and to gain 

trust and confidence of the people for their local and national government. Professionals known as local nationals were employed to 

facilitate the legitimacy and success of the operation.

After LTC Holland’s death, LTCs Diana Brown and Neil Aihle took 

over and put these ideas into action. Several insights were developed 

from their experiences during this operation and others; major initiatives included veterinarian, agricultural, and MedOps:

a. Facilitate vaccination and treatment of animals by local veterinarians with a specific focus of maintaining the food supply

for the populace.

b. Facilitate the clearing of drainage canals, distribution of fertilizer/seed, and standing-up of cooperatives. Cattle farms, 

chicken farms, and fish hatcheries appear to be the most

economically viable agricultural businesses. The cattle are 

a cross breed of a “regular” Iraqi cow and a water buffalo. 

Chicken farms are mostly egg farms, and initial surveys identify that farmers requested veterinary assistance (vaccines 

and animal-husbandry services).

c. Coordinate MedOps with the Ministry of Health—the manning and supplying of medical clinics and hospitals to provide 

basic medical and minor dental care. MedOps are also combined operations where coalition forces treat local nationals 

for basic medical care only. 

Major initiatives involved the agricultural associations (cooperatives) with objectives to improve the economy through the development of farm market forces as well as improve the quality and 

quantity of agricultural produce and products. The intent was to 

foster principles of cooperation and democracy in a hard-to-reach 

segment of the population—farmers.

The economy of Iraq was undergoing transformation to adjust 

to market-oriented reforms and move into the industrial era. The 

involvement of the Iraqi government and parastatals (state enter-
71

Bogart: Block by Block 

prises) in the Iraqi economy has been harmful in many ways. As a 

result, the government and parastatals need to be called upon to 

intervene less and to let markets work. In Iraq and especially the 

Abu Ghraib region, government policy has consisted of approaches 

that resulted in less, rather than more, effective agricultural operations and fostered isolation rather than cooperation in organizational 

structure and function. Farmers and agricultural participants in 

Abu Ghraib simply waited for governmental provision of agricultural 

products, then sold back all excess product to the government at a 

fixed price. Under this system, no cooperative organizations were

ever created and genuine participation in a cooperative sense never 

occurred. As a result, members of the farming communities have, 

in many cases, become alienated from issues that should be within 

their control and from having influence on issues that should be of

direct concern to them, such as the marketing and pricing of their 

own products.

The potential of genuine cooperative organizations to contribute 

to rural development based on popular participation has, to a large 

extent, been wasted. The very concept of cooperative self-help has 

been ignored or fallen into disrepute. Thus in Iraq, a review of policy 

concerning cooperatives was needed. The revised approach was 

based on the principles of individual participation and consultancy 

rather than governmental intervention. Existing policies need not be 

completely abandoned, however. In many cases, they can be adapted 

to suit a more participative and market-oriented approach. 

During the time of Operation Holland Light, Iraqi farm income 

was projected at a $16.5 million annual loss. This calculation was 

primarily from lost productivity 

and lost local economic stimulus 

from associated activities as well as 

through direct farm-market commodity devaluation. Losses caused 

by a lack of development include 

inhibition to developing democratic 

principles, self-reliance, and selfsufficiency that cannot be measured in dollar value alone. The 

record however, clearly reflects that Figure 18. Sheep-dip tanks
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JSOU Report 07-8

specific policies provided the seedbed to sow hatred and cultivate terrorist ideologies: isolation rather than cooperation and governmental dependency rather than independence combined with theocratic 

ideologies.

Encouraging agricultural cooperatives involved providing extension trainers to assist farmers with farm-market information. In 

addition, sheep-dip tanks placed in conjunction with agricultural coops contributed to parasite control and helped to improve meat and 

wool quality and quantity. 

The plan also called for engaging the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture for administration and inspections of slaughterhouses as a steady source of safe and reliable meat for the local 

populace. A general food safety campaign was developed to install 

confidence in government institutions, employ people, and save lives.

Additional facets of the program included a seed-purchase program 

and a revitalization of the poultry industry. In addition the operation 

sought to improve the capability of the Abu Ghraib Hospital, which 

had antiquated and marginal equipment and no maintenance-support program. At the time of this report, activities were underway 

to work with the Ministry of Health to improve services, equipment, 

medical stores, and staff. 

By July, the religious violence had intensified to an alarming level. Sunni on Shi’a attacks had increased to the point that 

the focus of MND-B operations was interdicting the religious strife. 

