Filed 9/30/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

TINA TURRIETA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LYFT, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent;

MILLION SEIFU et al.,

 Movants and Appellants. 

 B304701

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC714153)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Dennis J. Landin, Judge. Affirmed.

Lichten & Liss-Riordan, Shannon E. Liss-Riordan, Anne 

Kramer for Appellant Million Seifu.

Outten & Golden, Jahan C. Sagafi, Laura Iris Mattes and 

Adam Koshkin; Olivier Schreiber & Chao, Monique Olivier, 

Christian Schreiber and Rachel Bien for Appellant Brandon 
2

Olson.

Michael L. Smith as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellants.

The Graves Firm, Allen Graves and Jacqueline Treu for 

Plaintiff and Respondent. 

Horvitz & Levy, Christopher D. Hu, Peder K. Batalden, and 

Felix Shafir; Keker, Van Nest & Peters, R. James Slaughter, Erin 

E. Meyer, Ian Kanig and Morgan E. Sharma for Defendant and 

Respondent.

Appellants Brandon Olson and Million Seifu and 

respondent Tina Turrieta worked as drivers for a rideshare 

company, respondent Lyft, Inc. In 2018, Olson, Seifu, and 

Turrieta each filed separate representative actions against Lyft 

under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. 

Code, § 2698 et seq.),1 alleging that Lyft misclassified its 

California drivers as independent contractors rather than 

employees, thereby violating multiple provisions of the Labor 

Code. Following a mediation in 2019, Turrieta and Lyft reached 

a settlement.

After Turrieta moved for court approval of the settlement, 

appellants sought to intervene in the matter and object to the 

settlement. Appellants argued that Lyft had engaged in a 

“reverse auction” by settling with Turrieta for an unreasonably 

low amount, and that the settlement contained other provisions 

that were unlawful and inconsistent with PAGA’s purpose. The 

trial court rejected appellants’ requests to intervene, finding that 

appellants lacked standing. The court found the settlement to be 

fair and adequate, and approved it. The court also denied the 

1 All further statutory references are to the Labor Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
3

subsequent motions by appellants to vacate the judgment under 

Code of Civil Procedure section 663. 

On appeal, appellants contend the trial court erred in 

approving the settlement, and in denying their motions to 

intervene and to vacate the judgment. Respondents argue that, 

as nonparties, appellants lack standing to seek any relief in this 

case, and further, that the settlement was proper. We agree with 

respondents and the trial court that appellants’ status as PAGA 

plaintiffs in separate actions does not confer standing to move to 

vacate the judgment or challenge the judgment on appeal. 

Moreover, while appellants may appeal from the court’s implicit 

order denying them intervention, we find no error in that denial. 

We therefore affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. Initiation of PAGA Lawsuits by Drivers

Olson, Seifu, and Turrieta each worked as drivers for Lyft. 

As alleged by Turrieta, Lyft is a transportation company that 

employs drivers to transport customers by automobile. Lyft uses 

a cell phone application to connect its drivers with riders seeking 

transportation. During the relevant period, Lyft “maintained a 

uniform policy of classifying all Drivers as independent 

contractors rather than employees.” 

On May 24, 2018, Olson filed his lawsuit, Olson v. Lyft, Inc.

(Super. Ct. San Francisco County, No. CGC-18-566788) (Olson),

alleging PAGA claims on behalf of the State of California and 

other similarly situated individuals who worked as drivers for 

Lyft in California. He alleged that Lyft willfully misclassified its 

drivers as independent contractors resulting in numerous Labor 

Code violations, and sought recovery of civil penalties under 

PAGA. Seifu filed his lawsuit on July 5, 2018, captioned Seifu v. 
4

Lyft, Inc. (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, No. BC712959) (Seifu),

also alleging PAGA claims based on driver misclassification.

2 

Turrieta filed the instant case on July 13, 2018 (Turrieta).

Turrieta’s complaint alleged six claims under PAGA for willful 

misclassification, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to timely 

pay wages, failure to pay wages upon termination, failure to 

provide accurate itemized paystubs, and failure to reimburse 

business expenses. 

In April 2019, Olson filed a petition to coordinate five 

actions against Lyft pending in San Francisco and Los Angeles 

Superior Courts, including Olson, Seifu, and Turrieta. Lyft 

opposed the petition, as did Seifu and several other plaintiffs. 

The Olson court denied the petition without prejudice, noting 

that four of the five cases were currently stayed—Seifu and Olson

pending resolution of appeals and Turrieta pending resolution of 

Seifu.

3

II. Settlement in Turrieta

In September 2019, Turrieta and Lyft reached a settlement 

of her case following a mediation. Turrieta and Lyft signed the 

settlement agreement on December 4, 2019. The proposed 

settlement covered all individuals who provided at least one ride 

as a driver on Lyft’s platform from April 30, 2017 to December 

31, 2019. Lyft estimated the group to include a maximum of 

565,000 individuals. The settlement required Lyft to pay $15 

2 During oral argument, counsel for Seifu and Olson 

clarified that Olson added his PAGA claims to his existing 

complaint in July 2018, after Seifu had filed his PAGA complaint. 

