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26–225PDF 2017

AMERICA’S INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND

NORTH AFRICA: THE PRESIDENT’S

FY 2018 BUDGET REQUEST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 13, 2017

Serial No. 115–54

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Stuart Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near 

Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........................................................ 22

Ms. Maria Longi, Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for the Middle 

East, U.S. Agency for International Development ............................................ 24

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Stuart Jones: Prepared statement ............................................... 8

Ms. Maria Longi: Prepared statement ................................................................... 14

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 34

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 35

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 36

Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, 

a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, and chairman, 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, and written responses 

from: 

The Honorable Stuart Jones ............................................................................... 38

Ms. Maria Longi ................................................................................................... 42

(1)

AMERICA’S INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

AND NORTH AFRICA: THE PRESIDENT’S 

FY 2018 BUDGET REQUEST 

THURSDAY, JULY 13, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:00 p.m., in room 

2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize other 

members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then hear from 

our witnesses. Without objection, your prepared statements will be 

made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert 

statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

Today we are here to discuss the President’s budget request for 

the upcoming Fiscal Year 2018 for the Middle East and North Africa region. While I have always been an advocate of being efficient 

and effective in the use of taxpayer debt, American taxpayer dollars to fund our foreign assistance programs, I believe we have 

many good programs that should not be cut just for the sake of 

scaling back. 

To be sure, there has been plenty of waste, fraud, and abuse that 

needs to be addressed, but those should be addressed specifically, 

not simply by an across-the-board cut. But let us start with some 

of the positives. The current request represents $3.1 billion in foreign military financing, FMF assistance for our closest friend and ally, the Democratic Jewish State of Israel. This level is consistent with previous 

obligations and represents a final year of the previous 10-year 

Memorandum of Understanding, MOU, between the U.S. and 

Israel. We need to honor our obligations and guarantee that Israel 

is able to maintain its qualitative military edge, QME, over its 

neighbors. 

I am also pleased to see that the budget request honors the commitments we made to our ally, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 

under the current MOU between our two countries. Jordan reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:33 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\071317\26225 SHIRL
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mains a vital partner in the fight against ISIS, and its stability 

and security are top priorities for the region, for our ally Israel, 

and for the United States. This will be the final year of the current 

MOU. And I have offered a bill alongside Ted Deutch, Nita Lowey, 

and Hal Rogers that would authorize a new and expanded MOU 

for Jordan to ensure that the king can keep his country safe, continue fighting ISIS alongside us, and expand his economy. 

I strongly suggest for State to adequately address Jordan’s economic and security needs as it examines the new MOU, which 

hopefully will be for 5 years, in order to reaffirm our long-term 

commitment to the Hashemite Kingdom. 

I am also happy to see that the request for Israel’s (sic) economic 

assistance has been reduced, not because I think Egypt doesn’t 

need any economic assistance—of course it does—but because we 

still have a considerable pipeline of unobligated money in the hundreds of millions of dollars from previous years that we have yet 

to spend. I see no reason to continue to ask taxpayers to add to 

that pipeline until we can clear out that backlog. And if that money 

cannot go out the door in Egypt for whatever reason, then perhaps 

U.S. interests would be best served if it was reprogrammed elsewhere. 

And by elsewhere I suggest Tunisia, which brings us to the bad 

in this budget request. First, I’m extremely disappointed to see a 

request for continued assistance for the Palestinian Authority. I 

know we will hear how none of this money goes directly to the Palestinian Authority or that a lot of this money actually goes to 

Israel to pay off the PA debt, and that we are going—that we are 

doing important humanitarian assistance in the West Bank and 

Gaza. But we all know that money is fungible. For every dollar of 

PA debt to Israel that we pay, that frees more funds for Abu Mazen 

to pay the salaries of terrorists. 

And it means that even though we continue to find that the P.A. 

and the PLO have not lived up to their obligations, they continue 

to incite violence, and they continue to support terror, and they 

continue to work against the interests of the Palestinian people. 

Rather than holding them accountable, we are rewarding them 

with continued U.S. assistance. 

Another disappointment in the budget request is for Tunisia. Tunisia has been one of the very few positive developments in the region over the past few years. It’s not without problems, of course, 

but any country going through a transition like Tunisia in an earnest effort to become a democratic society is going to have some 

hurdles to overcome. Now is not the time to cut and run, now is 

the time to double down on Tunisia that is at the forefront of fighting terrorism, as it has to deal with the problem of foreign fighters 

coming from Tunisia. 