Operation Together Forward II went into action. Using a “clear-buildhold” methodology, U.S. and Iraqi forces began a systematic operation to protect the populace “block by block.” Chapter 6 takes a closer 

look at Operation Together Forward II, specifically the “build” phase

designed to clean up and restore essential services and governance 

to large sections of Baghdad.
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Bogart: Block by Block 

6. A Closer Look—Building Essential 

Services in Operation Together Forward II

I

n July, leaders decided that a new operation was needed in 

Baghdad to restore security and win the trust and confidence

of its people. Coalition and Iraqi security forces began Operation Together Forward II in early August in coordination with the 

Government of Iraq, the Baghdad Provincial Council, the City of 

Baghdad (Amanat), and District and Neighborhood Advisory Councils. Substantial progress was made in providing essential services 

to meet the basic needs of 495,000 people in the focus areas. The 

effort added “build” within the clear, hold, and protect methodology 

for COIN operations. 

The operation was carried out in three phases: clear, build, and 

hold. The 172 Stryker BCT established security in an objective area 

and conducted clearing operations for 4 days. Immediately after the 

clear phase, 2/1 AD, 1/4 ID, and 506 RCT began the build phase 

where trash pickup and essential service assessments were the initial big push. Once those operations were in order, the three units 

moved into the hold phase to work with the local government in 

establishing routines and continuous work, projects, and improvement in the neighborhoods.

The Plan

The civic-action plan conducted during Operation Together Forward 

II centered around three types of projects:

a. High impact/short duration was defined as civic action that

takes from 1 to 90 days to complete. For Operation Together 

Forward II, the focus was on 7-day duration civic actions, 

specifically involving civic cleanup, civilian MedOps, building

civil service, and improving public utilities. These projects are 

items that build the local government’s ability to protect and 

provide for their citizens. They also reduce or remove leading 

causes of instability (i.e., electricity, medical, lack of governance, and trash). MND-B had direct management responsibility for these actions. 
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JSOU Report 07-8

b. Mid-term stability was defined as civic action that would take

between 90 to 180 days to complete and provide opportunities 

for future employment and include major war-damage rubble 

removal. These projects strengthen the local government’s 

ability to provide for its citizens and expand their capabilities 

through development of ongoing and new civic actions. Here, 

MND-B took direct action with reinforcing support from other 

organizations.

c. Long-term/economic development involved civic action that 

lasts between 180 days to 3 years. For Operation Together 

Forward II, the focus was to revitalize the industrial base 

for market growth that would generate employment in and 

around the hot zones. Long-term/economic development 

ensures the local government can sustain and increase their 

capabilities and enable the local citizens to have a future that 

includes safety, economic security, and prosperity. The MNDB supported these activities with in-depth action provided by 

other organizations.

Sequencing the civic-action program was critical. The civic-action 

sequence of events for Operation Together Forward II aimed at stabilizing objective areas after strike operations. This involved cordonand-search operations and civic-action projects that encompassed 

the fields of public administration, utilities, health, and safety. The

critical tasks included the following:

a.	 Improve local government by staffing, training, and equipping the District Advisory Council(s).

b. Provide, improve, and upgrade the electrical services and 

consumer fuel distribution.

c. Conduct Civil MedOps (visiting doctors) for basic medical 

care to the citizens.

d.	 Initiate trash and debris removal, traffic control measures,

and passive security.

The civic-action projects were designed to flow through the following cycle: assessments, security, and resources. Each Brigade 

Combat Team conducted initial surveys of their respective area of 

responsibility. The initial survey determined the immediate quality 

of life needs (i.e., food, water, utilities, and medical) that are required 

to bring the local population to a sense of “normalcy” as quickly as 
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Bogart: Block by Block 

possible. The focus of the surveys was power substations and distribution points, water treatment facilities, sewage collection and treatment points, phone distribution centers, and cellular towers. 

Security for the workforce became paramount. Throughout the 

sequence of events, security for the local nationals performing the 

contract work, as well as for coalition forces personnel, became 

increasingly important to preempt and prevent worker harassments 

and death threats. As Operation Together Forward II progressed, so 

did the intimidation. At one point, a work stoppage had occurred and 

an Iraqi Police battalion provided additional security.

Contracting for Labor

Numerous resource requirements were established during the 

planning phase that included internal and external needs. These 

resources were sourced prior to commencing operations. The goal 

was to use local contractors to the maximum extent possible with an 

emphasis on neighborhood or beladiyah-based contractors. Bringing laborers from outside a neighborhood sometimes had negative 

consequences such as intimidation and attacks against the workers. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers kept complaining that security problems (i.e., worker intimidation) were putting 

completion of the R3 Water Treatment Plant off schedule. The Corps 

was employing Sunnis from the Karkh side of Baghdad for the R3, 

which was located in a Shi’a area, adjoining Sadr City. The working 

intimidation was directly due to Sunnis imported to work in a Shi’a 

backyard.