Thus, Seifu was the first of these three plaintiffs to file the PAGA 

claims at issue here.

3 We granted Olson’s request for judicial notice of the 

petition and court’s order regarding coordination in Olson. 
5

million in total, including a $14,000 enhancement payment to 

Turrieta, $5,048,087.34 in attorney fees and costs to Turrieta’s 

counsel, $6,071,978.17 to be paid to PAGA group members,4 and 

$3,215,934.50 in penalties paid to the state. Turrieta estimated 

that group members would receive an average payment of $12. 

Under the settlement, the parties agreed to file a first 

amended complaint in Turrieta that “covers all PAGA claims that 

could have been brought against Lyft” for the relevant time 

period, so that those claims would be released by the settlement. 

In the proposed first amended complaint, Turrieta alleged four 

additional claims for failure to provide breaks, failure to store 

records, failure to pay minimum wage, and failure to provide 

hiring notice. The settlement expressly exempted from release 

any claims for damages (as opposed to penalties) and direct 

claims by group members other than Turrieta. On December 9, 

2019, Turrieta gave notice of the settlement to the state through 

the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency 

(LWDA), including a copy of the settlement agreement and the 

proposed first amended complaint. The LWDA did not respond.5

On December 9, 2019, Turrieta filed a motion for approval 

of the settlement, with a hearing date of January 2, 2020. She 

4 The amount allocated to PAGA group members represents 

a $5 million payment for “underpaid wages” pursuant to section 

558, subdivision (a)(3), and the balance of over $1 million as 25 

percent of the recovered penalties paid to employees pursuant to 

section 2699, subdivision (i).

5Although the LWDA did not respond or object to the 

proposed settlement below, it did file a brief, through the Division 

of Labor Standards Enforcement, as amicus curiae on appeal, 

urging us to reverse the trial court’s order approving the 

settlement. Turrieta filed a response to the amicus brief. 
6

argued that the court should approve the settlement, as it was 

“almost twice the amount of a similar settlement in the rideshare 

industry that was approved in 2018,” citing Price v. Uber 

Technologies, Inc. (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, 2018, No. 

BC554512). Turrieta stated that she and Lyft engaged in 

“extensive informal pre-mediation discovery,” including provision 

by Lyft of the number of pay periods at issue, the number of 

unique drivers on Lyft’s platform each week during the liability 

period, and detailed data for a sample of 10,000 drivers. Based 

on that data, Turrieta’s counsel “completed an extensive and 

detailed calculation of the value of the claims in the case” and 

estimated the maximum liability to be over $30 billion. 

Turrieta acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s recent 

decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court

(2018) 4 Cal.5th 903 (Dynamex) established a new test that 

“poses a higher hurdle for employers” to prove that a worker was 

an independent contractor rather than an employee. However, 

she argued that “the uncertainty as to retroactivity of this ruling, 

as well as disputes as to which claims were subject to Dynamex, 

rendered the impact of Dynamex uncertain.” Turrieta also 

informed the court that the parties had attended a full day of 

mediation in September 2019 with “noted mediator” Antonio 

Piazza, but were unable to reach an agreement. However, the 

mediator later “made a settlement proposal representing his own 

independent valuation of the case, which the parties accepted.” 

III. Motions by Olson and Seifu and Approval of Settlement

On December 24, 2019, Olson filed a motion to intervene in 

Turrieta and raised objections to the settlement. He stated that 

he had not been notified by Turrieta’s counsel of the proposed 

settlement and only learned of it on December 20, 2019. Olson 
7

argued that he was entitled to intervene as a matter of right 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 387, subdivision (d)(1) 

because he “(1) claims an interest in the property or transaction 

that is the subject of the litigation; (2) is so situated that the 

disposition of the action may impair or impede his ability to 

protect that interest; and (3) will not be adequately represented 

by the existing party.” Alternatively, Olson sought permissive 

intervention under Code of Civil Procedure section 387, 

subdivision (d)(2). Olson objected to the proposed settlement as 

unfair, unreasonable, and inadequate in light of the purposes of 

PAGA, arguing, among other reasons, that the amount of the 

penalties paid to the state was “grossly inadequate” given the 

strength of the claims. In addition, Olson asserted the settlement

was secured through a reverse auction, it was obtained by

“deliberately excluding” Olson and his counsel from the 

negotiation, and it included an unjustified amount in attorney 

fees. 

Because the hearing on Olson’s motion was set for April 

2020, he also filed an ex parte application to continue the 

January 2020 settlement approval hearing until after his motion 

to intervene could be heard. The court denied the application on 

December 26, 2019.6

On December 31, 2019, Seifu also filed a motion for leave to 

intervene in Turrieta and an objection to the proposed 

settlement. Like Olson, he sought to intervene as a matter of 

6 There is no transcript in the record from the hearing on 

the ex parte application. In its subsequent order on January 2, 

2020 approving the settlement, the court stated that it had 

denied the application “after finding that there were no exigent 

circumstances warranting relief.” 
8

right, arguing that he had an interest in the action as a member 

of the PAGA settlement group and as the PAGA representative 

with the “first-filed” action. He also asked the court to postpone 

the settlement approval hearing and argued that the settlement 

was not fair, adequate, or reasonable. 

