Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB, FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

This monograph is the third of three volumes that follow from an 

August 2016 JSOU symposium, Theory of Special Operations. This 

compendium of articles is not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of special operations theory. Rather, it is intended to continue the 

conversation and, at least, bring to a culminating point the argument 

over whether a theory of special operations is necessary and if the 

suggestions are suitable, feasible, and acceptable. The editors of this 

compendium, JSOU resident senior fellows, highlight opposing views 

and conclude with an academic, joint special operations perspective 

on the status of the theory argument. No matter where you stand on 

the subject, this is worth your time and consideration.

ISBN 978-1-941715-25-3

Special Operations Theory 

Edited by Peter McCabe and Paul Lieber

Foreword by Professor Colin S. Gray

JSOU Report 17-6

JSOU Report 17-6 Special Operations Theory 

Volume Three of a Three-Part Theory Series
Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where efforts center upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Francis X. Reidy, Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Cindy Snyder, B.A., Mass Communications/Journalism, Assistant JSOU Press Editor

Resident Senior Fellows

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Command Historian, CANSOFCOM Education 

and Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 

Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow
JSOU Report 17-6

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2017

Special Operations Theory

Foreword by Professor Colin S. Gray

Essays by

Charles Cleveland 

David Baratto 

Robert G. Spulak Jr. 

Bernd Horn 

Travis Homiak 

Kurt E. Müller

Tom Searle 

Emily Spencer 

James Kiras 

Francisco R. Wong-Diaz, Esq. 

Harry (Rich) Yarger 

Peter McCabe 

Paul Lieber 

Edited by

Peter McCabe and Paul Lieber 
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the 

Director of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in August 2017.

ISBN 978-1-941715-25-3
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Special Operations Contracting: 21st Century Approaches for Service and 

Technology Acquisition, JSOU Report 17-5, Benjamin Tkach 

Outside the Box: A New General Theory of Special Operations, JSOU Report 17-4, 

Tom Searle 

Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco: Change, Instability, and Continuity in the Maghreb, 

JSOU Report 17-3, Roby Barrett 

A Social Marketing Analysis for Suicide Prevention Initiatives in USSOCOM: A 

Framework for Future Research and Success, JSOU Report 17-2, R. Craig Lefebvre 

A Unified Theory for Special Operations, JSOU Report 17-1, Richard W. Rubright 

IS and Cultural Genocide: Antiquities Trafficking in the Terrorist State, JSOU Report 

16-11, Russell D. Howard, Marc D. Elliott, and Jonathan R. Prohov

On the cover. In August 2016, JSOU held a symposium to examine the notion of 

special operations theory and whether such theory is valid, suitable, and necessary. 

GRAPHIC BY JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY. 
v

Contents

From the Director.........................................................................vii

Foreword 

Professor Colin S. Gray ....................................................................ix

Introduction: Special Operations Theory

Peter McCabe ................................................................................. 1

Chapter 1. Keynote Address—Special Operations Theory

Charles Cleveland, Special Operations Theory Symposium 

Remarks (transcribed) 30 August 2016.............................................11

Chapter 2. Special Operations Theory and Doctrine: 

A Symbiotic Relationship 

David Baratto................................................................................. 25

Chapter 3. Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future of Special 

Operations Theory 

Robert G. Spulak Jr. ....................................................................... 41

Chapter 4. Operationalizing SOF Theory: A Function of 

Understanding SOF Power

Bernd Horn ................................................................................... 55

Chapter 5. A Blueprint for What is Possible: The Value in a 

Theory of Special Warfare 

Travis Homiak ............................................................................... 75

Chapter 6. Civil Context for SOF Theory

Kurt E. Müller ................................................................................ 89

Chapter 7. Outside the Box: A Theory of Special Operations

Tom Searle .................................................................................. 103

Chapter 8. The Future is Now: The Need for a Special Operations 

and SOF Theory

Emily Spencer ...............................................................................119
vi

Chapter 9. Do We Even Need a Theory?

James Kiras ...................................................................................127

Chapter 10. The President of the United States and Special 

Operations Theory 

Francisco R. Wong-Diaz, Esq. .......................................................145

Chapter 11. Two Special Operations/SOF Theory Challenges: 

Building Depth and Avoiding Prescription

Harry (Rich) Yarger .......................................................................159

Chapter 12. Special Operations Theory: Looking Ahead 

Paul Lieber ...................................................................................167

Acronym List .............................................................................173
vii

From the Director

This is the third of three volumes that follow from an August 2016 JSOU 

symposium on special operations theory. This compendium is not a 

comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of special operations theory. Rather, 

it is intended to continue the conversation and, at least, bring to a culminating point the argument over whether a theory of special operations is necessary and if the suggestions are suitable, feasible, and acceptable. The editors 

of this compendium, JSOU resident senior fellows, highlight opposing views 

and conclude with an academic, joint special operations perspective on the 

status of the theory argument. 

There is no official or accepted general theory, but there is a strong desire 

for one and there is evidence that parts of such a theory have existed for 

decades at various headquarters, schools, and team rooms across the enterprise. On the other hand, some regard theorizing in general as a necessary intellectual exercise, but of little operational value. No matter where 

you stand on the subject, this monograph is worthy of your time and 

consideration.

The Center for Special Operations Studies and Research is especially 

pleased to welcome Professor Colin Gray’s contribution and foreword. Combined with references to other seminal works and JSOU Press monographs 

on special operations theory, we trust that this will serve as a benchmark 

until there is a change of conditions, authorities, doctrine, or operations.

Francis X. Reidy

Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

ix

Foreword 

Professor Colin S. Gray 

I find myself considerably challenged by the authors of this work to locate, 

and then sometimes explain, what I am able to make of the interest in 

special operations theorization recently. My modest contribution in this 

foreword is simply to offer nine comments that pertain to many, indeed most, 

of the chapters written by expert contributors. I will answer and comment 

on the fundamental questions: Should there be a theory of special operations 

at all? And, if so, why? I state plainly that I have no institutional interest to 

satisfy with my opinions. What follows, for good or ill, is strictly personal.

First, it is noticeable that the chapters have steered well away, too well I 

believe, from necessarily political judgments about the high policy choices 

handed down to Special Operations Forces (SOF). Up to a point, this is 

simply prudent. Nonetheless, those choices surely all but demand critical 

attention in a theory of special operations. Of course, national choices are 

far above and beyond the competence and responsibility of SOF—who are 

required to obey the orders they are given. As an elementary pragmatic 

matter, the proper path is clear enough; you must do what you are told 

to do by proper authority. However, a theory of special operations needs 

to signal very clearly indeed just how important it is for the United States 

Special Operations Forces to be committed only to worthy and winnable 

enterprises. Those who doubt my need to emphasize this point, I recommend they read the tragic tale about the United States in Vietnam told by 

General H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty.

1

 The over-familiar mantra of 

‘ends, ways, and means,’ typically does not allow (political) ends the analytic 

prominence they merit.

Professor Colin S. Gray is a political scientist and expert in national security 

policy, defense policy, strategy, theory, and military history. He is a professor 

of international politics and strategic studies and director of the Centre for 

Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England. He also serves as a 

senior fellow at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia.
x

Second, I must admit I find myself undaunted by the wide variety of 

demands that SOF can attract. There is a core of competencies that serve, if 

not quite a myriad, at least many tasks in many different places. Versatility 

and adaptability generally serve well enough. The SOF soldier has to be a 

warrior athlete who can think strategically. Those are tough requirements 

to pose for SOF selectors, but that is what needs to be. This may well be 

somewhat contrary to the norm in American popular culture, but SOF have 

to be physically, mentally, and emotionally superior. That is why selection 

needs to be arduous.

Third, a working theory of special operations provides essential guidance on the context for their professional military duties, and also as to the 

categories of action that may impinge upon them. Another way of expressing this would be to say that theory provides vital historical and strategic 

mapping for SOF. Nothing lasts forever, but theory can identify political and 

strategic phenomena that persist.

Fourth, theory identifies core skills essential for the conduct of special 

operations. The need for these, though they have to be somewhat adjusted 

and adapted for a changing technical context, persists generically for generations. The basic attributes required for the successful conduct of special 

operations have persisted over time and are relevant to many tactical contexts. SOF doctrine should not be limiting in its necessary influence.

Fifth, concerning SOF personnel, the quality of the soldier must always 

be of superior importance over quantity. While a truly excellent large force 

may be preferable to a truly excellent small one, it should be understood that 

a notable increase in force size always must mean a reduction in the average 

quality of soldiers. This has always been true historically, with no significant 

exceptions. Leonidas of Sparta knew it, and we do not know it any better!

Sixth, while intellect is of high importance in the planning and conduct of special operations, it gains advantage by exercising that sometimes 

rare quality we can term ‘strategic sense.’ Historically, it is not obvious that 

this quality can be taught, but experience can trigger its appearance if it is 

already there intuitively. Strategic theory and its evidential backing at least 

can attempt to teach with some historical exemplars. It is important to note 

that although the quality of key personnel for SOF is vitally significant, the 

choice of appropriate targets for special operations is usually more significant still.
xi

Seventh, while on one hand it is, of course, essential for SOF to exercise 

and develop teamwork to a high degree, it would be as well to remember 

that institutional loyalty can prove testing for the military discipline that 

operations frequently need for their contributions to overall strategic effect. 

In extreme dysfunctional mode, one can be troubled by evidence for what 

might develop into what amounts to a ‘private army.’ To some degree, tribalism is both inevitable and desirable in the military, but it can be taken too 

far and is hard to arrest.

Eighth, admittedly somewhat in contrast to the previous point, the global 

history of SOF misuse is all too rich. Especially in an ideologically egalitarian 

popular democracy like the United States, the very idea of truly special forces 

is something that is almost culturally unethical. A mass army, as was raised 

in WWII, and even as performed in Vietnam in the 1960s, proved that some 

examples of average soldiery were very average indeed. The Cincinnatus 

model of the citizen soldier rarely is a contemporary phenomenon (or most 

probably in ancient Rome also). However, it is only prudent for the planners 

of special operations to be engaged both in design and execution of SOF.

Ninth, and finally, I considered carefully the critique of a special operations theory developed and presented by one scholar in particular, James 

Kiras. His argument is impressively deep and wide in reach, but I suspect that 

it fails to empathize sufficiently with particular features that are unique to 

special warfare, even though they abut, if do not actually intrude, elsewhere 

also. What can and must be said, though, is that the chapter here generically 

hostile to theory creation for special operations, raises fundamentally important arguments that need unambiguous and preferably clear and certain 

answers, before further effort is expended upon this task. The highly critical chapter makes a vital contribution to the effort to consider theorization 

for special operations. I am confident that there are answers sufficient to 

reply persuasively to the critical chapter, but they need to be developed and 

engaged fully in the debate that this whole project needs to know in order 

to continue further. By way of a fairly generic very brief comment on the 

critique offered, I believe that the authors chose to categorize some activities 

in existing Services problematically and in ways that could, arguably should, 

belong under a special operations ‘Eagle.’

The monograph produced for it can be regarded as essential training 

before probable, but only probable, deployment in action supportive for a 

dominant theory of special operations. Where should the venture drive next? 
xii

As a first step, I suggest that competent and plausible answers need to be 

provided in answer to the first-rate critiques offered in this volume. Following that necessary vital exercise, concentrated and focused work is needed 

to produce a draft that would be relevant to all institutional members of the 

broad special operations community. It is possible, even probable, that it 

would not be highly pleasing to the entire community, but ironically such 

may need to be the case.

Endnotes

1. H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins 

Publishers, 1997).
1

McCabe: Introduction

Introduction: Special Operations Theory

Peter McCabe 

In August 2016, military and civilian personnel from various organizations convened for a Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) hosted 

symposium on MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. The purpose of 

this symposium was to foster an exchange of ideas through scholarly presentations by researchers, policymakers, and operators on the broad range of 

issues facing the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

enterprise today and in the future. The symposium theme takes into account 

that Special Operations Forces (SOF) have become an important instrument 

for the United States to address the security challenges of today. However, the 

pace of operations and the frequency of employment obliges professionals 

to again examine the notion of special operations theory and whether such 

theory is valid, suitable, and necessary. The symposium invited thoughtleaders as participants and speakers to build upon previous discussions and 

writings to identify new insights to propel future research in service to the 

enterprise. Some of the key questions addressed during this symposium were: 

Is the popular employment of SOF a short-term trend or is special operations 

more appropriately regarded as another Service uniquely suited to hybrid 

threats or so-called ‘gray zone’ conflicts? Do current theories adequately 

address the role of special operations? How can existing theories be improved 

in the performance and effectiveness areas?

So, what is theory? Scientists use the scientific method in an attempt to 

create an accurate understanding and representation of the world. Theories 

and hypotheses are created as an attempt to explain scientific observations 

Dr. Peter McCabe serves as a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special 

Operations University (JSOU). He came to JSOU from the U.S. Central 

Command where he worked as a strategic policy planner. Prior to that, he 

retired from the U.S. Air Force as a Colonel in 2011. He received his Ph.D. 

in political science from the University of Florida with a focus on international relations and comparative politics.
2

JSOU Report 17-6

and are later tested through experimentation. It is commonly said that scientific theories can never be proven, only disproved, 

thereby allowing the possibility for new and 

more accurate theories to be created. This 

volume presents divergent perspectives on 

special operations theory, which are not only 

to inform the reader, but also possibly to disprove existing special operations theories. 

A theory can be compared to a lens that 

supports the ability to see the world around us, and have some conception 

of the reality in which we live. To this end, theories help to put the world in 

focus. Theories can be a normal lens that we use every day or they can be 

telescopic to furnish an overview of the strategic environment. For a special 

operations theory, it would require a lens that allows the user to understand 

special operations and help determine what is important. As Professor Colin 

Gray argues, “theory should cast a steady light on all phenomena so that we 

can more easily recognize and eliminate the weeds that always spring from 

ignorance; it should show how one thing is related to another, and keep the 

important and the unimportant separate.”1

Based on a set of core assumptions, theory provides a picture of the world, 

explaining how it is put together, what dangers exist, and what opportunities are present. Theory may explain international behavior and/or make 

predictions about the future. Various theories compete to most accurately 

explain world politics and guide states in their international behavior. Special 

operations theory, specifically the ones addressed in this volume, continue 

the dialogue within the community. While there is no one theory that fully 

explains special operations, there are numerous theories by Navy Admiral (retired) William McRaven, Harry (Rich) Yarger, Robert G. Spulak Jr., 

Richard Rubright, and Tom Searle, that attempt to address aspects of special 

operations. 

This volume provides analysis of special operations theory from a broad 

range of perspectives. Chapters are penned by practitioners who are active in 

operations, policy, and research. Readers may want to compare the various 

points of view on special operations theory and decide for themselves if such 

a theory is necessary. If so, does a general theory of special operations exist 

or can numerous specific theories cover all the equities? The chapters have 

This volume presents 

divergent perspectives on 

special operations theory, 

which are not only to 

inform the reader, but 

also possibly to disprove 

existing special operations theories.
3

McCabe: Introduction

been organized to build upon the symposium opening remarks provided 

by Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland (U.S. Army, Retired) in chapter 1. 

The following can be considered an executive summary of each chapter to 

highlight the arguments and propositions of the authors. No one chapter 

will persuade the reader that special operations theory is required or not 

required, whether a unified theory is possible, or whether a special operations 

paradigm must consist of a multitude of theories. However, after reviewing 

this volume, the reader should be able to locate themselves on the spectrum 

of the argument and be better informed. After all, the point is, as Yarger 

notes in his chapter, “Theory’s rightful role is education and its focus is to 

inform decision making, doctrine, and operations.” 

Keynote Address: Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland 

(U.S. Army, Retired) 

General Cleveland’s transcript remarks opens this look at special operations 

theory, because he recognizes the inherent challenges and opportunities. In 

doing so, he expounds on the importance of the symposium and having an 

overdue conversation about special operations theory. He believes it is important to lay claim to a piece of the operational spectrum and provide serious 

thought to that part of the operation. He notes there is no place inside the 

Department of Defense that addresses America’s ability to conduct irregular 

warfare or how/when to conduct a surgical strike. But any special operations 

theory should not be U.S. only. Rather, it should be universal—functionally 

and geographically. Any special operations theory should accommodate U.S. 

expeditionary SOF partners (global SOF network). 

During his remarks, General Cleveland presents four specific challenges, 

three observations, two ideas, and one promise. The challenges include: a 

theory must be unit agnostic; creating a unified theory will be hard; conducting the theory over the long haul; and any theory needs to reconcile the tactical, operational, and strategic. The three observations include: there should 

be no separation between government agencies and SOF; outsiders see us 

best; and SOF are reluctant to lay claim to ideas such as the human domain. 

The two ideas serve as cautions on bringing the SOF community together and 

how special operations will no longer be the ‘go-to’ force. Finally, General 

Cleveland promises that even though pursuing a special operations theory 

is difficult, it is an incredibly important endeavor. 
4

JSOU Report 17-6

The general’s remarks are an important read for everyone within the 

SOF enterprise. Today, SOF are the main effort in many conflicts; SOF have 

a responsibility to more fully develop its “operational art so it can be burnished, improved, taught widely, practiced, then critiqued, and changed.” 

This opening chapter sets the stage for the theories and counterarguments 

in later chapters.

Special Operations Theory and Doctrine: A Symbiotic 

Relationship

Major General David Baratto (U.S. Army, Retired) argues the “relationship 

between theory and doctrine is interdependent and symbiotic in nature 

whereby both benefit from the relationship.” He accomplishes this lofty goal 

by defining both doctrine and theory. Joint doctrine is defined in the DOD 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as “Fundamental principles that 

guide the employment of United States military forces in coordinated action 

toward a common objective and may include terms, tactics, techniques, 

and procedures.” The definition of theory is less precise. The Oxford English 

Dictionary defines it as “an explanation of a phenomenon arrived at through 

examination and contemplation of the relevant facts; a statement of one or 

more laws or principles which are generally held as describing an essential 

property of something.” General Baratto compares and contrasts theory 

and doctrine and concludes they have complementary aspects. Especially, 

theory applies to doctrine to guide operational design, campaign planning, 

and planning and execution of military operations. 

Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future of Special 

Operations Theory

Robert Spulak’s chapter “provides a rigorous foundation for the application 

of theory to understanding special operations.” Epistemology explores how 

knowledge and theories are created. Paradigms are the characteristics of 

research as a community endeavor. These are lofty concepts and while they 

may be intimidating to wrestle with and consider, the special operations 

community would be wise to consider Spulak’s argument: “theory becomes 

the knowledge that informs expectations.” The numerous special operations 

theories are conflictual in nature and that is a good thing. These theories and 

future theories can coalesce into a future paradigm for special operations. 
5

McCabe: Introduction

As Spulak notes, “there will be multiple theories about special operations 

with a future paradigm.”

Operationalizing SOF Theory: A Function of Understanding 

SOF Power

This fourth chapter provides the reader a historical view of the rise of special 

operations. Colonel Bernd Horn (Canadian Armed Forces, Retired) argues 

that special operations/SOF theory was operationalized throughout history, 

and through special operations employment the community “learned, promulgated, and exercised.” The evolution of SOF and its strategic utility are 

tied to the concept of SOF power. Horn contends that SOF power consists 

of three components: capability, effect, and cost. The key to operationalizing 

SOF theory is to understand SOF power, especially those key political and 

military decision makers who can influence the capability, effect, and cost 

of special operations. 

A Blueprint of What is Possible: The Value in a Theory of 

Special Warfare

Lieutenant Colonel Travis Homiak (U.S. Marine Corps) argues there is value 

in a SOF-specific theory. More importantly, a SOF-specific theory can be the 

basis for action. Much like the previous chapter, Colonel Homiak advocates 

for operationalizing SOF theory. He first explains the five tasks that theory 

performs (based on historian Harold Winton). These five tasks are: define, 

categorize, explain, connect, and anticipate. Colonel Homiak also makes 

the distinction between ‘special operations’ and ‘special warfare.’ Special 

operations are distinguished from conventional operations whereas special 

warfare are those operations working by, with, and through indigenous 

forces. This chapter reinforces the three previous chapters’ view that theory 

provides a mechanism to educate policymakers on what special operations 

can achieve and ultimately move theory into action. 

Civil Context for SOF Theory

The sixth chapter expands upon the notion that special operations has strategic utility. Kurt Müller focuses this chapter on the need for SOF theory 

to link with and achieve policy goals. Müller notes the “small footprint 

of special operations offers advantages across the spectrum that facilitate 
6

JSOU Report 17-6

interagency integration to achieve a national objective.” This chapter explores 

that path to interagency integration and the role of unconventional warfare. 

Müller concludes that without multiagency perspectives and an agency to 

integrate analyses, it is doubtful an operational response will meet a national 

policy goal. It all starts with special operations theories that illustrate the 

strategic utility. 

Outside the Box: A Theory of Special Operations

Tom Searle provides a summary of his much longer 2017 JSOU Press monograph of the same title. The main argument is that a theory of special operations needs to define its operating space. Searle does this through a series of 

figures to demonstrate that special operations are outside the conventional 

box. The final figure depicts the changing nature of conventional operations 

whereby conventional operations expand into traditionally special operations 

missions (foreign internal defense, civil affairs, unconventional warfare, 

military information support operations, and counterinsurgency). Therefore, 

a theory of special operations must take into account the changing nature of 

the conventional and special operations roles and missions. 

The Future is Now: The Need for a Special Operations and 

SOF Theory

Emily Spencer asks an important question: Is theory required to maximize 

the utility of SOF and effectively conduct special operations into the future? 

She provides a resounding yes. However, one overarching theory is insufficient; rather, she argues for a SOF theory to examine the complex relationships (people) and a special operations theory to harness the potential of its 

missions. By examining both, Spencer provides the reader with a different 

way to view theory. Special operations theory can focus on three relationships: global environment, military/political decision makers, and conventional operations. SOF theory can explain SOF-specific characteristics not 

inherent in other military theories. These two theories, special operations 

and SOF, are distinct but interrelated; only by formulating and applying 

them will special operations improve. 
7

McCabe: Introduction

Do We Even Need a Theory?

This important ninth chapter is the other side of the coin. James Kiras argues 

that while a special operations or SOF theory is possible, having one is unnecessary. In fact, Kiras suggests that related and existing theory is sufficient for 

understanding special operations. One such example is Civil War scholarship which discusses irregular warfare. Other examples include a myriad of 

scholarship on strategic utility and effect, civil-military relations, and other 

historical accounts. Kiras warns that any special operations/SOF theory could 

be too bureaucratic (prescriptive) for the special operations community. In 

addition, Kiras argues the special operations community will most likely reject 

theory that is not “credible.” In other words, non-special operations outsiders will find it hard to convince operators to accept a theory focused on their 

community. This chapter will challenge the reader to explore the adequacy 

of extant theory and efficacy of special operations/SOF theory as a pursuit. 

President of the United States (POTUS) and Special 

Operations Theory

Francisco Wong-Diaz presents a critical look at two theories—Spulak and 

Yarger—and discusses the role of the U.S. President in special operations 

theory development. Wong-Diaz argues that the POTUS is the key driver on 

the development, structure, growth, and use of SOF. In addition, the relationship between POTUS and other military leaders, including USSOCOM 

commander, is critical in the use and future of SOF. 

Two Special Operations/SOF Theory Challenges: Building 

Depth and Avoiding Prescription

As a previous writer of special operations theory, authoring the book 21st 

Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations, Rich Yarger 

offers up sage advice on moving forward with special operations/SOF theory. 

A theory must present a framework on “what is necessary, appropriate, and 

acceptable for special operations/SOF and justifying it to the public, policymakers, and conventional military.” Included in this framework is how special 

operations/SOF fit into the broader national security apparatus, identify its 

strategic value, and the need for constant change to keep up with the operating environment. 
8

JSOU Report 17-6

Special Operations Theory: Looking Ahead

It should come as no surprise that the final chapter is reserved for JSOU. 

It is, after all, the university that hosted the theory symposium in August 

2016, and published this volume. Paul Lieber takes on the monumental task 

of pulling together everything we learned at the symposium, then mulled 

it over and provided a coherent conclusion. What he finds is a community 

in the embryonic stage of theory building. While there are many examples 

of published and unpublished special operations theory (Admiral McRaven,2

 Kiras,3 Spulak,4 Turnley,5 Yarger,6 Knarr, et al.,7 Gray,8 Shultz,9 Lieber,10

Rubright,11 and Searle12), the community is still grappling with the basic 

issues. Is a theory necessary? According to Kiras, it is not. Existing military 

theory can account for special operations. According to most of the community, a special operations specific theory is necessary. Is there one overall 

general theory of special operations? Possibly, if the reader is convinced by 

the works provided by Rubright and Searle (vol. 1 and 2 of the JSOU Press 

theory series). Lieber challenges the SOF community to move beyond the 

basic questions and develop theory that is distinguishable from conventional 

forces. 

Endnotes

1. Colin S. Gray, “Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory,” 

PRISM 3, no. 3 (June 2012): 17.

2. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: 

Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995).

3. James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War 

on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006).

4. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and 

Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007); Robert G. Spulak 

Jr., Innovate or Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations (Tampa, 

FL: JSOU Press, December 2010).

5. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF 

are the way SOF are (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2011); Jessica Glicken Turnley, 

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream (Hurlburt 

Field, FL: JSOU Press, February 2008).

6. Harry R. Yarger, 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, April 2013).
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McCabe: Introduction

7. William Knarr, Jessica Glicken Turnley, Dona J. Stewart, Rich Rubright, and 

Jason Quirin, Special Operations Forces Mixed-Gender Elite Teams (Tampa, FL: 

JSOU Press, June 2014).

8. Colin S. Gray, Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency 

Conversion (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, November 2015).

9. Richard Shultz, Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization, 

A Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, July 2016).

10. Paul S. Lieber, Rethinking Special Operations Leadership: Process, Persuasion, 

Pre-existing, and Personality (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2016). 

11. Richard W. Rubright, A Unified Theory for Special Operations (Tampa, FL: JSOU 

Press, 2017). 

12. Tom Searle, Outside the Box: A New General Theory of Special Operations (Tampa, 

FL: JSOU Press, 2017).

11

Cleveland: Symposium Remarks

Chapter 1. Keynote Address—Special 

Operations Theory

Charles Cleveland, Special Operations Theory Symposium 

Remarks (transcribed) 30 August 2016

I have purposely tried to kind of stay away from all things Special Operations Forces (SOF) for certainly this first year. I don’t know whether that 

is a good thing or a bad thing, but what it has allowed me to do with a little 

bit of over a year in retirement is put 400 steaming hours on my boat. And 

for those who don’t know, about a year before I retired I bought a boat, and 

have been, when I can, living life at seven knots and at anchor or holed up 

at a marina some place, and frankly, that gives you time to think and reflect 

on, what for me was, 37 years in the Army, add to that four years at the 

Academy, and so that’s over 40 years, and of that 36 years of them basically 

were in special forces. 

The one firm conclusion that I have drawn upon reflection, is that I could 

not have picked a finer way to serve the country, and I enjoyed every minute 

of it; well, maybe not every minute of it, a good portion of it, and certainly 

there was nothing, I think, that could have been more professionally satisfying. My goal is to put three times that amount on the boat this year. So you 

kind of know where my mind is on this stuff, and just to put it in perspective, 

there is life beyond the walls, the compound, and the uniform, but what you 

do is incredibly important. 

Reflection has showed me that you really don’t necessarily notice it when 

you are in the middle of it, but looking back on it and looking from outside in, I cannot tell you how much the country depends on you. And so 

Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland (U.S. Army, Retired) is a native of 

Arizona and a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, 

New York. General Cleveland is the former commander of the United States 

Army Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command Central, 

and Special Operations Command South. General Cleveland commanded 

at all levels in special forces and held key staff positions.
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JSOU Report 17-6

it is incumbent on you to think about the business that you are in, and do 

some deep thinking about this profession. That’s why I applaud Brian Maher 

[President] at the Joint Special Operations University, and the United States 

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). You won’t hear me say that 

very much. I do not applaud USSOCOM for many things, but I do applaud 

them for beginning this, and having this symposium, because they need a 

presence where thinking is most vigorous, and where questioning of the 

precepts and the assumptions that form the basis of who we are takes place. 

You have the correct brain power assembled here to make a significant 

dent in the question of whether or not you need a SOF theory or a theory 

of special operations; I think that’s better put. You know, as [JSOU Senior 

Fellow] Jim Powers pointed out, I mean it was a descriptor really in the 

original concept and we think holistically about it. You have civilian special 

operations assets in the country as well, and you have conventional forces 

that do things that look very special operations-like or can be. So, the lines 

are blurry and we need to ensure that whatever we come up with explains 

and basically doesn’t necessarily draw the hard lines but accommodates the 

flow between civilian and military, and conventional and special operations. 

Those are realities of the world we live in and whatever you come up with 

have to, I think, accommodate that reality. 

You are going to get a chance to not only talk about the problem, but I 

hope actually lay out some markers about what solutions might SOF theory 

consist of and it’s not uniquely special operations theory, which again you 

can come down on that side as well, and there are probably some School 

of Advanced Military Studies purists out there that would say: “Hey! The 

theory is already written. It came down from the mountain somewhere in 

Germany, and now someone has codified it.” But I hope it’s not just SOF 

theory. I hope we can at least agree on the idea that what constitutes today’s 

current operating theory is proving inadequate because it appears to me that 

it’s failing the nation.

At the end of the day, success is what this is all about and not losing, winning, although sometimes you campaign to not lose, which is different than 

a campaign to win. You have to understand the nuances. At the end of the 

day, you know, [former deputy commander of U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command] Dick Potter once said, “Hey, Charlie!” This was when he retired. 

Jim Powers and I were just talking about Potter. He lives within proximity of 

Potter, which means he is his de facto aide de camp, I guess. If you worked 
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Cleveland: Symposium Remarks

for Dick Potter once, you worked for him always, right? But, he used to tell 

me: “Hey, make sure you are successful because a successful Army pays pensions.” So I now have a stake in your success. I realize that. Okay. So I look 

forward to helping and providing a little bit of a perspective.

Now I have to admit, I struggle with the word ‘theory’ in what we are 

trying to do. I am not sure, and this is probably more a failing on my part, 

which I probably shouldn’t admit so freely, but I am not sure what the theory 

for conventional operations is; I mean whether we can pin it down. So, is 

theory the right word? I don’t know. Maybe it is. Maybe Clausewitz more. 

Maybe we’re Sun Tzu updated. You know, I don’t know. I will let you figure 

that out. Again, we have got the brain power here to do that.

The two Joint Special Operations University theory monographs were 

very helpful, and I encourage you to read those, but I think both encounter the problem that confounds most attempts at trying to generalize or 

provide overarching tenets and principles to special operations, namely to 

encompass, in my view, both the indigenous centric war fighting capability 

in foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare (UW), and the other 

part of the community using [Naval Postgraduate School, Dr.] Rothstein’s 

term, “a hyper-conventional raiding capability.” Well, they are in many, 

many, many ways different. 

They are different by design, by structure, by selection, and so part of the 

question is how fungible are SOF? And your theory needs to answer that 

question or help answer that question, or provide the framework to answer 

that question. Because right now, it really is up to the individual commander 

or those planning staff officers. A Navy SEAL team looks like an Operational 

Detachment Alpha, looks like a United States Marine Corps Forces Special 

Operations Command team, looks like a Ranger squad, or a Ranger platoon. 

At some point, we have to recognize that there is a limit to fungibility. 

And one thing about Rothstein who coined the term, I think, appropriately, you know. He is a retired special forces guy who I first met I think in 

El Salvador, San Miguel, when he was an advisor there. I see Rothstein on 

the docket here, but you really need to know that this is a very experienced 

SOF operator, as well as being a very, in my view, one of the premier thinkers in the business. 

So it is either that, you know, the squaring of those two problems, and 

it becomes so general if you try to provide one of these tenets, one of these 

principles of theory to encompass both things, that it either becomes so 
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JSOU Report 17-6

general as to be SOF truth-like, right? So, humans are more important than 

hardware, which is a great bumper sticker. It is true, but it doesn’t necessarily help you plan the campaign. Right? And it hasn’t, frankly, proven to 

be all that beneficial here locally when you try to fight for resources. Right? 

Or it’s wrong. All SOF are culturally savvy warrior diplomats, and we know 

that’s not true. 

And everyone knows in the business, as Jim pointed out, that the special 

forces missions aren’t much help either, direct action, special or strategic 

reconnaissance, essentially tactical missions, and not necessarily SOF alone. 

They often receive equal or better billing than UW—which is as much as the 

name implies; a form of warfare, distinct formal war, and frankly one that 

has been much derided over the course of my career often within the special 

forces community itself, as well as the special operations community at large, 

but being effectively put into practice today by the Russians, the Iranians, 

and Maxwell will tell you, even the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. If we miss 

the kind of war we are fighting, we risk failure. 

And of course, we still haven’t decided if civil affairs are truly special 

operations. Right? And the mission or discipline, which shall not be named, 

operating under the cover of Japanese soup, suffers from not being lethal, 

therefore not sexy, and almost always is some other agency to do, but they 

don’t seem to be doing it well, as we are repeatedly being told that in the case 

of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. We are losing the influence, information—dare I say—psychological war. So, the missions aren’t helpful either; 

and that they may be in law just means its bad law. What might be a more 

appropriate question is whether or not there isn’t, perhaps, an American 

way of war using Russell Wiley’s term from his book, the SOF edition, or 

an American way of irregular warfare. 

When I was at the United States Army Special Operations Command 

(USASOC), the approach we took was to lay claim to a part of the operational 

spectrum, but then we also went after the very fundamental thing of Army 

operational design, and again, that caused a little bit of a tremor in the foundations out at Leavenworth, but I think we were largely successful because 

what I learned was and what I would tell you is that when you are right, you 

are right, and they can’t refute the logic. We oftentimes don’t engage in the 

conversation because we are afraid of the reaction, perhaps, from an organization or an institution that we might have to be beholden to in some way, 

in this case, the U.S. Army. Sometimes you have to take on the orthodoxy. 
15

Cleveland: Symposium Remarks

And I think we came up with some SOF operational design tenets. I think 

13 went to 11 that I think might have been helpful. Maybe that’s part of the 

solution. Again, I will leave it to you here to really start working your way 

through, but regardless, either theory, way of war, or operational design, 

whatever you want to call it, some fundamentals about what constitutes 

special operations as Jim mentioned and articulated earlier. What bounds 

it is necessary today, and it is necessary today more than ever. 

The rise of SOF from being a footnote to the main effort means that we 

have responsibilities to more fully develop our operational art so it can be 

burnished, improved, taught widely, practiced, then critiqued, and changed. 

In fact, you kind of have to ask yourself: We have a joint special operations 

university here, but what the heck are we teaching? All things should stem 

from the fundamental contribution that SOF makes to the nation, so we 

have to start writing sheet music and quit playing by ear, right? As much as 

we love playing by ear, right? It is all jazz. I can remember when I was down 

on the team: “We don’t need no stinking operations plan.” Now things have 

changed a lot.

It still needs to be our jazz, but we have to recognize that we have lot 

more players in the orchestra now, and we have to lead that orchestra. That 

means that we have to educate men and women in the business on the broadest tenets of what constitutes special operations. You know, our network to 

defeat a network mantra, or if you look at the collection of agencies that it 

takes in order to conduct our form of UW that former deputy commander 

of USSOCOM, Lieutenant General John Mulholland (U.S. Army, Retired) 

practiced with the Northern Alliance; a huge number of agencies come to 

that dance. 

All of those players need to be able to read their part of the sheet music. 

Well, somebody has got to write it. So such a theory can help lay out special operations options also and better calibrate expectations on the part of 

policymakers. We can’t lose the character of who we are in the process of 

supersizing up, but we can’t avoid doing so. We owe it to the nation, and we 

owe it to those coming up through the ranks behind us.

I fear that we lose our character. I mean I don’t want to become too conventional. We have to hold on to what makes us who we are, and I am afraid 

we already attempt, in somewhat of an attempt because of these wars, to 

put so many forces on the battlefield doing very similar sorts of things that 

we, perhaps, unintentionally homogenize SOF almost too much. Now, I am 
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JSOU Report 17-6

going to fight the urge to say that it’s about time that we got around to this 

task or to ask, “Hey! Where have you been for 30 years?” I mean because 

really looking back on it that is half the time that it took the Army, which 

waited 60 years (from 1952-2012) to require our SOF to put in the cannon 

and Army doctrine SOF document. So, I mean you are twice as good as the 

Army. Right?

The opportunity was afforded because men like Lieutenant General 

Bennet Sacolick (U.S. Army, Retired), then commander of the U.S. Army 

John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and then Chief of Staff 

of the Army, and General Ray Odierno (U.S. Army, Retired)—a very experienced field commander—gave us that opportunity. While doctrine is not 

theory, in order to develop what became U.S. special forces doctrine or our 

Army version of it, we made some assumptions on what might constitute a 

start toward special operations theory. We started with the battlefield effects 

and the objectives of special operation units, our task to achieve, and principle methods used to achieve these effects. 

We took the step further and said, “What is missing from the inventory 

of things that we have in our kit bag that we need to create to do better those 

things which is too often what we fail to do.” Too often the starting point 

is what is extant versus what is needed. It is applying what you have today 

versus figuring out what is needed for today and tomorrow, and whatever 

that discussion should hinge on, it should be beyond the foundational theory 

that supports what special operations provide the nation.

But simply, we have two main efforts, and two main effects rather, that 

we had to achieve. And one was to achieve U.S. and partner nation objectives primarily through the use of indigenous forces, or indigenous mass if 

you will, or to conduct unilateral raids to achieve specific U.S. objectives. 

We gave them names. They weren’t very popular, but that was a great thing 

about being a three-star in charge of the Army segment of the business with 

a chief of staff that was supportive. 

We wrote them into doctrine as special warfare to describe that collection of activities from foreign internal defense to UW and surgical strikes 

to talk about this very, very hyper-conventional, high-end capability to conduct raids, not to say that they are always just unilateral. There are variants 

of everything between those two, if you will, goal posts. So while they are 

controversial in my view, they better delineated the results we needed. 
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Cleveland: Symposium Remarks

Now, for the surgical strike piece, the latter of the two, Admiral McRaven's work (Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and 

Practice) at Naval Postgraduate School, I think, is some of the best thinking 

out there in terms of the tactical level outlining how speed and surprise can 

locally offset mass and fires. Admiral McRaven’s operative theory constitutes 

today’s special operations, but its principles apply not only to SOF. If you 

think about it, those principles apply to any raiding force.

Those operations also are well understood by conventional commanders. 

Because in fact, it is very much related to what they do for a living, which is a 

challenge for SOF theory investigators. Now, how blurry is the line between 

SOF and the conventional raiding capabilities? For the former, of the indigenous centric war fighting capability though, there is no clear U.S.-authored 

theory on supporting the indigenous war fighting. 