For those Brigade Combat Teams that could not find contractors

locally, MND-B found backup contractors to support the teams as 

needed. Some of the resource requirements follow:

a. Trash contractors to clean up/remove trash and debris to 

include damage created from previous operations

b. Electrical contractors for electrical wiring upgrade/repair/

replacement

c. Water and sewer contractors for emergency repairs

d.	 General contractors for traffic control measures (i.e., stop

signs, street lights, and security cameras)

e.	 General contractors to fix/refurbish a maximum of four fuel

stations in each Muhallah and to provide dedicated fuels 
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JSOU Report 07-8

(e.g., benzene, liquid petroleum gas, and kerosene) delivery/

distribution for each station to become fully functional

f. Technical assistance teams to provide quality assurance and 

quality control of all CERP projects in the area of responsibility.

In addition to civic-action projects, Operation Together Forward II 

fully engaged and involved the local governments for activities in the 

objective areas. This empowerment strategy helped build local government. By involving the Neighborhood Advisory Councils (NACs) 

and District Advisory Councils 

(DACs) in the project nomination 

and community interface, the populace saw that the projects were 

directly tied to these local leaders. Consequently, the provincial 

government (especially the city) 

began interacting with the DACs 

and NACs to synchronize local 

civic action with city-wide projects. 

Such was the case in Adhamiyah with Sheik Hassan, the DAC chair, 

who with LTC Hall and the Ministry of Electricity revamped 34 transformers and began to restring wire in an area that had not been supplied with power for 4 months.

The Need for Security

Engaging the local government and the members of the communities has always been a civic-action task. During Operation Together 

Forward II, coalition forces ran into many problems of government 

officials not following through or showing up for meetings. In Ghazaliyah, Ameriyah, and Shulla, the main problem was always security. 

Workers did not want to come to work for fear of being killed. Government officials were kidnapped, murdered, and threatened when

they were seen working with coalition forces, and even the beladiyah 

designated the areas as “red” zones and would not conduct repairs 

in the communities. Conversely, in Adhamiyah and Sha’ab/Ur, no 

problems existed with contractors showing up to work; they were 

Figure 19. Typical Electric Grid infrastructure in Baghdad
77

Bogart: Block by Block 

actually able to employ on average 450 workers a day over a 3-week 

period, including Friday prayer day. 

The focus of projects varied between the areas. 4/4 ID maintained a focus on sewage and water, while 506 RCT focused on HA 

and electrical problems. 2/1 AD worked on long-term projects and 

establishment of government services such as regular trash pickup, 

bank, and Iraqi Police station openings as well as long-term sewage 

repairs. Each area’s first task was to clean up trash, and each unit

was successful with the initial effort. While difficult to change a

mind-set, the units worked with local nationals to set a standard of 

cleanliness and to establish regular pickup as well as systems for 

removal.

Operation Together Forward II created short-term jobs that supplemented many of the families’ incomes. With the school year underway, many of the schools were open, and the children were attending 

classes. The hope was that the security concerns would not increase 

because the coalition forces were in the area consistently. The markets were opening again, and good dialogue began between the coalition forces and the local governments. Not everything was good news 

in the objective areas, however. Many trash piles still existed, longterm jobs not yet established, and many of the essential services 

were still lacking due to contractors not working, the Ministry of 

Interior not providing maintenance, and many local nationals still 

living in fear. What follows are outlines of some of the projects in the 

objective areas: Doura and Risala; Adhamiyah and Sha’ab/Ur; and 

Ameriyah, Ghazaliyah, and Shulla/Nur.

Figure 20. Local nationals employed for trash removal or civic cleanup projects
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JSOU Report 07-8

The 4/4 ID Area of Operations: Doura and Risala

Operation Together Forward II started with clearing in Doura (August), 

Of the 9,082 homes searched, 92 doors, 192 locks, and 58 windows 

were replaced within 48 hours because broken or damaged during 

the clearing phase. The immediate action taken during the next phase 

was trash cleanup. Its impact on the people was evidenced by the 

increased activity in the Doura Market, which included the opening 

of new shops and vendors. Doura residents began to consolidate their 

trash to make it easier for the contractors to pick it up and keep the 

area clean, thereby demonstrating a sense of pride and commitment.

Coalition forces also worked with the Iraqi Army to distribute HA 

items to local nationals. Over 3,000 “meals in a box” and water were 

distributed throughout Doura and Risala. Waterline breaks were also 

repaired in Muhallahs 822, 824, and 826; and a large water-network 

renovation project occurred in Muhallahs 824, 826, 842, 804, 806, 

and 808. 

In August, September, and October, MND-B employed 15,224 

resident and nonresident workers for trash collection, sewer contracts, and general electrical work. The average number of daily 

workers in the Doura beladiyah totaled 146; in Risala, the number 

was 171. Workers removed 67,902 cubic meters of trash between 26 

August and 31 October.