The court held the settlement approval hearing in Turrieta

on January 2, 2020. Counsel for Turrieta argued that appellants 

lacked standing to intervene or object to the settlement because 

“this case belongs exclusively to the State.” He also contended

that the settlement would be “one of the largest payments” ever 

received by the state, “so they of course have not objected, they 

would like to be paid.” Lyft’s counsel agreed with Turrieta’s 

position. 

Counsel for appellants appeared at the hearing and the 

court allowed them to argue. Seifu’s counsel argued that Seifu’s 

case was “the first-filed case” and Lyft had engaged in a reverse 

auction by settling with Turrieta after it failed to reach an 

agreement with Seifu. She also argued that Seifu had moved for 

an injunction in his case, which was stayed pending Lyft’s appeal,

but that Lyft was attempting to avoid the effect of potential 

injunctive relief by settling a “copycat” case for monetary 

penalties. She argued in the alternative that Seifu should be 

allowed to opt out of the Turrieta settlement, so that “he can 

continue his pursuit of his injunction claim.” Olson’s counsel 

contended that the small amount of the settlement compared to 

the amount of possible liability “does not represent any kind of 

deterrent or punitive result for a company such as Lyft which is 

currently employing hundreds of thousands of workers in 

California and has billions of dollars in revenue each year.” He 

also argued that other drivers should have standing to intervene 
9

and appeal as they would in class actions. 

In response to Seifu’s arguments, counsel for Lyft 

contended that injunctive relief was not available under PAGA,

and that there was no such motion pending because Seifu was 

stayed. In addition, even if injunctive relief was permitted, the 

settlement would not preclude injunctive relief. He also disputed 

the suggestion of gamesmanship in the settlement. 

Turrieta’s counsel disputed appellants’ assertion of 

standing, arguing that if the court allowed notice to or 

intervention by another PAGA plaintiff, “you’d be undoing a basic 

structural element of PAGA” that was distinct from class action 

procedure. He also reiterated that the amount of the settlement 

was reasonable compared to past settlements, and rejected the 

suggestion that the state did not review the proposed settlement,

considering it was “their biggest recovery of the year.” He 

emphasized that the settlement was made at arm’s length, and 

was proposed by an experienced, neutral mediator. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under 

submission. 

The court issued an order later that day, January 2, 2020. 

The court overruled Seifu’s objection to the settlement, finding 

that “[a]part from the fact that it was filed on the eve of the 

hearing, the Court does not believe that he (like Olson) has 

standing to be heard on this matter.” The court held that the real 

party in interest was the state, citing Amalgamated Transit 

Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 

993 (Amalgamated). The court also denied Seifu’s request to “opt 

out” of the settlement, finding he had no legal basis to do so, and 

was not precluded by the settlement from pursuing a preliminary 

injunction. 
10

The court further found that the settlement was “fair, 

adequate, and reasonable in light of the time period that is 

encompassed by it and the amount that will eventually be paid to 

the State of California and to the hundreds of thousands of Lyft 

drivers.” The court noted it had considered another settlement 

approved in January 2018 for $7.75 million for a “period three 

times as long.” The court also found that “although it is possible 

that monetary penalties could be up to $100 billion,[

7] given that 

the claims in this case would likely be considered under preDynamex law, it is also possible that the penalties could be zero 

dollars.” The court rejected appellants’ assertion that “Lyft 

engaged in gamesmanship such that plaintiffs in other cases (as 

well as the State) could be shortchanged. In this regard, the 

court notes that after the parties engaged in mediation before a 

very experienced mediator, they were still not able to arrive at a 

resolution. Instead, they ultimately accepted the mediator’s 

proposal.” In addition, the court concluded that it would “not 

assume that the State of California [h]as not read and seriously 

considered the proposed settlement. As mentioned above, it is 

the real party in interest and by not filing an opposition to the 

settlement, the Court assumes that it agrees that the settlement 

is appropriate.” 

The court signed the proposed order submitted by Turrieta, 

approving the settlement agreement and finding the settlement 

7 Turrieta subsequently filed a request for clarification, 

noting that the record supported a value of “over $10 billion.” 

During the settlement approval hearing, Seifu’s counsel argued 

that the maximum liability totaled over $2 billion, while Olson’s 

counsel estimated it at over $12 billion. Ultimately, this factual 

dispute is irrelevant to resolution of this appeal. 
11

“is in all respects fair, reasonable and adequate, and complies 

with the policy goals of the PAGA. There was no collusion in 

connection with the Settlement. The Settlement was the product 

of informed and arm’s-length negotiations among competent

counsel and the record is sufficiently developed to have enabled 

Plaintiff and Defendant to adequately evaluate and consider their 

respective positions.” The court further found that the 

settlement agreement was “reasonable as it provides substantial 

payment for the State of California and will provide the PAGA 

Settlement Group Members with substantial recovery from a 

non-reversionary common fund.” The court retained jurisdiction 

to enforce the settlement agreement, vacated all other hearing

dates, and ordered the matter dismissed with prejudice. The 

court entered judgment on January 6, 2020. 