There are, of course, great works, some of them written by panelists that 

you are going to have on insurgency, counterinsurgency, resistance, and revolution. The concepts and doctrines on the development, manipulation, and 

employment of indigenous mass, fires, etc. or indigenous special operations 

with the use of resistance groups is, in my view, pretty thin, and certainly 

very thin inside of the Department of Defense (DOD). 

As a result, views on how the U.S. and third parties can approach the use 

of indigenous groups to achieve our objectives, their objectives—it is hard 

for us to recognize and reconcile the idea that it may not be our campaign, 

but one we are advising or helping. It’s difficult. That’s foreign. How you do 

that is different than being the guy in charge. It takes a different set of skills. 

We need to recognize those differences. 

So, I commend everybody on the USASOC Assessing Revolutionary and 

Insurgent Strategies project because I know [Retired Colonel] Dave Maxwell 

will. I think it is really a great ongoing effort to look at resistance, rebellion, and insurgency. The question is what you do about it and how you do 

it and that’s up to the practitioners and the leaders in the business. They 

need to help you, the academics, but it’s your responsibility. The lack of a 

well-articulated theory for this side of SOF hasn’t prevented us though from 

trying. I mean, witness the number of missions we have been under building 

partner nation capacity. Conventional and SOF units doing that, or training 

and equip programs—the latter being especially concerning in that some 

leaders are promoting training and education as a viable option—for instance 
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JSOU Report 17-6

in Syria, resulting in what, in my view, was a tremendous embarrassment to 

the country, and frankly to the community. 

What was the best military advice given? How informed was that military 

advice? Who gave it? One should hope that such a theory on how to support 

these things, some part of a holistic approach in how you explain special 

operations, the foundations of it would have resulted in a better educated 

senior leader, perhaps, and planners. You might have seen the challenge in 

removing fighters from the front lines with their families to become better 

at basic marksmanship for three-to-five second rushes. 

Indeed, it may have resulted in better advice to policymakers on how to 

execute more effective UW campaigns, which when matched with effective calls for fire from forward locations, from lethal U.S. raids and strikes 

might constitute what could pass for SOF operational art being applied in 

the battlefield. We may be there. We may be working our way to that. The 

battlefield is a great teacher. I am hoping that is where we are headed. The 

idea of using our technological advantage with indigenous mass, I think, is 

powerful. 

A theory of special operations should also get us beyond very debilitating 

obstacles to our thinking that has left the nation vulnerable, thus purposely 

diminishing and nearly terminating the whole idea of UW as a military mission. Theory has to protect the capabilities. It has to provide the rationale for 

their existence. It has to be the first line of defense when somebody comes 

out saying, “Hey, so what country in South America are you going to take 

over?” And that question was posed to me by USSOCOM staff. I listed off a 

few that I would have liked to have taken over at the time. The input wasn’t 

appreciated all that much since he outranked me, but that sort of thinking is 

temporary. The theory has to outlive that temporary condition. I think there 

are so many decisions ... talk about near misses. When I graduated from 

the special forces officer’s course back in 1979, the rumor was going about 

everybody with a red flash; you might as well buy a different colored one 

because 7th Group was going away. It wasn’t but in a blink of an eye when 

I am visiting Rothstein in El Salvador, and you look back a few short years, 

five, six years, and you realize just how myopic that decision would have 

been because 7th Group was knee deep into what was going on in Central 

and South America. 

But the demands of the time were, “Hey, we don’t need them.” And you 

can go on ... I mean I can remember giving the brief, and I have told this 
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Cleveland: Symposium Remarks

story a couple of times ... forgive me for repeating, but my first Quarterly 

Training Brief to my group commanders, my battalion commander, I mentioned, “Hey, I want to be the world’s finest UW battalion in the DOD.” And 

he goes through the entire Quarterly Training Brief and says, “Everything 

is good on this, everything you are proposing for your battalion, but you 

have got to take all that UW stuff out of there. We don’t do that anymore.” 

I was like, “What? Really?” 

So, again, the good thing about being the guy in charge of USASOC is 

when I go to the senior leader courses, and [USASOC Command] Sergeant 

Major George Bequer is here in attest to this, I would ask those great young 

Green Berets: “What is your mission?” And I get this laundry list of things, 

and I felt compelled to remind every one of them that your job is to be 

America’s UW capability. Be prepared to go into a denied area, operate for 

an extended period of time working with indigenous groups to overthrow 

a belligerent or occupied power. Now, we can do foreign internal defense. 

We can do all those other things, but your reason is to be expert enough 

to do that. That’s what the nation needs. We need a theory that actually 

allows it to be something more than 

just ‘it might pass through,’ and I try 

to keep it focused that way. So, again, 

I am going to give you four challenges, three observations, two ideas, 

and one promise. Four challenges: 

OK, the country needs this theory, 

or something like I said, you can debate what you call it, for special operations because the current theories on the application of military force don’t 

adequately account for the role special operations now fulfills. 

The ambiguity of the narrative—direct/indirect, national theater—which 

is beneficial to some segments in the community I’ll grant you but, overall, 

the lack of a theory encourages misunderstanding, and those descriptors, 

that narrative, has not been helpful. It gives unrealistic expectations and 

allows others less qualified, in my view, to lead campaigns, which today are 

SOF campaigns or as I think, Clausewitz would correct me, right, or campaigns where the defeat mechanism is basically the SOF component. Why 

would we job that out?

The first challenge is the theory needs to be unit agnostic. It needs to be 

taught at service schools and USSOCOM. Well, then what are you going to 

We need a theory that actually 

allows it to be something more 

than just ‘it might pass through,’

and I try to keep it focused that 

way.
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JSOU Report 17-6

base that education on? And that’s what I think this theory or this foundational underpinning of a holistic SOF, this idea between the indigenous 

centric war fighting and the hyper-conventional raid, bringing those two 

halves together at the campaign level to say this is what a SOF campaign 

looks like, and then educating leaders as they move up the chain to be able 

to command those campaigns, which are very complex. 

Now, if you think about UW, it’s the orchestration of subversive efforts, 

of sabotage, of confidence targets, knowing when to increase the tempo of 

certain operations, knowing when to pull back, having the discipline to 

wait when forces in the field aren’t ready. It takes somebody that frankly 

understands all that to orchestrate it properly. The second challenge will be 

not to confuse, as I said before, current structures or units as capabilities 

that are required.

The second challenge, a unified theory of special operations, will be difficult. It is not unlike finding Einstein’s unified field theory in physics, right? 

Anybody know what that is? There’s got to be a few closet physicists out there. 

This idea of squaring gravity and electromagnetism, but they haven’t done it 

yet. So this idea of actually building something that encompasses both parts 

of what SOF consists of, it’s going to be hard. I hope easier than the unified 

field theory is, but it will be a challenge.

The third challenge will be to organize yourself to conduct the inquiry 

over the long haul, to be able to resist the challenge, overcome the challenge. 

Now, witness the resistance to the gray zone, or earlier, the SOF International 

Security Assistance Force Joint Command (IJC) business. Right? Now, I 

am not saying that they don’t all deserve to be resistant. There needs to be 

a robust debate about it, but when you promulgate this theory, or whatever 

you are going to come up with, it is going to be controversial. It will draw 

fire because in the Washington, D.C., area, it will be seen as another SOF 

end run. And you have to have leaders that are prepared to defend it. They’ll 

have to know what it is, and you’ll have to be able to explain it to them. It 

will have to stand on its own, you know, the global SOF network. The SOF 

IJC made all the sense in the world, but why was it immediately attacked?

The fourth challenge will be reconciling the tactical, operational, and 

strategic; the theory needs to account for all three. It is obvious that certain tactical events, Bin Laden’s raid for example, had a strategic effect, but 

what is most absent in my mind in special operations’ approach, are special 
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Cleveland: Symposium Remarks

operations’ approaches and campaigns in the operational mode and we are 

not organized, frankly, to either write those campaigns or to command them. 

The Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), while they are 

much better than they were when [Retired Colonel] Chuck Fry took over 

from ... who was the first TSOC commander? I can’t remember. It went 

from 23 guys in the first TSOC when they peeled off part of the J-3 Special Operations Detachment down in USSOCOM, and when Fry took over 

eight months later, he tells the story, he was down to four because guys had 

purloined and pulled them back in the J-3. They wanted nothing to do with 

this TSOC business. 

Well, TSOC has gotten better since then, but what’s their role? Are they 

mini special mission units or should they be? What kind of campaigns are 

they supposed to promulgate? Or are they just whatever the Geographic 

Combatant Command wants them to be? And so, then you are leaving it to 

somebody who doesn’t necessarily have any inkling about what necessarily 

SOF are supposed to provide. Where he is supposed to get it? Inside his war 

college? Right? So we need this. 

So you have got to reconcile this, and frankly in my view, we have got to 

figure out a way to quit outsourcing our war-fighting at the campaign level to 

the Army and the Marine Corps. And I love my Army, right, but the Army 

corps really is poorly placed in charge of a very indigenous centric special 

operations heavy war front. And it’s a great guy that is there, and the staff 

that is under him, they come from every other background and we are doing 

it too often for it to just be acceptable as a one off. 

I observe three things. First, there should be no bright line between the 

capabilities of selected government agencies and SOF with respect to support the indigenous war fighting, or the lethal use of drones and force in 

the region. Nor is there necessarily a bright line between where a raid is a 

special operations activity versus a conventional. Units straddle both ends. 

The Rangers straddle the conventional special operations world. Special 

forces straddle the other government agencies and special operations world. 

Let’s recognize that. Organize yourselves so you can do it well. Don’t fight 

it. Figure out how to use it. 

Likewise, the solution to the SOF IJC piece, in my view, was a great opportunity for USSOCOM and the U.S. Army to collaborate deeply on forming 

what should have been a hybrid core to let the nation have the right capabilities in that headquarters’ residence there to fight that fight. But we resisted, 
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JSOU Report 17-6

and we were arrogant enough to say, “Hey, we are going to give you the 100 

best of our guys and just put them on top of the corps.” And, of course, with 

the Army, it was like, “Oh!” So our approach was, I think, poor, and frankly, 

I think we missed an opportunity.

Second observation is that outsiders sometimes see us best. You have 

assembled a great group of people here to take on these questions. Use them. 

Start at the fundamentals and fight through the temptation to retrofit the 

theory to today’s reality. We can do better for the nation. Keep an active and 

ongoing dialogue with academics, thinkers, technologists, your components; 

task the components to be part of the discussion, to be active in it. 

It should be vigorous. It should be ongoing and continuous. Each symposium should punctuate the ongoing discussions, not be the place in which 

you come to actually grapple with and capture the best you can and then 

head off to the next course. I am not saying that just about special mission 

units. I am saying that about the business that is SOF. So, use these academics, thinkers, technologists, your components, and joint force commanders 

who see us in the field. And remember that they are doing so using us in the 

field absent of a whole lot of formal education or training on what special 

operations really does in the broadest sense. 

My third observation is that we in SOF are reluctant to lay claim to primacy in any portion of the confidence spectrum ... I saw this with the pushback on the human domain. No one could argue the points on the concept, 

but resistance became overwhelming when realization set in that it would 

require a change in the status quo. Somebody was going to be perceived as a 

loser. The Marine Corps caught on very early and basically gave it the Heisman, but it gave SOF its domain, and while nobody owns the domain, the 

one in which SOF operates principally is, in my view, the human domain.

And, again, the community has to grapple with the idea, either take it on 

or not take it on, but again, your place, its place, SOF place, it’s rise to promise 

has a reason, and that reason is tied to the changes on the battlefield. And 

the changes on the battlefield appear to me, again, this DOD school educated 

guy, is basically the reemergence of this new space that we are having to fight 

in. And our tools that we used to fight in that space before had become less 

relevant. You can’t pick up everybody from a certain population, move them 

into a containment area, and declare everything outside of that containment 

area a free-fire zone. That is not acceptable to this nation anymore. So, this 

nation needs different tools. 
23

Cleveland: Symposium Remarks

You represent those tools. That’s the rationale behind your rise to prominence, selective targeting and using indigenous forces to solve their own 

problems. So it is SOF’ domain in my view, again, maybe that’s not the right 

view, but take on and figure out where your place is. Again, in my view, we 

had primacy there because we were the maneuver force of choice in that 

space. 

My two cautions relate to the fact that SOF have to do a better job bringing this community together. Firstly, we are still living, in my view, with the 

sins of our fathers, you know, as early as Delta versus Blue Light, that kind of 

stuff. At some point, special operation officers and noncommissioned officers 

must undergo, again, this indoctrination educational process that teaches 

them to be practitioners and leaders in the entirety of special operations. 

The problem being evident, as I indicated, is at the TSOC level where 

commanders have no experience with supporting indigenous war fighting 

or special warfare, to use the Army term basically, are for the first time given 

those commands. That’s not fair to them. It’s not fair to the staff, and frankly 

it could be, in my view, very damaging not for any purposeful reason. We 

just need to have an education process that at some point, I mean that’s with 

the conventional unit, that’s what the Army, the Navy, and the other Services 

do. That’s with special mission units. 

My second caution is the pendulum will inevitably swing away from SOF. 

We have been hearing whispers now for quite a while about the chatter of 

SOF or USSOCOM fatigue. That SOF has not suffered the same fate that 

it did after Vietnam or even post-Desert Storm when I had a reduction in 

force in my own group when I was at United States Army Forces Command. 

I called my buddies saying, “Hey! Man, I am looking at your file, you need 

to consider getting out.” We took a one-third cut just like everybody else. 

The fact that we are not going through that is based on basically the 

battlefield out there and a mature USSOCOM helping them defend the equities and the interest, but this never-ending war is going to come to some kind 

of conclusion at some point, and you can bet that the pendulum is going 

to swing back the other way. This foundational theory, this understanding 

of what the nation needs from the operations community articulated in 

theory is to help you get through those kinds of times of change when the 

pendulum swings back. 

And you have got a tremendous number of laboratories ongoing right 

now around the world. You can test your ideas on theory against those 
24

JSOU Report 17-6

laboratories or whatever you want to call it. Use that experience that is going 

on daily out there. 

Lastly, the promise. Even though this is hard, it is an incredibly important 

endeavor. The promise is that if you do this right, if you set the conditions, 

you have basically the promise of solving a whole host of chronic problems 

that I have lived with my entire time in this 

business. The problem of SOF and conventional. You know, it’s going on again. 

FORSCOM wants to take command of all 

the SOF that come into theater. It has no staff 

officers or understanding of how to use that 

capacity when it’s given to them, and in fact, 

may not have the dominance of force on the 

field, but still wants a stake in it. So, a good 

foundation, again, deep thinking, an articulation put down in writing of a theory, of an American way of irregular warfare 

has a promise of solving a lot of these problems. The nation needs world class 

capabilities in both. I applaud the effort and I hope that you are successful. 

So, what are special operations? How blurry should the lines between 

special operations and conventional operations, or military and civilian 

special operations be? What constitutes a SOF campaign? Is there such a 

thing? How does special operations differ? What are the characteristics of 

these differences? National theater, direct/indirect, what is the proper way 

to capture and bin special operations? 

Is the assumption that special operations missions are so closely related 

that specialization isn’t required as much as it used to be, stratifying then 

instead vertically based on proficiency as opposed to by function? I obviously 

have a decided opinion on that, and certainly you could come down on a 

different side of that question. A sound and agreed upon SOF theory should 

set the predicate to help answer this host of questions. It’s hard, but it needs 

to be done. I wish you the best of luck, and remember, you damn well need 

to be successful because successful SOF pay pensions too. 

The promise is that if you 

do this right, if you set 

the conditions, you have 

basically the promise of 

solving a whole host of 

chronic problems that I 

have lived with my entire 

time in this business.
25

Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship

Chapter 2. Special Operations Theory 

and Doctrine: A Symbiotic Relationship 

David Baratto

For some time now, there has been ongoing controversy about the value 

and purpose of a special operations theory. It has been argued to be of 

questionable value, at best, since there are sufficient theories that address 

warfare as a strategic phenomenon with special operations and Special Operations Forces (SOF) as lesser-included cases that do not warrant their own 

“special theory.” Dr. James Kiras [Air University], in an article presented at 

a Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) 2016 special operations theory 

symposium, offered a number of reasons why a unified, or synoptic special 

operations theory is not needed and goes even further to opine that doing so 

might even be dangerous.1 He proposed that special operations theory might 

be confused with, or mistaken for special operations doctrine.2 This chapter contributes to the dialectic 

by presenting an opposing view 

that failure to continue pursuit 

of special operations theory 

would be negligent on the part 

of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the special 

operations community, and JSOU in particular. The chapter attempts to demonstrate that the relationship between theory and doctrine is interdependent 

Major General David J. Baratto (U.S. Army, Retired) graduated from the 

United States Military Academy in 1964 and was commissioned in the infantry. He served as Commanding General of Southern European Task Force, 

finished his military career in the Central Intelligence Agency as director of 

military affairs with 32 years of service (predominantly in special operations), 

and retired in December 1995. He completed his public service with 10-plus 

years as a research analyst for the Institute of Defense Analyses specializing 

in interagency operations, personnel recovery, and special operations. 

The chapter attempts to demonstrate 

that the relationship between theory 

and doctrine is interdependent and 

symbiotic in nature whereby both 

benefit from the relationship.
26

JSOU Report 17-6

and symbiotic in nature whereby both benefit from the relationship. Theory 

can be used to enhance inquiry, investigation, and understanding of special 

operations. Tested and refined through continued observation and experimentation, it can assist in the development and enhancement of special 

operations doctrine.

About Doctrine

Ambiguity and Paradox

Joint doctrine is defined in the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms: “Fundamental principles that guide the employment of United States 

military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective and may 

include terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures.”3 Heeding caution in practical application creates a certain ambiguity in the interpretation. To vary 

from doctrine suggests that one may be leaving terra firma, or solid earth, 

and treading on the shaky ground of faulty judgment. This places a serious 

damper on innovative approaches at a time when contemporary experience 

mandates emphasis on adaptive and learning organizations. The practitioner 

too is faced with the reality that written doctrine is sure to lag best practices 

by at least three to five years.4 Confounding the issue even further, the dividing line where doctrine ends (in the sense of fundamental principles guiding 

actions in support of national objectives) and tactical (and ancillary) publications begin, is indistinct. Approved and published doctrine provides the 

military with an authoritative body of statements of best practices on how 

military forces conduct operations and common lexicon for use by military 

planners and leaders. Ideally, modern military doctrine should link theory, 

history, experimentation, teaching, and practice, as closely as possible.

Cultural Differences

Perhaps the ambiguity and paradox of the definition itself is a partial explanation why different services place different values on doctrine. Once, in an 

orientation briefing to the author, given by a spokesperson of a prominent 

three-letter agency, the briefer referred to doctrine as the “D” word. It was 

followed with an admonition that it should not be used internal to the organization for fear that it might conjure up a need to codify practices. Recent 

senior level retirees at the JSOU theory symposium in 2016 also expressed 
27

Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship

variations of the same view. Some services take doctrine seriously, others 

merely entertain doctrine as a necessary bureaucratic evil. At the joint level, 

it is embedded into the force structure analysis process through the doctrine, 

organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy5

 model. The reality is that the joint force in 2020 is about 80 

percent established today or already programmed. Hence, the only way to 

make significant and adaptive changes to our force structure is one of two 

ways: 1) by making changes in the other 20 percent, or 2) by making changes 

in the nonmaterial domains of doctrine, organization, training, material, 

leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy—namely doctrine, 

training, leadership, and policy. It is no coincidence that doctrine writ large 

is considered the engine of change, since doctrine is the driving requirement 

for what is to be done. 

Doctrine and Theory Often Overlap

Given the time-lag mentioned above in the development of written doctrine, 

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, published in 2012 attempts to 

describe a “doctrine” that may be applicable to the future thereby “theorizing” future operational environments and attendant operational concepts.6

Its purpose is to guide force development toward Joint Force 2020. While 

it does not provide detailed guidance, it advances new concepts for joint 

operations and suggests attributes that define the future force.

Similarly—neither theory nor doctrine—Joint Operating Environment 

2035 “illustrates several ideas about how changes to conflict and war might 

impact the capabilities and operational approaches required by the future 

Joint Force.”7 It is designed to encourage thinking about future conflict 

through the lens of various trends, conditions, and contexts. For all practical purposes, it provides a theory of the alternative scenarios, which expands 

our understanding of the challenges we face in the future security environment circa 2035.

Theory can rather quickly evolve into doctrine. We can see the process 

evident in a Best Practice Paper written by the Deployable Training Division 

of the Joint Staff J7 in July 2013.8 The paper emphasizes the need for developing a creative operational approach and suggests certain design activities 

that are at variance with traditional planning activities such as co-creation 

of context in understanding the operational environment and “adaptive 
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JSOU Report 17-6

planning” when responding to changes in the operational environment. 

Although lagging somewhat in influence and treatment, design theory had 

its debut in doctrine via chapter III of Joint Publication 5-0, August 2011.9

The design writings and initiative begin with a more critical inquiry into 

understanding the operational environment and the various forms of complexity, ambiguity, and non-linearity that are inherent. “Operational design 

combines aspects of military theory, systems theory, writings on the nature 

of problems and problem solving, and the challenge of critical and creative 

thinking in order to help the Joint Force Commander and staff understand 

and develop effective solutions for complex military problems.”10 To that 

end, the Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design is intended to provide 

useful details to commanders and planners on joint operational design and 

stimulate critical thinking, discussion, and debate on assimilating valueadded ideas into the Joint Operational Planning Process. It reviews relevant 

constructs from military theory such as Clausewitz’s center of gravity, culmination, and the value of dialectic discussion; Jomini’s interior and exterior 

lines of operation and the contemporary variant of lines of effort; and Liddel 

Hart’s indirect approach. In addition, several system theory and problem 

theories are introduced pursuing new approaches to analyze the problem. 

Recent efforts in dealing with ill-structured problems have also introduced 

a design initiative to the Joint Operational Planning Process.

About Theory

Definitions of Theory

Numerous definitions of theory exist depending on the context and the 

nature of the discipline under discussion. Without diving too far into the 

technical or esoteric, and more than adequate for the purposes of this chapter, the Oxford definition will suffice: “A supposition or a system of ideas 

intended to explain something, especially one based on general principles 

independent of the thing to be explained.”11 One can trace the etymology of 

the term and take delight in contemplating and debating an interesting variety of peculiar and arcane definitions, but such a venture would only serve 

to entertain the reader, not necessarily illuminate a better understanding of 

theory as it applies herein. What follows are rather generic descriptions and 

examples of theory and how theory may be used by the layman to enhance 

inquiry, investigation, and understanding of a particular phenomenon. 
29

Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship

Various Categories of Theory12

Depending on our experiences, education, and aptitudes, we are naturally 

inclined to choose a particular category of theory with which we are most 

comfortable. Yet, the fact of the matter is that it is virtually impossible, if not 

impractical to categorize theories into discrete little boxes to contemplate 

without regard for their interrelationships.

Scientific Theory 

The University of California, Berkley, defines a theory as “a broad, natural 

explanation for a wide range of phenomena. Theories are concise, coherent, 

systematic, predictive, and broadly applicable, often integrating and generalizing many hypotheses.”13

Any scientific theory must be based on a careful and rational examination of the facts. Facts and theories are two different things. In the scientific 

method, there is a clear distinction between facts that can be observed and/

or measured, and theories—scientists’ explanations and interpretations of 

the facts. Theories are the result of a tested hypothesis. While hypotheses 

are ideas, theories explain the findings of the testing of those ideas. Theories 

can be improved or modified as more information is gathered so that the 

accuracy of the prediction becomes greater over time.14

Social Theory 

Broadly speaking, social theories are analytical frameworks or paradigms 

used to examine social phenomena. Social theory encompasses ideas about 

how societies change and develop, about methods of explaining social behavior, about power and social structure, gender and ethnicity, modernity and 

civilization, religion, morality, and numerous other concepts. According to 

Harrington, a noted modern sociologist, social theorists do not view sociology, or the ‘human sciences,’ as a science per se in that they see definite limits 

to the extent that scientific method can be applied. Social theories cannot 

be subsumed under general principles of regular cause and effect relationships the way physical elements are classified by natural scientists, through 

repeatable experiments.15

Social theory transcends the observable and repeatable, but remains 

essential to greater understanding. Human sciences “study meanings, values, 
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JSOU Report 17-6

intentions, beliefs, and ideas realized in human social behaviour and in 

socially created institutions, events, and symbolic objects such as texts and 

images.”16 Harrington argues that social theory and critical social analysis 

can be used to give us reasoned accounts of the dynamics, motives, and forces 

extant in the real world, not only as an aid in seeking to better comprehend 

the complexities of modern society, but in an attempt to change the world 

for the better. He opines that the idea of ‘science of society’ is sociologically 

related to other disciplines and humanities such as political theory, anthropology, history, and philosophy. The implication is one of nonlinear and 

complex relationships between cause and effect—input and output.

In a similar sense, Clausewitz’s extensive study of and writing on disciplines related to war enabled him to expound prolifically on the theory of war, 

the art of war, and the science of war in book two of his opus, On War. Therein 

he declares the primary role of theory as merely to help us comprehend history. He believed that the mark of true theory was in its capacity for continued learning and growth of ideas. He saw war not only as a phenomenon of 

controlled violence and destruction, but also as a phenomenon imbedded in 

society and politics. He portrayed war as a ‘true chameleon’ whose properties and internal laws seemed to vary from nation to nation and age to age. 

War as an extension of politics accounted for the ‘dual nature of war’ for the 

variability. He also wisely advised that “theory becomes infinitely more difficult as soon as it touches the realm of moral values,”17 again suggesting a 

complexity, or perhaps even a nonlinearity between cause and effect. Of note 

here is the caution not to automatically assume that morality and religion are 

synonymous. As philosopher David Hume stated, “the greatest crimes have 

been found, in many instances, to be compatible with a superstitious piety 

and devotion. Hence, it is justly regarded as unsafe to draw any inference in 

favor of a man’s morals, from the fervor or strictness of his religious exercises, 

even though he himself believe them sincere.”18 There should be little doubt 

concerning our need to learn and understand more about the nature, relationships, and dynamics of ideology, religion, morality, and culture. 

Military Theory

Military theories, especially since the influence of Clausewitz in the nineteenth century, attempt to encapsulate the complex cultural, political and 

economic relationships between societies and the conflicts they create.19
31

Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship

Clausewitz further claimed that the “primary purpose of any theory is to 

clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled. Not until terms and concepts have been defined can one hope to make 

any progress in examining the question clearly and simply and expect the 

reader to share one’s views.”20 Another common definition applicable to military theory is: “A theory is a set of accepted beliefs or organized principles 

that explain and guide analysis.”21

Popular generalized theories such as Sun Tzu’s On the Art of War, Clausewitz’s On War, Jomini’s The Art of War, are some of the first ‘military theories’ that come to mind when a serious student approaches the subject. One 

could argue one of the reasons they are still viable today is their generality. 

However, one could also argue the more general nature of the theory, the 

less utilitarian value it might have to the current day; thereby demonstrating 

a need for narrower theories that have relevance to today’s combat employment across the spectrum of warfare. This may explain a series of more 

recent theories that describe various types of warfare based on the type of 

combat forces employed (air, sea, land power), the character of warfare (high 

or low intensity conflict, irregular, conventional, unconventional, etc.), and 

numerous other categories. 

Much like social theory, “military theory cannot have the same precision or consistency as theory in the physical sciences, because the means 

of measurement are highly uncertain.”22 In addition, since events are not 

repeatable, they do not lend themselves to experimentation and rigorous 

proofing. “Clausewitz rejected quantitative analysis and scientific formulas 

in favor of philosophical insights.”23 Likewise, one can expect that emerging 

theories in any given era will draw on ideas and influences advanced in other 

fields, e.g., scientific, social, systems, complex, chaos, et al. 

Special Operations Theory

A number of scholarly papers and monographs have been written on special 

operations theory;24 a quick perusal of the referenced list will give the reader 

some appreciation of the effort that has already been made to encapsulate 

special operations theory into relatively concise descriptions—concise at least 

when compared to On War, or the Art of War. The authors have expressed 

the need for and the value of special operations theory; some have attempted 

to propose synoptic theories that better explain the value, appropriate use 
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JSOU Report 17-6

and preconditions for success of special operations. However, in this author’s 

opinion, most of them fall short of the mark in one important aspect—they 

emphasize the warrior, direct action side of special operations, at the cost 

of properly addressing the indirect action side of special operations capabilities. Additionally, and more importantly, the narrow focus on direct 

action limits SOF thinking in two important dimensions. The first limitation emanates from the fact that the predominant context of those theories 

is nested in the specific condition of “war” as the strategic environment, as 

opposed to the generic strategic environment itself. This failure takes the 

focus off what special operations can do to shape the environment prior 

to the initiation of the actual beginning of warfighting, and likewise how 

special operations can assist in the resolution 

of conflict after termination of conflict. This 

error is particularly grave when considered 

in light of complexity and chaos theory and 

their extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. 

The second limitation comes from the false 

assumption that systems and organizational 

designs appropriate for force-on-force application are timeless and universally adaptable. 

Management and organizational theory has 

changed considerably from the time of the 

Industrial Revolution and Frederick Taylor’s theory—later known as scientific management theory which evolved with recent developments and 

applications of network theory, as espoused by General Stanley McChrystal 

(U.S. Army, Retired). A discussion of these special operations related theories is beyond the scope of this paper, but hopefully, the reader is stimulated 

to do further research on the evolution, interdisciplinary relationship, and 

potential application to SOF in today’s complex strategic environment. A 

partial list of references is provided.25

Theory and Doctrine—Similarities and Differences

Similarities

Both attempt to describe the “how” of a particular event or activity, and 

both identify underlying principles governing the activity. Although both 

mandate empirical testing for accuracy and truth, doctrine assumes a higher 

The first limitation emanates from the fact that 

the predominant context 

of those theories is nested 

in the specific condition 

of “war” as the strategic 

environment, as opposed 

to the generic strategic 

environment itself.
33

Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship

standard of rigorous testing. In that sense, theory benefits from its symbiotic relationship to doctrine. Both can be descriptive, anticipatory, and 

prescriptive. 

Differences

The doctrinal process is lengthy and bureaucratic.26 Typically it takes about 

two to five years to get a substantial change published. In addition, the coordination process is often convoluted resulting in a “watering down” of the 

originally intended message. Controversial thoughts are sure to bog the 

process down even further, resulting in delays and the probability that the 

thought will be stricken entirely. Doctrine requires a fair amount of institutional capital not only as a result of its several year developmental process, 

but also as a result of its interface with and required attachment to other 

main line processes.27 Military doctrine evolves primarily from practice; it 

codifies best practices and goes beyond being prescriptive by purporting to 

be authoritative.

Theory, on the other hand, can be easily created and just as easily discarded, or simply ignored. Contributors to theory can come from all walks 

of life and disciplines adding depth and breadth to discussions and important dialectic processes that are considered to be essential to the development of sound theory. Several theories might exist for any given activity 

or organization, but doctrine is expected to codify ‘best practices’ in more 

restrictive pragmatic fields. Accordingly, not all practices and certainly not 

all innovative ideas are presented. Controversial ideas are not likely to make 

it to final doctrinal publication. Doctrine is rooted in military knowledge 

and developed primarily by military doctrine writers in a collegial setting 

of shared views thus bounding out, at least to a certain extent, widely divergent views and free thought. In this setting, collaboration and compromise 

reign supreme—not dialectics that might illuminate ambiguities extant in 

the real world. 

Complementary Aspects

Perhaps the best example of how theory and doctrine can complement each 

other is to peruse chapter I of Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013. In a recent revision, an entire 

Section A on theory was added to the beginning of chapter I. The chapter 
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JSOU Report 17-6

provides a broad overview of fundamental beliefs and categorizations of 

war, war fighting and planning, and defines terms (task, function, and mission) relevant to the conduct of war. Clearly, the joint doctrine writers saw 

that section A was not doctrine per se, but without it, what follows would 

have been out of context and sans an intellectual framework. It elaborates 

further: “Extensive theory—developed by both classical and contemporary 

writers and practitioners—underpins the planning and execution of military operations. Some theoretical constructs such as center of gravity relate 

specifically to military operations, while constructs such as systems theory 

can apply across a wide range of disciplines.”28 If that is the case, then simple 

logic suggests that a case can be made for theory applying to doctrine that 

ostensibly guides operational design, campaign planning, and planning and 

execution of military operations.

How Special Operations Theory Could Enhance the 

Development of Special Operations Doctrine

Risks and Concerns

There are those, both within and outside the community who caution against 

too much energy and thought being given to the creation of theory, or for 

that matter, doctrine. Special operations is noted for the ability to adapt on 

the ground and implement sui generis solutions to “wicked problems” that 

defy both definition and remedy in doctrine. Certainly some concern is 

warranted in the possibility that doctrine might be relied on too much or 

too often as ‘the solution’ to a problem. Likewise, there is a risk in formally 

developed doctrine being faulty, misleading, and potentially costly in seeking a solution. Theorists tend to describe their theories by using esoteric 

terms that are not well defined or understood. Sometimes they devote verbose discussions in the attempt to coin new words that are nebulous and 

even unintelligible. Doctrine needs to be succinct, clearly written, and easily 

understood if it is to provide a common lexicon and modus operandi for the 

art of warfighting. 

Possibilities for Enhancements

Counterbalancing those risks and concerns is the potential for breakthrough 

ideas allowing special operations to uniquely contribute in the effort to make 
35

Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship

the world a safer and better place to 

live. We are reminded that theory is 

never absolute and final, but always 

in the state of development. Theory 

allows flexibility to consider the 

diverse and changing environment 

and most importantly, innovative 

ideas. It seeks to guide scientific inquiry, but does not necessarily provide 

definitive results. The following are a few possibilities that might be examined by theory. 

Exploring the Doctrinal Fringe Areas of Special Operations

The range and variety of military operations is vast and complex, as is the 

range of variety of special operations itself. From a strategic and whole of 

government point of view, gray areas and gaps exist in both policy and capability. SOF, on occasion, have filled some of those gaps on a short-term basis 

but have not taken the lead for a variety of reasons. Geographic combatant commanders and the Department of State are the default lead agencies 

and often fail to see how special operations can better contribute to the 

effort—especially lacking appreciation for how SOF can contribute early on 

in shaping the environment and later in the conflict termination and resolution stage. The ongoing tug between direct and indirect SOF applications 

need not result in a binary choice on the part of the geographic combatant 

commander. Any special operations theory that improves articulation and 

understanding of special operations capabilities might result in requests for 

forces based on effects rather than specific force packages that are not best 

suited to the requirement. 

Encouraging Scholarly Research

One might ask: what is the practical value of scholarly research? Basically, 

the answer is that it can be of little or no value unless it evolves to another 

level of authenticity such as theory or doctrine. As such, the development 

of theory should attract the best, brightest, and most innovative ideas from 

within and outside the special operations community. Given the numerous 

related disciplines intertwined within and supporting special operations, 

academia and subject matter expertise can be drawn from a wide variety 

Doctrine needs to be succinct, 

clearly written, and easily understood if it is to provide a common 

lexicon and modus operandi for 

the art of warfighting.
36

JSOU Report 17-6

of fields to co-create a context for theory and test it. JSOU provides an ideal 

crucible for the distillation of ideas into theory. From there, given the appropriate scrutiny, a handoff to the doctrine writers could be relatively seamless 

and efficient. 

Enhancing Civil-Military Discourse

One of the most crucial functionalities of doctrine and theory is to communicate ideas on beliefs and principles. The entire concept of special operations 

is strange and ambiguous to most, especially to those outside the community. 

Ironically those outside the community are the ones that decide how and 

what special operations will make its contribution. So-called “theoretical” 

discussions are likely to be perceived as nonthreatening regardless of the 

environment and the audiences involved, but provide an excellent opportunity for participants to learn and express their views. A serious review of 

the military-civil communications failures that have occurred over the past 

half-century compels us to improve on educating and communicating with 

those who control our destiny and the destiny of our nation.29

Illuminating and Refining Enduring Principles

The Special Operations imperatives below were developed in the late 1980s 

while the author was the commanding general of the U.S. Army John F. 

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Although, they seem to be just 

as valid today as they were then, they deserve contemporary scrutiny, parsing, and updating. Given the past several decades of conflict and resultant 

empirical data, considerable evidence exists to provide reinforcement of 

validity or indicators for a need of refinement.

• Understand the operational environment

• Recognize political implications

• Facilitate interagency activities

• Engage the threat discriminately

• Consider long-term effects

• Ensure legitimacy and credibility of special operations

• Anticipate and control psychological effects

• Apply capabilities indirectly

• Develop multiple options

• Ensure long-term sustainment
37

Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship

• Provide sufficient intelligence

• Balance security and synchronization

Special Operations Theory in Context: The Strategic Environment

Strategic lessons (long-term or enduring ones) are learned from the comprehensive study and analysis of war as a whole within its strategic environment—political, diplomatic, military, economic, informational, and 

other domains.30 As stated earlier, the strategic environment provides the 

universe context, and operational content for military theory. However, 

military theory—and for that matter, military doctrine—have no exclusive 

claim on special operations. The strategic missions and environments of 

special operations (political warfare and irregular warfare, in particular) 

are considerably different from those of conventional warfare and require 

an understanding of natural phenomenon outside the operational environment of force-on-force conflict.31 Nonmilitary elements of national power in 

preparation of war, as well as in the conduct of war, are essential ingredients 

of sound military theory.32 Simply put, the overall aim of special operations 

theory (or theories), should be to learn more about the nature and use of 

special operations in the strategic environment of today and in the future 

... nothing more, nothing less.

Special operations managers and leaders need to expand their horizons 

to incorporate the inquiry and learning that takes place in fields other than 

conflict and war. Antebellum applications of SOF are unique value added 

capabilities that need serious attention. An understanding of the humanities, 

political science, social, and behavioral science will be essential to acquiring 

the necessary wisdom to design, negotiate, and implement special operations 

contributions in the future complex and chaotic strategic environment. If 

chaos theory teaches us nothing else, it should instruct us on the importance 

of correctly assessing the initial conditions of the environment. It seems we, 

as a nation, have not been very successful doing so over the past half-century.

Hopefully, at this point, the reader has been persuaded that revolutionary 

thought is possible through diligent, expanded study and scientific inquiry. 

While a unified or single comprehensive theory of special operations might 

not be possible or necessary, there should be no moratorium on seeking good 

ideas in any of the many related special operations fields. As shown earlier, 

current and evolving ‘theories’ abound in special operations related domains 
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JSOU Report 17-6

and attendant sciences. Enlightenment in one field may contribute to a better 

understanding of another field, and so on. Special operations theory can 

and should be a catalyst for new ideas and rich fodder for doctrine, in a 

symbiotic relationship. 