By November, the following projects were either ongoing or projected:

a. Repair Muhallahs 850 and 860 sewer network and the 824, 

which collapsed due to overuse and lack of power and maintenance

b. Improve the Al I’ilam, Al Salam, Tahaddi, and Hadar primary 

health-care clinics and the Aka School grounds

Figure 21. Muhallah 

826 Mechanix Street 

cleanup, before and after
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Bogart: Block by Block 

c. Improve and repair the Muhallahs 883, 885, and 843 electrical network; New Amel 11-kilovolt electrical feeder; and 

Muhallah 879 11-kilovolt electrical feeders

d. Repair Sewer-Pump Station TC3 and Muhallah 861 sewer 

and water

e. Add street lights on major roads and the Doura Market to 

provide better security

f. Repair (via Army Corps of Engineers) two gas stations to 

improve efficiency and effectiveness at fuel stations and deny

a sanctuary for the enemy.

Night letters were an indication that COIN operations were succeeding. The basis was that the enemy leadership had determined 

the populace was moving away from their influence and toward that

of the Government of Iraq forces. The night-letter translation that 

follows demonstrated that a COIN was fought for control of the populace, not terrain, and the center of gravity is the people. MND-B 

patrol found the letter in Doura, and the G9 section translated.

In the name of God the most merciful

Thanks God and peace be upon Mohammed:

Lately we have come to know that Mujahideen had received 

money from contractors in order to allow them conducting 

their works such as trash cleaning or constructing...etc.

and we say thanks God we have not received any money 

from any contractor and whomever says so is a liar and 

soon will have his fate decided.

Figure 22. The Doura beladiyah (with vehicle) and marketplace (with metal frames)
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JSOU Report 07-8

On the other hand, some hypocrites who call themselves as 

Mujahideen, they cheat people in this regard in giving warranty to the contractors, we shall let them regret, God willing. We do know them and we do not want to name them.

Last, the high committee of Mujahideen in Doura has 

decided refraining all works that run by contractors like 

trash cleaning which is under the supervision of DAC or 

Baghdad Municipality or contractors. We warn all who are 

working in this channel; supervisor or worker...etc. has to 

quit working otherwise he shall be our target; he either will 

be killed or kidnapped.

And we warn all Lorries, machine drivers from working with 

those people.

The invaders said through their media we will clean up 

Doura from trashes and terrorists and what they meant by 

terrorists is Mujahideen. Thus, Ya...Doura bravest do you 

accept this thing...we say to the Americans our sons will not 

work with you in this job and we order you the disbelievers, 

the invaders to clean up our neighborhood from trashes and 

we will clean it from the invaders, the sons of monkeys and 

pigs and sons of Iranians and God is making the believers 

the conquerors and he is good judger.

We repeat our warning once more to those who are working with contractors except (Potable water and Sewer) have 

to stop working right now otherwise, their fate is in doubt 

and will be sorry and God is our witness...and we will make 

them as a sample for the rest who do not take lessons.

God we have told and be our witness...and everybody

should pass to the nonattendance God is Greatest...God is

Greatest....God is Greatest

And the pride for God, his prophet and believers.

The 506 RCT/101 AASLT Area of Operations: Adhamiyah and 

Sha’ab/Ur

After clearing the buildings in each area, the initial effort was toward 

trash cleanup in the Adhamiyah and Sha’ab/Ur. Next, the power 

grids were addressed, ensuring that residents of each area would 
81

Bogart: Block by Block 

have power a minimum of 4 hours a day. Generator distribution to 

the NAC and DAC assisted the residents and contractors with supplying power during the down hours of prime power. 

Table 5 summarizes activities accomplished in Adhamiyah and 

Sha’ab/Ur.

Table 5. Results of Civil-Action Activities

City Activities

Adhamiyah Cleared 11,659 buildings and replaced 1,203 doors, 1,260 locks, 

and 42 windows. 

Employed 18,827 resident and nonresident workers for trash 

collection, sewer contracts, and general electrical work in 

August, September, and October.

Conducted three MedOps, treating 450 civilians (65 men, 157 

women, 185 children, and 43 infants).

Removed 47,511 cubic meters of trash between 26 August and 

31 October.

Delivered fifty 5-kilovolt generators.

Distributed one hundred fifty 3-kilovolt generators to schools, 

the DAC, NAC, and businesses.

Emplaced twenty 50-kilovolt generators in Muhallahs 308, 310, 

and 312.

Repaired water/sewer breaks in Muhallahs 302, 312, 314, and 

316.

Transitioned responsibility for trash-collection services to the 

beladiyah on 10 October

Figure 23. Muhallah 316, before (30 August) and after (6 September)
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JSOU Report 07-8

City Activities

Sha’ab/Ur Removed 34,800 cubic meters of trash in September and 

October.

Employed 1,900 local workers for the cleanup.

Conducted three MedOps, treating 628 civilians (184 men, 221 

women, 176 children, 47 infants) with typical ailments being 

abrasions, headaches, stomach aches, diarrhea, and infections.

Distributed clothing and toys to local nationals.