On January 14, 2020, Olson filed a motion to vacate the 

Turrieta judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 

663. He again argued that the court erred in approving the 

settlement for several reasons, including: (1) the provision paying 

$5 million to drivers as underpaid wages pursuant to section 558 

was barred by the recent Supreme Court decision in ZB, N.A. v. 

Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175; (2) the amount paid in 

penalties to the state was unreasonable given the strength of the 

claims, which the court erroneously found would not be 

considered under Dynamex; (3) the court “ignored the undisputed 

facts suggesting that Lyft reverse-auctioned the State’s claims”; 

and (4) the court erred in finding that Olson lacked standing to 

intervene. Seifu also moved to vacate the judgment on January 

21, 2020.8 Lyft and Turrieta both opposed the motions. 

8 Seifu’s motion to vacate the judgment, supporting 

documents, and reply are not included in the record on appeal. 
12

The court held a hearing on the motions to vacate the 

judgment on February 28, 2020. Following argument by counsel 

for appellants and respondents, the court reiterated its finding 

that the settlement “is in the best interest of the workers and in 

the best interest of the state of California.” Then, the court found 

that appellants did not have standing to object to the settlement 

or to bring a motion to set aside the judgment. The court 

subsequently issued a minute order denying the motions. Olson 

and Seifu timely appealed. 

Respondents moved to dismiss the appeals, arguing that 

appellants lacked standing. We issued an order summarily 

denying the motions to dismiss without prejudice to the parties 

raising the issue again in their briefing.9 The parties submitted

their briefs and appellate record. After full consideration of the 

record and relevant legal authorities, we conclude that appellants 

lack standing to appeal the judgment. Although they have 

standing to appeal the trial court’s implicit denial of their 

motions to intervene, we find no error and therefore affirm.

After filing his opening brief, he moved to augment the record 

with these documents and then requested that we take judicial 

notice of them. We denied both requests. 

9 A summary denial of a motion to dismiss an appeal does 

not “preclude later full consideration of the issue, accompanied by 

a written opinion, following review of the entire record. . . .” 

(Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 900, overruling the 

contrary holding in Pigeon Point Ranch, Inc. v. Perot (1963) 59 

Cal.2d 227, 230–231; accord, Dakota Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz

(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 493, 509, fn. 6 [reversing prior order and 

dismissing appeal upon “review of a complete record and further 

analysis of the law”].)
13

DISCUSSION

I. PAGA Overview

“California’s Labor Code contains a number of provisions 

designed to protect the health, safety, and compensation of 

workers. Employers who violate these statutes may be sued by 

employees for damages or statutory penalties. [Citations.] 

Statutory penalties, including double or treble damages, provide 

recovery to the plaintiff beyond actual losses incurred. [Citation.] 

Several Labor Code statutes provide for additional civil penalties, 

generally paid to the state unless otherwise provided. [Citation.] 

Before PAGA’s enactment, only the state could sue for civil 

penalties.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 

Cal.5th 73, 80 (Kim), citing Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los 

Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 378 (Iskanian).) The 

Legislature enacted PAGA in 2003 to allow aggrieved employees 

to act as private attorneys general and recover civil penalties for 

Labor Code violations. (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 

969, 980-981 (Arias); Villacres v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 

Cal.App.4th 562, 578.) The Legislature’s declared purpose in 

enacting PAGA was “to supplement enforcement actions by 

public agencies, which lack adequate resources to bring all such 

actions themselves.” (Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.) 

PAGA deputizes “aggrieved” employees to bring a 

representative lawsuit on behalf of the state to enforce labor 

laws. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 81; Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 

at p. 386.) An “aggrieved employee” for purposes of bringing a 

PAGA claim is defined under the statute as “any person who was 

employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more 

of the alleged violations was committed.” (§ 2699, subd. (c); see 

also Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 82.) Although an aggrieved 
14

employee is the named plaintiff in a PAGA action, PAGA 

disputes are between the state and the employer, not between the 

employee and the employer. (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 

386; Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986 [plaintiff represents same 

legal rights and interests as state labor law enforcement 

agencies].) Thus, an employee suing under PAGA “does so as the 

proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies. . . .

In a lawsuit brought under the act, the employee plaintiff 

represents the same legal right and interest as state labor law 

enforcement agencies—namely, recovery of civil penalties that 

otherwise would have been assessed and collected by the 

[LWDA].” (Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986; accord, Iskanian, 

supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 380.)

Before filing a PAGA lawsuit, an employee must provide 

written notice to the LWDA and the employer of the specific 

Labor Code violations alleged and facts and theories to support 

the claims. (§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(1)(A).) “If the [LWDA] elects not 

to investigate, or investigates without issuing a citation, the 

employee may then bring a PAGA action.” (Williams v. Superior 

Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 (Williams); see § 2699.3, subd. 