USSOCOM is fortunate enough to have an institution in JSOU, specifically chartered to guide research projects across a broad range of subjects 

and in collaboration with other universities, academia—notwithstanding 

experienced retirees and respected experts in virtually any field; it would be 

tantamount to heresy if pursuit of special operations theory were relegated to 

mere chance findings. The challenge is to understand more, not necessarily 

all, nor completely. 

Endnotes 

1. James D. Kiras, “A Theory of Special Operations: “These Ideas Are Dangerous,” 

Special Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 75–88.

2. For the sake of brevity, the term “doctrine” in this chapter will be referring to 

military doctrine, not the many other applications where the term doctrine could 

be applied, as well.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, March 2017), 125. 

4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSM 5120.01A, Joint Doctrine Development Process (Washington, D.C., Joint Staff, 29 December 2014), B-12. Figure 

1 portrays 11 milestones over a period of 17.5 months as the Notional Joint 

Doctrine Development and Revision Timeline. Keep in mind that notional and 

actual typically will vary significantly.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3170.01I, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (Washington, D.C., Joint Staff, 23 January 

2015). In the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS), recent 

issuances expand this by adding a second P, which refers to “policy.” 

6. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Concepts Division, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (Washington, D.C., Joint Staff, 10 September 2012). 

7. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Concepts Division, Joint Operating Environment 2035: 

The Joint Force in a Contested and Disorderly World (Washington, D.C., Joint 

Staff, 14 July 2016). 

8. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7, Insights and Best Practices Focus 

Paper: Design and Planning, 1st ed. (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J7, July 2013). 

9. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation 

Planning (Washington, D.C., Joint Staff, 11 August 2011), III-1–III-46. 

10. Joint Staff J-7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J7), 7 October 2011, I-3. 
39

Baratto: A Symbiotic Relationship

11. Definition of “theory,” Oxford Living Dictionary – English, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/theory.

12. The categories and types of theories listed herein are by no means inclusive; 

they are only intended to give a sense of the broad range and scope of theories 

in academia unceasingly being studied, scrutinized, challenged, and refined. 

13. Alina Bradford, “What Is a Scientific Hypothesis? | Definition of Hypothesis,” Live 

Science, 17 March 2015, http://www.livescience.com/21490-what-is-a-scientifichypothesis-definition-of-hypothesis.html. 

14. Ibid. 

15. Austin Harrington, Modern Social Theory: An Introduction (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 2005).

16. Harrington, Modern Social Theory, 4.

17. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War), trans. and ed. Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 136. 

18. David Hume, “The Natural History of Religion,” in The Portable Atheist: Essential 

Readings for the Nonbeliever, ed. Christopher Hitchens (Philadelphia: Da Capo 

Press, 2007): 30. 

19. “Military theory,” Wikipedia, last modified 23 November 2016, https://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_theory. 

20. Von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War), 142. 

21. David Maxwell, “Operationalizing Theory” (remarks during panel, Special 

Operations Theory symposium, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, FL, 

30 August 2016). 

22. Milan Vego, “On Military Theory,” Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) 62 (3rd quarter 

2011): 65, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-62.pdf. 

23. Ibid.

24. Some of the more recent references are: John Arquilla, ed., From Troy to Entebbe: 

Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (Lanham, MD. University 

Press of America, 1996); James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From 

World War II to the War on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006); William 

H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and 

Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995); Joe Osborne, “Advancing a Strategic 

Theory of Special Operations,” Small Wars Journal, 13 May 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/advancing-a-strategic-theory-of-special-operations; 

Robert G. Spulak Jr., “A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, 

and Use of SOF,” Military Technology, Special Issue 2009, 23–28. 

25. Following is a partial list of articles, papers, and books on SOF-related theories: 

James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Penguin Books, 1987); 

Robert Jervis, “Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions” in Complexity, Global 

Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski 

(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997); John Schmitt, 

“Command and (Out of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity 
40

JSOU Report 17-6

Theory” in Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security, eds. David S. 

Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997); Maj. Susan E. Durham, Ph.D., “Chaos Theory for the Practical 

Military Mind” (research paper, Air Command and Staff College, March 1997), 

12; Rob Wengrzyn, “The Strategic Management Process” (lecture, Study.com), 

http://study.com/academy/lesson/the-strategic-management-process.html; Harry 

R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy

(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Feb 2006); David 

S. Walonick, Ph.D., Organizational Theory and Behavior, 1993, http://www.statpac.

org/walonick/organizational-theory.htm; Dr. Richard M. Swain, “Commander’s 

Business, Learning to Practice Operational Design,” Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)

53 (2nd quarter 2009): 67; Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in 

a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 155–169; Sherri Hartzell, 

“Bureaucracy: Max Weber’s Theory of Impersonal Management,” (lecture, Study.

com), http://study.com/academy/lesson/bureaucracy-max-webers-theory-ofimpersonal-management.html; Andrew Janiak and Eric Schliesser, Interpreting 

Newton: Critical Essay (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1. 

26. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSM 5120.01A, B-12. As previously 

mentioned, Figure 1 portrays 11 milestones over a period of 17.5 months as the 

Notional Joint Doctrine Development and Revision Timeline. Keep in mind that 

notional and actual typically will vary significantly.

27. JCIDS and professional military education (PME), in particular.

28. Joint Staff J-7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J7), 7 October 2011, I-3. 

29. For a better appreciation of past failures in this arena, read Thomas E. Ricks, 

The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today (New 

York: Penguin Press, 2012); for an in-depth account of civil/military discourse 

failures during the Vietnam War, read H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: 

Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that 

Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997).

30. The elements of soft power are often abstracted as diplomatic, information, military, and economic, or DIME, actions and their political, military, economic, 

social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) effects. For more detail, see 

Roger Hillson, “DIME/PMESII Model Suite Requirements Project,” (final report, 

submitted by the Naval Research Laboratory to OPNAV N81, December 2008). 

31. For a visual portrayal of the role and utility of SOF in three categories of warfare—

political, irregular, and conventional—see Joseph Celeski, Report of Proceedings, 

Joint Special Operations University SOF-Power Workshop: A Way Forward for Special 

Operations Theory and Strategic Art (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 22–23 August 2011), 23. 

32. Julian Lider, Military Theory: Concept, Structure, Problems (Aldershot: Gower, 

1983), 15. 
41

Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future

Chapter 3. Epistemology, Paradigms, and 

the Future of Special Operations Theory 

Robert G. Spulak Jr. 

There is an emerging community of researchers using theory to discuss 

special operations. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a rigorous 

foundation for the application of theory to understanding special operations. In addition, it will provide perspective on how research communities 

historically evolved in their pursuit of understanding and where we are in 

the discovery process.

Theory is an abstraction or explanation of what has been examined that 

allows us to apply what we know to new situations. That is, theory is knowledge that we use to inform our expectations. The first section of this chapter, 

“Epistemology,” explores how knowledge and theories are created. This section relies on the age-old philosophical quest to logically frame how we actually know something. This may seem obtuse, but special operations theory 

as a serious and credible subject deserves to be placed in the appropriate 

context in the pursuit of human knowledge.

Keeping in mind the rigor of the subject matter, it is encouraging that 

the first section comes to some predictable conclusions. Special operations 

theory, dealing mostly with the 

meanings behind human behavior, 

will not be natural scientific theory; 

it will not produce predictions testable by experimentation. A different approach is necessary, more 

common in the social sciences, 

where meanings are discussed and 

Special operations theory, dealing 

mostly with the meanings behind human behavior, will not be 

natural scientific theory; it will not 

produce predictions testable by 

experimentation.

Dr. Robert Spulak Jr. is a JSOU Senior Fellow and the principal point of contact for special operations at Sandia National Laboratories. For more than 20 

years, he has invested significant time with special operations components 

and spent five weeks with a special operations task force in Afghanistan. 
42

JSOU Report 17-6

theories are offered that can be explored to see if they have the power to 

explain.

The second section of this chapter, “Paradigms,” discusses the characteristics of research as a community endeavor. In a scientific community, a 

wide variety of theories get sorted by those that work the best. This collection of theories (and other accepted methods of practice) has been labeled a 

‘paradigm.’ All observations are interpreted by some kind of theory, even if 

it is our own personal theory of how the world functions. Paradigms arise 

for a community to reconcile varying points of view and develop a common 

understanding.

The final section of this chapter, “The Future of Special Operations 

Theory,” discusses the emerging community of practitioners of special operations theory. We are in the pre-paradigm stage of this discussion, where 

no personal theory is allowed to dominate observations or how they are 

interpreted. As the community develops, we will likely see the emergence 

of a paradigm that guides what questions are important, how we approach 

answering those questions, and whether the answers make sense. Some tentative observations about the future are presented in this section, including the 

need for scholarship (e.g., explicitness in presenting a theory) and the likely 

primacy of the interpretive approach. Possible progress toward a paradigm is 

illustrated by examples of how published special operations theories indeed 

used explicitness and the explanatory-interpretive approach. There is an 

emerging discipline of special operations theory and it is unlikely there will 

be one theory of special operations, rather multiple theories about special 

operations within a future paradigm.

With this introduction as your guide we will begin with epistemology, 

the study of how we actually know something, so we can understand the 

creation of special operations theories. 

Epistemology

We want to know about special operations. How do we know something? 

Philosophers and scientists have been debating this topic for thousands of 

years starting with the Greeks (or before).1 Epistemology is the study of how 

to know things, and in epistemology the Traditional Analysis of Knowledge 

says that knowledge is justified true belief.2 Justification means that you 

have enough information to be highly reasonable in believing something, 
43

Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future

whether it is true or not. True means that it corresponds to the facts. Finally, 

the justification itself must not depend upon one or more falsehoods. The 

fun and philosophy begin when we debate whether a justification is highly 

reasonable or whether a belief corresponds to the facts.

The Standard View of knowledge states that “People have a great deal 

of knowledge of the world around them, including some knowledge of the 

past, their current surroundings, the future, morality, mathematics, and so 

on,” and “some of our main sources of knowledge are perception, memory, 

introspection, testimony, and rational insight.”3 So, epistemology is about 

how people ‘know’ things, not about the things themselves.4 (And we know 

a lot about special operations based on observation, direct experience of 

operations, testimony including, e.g., after-action reports, etc.)

But knowing a collection of specific things is not enough. For example, 

we want to inform decisions that leaders might make in providing the right 

resources for the future and in planning and executing operations. We want 

to know how the specific things we know about special operations can be 

extended or organized to be used for those purposes. We want to have a 

‘justified true belief’ about special operations in situations where we have 

not yet had experience, or observations, or reports. Put another way, we want 

to inform our expectations.

We call this knowledge that informs our expectations ‘theory.’ Many 

people are most familiar with theory in a physical or natural scientific context. Scientific theory has been very successful in producing practical results 

extrapolated to new situations. For example, quantum mechanics led to solid 

state physics that led to semiconductors that led to high definition television. Yet, how do we develop a justified true belief in a scientific theory? Can 

that process help us understand how to inform expectations about special 

operations?

Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman succinctly explained testing a scientific 

theory: “If it disagrees with experiment it’s wrong. In that simple sentence is 

the key to science. It doesn’t make any difference how beautiful your guess 

is, it doesn’t make any difference how smart you are, who made the guess, 

or what his name is, if it disagrees with experiment it is wrong. That’s all 

there is to it.”5

Karl Popper makes the point in more detail (but not necessarily better) 

using the language of philosophy:
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JSOU Report 17-6

From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any 

way—an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or what 

you will – conclusions are drawn by logical deduction. We may if 

we like distinguish four different lines along which the testing of a 

theory could be carried out. First there is the logical comparison of 

the conclusions among themselves, by which the internal consistency 

of the system is tested. Second, there is the investigation of the logical 

form of the theory, with the object of determining whether it has 

the character of empirical or scientific theory, or whether it is, for 

example, tautological. Thirdly there is the comparison with other 

theories, chiefly with the aim of determining whether the theory 

would constitute a scientific advance should it survive our tests. 

And finally, there is the testing of the theory by way of empirical 

application of the conclusions that can be derived from it.6

This seems easy enough. The goal is to simplify the situation to the point 

where we can solve it mathematically and make an accurate measurement 

while eliminating or minimizing all the complications (errors) of the real 

world. The power of this approach is illustrated by quantum electrodynamics, which predicts the magnetic moment of the electron to 11 decimal places. 

Experiments agree with the theory until the last decimal place.7 That’s the 

same accuracy as knowing the distance from Los Angeles to New York to 

within the thickness of a human hair. But if a valid measurement disagreed 

with quantum electrodynamics we would have to reexamine the theory.

In addition, physics is reductionist. We assume that we can take the problem apart into simple pieces that we can actually solve, solve those pieces 

exactly, and then put the answers together to get the bigger solution. So, 

for example, when calculating the trajectory of a sniper’s bullet, we have to 

account for range, muzzle velocity, ballistic performance of the bullet, spin 

drift, shooting angle, the rotation of the Earth, altitude, humidity, temperature, atmospheric pressure, and wind. In practice, the ballistic calculator 

you may have as an app on your iPhone can calculate each of these effects 

(predictions of theories) separately, then add up the answers. We can then 

measure the impact point to make sure we did it right.

But Special Operations Forces (SOF) are not electrons or bullets. We don’t 

have a predictive theory of human behavior that we can test. For example, 

suppose you want to know how dedicated a terrorist is to their cause so 
45

Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future

you can predict whether they would actually pull the trigger. You can’t see 

dedication inside the terrorist. The only thing you can observe is how they 

behave. A given level of dedication may result in different behaviors in different people. Some dedicated terrorists may be very vocal in supporting the 

cause while others silently await their opportunity to strike. And a given 

behavior may have more than one explanation. The vocal terrorist may be 

overcompensating for their lack of dedication while the silent one may be 

internalizing their doubts. What is seen and is interpreted depends, to a 

very large degree, on what you are looking for and what you are willing to 

accept as evidence.

The philosophical basis for experimentally-based testing of theories that 

works so well for physics is known as positivism. Positivism asserts that 

knowledge is derived from what we perceive. “The central position of positivism as a philosophy of knowledge is that experience is the foundation of 

knowledge.”8 That is, reasonable justification is based on what we take in 

with our senses. But philosophers dispute whether all knowledge is derived 

this way. In general, they claim there are four basic sources of knowledge: 

“perception, memory, consciousness (sometimes called introspection), and 

reason (sometimes called intuition).”9 And, interestingly, it is difficult to 

describe how, even in the positivistic (scientific) model, one comes up with 

the initial guess at a theory to be tested.10

Special operations theory will be more about people, and what they do 

belongs more in the realm of social science than physics. This is true for 

theories of special operations describing the activities of people (both kinetic 

and non-kinetic) in the larger context of the social activity of conflict, as 

well as theories of SOF as groups of people. As described in the terrorist 

example above, it is difficult to see, or observe, the things you might want 

to measure with people. Some social scientists are positivists because they 

look at questions that can be examined this way. Psychologists often research 

using prediction, experiments, and falsifiability. Even so, I would claim that 

the results are often fuzzier than in physics because you can’t make truly 

reproducible experiments. An electron is an electron is an electron that you 

can put in an identical apparatus, but even with perfect sampling technique 

you can’t replicate the exact same set of people with the exact same histories 

and put them in the exact same circumstances.

Other social scientists, especially those such as anthropologists who 

study groups of people, are generally not positivists.11 These social scientists 
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JSOU Report 17-6

have pretty much made peace with the idea that theory, to them, doesn’t 

mean the same as theory to a physical scientist. They are still interested in 

understanding human behavior, but use other approaches. One approach 

is the humanist-interpretive approach.12 Human interactions are not just 

based on behaviors that can be observed, but on meanings that cannot be 

observed, such as in the terrorist example. One has to explore these meanings by examining them in different ways and offering different interpretations that make sense. Since SOF are a special case of military forces where 

the human dimension reigns supreme, it is this approach that can lead to 

understanding.

An example of the humanist-interpretive approach is “whether King Lear 

is to be pitied or admired as a pathetic leader or as a successful one.”13 This 

may not seem to have much relevance to special operations (like assessing 

the motivation of a terrorist would, for example) but Paul Lieber published a 

2016 Joint Special Operations University occasional paper entitled Rethinking 

Special Operations Leadership: Process, Persuasion, Pre-existing, and Personality.

14 Leadership is an issue of great interest to special operations. And since 

leadership has a meaning that cannot be directly observed, and each specific 

behavior that is observed can be interpreted 

either positively or negatively for ‘leadership,’ 

a strictly positivist approach cannot illuminate what we mean by leadership. “Carefully 

examining the question of Lear, however, and 

producing many possible answers, leads to 

insight about the human condition.”15 Carefully examining special operations leadership 

and producing many possible answers leads to 

insights about what we mean by leadership for special operations.

According to epistemology, developing knowledge implies a theoretical 

component to determine whether a belief is highly reasonable and whether 

it corresponds to the facts. As we will soon see below, even descriptive observations are theory-laden. Everyone has a personal theory or theories of special operations. What we are looking for—having noted the limitations of 

using a natural science approach—is a social science of special operations. In 

addition, science itself (whether natural science or social science) is a community endeavor. Organizing understanding into a coherent whole instead 

Carefully examining 

special operations leadership and producing many 

possible answers leads to 

insights about what we 

mean by leadership for 

special operations.
47

Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future

of a random collection of personal theories requires something more. Historically this whole has been called a paradigm. 

Paradigms

The English word ‘paradigm,’ from the Greek word paradeigma, originally 

meant an exemplar or a standard model to use as an example—the very best 

example of something.16 Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,

17 used the word paradigm to describe the structure of science itself and 

thus changed the meaning of the word forever. 

Kuhn claimed to be looking at science from a historical point of view 

and discussed paradigms as historical facts. He discovered that what he 

called paradigms emerge as people organize themselves into scientific communities. “By choosing it (the term paradigm), I mean to suggest that some 

accepted examples of actual scientific practice – examples of which include 

law, theory, application, and instrumentation together – provide examples 

from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research.”18

According to George Ritzer, this new meaning of paradigm “is a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science. It serves to define what 

should be studied, what questions should be asked, and what rules should be 

followed in interpreting the answers obtained. The paradigm is the broadest 

unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific 

community (or sub-community) from another.”19

Are these kinds of paradigms necessary, or are they merely traditions 

or historical artifacts? What if we had no tradition or consensus of what 

data to collect? What questions should be asked, or what rules should be 

followed in interpreting the answers? One example of such an exercise may 

be what is called ‘big data.’ Big data collects vast amounts of information 

and tests for correlations or patterns.20 Once a number of correlations are 

identified, researchers can try to explain them and perform experiments to 

see whether the explanations make sense. Unfortunately, there are usually 

a great many correlations, many of them spurious, and far too numerous 

to have the time to investigate thoroughly. Unlike looking for your car keys 

under the streetlight instead of where you lost them, David Sarewitz in The 

New Atlantis said, “ big data is like looking all over the world for your keys 

because you can—even if you don’t know what they look like or where you 

might have dropped them or whether they actually fit your lock.”21
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JSOU Report 17-6

But in fact, the data that is chosen to be collected for big data is actually 

the result of someone’s theory of what is important, that is, what plausible 

explanation they think already exists. For example, scooping up all the tweets 

on Twitter for a day means that someone believes that tweets contain useful 

information and that a particular day’s worth of tweets is important. All 

observations, including the ones in some big database, are what is called 

“theory-laden.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains it this way:

All observation involves both perception and cognition. That is, 

one does not make an observation passively, but rather is actively 

engaged in distinguishing the phenomenon being observed from 

surrounding sensory data. Therefore, observations are affected 

by one’s underlying understanding of the way in which the world 

functions, and that understanding may influence what is perceived, 

noticed, or deemed worthy of consideration. In this sense, it can be 

argued that all observation is theory-laden.22

This is one reason why theory is important to understanding. Since, as we 

saw above, knowledge is “justified true belief,” what information we choose 

as highly reasonable in believing something, and also whether our belief 

corresponds to the facts, is “theory-laden” and depends on our underlying 

understanding of the way in which the world functions. This is why it is 

stated above that theory is knowledge that informs our expectations.

In addition, we have seen that the positivist philosophy, where all knowledge is derived from what we perceive, is an arguably inadequate approach 

to understanding special operations. In examining the meanings (which 

cannot be directly observed) behind behaviors (which can be observed) it is 

necessary that there are stated expectations about how to interpret behaviors.

Paradigms are necessary for a community to develop understanding, and 

theories are key parts of a paradigm. In the big data example, the lack of a 

paradigm means that decisions for what data to collect are usually made by 

many different people at different times, and the reasons for including or 

excluding any given data are not explicit. And which correlations to pursue 

are also the result of someone’s theory of what is likely to be important. In 

the earlier terrorist example, observations of a terrorist’s behavior to understand their dedication and thus their likelihood to act (the meaning behind 

behavior) is also theory-laden, and the interpretation of behavior depends 
49

Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future

on the observer. Without agreement in a community, there can be many 

different unknown personal theories operating at the same time.

Kuhn describes three stages of paradigm development. First there is 

“pre-science” where there is no commonly accepted point of view.23 So, no 

personal theory dominates what observations are made or how they are 

interpreted. “The pre-paradigm period, in particular, is regularly marked by 

frequent and deep debates over legitimate methods, problems, and solutions, 

though these serve rather to define schools than to produce agreement.”24

Eventually one theoretical framework (whether described as positivist, 

humanist, otherwise, or a combination) becomes commonly accepted as 

the paradigm. This is the second stage where the paradigm guides observations and interpretations. This stage is called “normal science” by Kuhn. In 

this stage a paradigm has developed that “was sufficiently unprecedented 

to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of 

scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all 

sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve.”25 There 

is plenty of work to do in normal science. “Normal science consists of the 

actualization of that promise (‘of success discoverable in selected and still 

incomplete examples’), an actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by 

increasing the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm’s 

predictions, and the further articulation of the paradigm itself.”26

As a paradigm by definition explains things well, new problems are solved 

and understanding progresses. Often, however, there are credible results that 

don’t fit. These anomalies are not immediately seen as falsifying a theory, 

as Popper and Feynman would require. Often the researchers who produce 

them are accused of errors.27 But as more and more evidence shows up that 

can’t be explained by existing theory, a “crisis” occurs. At that point, new 

achievements that redirect research serves as a new paradigm.28 The concluding section will discuss the emerging community and discipline of special 

operations theory, and discuss how the nature of knowledge and the existence of paradigms affect the future of the discipline. 

The Future of Special Operations Theory

There is an emerging community of practitioners and interest in special 

operations theory, as demonstrated by the 2016 JSOU symposium on special 
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JSOU Report 17-6

operations theory. As we have seen, understanding for its 

own sake necessarily has a theoretical component; even 

descriptive observations are theory-laden. Further, one 

purpose of special operations studies and research is to 

develop understanding to inform leadership decisions 

toward selecting the right resources for future planning 

and operations. Theory becomes the knowledge that informs expectations.

This community includes a number of practitioners who publish theoretical treatments of special operations or apply various theoretical perspectives 

to specific special operations issues e.g., strategy and SOF organizations. A 

very incomplete list includes Navy Admiral (retired) William McRaven,29 

James Kiras,30 Robert Spulak Jr.,31 Jessica Turnley,32 Harry Yarger,33 William Knarr, et al.,34 Colin Gray,35 Richard Shultz,36 and Paul Lieber.37 One 

might argue that not all of the works cited are specifically about a theory 

of special operations, but are applications of psychology, organizational 

theory, sociology, anthropology, conventional military theory, or theories 

from other disciplines, to special operations questions. This certainly does 

not mean there is no emerging discipline of special operations theory. For 

example, astrophysical theory includes electromagnetism, quantum mechanics, gravitation, spectroscopy, nuclear physics, and many other theories. But 

astronomy is a separate discipline where these theories intersect to answer 

unique and important questions.38

Further evidence of an emerging community and discipline is the Special 

Operations Research Association—“a group of scholars, educators, and military personnel (including present and former special operators) who share an 

interest in the field of special operations, ranging from theory to practice”39

that publishes the peer-reviewed Special Operations Journal.

We are still in Kuhn’s “pre-science” stage of paradigm development 

for special operations theory, “marked by frequent and deep debates over 

legitimate methods, problems, and solutions,” in which we enthusiastically 

engaged in the above-mentioned symposium this chapter serves to represent. 

If we are effective in developing understanding of special operations and 

creating useful knowledge that informs the community’s expectations, then 

we will get a paradigm, whether we want one or not. 

Much of special operations theory will be about people, in keeping with 

the SOF Truths: “Humans are more important than hardware, quality is 

better than quantity, special operations forces cannot be mass produced, 

Theory 

becomes the 

knowledge 

that informs 

expectations.
51

Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future

competent special operations forces cannot be created after emergencies 

occur, and most special operations require non-SOF assistance.”40 Turnley, in 

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream,

41 argued 

that SOF’ precarious core value is the quality of its people. It is often not 

politically correct within the larger military to assert that SOF personnel 

are indeed special—a statement that inaccurately implies to some that they 

somehow think they are better than conventional forces.42

Thus, the humanist-interpretive perspective will be important to examine 

meaning. Theory, in this case, is explanatory, not predictive. But this does 

not imply a lack of scholarship; any theory must be carefully constructed and 

clearly communicated. For those unfamiliar with the humanist-interpretive 

approach, two examples can illustrate both explicitness and the power of 

explanation.

In A Theory of Special Operations, the theory for why special operations 

and SOF exist was explicitly stated at the beginning: “Special operations are 

missions to accomplish strategic objectives where the use of conventional 

forces would create unacceptable risks due to Clausewitzian friction. Overcoming these risks requires special operations forces that directly address 

the ultimate sources of friction through qualities that are the result of the 

distribution of the attributes of SOF personnel.”43 The rest of the monograph 

was an exploration of whether this made sense and had the power to explain.

Spec Ops addressed the question of the success and failure of special 

operations raids. This famous book proposed the theory that for raids a 

smaller attacking force could minimize friction and attain a theoretical 

temporary relative superiority by applying certain principles.44 The rest of 

the book used historical case studies to explore whether the theory made 

sense. In both these examples, the idea of Clausewitzian friction was used 

to lead to a reasonable explanation of human behavior. Friction itself is an 

interpretive concept. Clausewitz was trying to explain why people behave 

differently in war: “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing 

is difficult.”45

Neither of the examples above explain everything about special operations. (And neither produce specific predictions that could be tested by 

experiment.) But they could be progress toward a paradigm. Different questions can lead to different theories. Even for a given question and within a 

given paradigm, two researchers may have different interpretive approaches 

and theories that both make sense. They lead to different understandings, 
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JSOU Report 17-6

but combined add to the whole. There is unlikely to be one theory of special 

operations. There will be multiple theories about special operations within 

a future paradigm.

Endnotes 

1. Some more recent famous contributors include Isaac Newton, John Locke, Voltaire, Ernst Mach, and Friedrich von Hayek. Also see: H. Russell Bernard, Social 

Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2013), 2–26. 

2. Richard Feldman, Epistemology, Foundations of Philosophy (Upper Saddle River, 

NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 15–16. 

3. Ibid., 170. 

4. Ibid. And, since it is philosophy, there are also alternative positions besides the 

traditional analysis of knowledge and the standard view. 

5. Richard Feynman, “The Scientific Method” (lecture, Cornell University, 1964), 

accessed 20 December 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OL6-x0modwY. 

6. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino 

Publishing, 2014), 32–33. 

7. Richard P. Feynman, QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 7. 

8. Bernard, Social Research Methods, 17. 

9. Robert Audi, “The Sources of Knowledge,” in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Paul K. Moser, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2002), 72. 

10. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 31. 

11. Bernard, Social Research Methods, 17. 

12. Ibid., 21. 

13. Ibid., 22. 

14. Paul S. Lieber, Rethinking Special Operations Leadership: Process, Persuasion, 

Pre-existing, and Personality (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2016). 

15. Bernard, Social Research Methods, 22. 

16. Ian Hacking, introduction to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, by Thomas 

S. Kuhn (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), xix. 

17. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, ibid. 

18. Ibid., 11. 

19. George Ritzer, Sociology: A Multi-paradigm Science (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 

Inc., 1975), 157. 

20. “The Big Data Conundrum: How to Define It?” Emerging Technology from the 

arXiv, MIT Technology Review, 3 October 2013, accessed 1 February 2017, https://

www.technologyreview.com/s/519851/the-big-data-conundrum-how-to-define-it/. 

There is no consensus on the definition of ‘big data.’ One attempt at a definition 
53

Spulak: Epistemology, Paradigms, and the Future

in this article is: “Big data is a term describing the storage and analysis of large 

and or complex data sets using a series of techniques including, but not limited 

to: NoSQL, MapReduce and machine learning.” 

21. Daniel Sarewitz, “Saving Science,” The New Atlantis, Spring/Summer 2016, 32, 

http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20160816_TNA49Sarewitz.pdf. 

22. James Bogen, “Theory and Observation in Science,” Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), accessed December 20, 2016, 

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/science-theory-observation/. 

23. Thomas S. Kuhn, “The Route to Normal Science,” chap. II in The Structure of 

Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2012). 

24. Ibid., 48. 

25. Ibid., 10–11. 

26. Ibid., 24. 

27. Ibid., 59. Lord Kelvin famously pronounced Wilhelm Roentgen’s discovery of 

x-rays to be a hoax. 

28. Hacking, introduction to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, xxiii. 

29. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: 

Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995). 

30. James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War 

on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006). 

31. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and 

Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007), https://jsou.libguides.

com/ld.php?content_id=2876965; Robert G. Spulak Jr., Innovate or Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, December 

2010). 

32. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF 

are the way SOF are (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2011); Jessica Glicken Turnley, 

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream (Hurlburt 

Field, FL: JSOU Press, February 2008). 

33. Harry R. Yarger, 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, April 2013). 

34. William Knarr, Jessica Glicken Turnley, Dona J. Stewart, Rich Rubright, and 

Jason Quirin, Special Operations Forces Mixed-Gender Elite Teams (Tampa, FL: 

JSOU Press, June 2014). 

35. Colin S. Gray, Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency 

Conversion (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, November 2015). 

36. Richard Shultz, Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization, 

A Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, July 2016). 

37. Lieber, Rethinking Special Operations Leadership: Process, Persuasion, Pre-existing, 

and Personality. 
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JSOU Report 17-6

38. One part of the astrophysics paradigm is that what we observe in the laboratory 

we can apply to the stars. 

39. Homepage, SORA: Special Operations Research Association, accessed 22 December 2016, http://www.specopsjournal.org/home.html. 

40. John M. Collins, “U.S. Special Operations - Personal Opinions,” Small Wars 

Journal, 13 December 2008, accessed 22 December 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.

com/blog/journal/docs-temp/148-collins.pdf. 

41. Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value. 

42. According to Turnley, this reluctance to explicitly state the core value is what 

makes the quality of its people a precarious value for SOF. 

43. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations, 1. 

44. McRaven, Spec Ops. 

45. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War), trans. and ed. Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119–120. 
55

Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power

Chapter 4. Operationalizing SOF Theory: 

A Function of Understanding SOF Power

Bernd Horn 

The Special Operations Forces (SOF) community remains engaged in 

a discussion on whether it requires a theory of SOF and/or special 

operations.1 The reality, however, is that nations have possessed SOF and 

have conducted special operations throughout history. In so doing, tenets 

and principles of effective employment of SOF and the conduct of special 

operations were learned, promulgated, and exercised. As such, arguably 

SOF/special operations “theory” was operationalized by key political and 

military decision makers understanding and advocating for the strategic 

utility of exercising SOF power. 

What is Theory?

Initially, it is important to articulate what is meant by theory. In its simplest form, theory refers to “a supposition or system of ideas explaining 

something,” or in other words, “the principles on which a subject of study 

is based.”2 Military theory, then, provides the framework for understanding the foundation, nature, character, and conduct of warfare, as well as its 

relationship with society. More specifically, a theory of SOF and/or special 

operations would describe the nature, character, and characteristics of SOF 

Colonel Bernd Horn (Canadian Armed Forces, Retired), Ph.D., has held key 

command and staff appointments in the Canadian Armed Forces including 

deputy commander of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, 

commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment and 

Officer Commanding 3 Commando, and the Canadian Airborne Regiment. 

He is currently the command historian for the CANSOFCOM Education and 

Research Centre, and a JSOU Senior Fellow. Horn is also an adjunct professor of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, as 

well as an adjunct history professor at the Royal Military College of Canada. 
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JSOU Report 17-6

and/or special operations to inform political and military decision makers 

on relationships, strategic drivers, actions, and specific conditions required 

for SOF and/or special operations to attain desired political outcomes (or 

national interest).3

Theory is viewed by many to be absolutely necessary to ensure proper 

understanding of SOF, their capabilities, as well as their limitations, particularly under varying circumstances and conditions, so that their employment is best positioned for success. Prussian theorist, Carl von Clausewitz 

explained: 

Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze 

the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first 

sight seems confused, to explain in full the properties of the means 

employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the 

nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in 

a thorough critical inquiry ... Theory exists to that one need not start 

afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but 

will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate 

the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide 

him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield.4

Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, no definitive, comprehensive SOF or 

special operations theory currently exists. Although most national SOF commands or organizations promulgated capstone or doctrinal-type publications 

covering the roles, tasks, capabilities, etc. of SOF and special operations, no 

true theoretical foundation was ever postulated on their role in the formulation and exercise of national power.5

As such, the question becomes: Is the existence of a formalized theory 

essential for the operationalization of the concept or capability? Or, is it 

possible to operationalize the concept or capability through a thorough 

understanding of its nature, use, and employment? An overview of the use 

of SOF and special operations through the years perhaps provides an answer. 
57

Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power

The Employment of SOF and the Conduct of Special 

Operations—A Historical Overview 

French Canadian Raiders

From a North American perspective, there is no better place to start than 

our own “Ranger Tradition.” Arguably, the daring raids, ambushes, and 

stealthy reconnaissance missions undertaken behind enemy lines during 

the colonial struggle for North America encapsulates the very essence of 

special operations. French-Canadian raiders, and later their Anglo-American 

counterparts, conducted daring forays in a harsh climate and unforgiving 

terrain in the face of intractable and often savage opponents. Importantly, 

for an extended period of time, these tactical actions produced strategic 

effect on the bitter struggle for North America. Through the use of selected 

men, hardened and trained in the realities of raiding, the French were able 

to maintain a balance of power in North America. This was despite an overwhelming disparity in numbers, economy, and military strength available 

to the Anglo-American colonies. 

The key to success in these early days was the understanding of the use of 

special operations in the manner of the “Canadian Way of War.”6 Specifically, 

French and Canadian leaders, particularly those with extended exposure to 

the North American manner of war, believed that the optimum war fighting 

technique was achieved by a mixed force that included the military strengths 

of regulars (e.g. courage, discipline, tactical acumen) combined with those of 

volunteers and Indians (e.g. endurance, familiarity with wilderness navigation and travel, as well as marksmanship). The latter group relied more on 

initiative, independent action and small unit tactics than on rigid military 

practices and drills. As such, over generations, governors of New France, 

many born in Canada, came to understand that the use of specially picked 

partisan leaders with trained and experienced small raiding parties, which 

included indigenous allies, was an optimal strategy. These raiding parties 

placed emphasis on stealth, speed, violence of action, physical fitness, and 

courage, and when unleashed on the southern colonies wreaked havoc on 

their enemies. 

The Governors of New France maintained this policy despite the protests 

of senior ranking French military commanders who decried, “the Canadians 

thought they were making war when they went on raids resembling hunting 
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JSOU Report 17-6

parties.”7 For example, Major General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm, the senior 

French commanding general during the French and Indian War (1754–1761), 

often complained of the “petty means” and “petty ideas” of the Canadians.8 

Nonetheless, the Governor of New France, who held ultimate command of 

all military forces in New France, and understood the strategic utility of his 

special raiders, maintained the policy. It remained in effect from 1688 until 

1758, when circumstances put an end to the raiding approach. First, in 1758 

the King of France promoted Montcalm to the rank of Lieutenant General 

and made him commander of all military forces in New France.9

 As such, 

Montcalm ended the policy of la petite guerre because he disagreed with the 

concept and believed it was unable to achieve a strategic effect.10 Second, the 

British decided to concentrate on the New World, and deployed the largest 

contingent of regular forces to the continent up to that time. By the spring 

of 1761, they defeated the French forces and controlled North America. 

Interestingly, the Anglo-Americans created a similar capability. It was 

the success of the French-Canadian raiders that prompted Major General 

William Shirley, commander-in-chief of the British Army in North America, 

to argue: 

It is absolutely necessary for his Majesty’s Service, that one Company 

at least of Rangers should be constantly employ’d [sic] in different 

Parties upon Lake George and Lake Iroquois [Lake Champlain], 

and the Wood Creek and Lands adjacent ... to make Discoveries of 

the proper Routes for our own Troops, procure Intelligence of the 

Enemy’s Strength and Motions, destroy their out Magazines and 

Settlements, pick up small Parties of their Battoes upon the Lakes, 

and keep them under continual Alarm.11

By 1756, Major General Shirley ordered Major Robert Rogers, who had 

begun to make forays behind the French lines to great success, to raise a 

60-man, independent ranger company separate from both the provincial and 

regular units. As such, it was titled “His Majesty’s Independent Company 

(later Companies) of American Rangers.” 

Importantly, for the creation and maintenance of the special raiding 

and scouting capabilities, it required specific political and military decision makers who could see beyond their cultural and organizational biases, 

if not blinders. They would need to understand the strategic utility of a 
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power

specific capability that allowed the implementation and execution of special 

operations. 

The Rise of SOF in WWII

The importance of “champions” to “operationalize” SOF and special operations was further underscored during WWII. In the dark days after the 

Dunkirk evacuation—when conventional minded military commanders 

wanted to focus on the defense (understandably as they had to rebuild, 

reequip, and retrain their army)—United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the former military man, adventurer, and war correspondent insisted on maintaining the initiative by offensive action. Through his 

experience with Boer commandos during the war in South Africa, he also 

understood the value of tying down German forces through raids, sabotage, 

and subversion. As such, he was responsible for the creation of commandos, 

paratroopers, the special operations executive, and what was to become the 

First Special Service Force.12

The Commando raids, despite a slow start and relative short history, 

were for the large part successful, and achieved their aim. They not only 

raised public morale, but also forged a record for perseverance and toughness, as well as tactical, and at times, arguably, strategic success.13 Importantly, Churchill’s prescience prepared the ground for the birth, if not near 

explosion, of other modern SOF. Although not 

popular with the general military, the idea of specially organized and specially trained units, made 

up of intrepid individuals who reveled in challenging and highly-dangerous small unit action 

that called for innovation, individualism, and 

independent action, found allies among a select 

number of senior military commanders. These 

paved the way for such SOF organizations as the Special Air Service, the 

Special Boat Service, the Long Range Desert Group, Phantom, Layforce, 

Popski’s Army, the U.S. Rangers, the Office of Strategic Services, Alamo 

Scouts, Underwater Demolition Teams, to name a few. 