This year’s request seriously undermines Tunisia’s economic 

progress, and it completely cuts out all FMF assistance to a country whose security and stability are vital as it struggles to stay on 

a path toward democratic governance. Tunisia is not the only country that lost its FMF assistance under this request, which calls into 

question the dramatic shifts the administration has taken in the 

FMF program itself. 

3

I hope we hear more about this global FMF fund, which I believe is something like $200 million for everyone, and how the administration plans on distributing that and its plans for moving to loans 

rather than grants. I worry this may be a move by the administration to remove the State Department and, therefore, our Foreign 

Affairs Committee out of the foreign military sales realm by cutting 

FMF, yet making these countries eligible to receive Defense Department-funded security assistance. 

And though this is not a part of the budget request, this also 

calls into question the State Department’s role in the Saudi 

counterterror center. And with Secretary Tillerson in the region at 

the moment, and with the announcement out of this Riyadh Summit, it raises questions regarding the agreements we just signed 

with Qatar, and how we will fund our commitments. There are also 

many questions that this budget request conjures up. And I have 

great concern with many aspects of it and how this budget will promote America’s interests and help raise stability and security to 

the region. 

And with that, I am pleased to yield to the ranking member, my 

friend Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks to Ambassador Jones and Ms. Longi for being here today to discuss the administration’s proposed FY 2018 budget. 

Ambassador Jones, I especially want to thank you for your distinguished career serving this country in some of the most challenging environments. And while we wish you well in your retirement, which I understand is coming in just a few short weeks, this 

country is losing a great diplomat and we are grateful for all that 

you have provided to us. 

Let me say that we appreciate the relationship that we have had 

with your respective bureaus. We hope we will continue to work together to address the very real challenges facing the Middle East 

and North Africa. And I want to commend the remarkable Foreign 

Service and career personnel serving at both State and USAID. We 

are fortunate to have tremendously talented people who are willing 

to dedicate their lives to public service, often in dangerous conditions. And we are grateful for that service. 

That said, I am deeply concerned that senior level positions at 

both State and USAID have yet to be filled. I am concerned that 

while both of you are extraordinarily capable of doing your job, you 

are still filling an acting role 7 months into this administration. 

And I continue to read articles that refer to no one being home at 

the State Department. That is not a good message for our friends. 

It is not a good message for our allies. And it is a terrible message 

to send to our adversaries around the world. 

Diplomacy and development should be driving our foreign policy 

decisions, not taking a back seat to whatever decision the President 

cedes to the Defense Department. State and DoD should be working hand-in-hand to craft consistent policy messages that are amplified coherently across the entire government. And I just don’t 

see how this budget request in any way prioritizes either diplomacy 

or development. 

When the Pentagon receives a $54 billion increase and the State 

Department receives a 32 percent decrease, I have a hard time 

4

hearing the argument that this is about efficiency and saving 

money for the taxpayers. The budget for the Middle East and 

North Africa is by far the largest of the regional funds. And the 

Trump administration is proposing an 11 percent cut in bilateral 

aid to the Middle East and North Africa over the FY 2016 enacted 

levels. Most of these cuts are coming from our foreign military financing. The proposed restructuring of our FMF into one $200 million 

global fund that might be in the form of grants or might be in the 

form of loans is one of the most perplexing things about this budget 

proposal. I can’t quite understand why we would pull this critical 

security assistance from countries desperately in need of it, like 

Tunisia and Lebanon. I don’t understand what kind of message it 

sends when we tell a country that is our partner in the fight 

against terrorism that instead of a dedicated funding stream we 

are going to somehow figure out who will get or how much they get 

from this new global pot of money. 

I am also concerned that converting grants to loans will prevent 

poor countries from getting the assistance they need to protect 

their and our interests. So I would like to better understand how 

you envision the decisions related to the global FMF fund that you 

made, how the priorities will be decided, who gets what, and what 

are we telling our allies who have been the recipients of these 

grants. 

I understand that budget numbers can be deceiving when it 

comes to pipelines and funding streams and allocations of prior 

year funds, but this proposal in no way seems to reflect the serious 

challenges that the region faces. Egypt, which has hundreds of millions of dollars sitting in the pipeline because we have a fundamental difference with the Egyptians on how economic support 

funds should be used, is still receiving $75 million in economic support funds. 