(a)(2)(A); Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853, 866 

(Julian).) The notice requirement allows the relevant state 

agency to decide “whether to allocate scarce resources to an 

investigation.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546.) The LWDA 

receives 75 percent of the civil penalties recovered in an action 

brought by an aggrieved employee; the remaining 25 percent of 

the penalties is distributed to the “aggrieved employees.”

(§ 2699, subd. (i); Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 980-981.) 

Overlapping PAGA actions may be brought by different 

employees who allege the same violations and use the same 
15

theories. (Julian, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 866-867.) 

However, because an employee who brings an action under PAGA 

does so as the “proxy or agent” of the state, a judgment in an 

employee’s action under PAGA “binds all those, including 

nonparty aggrieved employees, who would be bound by a 

judgment in an action brought by the government.” (Arias, 

supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.) As our Supreme Court has 

explained, when an employee plaintiff prevails in a PAGA action, 

“[n]onparty employees may then, by invoking collateral estoppel, 

use the judgment against the employer to obtain remedies other 

than civil penalties for the same Labor Code violation[s].” (Id. at 

p. 987.) “If the employer had prevailed, however, the nonparty 

employees, because they were not given notice of the action or 

afforded any opportunity to be heard, would not be bound by the 

judgment as to remedies other than civil penalties.” (Ibid.; see 

also Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 547, fn. 4 [employees “do not 

own a personal claim for PAGA civil penalties”].)

If the parties settle a PAGA claim, section 2699, 

subdivision (l)(2) requires the plaintiff employee to 

simultaneously submit the proposed settlement to the LWDA and 

the court, and further requires that the court “review and 

approve” the settlement. As such, the court must “ensur[e] that 

any negotiated resolution is fair to those affected.” (Williams, 

supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 549.)

II. Analysis

This appeal presents overlapping challenges to two 

separate orders. First, appellants seek to appeal from the 

judgment on the ground that the trial court should not have 

approved the settlement. They contend that they have standing 

to do so because they moved to vacate the judgment under Code 
16

of Civil Procedure section 663. Respondents counter that

appellants, as nonparties, lacked standing to move to vacate the 

judgment and therefore cannot use those motions as a basis for 

appeal. We agree with respondents and the trial court that due 

to the unique nature of PAGA, in which the state is the real party 

in interest, appellants had no personal interest in Turrieta and 

therefore are not “aggrieved parties” who may appeal from the 

judgment.

Second, appellants challenge the trial court’s denial of their 

motions to intervene in Turrieta. Again, they argue that they 

had a personal interest in the Turrieta proceedings and proposed 

settlement because they were deputized to prosecute PAGA 

claims on behalf of the state. Respondents assert that this issue 

is outside the scope of the appeal and, additionally, that 

appellants are not entitled to intervene. Although we agree with 

appellants that they may raise this issue on appeal, we conclude 

that the trial court did not err in denying them intervention.

A. Motion to vacate judgment

Respondents contend that appellants lacked standing below 

to bring a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Code of 

Civil Procedure section 663, and lack standing to appeal from the 

judgment for the same reasons. We agree.

Code of Civil Procedure section 902 allows “‘[a]ny party 

aggrieved’” to appeal from a judgment. Thus, “[t]he test is 

twofold—one must be both a party of record to the action and

aggrieved to have standing to appeal.” (Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft 

Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1342; see also Hernandez v. 

Restoration Hardware, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 263 

(Hernandez).) However, a nonparty that is aggrieved by a 

judgment or order may become a party of record and obtain the
17

right to appeal by moving to vacate the judgment pursuant to 

Code of Civil Procedure section 663. (Hernandez, supra, 4 

Cal.5th at p. 267, citing Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. (1942) 

20 Cal.2d 199, 201; County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 

Cal.3d 730, 736, 738 (Carleson) [one who is legally “aggrieved” by 

judgment may become “party of record” with the right to appeal 

by moving to vacate judgment for “incorrect legal conclusion” or 

“erroneous judgment upon the facts”].) Similarly, pursuant to 

Code of Civil Procedure section 663, a “party aggrieved” may 

move for a judgment “to be set aside and vacated . . . and another 

and different judgment entered, . . . materially affecting the 

substantial rights of the party and entitling the party to a 

different judgment.” Thus, in order for appellants to have 

standing to bring a motion to vacate the judgment or to appeal 

from that judgment, they must have been “aggrieved” by the 

judgment.