However, this limited, if not conditional, acceptance existed largely only 

at the beginning of the war. During this dark period when the Allies required 

time to rebuild, a few desperate men were able to fill a void—an ability to 

Importantly, 

Churchill’s prescience 

prepared the ground 

for the birth, if not 

near explosion, of 

other modern SOF.
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JSOU Report 17-6

strike out from a position of seeming impotence. And so, special units were 

raised to cover for weakness, as well as to meet specific needs that conventional forces were seen as too unwieldy or poorly trained to accomplish. 

Throughout their short existence during WWII, SOF selection, training, 

and roles, as well as their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) were 

evolved and refined. Although the mainstream military still railed against 

their existence, the few key champions who understood their value allowed 

SOF to make an impressive contribution to the war effort. SOF, through the 

execution of special operations: 

• bought the Allies time to rebuild through offensive action;

• tied down Axis troops in defensive tasks and caused attrition of the 

enemy war effort (i.e., raids, sabotage, and subversion);

• psychologically dislocated the enemy;

• raised secret armies and resistance movements;

• shaped the battlefield for conventional force operations; and

• conducted strategic strikes.14

In fact, one Allied report noted, “the dividends paid by introducing small 

parties of well trained and thoroughly disciplined regular troops to operate 

effectively behind the enemy lines can be out of all proportion to the numbers involved.”15 Regardless of SOF’ proven track record of success and strategic utility throughout the war, virtually all special operations organizations 

were disbanded at its end. It was not a question of a lack of theory for SOF 

or special operations, but rather philosophical and organizational culture 

biases of the mainstream military. Even for the champions that remained, 

the cost of fighting to preserve capability (once the crisis was over) seemed 

not worth the fight. 

Savage Wars of Peace in the Post-War Era

Significantly, the post-war era did not provide war-weary and debt-ridden 

governments or their publics with a prolonged period of peace. The onset of 

the Cold War in 1948, the Korean War a few years later, as well as a myriad of 

“brushfire” wars created another set of crises.16 Once again, SOF were tapped 

to conduct direct action raids, special reconnaissance, counterinsurgency, 

and unconventional warfare (i.e., raise secret armies and resistance movements behind enemy lines). Experience in theatres such as Korea, Malaya, 

Oman, and Borneo revealed to political and military decision makers that 
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power

SOF, when employed correctly, had a “comparatively low cost in lives set 

against results achieved.”17 Moreover, frugal bureaucrats realized that SOF 

provided an inexpensive means of waging war against insurgents in distant 

places, often largely on their own. Once again, understanding and belief 

in the strategic utility of SOF, particularly during periods of crisis, led to 

its creation, maintenance, and employment. Institutional enmity, however, 

ensured its marginalization within the larger military establishment.18

Still, key political and military decision makers’ understanding of SOF’ 

strategic utility has allowed SOF to break the artificial barriers and marginalization by the greater military institution. The absence of an established 

and endorsed theory or doctrine played no role. For example, against huge 

institutional resistance, in May 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced 

to a joint session of Congress: “I am directing the Secretary of Defense to 

expand rapidly and substantially ... the orientation of existing forces for 

the conduct of ... unconventional wars. In addition, our special forces and 

unconventional warfare units will be increased and reoriented.”19 Kennedy 

understood the strategic utility of SOF in the savage wars of peace in the 

post-war era.

Ironically, and despite their pushback, conventional military decision 

makers also comprehended the value of SOF/special operations. When the 

complexities of the Vietnam conflict (e.g., terrain, population, locating the 

enemy, interdicting supply lines) confounded conventional military commanders, they were quick to create new SOF units or expand existing ones to 

address the requirements. SOF could carry out such unique tasks as unconventional warfare, long-range reconnaissance, interdiction, and riverine 

operations in politically restrictive and environmentally hostile theatres of 

operation. For example, the U.S. Special Forces (SF), or “Green Berets,” were 

dramatically increased in size and undertook such programs as the Strategic 

Hamlet Program and later became responsible for the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA)-funded Civil Irregular Defense Group program which largely 

involved raising local defense forces capable of defending their villages. However, SF also undertook activities such as improving agricultural practices, 

improving sanitation and water supply, as well as building and occupying 

fortified camps from which fighting patrols by SF and Civil Irregular Defense 

Group soldiers could be mounted.20 In addition, Navy SEALs were created 

in 1962, as was the Studies and Observation Group in 1964, as well as 13 

long range reconnaissance companies in 1965, which were four years later 
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JSOU Report 17-6

collectively designated the 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger).21 Furthermore, 

projects Delta, Omega, and Gamma, were sequential programs to create 

battalion-sized SOF units comprised of both U.S. and Vietnamese personnel—ones capable of long-range reconnaissance and raiding.22

The Rise of Terrorism in the West 

Not surprisingly, at the termination of the Vietnam War, SOF were once 

again relegated to the periphery.23 Again, it was not a lack of theory or doctrine to derive longstanding purpose, rather once again it was institutional 

bias. Despite Kennedy’s urging, as [former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff] General Maxwell Taylor revealed, “not much heart went into [the] 

work [of placing greater emphasis on SOF].” General Taylor, like many senior 

commanders, believed that SOF didn’t provide anything unique that “any 

well-trained unit” could not do.24

It was a fundamental shift to the perceived threat to Western nations, 

one that began to make itself known in the 1960s, but seemed to explode 

in the 1970s, that once again placed an emphasis on SOF. Terrorism hit the 

West with a vengeance. Bombings, kidnapping, murders, and the hijacking 

of commercial aircraft seemingly emerged out of nowhere, and not just in 

the Middle East. European countries were thrust into a state of violence as 

both homegrown and international terrorists waged a relentless war that 

recognized no borders or limits. The murder of Israeli athletes at the 1972 

Olympics in Munich, West Germany, became a defining image of the crisis, 

as did the 1975 terrorist assault on the headquarters of the Office of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Vienna, Austria.25

Seemingly no country was immune to the onslaught of terror. As a result, 

every state required a capability to deal with the threat. Quite simply, fighting terrorism required specific skills not resident 

within the military institution at large. As such, 

by the late 1970s, SOF were once again targeted 

to provide the solution. After all, who better than 

specially selected individuals who were capable 

of agile thought, are adaptable in operations, 

and possess superior martial skills? New units 

were created, or existing ones assigned new tasks. Almost universally, most 

countries developed specialist counterterrorism organizations to deal with 

Quite simply, fighting 

terrorism required specific skills not resident 

within the military 

institution at large.
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power

the problem.26 Despite this new evolution, for the mainstream military, SOF 

were simply seen as taking on another niche, designer task, one not yet fully 

recognized as a mainstream military function.

Importantly, the pattern continued. SOF and special operations—based 

on historical practice, evolution, and record of performance—were identified as capable of taking on the new task. The absence of theory or doctrine 

did not stop its employment. Key personalities who understood and supported SOF’ strategic utility were able to push to attain the necessary levels 

of approval. The same transpired even after the tragic failure at Desert One in 

Iran (i.e., the failed rescue attempt of the American hostages held at the U.S. 

embassy in Tehran) in 1980 (which was laid at the feet of American SOF) and 

the lackluster performance of the United States Special Operations Forces 

during Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada.27

Creation of USSOCOM to Present Day

On 13 April 1987, due to their understanding and advocacy of the utility of 

SOF power, SOF champions in the Pentagon and Congress were able to push 

past Service resistance and establish the United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM).28 Subsequently, SOF employment began to increase 

in the 1990s. The performance of the United States Special Operations Forces, 

as well as some of its allies, in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, where it conducted 

strategic reconnaissance, direct action raids, economy of effort activities such 

as deception operations, and liaison/training missions with less advanced 

non-NATO coalition partners, demonstrated SOF’ capability. However, what 

cemented SOF’ utility in the eyes of decision makers and the public-at-large 

was its “Scud busting”—a strategically essential task critical to maintaining the integrity of the coalition by keeping Israel from retaliating against 

Saddam Hussein’s continued Scud missile attacks on Israeli soil. SOF were 

given the difficult task of locating and destroying the mobile launchers.29 

They rose to the challenge and emerged from the war a stronger entity. SOF’ 

next public exposure was hunting down persons indicted for war crimes in 

the former Yugoslavia and Africa during the mid-1990s.30

SOF were now seemingly in ascendency. The invasion of Afghanistan in 

the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center towers in 

2001 culminated SOF’ growing importance. The American public demanded 

retribution and political and military decision makers were looking for a 
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JSOU Report 17-6

means of striking back swiftly and effectively. The rapid deployment of CIA 

operatives and 316 SF soldiers working with Northern Alliance, combined 

with Joint Terminal Air Controllers and precision air, resulted in the rout 

of al-Qaeda and their Taliban sponsors in only 49 days (from the insertion of the first American SF teams to the fall of Kandahar).31 This success 

prompted analysts, decision makers, and scholars to refer to SOF as the 

“force of choice.”32 Subsequent persistent wars against terrorists and their 

networks in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, 

to list a few of the problem areas, cemented the strategic utility of SOF and 

the exercise of special operations. 

Importantly, SOF organizations, their TTP, and employment continued 

to grow and expand. Again, employment and investment of SOF was not a 

function of elaborate theory or refined doctrine. Rather, it was a function 

of senior political and military decision makers understanding the strategic 

utility of SOF—specifically SOF power. 

SOF’ Strategic Utility and the Rise of SOF Power

The evolution of SOF, from a concept born from weakness in the early days 

of WWII to a force of choice in the post 9/11 environment is intricately tied 

to SOF’ strategic utility in the contemporary operating environment. SOF’ 

indispensable relevance to decision makers in providing them with a wide 

scope of cost efficient, low risk, and effective options is precisely the driving 

force behind SOF power. Their ability to produce on short notice, courses of 

action and desirable outcomes, in a number of domains, regardless of location, with a high probability of success, give them great saliency to political 

and military decision makers. After all, arguably, the acid test of strategic 

utility is what an organization contributes to national power and the ability 

to project or defend national interests. 

Strategy, in essence, is about ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), 

and means (resources). Military strategy specifically is commonly understood to mean the application of, or threat of the use of, military force to 

achieve political ends.33 Therefore, for SOF to be a “force of choice,” or to 

demonstrate “SOF power,” means that SOF must have substantive value 

in the exercise of national interest. In short, they must deliver capability 

complementary to traditional conventional ones delivered by the Services, as 
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power

well as expand the option space for political and/or military decision makers 

to achieve desired outcomes. 

Importantly, throughout their evolution, SOF have responded quickly, 

adaptively, and with agility to changing circumstances and threats. Their 

strategic utility to political and military decision makers, and their ability to assist with the protection and projection of the national interest has 

made SOF a “force of choice,” which in turn is a manifestation of “SOF 

power.” In essence, the concept of SOF power represents three fundamental 

components:

1. Capability—the ability to deploy specially selected, intelligent, innovative, risk accepting, adaptive, highly-trained individuals capable of 

performing a wide spectrum of tasks, from precision kinetic actions 

(e.g. direct action) to non-kinetic operations (e.g. military assistance) 

in any environment or circumstance;

2. Effect—the ability for SOF to act as a military instrument delivering a 

precision kinetic effect to achieve a military objective(s), or as a foreign 

policy tool by providing assistance to allied or friendly nations; and 

3. Cost—the small footprint and low visibility of SOF allow for relatively 

low costs in both fiscal expenditure for operations and in terms of 

commitment. SOF team(s) or task force(s) represents a relatively small 

commitment and is generally not interpreted by national publics as 

“boots on the ground.” As such, it is easier to tailor host nation commitment expectations and it is easier to withdraw forces should the 

situation become tenuous or undesirable. Furthermore, the likelihood 

of high casualties is minimized, which often acts as a lightning rod 

for criticism, further action, or commitment. 

It is therefore the ability of political and military decision makers to 

understand SOF power that has, in essence, operationalized the formally 

unstated “theory.” Specifically, decision makers who understand SOF power 

have come to realize that SOF furnish:

1. High readiness, low profile, task-tailored special operations task force 

and/or SOF teams that can be deployed rapidly, over long distances, 

and provide tailored proportional responses to a myriad of different 

situations;
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2. Highly trained technologically enabled forces that can gain access to 

hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas;

3. Discrete forces that can provide discriminate precise kinetic and 

non-kinetic effects; 

4. A deployed capable and internationally recognized force, yet with a 

generally lower profile and less intrusive presence than larger conventional forces;

5. An economy of effort foreign policy implement that can be used to 

assist coalition and/or allied operations;

6. A rapidly deployable force that can assess and survey potential crisis 

areas or hot spots to provide “ground truth” and situational awareness 

for governmental decision makers;

7. A highly trained, specialized force capable of providing a response to 

ambiguous, asymmetric, unconventional situations that fall outside 

of the capabilities of law enforcement agencies, conventional military, 

or other government departments;

8. A force capable of operating globally in austere, harsh, and dangerous 

environments with limited support. SOF are largely self-contained and 

can communicate worldwide with organic equipment and provide 

limited medical support for themselves and those they support; 

9. A culturally attuned special operations task force or SOF team that can 

act as a force multiplier with the ability to work closely with regional 

civilian and military authorities and organizations, as well as populations through defense, diplomacy, and Military Assistance/Security 

Force Assistance initiatives;

10. A force capable of preparing and shaping environments or battle 

spaces (i.e., setting conditions to mitigate risk and facilitate successful 

introduction of follow-on forces); and

11. A force able to foster interagency and interdepartmental cooperation.34

It is within the exercise of SOF power that SOF demonstrates their strategic utility to political and military decision makers. This ability in turn 

has been one of, if not, the critical reason, why SOF have evolved from 
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power

historically existing in the margins of military institutions to currently where 

SOF are a mainstream, recognized capability.

How to Operationalize SOF Theory 

In summary, accepting that there is no formalized/recognized SOF theory 

for SOF or special operations in place, how is it that SOF evolved to its 

current era described as the “Golden Age of SOF”?35 How was SOF power, 

albeit in an informal, evolving, and highly comprehended state by political 

and military decision makers, operationalized? Based on the rudimentary 

historical analysis conducted in this chapter, it appears there are a number 

of key factors/benchmarks required to informally operationalize SOF power. 

These are:

1. Create Capability. Intuitively and practically it is necessary to create 

a capability that demonstrates strategic utility relevance to decision 

makers. It needs to provide viable options that allow them to attain 

national objectives, whether it is to buy time, maintain the strategic 

offensive, tie down enemy war efforts, attack networks, provide strategic intelligence, etc. To achieve this normally requires a well-placed 

champion(s). Most importantly, it demands highly trained and capable 

personnel able to deal with complex (i.e., unknown and constantly 

changing) and ambiguous environments.

2. Educate political and military decision makers. Most individuals, 

particularly those in senior positions of responsibility bring with them 

their own experiential baggage (i.e., what worked to get them where 

they are) and are normally risk averse as they will wear any failure. 

As such, it is exceedingly important to socialize and educate these 

decision makers with regard to the capability, its effectiveness, and its 

ability to translate military action into political reward.

3. Prove capability. Theory and demonstrations only go so far in building 

trust and capability. The proof is always found in successful execution 

of operational expertise. The greater the “political reward” of an action 

or the amount of successful operations undertaken, the greater the 

trust, credibility, and “capital” accrued. 
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4. Have a proactive strategic communication plan. Success shared 

within a closed group is of little utility to the organization. In addition, the inability of political and military decision makers to reap 

their political “reward” can also dampen the usefulness of a given 

operation. Operational security to protect identities, methodologies, 

TTP, etc., is paramount. However, a proactive, informative narrative that explains the importance and utility of the SOF capability is 

increasingly important in an information rich environment. Building 

a constituency for SOF is an important component of maintaining 

strategic relevance, as well as insurance, should a catastrophic failure 

occur. Unknown to the public, SOF would fall to the mythology of the 

narrative that SOF are uncontrolled, unaccountable secret warriors run 

amok. With a sustained narrative, the discourse becomes one of the 

challenges of operating in an extremely hostile, volatile, and complex 

security environment. 

5. Safeguard uniqueness. Strategic relevance rests on what SOF can 

contribute to the attainment of national objectives/national interest. As 

such, SOF must remain innovative and agile, adjusting to the changing 

threats and security environment. To rest on hard-won laurels, competencies, roles, and tasks, risks being left behind as other conventional or 

other organizations begin to demonstrate those capabilities; or, worse 

yet, the opponents or security environment evolves/morphs to a degree 

that SOF are unable to meet the new challenges and threats that arise.

6. Remain strategically relevant. In keeping with the previous point, it 

is essential that SOF maintain its salience/strategic utility. SOF must 

always offer decision makers a wide range of precision kinetic and 

non-kinetic options to address challenges in the international security environment. It is this utility that empowers SOF to continue to 

be resourced and trusted to execute missions in the national interest.

In the end, the absence of a formal theory on SOF and special operations 

did not limit SOF’ ability to evolve into a force of choice. What was and is 

always vital to SOF’ existence and ascendency is ensuring that key political 

and military decision makers fully understand SOF power and its ability, at 

relatively low cost and risk, to achieve national objectives and support the 

national interest. 
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power

Endnotes

1. Canadian Special Operation Forces Command. An Overview (Ottawa: Department 

of National Defence, 2008), 7, http://www.cansofcom.forces.gc.ca/pub/doc/oveape-eng.pdf. For the purpose of this chapter the Canadian doctrinal definition 

of SOF will be utilized, specifically: “Special Operation Forces are organizations 

containing specially selected personnel that are organized, equipped and trained 

to conduct high-risk, high value special operations to achieve military, political, 

economic or informational objectives by using special and unique operational 

methodologies in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas to achieve desired 

tactical, operational and/or strategic effects in times of peace, conflict or war.” 

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, 4th ed. (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 

June 2015), A8. Similarly, special operations are defined as: “Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training 

often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and 

characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low 

visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional 

expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. 

2. Katherine Barber, ed., Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford 

University Press, 2004), 1613. 

3. See: Joe Osborne, “Advancing a Strategic Theory of Special Operations,” Small 

Wars Journal, 13 May 2016, accessed 14 May 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/

jrnl/art/advancing-a-strategic-theory-of-special-operations; and Milan Vego, 

“On Military Theory,” Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) 62 (3rd quarter 2011): 60. 

4. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War), trans. and ed. Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 163. 

5. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: 

Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995); James D. Kiras, Special 

Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (New York: 

Routledge, 2006); Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, 

Qualities, and Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007), https://

jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=2876965. Some effort has been made to 

develop a theory. McRaven’s case studies focused solely on stronghold breakin and he laid out the concept of “relative superiority”—namely, the ability of 

SOF to gain a temporary decisive advantage even over a larger or well-defended 

enemy force. From his case studies, he derived the key principles of surprise; 

speed; purpose; security; repetition; and simplicity. Kiras postulated that the 

cumulative effect of numerous disparate special operations, in conjunction 

with conventional forces, was working toward a common goal of attrition of 

an adversary’s key moral and material resources. Finally, Spulak argued special 

operations were missions undertaken to accomplish strategic objectives when 

the use of conventional forces would create unacceptable risks due to Clausewitzian friction. Although all are excellent works in their own right, none are 

considered adequate to provide the necessary comprehensive theory for SOF or 

special operations. 
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6. Bernd Horn, “La Petite Guerre: A Strategy of Survival,” in The Canadian Way of 

War: Serving the National Interest, ed. Bernd Horn (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 

2006), 21–56; and Bernd Horn, “Only for the Strong of Heart: Ranging and the 

Practice of la Petite Guerre During the Struggle for North America,” in Show No 

Fear: Daring Actions in Canadian Military History, ed. Bernd Horn (Toronto: 

Dundurn Press, 2008), 17–64. 

7. C.P. Stacey, Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle, ed. Donald Graves (Toronto: 

Robin Brass Studio, reprint 2002), 33. 

8. H.R. Casgrain, ed., Lettres et Pièces Militaires: Instructions, Ordres, Mémoires, 

Plans de Campagne et de Défense 1756–1760 (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frére, 1891), 

45; Martin L. Nicolai, “A Different Kind of Courage: The French Military and the 

Canadian Irregular Soldier during the Seven Years’ War,” Canadian Historical 

Review 70, no. 1 (1989): 59–64. 

9. The promotion and appointment was the result of Montcalm’s victory at Ticonderoga in 1758. He then decided to pull back from the frontier and concentrate his 

defenses at Montreal and Quebec, believing that he could defeat the superior British forces from an entrenched defensive position as he had done at Ticonderoga.

10. M. Pouchot, Memoirs on the Late War in North America between France and 

England (1781; repr., Youngstown, NY: Old Fort Niagara Association, Inc., 1994), 

242. La petite guerre is, in essence, small-scale irregular warfare. The literal 

translation is “small war.” European understanding of “petite guerre” was warfare “carried on by a light party, commanded by an expert partisan ... separated 

from the army, to secure the camp or a march; to reconnoiter the enemy or the 

country; to seize their posts, convoys and escorts; to plant ambuscades, and to 

put in practice every stratagem for surprising or disturbing the enemy.”

11. John R. Cuneo, Robert Rogers of the Rangers (New York: Oxford University Press, 

1959), 33. 

12. Colonel Bernd Horn, “Strength Born From Weakness: The Establishment of the 

Raiding Concept and the British Commandos,” Canadian Military Journal, 6, 

no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 59–68. 

13. Hilary St. George Saunders, The Green Beret: The Story of the Commandos, 

1940–1945 (London: Michael Joseph, 1949); Louis Mountbatten, Combined 

Operations. The Official Story of the Commandos (New York: The Macmillan 

Company, 1943); Brigadier T.B.L. Churchill, “The Value of Commandos,” Royal 

United Services Institute (RUSI) 65, no. 577, February 1950, 85. 

14. For a sampling of SOF achievements, see: Colonel Bernd Horn, “Reckoning: The 

Value of SOE in the Second World War,” chap. 10 in A Most Ungentlemanly Way 

of War: The SOE and the Canadian Connection (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2016); 

McRaven, Spec Ops; James Ladd, Commandos and Rangers of World War II (New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); and Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History 

of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York: Liveright 

Publishing Corporation, 2013), 313–317. 
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power

15. “Precis of a Memorandum by Commander 1 Airborne Corps on the Value and 

Future Use of SAS Regiment” (WO 193/705, “Future of SAS Regiment,” National 

Archives [UK]) 1. 

16. The term “brushfire” war is a term commonly used to refer to small-scale conflict 

or war that erupts, but is not part of an officially declared war. In the post-War 

era, this referred to a large number of “wars of national liberation,” and/or 

communist insurgencies (depending on perspectives). Borneo, Malaya, Oman, 

Yemen, Vietnam, and Algeria are but a few examples. 

17. Ken Connor, Ghost Force: The Secret History of the SAS (London: Weidenfeld 

Military, 1998), 54–55 and 84–86; Anthony Kemp, The SAS: Savage Wars of Peace, 

1947 to the Present (London: Penguin, 2001), 38; Tony Geraghty, Inside the SAS 

(Toronto: Methuen, 1980), 49. 

18. Bernd Horn, “Love ‘Em or Hate ‘Em: Learning to Live with Elites,” Canadian 

Military Journal 8, no. 4 (Winter 2007–2008): 32–43. 

19. Jon E. Lewis, The Mammoth Book of Covert Ops (Philadelphia: Running Press, 

2014), 360. 

20. Colonel Scott Crerar, “The Special Force Experience with the Civilian Irregular 

Defence Group (CIDG) in Vietnam,” chap. 5 in Force of Choice: Perspectives on 

Special Operations Forces, eds. Bernd Horn, J. Paul de B. Taillon, and David Last 

(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004); Robin Moore, The Green 

Berets (New York: Ballantine, 1985), 99–119; Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional 

Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 

Institution Press, 1997), 14–20; and Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green 

Berets: The Story of the U.S. Army Special Forces (New York: Berkley Books, 1985), 

72–73. An example of the spike in growth was the Special Warfare Centre, which 

on average graduated less than 400 individuals in a given year. By 1962, the 

selection rate, which was historically 10 percent, shot up to 30 percent. By 1964, 

it had swelled to 70 percent. The following year, SF accepted, for the first time, 

6,500 first-term enlistees and second lieutenants! Not surprisingly, the emphasis 

on quality—that is, ability, experience, maturity, and skill—was ignored in favor 

of quantity. 

21. John D. Lock, To Fight with Intrepidity: The Complete History of the U.S. Army 

Rangers, 1622 to Present (New York: Pocket Books, 1998), 330–438. 

22. Robert M. Gillespie, Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011); Susan Marquis, Unconventional 

Warfare, 14-20; John L. Plaster, SOG: The Secret War of America’s Commandos 

in Vietnam (reprint, New York: Onyx, 1997); Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Secret 

War Against Hanoi: The Untold Story of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors 

in North Vietnam (New York: Perennial, 2000); Thomas K. Adams, US Special 

Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (London: 

Routledge, 1998), 78–149. 

23. SOF performance in Vietnam is contentious. The sudden spike in demand for 

SOF personnel was met, in many cases, by lowering selection standards, where 
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in fact they existed, which inevitably led to a diminution of the overall standard 

of individuals serving in those units. In theatre, the SOF culture of lax discipline 

and deportment, as well as ‘unconventional’ tactics, exacerbated by the type of 

inexperienced, and often immature, individuals who were now serving in SOF, 

created difficulties. Rightly or wrongly, the reputation of SOF suffered. They 

became viewed by the conventional military, as well as by much of the public, 

as largely a collection of ill-disciplined cowboys, and soldiers of questionable 

quality and planning ability, who were running amok without adequate control 

mechanisms. 

24. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, 70, 148. 

25. Peter Harclerode, Secret Soldiers: Special Forces in the War Against Terrorism 

(London: Cassell & Co., 2000); Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists: Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics, 2nd ed. (New York: Facts on File, 

1982); and Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 62–65. 

26. Major-General Ulrich Wegener, “The Evolution of Grenzschutzgruppe (GSG) 

9 And the Lessons of ‘Operation Magic Fire’ in Mogadishu,” chap. 7 in Force of 

Choice: Perspectives on Special Operations Forces, eds. Bernd Horn, J. Paul de 

B. Taillon, and David Last (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004); 

David Miller, Special Forces: The Men, the Weapons and the Operations (London: 

Salamander Books, 2002), 18–73; Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta 

Force: A Memoir by the Founder of the U.S. Military’s Most Secretive SpecialOperations Unit (New York: Dell, 1983); and Leroy Thompson, The Rescuers. The 

World’s Top Anti-Terrorist Units (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1986). 

27. Beckwith and Knox, Delta Force, 216–262; Adams, 163–167; Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 69–73; and Colonel John T. Carney, Jr., and Benjamin F. Schemmer, No Room for Error: The Covert Operations of America’s Special Tactics Units 

from Iran to Afghanistan (New York: Presidio Press, 2003), 84–100. 

28. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History, 3rd ed. (Tampa, FL: Department of Defense, 1999), 3-16; Marquis, 

Unconventional Warfare, 69–226; Department of Defense, United States Special 

Operations Forces: Posture Statement 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Department of 

Defense, 2000), 11–14; and Tom Clancy and John Gresham, Special Forces: A 

Guided Tour of U.S. Army Special Forces (New York: Berkley Books, 2001), 10–27. 

29. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations Command History, 42–44; William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive 

Enemy Ground Targets. Lesson from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 42; B.J. Schemmer, “Special Ops Teams Found 29 

Scuds Ready to Barrage Israel 24 Hours Before Ceasefire,” Armed Forces Journal 

International, July 1991, 36; Mark Thompson, Azadeh Moaveni, Matt Rees, and 

Aharon Klein, “Iraq: The Great Scud Hunt,” Time, 23 December 2002, 34; and 

Cameron Spence, Sabre Squadron (London: Michael Joseph, 1997). 

30. USSOCOM History and Research Office, United States Special Operations 

Command History, 44–69; Carney and Schemmer, No Room for Error, 245–282; 
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Horn: A Function of Understanding SOF Power

Department of Defense, Posture Statement 2000, 15–23; and Adams, US Special 

Operations Forces in Action, 244–286. 

31. Glenn Goodman, “Tip of the spear: US Army Special Forces take on high profile 

in global war on terrorism,” Armed Forces Journal International 139, no. 11 (June 

2002): 34–35; Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger (New 

York: Ballantine Books, 2003), xix, 2; and Carney and Schemmer, No Room for 

Error, 7. 

32. Bernd Horn, J. Paul de B. Taillon and David Last, Force of Choice: Perspectives 

on Special Operations (Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2004); and 

Colonel Bernd Horn and Major Tony Balasevicius, eds., Casting Light on the 

Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on Special Operations Forces (Toronto: Dundurn 

Press, 2007). 

33. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy. A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 

2013), 194–195; and Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18. 

34. Canada Department of National Defence, CANSOFCOM Capstone Concept for 

Special Operations 2009 (Ottawa: DND, 2009), 4–5. 

35. Dan Lamothe, “Retiring top Navy SEAL: ‘We are in the golden age of Special 

Operations,” The Washington Post, 29 August 2014, accessed 3 December 2016, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/08/29/retiringtop-navy-seal-we-are-in-the-golden-age-of-special-operations-2/?utm_term=.

a8663dc140d9. 

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Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare

Chapter 5. A Blueprint for What is 

Possible: The Value in a Theory of Special 

Warfare 

Travis Homiak 

In August 2016, the Joint Special Operations University hosted a symposium on special operations theory. The purpose of the gathering was 

not, as one might have expected, to debate the finer points of theory among 

academics and long-time Special Operations Forces (SOF) practitioners. 

Rather, the symposium was held to determine whether there was a requirement for a theory of special operations in the first place. The conclusion of 

this writer is that such a need does exist 

if only to provide policymakers with a 

better understanding of what special 

operations can do as an element of the 

nation’s military power. At a minimum, 

the result might help demystify special 

warfare and increase its viability as a policy option. Insofar as we are able 

to move toward realizing such goals, theory will prove its value to special 

operations. 

It is surprising that this debate continues unabated: a substantial body of 

work addressing the theoretical aspects of special operations and SOF already 

exists. Most notably Admiral William McRaven's (U.S. Navy, Retired) work 

on relative superiority (1995); Robert Spulak’s A Theory of Special Operations: 

The Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF (2007); and Harry (Rich) Yarger’s 21st 

Lieutenant Colonel Travis L. Homiak (U.S. Marine Corps) is a special operations officer with experience at the operational and policy level. His research 

interests include civil-military relations, defense policy, and organizational 

dynamics. He is currently serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, 

Concepts, and Assessments (G-5) at Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

At a minimum, the result might 

help demystify special warfare 

and increase its viability as a 

policy option.
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Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations (2013), to 

name but a few. In addition, special operations research has recently emerged 

as a distinct field of study. Championed by [U.S. Army Command and General Staff College] Dr. Christopher Marsh, among others, the field is intent 

on applying rigor and scientific methods to the study of special operations 

for the benefit of a wider audience. Notwithstanding the creation of a new 

field or the significant thinking done by those previously mentioned, the 

debate surrounding the utility of a standalone theory of special operations 

continues. One reason is that no theory has yet surfaced that adequately 

canvases the spectrum of special operations or is so widely accepted by the 

community as to be considered universal. At least in part, the nature of special operations itself accounts for the lack of theory, accepted or otherwise. 

Many attributes of special operations run counter to the creation of a 

unified theory or discourage the use of theory in general. Borrowing from 

another prospective theory, special operations have historically been about 

doing the “extraordinary” to achieve a specific effect (often aimed at the 

operational or strategic levels of war).1 If one accepts that the defining characteristic of a special operation is its “extraordinary” nature in relation to 

more “ordinary” military activities, then it follows that special operations 

are in a constant state of flux.2 They adapt and change just as military operations and capabilities adapt to fit what Clausewitz identifies as the “ever 

changing character of warfare.”3 Any theory needs to be sufficiently flexible 

to accommodate this fact. Second, the special operations community sees 

little utility in theory. As one might expect, the community is dominated 

by operationally-focused practitioners who are results-driven, and appear 

to have little use for theory in the day-to-day performance of their trade. 

This is not to say that these individuals are not deep thinkers or have no 

interest in moving their profession forward. Rather, they overwhelmingly 

focus on overcoming the day-to-day tactical problems related to current and 

future operations, and put forth much less effort on pushing the theoretical boundaries of their profession. As a final point, military professionals 

and academics have, for a multitude of reasons, been content to let special 

operations nest within general theories of warfare. The earlier reference to 

Clausewitz reinforces this point. Until recently, there was no requirement or 

movement afoot to create a theory specific to special operations. 

This chapter will argue that there is value in a SOF-specific theory; one 

that is relevant to the SOF practitioner in two ways. First, an accepted theory 
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Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare

of special operations can provide both military and civilian leaders with a 

common departure point from which to understand how special operations 

may be used and what these operations might achieve. Second, having a 

theory will prove beneficial to SOF practitioners by enabling them to have a 

set of principles upon which they can anticipate specific actions and counteractions among both enemies and partners. Inspiration for this chapter came 

from the opening remarks made by Lieutenant General Charlie Cleveland 

(U.S. Army, Retired), former commander of United States Army Special 

Operations Command (USASOC), at the Joint Special Operations University 

symposium. General Cleveland, an advocate for a SOF-specific theory put 

forth that “theory has use in that it provides policymakers with a blueprint 

demonstrating what may be within the realm of the possible.”4

Building off of General Cleveland’s comments, this chapter will begin 

by looking at the role played by theory, briefly review existing work on special operations theory to frame the state of the field of special operations 

research, and provide insight on what having a theory might mean for the 

field and the SOF enterprise. The second part of the chapter will provide an 

example of how theory might benefit special operations. To that end, it will 

draw heavily from the recent work of Marsh, Lieutenant Colonel (retired) 

Mike Kenny, and Major Nathanael Joslyn who, although stopping short of 

recommending a unified theory, advocate for multiple, connected theories 

of special operations.5 They see this method as the best way to move forward, 

while managing the diversity inherent in special operations. 

The Five Tasks of Theory

Like any examination of ‘theory,’ irrespective of discipline or field, a definition of the term is compulsory and ensures a common understanding as we 

move forward. Previous work on special operations theory such as those by 

Dr. James Kiras [Air University] and Marsh provided detailed definitions 

along with an accompanying etymology of the word. Kiras, for example, 

defines theory as “a supposition intended to explain actions or behavior 

based on systematic explanation of its nature through a series of codified, 

related propositions backed by sufficient analysis and evidence.”6 For the 

purposes of this chapter a simpler definition is sufficient, although the choice 

is not intended to invalidate the earlier, and admittedly more scientific, work 

done by the aforementioned authors. Merriam-Webster’s definition holds 
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that theory is a “belief, policy, or procedure proposed or followed as the 

basis of action.” The utility of this definition over others is the directness 

with which it highlights theory as a “basis for action.”7 This point is worth 

emphasizing because it reinforces the central idea that theory can serve as 

a springboard for action. 

Within the armed forces, theory performs multiple functions. In his effort 

to define the relationship between theory and the military, historian Harold 

Winton identifies no fewer than five “tasks” that theory performs. Winton’s 

five tasks are worth discussing because they broaden the understanding of 

theory and facilitate later linkages as the argument develops. According to 

Winton and depicted in figure 1, theory defines, categorizes, explains, connects, and anticipates.8

 Not surprisingly, Winton accords primacy of place to 

theory’s role in explaining behaviors and relationships, which he identifies 

as its third function.9

 Theory’s explanatory role is well understood. There is 

not much else that needs to be said on the theory’s role in explaining beyond 

acknowledging that it can be used to forge shared understanding across different groups—a point which directly supports General Cleveland’s proposition on the value of theory for special operations. That said, Winton calls 

attention to the fact that theory must, as its first task, define the “what” or 

the object against which it’s oriented before it can rightly explain anything. 

He also identifies the ability to categorize as the theory’s second task. A 

close second to the theory’s explanatory function, “categorizing” is also a 

key component in generating shared understanding because it denotes the 

use of a taxonomy or naming convention as a means to better understand 

the phenomena being explained.10

Theory’s Five Tasks in the Military Profession According to Winton 

Task Example

Define Identifies, scopes, and delimits the phenomena to be explained. 

Categorize Provides a taxonomy for evaluating the phenomena.

Explain Articulates how the facts under consideration relate and interact 

with one another.

Connect Links the theory to the wider world, making it relevant.

Anticipate Looks forward to “predict” outcomes that have yet to occur.

Table 1. Theory’s Five Tasks in the Military Profession 

According to Harold Winton11
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Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare

The fourth task of theory is to connect or link with other fields of study 

or the wider world in general. “Connecting” places theory within much 

broader context and speaks to its accessibility for those outside of the field in 

question. Identifying where a specific theory fits within the broader scheme 

of knowledge and understanding the role it performs in relation to other 

theories enables one to evaluate its relevance as part of a larger whole. The 

relevance provided by the “connect” function contributes to shared understanding by using other theories to provide context and make the theory in 

question more accessible. 

The fifth, and last, task of theory is its ability to help anticipate future concepts, trends, and capabilities. That said, Winton qualifies theory’s predictive 

ability, reserving it primarily for the realm of the natural sciences. Like many 

within the social sciences, Winton recognizes that human behavior is of 

such complexity as to make prediction a bridge too far in most cases.12 Winton’s view is similar to that of noted international relations theorist Kenneth 

Waltz. Waltz too had little confidence in theory’s ability to predict real world 

outcomes, but nonetheless considered theory useful in predicting discrete 

behaviors.13 Similarly, Winton takes the position that theory can provide 

the conceptual foundation for future modes of warfare and capabilities that, 

although currently beyond our grasp, might one day be realized. The fact 

that theory invariably falls short in its ability to predict human behavior in 

no way compromises its overall utility. At the risk of borrowing too heavily 

from the field of international relations, theory, if it does nothing else, allows 

us to expand our understanding of special operations research and enhances 

our ability to act and think effectively on the topic.14

Finally, and before launching directly into the argument, a brief explanation of differences in terminology between words like ‘special operations’ 

and ‘special warfare’ is warranted, and will benefit the understanding of 

the lay reader. Although some of these terms may appear interchangeable, 

there is distinction and nuance in their use. This paper deals with special 

operations as a subset of military operations, the extraordinary nature of 

which distinguishes them from conventional operations.15 While having 

previously established that the quality of being extraordinary is static, the 

nature of special operations in practice change over time. It is therefore, 

plausible that future special operations will expand beyond these categories, 

but they are sufficient for the present argument. Next, we will introduce 

the terms ‘special warfare’ and ‘surgical strike’—both terms are admittedly 
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U.S. Army centric—as two broad categories that encompass the majority of 

contemporary special operations. 