Cleared 36,835 buildings and replaced 480 doors, 862 locks, 

and 8 windows.

Distributed one hundred thirty 5-kilovolt generators to the 

NAC. 

Distributed 3,970 HA meals and 2,000 school-supply packages.

Delivered sixty five 5-kv generators to Ur NAC for distribution to schools and businesses on 8 October.

Examples of planned projects in Sha’ab/Ur and Adhamiyah 

included work on sewage pumps at lift stations, rehabilitation of the 

storm water network, and working with the Ministry of Health to 

provide supplies to public health clinics. 

The 2/1 AD Area of Operations: Ameriyah, Ghazaliyah, and 

Shulla/Nur 

After clearing the buildings in each area, the initial effort was toward 

the trash cleanup, CM, and HA in Ameriyah, Ghazaliyah and Shulla. 

Long-term projects of fixing sewage and reducing IED threats were

Table 5. Results of Civil-Action Activities (continued)

Figure 24. U.S. 

and Iraqi forces 

ongoing repair of 

major sewer and 

water point breaks in 

Sha’ab/Ur districts 

of Baghdad
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Bogart: Block by Block 

additional requirements within the neighborhoods. In the beginning 

of October, the NAC and DAC in Ghazaliyah began distributing 50 

generators provided by coalition forces to local schools. Ameriyah was 

trying to reopen the Rafaidan bank that was closed due to a robbery 

in July. The Ministry of Finance acknowledged the need to reopen it 

but would not agree until security was no longer a problem. 

Contractors did not want to work for fear of being shot or kidnapped. For example, four contractors were shot over the duration of 

Operation Together Forward II, and two front-end loaders were blown 

up and destroyed. The beladiyah and Amanat people were not willing 

to conduct their own projects and fix ailments within Ameriyah due

to their area being designated a Red Zone because of security. Haji 

Aiyed, the most involved Ameriyah NAC chairman, was murdered 

in front of his family while shopping for HA in support of Ameriyah 

families during Operation Together Forward II. 

The NACs in all three neighborhoods increased their willingness 

to get involved by working with the combined force on a regular basis. 

However, many times coalition forces had to push them to work with 

each other as well as deter militias and violence within their neighborhoods. A summary of results follows:

a. Cleared 39,307 buildings in Ameriyah, Ghazaliyah, and 

Shulla. 

b. Employed 10,655 resident and nonresident workers for trash 

collection and CM between 15 August and 1 November.

c. Conducted three combined MedOps, treating 979 civilians 

(226 men, 368 women, 364 children, and 21 infants).

d. Removed 58,083 m3 of trash between 26 August and 31 October.

e.	 Distributed fifty 3-kilovolt generators to schools (provided by

coalition forces but distributed by the Ghazaliyah and Shulla 

NAC in order to promote the government system).

f. Transitioned responsibility for trash collection services in 

Ameriyah to the beladiyah in October.

g. Commenced USAID-funded vocational training 2 October in 

Shulla for 250 students with coalition forces working with 

USAID and the NAC for job placement for trainees.

Examples of other projects planned for Ameriyah, Ghazaliyah, 

and Shulla/Nur included the restoration of several gas stations in 
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the objective area. Restoration was needed to decrease the amount of 

hours local nationals waited to receive their gas and help the owners 

regulate the traffic flow and address security concerns. Four new

schools and refurbishment of 10 primary schools were scheduled. 

Efforts were underway to introduce the regular use of commercial 

dumpsters and residential trash bins. About 200 were purchased for 

Ameriyah, and USAID funded the purchase of dumpsters and trash 

bins for Ghazaliyah and Shulla. The bins and dumpsters were part 

of a working project with the beladiyah to help improve regular trash 

pickups as well as promote the use of bins rather than fields and

streets within the neighborhoods.

Results of Operation Together Forward II

The $8.9 million civic-action program added the “build” within the 

clear, hold, and protect methodology for COIN operations. The results 

of the civic action follow:

a. Removed in excess of 221,300 cubic meters of trash from the 

streets of Baghdad.

b. Employed an average of 1,980 workers a day (59,326 total 

man-days) as of 1 November 2006.

c. Reduced unemployment by 4 percent Baghdad wide, which 

gained about 62,000 new jobs across the city.

d. Treated about 2,200 men, women, and children.

e. Began the electric grid and sewer rehabilitation for an estimated 495,000 Baghdad residents.

f. Built local government by empowering District and Nahia 

Council chairs and leaders with authority, gained from providing their citizens with essential services funded through 

the CERP.

g. Reestablished the University of Baghdad’s technical assistance teams through a $2.1 million contract to employ 

upwards of 182 professors and students for conducting surveys, engineering assessments, and quality control/quality 

assurance of Baghdad CERP projects.