A party is aggrieved “only if its ‘rights or interests are 

injuriously affected by the judgment.’” (Sabi v. Sterling (2010) 

183 Cal.App.4th 916, 947, quoting Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 

737.) The aggrieved party’s interest “must be immediate, 

pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remote 

consequence of the judgment.” (Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 

737; see also Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald 

Construction Co., Inc. (1998) 71 Cal.App.4th 38, 58.)10

10 We note that whether someone is an “aggrieved

employee” as defined by section 2699, subdivision (c) and thus 

able to bring a lawsuit under PAGA is a distinct inquiry from 

whether a nonparty may become an aggrieved party because of a 

personal interest in a different lawsuit and thereby obtain 

standing to challenge the judgment. None of the parties here 
18

Appellants contend they are “aggrieved” parties because of 

their status as designated proxies for the state. Olson argues 

that the settlement has an “‘immediate, pecuniary, and 

substantial’ effect on the State (and Olson as the State’s proxy): 

it extinguishes the claims Olson was deputized to pursue for less 

than pennies on the dollar.” Similarly, Seifu contends that he 

has “an interest in representing the State’s interest” in 

“achieving the maximum recovery possible for Lyft’s misdeeds,” 

and deterring future violations. 

We are not persuaded that appellants’ role as PAGA 

plaintiffs confers upon them a personal interest in the settlement 

of another PAGA claim. As our Supreme Court recently 

explained: “A PAGA claim is legally and conceptually different 

from an employee’s own suit for damages and statutory penalties. 

An employee suing under PAGA ‘does so as the proxy or agent of 

the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.’” (Kim, supra, 9 

Cal.5th at p. 81, quoting Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.) As 

such, “[e]very PAGA claim is ‘a dispute between an employer and 

the state.’ [Citations.] . . . . Relief under PAGA is designed 

primarily to benefit the general public, not the party bringing the 

action.” (Ibid.; see also Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 386; 

Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.) “‘A PAGA representative 

action is therefore a type of qui tam action,’” and the “government 

entity on whose behalf the plaintiff files suit is always the real 

party in interest.” (Ibid., quoting Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 

p. 382.)

11

have claimed otherwise.

11 As such, Seifu’s contention that he “supplanted the State 

as the real party in interest” is meritless. 
19

In Amalgamated, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1003, the court 

rejected an attempt by a labor union to bring a PAGA claim as 

the assignee of the employees who had suffered injury. The court 

reasoned that the claim could not be assigned because PAGA 

“does not create property rights or any other substantive rights. 

Nor does it impose any legal obligations. It is simply a 

procedural statute allowing an aggrieved employee to recover 

civil penalties—for Labor Code violations—that otherwise would 

be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies.” (Ibid.) Thus, 

the court held that an aggrieved employee could not assign a 

PAGA claim for “statutory penalties because the employee does 

not own an assignable interest.” (Ibid.)

Consequently, appellants’ ability to file PAGA claims on 

behalf of the state does not convert the state’s interest into their 

own or render them real parties in interest. (Amalgamated, 

supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1003; Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.) 

Appellants were deputized under PAGA to prosecute their 

employer’s Labor Code violations on behalf of the state; they fail 

to point to any authority allowing them to act on the state’s 

behalf for all purposes. Because it is the state’s rights, and not 

appellants’, that are affected by a parallel PAGA settlement, 

appellants are not aggrieved parties with standing to seek to 

vacate the judgment or appeal.

12 Nor can appellants claim a 

pecuniary interest in the penalties at issue, as the “civil penalties 

recovered on the state’s behalf are intended to ‘remediate present 

violations and deter future ones,’ not to redress employees’ 

12 To the extent Seifu additionally contends that his 

purported status as the “first-filed” PAGA plaintiff creates a 

personal interest in the settlement of a later-filed PAGA action, 

he cites no authority supporting that contention.
20

injuries.” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th 73, 86, quoting Williams, supra, 

3 Cal.5th at p. 546; see also Iskanian, supra, at p. 381.)

We disagree with Olson’s prediction that denying him 

status as an aggrieved party will “have the dangerous effect of 

insulating all PAGA settlement approval orders from objection at 

the trial court level and subsequent appellate review,” allowing a 

plaintiff to “settle PAGA claims on patently unreasonable terms.” 

PAGA expressly requires notice of a proposed settlement to both 

the LWDA and the trial court, and directs the court to review the 

settlement prior to approval. (§ 2699, subd. (l)(2); see also

Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 549 [court must “ensur[e] that 

any negotiated resolution is fair to those affected”].) These 

procedures were followed here.13 Moreover, as evidenced by 

several of the cases cited by appellants, the LWDA may provide 

the trial court with comments on or objections to a proposed 

settlement, and has done so in the past. (See O'Connor v. Uber 

Technologies, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110, 1113 

[noting that the court “invited and considered the comments” of 

the LWDA before rejecting the proposed settlement of class and 

PAGA claims].) Here, the LWDA did not raise objections to the 

settlement until it submitted an amicus brief on appeal, but that 

does not invalidate the protections provided by PAGA’s notice 

and review requirements.14

13 We also note that, while it did not allow appellants to 

intervene, the trial court did allow appellants to submit 

objections, and to present argument at two hearings, and it

addressed those objections (albeit briefly) in its order approving 

the settlement.