The first term is ‘special warfare’ which comprises the family of operations that involve working through, with, and by indigenous forces. Special 

warfare occurs on a continuum ranging from the peacetime training of foreign forces to active involvement in counterinsurgency, and, at the far end, 

unconventional warfare (UW). The advice and assistance provided to the 

French resistance in 1944 by American and British commandos falls squarely 

within this category.16 UW refers to U.S. support to a resistance movement 

in a foreign country, the aim of which is to overthrow the government. 

As it is doctrinally conceived, UW generally entails the lengthy process of 

building infrastructure to expand and develop local resistance into a force 

able to take the field and win against a conventional opponent.17 The second 

category, ‘surgical strike,’ covers the operations that come to mind when 

one thinks of “commando” operations like the 1942 raid by U.S. Marine 

Raiders on Japanese-held Makin Island and the 2003 rescue of Army Private 

Jessica Lynch. More precise, doctrinal definitions for special warfare, UW, 

and surgical strike will be provided as the argument unfolds, but a working 

understanding of the differences is necessary and suffices for the present. 

SOF Theory: How Did We Get Here?

Having addressed theory’s potential uses, this next section will provide an 

overview of existing work within the field of SOF theory. Understanding 

what was already produced allows us to better determine which theories 

are most appropriate to our ends. Much of what was already done regarding special operations theory focuses more on SOF as an organization, and 

endeavors to get at those aspects that make it unique from conventional 

counterparts. This is certainly true for Spulak’s A Theory of Special Operations and Yarger’s 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special 

Operations. Spulak addresses SOF’ unique characteristics which allow them 

to overcome friction in a way that conventional forces are unable.18 Similarly, 

Yarger focuses on the attributes that makes SOF unique in his 21st Century 

SOF. However, Yarger’s treatment of the topic differs from that of Spulak 

in its explicit focus on American special operations and his idea of SOF 

power as “a distinct form of military power.”19 Placing United States Special 

Operations Forces over traditional military instruments as the logical and 
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Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare

preferred tool with which to address challenges in the 21st century, Yarger 

advises that theory can play an influencing role in ensuring that SOF are 

both resourced for success and employed wisely.20

When one considers that SOF struggled for their place within the conventional military establishment for much of their existence, it is understandable 

that a great deal of the earlier “theoretical” work focuses on defining the 

nature of SOF and special operations, especially in relation to the conventional force “other.”21 This early work was often intended by those within the 

SOF community to prevent what they saw as misuse of a poorly understood 

asset by the larger, conventional military. However, more relevant to the 

purposes of this essay are theories that explain why and how special operations achieves its effects or those that place special operations within larger 

theories of warfare. Kiras’ 2006 work entitled Special Operations and Strategy

does exactly this; it nests special operations within Clausewitzian theory and 

argues that such operations, in conjunction with conventional operations, 

achieve their effects through the moral and material erosion of an opponent’s 

psychological resolve.22 Rich Rubright offers his own theory of special operations, “special operations are extraordinary operations to achieve a specific 

effect.”23 In Rubright’s words, the theory “is broad by intention so that it 

covers all of special operations and is applicable through time; in essence, 

unbound and serving solely as an explanatory tool for the phenomenon 

of special operations.”24 Rubright’s theory appeals because of its simplicity 

and applicability. While it explains the phenomena of special operations 

better than other existing theories, its lack of mission specificity—arguably 

one of the theory’s main strengths—may disadvantage its use as a tool to 

demonstrate what special operations might achieve in a particular context. 

To distill a theory with enough substance to connect both military and 

policy spheres, we must look at sub-theories under the broader heading of 

special operations. This is exactly the route proposed by Marsh, Lieutenant 

Colonel (retired) Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn in their 2015 article 

“SO What?: The Value of Scientific Inquiry and Theory Building in Special 

Operations Research.” After establishing the requirement for a scientifically rigorous theory within special operations, the authors point out that 

the nature of special operations is variable.25 This variability occurs across 

the range of special operations missions amounts to “quite distinct (though 

interrelated) phenomena,” making it difficult for one single theory to cover 

them all. Therefore, Marsh, et al., advocate for several theories to cover the 
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range of special operations. The authors adopt USASOC’s taxonomy, introduced earlier, for different types of special operations, which breaks special 

operations into two capability areas: surgical strike and special warfare.26

The succeeding paragraphs will explain these two areas in greater depth and 

demonstrate the reasoning behind multiple theories. 

The Army’s current doctrinal publication on special operations describes 

surgical strike as a precision direct action capability that can be used “in 

hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets, or influence threats,” or 

what the layman would consider to be traditional “commando” or raid-type 

operations.27 Although it garners significant attention and is undoubtedly 

a critical capability provided by SOF, surgical strike will not figure in the 

subsequent argument for several reasons. 

First, surgical strike already has a widely accepted associated theory. 

Admiral William McRaven’s book Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice examines surgical strike in depth and 

has been in publication since 1995. Second, a cursory search of The New York 

Times for “U.S. raid” yields a surprising number of results, one of which indicates that policymakers likely possess a solid understanding of that capability along with a demonstrated willingness to employ it. A similar statement 

cannot be made for special warfare, despite its closer proximity to the heart 

of USASOC’s institutional culture and historical experience. 

Special warfare, which includes UW as one of its main subsets, is also 

a “traditional” SOF activity and speaks to the U.S. military’s significant 

involvement with resistance forces in both WWII and the Cold War. However, special warfare gets much less attention. For a multitude of reasons 

outside of the present argument, it does not capture the public’s attention or 

figure into popular culture to the same degree as surgical strike. This point is 

emphasized by the lack of a joint definition for special warfare.28 As a result, 

the U.S. Army definition for special warfare is provided here: 

activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions 

taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit 

tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat 

formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.29
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Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare

Special warfare comprises a range of activities such as foreign internal 

defense, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and security force assistance 

among others. That said, UW has primacy of place within the pantheon of 

special warfare-related tasks, largely because of its place within the institutional psyche of Army special forces. 

Linking Theory to Policy

The challenge arises in that UW and the other special warfare tasks are not 

particularly attractive options with policy makers. First, special warfare, 

more so than unilateral military action, works primarily “through collaborative efforts with indigenous populations.”30 This means that the U.S., 

although it may be driving actions, likely lacks the control and assurance 

it would have were it taking action with its own forces. Second, not only is 

there a reliance on partner actions, but also the matter of the target population’s receptiveness to those actions. These two qualities generally make 

special warfare a long-term endeavor, and, more importantly, one fraught 

with uncertainty and substantial political risk. This fact typically places 

special warfare solutions, especially those involving UW, outside the desired 

selection criteria of policy makers striving to satisfy more immediate political goals. In addition, the use of special warfare—specifically UW—by a 

liberal democracy such as the United States also raises difficult legal and 

moral questions for which there are no easy answers. Thus, political calculus 

almost always works against special warfare options, even when such a solution might ultimately prove more durable over the long-term. 

The end result is that U.S. policymakers tend not to consider special 

warfare as a viable policy option. This is especially true in today’s political 

climate, one particularly unforgiving of military actions characterized by 

large troop deployments with open ended commitments. A prime example of this phenomena is the ongoing debate involving the commitment of 

increasing numbers of U.S. ‘boots on the ground’ against the Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria in both Syria and Iraq. Other examples includes Russian 

annexation of the Crimea and support to separatists in eastern Ukraine in 

2014. Both examples point to an environment, often imperfectly referred to 

as the ‘Grey Zone,’ that is certainly not peace, but falls short of state-on-state 

war. In precisely this sort of environment, SOF’ small footprint and low visibility make them a preferred policy option over larger, conventional units.31 
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Unfortunately, the doctrine-based language settled upon for communicating 

special operations options to policymakers is almost always grounded in 

traditional concepts of war, e.g., special warfare, unconventional warfare. 

Using such terminology subconsciously pushes one toward a conventional 

mindset that culminates with U.S. forces conducting the dominating activities reminiscent of a doctrinal joint campaign.32 Theory may prove beneficial 

in defusing precisely this type of thinking, and expanding the locus of decision making to entertain special warfare options more appropriate to the 

ambiguous space characterizing modern warfare. 

Charting a path toward this outcome brings us back to Marsh, Kenny, and 

Joslyn’s work on special operations theory. In seeking a scientifically rigorous 

theory of special operations, the authors, after opting to split special operations into the subsets of surgical strike and special warfare, looked at applying contemporary social movement theory as a means to better conceive of 

special warfare activities. Specifically, they recommend applying Charles 

Tilly’s theory of contentious politics. In their minds, Tilly’s theory could 

add depth to explaining how “SOF plan, construct, and utilize functional 

networks of human relationships to effect the mobilization and demobilization of collective actors operating within political opportunity structures and 

cultural contexts to achieve political objectives.”33 Incorporating Tilly’s more 

scientific theory would help explain the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of special warfare 

where previous attempts stopped at explaining the ‘what.’ This is especially 

salient in an age where the proliferation of information technology and individual empowerment has made for an increasingly complex landscape; one 

with a plethora of nontraditional international actors able to compete, in 

certain areas, with sovereign states. Tilly’s theory would not usurp existing 

theoretical thought entirely but serve as “a point of departure for systematic 

and scientific discourse aimed at constructing a theory of engagement [with 

indigenous populations] and special warfare.”34 The authors drew their conclusions using previous and related research done by Joslyn on the origin 

and future of U.S. special warfare doctrine. 

In his monograph entitled Past and Present Theory for Special Warfare 

Operational Art: People’s War and Contentious Politics, Joslyn traces the roots 

of U.S. Army thinking on special warfare back to two distinct theories: one 

oriented toward guerrilla operations and came out of the American experiences in the Philippines during WWII, and two, a theory of insurgency the 

intellectual foundation of which rests on Mao Zedong’s model of people’s 
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Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare

war.35 While Joslyn praises the durability of U.S. thinking on guerrilla warfare, he critiques the simplified manner in which many of the ideas in Mao’s 

theory of people’s war were absorbed into U.S. special operations thinking 

and what he considers to be a lack of intellectual scrutiny of the model itself.36

His critique includes the fact that U.S. institutional models of insurgency 

have historically taken a simplified approach when looking at indigenous 

populations, overlooking the religious, cultural, and even economic variations present in any large group of people that provide multiple avenues of 

engagement.37 Russia’s exploitation of ethnic fault lines in Georgia and South 

Ossetia in the run-up to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and again in Eastern 

Ukraine in 2014 are examples of how a state or group can capitalize on a 

deeper cultural and societal awareness.38 Notwithstanding the limitations 

of the U.S. military’s interpretation of Mao’s theory, there is inherent virtue 

in updating, or at least revalidating, a theory that has its origin in 1950s and 

60s thought. 

Despite the ability of Tilly’s theory to describe the dynamics of modern 

contention better and more fully than current U.S. military thinking on 

special warfare, the question of how one puts theory into practice remains. 

Joslyn, for one, recognizes the challenges involved in operationalizing 

theory, especially one that originated 

in academia outside of the military. He 

recommends further study as to whether 

a theory of contentious politics can serve 

as the foundation for future approaches 

to special warfare.39 Particularly as it 

applies to special warfare, theory acts 

as a mechanism for creating a shared vision between the military, other 

governmental departments and agencies, and those who craft policy. This 

is theory fulfilling its tasks to define and explain. 

Conclusion

When weighing policy options, it is difficult to conceive of an instance in 

which one wouldn’t desire complete understanding of the problem along 

with the promise of an optimal solution. It is in this precise space that 

we would look to capitalize on General Cleveland’s view of theory and its 

Particularly as it applies to 

special warfare, theory acts 

as a mechanism for creating 

a shared vision between the 

military, other governmental 

departments and agencies, 

and those who craft policy.
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potential utility to special operations. Theory may very well open the aperture on courses of action that, for lack of a shared vision, would otherwise 

remain misunderstood and far from the light of day, never to receive serious 

consideration. As policymakers gain a better understanding of what special 

operations can achieve, the result might be to demystify and clarify special 

warfare; bringing it closer to the mainstream thinking, and increasing its 

viability as a realistic policy option. Insofar as we are able to move toward 

realizing such goals, theory will have proved its value to special operations. 

Endnotes

1. Richard W. Rubright, A Unified Theory for Special Operations (Tampa, FL: JSOU 

Press, 2017), 7. 

2. Ibid., 36. 

3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, rev. ed., ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89. 

4. Charles T. Cleveland, “Opening Remarks: Strategy and Theory” (remarks, 

Special Operations Theory, Summer 2016 Symposium, Joint Special Operations 

University, Tampa, FL, 30 August 2016). 

5. Christopher Marsh, Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn, “SO What? The Value of 

Scientific Inquiry and Theory Building in Special Operations Research,” Special 

Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 95, accessed 4 November 2016, http://dx.doi.

org/10.1080/23296151.2015.1062678. 

6. James D. Kiras, “A Theory of Special Operations: ‘These Ideas Are Dangerous,’” 

Special Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 77, accessed 13 November 2016, http://

dx.doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2015.1062677. 

7. “Theory,” Merriam-Webster.com, accessed 15 November 2016, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/theory. 

8. Harold R. Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 6 (December 2011): 854–856, accessed 

14 November 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.583389. 

9. The decision to lead with theory’s explanatory role was made because “explanation,” more so than Winton’s other functions, appears as the logical function of 

theory and what the layperson would expect to encounter first. 

10. Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel,” 855–856. 

11. Ibid, 854–856. 

12. Ibid, 856. 

13. Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 

2008), 44–45. 

14. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, “Between Utopia and Reality: The 

Practical Discourses of International Relations,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
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Homiak: The Value in a Theory of Special Warfare

International Relations, eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2008), 25. 

15. Rubright, A Unified Theory for Special Operations, 29. 

16. David W. Hogan, Jr., U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington, 

D.C.: Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1992), 49. 

17. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2014), II-8. 

18. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and 

Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007), 39, accessed 2 August 

2015, https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=2876965. 

19. Harry R. Yarger, 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, April 2013). 

20. Ibid., 75. 

21. Elliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern 

Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International 

Affairs, 1978), 88. 

22. James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War 

on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006), 80. 

23. Rubright, A Unified Theory of Special Operations, 7. 

24. Ibid., 2. 

25. Christopher Marsh, Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn, “SO What? The Value of 

Scientific Inquiry and Theory Building in Special Operations Research,” Special 

Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 95, accessed 4 November 2016, http://dx.doi.

org/10.1080/23296151.2015.1062678. 

26. Ibid., 96; and Department of the Army, ADRP 3-05, Special Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 2012), 8. 

27. Department of the Army, ADRP 3-05, Special Operations, 8–9. 

28. Homer W. Harkins, “What Is Old Is New Again: The Reemergence of Special 

Warfare,” Special Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 116, accessed 7 November 

2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2015.1096687. 

29. Ibid., 9. 

30. Ibid., 115. 

31. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “Obama’s ‘Boots on the Ground’: U.S. Special 

Forces Are Sent to Tackle Global Threats,” New York Times, 27 December 2015, 

accessed 28 December 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/world/middleeast/more-and-more-special-forces-become-obamas-military-answer.html. 

32. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 11 August 2011), III-39, accessed 9 November 

2016, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. 

33. Marsh et al., “SO What?” 97. 
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34. Ibid. 

35. Nathanael E. Joslyn, Past and Present Theory for Special Warfare Operational Art: 

People’s War and Contentious Politics (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies, 2015), 6, 

12, accessed 7 November 2016, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/

collection/p4013coll3/id/3327/rec/3. 

36. Ibid., 24–26. 

37. Ibid., 27–29. 

38. Kyle Oliver Kendall, “Using their own people against them: Russia’s exploitation 

of ethnicity in Georgia and Ukraine” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate 

School, 2015), 2–3, accessed 2 December 2016, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/47981. 

39. Joslyn, Past and Present Theory, 49. 
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Müller: Civil Context for SOF Theory

Chapter 6. Civil Context for SOF Theory

Kurt E. Müller 

As a mid-grade officer, Admiral William McRaven (U.S. Navy, Retired) 

applied professional military education to derive from eight specific 

instances of the employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) a set of 

principles to improve the likelihood of success for particularly risky missions. Undertaken as a study while at the Naval Postgraduate School, Admiral McRaven’s presentation draws examples from the experiences of five 

nations, both within major conflicts (WWII and Vietnam) and in an isolated 

operation during peacetime (the Entebbe hostage rescue).1 In a later exploration of SOF theory, Robert Spulak correctly notes that then-Commander 

McRaven’s study is actually an exploration of direct-action missions—i.e., a 

specific subset of SOF missions—that provide a basis for more generalization. 

Although he notes non-wartime roles for SOF, in particular in foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, and civil affairs, Spulak nonetheless focuses 

on wartime because the “value of SOF in peacetime is derived from their 

unique roles in war.”2

The wartime–peacetime dichotomy complicates the development of a SOF 

theory to the point that some may see the distinction between direct-action 

missions and persistent-presence roles as sufficiently different to preclude 

a theory applicable to both. But many in the SOF community are strident 

advocates of definitions that account for the “spectrum of conflict,” from 

peacetime competition through low-intensity conflict to war. Although we 

Dr. Kurt E. Müller earned his Ph.D. from Rutgers University, is a senior 

research fellow in the Center for Complex Operations of the National 

Defense University, and completed a 31-year military career, the latter half 

of which was in Civil Affairs. He followed that career with several years in 

the futures directorate (J-9) of USSOCOM, and then four years with the 

Department of State, primarily in the Civilian Response Corps, and then 

the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. His research focuses 

on interagency responses to foreign-policy challenges.
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may expect wartime experiences to lead policymakers to call for preserving, 

if not expanding, the SOF structure, there should be little doubt that the 

challenges short of war that the U.S. experienced between periods of major 

conflict prevented the usual demobilization pattern, which hits military 

specialties differentially. In an effort to preserve conventional combat power 

when “peace dividends” demand a reduction in the armed forces, those units 

with special skills developed for a specific environment or circumstance are 

most likely to case their colors or move to the reserve components. But without an element constantly attending to identifying emerging challenges, the 

options for responding to sudden crises short of war are too limited, as the 

U.S. discovered with Operation Eagle Claw, the attempted rescue of hostages 

in Iran. The SOF truth about being unable to mass produce special operators in a short time helps diminish pressure to reduce SOF force structure, 

but more important yet is recognition of the continuing utility of SOF in 

environments other than major conflict. If indeed the utility of SOF spans 

the spectrum of conflict, theories of SOF’ effectiveness should be applicable 

across that spectrum.

Admiral McRaven opens his exploration by proposing a need for a theory 

of special operations. Noting the existence of “theories of war escalation and 

war termination, theories of revolution and counterrevolution, ... theories 

of insurgency and counterinsurgency ... general airpower and sea power 

theories, and more specific theories on strategic bombing and amphibious 

warfare,” he then sets his inquiry into the necessary features of successful 

special operations as a response to the need to reduce “the frictions of war 

to a manageable level.”3

In essence, this approach contributes to a specific theory of armed force—

a category that would include air and sea power theories. This category differs 

from general theories of armed force such as Clausewitz presents in his classic, Vom Kriege, in that the latter moves from the specifics of tactics through 

strategy to broader goals in interstate relations, often called the political, or 

grand-strategic, level. The gap in recent approaches to theories of special 

operations is at this broader level. It may be that exploration of the utility of 

special operations to achieving foreign policy goals leads us to conclude that 

a theory of effective special operations must be a subset of the general theory 

that Clausewitz offered. But if the utility of SOF extends across a spectrum 

of interstate relations, theories of SOF’ effectiveness ought to account for 

such varying circumstances. 
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The consistent emphasis on the small footprint of special operations 

offers advantages across the spectrum that facilitate interagency integration 

to achieve a national objective. 

Such integration, which has been 

lacking in both conventional 

campaigns and special operations, is necessary from analysis 

through planning and execution 

to post-operation assessments. 

In particular, special operations should not constitute an independent activity nor are they just an option to achieve a conventional military end state. 

Rather, as with the tie between military power and policy goals, the policy 

goals must remain in focus. 

Strategic Impact

One aspect of SOF lore and argument for SOF utility needs some examination before turning to this broader context. Spulak opens his Joint Special 

Operations University monograph with a characterization of special operations as “missions to accomplish strategic objectives where the use of conventional forces would create unacceptable risks due to Clausewitzian friction.”4 

Citing Dr. James Kiras's [Air University] dissertation on special operations 

and strategy, Spulak extends Kiras’s view that special operations “enable 

conventional operations and/or resolve economically politico-military problems at the operational or strategic level that are difficult or impossible to 

accomplish with conventional forces alone” by asking why special operations 

don’t have strategic roles of their own.5 Thus, both Kiras and Spulak accept 

the proposition that SOF emphasize accomplishing strategic objectives. Does 

the historic record validate this assertion? If not, in what ways does the lore 

differ from the record and what is the impact of that difference?

Admiral McRaven’s primary concern is not whether the operation pursued a Clausewitzian center of gravity that would result in strategic impact. 

He concentrates on analyzing the cases to derive principles to improve the 

chances of success and then looks for conformity or divergence from those 

principles. Admiral McRaven provides a succinct definition of success that he 

applies to most of the cases he studied. He writes, “[i]n wartime the success 

of an operation is judged almost solely on the achievement of the objectives.”6

In particular, special operations 

should not constitute an independent 

activity nor are they just an option to 

achieve a conventional military end 

state.
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But the objectives he considers are the immediate tactical ones rather than 

the intended strategic impact. Thus, he can conclude that most of the cases 

he examined succeeded. 

This focus also allows Admiral McRaven to conclude that the Son Tay 

raid to recover American prisoners of war (POWs) in Vietnam, Operation 

Kingpin, “is the best modern-day example of a successful special operation 

and should be considered textbook material for future missions.”7 If one’s 

focus is on the intended outcome, the fact that there were no POWs in the 

compound means the mission failed to meet its objective. As he notes, the 

public reaction to war escalation and the press indictment of the intelligence 

community for failing to verify the continuing presence of POWs in the 

compound both had an impact on public attitudes.8 The lack of public support of course violates the Clausewitzian trinity of people, army, and public, 

which has been known to American military readers since Army Colonel 

Harry Summers published his immensely influential study, On Strategy: The 

Vietnam War in Context.

9

The focus on military tasks without linkage to political objectives is not at 

all unusual, even among some who evoke Clausewitz as a theoretical mentor. 

In a work that looks back at the 1991 Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm) to 

determine whether the technical advantage U.S. and coalition forces enjoyed 

over the Iraqi Army required reassessing Clausewitz’s concept of friction, 

Barry Watts concludes:

[T]here was no shortage of friction at any level—tactical, operational, 

strategic, or even political. Indeed, close examination of Desert 

Storm suggests that frictional impediments experienced by the 

winning side were not appreciably different in scope or magnitude 

than they were for the Germans during their lightning conquest of 

France and the Low Countries in May 1940.10 

Watts cites an assessment of the concept of a Military Technical Revolution, then in vogue, that would “imbue the information loop with nearperfect clarity and accuracy, to reduce its operation to a matter of minutes 

or seconds, and—perhaps most important of all—to deny it to the enemy.”11 

Watts rejects the conclusion that technological advances will obviate the 

concern over the concept of friction. Yet, Watts too foregoes any connection 

between the conduct of war and its political aims. To restore this connection, 

it is necessary to recognize interrelations among elements of national power 
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in the analysis of a policy challenge and in the formulation and execution 

of a response. 

Policy Objectives and the Focus of Military Campaigns: 

Harnessing Essential Elements of National Power

With many regimes that replace predecessors that repressed a majority of 

the populace, the successor asserts its power with majoritarian support and 

fails to safeguard minority rights. Examples are easy to find as far apart as 

the Reign of Terror following the 1789 French Revolution and the Mugabe 

regime in Zimbabwe that replaced British colonial rule in Rhodesia. Similarly, the competition among political parties seeking to replace civil administrators who were members of an ousted regime offers a challenge the U.S. 

government has consistently failed to address, with examples readily available from WWII, the aftermath of the 1992–95 Bosnian war, and Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. 

The trajectory toward interagency collaboration has a long arc. In modern 

military history, an early touchstone lies in the observation by the longserving chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, the elder, 

that the lack of mutual support across the combat arms constituted an urgent 

problem to be rectified.12 In time, similar reasoning applied across land, sea, 

and air services. In turn, jointness in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era built 

a foundation for interagency collaboration in the execution of campaigns. 

An interagency approach to assessment and planning should also have been 

forthcoming, but conducting a whole-of-government approach to foreignpolicy challenges has been stymied by both institutional prerogatives and 

structural hindrances in the deployment of civilians. In the aftermath of the 

Northern Alliance defeat of the Taliban and the U.S. and coalition defeat 

of the Iraqi Army, a common theme in Washington corridors was the need 

for a “Goldwater-Nichols II,” to do for the interagency environment what 

the 1986 legislation did for joint forces. For about a decade, think tanks and 

various Washington agencies devoted considerable attention to the need 

for national security professionals conversant with the capabilities and perspectives of various federal agencies, for personnel to take assignments in 

other agencies to develop such expertise, and for professional development 

to address whole-of-government responses to security challenges through 

a National Security University.13
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The response to various foreign challenges prior to Operations Enduring 

Freedom and Iraqi Freedom had uncovered significant gaps in interagency 

collaboration. In 1997 (during the President Bill Clinton administration), the 

White House issued Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Managing Complex 

Contingency Operations,” which directed mechanisms to establish and conduct: (1) an interagency executive committee, (2) a political-military plan, 

(3) an interagency rehearsal of the plan, (4) interagency training, (5) agency 

review, and (6) an after-action review.14 In 2002, the Association of the United 

States Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies jointly 

published “Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” which offered a framework that 

specified tasks under four general categories—security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, governance and participation—

without assigning tasks to any specific agency. Two years later, the Defense 

Science Board devoted its summer study to “Transition to and from Hostilities,” and in the same year, the Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy issued a volume that explored interagency contributions to stabilization and reconstruction.15 The following year, the President George W. Bush 

administration promulgated National Security Policy Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” 

which identified roles for 10 federal agencies that were to respond to foreign 

crises through a coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization. In 2006, 

the Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker 

and former Congressman Lee Hamilton, echoed this call for interagency 

training and operations “following the Goldwater-Nichols model” as well 

as for improving the response of civilian agencies to stability operations.16

The path to National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD) 44 was by 

no means an even one. The consolidation of the Iraq campaign had demonstrated both competition among agencies for influence and lack of collaboration in conducting an occupation to empower a replacement for the 

Saddam Hussein regime. In 2003, NSPD 24 had given the Department of 

Defense (DOD) the lead for reconstruction, but in 2004, NSPD 36 assigned 

that responsibility to the Department of State. The root of the failure to 

address the key issues in establishing the structure for a transition to a representative democracy however, lay in the failure to coordinate between 

State and Defense in planning that transition. The Department of State had 

undertaken a significant effort known as the Future of Iraq project. The 

project’s working groups held 23 meetings with some 200 expatriate Iraqis 
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Müller: Civil Context for SOF Theory

who identified issues across sectors of Iraqi society. Although the project 

did not produce a blueprint for transition that either Lieutenant General Jay 

Garner (U.S. Army, Retired) or Ambassador Bremer could pick up and seek 

to implement, it did present a broad background on each of these sectors and 

identified both desired outcomes and pitfalls to avoid.17

State Department personnel indeed saw the need for expertise from 

other federal agencies if Iraq was to become stable. The fate of this State 

Department project is a benchmark that advocates for reform of the nationalsecurity structure use to call for changes in structure and process. The Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward writes that National Security Advisor 

Stephen Hadley saw the question of stability broadly: “It wasn’t just achieving 

stability—political or otherwise. The president wanted to achieve democracy. 

So Hadley realized they needed a comprehensive postwar plan.”18

In the early stages of the civilian surge, there was considerable public 

criticism regarding the inability of the State Department to deploy personnel 

to hardship posts, first Iraq, then Afghanistan.19 Criticism came from the 

DOD as well, which had to fill civilian positions in Provincial Reconstruction Teams with military personnel. A New York Times reporter interviewed 

Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and 

quoted him as saying, “[w]e send out orders, we execute orders, we deploy 

our military, and guess what happens? They turn up and do their job.”20

Missing in this description is any perception of the differences in career 

patterns, employment modes, and support structures between military 

and civilian personnel. Even the DOD encountered substantial difficulties 

deploying its civilian staff. The term-hire option, typical for the United States 

Agency for International Development, which most frequently uses implementing partners (contractors), became routine through various mechanisms for other agencies as well.21 This option was common in the DOD’s 

experience of filling positions through the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, though the pattern was to use term-hires (typically of one-year duration) in the early stages of the program and gradually transition to career 

employees. But the impact on the careers of volunteers was not sanguine: 

approximately one third of career civilians who deployed lost their positions 

when they returned to their previous stations.22
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JSOU Report 17-6

Unconventional Warfare and Steady-State Operations

These issues were primarily attributable to the scale of the civilian surge. 

The major problem civilian agencies have in deploying personnel is meeting the numbers required, which would not be true for civilian support to 

special operations. In 2007, there were over 200,000 more civilians in DOD 

than civilians with skills appropriate for stabilization activities across 10 

domestic agencies with applicable missions.23 Since there have always been 

volunteers for deployment assignments, small-footprint operations, such as 

SOF undertake, can more easily obtain access to civilian expertise than can 

their conventional counterparts, in some instances on operations, in others 

for support in field sites or headquarters. 

In his 2016 monograph, Will Irwin states with conviction that “unconventional warfare is an inherently interagency affair.”24 Noting that “nonwartime UW efforts rarely succeed,” Irwin addresses factors and actors 

in non-violent civil resistance to achieve policy goals at the lower end of 

the conflict spectrum, but above steady-state diplomatic engagement. His 

description evokes Sun Tzu’s dictum, “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”25

As Irwin concludes, states subjected to the range of activities he describes 

may very well react to the threat against their power as an act of war. The 

gray zone of supporting a non-violent insurgency will remain controversial 

in the absence of international agreements on the level of influence that 

crosses a threshold recognized as interference in the polity of another state. 

Consequently, the potential for escalation demands consideration of the 

affiliation, by agency, of personnel sent to conduct specific activities. Not only 

does a public association of foreign military personnel with anti-government 

activity offer a regime a propaganda point of foreign interference, as Irwin 

notes, but activity outside a civilian agency’s normal range of expertise can 

also backfire. 

The matter of state fragility and the factors that contribute to it lie well 

beyond the focus of this chapter, as does consideration of the circumstances 

that would engender a U.S. government response to threats to a state’s stability. But assessment of these conditions should be an on-going process. A 

salient point in an article about the need to understand societies and their 

politics before tensions turn violent is a focus not only on the adequacy 

or character of security structures in these societies but on the character 
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Müller: Civil Context for SOF Theory

of the societies themselves.26 That analysis requires multiple perspectives 

obtainable from members of a country team steeped in the expertise of 

their home agencies.27 Herein lies a potential SOF role, if carefully scoped 

and adequately prepared.

The choice of agencies to assess conditions in fragile states colors the 

type of response and reflects the priorities of ambassadors and their country 

teams. In an article in The National Interest, “Fixing Fragile States,” former 

Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, Ambassador Ronald Neumann, and Admiral Eric Olson call for empowering ambassadors to direct 

resources through their country teams rather than having representatives on 

the country team send recommendations back to home agencies for approval 

in Washington.28

In addressing a state’s stability, the default recommendation from the 

defense sector has become to follow the strategy of building partner capacity. But ambassadors may be wary of this recommendation, both from 

recent analyses and prior history. A 2013 RAND study that looked at the 

effectiveness of building partnership capacity found that securing access to 

the country was a higher priority than building the partner state’s defense 

capacity.29 Moreover, in describing persistent presence as Phase 0, the model 

of campaign phasing presented in Joint Publication 5-0 (Joint Operation 

Planning) can easily strike diplomats as supporting confrontation when 

they would prefer de-escalation.30 Recent events in Mali implicated troops 

in the oppression of citizens, and although SOF advocates can point to the 

reliability of the battalion the U.S. elements had mentored, the overall public 

impression is still that support of the military in some countries makes them 

more proficient at repression. 

Such a record of events recalls Army General Stanley McChrystal’s comments in his 2013 interview by Foreign Affairs: “When we first started, the 

question was ‘Where is the enemy?’ ... As we got smarter, we started to ask, 

‘Who is the enemy?’ ... and then ... we asked, ‘What’s the enemy trying to 

do?’ And it wasn’t until we got further along that we said, ‘Why are they the 

enemy?’”31 Answers to these questions reflect the perspectives of the agencies supplying them. Herein lies a potential assessment role that SOF is well 

qualified to undertake.

The challenge lies in the compilation of agency assessments. Because SOF 

field elements, particularly both special forces and civil affairs, are accustomed to working in interagency environments, they are better situated than 
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JSOU Report 17-6

any institutional structure outside an embassy’s country team to conduct 

such a holistic analysis. The SOF education model comes closest to that 

projected for a national security university since that concept was introduced. During the brief period the Civilian Response Corps existed, its predeployment qualification program 

introduced its practitioners to the 

capabilities resident across federal 

agencies. The closest such programmatic introduction of capabilities is 

at the senior service colleges, where 

the theme of “all elements of national 

power” gets its due but is primarily 

theoretical. Interagency participation occurs at this level, but it is limited in its reach across agencies, and 

familiarity with agency capabilities is still missing. The SOF education model 

introduces these themes at an earlier stage in the practitioners’ careers. 

Conclusion

To return to the departure point of this discussion—the strategic impact 

of special operations—one can conclude that the best example of a special 

operation that truly had a strategic impact is the Entebbe hostage rescue. The 

narrow objective was self-contained in that its accomplishment concluded 

the crisis. As this exploration has shown, for strategic impact, the desired 

outcome must be clear, and this outcome is not the province of a specific 

agency so much as it is a U.S. government goal. In the absence of both multiagency perspectives and an office that seeks to integrate agency analyses, it is 

unlikely that any given agency will develop a sufficient operational picture to 

propose a holistic response to meet the national policy goal. Whereas a good 

number of senior executives in the foreign policy arena have embraced the 

notion that unstable states can harbor threats to the security of the United 

States, its friends, and allies, the defense-sector response of building partner 

capacity addresses only part of the challenge. If conducted with sensitivity 

toward multiagency analysis, the low profile typical of special operations 

offers options that do not currently exist elsewhere in the U.S. government. 

To demonstrate utility across the spectrum of conflict, the SOF community 

Because SOF field elements, 

particularly both special forces 

and civil affairs, are accustomed 

to working in interagency environments, they are better situated 

than any institutional structure 

outside an embassy’s country 

team to conduct such a holistic 

analysis.
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Müller: Civil Context for SOF Theory

needs to address not only its contribution to the military instrument of 

power but also to long-established connections between power and policy. 

Such an approach provides a useful starting point for developing further 

theories that undergird the effectiveness of special operations. 

Endnotes

1. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: 

Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996). 

2. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and 

Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2007), 4, https://jsou.libguides.com/

ld.php?content_id=2876965. 

3. McRaven, Spec Ops, 1. 

4. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations, 1. 

5. Spulak Jr., citing James Kiras, “Rendering the Mortal Blow Easier: Special Operations and the Nature of Strategy” (Ph.D. diss., University of Reading, July 2004), 

8–9. 

6. McRaven, Spec Ops, 142. 

7. Ibid., 318. 

8. The comparison with Operation Eiche, the Mussolini rescue, is striking in that 

Mussolini had been moved several times and intelligence reports conflicted, but 

the planners got it right. 

9. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1981). 

10. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: 

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2004), 2. 

11. Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey Shaffer, and Benjamin Ederington, “The Military 

Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework,” Final Report of the CSIS Study 

Group on MTR (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 1993), 58. 

12. Abtheilung für Kriegsgeschichte der Großen Generalstab, Moltkes Militärische 

Werke II: Die Thätigkeit als Chef des Generalstabes der Armee in Frieden [War 

History Section, Great General Staff, Moltke’s Military Works II: The Activity as 

Chief of Staff of the Army in Peacetime (Berlin: Mittler, 1900), 67–164, esp. 74. 

The reference is to peacetime reflections on the 1866 war against Austria. 

13. For an excellent overview of the predecessor efforts to address interagency education, see John W. Yaeger, “Developing National Security Professionals,” Joint 

Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quarter 2008): 115–120. 

14. “Policy Guidance: U.S. Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” 

Presidential Decision Directive 56, May 1997. 
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15. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Transforming for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization Operations (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 2004). 

16. James A. Baker III et al., The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage Books, 

2006), 93. 

17. Economy and Infrastructure (Public Finance) Working Group, Future of Iraq 

Project: Overview (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2005 [date of 

unclassified release], originally compiled 12 May 2003), as posted on the National 

Security Archive, a project of George Washington University, http://nsarchive.

gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/. 

18. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade 

Iraq (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 281. For various critiques of the 

national security process in general, and the disjuncture between State and 

Defense regarding Iraq, see Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley, Strategic Planning for U.S. National Security: A Project Solarium for the 21st Century 

(Princeton: Princeton Project on National Security, n.d.); Paul David Miller, 

“The Contemporary Presidency: Organizing the National Security Council: I 

Like Ike’s,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 43, no. 3 (September 2013), 592–606; 

and Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to 

Save the World (New York: Penguin Press, 2008). 

19. Harry W. Kopp and Charles A. Gillespie, Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in 

the U.S. Foreign Service (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011). 

20. Helene Cooper, “Few Veteran Diplomats Accept Mission to Iraq,” New York Times, 

8 February 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/students/pop/articles/08diplo.

html. 

21. Center for Complex Operations, Civilian Expeditionary Capabilities after a 

Decade of War, report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy)/Office 

of Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (Washington, D.C.: National 

Defense University Center for Complex Operations, 2013). 

22. Michael Davies and Kurt Müller, “The Civilian Expeditionary Workforce as 

a Revolution in Defense Culture,” Center for Complex Operations, National 

Defense University, September 26, 2014, 131,155. 

23. Bernard T. Carreau, “Domestic Agencies, Civilian Reserves, and the Intelligence 

Community,” in Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, eds. Hans Binnendijk 

and Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 

2009), 137, table 7-1. 

24. Will Irwin, A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to Unconventional Warfare

(Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2016). 

25. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University 

Press, 1963), 77. 

26. Michael T. Flynn, James Sisco, and David C. Ellis, “‘Left of Bang’: The Value of 

Sociocultural Analysis in Today’s Environment,” Prism 3, no. 4 (September 2012), 

13–21. 
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27. Note, however, that the State Department maintains numerous small embassies 

with very limited multi-agency capabilities. 

28. Dennis Blair, Ronald Neumann, and Eric Olson, “Fixing Fragile States,” The 

National Interest 133 (September–October 2014), 11–20. 

29. Christopher Paul et al., What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and 

Under What Circumstances? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 17. 

30. Kurt E. Müller, “Interagency Qualifications to Address Fragility, or Rethinking 

Civil Affairs,” InterAgency Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring 2016), 14–27. 