Where is the money going to be used, particularly after the government’s decision to sign the restrictive new NGO law? 

How do these budget cuts reflect the need to bring stability or 

relief to Libya, and Syria, and Iraq, and Yemen while continuing 

to push for a political solution to those conflicts. We should be pursuing robust programs that strengthen these countries and their 

people so they can resist extremist elements. 

How will the budget help to shore up Jordan, one of our most reliable partners in the fight against ISIS, whose economy is in terrible shape? The chairman and I continue to work to advance our 

legislation that would secure a new 5-year MOU for Jordan, as well 

as set up an enterprise fund. And I would like to hear today about 

progress on both of these fronts. 

I will say I am pleased to see the FMF for Israel and assistance 

to the Palestinians remain relatively steady. The support will be 

vital as the administration works for a lasting peace that hopefully 

results in two states for two peoples. 

Finally, I am deeply concerned about the idea of folding USAID 

into the State Department, particularly when we hear that 40 percent of missions across the world would be closed. I am quite certain that Congress recognizes the value that our humanitarian, 

global health, and food security programs provide to our own naVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:33 Sep 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\071317\26225 SHIRL
5

tional security. And I understand that sometimes cuts are necessary, and we all want the government to run more efficiently, but 

simply cutting the four evaluations of the efficiency and effectiveness of the department are completed seems, frankly, irresponsible, 

especially when our national security is at stake. 

I hope today we will be able to address some of these concerns. 

Appreciate your being here. And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

Now the members can make their opening statements. Mr. 

Chabot is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this very important hearing. 

There is no shortage of crises to discuss here today. In recent 

years we have witnessed chaos ensue throughout the Middle East 

and much of North Africa from seemingly endless civil war in 

Syria, to the scourge of ISIS, to a very flawed deal with Iran, and 

on and on. And, unfortunately, the new administration adopted a 

real mess. 

The region has become even more complicated due to massive 

immigration of refugees, and Russia’s increasing engagement there. 

And it just really does go on and on. 

Although we may be seeing some successes, such as the Iraq 

army finally reconquering Mosul; and our military taking a number 

of actions to target Syrian- and Iranian-backed forces, most notably 

the strike in response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons; and the 

shooting down of a Syrian fighter plane last month, it appears Russia and Iranian forces will continue to cause trouble in the region 

into the foreseeable future. So that’s something that has to be dealt 

with before the hearing in the administration today. 

Thank you for holding this hearing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking 

Member Deutch for calling this hearing. And thank you to our witnesses for being here to discuss the important topic of U.S. priorities in the Middle East and North Africa for Fiscal Year 2018. 

The proposed cuts that President Trump has submitted to Congress are dangerous, short-sighted, and undermine the important 

role the United States plays in supporting peace and security in 

the region. It is critical that the United States has the funds necessary to support the current complicated, unstable conditions in 

the region, something the President’s proposal clearly does not take 

into consideration. 

At a time when threats from ISIS are unrelenting, Syria continues to face an unimaginable humanitarian and refugee crisis, 

and the threat from Iran is ever looming, U.S. foreign assistance 

is more important than ever. The Fiscal Year 2018 request fundamentally overlooks the threats to security and human life that 

affect countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa and 

America’s leadership role in the world. And many of my colleagues 

on both sides of the aisle have expressed their concerns over the 

proposed cuts, both to diplomatic and development funding. 

I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses today. And I 

thank you, Madam Chairman, and I yield back. 

6

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Cicilline. 

Mr. Cook of California. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

After reading this and looking at the President’s budget I am 

very nervous. I am on the House Armed Services Committee. Obviously we are interested in the plus-up on some of the military 

spending. But if we ignore our allies, our friends, anything else 

particularly in this region, with these cuts I think General Mattis 

said it, basically you are going to be paying for more ammunition. 

And so what you have to save today is extremely important. And 

I think I have been very fortunate to be on both committees because you have to work together on that. You can’t solve it with 

just bullets, and bombs, and everything else. That if we don’t have 

the money there to help these countries it is going to be in those 

terms that I have described. 

So thank you very much for being here. I look forward to the 

hearing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cook. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you all for 

being here. 