14 The LWDA raises several objections to the settlement in 

its amicus brief; in particular, it contends that the settlement 

released claims (newly added to the FAC) that Turrieta was not 
21

Appellants also argue that they are aggrieved as nonparty 

employees who would be bound by the judgment. But the 

settlement of Turrieta’s PAGA claims is only binding with respect 

to the state’s assertion of the same PAGA claims and recovery of 

the same civil penalties—not any personal claims appellants may 

have against Lyft. (See Julian, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 867 

[“under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a [PAGA] judgment . . .

binds the government, as well as all aggrieved nonparty 

employees potentially entitled to assert a PAGA action”].) As the 

Williams court explained: “absent employees do not own a 

personal claim for PAGA civil penalties (see Amalgamated[,

supra,] 46 Cal.4th [at p.] 1003), and whatever personal claims the 

absent employees might have for relief are not at stake (Iskanian

deputized to pursue because she never gave the requisite 65-day 

notice to the state under section 2699.3, subdivision (a). This 

argument should have been addressed to the trial court below. If 

the LWDA had asserted its objections before the trial court (or at 

a minimum, requested more time to consider the proposal), it 

could have provided the court with potentially useful information 

in considering the fairness of the settlement. Instead, it did so 

only belatedly and in its limited role as amicus on appeal. 

Moreover, regardless of the standing issue, neither appellant 

timely raised the argument that adding causes of action in the 

FAC required a new notice to the state—Seifu did not raise it at 

all and Olson did so only in a single paragraph at the very end of 

his reply in support of his motion to vacate. This issue is 

therefore forfeited and we would not consider it, even if 

appellants had standing to raise it. (See St. Mary v. Superior 

Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 783 [“points raised in a reply 

brief for the first time will not be considered unless good cause is 

shown for the failure to present them before”]; Balboa Ins. Co. v. 

Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010.)
22

[ ], supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 381 [“The civil penalties recovered on 

behalf of the state under the PAGA are distinct from the 

statutory damages to which employees may be entitled in their 

individual capacities”]).” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 547, fn. 

4; see also Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc. (9th 

Cir. 2015) 803 F.3d 425, 436.) Thus, the settlement forecloses 

only the state’s ability to seek the same civil penalties; it does not 

bar any claims owned by appellants and therefore does not injure 

their personal interests.

The unique nature of a PAGA claim is further underscored 

by the distinction between a PAGA claim and a class action. “In a 

class action, the ‘representative plaintiff still possesses only a 

single claim for relief—the plaintiff's own,’” and the class action 

is used as a procedural device to aggregate numerous individual 

claims. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 86-87, quoting Watkins v. 

Wachovia Corp. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1589.) “‘But a 

representative action under PAGA is not a class action.’ 

[Citation.] There is no individual component to a PAGA action 

because ‘every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on 

behalf of the state.’” (Ibid., quoting Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 

at p. 387.) As a result, unlike a class action, PAGA has no notice 

requirements for unnamed aggrieved employees, nor may such 

employees opt out of a PAGA action. (See Sakkab v. Luxottica 

Retail North America, Inc., supra, 803 F.3d at p. 436; see also 

Arias, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 987 [“the nonparty employees, 

because they were not given notice of the action or afforded any 

opportunity to be heard, would not be bound by the judgment as 

to remedies other than civil penalties”].)15 Here, appellants have 

15 Although appellants complained to the trial court and on 

appeal that they were not notified of the settlement, they cite no 
23

no individual claims that would be affected by the settlement and 

are therefore not “aggrieved” for the purposes of standing to move 

to vacate or appeal from that judgment.

B. Motion to intervene

1. Scope of appeal

We next turn to appellants’ challenge to the court’s denial 

of their motions for intervention pursuant to Code of Civil 

Procedure section 387. As an initial matter, respondents contend 

that appellants have not properly raised this issue on appeal 

because the trial court never denied the motions and appellants 

did not appeal from any such denial.

From the record before us, it appears that the court did not 

issue an order specifically denying appellants’ motions to 

intervene. However, Olson argues that the court effectively 

denied his motion when it vacated the scheduled hearing and 

denied his motion to vacate the judgment.16 We find that the 

record supports the conclusion that the trial court denied 

appellants’ motions for intervention.

17 In its January 2, 2020 

authority entitling them to such notice. Similarly, appellants 

devoted much of their briefing and most of their time during oral 

argument on appeal to policy arguments (despite the panel‘s 

inquiries on the standing issue). The policy issues appellants 

raise are best addressed to the Legislature.

16 Despite its length, Seifu’s reply brief is largely silent as to 

respondents’ challenges to intervention. In his opening brief, he 

commingles the discussion regarding the motion to vacate and 

intervention. 

17 Respondents do not dispute that an order denying 

intervention would be appealable. (See Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d 

at p. 736 [“[O]ne who is denied the right to intervene in an action 

ordinarily may not appeal from a judgment subsequently entered 

in the case. [Citations.] Instead, he may appeal from the order 
24

order, the court addressed the issues raised by the parties 

regarding intervention, expressly finding that Seifu and Olson 

did not have standing to be heard, because the state was the real 

party in interest. The court also vacated the scheduled hearing 

on the motions to intervene. As such, the trial court’s January 2, 

2020 order effectively denied appellants’ motions for intervention. 