31. Stanley McChrystal and Gideon Rose, “Generation Kill: A Conversation With 

Stanley McChrystal,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 2 (March/April 2013), 2–8, https://

www.foreignaffairs.com/interviews/2013-02-11/generation-kill. 

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Searle: Outside the Box

Chapter 7. Outside the Box: A Theory of 

Special Operations

Tom Searle 

Every book, article, and movie about special operations includes at least 

an implied theory of special operations. However, all this theorizing has 

produced myriad competing theories rather than a consensus theory. The 

most common flaw in these theories is that they start from each author’s ideal 

special operation, and then attempt to connect all other special operations 

to that ideal. That approach breaks down because there is no consensus on 

what defines an ideal special operation. 

For example, Admiral William McRaven (U.S. Navy, Retired), in his book 

Spec Ops, Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, 

treats direct action raids as the ideal special operation, and claims that other 

types of special operations are closely related to direct action.1 Hy Rothstein 

disagrees. For Rothstein, the direct action raids that Admiral McRaven studies are more like “hyperconventional” operations than special operations.2

Rothstein believes the real special operations are things like psychological 

operations and support to foreign resistance forces trying to overthrow a 

government or drive out an occupying army.3 Yet another approach used, for 

example, by Robert Spulak Jr., is to start with the troops who conduct special 

operations—Special Operations Forces (SOF)—and work backwards from 

Dr. Tom Searle is an instructor in the College of Special Operations at JSOU. 

He retired from the U.S. Army after 23 years as a special forces officer. His 

degrees include a doctorate in history from Duke University, a master’s 

degree from the U.S. Army War College, and a bachelor’s of science and 

engineering degree from Princeton University. 

Adapted from JSOU Report 17-4, Outside the Box: A New General Theory 

of Special Operations by Tom Searle, a publication of the Joint Special 

Operations University Press.
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the supposed common characteristics of all SOF to a theory of the special 

operations that require SOF.4

This lack of consensus on the ideal special operation and what exactly all 

special operations have in common leads to unsatisfactory general theories of 

special operations. (In fairness, Rothstein did not even attempt to fit “hyperconventional” and “unconventional” operations under a single theory. He 

instead argued that calling both “special operations” caused the United States 

to overemphasize the hyperconventional and neglect the unconventional.) 

Defining special operations positively, i.e. in terms of what all special 

operations have in common, leads to flawed theories because special operations should not be defined that way. As Admiral Eric Olson (U.S. Navy, 

Retired), former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, pointed 

out at the 2016 symposium on special operations theory, “special operations 

are defined negatively,” i.e., in terms of what they are not rather than what 

they are.5 Specifically, special operations are operations that are not conventional operations. 

This chapter agrees with Olson’s view and accepts the negative definition of special operations as different from conventional operations. It also 

accepts the related fact that different types of special operations might be 

quite different from each other. Further, it builds on the fact that special 

operations are heterogeneous to present a new theory of special operations—

one that does not see special operations as a minor addition to conventional 

operations but as the vast universe of potential military operations that, for 

any reason, are not conventional. The theory relies on a particular visualization, developed through a series of figures, to demonstrate that special 

operations are outside the conventional box. The chapter also investigates 

the implications of this theory for special and conventional operations and 

what happens as conventional operations evolve. 

To introduce the visualization, let’s start by imagining conventional military operations as a box. Inside the box are conventional forces (CF) conducting all the conventional operations they were designed for: Army Divisions 

and Brigade Combat Teams are attacking and defending; Navy Carrier Task 

Groups are clearing the seas of enemy ships; Marine Air-Ground Task Forces 

are conducing amphibious assaults; Air Force strike aircraft are dismantling 

the enemy’s integrated air defenses before destroying the things that make 

it possible for the enemy to function as a coherent system, etc. Since special operations are different from conventional ones, they are by definition, 
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Searle: Outside the Box

outside the conventional box. Figure 1 depicts this relationship, with conventional operations in the center surrounded on all sides by various types 

of special operations outside the box. 

The ‘special operations’ outside the conventional box include all special 

operations activities listed in Title 10 U.S. Code § 167 (direct action, strategic 

reconnaissance, unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense 

(FID), civil affairs (CA), military information support operations (MISO), 

counterterrorism (CT), humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, 

and such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense), but are not limited to that list.6

 Special operations likewise 

include all special operations core activities listed in Joint Publication 3-05 

(direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism (CT), UW, FID, security force assistance, hostage 

rescue and recovery, counterinsurgency (COIN), foreign humanitarian assistance, military information operations, and CA operations, and other such 

activities as may be specified by the President and/or Secretary of Defense), 

but are not limited by this list either.7 The current (2011) edition of U.S. Special Operations Command Publication 1, Doctrine for Special Operations, 

provides yet another unique list, this time broken down into Core Operations and Core Activities, and including many items not found in the other 

two lists.8

 Together, the fact that: a) all three lists are in effect; b) they differ 

from one another and; c) the lists often include escape clauses about “other 

activities” that are not listed, suggests no list of special operations could be 

complete. Still, this poses no problems for our definition since a negative 

Figure 1. Special operations are outside the conventional operations box.

Conventional

Operations

Special Operations

Special Operations

Special

Operations

Special

Operations

Conventional vs. Special Operations
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JSOU Report 17-6

definition can include a large number of cases (i.e., conventional may include 

a small number of similar cases but not conventional will include a vast array 

of potentially dissimilar items).

Figure 1 suggests that the field of special operations extends indefinitely 

in all directions away from the conventional box, but there is a limit. The 

scope of special operations we are considering is limited by the authorities 

given to the military. (In the United States, these authorities are given to the 

Department of Defense (DOD) by the U.S. Congress.) For U.S. purposes, a 

large circle around the conventional box represents the full range of operations the military is authorized to conduct. As depicted in figure 2, this large 

circle representing all military operations contains a box in the center representing conventional operations. Everything inside the circle, but outside 

the box, is a special operation.

Civilian and military leaders of U.S. DOD, with guidance from Congress 

and the President, allocate resources based on national strategic goals and 

expectations about the future. They define conventional operations as the 

ones that the DOD will focus its resources on, and the DOD puts the vast 

majority of its resources into CF, to conduct conventional operations. But 

figure 2 is a reminder that emphasizing conventional operations does not 

eliminate DOD’s other responsibilities. 

Figure 2. Special operations are inside the large circle containing all military 

operations but outside the conventional operations box.

Conventional

Operations

Special Operations

Conventional vs. Special Operations

All DoD Responsibilities

and Authorities
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Searle: Outside the Box

Figure 2 naturally emerges from our definition, and it helps us understand 

several important aspects of the relationship between special and conventional operations. The first thing to emphasize is that a narrower definition 

of conventional operations allows CF to improve their performance in those 

operations (since they are dividing training time among fewer different activities).9

 However, narrowing the definition of conventional operations also 

makes the conventional box smaller, causing more activities to fall outside 

the conventional box and become special operations. As a result, efforts to 

focus CF on a smaller range of tasks, and thus increase their proficiency, 

should be coupled with expansion in special operations capabilities (since 

the DOD will still need to maintain some capability in areas no longer considered conventional operations). 

Figure 2 demonstrates that special operations are desperately important to DOD, and may even cover the majority of the DOD’s responsibilities, regardless of whether they directly facilitate conventional operations. 

Neglecting the special operations capability leaves the DOD unable to perform the tasks assigned it and such neglect would, arguably, constitute professional negligence and dereliction of duty by DOD leadership. 

Another way of looking at figure 2 is to see special operations capabilities as insurance against the possibility that leadership might misjudge the 

type of operations the department would need to conduct and focused on 

conventional operations that are inappropriate for the new threat. When 

conventional operations are inappropriate, the DOD will have to rely on 

special operations and the ability to conduct such operations will be vitally 

important. The DOD has two obvious options for creating and sustaining 

the ability to conduct special operations. One is to require CF to devote some 

training time to special operations. The other is to reclassify a small portion of the force as SOF and organize, train, and equip them to be experts 

in special operations. Building special operations capabilities by expanding 

the responsibilities of CF makes those forces less capable of conducting their 

conventional missions. On the other hand, building competent and robust 

SOF allows the rest of the force to concentrate on conventional operations, 

thus indirectly enhancing conventional capabilities while directly mitigating risk. 

Insurance against guessing wrong is desperately important. As Admiral 

Michael Mullen (U.S. Navy, Retired) admitted when he was Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “We’re pretty lousy at predicting the kind of warfare 
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JSOU Report 17-6

we’ll be in.”10 Competent SOF are the insurance that 

protects against “lousy” predictions. Fortunately, the 

United States purchased this insurance at a startlingly low cost. United States Special Operations 

Forces receive a tiny portion of DOD resources: less 

than 5 percent of the total and often closer to 1 percent of the total, depending on the resource in question.11

In addition to mitigating the unforeseen problems of guessing wrong 

about enemy threats, special operations capabilities also create new options 

and unanticipated opportunities. For example, in late 2001, when the United 

States found itself preparing for a totally unexpected war in Afghanistan, 

it was enormously helpful that the nation already had units that were organized, trained, and equipped to link up with irregular indigenous forces and 

assist them in liberating their country. (In U.S. military doctrine this type of 

operation is UW.) These units were, of course, the Army special forces and 

other special operations personnel who helped topple the Taliban government. The existence of this special operations capability before the conflict 

began made it possible for the United States to drive the Taliban and their 

al-Qaeda allies out of Afghanistan much sooner, and with many fewer U.S. 

casualties.12

Ironically, special operations capabilities are just as important when we 

guess right, as when we guess wrong. Our preference is to deter conflict 

rather than fight wars, and build an array of CF to deter potential enemies. 

But what happens when we correctly assess the way an adversary wants 

to confront us, and we respond correctly by building and deploying CF 

that successfully deter that adversary? Some potential adversaries might 

abandon confrontation in favor of cooperation, but others might abandon 

conventional military confrontation in favor of an approach that evades 

conventional deterrence. In such cases, special operations capabilities may 

be vital to countering the adversary’s non-conventional approaches. Thus 

the better we are at conventional operations, the more successful we will be 

in deterring the enemy from confronting us conventionally, and the more 

likely it is that we will instead have to conduct special operations. 

Arguably, this is exactly what is happening in the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization’s (NATO’s) eastern flank, where NATO CF seem to be successfully deterring Russian conventional operations. Rather than cooperating with NATO, Russia chose a confrontational approach using what some 

Competent SOF 

are the insurance 

that protects against 

“lousy” predictions.
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Searle: Outside the Box

call hybrid warfare.13 To date, this approach successfully advanced Russian 

interests by force but without justifying a NATO conventional operation 

response. If NATO conventional operations cannot counter Russian hybrid 

warfare, then special operations may become NATO’s main military option. 

Figure 2 also explains the origins of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and congressionally mandated Major Force 

Program (MFP)-11, SOF funding. Congress defined the large circle of activities it wanted the military to be able to conduct, but conventional-minded 

service chiefs chose to see their duties as confined by the much smaller, 

conventional box. As a result, when Congress authorized funding to address 

concerns associated with special operations as depicted in figure 2 (i.e., inside 

the military circle but outside the conventional box), the military services 

consistently redirected those funds to address conventional priorities inside 

the box. The failed attempt to rescue hostages from Iran in 1980 provided 

objective proof that this approach was leaving the U.S. military unprepared 

for hostage rescue missions, CT more generally, and, by extension many 

other special operations outside the conventional box. Congress finally lost 

patience. In 1986, over the objections of all the Services chiefs, Congress created a funding stream, MFP-11, outside the control of the services. Congress 

also created USSOCOM, a combatant command with service-like responsibilities, to manage MFP-11 funds and address special operations challenges 

that the Services neglected.14 Figure 2 highlights the gap between what Congress saw: the whole circle; and what the Services saw: the conventional box; 

and thus helps clarify the pre-USSOCOM disagreements between Congress 

and the Services over special operations. 

Unfortunately, there are still conventional officers who see the edges of 

the conventional box as the limits of military responsibility. They value special operations only to the extent that they directly 

support conventional operations, suspect that 

preparing for special operations distracts people 

from more important conventional operations, 

and believe any resources devoted to SOF are 

wasted. Perhaps figure 2 will help these officers 

realize that when SOF provide special operations 

capabilities they are relieving the conventional 

force of those tasks. They might then value the way SOF improve conventional capabilities by allowing CF to focus on fewer tasks. Ideally they would 

They might then 

value the way SOF 

improve conventional 

capabilities by allowing CF to focus on 

fewer tasks. 
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JSOU Report 17-6

also recognize that SOF create options and opportunities that would not 

otherwise exist and insure the nation against adversaries who confront us 

in a manner that makes conventional operations inappropriate. 

Implications of the Theory for Conventional and Special 

Operations

Figure 3 depicts many aspects of special operations and the relationship 

between special operations and conventional operations. For example, a 

glance at figure 3 reminds us that special operations extend to the boundaries 

of what the DOD is authorized to do whereas conventional operations do not. 

As a result, special operations will be unusually sensitive to changes in DOD 

authorities and to different interpretations of existing authorities. Another 

important implication is that, as shown in figure 3, extending to the outer 

edges of what DOD is authorized to do means special operations are much 

more likely than conventional operations to overlap with the authorities 

and activities of other U.S. government agencies such as the Department of 

State, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement 

Agency, etc. Also as depicted in figure 3, special operations are more likely 

than conventional operations to involve cooperation with foreign governments. Furthermore, the routine overlap between special operations and the 

activities of other U.S. government agencies and other governments means 

that forces who conduct special operations will need specific expertise in 

working with these entities. 

Conventional

Operations

Special 

Operations

Country X

DOS Etc.

CIA

DOJ

Figure 3. Relationship between conventional operations, special operations, 

international partners and interagency partners.

All DoD

Responsibilities

and Authorities
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Searle: Outside the Box

Figure 3 also suggests forces that routinely conduct special operations 

occupy a middle ground between U.S. CF and non-DOD agencies, both 

foreign and domestic. As a result, forces that routinely conduct special operations will often serve as liaisons between U.S. CF, and both international 

and interagency partners. This liaison role will come naturally, since other 

nations and agencies will often encounter forces conducting special operations before conventional ones. 

This is not to say that conventional operations do not frequently overlap 

with the activities of other U.S. government agencies and especially foreign 

militaries. For example, U.S. CF in Europe and Korea have been working 

closely with foreign CF for generations. But these are exceptions. Conventional U.S. military operations are usually intended to create a gap between 

military operations and the activities of other U.S. government agencies. 

Foreign forces tend to be added to, rather than incorporated within, conventional U.S. military thinking. By contrast, special operations, such as FID, 

UW, CA, etc., are tightly integrated with other U.S. government agencies 

and with the activities of friendly foreign governments and organizations. 

What Happens as Conventional Operations Evolve?

Some authors are uncomfortable defining special operations as different 

from conventional ones because this definition makes an operation special 

or conventional based on the then-current definition of conventional rather 

than some timeless aspect of specialness.15 Their insistence on a positive and 

unchanging definition of special operations is a mistake. Our understanding of special operations and how they evolve is enhanced by accepting the 

negative definition of special operations. 

To understand how the evolution of conventional operations affects 

special operations we need to consider some of the many types of special 

operations. Figure 4, on the following page, depicts five types of military 

operations: FID; CA; UW; psychological operations (PSYOP); and COIN. 

The first four were among the “Principle Special Operations Missions” listed 

in USSOCOM Pub 1 dated 25 January 1996, and that list was still current 

on 11 September 2001.16 The term ‘COIN’ was still out of favor in DOD, as it 

had been since Vietnam. It is, however, included with an asterisk in figure 

4 because if the term had been acknowledged, it would almost certainly 

have been listed as a special operations core activity, as it is now in the 2014 
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edition of Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations.

17 (The five missions 

depicted in figure 5 are, of course, a severe oversimplification of the true 

diversity of special operations, but including more activities and missions 

associated with special operations would make the figure more confusing 

without advancing the argument.) Figure 4 thus depicts specific 2001 missions that were (or would have been) officially classified as special operations 

rather than conventional operations.

Now compare figure 4 to the situation at the height of the Iraq War, in 

about 2008, depicted in figure 5. Several things changed. COIN was reinstated as an accepted doctrinal term, and even became fashionable in some 

circles. It was also identified as a special operations core activity. PSYOP 

was renamed MISO. Most importantly, the long occupation of Iraq and 

Afghanistan by U.S. CF has forced U.S. conventional operations to expand 

into areas that were previously considered special operations. By 2008, certain CA, MISO, FID, and COIN operations were all routinely conducted by 

CF and there were prominent conventional officers, such as General David 

Petraeus (U.S. Army, Retired), who were trying to permanently expand the 

U.S. Army’s view of conventional operations to include elements of COIN, 

FID, CA, and MISO. UW, on the other hand, remained strictly a special 

Conventional

Operations

Special Operations

CA

PSYOP UW

*

COIN

FID

Figure 4. Some of the principle Special Operations Missions included 

in doctrine before 9/11.
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Searle: Outside the Box

operation. In terms of our visualization, the conventional operations box 

expanded to include parts of CA, FID, MISO, and COIN, but not UW. 

The expansion of the conventional operations box depicted in figure 5 

may prove to be temporary. Certainly there are conventional officers who 

want to narrow the scope of conventional operations (shrink the box) back 

to pre-9/11 size, and there are special operations personnel who want to 

keep these missions, and the forces who conduct them, entirely within the 

special operations community.18 But the fact remains that in recent years, 

the conventional operations box expanded and changed its shape to include 

things previously considered to be strictly special operations. This sort of 

evolution in the size and shape of the conventional operations box is both 

natural and desirable. 

Figure 5 helps us understand the implications of changes in conventional 

operations for both SOF and CF. The fact that the conventional operations 

box expanded after 9/11 to include, for example, some portions of CA does 

not mean that CA was never a real special operation. It instead means that 

Conventional

Operations

Special Operations

CA

UW

MISO

COIN

FID

Figure 5. The situation at the height of the Iraq War with the conventional operations box expanding to include parts of CA, MISO, COIN, and FID, but not UW.

Changing Nature of Conventional Operations
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the situation changed, and CA, previously peripheral to success in conventional operations, is now central to conventional success. Fortunately for 

CF, prior to 9/11 the DOD did not put 100 percent of its resources into conventional operations as defined at that time. Rather, it invested a small, but 

prudent amount in maintaining a CA capability within the special operations community. That pre-9/11 investment in special operations CA meant 

that when conventional operations required it, a capability already existed 

and could expand to meet new, and unexpected requirements. The same 

holds true of FID, COIN, and MISO/PSYOP.

Thus SOF not only create and maintain capabilities outside the conventional box, they also serve as scouts preparing the way in case the conventional box needs to expand into those areas. This scout role requires SOF 

to share their techniques and expertise with their conventional brethren. 

Figures 1–5 depict operations, but not forces. There is, however, a connection to forces, since certain forces are commonly associated with specific 

tasks. For example, CA teams are routinely assigned civil affairs missions 

(depicted by the CA circle entirely outside the conventional operations 

box and inside the special operations area in figure 4, but partly inside the 

expanded conventional operations box depicted in figure 5 and partly still 

outside that box in the realm of special operations). As the situation changed 

between figures 4 and 5, some SOF CA teams became CF, or SOF who routinely supported conventional operations versus special operations. By the 

same token, conventional infantry, armor, and artillery units that would have 

been conducting conventional combined arms maneuvers inside the conventional box in figure 5 had their mission set expanded into FID and COIN (in 

figure 5). This might have started out as CF performing a special operation on 

a temporary basis, but later (as the situation changed from figure 4 in 2001 to 

figure 5 in 2008) transitioned into CF conducting a conventional operation 

that used to be a special operation. Case in point, the conventional portion 

of the U.S. Army embraced FID and COIN to such an extent that entire 

Advise and Assist Brigades were organized, trained, and equipped, within 

the conventional force, for the specific tasks of FID and COIN.19

Conclusion

The outside the box theory of special operations starts from a definition 

of what special operations are not: special operations are not conventional 
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operations. It uses a simple graphic to depict the relationship between special 

operations and conventional operations: a large circle represents everything 

the military is authorized to do; a box in the center of the circle represents 

the portion of those responsibilities that are conventional operations; and 

everything inside the circle but outside the box is a special operation. This 

visualization shows that SOF (i.e., the capability and capacity to conduct 

special operations) enable conventional operations by allowing the DOD to 

focus on conventional operations without neglecting its non-conventional 

responsibilities. Robust SOF covering a wide range of special operations 

allows the military to use a tighter definition of conventional operations and 

thus, achieve higher levels of proficiency in those operations. 

The proposed theory explicitly recognizes that the edges of the military 

circle expand and contract as military responsibilities and authorities change 

over time. Also, the conventional box within that circle changes its size and 

shape as the definition of conventional operations evolves. The visualization makes it obvious that special operations will be extremely sensitive 

to changes in the size and shape of the circle, and at the edges of military 

authorities and responsibilities, special operations will frequently overlap 

with activities of other U.S. government agencies and both friendly foreign 

governments and non-governmental actors. Special operations will also be 

extremely sensitive to changes in the size and shape of the conventional 

box, since special operations expands when the conventional box shrinks, 

and special operations roles and missions become conventional when the 

conventional box expands. 

In sum, where other theories of special operations define special operations narrowly and see conventional operations as the archetypal military 

activity, this chapter reframes special operations as a vast array of military activities outside the narrow confines of the conventional box. As the 

authorities and responsibilities of the military change, special operations 

change. As conventional operations change, they also affect special operations. The theory explores how these changes come about and demonstrates 

that, through all these evolutions, the ability to conduct special operations 

remains an essential requirement for the DOD and the nation.
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Endnotes 

1. William McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory 

and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996). 

2. Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan & the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare 

(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 102. 

3. Ibid. 

4. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and 

Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007). 

5. Author’s notes on: Admiral (retired) Eric Olson, “Importance of Special Operations to National Power (keynote speech, Special Operations Theory, Summer 

2016 Symposium, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, FL, 31 Aug. 2016). 

6. Title 10-Armed Forces, 10 U.S.C. § 167, Unified combatant command for special 

operations forces, accessed 1 Feb 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE2011-title10/pdf/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap6-sec167.pdf. 

7. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (U.S. Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, July 2014), II-1–II-18. 

8. United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Publication 1, Doctrine 

for Special Operations (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, 5 August 2011), 20–28. The 

core operations are: counter weapons of mass destruction, counterinsurgency, 

counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, stability operations, support to major 

operations and campaigns, and unconventional warfare. The core activities are: 

civil affairs operations, direct action, hostage rescue and recovery, interdiction of 

offensive weapons of mass destruction, military information support operations, 

preparation of the environment, security force assistance, special reconnaissance, 

SOF combat support and combat service support. 

9. The author is reminded of his role in training and advising a heavy-mech task 

force in the Royal Saudi Army during Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM. The initial mission of the task force, before large coalition 

conventional forces arrived in the kingdom, was ‘delay defense,’ and that was 

what we helped them train for. As coalition forces built up, the mission changed 

to deliberate defense. Later still, it changed to deliberate attack through minefields 

and prepared defenses. The repeated changes of mission meant that the task force 

never achieved the level of proficiency it could have achieved if we had trained 

for just one mission the entire time. 

10. Quoted in: Micah Zenko, “100% Right 0% of the Time: Why the U.S. military 

can’t predict the next war,” Foreign Policy 16 October 2012, accessed 8 December 

2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/16/100-right-0-of-the-time/. Mr. Zenko 

also includes similar quotes from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Commander, U.S. Central Command General James Mattis, and other prominent 

DOD leaders. 

11. General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, United States Special Operations Command, statement regarding “Special Operations Forces in an Evolving Threat 
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Environment: A Review of the Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request for U.S. Special 

Operations Command” ( House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Washington, D.C., 1 March 2016); and “About 

the Department of Defense (DOD),” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed 3 May 

2016, http://www.defense.gov/About-DoD. For example, USSOCOM contains 

about 4 percent of U.S. active duty military personnel (56,000 out of 1.3 million 

in DOD), less than 1 percent of the DOD civilian work force (6,600 out of 742,000 

in DOD), and less than 1 percent of National Guard and Reserve personnel (7,400 

out of 826,000 in DOD). 

12. The most complete account of what SOF did to facilitate the liberation of Afghanistan from the Taliban is: Charles Briscoe et al., Weapon of Choice: U.S. Army 

Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2003). 

13. For a good introduction to how Russia has kept its aggression against Ukraine 

below the level of conventional warfare, see: “Little Green Men”: a primer on 

Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013–2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: 

United States Army Special Operations Command, 2015). 

14. USSOCOM History Office, United States Special Operations Command History: 

1987–2007, (MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM History Office, 2008), 5–7. 

15. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and 

Use of SOF. 

16. United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Pub 1: Special Operations in Peace and War, 25 January 1996, pp. 3-2, 3-3. 

17. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (U.S. Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, July 2014), xi. Shortly after Vietnam, the term “foreign internal 

defense,” or FID, was invented to describe COIN when the term was being 

expunged from official Army doctrine post-Vietnam. 

18. For a conventional officer calling for a rush back to the old definition of conventional operations, see Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost (New York: Houghton 

Mifflin, 2014). 

19. Sergeant Benjamin Kibbey, “Advise and Assist Brigade: A familiar unit with a 

new mission in Iraq,” U.S. Army Public Affairs, 25 August 2010, accessed 22 

Dec 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/44206/advise-and-assist-brigade-afamiliar-unit-with-a-new-mission-in-iraq. 

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Spencer: The Future is Now

Chapter 8. The Future is Now: The Need 

for a Special Operations and SOF Theory1

Emily Spencer 

Introduction

Theories help to provide an understanding of relationships. They are 

not necessary for relationships to occur, but knowledge acquired from 

proven theories can help maximize the potential of these relationships. For 

instance, the law of gravity, developed from a theory, enabled the theory of 

relativity to develop, which in turn contributed to numerous scientific discoveries and developments. For example, without an understanding of gravity, apples still fall from trees. The law of gravity, however, enabled theorists 

to build upon this knowledge and develop and test further theories, which 

eventually led to the creation of rocket ships amongst many other things.2 

Clearly, understanding the theory of relativity did not change the physical 

environment, but it enabled further developments to occur.

Modern special operations and Special Operations Forces (SOF) date back 

to WWII, and preexist any specific theory of these special missions or people. 

While arguably effective forces in this conflict, many Western SOF were 

disbanded after the war only to reemerge periodically as capability gaps or 

crises arose. Since the mid-1980s, however, many nations not only maintain 

a SOF capability, they also expand special operations mission sets. Moreover, 

Dr. Emily Spencer is the director of research and education at the Canadian 

Special Operations Forces Command Education and Research Centre. She 

holds a doctoral degree in war studies from the Royal Military College of 

Canada and has authored, co-authored and edited numerous books, chapters, and articles on the contemporary military operating environment. Her 

research focuses on the importance of cultural knowledge to succeed in the 

contemporary operating environment, as well as the role the media plays in 

shaping and understanding world events. Spencer is an adjunct professor at 

Norwich University and a Joint Special Operations University Senior Fellow. 
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SOF have retained a more continuous, high-profile presence within military 

institutions and the national defense realm as they have increasingly been 

called on to fulfill a variety of engagements across the spectrum of conflict.3

With the expansion of special operations and the growth of SOF, military 

practitioners, theorists, and historians must now ask if a theory is required 

to maximize the utility of SOF and 

effectively conduct special operations into the future.

The answer in short is ‘yes.’ 

A special operations theory is 

required for SOF to continue to 

succeed. Importantly, a special 

operations theory is, however, 

insufficient to examine the complex 

relationships of SOF’ most valuable asset—its people. As such, a SOF theory 

is also required to explore this realm. In brief, a special operations theory is 

needed to harness the potential of the missions and a SOF theory is required 

to harness the potential of its people. The two are related but distinct enough 

to require their own examination.

As special operations and SOF expanded and evolved, generic military 

theories are no longer sufficient for understanding the uniqueness of special 

operations and SOF. Also, the absence of a specific theory for each prevents 

them from being used to their full advantage. Specifically, and notably not 

exclusively, a special operations theory could allow for a deeper understanding of the relationships between: a) special operations and the global environment; b) special operations and conventional operations, and c) special 

operations and decision makers. Additionally, a SOF theory could allow for 

a deeper understanding of the relationships between: a) SOF and the global 

environment; b) SOF and conventional forces; c) SOF and special operations; d) the different units within SOF, and e) operators, supporters, and 

staff within units. 

This chapter will therefore demonstrate how the development of specific 

special operations and SOF theories can maximize the utility of SOF power 

and maintain SOF’ current status as the force of choice within many defense 

departments. In essence, we must now ask: Are we satisfied with falling 

apples? Or are we ready to harness the power of rocket ships, and devote 

With the expansion of special 

operations and the growth of SOF, 

military practitioners, theorists, and 

historians must now ask if a theory 

is required to maximize the utility of SOF and effectively conduct 

special operations into the future.
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the time and effort toward establishing well-researched special operations 

and SOF theories? 

The Utility of Theory

Notably, the fact that the SOF community is still asking whether or not they 

need a theory is paradoxically both simultaneously surprising, and not. It is 

surprising because SOF should be so much further in their evolution. Undeniably though, by their very nature, SOF hate being boxed up—something 

that theory, by its very nature, implies—and thus the lack of an established 

special operations and/or SOF theory is also not too surprising. Nonetheless, 

it is time to move beyond fears of being normalized through theory, and of 

potentially losing what has become known as a SOF mystique. The community must realize that at this point in SOF’ evolution, it needs a SOF theory 

to continue to exude SOF power and be the force of choice into the future.

Notably, the acknowledgement that ‘need’ is a very strong word should be 

addressed. Do we ‘need’ a special operations and/or SOF theory? Clearly, to 

exist, the answer is no. Historically, SOF were created to fill a gap or respond 

to a crisis, and when no longer needed they were minimized, marginalized, 

or disbanded. And they did so valiantly without any special theory. Arguably, however, the last couple of decades represent a new era of international 

conflict in which SOF proved their strategic worth to many Western governments by providing what has become known as ‘SOF power.’ For many 

Western governments, SOF are now the force of choice for low-intensity warfare and to fight belligerents beyond their borders with a minimal footprint. 

Like so many important terms, there is no singular definition of ‘theory.’ 

At their core, theories try to explain relationships, causal or otherwise, and 

help form mental constructs to make order out of chaos, and thereby affect 

the relative importance and relevance given to items. Notably, and due to 

the multiple variables at play, theories that deal with humans and reside 

in the social sciences are particularly complex. War clearly exists in this 

realm. And, despite claims by the movie The Theory of Everything, there 

is really no theory that covers everything. Instead, specific theories were 

developed in specific areas, ones considered unique enough to require their 

own understanding. Similarly, although there is no theory of everything, 

there also cannot be a theory for everything. At times, common sense is 

enough. Still, and even in these instances, theories assist common sense by 
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helping raise the level of consistency, are more evidence based, and tend to 

be broad in scope.4

Specifically, military theory explains how to conduct and win a war. For 

military practitioners, doctrine takes theory from the realm of thought into 

the realm of action. As such, a prerequisite for good doctrine is generally 

good theory.

The issue of whether special operations and/or SOF need a theory hinges 

on what level of military theory is required for optimal employment. Ultimately, the issue becomes how micro is too micro and vice versa (how macro 

is too macro)? Are SOF and special operations sufficiently unique from other 

environments to require their own theories? Or can an effective understanding of special operations and SOF be found in military theory at-large, or 

within land, sea, or air theories? 

Special Operations Theory

As Clausewitz noted, “The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled.”5

 Subsequently, a good start point of this discussion is the definition of special 

operations. A current definition of special operations is: 

Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, 

techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted 

in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: 

time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work 

with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional 

orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk ... 

Although special operations can be conducted independently, most 

are coordinated with conventional forces (CF), interagency partners, 

and multinational partners, and may include work with indigenous, 

insurgent, or irregular forces. Special operations may differ from 

conventional operations in degree of strategic, physical, and political 

and/or diplomatic risk; operational techniques; modes of employment; and dependence on intelligence and indigenous assets.6

As such, special operations are operations—we are not talking about 

people, rather missions, whether independent or joint. Most importantly, 
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special operations differ from conventional operations in fundamental ways, 

specifically, the degree of risk, methods, and value.

In fact, as social constructs, special operations are dependent on conventional operations. Conceptually, we can have conventional operations 

without special operations, but special operations cannot exist without conventional ones (as conventional operations help define special operations). 

From a special operations perspective, one can visualize this relationship as 

a double helix. As the two strands evolve, they remain at an equal distance 

from each other. What was a special operation may ultimately become a 

conventional one. By that time, however, special operations did not stand 

still, and continued to evolve. Thus, like a double helix, the distance between 

the two remains the same.

The point being, by their very definition, special operations are sufficiently 

unique from conventional operations to require its own theory. As such, it 

is important to consider what a special operations theory can bring to the 

table. A special operations theory would help clarify the unique relationships 

between: 1) special operations and the global environment; 2) special operations and military and political decision makers; and, importantly, 3) special 

operations and conventional operations. Using this definition, relationships 

between special operations and the global environment, and special operations and military and political decision makers are sufficiently different 

that those of conventional operations to require its own theory. Additionally, and in the contemporary operating environment, an understanding of 

relationships between special operations and conventional operations is vital 

to understanding how to both win and conduct a war. As such, a theory that 

helps clarify these relationships could help enable the full potential of special 

operations in these areas. Notably, current theories do not have the level of 

detail required, and moving forward in an ad hoc manner could result in 

misuse/misemployment of special operations resources.

Consequently, a special operations theory that looked at these relationships could help clarify, among other things, our understanding of: a) the 

effects of special operations (vs. intent and/or perceived effect); b) how the 

global environment shapes special operations; c) and the optimal type, duration, and environment in which to conduct special operations. More precisely, a special operations theory could provide military-political decision 

makers with information about relationships between special operations and 

the environment, and with it outline optimal conditions in which to conduct 
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special operations (and thereby help to minimize misemployment of the 

resource). Additionally, this theory could shed light on how special operations and conventional operations relate to each other. Again, visualizing 

this relationship as a double helix one can see 

the potential of each strand to be optimized. 

It is a matter of understanding both how they 

work independently and how they relate to 

each other.

Importantly, theory is about what is, which 

may not necessarily be the same as what you 

want it to be. The three relationships discussed above (i.e., special operations 

and the global environment, special operations and military and political 

decision makers, and special operations and conventional operations) are 

not fully covered in military theory at-large and/or Service theories. Instead, 

people rely on common sense, intuition, and personal beliefs on where and 

when to conduct special operations. Alternatively, special operations theory 

could help ensure, for example, that governments are getting value from 

phase zero operations, that training and assistance missions are achieving 

desired ends, that counterterrorism operations are placed in the right priority, and, importantly for our discussion, that the right people are being 

selected, trained, and educated appropriately. 

SOF Theory

Indeed, an important element for ensuring special operations achieve its 

desired effect is to make sure the appropriate people are conducting the 

operations. As such, this chapter now moves from a discussion of missions 

to one of people, or SOF. Again, a good place to begin is with a definition. 

The Canadian definition of SOF is:

Special Operation Forces are organizations containing specially 

selected personnel that are organized, equipped, trained and educated to conduct high-risk, high value special operations to achieve 

military, political, economic or informational objectives by using 

special and unique operational methodologies in hostile, denied 

or politically sensitive areas to achieve desired tactical, operational 

and/or strategic effects in times of peace, conflict or war.7

Additionally, this theory 

could shed light on how 

special operations and 

conventional operations 

relate to each other.
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Spencer: The Future is Now

In brief, SOF represent specially selected, trained, and equipped individuals to conduct special operations. They are the men and women who 

perform the mission(s).

Notably, by the same logic that distinguishes special operations from conventional operations, SOF are sufficiently unique from conventional forces 

to require their own theory. A SOF theory could help explain SOF-specific 

characteristics not sufficiently detailed in other military theories. Specifically, are SOF organizing their human resources effectively? Do those in 

charge of SOF know what their men and women are capable of (and do they 

understand their limitations)? Are SOF selecting the right people for the 

right tasks and achieving desired effects? 

With the rise of multiple special operations commands and special operations forces, understanding relationships between different units within 

these commands can maximize the potential of each individually, as well as 

collectively through the formation of special operations task forces. A SOF 

theory could help explain how all the pieces fit together, and which pieces 

are needed to achieve a government’s desired strategic effect.

A SOF theory could also help to explain relationships between staff, supporters, and operators. It is clearly a case where the whole is greater than 

simply the sum of its parts: no operator can achieve strategic effect sans 

supporters and staff. 

Stated above, relationships between SOF and conventional forces can 

also be visualized as a double helix, one where SOF define themselves in 

contrast to conventional forces while remaining continuously distinct (based 

on government need). A theory would provide a deeper understanding of the 

similarities and uniqueness of each of these two groups, also how and when 

the two should act independently or collectively. A theory could also help to 

explain differences in aptitude, skills, training and education, for example.

Finally, one reason why we need both a special operations and SOF theory 

is that the two are distinct yet interrelated. As such, a SOF theory could 

explore whether we are selecting and training the right people for the right 

special operations missions. Notably, this level of specific analysis is not 

covered within other military theories. 

To return to the word ‘need;’ it is a strong word, but so is ‘mediocracy.’ 

For SOF to continue as the force of choice in future operating environments 

and for the full potential of special operations and SOF power to be realized, 

theory must be formulated and applied. A critical first step is to allocate 
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resources required to conduct unbiased research upon which to base a special 

operations and SOF theory. 

Endnotes

1. The following chapter is based on a presentation prepared for the Special Operations Theory, summer 2016 Symposium, held 30–31 August 2016 at Joint Special 

Operations University. Specifically, I was asked to argue in the affirmative on a 

panel titled “Do We Need a Theory at All?” 

2. Notably, this overview is an extremely simplified version and used only as an 

analogy, not as a scientific explanation. 

3. See, for example: Bernd Horn, “‘Avenging Angels’: The Ascent of SOF as the Force 

of Choice in the New Security Environment,” in Colonel Bernd Horn and Major 

Tony Balasevicius, eds., Casting Light on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on 

Special Operations Forces (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007), 160–161. 

4. Adapted from: Mark L. Mitchell & Janina M. Jolley, Research Design Explained, 

8th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsorth, 2010). 

5. Carl von Clausewitz, as cited in: Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz: Toward a 

Theory of Applied Strategy,” Defense Analysis 11, no. 3, 1995, 229–240, accessed 13 

December 2016, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Echevarria/APSTRAT1.htm. 

6. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (Washington, 

D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2014), I-1. 

7. Canadian Special Operation Forces Command. An Overview (Ottawa: Department 

of National Defence, 2008), 7, http://www.cansofcom.forces.gc.ca/pub/doc/ove-apeeng.pdf.
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Kiras: Do We Even Need a Theory?