h. Established a comprehensive CM operation (Operation Strong 

Will) formulated in response to the 22 February Samarra 

Mosque bombing. The CM involved 15 HA and 15 construction 
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packages—prepacked bundles designed to provide immediate 

relief per pack for 100 individuals and light repair to 20 to 

30 houses, direct access to the East and West Baghdad Fire 

Departments, and a comprehensive catalogue of 1,300 Sunni 

and Shi’a mosques in Baghdad.

i. Provided critical strategic synchronization for interagency 

operations that enabled the fusing of the economics, governance, and security lines of operations in the center of gravity 

through the allocation of two Civil Affairs companies to the 

Baghdad and Babil provincial reconstruction teams.

j. Established the Joint Planning Commission, an interagency, 

multiorganization synchronization board to coordinate $2.2 

billion in reconstruction projects in the MND-B area of 

responsibility.

A key lesson from the operation was the imperative that civic 

action must follow strike operations. Such civic action must encompass public administration, public health, public safety, and public 

utilities. While units can identify local trash, electrical, water, and 

sewer emergency repairs, having general contractors do the work 

gets locals involved and provides jobs.

Continued initiatives are needed to keep up the momentum of 

Operation Together Forward and similar operations. The Government Service Office program is necessary to provide basic training

for those administrative personnel that support government services. Iraq’s government offices do not have trained staffs to operate

offices efficiently. A prime example is traffic tickets. Are laws clearly

written? What are the penalties for violators? Is there a fine? How do

police write tickets? If the police write a ticket, where does the recipient pay it? Who processes the information to keep track of it? 

Working through the University of Baghdad, a National Teachers’ 

Corps is needed to establish a program to accredit all levels of teachers. Included in this package should be graduating teachers’ salaries 

and job placement. Another required initiative is the National Library, 

with the recommended location being the University of Baghdad. Its 

design would restore Baghdad to its history of being a center for 

culture and knowledge. A new facility could serve as the national 

archives for the Government of Iraq, and it would give Iraqis a great 

sense of pride.
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Another project is the revitalization of the Army Canal on the east 

side of Baghdad. Because Iraqis take great pride in parks, this project will turn a long stretch of ugliness into a beautiful walkway and 

waterway lined with trees. It will be an area where families can enjoy 

the day or simply go for a walk. These projects and other long-term 

initiatives have the potential to turn Baghdad into a livable city that 

will one day be a major center for the Middle East.
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7. Conclusions and Insights

All they saw before was American patrols...up and down 

the main streets. Now we’ve got American patrols out 

there with the Iraqi Army. And we’ve got garbage trucks 

out here and workers from Amariya picking up garbage. 

It gave them a sense of security that things are a little 

better.

— LTC Gian Gentile 

The Battle of Baghdad was fought and continues using a combination of strike operations and civic action. The enemy 

morphed constantly over the course of 2006, but what we 

found was the emergence of a hidden enemy that surfaced when the 

time was appropriate. A variety of undercurrents were present:

a.	 Ebb and flow from the formation of an Islamic state to the

establishment of a democratic republic of Iraq

b. Pro-western versus traditionalism

c. Sunni versus Shi’a to regain control of Baghdad.

Persian against Arab, or Al Qaeda and Sunni extremist against Shi’a 

Ayatollah and militia, regardless of the enemy situation or force, the 

civic-action plan sought to stabilize the 75 to 80 percent of the population who were the focus of the fight.

The MND-B civic-action program started reversing 30 years of 

neglect when Saddam Hussein tyrannized Iraq. During that time, 

the wealth of Iraq was spent on weapons and war instead of caring 

for the citizens or maintaining the infrastructure and improving the 

quality of life for the ordinary citizen. Without the capital improvements to the society, MND-B faced significant infrastructure challenges to repair and restore in the MND-B area of responsibility, 

everything ranging from road repair to revitalization of the decrepit 

electric power grid to refurbishing schools.

The civic-action program assisted in improving the quality of life 

for the villages, towns, and neighborhoods of Baghdad city and the 

surrounding districts, which involved $138 million total obligation 

for fiscal year 2006, with $75 million as the obligation target for

fiscal year 2007. At the transition of authority, the 1,044 projects

underway spanned nine categories; see Table 6.
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Table 6. Civil-Action Program Overview, Accomplishments

Category Percent Synopsis

Water/sewer 14 146 projects, including 13 sewage pump stations, 19 water treatment plants, 6 compact 

water units, 26 sewer and water main breaks, 

replacement of 25 kilometers of water pipe, 

overhaul of canal cleaning, potable water delivery, and water distribution for 38 city blocks

Electric 10 107 electric network, grid rehabilitations, and 

power generations projects

Education 13 140 projects to include the renovation of 5.5 

percent of Baghdad’s 93 (of 170) schools and 

upgrading facilities for 111 elementary schools 

(310,800 students)