In case I don’t get to ask questions I just wanted to make a brief 

statement, which is I think not only executing the war on terror 

is important, and using the funding to do that, but I think we are 

forgetting about what I call the next generational war on terror, 

which is the 7- and 8-year-olds of today that are IDPs or that are 

in refugee camps that have denied opportunities to get an education, or for hope, or economic opportunity. 

And with the evil dictator Assad in power and denying this opportunity, I actually believe that Assad is the reason ISIS exists, 

and he is the continued incubator for ISIS. So there can be no defeat of radical terrorism in Syria with the existence of this dictator 

continuing to foster the conditions for this recruitment. 

But when we look at things like USAID, the importance of the 

State Department, and soft power exercise, I think we would be 

very remiss in a few years looking back to have ignored those tools 

in favor of just the military option because we would be finding 

ourselves fighting another generational war on terror. 

And so with that, I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Good point. Thank you, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I want to thank my colleague from Illinois for his topical comments because this is important. We are at a point in history 

where we have to be looking forward and dealing not just with the 

immediate threats such as ISIS but the sources of those threats. 

And it is visualizing these threats that go into the next step to stabilizing these regions, creating a future where there is hope. 

Right now we are spending a lot of effort in dealing with people 

and helping people in crisis. We need to be, I believe, able to get 

to a point where we can go from helping people in crisis, helping 

people with good governance, with economic development, with 

education. And I am very concerned, as has already been said, that 

we are cutting our budget at a time when the needs are growing. 

7

They are growing more diverse, they are growing more complex. 

And as others have said, if we cut our budget on diplomacy, if we 

cut our budget on development, it is going to impact what we have 

to do on defense. 

So, as you address these questions I look forward to hearing your 

answers. And I will also echo the concern that here we are 6 

months into the year and you are still with the titles of acting. 

So, thank you. And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

Ms. Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you. And thank you both of you for your 

service. And I apologize you have to hear our frustration. 

So, the world is a dangerous place. And I, I heard that our President said he is inheriting a mess. Well, guess what, his budget is 

making a mess. That is my opinion. And his own defense secretary 

said something to the effect that we can’t gain peace and security 

just with bombs and bullets. 

And I don’t know how we are going to even explain to our military personnel or their families that have sent them to places, I 

will use Iraq as an example, where we spend billions of dollars to 

so-called ‘‘win a war’’ when we know a country has to become stable eventually with development and diplomacy. And this budget 

fails in that respect. 

So, I hope you will be able to explain these cuts. And, again, 

thank you for your service. And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And thank you to all the members. And thank you especially to our witnesses because we will 

have a series of votes coming up shortly. And in the interests of 

time they have agreed to not give their opening statements. I will 

introduce them and then we will go right to questions. And I will 

start with Mr. Chabot. 

So, first, we are delighted to welcome back the Acting Assistant 

Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Bureau, Ambassador Stuart Jones. Ambassador Jones previously served as the United 

States Ambassador to Iraq and Jordan. I have had the honor of visiting him in both countries. He is a good friend. 

Prior to this he served in a variety of positions in places like Turkey, El Salvador, Colombia, and in our mission at the U.N. It is 

good to see you again, Mr. Ambassador. And congratulations on 

your upcoming retirement. Thank you for your 30 years of service. 

And I hope that you and Barbara enjoy retirement. Thank you for 

joining us today. We will look forward to hearing your testimony—

well, we will look forward to reading your testimony and asking 

you questions. 

And we are delighted to welcome back another good friend, 

Maria Longi. Ms. Longi is USAID’s Acting Assistant Administrator 

of the Bureau for the Middle East. Previously she served as the 

Deputy Assistant Administrator for USAID’s Middle East Bureau. 

And prior to joining USAID, Ms. Longi served as the Director for 

Management, Policy, and Resources in the State Department Bureau of International Organization Affairs. 

So, welcome back. We look forward to you answering our questions. 

8

[The prepared statements of Ambassador Jones and Ms. Longi 

follow:]


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opporttmity for the United States to support those elements across the region that 

share the American vision for stability and security, while protecting U.S. long-tenn 

national security interests and maximizing our limited resources. Each issue presents 

its own unique set of trials and requires a different set of tools. 