Chapter 9. Do We Even Need a Theory?1

James Kiras 

Over the last two decades, special operations and the forces that conduct them, shifted from ancillary roles into a cornerstone of national 

security policy in responding to the challenges of terrorism. Policymakers 

are attracted to special operations for three main reasons: they are effective 

in accomplishing missions with a high degree of success; they are efficient in 

that they achieve disproportionate results relative to the amount of resources 

committed; and, they minimize political risk for decision makers. The shift 

from conventional force actions to special operations is evident in recent 

casualty figures. According to Dave Philipps, over the last twelve months 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) “have died in greater numbers than conventional troops—a first” as “the Pentagon, hesitant to put conventional 

troops on the ground, has come to depend almost entirely on small groups 

of elite warriors.”2

The growth in utility and use of special operations was accompanied by 

expansion in force numbers and organization. Such expansion is not limited 

to the United States. Other nations, such as Canada and Russia, created specific special operations command headquarters and reorganized their forces 

to ensure special operations can be sustained and conducted as effectively as 

possible. Within nations with relatively small armed forces such as Sweden 

and Denmark, special operations were elevated to the level of an armed 

service comparable to their respective army, navy, or air force.3

Given their increased visibility and prominence in defense and national 

security, there remain calls to create a specific theory for special operations. 

Dr. James Kiras is an associate professor at the School of Advanced Air and 

Space Studies at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, and a Joint Special 

Operations University Senior Fellow. He earned his doctorate in politics and 

European studies from the University of Reading in the UK in 2004 under 

the direction of Colin S. Gray. His current research interests include the 

civil-military implications of contemporary special operations use. 
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Such a theory might be desired by the special operations community but is 

it really warranted? This chapter makes the argument that while a theory 

of special operations or SOF is possible, it is simply unnecessary. To answer 

the main question, this chapter explores 

four related points. The first two examine 

theory generally, including its boundaries, 

sufficiency, and overall purpose. Theory 

can provide great insight but is based on 

its purpose and (the second two points) the 

nature of special operations and their influence on theory development. 

This chapter suggests related and existing military theory is sufficient for 

understanding special operations. 

Theory

Theory, in a general sense, consists of a supposition or hypothesis intended 

to explain actions or behavior based on systematic exploration of its nature 

through a series of codified, related propositions, backed by sufficient analysis and evidence. Theory should reduce complex phenomena down to an 

elegantly simple, abstract explanation. There are several ways to parse theory. 

One category of theory, military theory, explores as its central phenomenon 

war or armed conflict. Armed conflict involves the use or the threat of use of 

violence to impose one’s will against a dynamic, adaptive opponent seeking 

to deny it this goal and impose their own will upon it. Given the range of 

actors in contemporary irregular warfare, the current debate within military 

theory is whether this central assumption about opponents and imposition of 

will is still valid.4 Most military theories, however, start from the assumption 

that war, in its most abstract form, is a rational undertaking for a political 

purpose and involves a dynamic between competing wills. In other words, 

the nature of armed struggle remains a reflection of, and is heavily influenced, by human nature.

To paraphrase George Orwell, not all theories are created equal but some 

are more equal than others. This statement is especially true for military 

theory, including any theory of special operations. Harold Winton, Professor Emeritus of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, provided 

an exceptionally useful and informative method for evaluating military 

theory. Winton suggests that the sufficiency of military theory should be 

This chapter suggests related 

and existing military theory 

is sufficient for understanding special operations.
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assessed according to its five functions: define, categorize, explain, connect, 

and anticipate. Defining clarifies the subject under investigation by outlining 

what is comprised within it and what is not, in a general sense. It establishes 

the boundaries for enquiry.5 Categorizing “break[s] the field down into its 

constituent parts.”6 An important and often neglected aspect of categorizing 

lies not just in identifying and separating out the constituent parts, but relating them together. Next, and perhaps most importantly, a military theory 

should explain the phenomenon under investigation through “repetitive 

observation and imaginative analysis” or Albert Einstein’s “intuition, supported by being sympathetically in touch with experience.”7

 For a theory to 

have explanatory power, it must explore both the scope and limitations of 

such operations relative to other methods or means. Winton concludes pithily that “theory without explanation is like salt without savor—it is worthy 

only of the dung heap.”8 Military theory can and should connect to other 

fields of study. As Winton argues, Clausewitz’s genius lies not in defining 

the character of battle or identifying timeless principles of war but rather 

connecting war to politics.9 Lastly, theory can anticipate; this function can 

be especially valuable as it should provide a clear direction for future military 

operations and guide the organizing, training, and equipping in times of 

great change and uncertainty.

The Purpose of Theory 

There are different types of military theory, depending on the scope of their 

inquiry and purpose. One difference is between pure theory, based largely 

on logic and argumentation about the nature of a phenomenon, and pragmatic theory, which seeks to develop a set of principles based on the activity 

under investigation. Pure theory seeks to abstract away contextual clutter to 

determine the essence, or philosophical truth, of the subject of investigation. 

Another way to categorize military theory beyond its approach is the 

scope of inquiry. Military theory can be general or specific.10 General theories 

examine broadly a phenomenon, such as armed conflict. Examples of general 

military theories are theories on war, the art of war, or strategy. Specific military theory, in contrast, explores particular sub-phenomena within armed 

conflict, and often focuses on an individual physical operational domain in 

which wars are fought, such as land, sea, air, or space. More recent specific 

theory attempts to scrutinize less tangible domains such as the virtual one 
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of cyberspace, or the social, ‘human domain.’ Other specific theory can be 

even more circumscribed in the scope of its inquiry. Specific theory can 

assess particular special operations organizations or units, as well as roles 

and missions, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Admiral 

William McRaven's (U.S. Navy, Retired) work Spec Ops, which some identify as a theory of special operations, is instead a highly specific theory of a 

specific special operations mission set, raid or direct action.11

One final way of categorizing military theory relates to the function it is 

designed to serve. Historically, military theories serve a variety of different 

purposes including describing, prescribing, integrating, and advocating. It is 

important to note these purposes are not mutually exclusive but frequently 

privilege one or more functions over others.

Of all the functions theory is designed to serve, descriptive theories tend 

to appeal to those seeking to understand the nature of phenomena. Descriptive theories tend to be general, and begin at a line of inquiry along the lines 

of Clausewitz’s On War, in which he was trying to understand the complexity of war as it changed during the course of his lifetime.12 In a similar 

manner, Emile Simpson places into a much broader context what he observed 

in Afghanistan, and what is different about contemporary conflict.13 Such 

theories are philosophical explorations and attempt to identify, connect, and 

explain general causalities. Descriptive or general theory, however, is not 

theory for theory’s sake. The manner of inquiry serves a pragmatic purpose 

as well. Clausewitz intended his readers to pursue a broader understanding 

of the phenomenon of war, which would help to develop critical thinking 

skills. It would inform the judgment of future commanders, and serve as a 

guide for a more structured and analytical reading of military history. He 

went to great pains to insist theory cannot and should not accompany a 

commander to the battlefield. Descriptive theory, then, attempts to answer 

the question of why a phenomenon occurs. 

Prescriptive theory has a different purpose than descriptive. Given their 

directive nature, professional military educators teach prescriptive theories 

such as Baron Antoine de Henri Jomini’s The Art of War and J.F.C. Fuller’s 

The Foundations of the Science of War (1926).14 Prescriptive theories remain 

popular as they tell the reader how and what to do, and are not as concerned 

with deeper connections or explanations. More often than not, prescriptive 

theory focuses specifically on a different core truth within war—the method 

of or formula for achieving decision or victory. Much of modern doctrine 
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and planning, as a result, borrows heavily from the concepts and terms used 

by prescriptive authors. For example, three domain-specific but enduring 

prescriptive theories of victory, by Jomini, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Guilio 

Douhet, place exclusive weight on massing forces at the decisive point to 

achieve success in battle.15 To be fair, Clausewitz mentions the importance 

of doing so but does not elevate this suggestion to the level of the central 

proposition of his theory. According to Jomini, Mahan, and Douhet, the 

battle at the decisive point leads to decisive victory. Prescriptive theories 

place a premium on simplifying the process of battle, identifying causal 

mechanisms for success, and suggesting how specific means used in particular ways will lead to desired outcomes. 

Prescriptive approaches to theory often mask an ulterior motive, namely 

advocacy. Such theories advocate for investment in capabilities or independent services. The means of such capabilities or independent services, 

linked to decisive battle, have the potential to determine national welfare 

or survival. Failure to invest in such means, so the line of reasoning goes, 

puts a specific armed service or a nation at a competitive disadvantage at 

best, or vulnerable to their technologically superior opponents at worst. 

For Mahan, once the decisive battle was fought, a grand fleet comprised of 

capital ships was linked directly to command of the sea and its unfettered 

exploitation.16 For Douhet, given the importance of popular will and domestic support to wars in which nations mobilize resources against one another, 

grinding through military resources is costly and wasteful. Through the 

domain and vast expanse of the air, fighting forces could be avoided and the 

source of national will and support, the population, could be attacked and 

influenced directly by a grand fleet of battleplanes.17 Although the central 

propositions of both theories were invalidated by subsequent experience, 

Mahan and Douhet remain popular as sources of inspiration and emulation. For example, in countries such as Russia and the People’s Republic of 

China, armed service leaders attempt to justify their expansion while others 

employ logic of both authors to advocate for growth in the prestige, status, 

budget, or independence of nuclear weapons and space forces. The power 

and persuasiveness of advocative theory rests on its simplicity: it promises 

a favorable and decisive outcomes via technologically advanced means, and 

at a greatly reduced price.

A last purpose of theory, to integrate, also has economy at its root. Put 

simply, integrative theory is the polar opposite of advocative in how it 
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identifies the primary means of success. Authors of integrative theory stress 

unique attributes of different domains but dismiss or downplay the ability 

of any one means to achieve decision independently. The watch phrase for 

integrative theory is ‘interdependence of means.’ Employing means in an 

interdependent manner explains how the sum application is greater than the 

value of the independent means, such as armies, navies, or air forces. In other 

words, the efficiency of using combined means leads to greater overall effectiveness. Integrative theories incorporate objectivity and nuance into their 

assessment of combined means, and explore ways to employ them together 

to achieve the desired end. Examples of integrative theories include Some 

Principles of Maritime Strategy written by Julian Corbett, and Air Power 

and Armies by John Slessor.18 Corbett reasoned maritime strategy differed 

from naval strategy in its scope and scale, and as a result concluded dispersion of forces was necessary to achieve local control of the sea to guarantee 

open sea lines of communication, along which flowed commerce essential 

for the survival of maritime nations. Slessor identified a key vulnerability of 

industrial armies—its supply lines: airpower possessed the ability to strike 

at vulnerable targets deep behind the frontlines. Despite being more objective and holistic, integrative theories tend to offer modest recommendations 

often ignored by armed services jockeying for budget, prestige, and influence.

Of the four different functions theory can serve, those that prescribe, 

advocate, and integrate have the least longevity. All three tend to connect 

the ends and ways of strategy to specific means that change, sometimes 

rapidly. Such theories tend not to anticipate developments that render some 

of their key assumptions invalid, such as radar, submarines, underwater 

mines, stealth, and precision-guided munitions, among others. In particular, 

prescriptive and advocative theory privilege solutions above understanding 

the nature of a problem. In short, by putting action and advocacy above 

critical thinking, such theories served institutional purposes at the expense 

of deeper understanding of conditions under which such action is unwise, 

counterproductive, or even paradoxical.

The reason for this extended survey on the purpose and function of 

theory is to point out how descriptive theories ask and answer fundamentally different questions than prescriptive, advocative, or integrative. The 

purpose of theory drives its assumptions, function, and outcome. Stated 

another way, the purpose theory eventually will likely determine its sufficiency. In the case of special operations theories, they may be unnecessary 
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for two compelling reasons. The first reflects a 

paradoxical logic, and the second, a function of 

the context in which the theory is written, a time 

of special operations ascendance. The theory the 

special operations community wants is not the one 

it ultimately needs. By the same token, the theory 

the community needs is also the one most likely 

to be ignored or rejected. This is given the nature of special operations and 

the pitfalls contained within, as the next two sections demonstrate. 

The Nature of Special Operations 

Any serious scholarly enquiry into special operations begins with a single 

question: what exactly is special about them? More pedantic investigations 

parse the word ‘special,’ while others are content to cite official definitions, 

often from sources of doctrine, without a second thought. Definitions for 

military or national security often begin by linking together the following 

elements: actions taken by an actor against a target for an explicit purpose, 

or to achieve a specific effect. 

For the purpose of this argument, special operations are “unconventional 

actions against enemy vulnerabilities in a sustained campaign, undertaken 

by specially designated units [SOF], to enable [military or other governmental] operations and/or resolve economically politico-military problems at the 

operational or strategic level that are difficult or impossible to accomplish 

with [military or other government] forces alone.”19 There are a number of 

key attributes about special operations implicit from this definition as well 

as ones from other theoretical inquiries:

• They are small-scale actions that can have disproportionate effects 

relative to their size and scale, but lack sufficient mass to achieve decisive effects on their own;

• They are enablers for other actions operationally and strategically—

conventional, other government department and agencies (individually or integrated), proxies, and/or host nation forces—often by setting 

the conditions for the success of future operations ... but cannot 

resolve problems at the level of strategy by themselves; 

• They have a relationship to time, but not a unique one, against an 

adversary by speeding up or slowing down the tempo of conflict, often 

Stated another way, 

the purpose theory 

eventually will likely 

determine its sufficiency. 
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to buy strategic time and space but also to wrest the initiative from 

an adversary;

• They have strategic utility primarily by providing national security 

leaders and commanders with appealing economy of force options, 

because of their high degree of success, with immediate results, relative to other military options;20 and 

• Their use conforms to, and is shaped by, the orientation of strategy 

and policy, and should be tailored to meet the unique policy demands 

of the era.21

The sum of these qualities and characteristics is that special operations 

are useful tools for political and military leaders because they appear to 

address immediate problems successfully and economically.22

The preceding definition is necessary but ultimately insufficient, as the 

key distinction is between conventional and that which is not. To expand the 

definition somewhat, and to cut to the heart of the matter, special operations 

are discrete actions that are extra-normative in their preparation, planning, 

execution, and effect. There is an established set of norms of warfare and special operations operate on their fringes. Such operations blur the distinctions, 

or operate in the gray zones, between war and peace, moral and immoral, 

legal and illegal, or systemic and anti-systemic, as recent scholarship suggests.23 As context changes—norms, opponents, technology, and methods—so do special operations. Therefore, special operations are relativistic 

in nature, and their distinctiveness is a function of the prevailing norm and 

behaviors. At the risk of being overly simplistic, the special characteristics of 

such operations change over time; what used to be special is now the norm.

There is a relationship between special operations relativism, scale, and 

enabling function. Because of their limited scale, any inquiry into special 

operations must acknowledge they are operational and strategic enablers. 

Special operations, by definition, cannot be conducted in sufficient mass to 

achieve independently decisive effects relative to the problem sets against 

which they are used. To attempt to develop sufficient mass risks turning what 

is unique into the mundane. It puts at risk the unique knowledge, abilities, 

and skills of selected and highly trained individuals capable of conducting 

them. Put in different terms and regardless how vigorous the application, 

special operations alone cannot defeat terrorism or insurgency. Such operations can devastate terrorist groups, sometimes with great success, as the 
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campaign against al-Qaeda in Iraq from 2006-2008 suggests.24 Yet, special 

operations did not resolve the underlying conditions that led to terrorism; 

but contributed to the metastasizing of the remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq into 

a more powerful form, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. As Colin Gray 

has suggested, a primary problem for special operations is the challenge of 

converting the currency of tactical actions into more meaningful strategic 

effect.25

Enabling operations, no matter how unorthodox, are insufficient to 

require theory. A historical driver of theory, however, is a sufficiently unique 

operating environment or domain, such as space or cyberspace. Special operations do not operate in a unique, much less new, domain. Much effort has 

gone into arguing that social contexts, regardless of where they are, are a 

domain unto themselves. Neither the concept of “Strategic Landpower” nor 

the Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations make a sufficiently compelling argument that there is a separate and distinct “human 

domain” which is the exclusive preserve of special operations.26 Through 

the ability of the units that conduct them, special operations have value 

within domains and context to serve a crucial integrative function, or vital 

connector, between disparate elements. For example, special operations succeed when working “by, with, and through” other forces, which includes 

conventional forces, proxy forces, and other governments and government 

departments, and agencies.27 In other words, the bridging function special 

operations perform reflects their enabling function rather than a specific 

domain or operating environment. While armed conflict for the foreseeable future will reflect individual and collective human nature, turning this 

crucial element of the context into its own domain of action risks focusing 

so much on the trees that one misses the forest in the process. 

Given their extra-normative and relativist characteristics, as well as their 

scale and enabling function, special operations face one more challenge on 

the road linking their nature with theory. At a level above mission execution, 

special operations remain bound by the overarching phenomenon to which 

they belong: armed conflict. If special operations remain within armed conflict, they must conform to a host of other theoretical pairings operationally 

and strategically. These pairings, or strategy types as Colin Gray labels them, 

include, but are not limited to, the following: offense versus defensive; direct 

versus indirect; attritional versus maneuverist or annihilationist; sequential 

versus cumulative, among others.28 Sufficient military theory must make 
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appropriate connection to these pairings or, at the very least, acknowledge 

their existence and relevance. Based on the characteristics and attributes of 

special operations inherent in their nature, there is little to suggest they are 

sufficiently unique to escape the logic inherent to strategy or war. For this 

we have a wealth of provocative, educational, and useful theory.29 To make 

the case that special operations operate beyond the contexts of war and 

strategy would require connecting them to associated theories for activities 

such as diplomacy and development, intelligence, and the like. While such 

a task is possible, it is unlikely that a single individual is capable of doing so 

without a lifetime of reading, reflection, and experience. Even more so for a 

unified field theory for any phenomenon, especially one as extra-normative 

and relativistic as special operations. 

The Influence of Special Operations on Theory 

Theory is not written in a vacuum. It is a product of its time, influenced 

by individual and institutional desires and ambitions, the contemporary 

operating environment, as well as other internal and external inputs. The 

primary problem with a theory of special operations today is not with theory 

development per se—one which can and should critically survey and assess 

the landscape and anticipate future changes. The main problem is a reflection of the purpose for which theory is written. Rather than engaging in a 

critical inquiry of the nature of the phenomenon, to assist in educating the 

mind, theory may serve entirely different purposes. To connect back to earlier arguments in this chapter, there are two challenges endemic to special 

operations that make theory development problematic. The two challenges 

will likely lead to an operationally unsatisfying, intellectually underwhelming, and potentially dangerous final product.

The first challenge is an institutional purpose that will influence the 

writing and acceptance of theory. The United States Special Operations 

Command (USSOCOM) was created thirty years ago to ensure the special 

operations community was adequately resourced, the health of its component organizations—the Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF (and much later, 

the Marine Corps)—assured to conduct a wide range of unconventional 

missions. As the utility and prestige of special operations grew, so too has 

the bureaucracy of USSOCOM and the ambition of its leaders. Jessica Turnley warned persuasively of the danger inherent in an overly bureaucratic 
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USSOCOM—one that threatens the culture of innovation resident in subordinate component organizations. The same challenge, she said, exists 

for theory.30 At the bureaucratic level of 

USSOCOM, leaders and managers value 

theory that amplifies the uniqueness of 

special operations to fulfill the ambition 

of its leaders. This ambition is to become 

an armed Service on par with the departments of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, 

and Air Force. Many of the other armed 

Services have their own theories, so a theory of special operations should 

make its community just as important and prestigious by extension. 

The second challenge relates to the incompatibility of most theory with 

the utilitarian mindset of subordinate special operations organizations and 

‘the operators’ themselves. SOF are eminently pragmatic—a reflection of 

the time and resources they spend in training and rehearsal for missions—a 

quality that makes them unique. Success or failure in such missions, which 

are often risky and at the limits of personal and equipment performance, 

depends on training and tactical excellence. The implications for theory 

and its acceptance at this level are clear. For theory to have utility within 

the special operations community, it should explain how to do a job better. 

In other words, theory should provide prescriptive insights that will lead 

to mission success. Arguably such insights are already available. Existing 

special operations tactics, techniques and procedures, concepts of operation, and doctrine fill these needs currently. In consequence, it is doubtful 

theory would have much to add at this instrumental level. A theory at the 

instrumental level, such as a theory for special warfare or surgical strike, 

will have limited application and provide few insights outside of a specific 

community. It is akin to creating a ‘theory of a hammer’ or a ‘theory of a 

nail.’31 Other dynamics at the component level within the special operations 

community will influence theory development. A theory made by consensus 

that reflects the interests of the components will have to meet with their 

approval individually. In the bid for equal representation, this will dilute 

explanatory power and reflect specific organizational interests. There is a 

high likelihood of theory developed within the special operations community descending into squabbling. For instance, which organization is the 

Many of the other armed 

Services have their own theories, so a theory of special 

operations should make its 

community just as important 

and prestigious by extension.
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most special, or more unique than the others, as well as which roles and 

missions are the most important.

The net effect of bureaucratic politics as represented by USSOCOM, and 

the organizational dynamics of the special operations components, will be a 

subjective quest for a theory that demonstrates the unequivocal uniqueness 

of special operations at the expense of objective, critical inquiry. Critical 

inquiry characteristic of descriptive theory seeks to answer different questions from aspirational and prescriptive ones, such as why a phenomenon 

occurs (its nature) and so what (or its implications). Such inquiry must challenge prevailing assumptions that operators and the special operations community take as matters of faith, and should be prepared to turn over every 

rock in the process. In other words, for a special operations theory to be 

sufficient, it should strive to meet and pass with flying colors Winton’s five 

criteria for sufficiency, not merely seek to stagger across the finish line to 

serve institutional agendas. 

The foundation of critical inquiry has a keystone of submitting cherished notions and core beliefs to scrutiny. For example, the special operations community accepts a current assertion about the misuse of special 

operations based on a number of precedents during WWII, Vietnam, and 

the Gulf War.32 The implication from history is that conventional minds 

do not sufficiently understand the more subtle approach and nuances of 

special operations. Is this misuse still the case? Other questions driving 

critical inquiry relate to roles and missions, which are often at the core of 

a special operations organization’s identity and culture. For example, the 

unconventional warfare mission is central to the identity of special operations generally and Army Special Forces specifically. The mission, however, 

is not as unique as the ones Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary forces 

can conduct, ones often with greater operational and legal flexibility but on 

a much smaller scale. In addition, the special operations community does 

not have a satisfactory understanding of the overall strategic or operational 

effectiveness to ascertain how often UW succeeded or failed. 

Other avenues of critical inquiry are likely to ask even more heretical 

questions. For example and given globalization and the role of social media, 

if a theory is to connect and anticipate, what will UW look like in the future? 

More to the point, who is better suited under these conditions to “Free the 

Oppressed” (motto of Army Special Forces) in the future? Should it be candidates selected and screened for physical toughness who can grow beards 
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and integrate into tribal structures? Or pale and callow youths whose skills 

are mental dexterity, computer aptitude, and an ability to influence social 

networks virtually? A more challenging question for special operations strategically, which runs counter to its culture, is when should special operations not be used—under what circumstance and condition are they not the 

answer? The point is sufficient theory requires asking and providing answers 

to questions based on roads of inquiry that may seem uncomfortable or 

unnecessary to operators, organizations, and the broader special operations 

community. Such questions are likely to cause a closing of ranks if they are 

asked by those outside the community, individuals who have not passed 

through the crucible of special operations selection, and whose qualifications 

and motivations may be looked upon with suspicion. 

Conclusion 

The sufficiency of any theory is a function of the purpose it is designed to 

serve. The type of theory the special operations community is most likely 

to value and embrace is prescriptive and/or aspirational. Prescriptive theory 

provides answers to pragmatic questions such as: what should be done differently, or in what way, to achieve victory or improve tactical performance. 

From the operator’s perspective, a theory that does not have direct application has no value. Given that the distinct attributes of special operations 

change over time, a theory that answers ‘what’ or ‘how’ questions is likely 

to have marginal utility and questionable longevity. 

The more dangerous purpose of theory, however, is aspirational. A theory 

that reflects organizational ambitions is likely to gloss over or ignore questions that provide deeper insight in the nature and future direction of special 

operations. In the quest to enhance the reputation and stature of special 

operations, it instead caters to institutional requirements and cherished missions and myths. Starting points for any theory of special operations must 

accept that they are useful strategic enablers first and foremost, do not exist 

in a vacuum, and allow others to perform more effectively. 

Put simply, if the special operations community wants theory badly 

enough, it will get bad or insufficient theory at best, or a shallow and dysfunctional collection of organizational aphorisms at worst. Theory that describes 

and is designed to facilitate critical inquiry, one that acts as a guiding light 

for current study and future judgment, requires time to develop and must 
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submit prevailing wisdom to scrutiny. As Clausewitz suggests, such theory 

is linked directly to education. In this case, theory acts as a guiding light for 

education, which in turn requires deep reading, reflection, and querying. It 

takes time to develop patterns of thought and habits of mind and inquiry of 

the critical thinker and strategist. 

If the purpose of theory is for education, existing theory may be sufficient. There is a wide range of theory and scholarship that can educate special operators and illuminate their path to critical inquiry. At its very least, 

such theory can provide special operators with insights into the pragmatic 

questions about which they care the most. There is a vast body of theory on 

war, specific operating domains, not to mention core phenomena related 

to special operations. One example is relatively recent scholarship on civil 

wars. Civil wars may not fall neatly into the list of special operations roles 

and missions, but the scholarship tackles a portion of irregular warfare that 

is USSOCOM’s charge. Its focus includes but is not limited to: the logic of 

violence within irregular conflicts and the agency of the populations in settling local vendettas;33 insurgent organizational types and their robustness 

or brittleness based on pre-war social networks;34 the challenges terrorists 

face in trying to balance control over subordinates against remaining hidden 

from security forces;35 the relational, constructed, and emergent nature of 

clandestine political violence;36 the logic and disproportionate success rate 

of non-violent civil resistance compared to violent;37 alliance formation and 

dissolution as a function of weighing rational cost calculations.38

On special operations specifically, there are also a wide range of works 

that provide useful insights into the nature of special operations. While not 

theory per se, such works cover subjects including the various dimensions of 

special operations organization,39 the mindset and culture of SOF and operators,40 strategic utility and effect,41 strategic effectiveness,42 special operations 

civil-military relations,43 as well as a wealth of historical material. 

In sum, there is a vast range of useful works that provide theoretical 

insights into special operations and do not require reinventing the wheel as 

a theory of special operations. Existing theory and scholarship, which will 

continue to grow and evolve, is more than sufficient to educate the special 

operations community. That is, if its operators are willing to invest the energy 

and, above all else, the time, patience, and reflection and self-introspection 

to do so. 
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Endnotes 

1. This chapter draws upon, but differs from, an earlier published work on this 

subject. See James D. Kiras, “A Theory of Special Operations: ‘These Ideas Are 

Dangerous,’” Special Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 75–88.

2. Dave Philipps, “Special Operations Troops Top Casualty List as U.S. Relies More 

on Elite Forces,” New York Times, 4 February 2017, accessed 4 February 2017, 

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/navy-seal-william-ryan-owens-deadyemen.html?_r=0. 

3. Gitte Højstrup Christensen, ed., Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Special Operations Forces (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College, 2017); and Gunilla 

Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson, eds., Special Operations from a Small State 

Perspective: Future Security Challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 

4. Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 54–75. 

5. Harold R. Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 6 (December 2011): 855–857. 

6. Harold Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the Military Profession” (paper delivered at the Society of Military History, May 2004), 2. 

7. Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel,” 2011, 855. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Ibid., 856. 

10. Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 22–27. 

11. William McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory 

and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995). 

12. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War), trans. and ed. Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 

13. Simpson, War from the Ground Up. 

14. Baron Antoine-Henri De Jomini, The Art of War, Captain G.H. Mendell and 

Lieutenant W.P. Craighill, trans. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971); and 

J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson & Co., 

Ltd., 1926). 

15. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783

(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890); and Giulio Douhet, The Command of the 

Air, Dino Ferrari, trans. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983).

16. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power. 

17. Douhet, The Command of the Air. 

18. Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Brassey’s Defence 

Publishers, 1988); and J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, (1936; repr., Tuscaloosa: 

University of Alabama Press, 2009). 
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19. James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War 

on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006), 5. The original parentheses contained 

the term “conventional” to describe forces, which limited the scope of the original 

inquiry. 

20. Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996).

21. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy, 112–113; and Colin S. Gray, “Handfuls of 

Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations Succeed?” Parameters (Spring 1999): 3. 

22. James D. Kiras, “A Theory of Special Operations: ‘These Ideas Are Dangerous,’” 

Special Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 83, accessed 13 November 2016, http://

dx.doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2015.1062677. 

23. Phillip Lohaus, “Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone: An Operational 

Framework for Using Special Operations Forces in the Space Between War and 

Peace,” Special Operations Journal 2, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 75–91; and Anton Asklund 

Johnsen and Gitte Højstrup Christensen, “Clarifying the Antisystemic Elements 

of Special Operations: A Conceptual Inquiry,” Special Operations Journal 2, no. 

2 (Fall 2016): 106–123. 

24. General Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York, NY: 

Portfolio Penguin, 2013); and Richard Shultz, Military Innovation in War: It 

Takes a Learning Organization, A Case Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq (Tampa, 

FL: JSOU Press, July 2016). 

25. Colin S. Gray, Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency 

Conversion (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, November 2015). 

26. Raymond T. Odierno, James F. Amos, and William H. McRaven, Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Landpower Task 

Force, 2013), accessed 13 February 2017, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/FrontPageContent/Docs/Strategic%20Landpower%20White%20Paper.pdf; and Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, Joint Concepts for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO) 

(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 19 October 2016), accessed 13 February 

2017, http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/20161019-JointConcept-for-Human-Aspects-of-Military-Operations-Signed-by-VCJCS.pdf. 

27. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy; and Richard Rubright, “The U.S. Strategic 

Paradox, Third-Party Proxies, and Special Operations Forces,” Special Operations 

Journal 2, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 135–145. 

28. Gray, The Strategy Bridge, 65–70. 

29. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, rev. and enl. ed., 

(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002); Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy: 

Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age (New York: Frank Cass, 

2005); Harry R. Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic 

Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger 

Security International, 2008); and Gray, The Strategy Bridge. 
143

Kiras: Do We Even Need a Theory?

30. Jessica Glicken Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go 

Mainstream (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2008). 

31. Christopher Marsh, Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn, “SO What? The Value of 

Scientific Inquiry and Theory Building in Special Operations Research,” Special 

Operations Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 89–104. 

32. Roger A. Beaumont, Military Elites: Special Fighting Units in the Modern World 

(New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1974). 

33. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2006). 

34. Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). 

35. Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). 

36. Donatella della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 2013). 

37. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic 

Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 

38. Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 

39. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces 

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan & 

the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 

Press, 2006); Richard Shultz, Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning 

Organization (MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU Press, 2008); and Richard H. Shultz Jr., 

“Showstoppers: Nine reasons why we never sent our Special Operations Forces 

after al Qaeda before 9/11,” Weekly Standard (26 January 2004): 25–33. 

40. Anna J. Simons, The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. Army Special Forces

(New York: The Free Press, 1997); Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origins, Qualities, and Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 

2007); and Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value. 

41. Gray, Explorations in Strategy; and Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes,” 2–24. 

42. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy. 

43. Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern 

Democracies, Harvard Studies in International Affairs 40 (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1978); and James D. Kiras, “‘Unintended Acceleration’: The Problematique of Civil-Military Relations of Special 

Operations Forces in the American Context” in Special Operations Forces in the 

21st Century: Perspectives from the Social Sciences, Jessica Glicken Turnley, Kobi 

Michael, and Eyal Ben-Ari, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2017). 

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Chapter 10. The President of the United 

States and Special Operations Theory 

Francisco R. Wong-Diaz, Esq. 

Over a decade ago, a prescient Colin Gray foresaw the coming of a 

golden era for special operations in the 21st century.1 According to 

former United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) commanders Admiral William McRaven (U.S. Navy, Retired) and General Joseph 

Votel (U.S. Army), we are living in a golden age of Special Operations Forces 

(SOF).2 Indeed, both leaders were honestly descriptive in their comments, 

for between 2001 and 2016, USSOCOM grew in personnel from 33,000 to 

about 56,000 total active duty, 7,400 reservists, and 6,600 civilians assigned 

to its headquarters, its four components, and subunified commands, budgets, headquarters, and missions.3

 The rapid growth of SOF is not solely an 

American phenomenon, but a global trend occurring in the major powers 

as well as in some middle and small nation-states.4

A study by Thomas and Dougherty underlined that after more than a 

decade of continuous combat operations, SOF emerged as the most costeffective “weapons system” in the U.S. arsenal and a major source of strategic 

advantage for the nation.5 But to maintain the competitive advantage that 

SOF provides the United States into the future, they recommend a prudent 

course that:

Would retain what has proven successful over the last decade, repurpose that which is effective but overly focused on today’s challenges, 

rebuild the capabilities and knowledge that have declined while SOF 

have been consumed in current operations, and develop innovative 

solutions to emerging problems.6

Dr. Francisco Wong-Diaz is president of FWD Consulting. He is the author 

of several JSOU Press publications, served as a JSOU Senior Fellow, and 

continues to write and support education programs at JSOU. 
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U.S. defense strategy is emphasizing the prevention of wars and building 

the capacity of partner nations through persistent engagement. But as the 

new USSOCOM Commander General Raymond Thomas stated, “We are 

very, very kinetic right now; very direct action.”7 Recently, a group of experts 

including a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and six former SOF commanders participated in a Center for Naval Analysis discussion prior to the 

2016 presidential election. Among the four general themes discussed, one 

was balancing the future force. A recommendation was that policymakers 

and SOF leaders should reexamine the balance between surgical strike (raids) 

and special warfare capabilities, personnel, and resources.8 The establishment of a separate SOF unconventional/special warfare command, whose 

primary mission would be to work ‘by, with and through’ indigenous forces 

rather than killing and capturing the enemy, is a controversial idea gaining 

support among some elements of the force.9 

Theorizing 

Concurrent with the rise of SOF is the search for its theoretical underpinnings. Joe Osborne notes the emphasis on qualitative, non-randomized historical case analyses susceptible to selection bias, like former USSOCOM 

Commander Admiral McRaven’s study of direct action raids, also a dearth 

of quantitative studies applying the scientific method with variable analysis and testable hypotheses. To promote the latter, Osborne presented four 

propositions, but did not identify and operationalize the relevant variables 

and the nature of their relationships.10

At the 2016 Joint Special Operations University symposium on special 

operations theory, subject matter experts and participants addressed the 

status and pros and cons of special operations theories. Viewpoints ranged 

from support for an integrated general theory of special operations,11 an 

American theory of special operations,12 to a more modest argument for 

improved doctrine and codification of lessons learned.13 This chapter, after 

briefly noting two useful theoretical works from peers, concludes by discussing the role of the President of the United States (POTUS) in the SOF theory 

development process—an often overlooked role. 
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Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations

Two Viewpoints 

Robert G. Spulak Jr., featured in this volume, published a qualitative model 

of an integrated theory of the origin, qualities, and use of SOF.14

Special operations are missions to accomplish strategic objectives 

where the use of conventional forces would create unacceptable 

risks due to Clausewitzian friction. Overcoming these risks requires 

special operations forces that directly address the ultimate sources 

of friction through qualities that are the result of the distribution 

of attitudes of SOF personnel.15

Spulak believes a theory of SOF and a theory of special operations “cannot 

be separated.”16 Therefore, he sought to integrate the two by blending, among 

others, McRaven’s seminal theory of direct action special operations (raids) 

with [Naval Postgraduate School, Dr.] Hy Rothstein's treatment of unconventional warfare in Afghanistan.17 In his view, the need for a theory of special 

operations is based on the enduring limitations of conventional forces and 

should guide the application of SOF to strategic ends beyond the ad hoc. It 

is needed for at least three reasons: (1) conventional wisdom sees a growing 

role for SOF in the extant security environment, (2) special operations have 

been discussed in terms of their potential and actual strategic impact, and 

(3) for strategic capability, and to improve the institution of SOF.18

Spulak disagrees with Dr. James Kiras's [Air University] characterization of special operations as a definition by exception, namely that special 

operations are defined only relative to what is unconventional.19 The reason 

is that, for him, as well as for Dr. Jessica Turnley [JSOU Senior Fellow], it is 

not the missions that define special operations but rather the personnel.20

While Spulak proffers a unified and universally applicable theory of SOF, 

Rich Yarger, also featured in this volume, seeks to syncretize extant theories and schools of thought into a unified American theory of SOF.21 He 

believes an American theory of SOF is justified because “American values, 

strategic culture, and experience make the practice of military operations 

by the United States distinctive, and these differences have given rise to a 

particular school of thought and set of constructs.”22 Yarger brings rigor to 

his work by clarifying and defining terms before integrating them into 26 

qualitative premises or propositions. As a military historian, Yarger does not 

present variable analysis, testable hypotheses, or quantification. However, 
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even Yarger suggests approaching his theory as a work in progress, that it 

“leaves much for deeper consideration and further development.”23

Both conceptual models better depict reality when one considers the cultural, legal, and 

institutional differences between global SOF. 

In nearby Canada, for instance, a recent report 

complains that unlike the Americans, Canadian SOF, part of the global SOF network, and 

the American, British, Canadian, New Zealand 

Coalition, are not being used enough because 

the political authority appears to have an inchoate understanding of how and 

when it is best to use and deploy this capability.24 Another difference is that, 

unlike in the United States where legal, structural, and functional lines of 

authority and responsibilities separate USSOCOM and the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI)—with USSOCOM entrusted with counterterrorism 

responsibility outside the continental United States and the FBI with domestic counterterrorism—in Canada, the Canadian Special Operations Forces 

Command has the domestic counterterrorism mandate.25 Significantly, the 

report resonates the mantra that “With large-scale deployments of conventional forces improbable in the foreseeable future, SOF has emerged as the 

force of choice to achieve kinetic and non-kinetic strategic effects.”26 The 

contributions of Spulak and Yarger are noted to reflect a growing interest 

and a sense of urgency in developing a theory that would help guide civilian policymakers and military leaders in understanding the true nature and 

proper use of SOF.27

The Rise of SOF 

Two sets of explanatory hypotheses were proposed by Boas Shamir and Eyal 

Ben-Ari to explain the global rise and expansion of SOF, ones based on the 

perception that they are adaptive organizations. The first focuses on the 

role of the changing, exogenous environment of armed conflicts while the 

other focuses on internal domestic factors.28 The external hypothesis views 

SOF expansion as a reaction to new types of conflicts like hybrid warfare. 