Respondents also contend that appellants appealed only 

from the denial of their motions to vacate, not from any order 

denying intervention. “[I]t is and has been the law of this state

that notices of appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect 

the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what appellant was 

trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not 

possibly have been misled or prejudiced.” (Etheridge v. Reins

Internat. California, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 908, 913, 

quoting Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54, 59; Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.100(a)(2).) In Seifu’s notice of appeal, he expressly 

appealed from both the January 2 and February 28, 2020 orders. 

Olson’s notice of appeal lists only the February 28, 2020 order 

denying the motion to vacate; however, in his description of the 

issues to be raised on appeal, he included the court’s refusal to 

hear his motion to intervene. Moreover, all the parties addressed 

the issue of intervention in their briefs on appeal. As such, we 

construe appellants’ notices of appeal as taken from both the 

order denying their motions to vacate the judgment and the 

implicit order denying intervention.

denying intervention.”]; see also Hodge v. Kirkpatrick 

Development, Inc. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 540, 547 (Hodge) [an 

order denying a motion to intervene is appealable “because it 

finally and adversely determines the moving party’s right to 

proceed in the action”].)
25

2. Code of Civil Procedure section 387

Code of Civil Procedure section 387 allows either 

mandatory or permissive intervention. A nonparty has a right to 

mandatory intervention where “[t]he person seeking intervention 

claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is

the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the 

disposition of the action may impair or impede that person's 

ability to protect that interest, unless that person’s interest is 

adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(1).) Thus, “the threshold 

question is whether the person seeking intervention has ‘an 

interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 

subject of the action.’” (Siena Court Homeowners Assn. v. Green 

Valley Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1423, quotation 

omitted; Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Soon–Shiong (1999) 76 

Cal.App.4th 71, 78 (Mylan).)

Permissive or discretionary intervention under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 387, subdivision (d)(2) also requires a 

showing that “the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest 

in the action,” among other criteria. (Reliance Insurance Co. v. 

Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386.) “The 

requirement of a direct and immediate interest means that the 

interest must be of such a direct and immediate nature that the 

moving party ‘“will either gain or lose by the direct legal 

operation and effect of the judgment.”’” (City and County of San

Francisco v. State of California (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1030, 

1036.) “Conversely, ‘[a]n interest is . . . insufficient for 

intervention when the action in which intervention is sought does 

not directly affect it although the results of the action may 

indirectly benefit or harm its owner.’” (Ibid.)
26

3. Standard of review

The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review. 

Several appellate courts have implicitly applied the de novo 

standard of review to an order denying mandatory intervention.

(See, e.g., Hodge, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 548–550; Mylan, 

supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 78–80.) Turrieta, on the other hand, 

argues that the applicable standard is abuse of discretion, citing 

Reliance Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 386. We conclude that the denial of mandatory intervention 

was proper under either standard. We review the denial of 

permissive intervention for an abuse of discretion. (See id. at p. 

386; Truck Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 

342, 345.)

4. Denial of Intervention

Appellants contend the trial court should have granted 

their motions based on either mandatory or permissive 

intervention. Both mandatory and permissive intervention 

require a motion to intervene to be made “upon timely 

application.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 387, subds. (d)(1), (2).) 

Respondents argue that neither appellant’s motion was timely, as 

they knew about the Turrieta action for many months but did not 

seek to intervene, even after the court in Olson denied Olson’s 

motion to coordinate the cases. Appellants counter that 

timeliness is measured from the date the intervenors “knew or 

should have known their interests were not being adequately 

represented.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (2018) 

27 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1013.) According to appellants, they had no 

reason to believe their interests were not being protected by 

Turrieta as another proxy until they became aware of the terms 

of the settlement. 
27

Although the trial court noted that Seifu’s motion to 

intervene was filed on the eve of the settlement approval hearing, 

it is not apparent from the record that the court made a finding of 

untimeliness as a basis to deny intervention. We need not 

resolve this issue. Even if we found that appellants’ motions 

were timely, we nevertheless would conclude that they failed to 

establish a right to intervention.

Appellants cannot meet the threshold showing that they 

had a direct and immediate interest in the settlement, which 

would establish their entitlement to mandatory or permissive 

intervention. Appellants’ claim that they had a qualifying 

interest fails for the same reason they could not establish they 

were “aggrieved” for the purposes of standing. As we explained 

in our discussion of standing above, appellants’ position as PAGA 

plaintiffs in different PAGA actions does not create a direct 

interest in Turrieta, in which they are not real parties in interest. 

Appellants’ interest in pursuing enforcement of PAGA claims on 

behalf of the state cannot supersede the same interest held by 

Turrieta in her own PAGA case. As with standing, appellants 

have no personal interest in the PAGA claims and any individual 

rights they have would not be precluded under the PAGA 

settlement. (Amalgamated, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1003; Arias, 

supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 986.) Thus, the trial court did not err in 

denying appellants’ motions to intervene.
28

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their 

costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

CURREY, J.