HA/MedOps 7 71 operations or projects

Health care 5 57 MedOps, including 21 hospital and clinic 

renovations

Civic cleanup 10 102 projects that removed about 260,000 cubic 

meters of trash and rubble

Transportation 14 145 primary and secondary roads repaired or 

paved, as well as sidewalk and curb repair/construction and bridge construction

Telecommunications, 

law/governance, 

economics/

finance, 

agriculture/

irrigation, food 

distribution

9 37 agriculture projects that helped farmers 

across Baghdad, Karbala, Babil, and Najaf provinces

14 Qada, District, and Nahia Councils building 

renovations

38 local government support and sustainment 

programs

During peak employment, provided jobs and 

job opportunities for 53,908 local nationals 

(22,491 with CERP, 29,168 reduced unemployment, and 2,249 for Operation Together 

Forward II)

Other 18 187 projects—e.g., veterinarian operations, 

HA, school supplies, gas station repair, and CM

The solution in Iraq involves developing a fully resourced Internal 

Defense and Development (IDAD) plan of action. It would be a full 

interagency effort to bring all the elements of U.S. national power 

into play. The effort would be assisting the Government of Iraq and 

the Iraqi people in modernizing their country through the revitalization of their public administration or civil service, public health 
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system, public safety, and public utilities. As advised by Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign 

Internal Defense (FID), 30 April 2004: 

The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a 

nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The strategy focuses 

on building viable political, economic, military, and social 

institutions that respond to the needs of society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent an insurgency or other forms 

of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating 

the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt 

violence. The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is ideally a preemptive 

strategy; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or 

other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to 

combat that threat. 

With this writing the battle for Baghdad continues apace with 

many challenges for the ground troops. As military and civilian planners look ahead, they will need to address the causes of instability 

listed in Table 7. 

Table 7. Baghdad Specific Civic Action

Cause of Instability Civic Action to Remove or Reduce

Concern for being a victim of indiscriminate firing by American soldiersEnforce disciplined adherence to 

rules of engagement, good fire-control measures, sighted in weapons

Feeling unsafe from attacks Conduct security operations with 

vetted Iraqi forces, Army in active 

overwatch, police on the beat

Desire for Islamic nation, one that is 

built on a community of the faithful 

within Islam

Public-information campaign on 

tolerance and treating each other 

as one would want to be treated 

themselves

Unstable electricity—wants free 

service optimally, but will pay for 

24-hour electricity; requires an even 

distribution of power

Revitalize beladiyah electric networks, along the Adhamiyah model

Ongoing car bombings and other 

insurgent attacks

Mobile checkpoints, none fixed along 

the 7 main and 20 secondary roads 

into and out of Baghdad city
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Cause of Instability Civic Action to Remove or Reduce

Wanting respect from American 

forces

Add to the rules of engagement the 

standards of conduct to local nationals, with equal opportunity advisors 

as teachers/battle trackers

Closed universities, colleges, and 

schools; wanting them open with a 

tolerant syllabus, not fundamentalist

Focus on renovations, build a Baghdad University Teachers Corps, and 

teach tolerance and science

Iraq oil industry not self-sufficient 

throughout, thereby unable to generate revenues for the citizens

Focus reconstruction efforts on 

revamping the oil infrastructure first

Desire for honorable employment—more of a technical nature 

and white-collar perspective; wanting 

dirty work done by others

Create an Iraqi Job Corps to teach 

technical jobs, reinstate the civil service, train teachers, and hire thirdcountry nationals as laborers

View of American forces as occupiers, not as liberatorsPublic-information campaign on how 

the coalition is assisting the citizens 

of Baghdad

Lack of local medical care if they are 

caught up in any violence

Pressure the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers to finish the primary 

health-care clinics and move completion to a priority behind grid revitalization

American arrogance (vs. assistance) Embed Iraqi media with U.S. and Iraqi 

forces and personalize the American 

soldier to Baghdad citizens

Ongoing kidnapping and robberies Place Iraqi Police on the beat, 24 

hours a day, and a 911 system per 

beladiyah under a DAC security 

coordinator

Trash accumulation, dirty streets, and 

streetlights not working

Remove trash, transition contracts 

for U.S. control to DAC control, 

institute a service fee per household

Lack of communication from the 

Americans—want to know what is 

going on with security and infrastructure development

Hold a weekly TV and radio talk 

show, with a focus per belayditah to 

provide the citizens access to coalition forces

Lack of clean water in the homes No new starts—complete all ongoing 

CERP projects pertaining to infrastructure and place a 3-year service 

contract on all

Table 7. Baghdad Specific Civic Action (continued)
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Cause of Instability Civic Action to Remove or Reduce

Desire for relaxing environments for 

families

Give the lead to the City of Baghdad 

for soccer field, parks, and outdoor 

amusement projects

Desire for a national identity Baghdad-identity public-information 

campaign that recounts the glory of 

the past, the promise of the future

The final insight for civic action centers on the three driving principles: simplicity, results, and focus. MND-B was effective in keeping 

the civic-action program simple. Upon receiving direction from higher 

headquarters to embark on complex Baghdad-wide infrastructure 

development programs, which by U.S. standards was complex and 

by Iraqi reality impossible, we stayed with basic local needs. 