As noted by [Retired Colonel] T.X. Hammes:

Yarger brings rigor to his 

work by clarifying and 

defining terms before 

integrating them into 26 

qualitative premises or 

propositions. 
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Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations

“the underlying nature of war will not change. War will continue to 

be driven by Clausewitz’s primary trinity of violence, chance, and 

reason. Fog and friction will remain a constant element in conflict, 

and must never be assumed away. What will change, however, is the 

character of war—how it is fought.”29

To fight terrorism after 9/11, the argument goes, the United States turned 

to SOF because of their unique suitability to engage in hybrid conflicts due 

to their diverse capabilities—agility, precision, discretion, and adaptability to 

local conditions.30 Paradoxically, according to Bartles, SOF’ adversaries and 

peer competitors resorted to indirect and asymmetric methods in response 

to the so-called new western way of war.31 Russia’s “Gerasimov Doctrine” 

presents a new way of conducting war by emphasizing nonmilitary means 

where warfare is started by persistent and subtle information operations 

before any official acknowledgment:

This new form of warfare makes it more difficult to distinguish the 

lines between strategic, operational, and tactical military objectives. 

All state assets are theoretically enlisted into the fight. Business, 

economic, information and even religious assets work in concert 

with security and military forces to attain the political objectives.32

In March 2014, Gerasimov’s doctrine was put into practice leading to the 

annexation of Crimea and conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The description of 

this response to the “Western way of war” closely resembles an application 

of the decades old Chinese theory of unrestricted warfare on steroids.33

A second set of explanations focuses on the relationship between domestic factors and the rise of SOF. It is argued that the United States and other 

industrial democracies shrunk their security budgets due to the growing 

number of casualties on both sides of a conflict. This is due to humanitarian concerns, also technological advances in intelligence-gathering, and 

advanced guided munitions that changed the character of warfare from 

mass-on-mass confrontations to precision strikes. The use of SOF provides 

policymakers in a reduced budget environment with a less costly, small footprint, highly lethal instrument of war.34 Furthermore, in addition to professional competence and unique capabilities, SOF provide greater discretion 

and deniability.35
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While not mutually exclusive, the above sets of explanations are insufficient to account for the fast growth and importance of SOF. A third complementary explanation exists that combines both viewpoints within an 

organizational theory approach. In brief, the argument is made that the huge 

growth of SOF in the industrial democracies is the outcome of the actions 

of military organizational entrepreneurs—boosters, mentors, sponsors, or 

promoters—who in concert with influential backers have identified the needs 

of militaries and marketed SOF as uniquely suited to meet those needs.36

The great value of SOF is that they are “specialized generalists,” local 

level integrators that link between the tactical, operational, and 

strategic levels of action in ways that may enhance the autonomy 

of the military. SOF are therefore hybrid forms of organizational 

response to environmental pressures: to reduce risk, to manage the 

links between the armed forces and external environments and to 

integrate specialties.37

This viewpoint calls attention to the warning in former President Dwight 

D. Eisenhower’s farewell address:

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the 

military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of 

misplaced power exists and will persist ... We should take nothing 

for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel 

the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery 

of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security 

and liberty may prosper together.38

POTUS as the Sponsor 

Article II Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States established that 

POTUS shall be the commander in chief of the United States Army and Navy, 

and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual Service 

of the United States.39 In addition to this express delegation of power over 

the military, POTUS has some inherent constitutional powers to respond to 

terrorist attacks without prior Congressional authorization. This was called 

the “POTUS defensive war power.”40 The preceding analysis, and the cited 
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Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations

work from Shamir and Ben-Ari, postulates that in developing an American 

theory of special operations, POTUS, as commander in chief, is the key 

driver (independent variable) operating upon the development, structure, 

growth, and use of SOF.

Historical record reveals that past and recent presidents exercised their 

defensive war power by promoting the growth of SOF. President John F. 

Kennedy, for example, holds a special place in the history of U.S. Army 

special forces. In 1961, prior to his visit to Fort Bragg, the president asked 

Brigadier General William Yarborough, commander of Army special forces, 

that his troops wear green berets. Shortly thereafter, President John F. Kennedy authorized the green beret as Army special forces’ official headgear, 

and sent them a message stating, “I am sure that the Green Beret will be a 

mark of distinction in the trying times ahead.”41 The following year, Kennedy affirmed his support by calling the green beret “a symbol of excellence, 

a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom.”42 Under 

the Kennedy administration, Army special forces grew by seven groups. A 

few years later, the Kennedy family requested that the Green Berets be the 

honor guard at the president’s funeral; he was laid to rest with 43 Green 

Berets by his side. The United States Army Special Operations Command 

trains at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 

and every November 22nd, on the anniversary of the late president’s 1963 

assassination, they place a wreath and a green beret on his grave at Arlington 

National Cemetery.

More recently, President Barack 

Obama’s strong support for SOF bears 

comparison to Kennedy’s dedication to 

the Green Berets. During the Obama 

Administration, as the conventional 

forces numbers, budgets, and missions 

declined, those of USSOCOM increased. 

In a 2015 interview, however, outgoing 

Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno 

bitterly blamed the rise of the Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria on the president’s 

mission change requiring the military to 

back efforts in Iraq. He argued that if the 

United States had left more troops in the region, the Islamic State of Iraq 

The United States Army 

Special Operations Command 

trains at the U.S. Army John F. 

Kennedy Warfare Center and 

School, and every November 22nd, on the anniversary 

of the late president’s 1963 

assassination, they place a 

wreath and a green beret on 

his grave at Arlington National 

Cemetery.
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JSOU Report 17-6

and Syria would not have been able to capture territory in that country or 

in Syria.

“I go back to the work we did in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 and we 

got it to a place that was really good. Violence was low, the economy 

was growing, politics looked like it was heading in the right direction. Odierno also sounded the alarm on the massive cuts Obama 

has made to the number of army troops. They are expected to fall 

to 450,000 ... down from 570,000 in 2010. With Russia becoming 

more hostile and ISIS recruiting a record number of new members, 

this is hardly the time for America to scale back the military.”43

General Odierno’s criticism of President Obama for cutting the military 

force is somewhat misplaced and harkens back to the pre-9/11 period. In a 

1999 speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, then presidential candidate, Governor George W. Bush addressed the issue of American defense 

by stating that “a president must be a clear-eyed realist. There are limits to 

the smiles and scowls of diplomacy. Armies and missiles are not stopped by 

stiff notes of condemnation ... Unless a president sets his own priorities, his 

priorities will be set by others—by adversaries, or the crisis of the moment.”44

Additionally, presidential candidate Bush later complained that under the 

Clinton Administration: 

“not since the years before Pearl Harbor has our investment in 

national defense been so low as a percentage of GNP ... Thousands 

of members of the armed forces are on food stamps ... Sending our 

military on vague, aimless and endless deployments is the swift 

solvent of morale ... We must be selective in the use of our military ... homeland defense has become an urgent duty ... We will 

defend the American homeland by strengthening our intelligence 

community—focusing on human intelligence and the early detection of terrorist operations both here and abroad ... I know that the 

best defense can be a strong and swift offense—including the use 

of Special Operations Forces and long-range strike capabilities.45

About two years later, during the first President George W. Bush administration, the 9/11 terrorist attacks took place. Since that time, the U.S. has 

been fighting a “long war” against Islamic terrorism while undergoing a 

military drawdown and a comparable increase in the numbers, funding, and 
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Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations

importance of its SOF.46 President George W. Bush’s first term administration 

initiated and oversaw U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Following a top-to-bottom review by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that concluded the invasion and occupation of Iraq was an anomaly, 

the second term Bush administration sought a larger and more aggressive 

special operations force with broader latitude to work with indigenous forces 

and act against small cells of al-Qaeda and its radical offshoots in countries 

where the United States was technically not at war.47

Gregg Jaffe notes that prior to 9/11, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was 

already speaking of “a faster, more agile military,” expressing suspicion 

about committing U.S. forces to expanded nation-building missions. He was 

“intent on laying a foundation for future administrations to use the military’s 

elite commandos more expansively. The current plan would increase the 

number of special-operations troops by 14,000 to about 64,000. Meanwhile, 

conventional ground forces will by 2011 return to their prewar levels. The 

Air Force and Navy will absorb even deeper personnel cut[s].”48 Therefore, 

the critique of President Obama by General Odierno is arguably somewhat 

misplaced because he faced a severe economic downturn and his military 

drawdown plan was consistent with previous presidential decisions.

A second hypothesis is that the relationship between POTUS, his Secretary of Defense, powerbrokers, and military stakeholders, such as USSOCOM 

current and former leaders, is a critical intervening variable in the use and 

future of SOF.

The American political system is founded on the principle of civilian control over the military. Military leaders are part of a tight, professional class 

imbued with military culture and views. The U.S. society is one with a volunteer military force, a minuscule percentage of the total population.49 When 

so many have not undergone military training and discipline, interpersonal 

skills are very useful in conducting civil-military affairs. For example, the 

current commander of USSOCOM, General Thomas, was quoted as saying, 

“our strategy is by nature ill-defined and harder to achieve.”50 A U.S. Army 

Ranger like his predecessor General Joseph L. Votel, General Thomas did not 

have time nor opportunity to develop the close personal relationship with 

POTUS established and cemented by former USSOCOM leader Admiral 

William McRaven during the Osama Bin Laden takedown period.51

General Thomas sees the future of USSOCOM as a command transformed, almost, into a quasi-intelligence agency.52 Former Secretary of 
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Defense Ashton Carter and other SOF sponsors, mentors, and boosters (i.e., 

Congressional committees and military contractors) support his vision for 

a command committed to a ‘left of bang’ approach, one where SOF focus 

on anticipatory special operations. For General Thomas, “Left of bang is 

less a technological approach than a people-access approach: being there 

ahead of time, having relationships there ahead of time, identifying problems before they become crises, developing that partner capacity, prior, not 

after a response.”53 Left of bang apparently is the indirect action approach 

in Phase 0, consistent with the Obama doctrine (one of several principles) 

of fighting special warfare “by, with, and through” local forces.54 It aims to 

rebalance USSOCOM’s emphasis on kinetic operations by seeking actionable 

intelligence to provide early warning to eliminate threats.

This chapter highlights challenging questions and issues that could be 

considered by special operations theory builders. Much work lies ahead. 

There is a need for a parsimonious, lessons-learned work to guide policymakers and practitioners on this important subject. It is the author’s hope that 

others will continue to refine and sustain their efforts on this topic.

Endnotes

1. Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld & 

Nicolson, 2005), 252; see also: Andrew Bacevich, “Tomgram: Andrew Bacevich, The Golden Age of Special Operations,” TomDispatch.com, 29 May 2012, 

http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175547/tomgram%3A_andrew_bacevich%

2C_the_golden_age_of_special_operations.

2. Howard Altman, “Gen.Votel takes over Socom command,” TBO.com, 28 August 

2014, http://www.tbo.com/list/military-news/gen-votel-takes-over-socom-command-20140828/; and Nick Turse, “The Golden Age of Black Ops.” HuffPost, 22 

March 2015, accessed 9 January 2017, http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/6507142.

3. Andrew Feickert, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues 

for Congress, Congressional Research Service report 7-5700 (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 6 January 2017), 1. 

4. Eitan Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari, “The Rise of Special Operations Forces: Generalized Specialization, Boundary Spanning and Military Autonomy,” Journal of 

Strategic Studies, 9 August 2016, accessed 16 September 2016, http://dx.doi.org/

10.1080/01402390.2016.1209656. 

5. Jim Thomas and Chris Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) 

(Washington, D.C.: CSBA, 2013), 3. 

6. Ibid. 
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Wong-Diaz: POTUS and Special Operations

7. Patrick Tucker, “America’s New Special Operations Commander Wants to Predict the 

Future,” Defense One, 25 May 2016, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2016/05/

americas-new-special-operations-commander-wants-predict-future/128583/. 

8. Joe Osborne, “Advancing a Strategic Theory of Special Operations,” 

Small Wars Journal, 13 May 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/

advancing-a-strategic-theory-of-special-operations. 

9. Sean D. Naylor, “Support grows for standing up an unconventional warfare 

command,” Armed Forces Journal, 1 September 2007, http://armedforcesjournal.

com/support-grows-for-standing-up-an-unconventional-warfare-command/. 

10. Joe Osborne, “Advancing a Strategic Theory.” 

11. Robert G. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations: The Origins, Qualities , and 

Use of SOF (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, October 2007). 

12. Harry R. Yarger, 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, April 2013). 

13. General Charles Cleveland (keynote address, Special Operations Theory, Summer 

2016 Symposium, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, FL, 30–31 August 

2016). 

14. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations, 2007. 

15. Robert G. Spulak Jr., “A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and 

Use of SOF,” Military Technology, Special Issue 2009, 23. 

16. Ibid., 24. 

17. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations, 2007, 21. 

18. Ibid., 38. 

19. Ibid., 1; and James D. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War 

II to the War on Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006). 

20. Spulak Jr., A Theory of Special Operations, JSOU Press, 2007, 13; and Jessica 

Glicken Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2008). 

21. Yarger, 21st Century SOF. 

22. Ibid., 45. 

23. Ibid., 4. 

24. Christian Leuprecht and H. Christian Breede, Beyond the Movies: The Value 

Proposition of Canada’s Special Operations Forces (Ottawa, Ontario: CDA Institute/Macdonald-Laurier Institute, December 2016), 1. 

25. Ibid., 5. 

26. Ibid., 6. 

27. Steven P. Bucci, “The Importance of Special Operations Forces Today and 

Going Forward,” 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength, The Heritage Foundation, 

accessed 30 December 2016, http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/importantessays-analysis/importance-special-operations-forces-today-going-forward/;
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William Bradley, “Revelation of Special Forces Misuse Points Up the Need for A 

Hard Assessment of the Long Wars,” HuffPost, 9 June 2015, accessed 11 January 

2017, http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/7545476. 

28. Shamir and Ben-Ari, “The Rise of Special Operations Forces,” 12. 

29. T.X. Hammes, “The Changing Character of War,” The Journal of International 

Security Affairs, no. 26 (Spring/Summer 2014): 66–71. 

30. Shamir and Ben-Ari, “The Rise of Special Operations Forces,” 12. 

31. Charles K. Bartles, “Russia’s Indirect and Asymmetric Methods as a Response to 

the New Western Way of War,” Special Operations Journal 2, no. 1 (1 June 2016), 

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2016.1134964. 

32. Ibid., 5. 

33. Francisco Wong-Diaz, Retooling for the Future (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, May 

2013). 

34. Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of 

War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 

35. John Arquilla, “The New Rules of War: How to Fight Smaller, Cheaper, Smarter,” 

Foreign Policy, March/April 2010, http://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/

the_new_rules_of_war?page=0.4; Shamir and Ben-Ari, “The Rise of Special 

Operations Forces,” 13. 

36. Shamir and Ben-Ari, “The Rise of Special Operations Forces,” 29. 

37. Ibid. 

38. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Radio and Television Address 

to the American People, January 17, 1961” in The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1960–61 (Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 1035–1040, http://name.umdl.umich.

edu/4728424.1960.001. 

39. Stephen Dycus, William C. Banks, and Peter Raven-Hansen, “Appendix: Constitution of the United States” in Counterterrorism Law (New York: Aspen Publishers, 

2007), 757–763. 

40. Dycus, Banks, and Raven-Hansen, Counterterrorism Law, 41. 

41. Jeremy D. Crisp, “Green Berets honor President Kennedy in ceremony,” Inside 

the Army News, 18 November 2011. 

42. Sarah Pruitt, “History in the Headlines: U.S. Special Ops: 6 Things You 

Should Know,” History.com, 13 January 2016, http://www.history.com/news/

6-things-you-might-not-know-about-u-s-special-operations-forces. 

43. Thomas, “BREAKING: Army General Exposes Barack Obama in a BIG WAY 

After Resigning,” The Political Insider, 23 July 2015, http://thepoliticalinsider.com/

breaking-army-general-exposes-barack-obama-in-a-big-way-after-resigning/.

44. Governor George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism” (speech, 

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA, 19 November 1999). 
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45. Ibid. 

46. Bucci, “The Importance of Special Operations Forces”; Bradley, “Revelation of 

Special Forces Misuse.” 

47. Greg Jaffe, “Rumsfeld Aims To Elevate Role Of Special Forces,” Wall Street Journal, 

18 February 2006, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114020280689677176\; Leslie 

Larson, “Donald Rumsfeld: A ‘trained ape’ has better foreign policy skills than 

Obama,” New York Daily News, 25 March 2014, http://www.nydailynews.com/

news/politics/donald-rumsfeld-slams-obama-foreign-policy-article-1.1732895. 

48. Jaffe, “Rumsfeld Aims To Elevate Role Of Special Forces.” 

49. Mark R. Shulman, Lead Me, Follow Me, or Get Out of My Way: Rethinking and 

Refining the Civil-Military Relationship (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War 

College Strategic Studies Institute, September 2012). 

50. Wesley Morgan, “The shadowy JSOC general expected to be the next 

leader of America’s special operations forces,” Washington Post, 7 January 

2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/07/

lt-gen-tony-thomas-the-shadow-soldier-tapped-to-lead-americascommandos/?utm_term=.3dbad7731688. 

51. For an interesting narrative of the period, see Michael Morell with Bill Harlow, 

The Great War of Our Time: CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism—from al Qa’ida to 

ISIS (New York: Twelve/Hachette Book Group, 2015). 

52. Tucker, “America’s New Special Operations Commander.” 

53. Ibid. The term “left of bang” commonly refers to situational and tactical awareness to identify, preempt, and prevent threats. 

54. Kevin Baron, “SPECIAL REPORT: The Military Loves the Obama Doctrine. Can It Survive Trump?” Defense One, 15 January 2017, http://www.

defenseone.com/ideas/2017/01/special-report-military-loves-obama-doctrine

-can-it-survive-trump/134609/.

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Yarger: Building Depth and Avoiding Prescription

Chapter 11. Two Special Operations/SOF 

Theory Challenges: Building Depth and 

Avoiding Prescription

Harry (Rich) Yarger 

Writing theory is not easy. Theory as a concept can be debated in 

regard to typology—scientific, social, historical, and others—but 

the value of any theory is the purpose it serves. Well over two centuries ago, 

Clausewitz argued the best purpose of military theory is to “educate the 

mind.”1 Hence, good political and military theory does not prescribe what to 

do in specific cases but provides a framework (a paradigm) to broaden and 

discipline thinking in ways that lead to better understanding and choices 

by leaders and decision makers in the preparation for and conduct of war. 

Future special operations and Special Operations Forces (SOF) theory can 

learn from past efforts.

In 2013, I proffered a short monograph 21st Century SOF: Toward an 

American Theory of Special Operations to explain what my research and 

observations revealed about American special operations/SOF theory.2 That 

experience suggested to me that the two greatest challenges confronting the 

SOF community in developing a shared, comprehensive theory is providing 

sufficient depth for understanding the nature of special operations and SOF 

phenomena without plummeting into prescriptive dogma. To fail to do the 

first would leave the community founded in indefensible assertions. To do 

the latter would confine thinking to a rote practice of skills. Neither would 

serve the strategic needs of the United States Special Operations Forces or 

national defense adequately.

Like more general military theory, any special operations/SOF theory 

must explain the nature and purpose of the subject, provide essential 

Dr. Rich Yarger is a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. 

Following retirement from the U.S. Army he served as a faculty member and 

department chair at the U.S. Army War College. 
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terminology and definitions, explain the essential assumptions and premises of the theory, explain the relationships 

among these concepts and ideas internally 

and externally, and perhaps relate the theory 

to the past, present, and future.3 In essence, 

a coherent special operations/SOF theory 

accounts for the past and informs the debate 

in regard to critical questions that must be 

answered to guide the American SOF community into the future. Logically examining 

some of these emerging critical questions 

might inform the level of detail or depth appropriate for theory (as opposed 

to doctrine).

In general I would argue that special operations, like war, is a human 

enterprise. I would also highlight that like the principles of war, a theory’s 

premises and principles are not absolute; they must be understood as being 

in different relationships and tensions among themselves based on environmental contexts. Consequently, understanding all of these principles and 

premises is essential, and none can be ignored without risk. 

For example, think of the relationship between surprise and mass in the 

principles of war. There is always a tension between achieving sufficient mass 

and retaining a favorable degree of surprise. The commander’s genius lies 

in how they understand these principles, and resolve the tension to serve 

operational or strategic purpose. Of course, they must consider all other 

principles, relationships, and tensions among them in pursuing the ends. 

Likewise, the challenge for any special operations/SOF theory is to identify all appropriate premises and principles, and develop them to be understood both individually and in relationship to one another (in the strategic 

and operational contexts in which SOF must perform). What these premises 

and principles are—and how best to explain the relationships and tension 

in such a way that they have a general or more universal utility (e.g., inform 

more detailed doctrine and the commander’s thinking across diverse environments)—is the proverbial holy grail.

Some argue there is no need for a special operations/SOF theory, and in 

fact the sanction of a theory might be counterproductive in that it might limit 

SOF to a “theoretical box.”4

 Like Clausewitz, however, it is essential to educate 

In essence, a coherent special operations/SOF theory 

accounts for the past and 

informs the debate in 

regard to critical questions 

that must be answered to 

guide the American SOF 

community into the future.
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all those who are part of or interface with SOF. Specifically, an accepted SOF 

theory, even with debate on specific premises or principles, can:

• Provide a basis for better internal SOF discussions and deliberations.

• Offer better external interfaces with policymakers, conventional military, and partner nations.

• Better inform decision making at all levels.

• Improve education about and within SOF.

• Improve doctrine.

• Propose a theoretical basis for resource justification.

Nonetheless, the concern over confining SOF thinking within a theoretical box is valid; any theory should avoid being excessively prescriptive or 

vague (to facilitate comprehensive understanding).5

Propitiously, understanding what questions the current and future environments portend for special operations/SOF informs theory’s content and 

expression. That is, identifying what questions modern war or society poses 

for SOF can help theorists better express or illustrate a proposed theory’s 

premises. Considering such questions may also help illustrate the intent 

of the theory’s premises, and with it add depth to special operations/SOF 

theoretical perspectives (albeit if not overly prescriptive while doing so).

For example, in examining the history and research available on special 

operations/SOF, there are obvious tensions between special operations/SOF 

and the American body politic, conventional military, and global body politic. These tensions affect special operations/SOF in many ways to include 

appropriate roles and activities—i.e., the boundaries and consequences for 

SOF in violating them. 

Natural tensions exist between special operations and SOF and 

the greater American political system and conventional military.

Americans for the most part are opposed to unconventional conflicts 

and any form of elitism. Such conflicts do not adhere to Americans’ 

preferences for conduct of a decisive war and raise political questions and moral issues for which the right answers are unclear and 

potentially controversial. As a result of who they are and what they 

are asked to do, SOF are different. The differences engender a degree 

of exclusiveness and commitment essential to sustaining a ready 

force, and that is even admired as part of an American subculture. 

However, exclusiveness and elitism run counter to America’s greater 
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culture of anti-elitism and egalitarianism. Consequently, SOF must 

manage a balance of political, public, and conventional military 

trust and SOF cultural imperatives that sustain an acceptable and 

sharp military instrument of quiet professionals.6

In writing special operations/SOF theory, roles and activities is not about 

a list, but rather a framework for thinking about what is necessary, appropriate, and acceptable for special operations/SOF and justifying it to the 

public, policymakers, and conventional military at different times and for 

different circumstances. Answers lie in American political, social, and military history and theory—and in a body of knowledge and experience that 

constitutes a SOF theory. For those not concerned about this, what happens 

if peace breaks out, terrorism and political violence escalate, world opinion 

of American intervention worsens, or different threats requiring different 

countering activities emerge? Remember, theory does not provide ‘what to 

do,’ but guides thinking to help frame and understand potential issues and 

how to address them. We should be concerned about the appropriate premises and tensions, and building understanding of them. 

In a similar manner, theory should also espouse premises about the relationships and interconnectedness of SOF and conventional forces, and SOF 

and other government agencies in national security. 

Military special operations can be conducted unilaterally, in support 

of, or supported by conventional, interagency, whole of government, 

and coalition operations, or in concert with all of the above.7 SOF 

and conventional capabilities are complementary, integrative, and 

mutually supportive.8

These allude to a theoretical framework toward collective and mutual 

understanding of how special operations/SOF fit into the broader national 

security paradigm. Again, other theoretical frameworks—military, international relations, political, etc., contain useful paradigms. However, a prevailing, if emerging, SOF theory is useful for meaningful deliberation of what 

this means for any particular time or context. For those not concerned, think 

about turf battles, wasted or lack of resources, and a less effective national 

security in changing and challenging times. Members of special operations 

force development, operational, and scholarly communities deal with these 

on a regular basis. Still, theory can contribute to a better effort, but it must 
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be explained and illustrated in a way that leads to a fuller understanding 

that is both not prescriptive and retains validity over time.

Another key question might be: What are the attributes of the “precarious 

nature of SOF culture” and how can they be managed? 

Organizations dedicated to special operations are inherently precarious. Special operations organizations fare best in times of crises or in 

situations when unique skills are in urgent demand or in situations 

where politicians do not wish to acknowledge ambiguous threats as 

a crisis. “Nor is it odd that when the crisis abates, unorthodox skills 

should experience a diminution of legitimacy in the minds of the 

public and the military establishment.”... SOF are also a precarious organization as a result of internal contradictions to their own 

cultural identity.9

How best can SOF understand its own internal and external precariousness? What can other theoretical frameworks tell us about precarious 

organizations, notably how to lead, manage, and sustain them? How does 

such ‘precariousness’ interrelate with other premises? What other theoretical 

constructs can contribute to a specific SOF understanding/paradigm? How 

can this knowledge be supported with evidence and illustrations that lead 

to a fuller understanding of special operations/SOF at large? 

Another contemporary question is: What is the nature of special operations/SOF strategic value? Additionally, what is the need for SOF strategic 

acumen (understanding) and how must it be learned? Some thoughts: 

• Special operations and SOF are applicable at all the levels of war and 

interaction—strategic, operational, and tactical.10

• Special operations represent a distinct military capability of strategic 

value to national security.11

• Special operations have strategic utility.12

• Special operations and SOF’s relative value increase as direct strategic 

utility is approached.13

My concern here is multifold. First, how can theory inform about special 

operations/SOF’ strategic utility? Second, how do we explain this to ourselves 

and others? And third, what insights can theory contribute toward developing the strategic acumen needed to maximize SOF strategic utility? Further 
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development of this subject would validate these premises and also lead to 

a better understanding.

Another related question is what does social theory—or other paradigms—suggest to better understand gender and/or other diversity roles in 

special operations? 

Special operations benefit from diversity within SOF and among 

enablers. Diversity is a positive virtue in SOF. It potentially brings 

more nuanced competencies and insights to bear on special operations mission planning, rehearsal, and conduct. It also provides a 

similar enrichment to activities related to preparation for war. For 

similar reasons, SOF value and special operations benefit from diversity among and within enablers. Different enablers bring different 

perspectives and capabilities to an operation, generating ideas and 

options for consideration. However, diversity can also be a source 

of multiple frictions, and value added versus tensions is always a 

matter of consideration for SOF leaders.14

My immediate concern here is very simple: What can other theories 

and experiences tell us about how women can best contribute in special 

operations? Here again existing premises need further development and 

illustration. And, women as diversity are but one aspect of this discussion. 

Of course, other premises and tensions within theory would logically be 

considered. 

Similarly, what does political and military theory suggest in regard to 

special operations/SOF participation in political violence and/or third party 

conflicts? It seems this is a valid question for the 21st century strategic environment and the circumstances SOF might find themselves in. One definition that extends existing doctrine: 

Special operations and SOF evolve over time according to strategic 

context. Special operations and SOF are defined by the nature of the 

threats or opportunities in the security environment, the needs of 

policymakers, and the ability or inability of conventional forces to 

provide appropriate policy options. Special operations can be conducted overtly, covertly, clandestinely, or mixtures thereof; however 

any choice has potential political, legal, moral, and operational risks 

associated with it.16
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“Political violence” and “third party conflicts” are evolving and becoming more complex; they may have surpassed our past military paradigms. 

What is needed is a new look, a SOF specific one that adds new theoretical 

depth to SOF understanding.

One last question: What theory can inform SOF on how to anticipate 

and deal with change? 

Special operations and SOF exist on the cutting edge of change and continuity in the security environment.17

The concern expressed in the question is that we are living in a period of 

great change. There is plenty of research out there dealing with change of all 

types. Are there paradigms available, however, that will enable SOF—or the 

military more generally—to better understand the nature of change and the 

use of national power? In exploring this, do any of these existing theories 

possess specific, named applicability to SOF and with it new depth and clarity in understanding the relation of special operations/SOF to change? If so, 

such a special operations/SOF theory should first recognize the relationship 

among change, special operations, and SOF, and substantiate it with evidence 

and illustrate it as appropriate for proper understanding.

While concerns and examples herein are just illustrative, each premise 

and others can be further developed from a theoretical perspective. In doing 

so, they can be appropriately articulated, and illustrated in such a manner 

that builds depth and understanding in a much needed special operations/

SOF theory, one that improves future leaders’ perspectives and special operations/SOF performance. Past works should be considered in any further 

theory development, but most importantly, any effort must achieve its understanding without being so prescriptive that it becomes doctrine or so general 

that it is meaningless. Theory’s rightful role is education and its focus is to 

inform decision making, doctrine, and operations.

Endnotes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War), trans. and ed. Michael Howard and 

Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 141. 

2. Harry R. Yarger, 21st Century SOF: Toward an American Theory of Special Operations (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, April 2013). For other examples of recent theory, 

see William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: 

Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996); Robert G. Spulak Jr., A 

Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities, and Uses of SOF (Hurlburt 
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Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2007); Jessica Glicken Turnley, Cross-Cultural Competence 

and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF are (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2011); 

and Jessica Glicken Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations 

Go Mainstream (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, February 2008). 

3. Ibid., 3. 

4. “Do We Need a Theory at All?” (panel discussion, Special Operations Theory, 

Summer 2016 Symposium, Joint Special Operations University, MacDill Air 

Force Base, FL, 31 August 2016). 

5. Yarger, 21st Century SOF, 52. This author recognized this dilemma by identifying and developing a premise in theory that states: “Special Operations and SOF 

evolve over time according to strategic context.” 

6. Ibid., 52.

7. Ibid., 51.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 61–62. Quote is found in: Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard 

H. Shultz, eds., Special Operations in US Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National 

Defense University Press, 1984), 5. 

10. Ibid., 52–53.

11. Ibid., 48–49.

12. Ibid. 

13. Ibid., 54–55.

14. Ibid., 58. 

15. Ibid., 52. 

16. Ibid., 55. 

17. Ibid., 50–51. 
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Chapter 12. Special Operations Theory: 

Looking Ahead

Paul Lieber 

Any discussion about theory should be considered a work in progress. 

No theory is ever razor sharp definitive or conversely broad enough to 

cover all aspects of a problem set. As this edited volume and its symposium 

reasoned, thus is the case for special operations or Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) theory, depending on one’s preferred label. More on this point later.

In either instance, defining the term ‘theory,’ period, is no small feat, 

especially if taken from a social/natural science perspective. From this point 

of view, a theory formally assigns idea or presupposition into a proposed 

collection of fact, one ready and willing to test its mettle via rigorous testing. From this definition, social/natural science theory aspires to inform, 

direct, and sort ideas potentially useful for longer term use. This organization 

of ideas, via a named theory, empowers scholars to now advance existing 

knowledge, but within a nicely defined theoretical framework. This framework can more easily identify strengths and weakness in known ideas to 

subsequently create new ones. External validity—the steadfastness of social/

natural science theory against numerous and diverse problem types—serves 

as a continuous reminder of the lengths a theory can be applied, and where 

it may be appropriate to expand/explore theoretical alternatives when the 

original falls short. If sufficient evidence emerges, a new theory built upon 

foundations of the original emerges to replace it. And the process starts 

anew. As Peter McCabe opened this volume, theory exploration should aspire 

toward more self-aware and informed scholars. 

From this social/natural perspective on theory, no theory should be 

considered ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ rather part of a natural, intellectual evolution 

Dr. Paul Lieber is a Resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations 

University. Prior to that he served as the command writer for the United 

States Special Operations Command, and as strategic communications advisor to the commander of Special Operations Command-Australia.
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where theories mature alongside ideas and paradigms. Ergo, falling in love 

with a particular theory for the sake of said theory leaves those individuals 

in the knowledge rearview mirror. A social/natural science theory’s goal 

is to explain outcomes; it should never drive them, let alone indefinitely. 

Reflecting on the bigger question above: Can or should a social/natural science definition of theory be used to explain special operations? And more 

importantly, what is the utility in doing so? 

Yes, and that depends. Much like social/natural science, to do so would 

require sorting individual areas of special operations into unique theoretical 

constructs. While theories can be correlated—obviously no special operations or scientific phenomena exists in total isolation—each one is intended 

to be mutually exclusive for the purpose of testing. Otherwise, there is no 

way to confidently state that a particular theory is producing a particular 

result, or lack thereof.

To create its own mutually exclusive theory would require the special 

operations community to determine the boundaries of said theory. Meaning, firm agreement on a core mission set for special operations/SOF, also on 

outcomes considered inherently special operations. This agreement only gets 

muddied by debate on where conventional and special operations capabilities 

should begin and end, apt to intensify thanks to evolved concepts on how 

to define an ‘adversary’ or ‘conflict.’ Throwing international partners into 

the mix only further complicates matters. Should theory and capability be 

defined solely by U.S. models or under a global SOF network concept?

Globally defined or otherwise—and if there’s any hope for a social/natural 

science theory emerging—the special operations community can no longer 

amorphously define itself by conducting any and every mission deemed 

‘special,’ or those that conventional forces cannot execute. This definition—

while a point of pride for the community—is arguably doing itself a disservice in the longer term. Not only does this generality inhibit creating a 

social/natural science compatible theory, it likewise leaves the community 

vulnerable to excess risk by reactively adjusting as unprecedented, ‘special’ 

challenges emerge. 

Tangibly, this broadly termed ‘special’ definition creates an uncomfortable dichotomy between mission and funding/authorities. Logistically, special operations capability is reasonably determined by current and prior 

needs for the force; authorities, funding, and capabilities follow in suit. 

At present, however, special operations is tasked with accomplishing the 
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unprecedented. What results is an inability for special operations leadership 

to deliberately plan for future conflict –those ‘special’ challenges—beyond 

speculative requests on what might happen. 

Alternatively, a futurist approach to special operations—i.e., one emphasizing countering weapons of mass destruction or cyberattacks—can lead to 

wild forecasting and its own excess risk by planning toward hypotheticals 

separated from current reality and logistical support suited for past conflict. 

In both scenarios, this disconnect makes forming a social/natural science 

theory under the current construct nearly impossible. 

There is, however, an alternative approach to defining special operations, 

one compatible with social/natural science theory formation. In lieu of the 

moniker ‘special,’ the community should explore capability alongside purpose, and with it marry intent to practicality. Much like initial steps to forming a social/natural science theory, the global special operations community 

(both collectively and as individual forces) should take an inward look on 

where special operations is and where it should be in the near future. This 

introspection will empower authorities, funding, and capabilities to march 

alongside it. 

This inward look, however, may create some moments of discomfort. It 

requires special operations and conventional forces to agree on what missions and capabilities belong in which bin. Then, the theory formation can 

begin for each. This agreement is long overdue. Despite its exponentially 

increasing employment, special operations was never intended to be the 

force of choice for modern conflict. While these conflicts favor asymmetric 

warfare as a sweet spot for special operators, this does not necessitate this 

force to account for every possibility within. Second, cuts to conventional 

force manpower and capability does and should not default to special operations being asked to do more with less. By design, special operations across 

the globe is a small and precise force.

Throughout this edited volume are an array of recommendations to arrive 

at this future. For instance, creating a distinction between special operations 

and SOF can determine core capabilities toward forming useful theory. This 

distinction may include international partners, many of whom do not make 

this distinction and/or do not feature joint elements. 

On the other end of the spectrum, does special operations even require 

a theory, social/natural science or otherwise? Is it better served by the current paradigm, limitations and all? One may argue U.S. special operations, 
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being joint, can logically borrow from theory literally battle-tested in other 

services, and with it determine fit within a special operations context. 

So, where do we go from here? Regardless of one’s opinion on the role 

and place of special operations theory, Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland 

(U.S. Army, Retired) perhaps said it best in that it is an important endeavor 

to pursue (either special operations specific, or as an offshoot of the Services). 

Related, and echoing Major General David Baratto (U.S. Army, Retired), 

we must actively close the gap between theory and doctrine if either is to 

remain relevant and, more importantly, current. Conversations on what is 

or isn’t theory, are unimportant in lieu of the utility of a theory to a greater 

strategic picture. 

In doing so, it’s key to put this edited volume and related symposium 

into perspective. While opinions are convincingly presented, no single one 

should stand alone as the means to define and value special operations or 

SOF theory. Robert Spulak is on the right path in placing paradigms, not 

theories, as the end goal. Likewise, Bernd Horn in arguing for operationalizing theory to empower those who rely most on special operations to best 

fund and employ them. As Colonel Homiak posited, any theory for special 

operations should educate those tasked with understanding it.

Arguably the greatest achievement of this research endeavor is recognition that, even as the force of choice, special operations cannot do it alone. 

Ergo, any theory that includes them must also account for Kurt Müller’s 

position that the interagency plays a significant role in special operations 

success, most notably—as Francisco Wong-Diaz reasons—the U.S. President 

as its commander in chief. Thus, a special operations theory must account 

for both domestic and international partners, to include recognition of the 

key activities Tom Searle details that require such collaboration and reach. 

Whether it’s a unique or service-driven definition, Emily Spencer and 

James Kiras will agree that any theory exploration for special operations 

must be rigorously tested. Today’s enemies will be different than tomorrow’s, 

and no theory should ever be problem centric. Rich Yarger’s ‘strategic value’ 

litmus test for theory is one that should be applied, regardless of definition. 

If it doesn’t check this box, it is not ready for consideration. 

Most importantly and beyond this volume, conversations must transcend arguments of the utility of theory and/or where definitions should 

begin and end. Similarly, abandon hope of determining any sort of theory 

thanks to seemingly invulnerable enemies who do not value sovereignty or 
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international law. War has, and always will be a part of human existence 

as will the need for special operations—which by definition, purpose, and 

theory—are capable of challenging traditional definitions and approaches 

to conflict.

173

Acronym List

Acronym List 

CA civil affairs

CF conventional forces

COIN counterinsurgency

CSOSR Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

DOD Department of Defense

FID foreign internal defense

IJC International Security Assistance Force Joint Command

JSOU Joint Special Operations University

MFP major force program

MISO military information support operations

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSPD National Security Presidential Directives

POTUS President of the United States

POW prisoner of war 

PSYOP psychological operations

SF special forces

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOTF Special Operations Task Force

TSOC Theater Special Operations Command

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

UW unconventional warfare