We are grateful for your continued support for the State Department and USAID, 

which will be necessary for us to meet these challenges. To this end, the President's 

FY 2018 budget request includes $6.6 billion in foreign assistance for the Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs across economic and security assistance accmmts. This budget 

request concentrates resources to support efforts that advance U.S. leadership in the 

region, to protect the American homeland and maintain accountability to the U.S. 

taxpayer. The importance of U.S. efforts in the Middle East and North Africa is 

reflected in the tact that the Budget maintains robust assistance levels in the region 

even while reducing top-lines significantly. 

As President Trump has highlighted on numerous occasions, our priority in the 

region is to defeat ISIS. Tllis FY 2018 budget provides a sustained and continued 

commitment from the United States to support partners that share our common 

interests and vision to ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS and other terrorists. 

With Congress' continued support, including through funding provided in the FY 

2017 Security Assistance Appropriations Act, the FY 2018 budget request includes 

the foreign assistance resources needed to support the Administration's strategy to 

defeat ISIS through FY 2018: $539.4 million supports efforts to defeat the ISIS 

core in Iraq and Syria; $66.0 million to cotmter ISIS branches in Yemen and Libya; 

and nearly $1.2 billion to support stability and security in Jordan, Ttmisia, and 

Lebanon, that have been so dramatically impacted by the conflicts. This funding 

ensures that, as the U.S.-led Coalition effort to defeat ISIS intensifies in the region, 

the United States has the resources necessary to support key partners through 

civilian-led efforts to stabilize and secure areas liberated from ISIS and other 

violent extremist control. 

In Iraq, ISIS is on the brink of defeat as a result of the Government of Iraq and 

U.S.-led Coalition efforts. The FY 2018 request of$347.9 million will enable 

timely and critical support that consolidates these military gains across Iraq and 

ensures the enduring defeat ofTSIS. For example, the hard-fought Iraqi victory in 

Mosulletl large parts of the city in ruins; stabilizing the city to allow residents to 

return to their lives will require significant financial resources. The United States 

will continue its partnership with the Iraqi government including through foreign 

assistance that complements the Coalition's nlilitary campaign with stabilization 

and recovery efforts. Enabling long-term stability requires sustained support from 
10


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the United States. To this end, our assistance bolsters the Iraqi govenm1ent's 

efforts to advance economic refonn, expand governance, and promote broad 

reconciliation. For example, U.S. ftmding has provided the Iraqi government with 

essential fiscal space through a sovereign loan guarantee to help avert economic 

instability as it expends its stretched resources to defeat lSlS. The American 

people have provided a life-line to the most vulnerable, including women, children, 

and members of religious minorities who have been forced to flee the conflict 

zones and the brutality ofiSIS. The United States is also working to facilitate the 

safe and voluntary return of students and communities to their lives in Ninewa 

through efforts to support the removal of explosive remnants of war (ER W), 

including at sites such as Mosul University. 

Tn Syria, U.S. assistance totaling $191.5 million will continue to promote stability 

and support programs that counter the intluence of violent extremists, including in 

areas liberated from TSTS. Assistance continues to support local councils and civil 

society groups in Syria risking their lives to stabilize areas and to provide essential 

services, such as access to clean water, to Syrians returning to rebuild their homes 

in areas liberated from ISIS control. Specifically, in Raqqa, the United States is 

planning for removal of ERWs and quick-impact projects to restore essential 

services to help cement the military gains made against TSTS and enable people to 

return home once they are ready to do so, complementing the continued provision 

ofh1m1anitarian assistance. The Administration is also requesting $103.8 million 

to expand our investment in Lebanon's stability as it grapples with multiple 

challenges, including the threat ofiSIS on its border and over a million refugees 

fleeing from the regional conflicts. 

Tn Libya, U.S. funding helps Libyans in their efforts to build a unified government 

capable of defeating ISIS and other terrorist groups, restore the stability of Libya's 

economy, and address humanitarian needs. The Libyan people face a decisive 

moment in their cmmtry's political transition, six years after the uprising that 

toppled the repressive Qadhafi regime. The Libyan Govemment of National 

Accord (GNA) and its aligned forces, with support from U.S. airstrikes, expelled 

lSlS from Sirte, its largest stronghold outside of lraq and Syria. Unfortunately, 

Libya's internal political divisions and tensions on the ground threaten to undo this 

progress. U.S. assistance is critical to denying TSTS safe haven, preventing the 

return of terrorists to areas cleared ofTSTS and other terrorist threats, and creating 

conditions tor displaced people to return to their homes. Of the half million people 

displaced internally begi1ming in mid-2014, the Intemational Organization for 

Migration has already registered 250,000 retumees as of JLme 2017, marking the 

first time that returns exceed internally displaced persons. The FY 2018 request of 
11