By keeping efforts simple, results are achieved. In Iraq the populace is in Maslov’s basement, and the focus is on the basic needs 

of the populace. To win the trust and confidence of the populace,

you simply have to produce. Promises made must be kept. One who 

walks into a neighborhood and promises to fix all the problems and

then not deliver is viewed as just another good-hearted American 

who cannot produce. 

The principle of focus is pinnacle to the success of civic action—

that is, analyze what the people need, not what we want to give them. 

Focus on their standards, then on many short-term civic-action projects spread over a wide area, not one major project spread over a 

long term. Also focus on areas in need. By doing so, the battle can be 

won by applying civic action, block-by-block.

Table 7. Baghdad Specific Civic Action (continued)

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Endnotes

1. Mujahideen (the Arabic literally meaning “strugglers”) is a term for 

Muslims fighting in a war or involved in any other struggle. Mujahid

and its plural, mujahideen, come from the same Arabic root as jihad

(“struggle”). The word is the plural form as literally translated from 

Arabic meaning “struggler.” In Islamic scripture, the status of mujahid

is unequal to qaid—one who does not join the jihad. Available from 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujahideen (accessed July 2007).

	 2.	 The Joint Staff, 23 February 2007 briefing on Countering Ideological

Support for Terrorism.

3. Tim Green, The Red Zone (New York: Warner Books, 1998).

4. Ian Frazier, “Invaders, Destroying Baghdad,” The New Yorker, 25 April 

2005. 

5. Roger J. Spiller, Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century’s End

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC Press, 2001). 

6. Adrian Bogart, One Valley at a Time, JSOU Report 06-6 (Hurlburt 

Field, FL, August 2006), pp. 19-22 and 24-26.

7. Under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, Iraq was formally made a Class A mandate entrusted to Britain. The award was 

completed on 25 April 1920 at the San Remo Conference in Italy. As 

news of the mandate reached Iraq in late May, a group of Iraqi delegates met with the British administrator and demanded independence. Wilson dismissed them as a “handful of ungrateful politicians.” 

During the Holy Month (Ramadan), joint Sunni-Shi’a meetings were 

held appealing for unity against the British. On 30 June 1920, insurrection against the British erupted in Iraq. Over the next 6 months, 

the British lost 1,654 men and spent six times as much as they had 

spent on the entire wartime campaign in the Middle East.

8. Quote is from the poem “To a Louse” by Robert Burns.

9. See www.terrorism-news.blogspot.com/2005_10_02_archive.html 

(accessed 31 August 2007). 

10. Ellen Knickmeyer, “Baghdad Neighborhoods Hopes Dimmed by the 

Trials of War,” Washington Post, 27 September 2005, p. 1.

	 11.	 Kuffar, pl. Kaffir—person who refuses to submit himself to Allah (God),

a disbeliever in God.

12. See http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=908368152252752624

2 (accessed 31 August 2007).

13. Iraqi Advisor Task Force (IQATF) local national advisors (LNAs), October 2006
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14. See www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4575, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (accessed 31 August 2007). 

15. In western terms, reconcile is to resolve differences, but in Iraq, it is to 

define tribal and religious areas of control.

16. CPAC report—Surprise Passage of the Federal Region Formation Law 

by John Houston and Hussam Al Odeh, cultural and political advisors, 11 October 2006.

17. Joint Publication 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 15 August 2001.

18. The Iraqi society is nomadic. The movement of civilians across the 

country is normal and not an indicator of civil war, as would be construed in a western construct.

19. The term reconstruction is a gross misnomer because used to cite 

repair, rebuild, or replace damage created by war. The U.S. prided itself 

on limited war damage. A testimonial is seeing the Special Republican 

Guards complex leveled in April 2003, but the mosque next to it without even dust. By the end of 2006, however, the destroyed building 

was still not rebuilt. Reconstruction really meant infrastructure development.

20. For the 16 governmental functions, see FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, February 2000. 

21. Ellen Knickmeyer, “U.S. Plan to Build Iraq Clinics Falters, Contractor Will Try to Finish” Washington Post Foreign Service 3 April 2006, 

p. A01; available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2006/04/02/AR2006040201209.html (accessed 13 August 

2007). 

22. The schools, clinics, and projects that Sadr would cite as his contribution to the local community were in fact civic-action projects from 

Multi-National Division, Baghad. Likewise was the case with Sunni 

leaders such as Saed Janabi who claimed that the cleanup and neighborhood revitalization of Doura was his ‘political’ effort (interview 

during Ramadan at the Deputy Commanding General, Support visit).
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