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$31 million will enable the United States to help Libyans prevent ISIS from 

reasserting itself in Libya and promote the broader stability necessary for longterm counterterrorism success. 

ln Yemen, we are facing a humanitarian crisis due to conflict, exacerbated by 

terrorist threats and malign Iranian influences in the region. Yemen is grappling 

with a prolonged period of instability and uncertainty and the cmmtry is at risk of 

famine in addition to facing the world's largest cholera outbreak. The ongoing 

conflict has hastened economic deterioration, stretched provision of basic services, 

and enabled the expansion of terrorist groups. Nearly 21 million Yemenis, 75 

percent of the population, require humanitarian assistance and at least 2 million 

people are displaced as a result of the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and 

the Yemeni government, on one side, against the Iranian-backed Houthi forces, on 

the other side. Funding in the FY 2018 request will advance the United States' 

ability to support international etlorts to bolster early stabilization activities, the 

reswnption of economic and conm1ercial activities, and the provision of basic 

services. The United States and our partners will continue to press for a 

comprehensive political settlement to end the conflict. 

The FY 2018 budget request continues our commitment to provide extraordinary 

support tor Jordan. By again providing $1.0 billion in foreign assistance, even 

amidst significant topline reductions, the United States will continue its strong and 

enduring partnership with the Government of Jordan to achieve critical U.S. 

national security priorities, including contributing as a key Coalition member to 

defeat lSlS and promoting efforts to forge a lasting peace between Israelis and 

Palestinians. The FY 2018 budget request will enable the United States to support 

stability and provide robust economic support, provide essential services to the 

Jordanian people, and strengthen Jordan's as they maintain security and engage in 

the campaign to defeat ISIS. 

ln Egypt, our foreign assistance request includes $1.3 billion in Foreign Military 

Financing (FMF), supporting the Egyptian Armed Forces' efforts to promote 

stability in the Sinai, secure its borders, and counter terrorism, including the threat 

ofTSTS. This part11ership, and Egypt's efforts to defeat terrorism, strengthen 

American national security. The United States will also continue funding priorities 

that advance the prosperity and security of the Egyptian people, tor example 

partnering with Egypt to further develop its health system and private sector. 

With FY 2018 funding, the United States will also continue to support efforts that 

advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. This budget maintains our unwavering 
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commitment to Israel's security and prosperity with $3.1 billion in FMF, consistent 

with the current MemorandLml of Understanding. The FY 2018 request also seeks 

$251.0 million in development and security assistance funding for programs in the 

West Bank and Gaza. These programs are critical to supporting the Palestinian 

people in realizing their economic and social potential thereby creating the 

conditions necessary to restart negotiations and achieve a solution to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. These investments in basic services for the Palestinian people 

further the Administration's vision to enable the growth of the Palestinian 

economy and improve quality of life for the Palestinians, which will also 

strengthen Israel's security. 

The Administration is requesting $16.0 million to support the U.S. partnership with 

Morocco and address shared development and security challenges in the region and 

$54.6 million to bolster Tunisia's security sector and civil society as the 

Govemment undertakes economic and political refonn. The Administration's 

budget request also includes fLmding to support the development of, and provide 

tools to, civil society, youth, and business leaders across the region, spanning from 

Morocco to Iran, who ultimately seek security, stability, and prosperity. 

Our efforts to advance U.S. national security cannot focus solely on the immediate 

operational defeat of violent extremist organizations. The United States must also 

support long-term stability and prosperity in the region to prevent the re-emergence 

of groups like ISIS. This requires strong engagement to degrade de-stabilizing 

threats in the region. U.S. assistance cmmters Iran's de-stabilizing influence, 

supports broad-based economic growth, deepens security engagement and 

cooperation efforts across the region, and advances partnership with the region's 

citizens. Our capacity to react quickly in changing environments like the evolving 

conditions in the Middle East and North Africa will require your continued 

support. 

I have seen significant successes and benefits of U.S. assistance both in the region 

and here at home. Assistance programs create local jobs as well as opportunities 

for U.S. companies through improved investment climates and support the creation 

oftransparent, predictable regulations and procedures. Assistance in Lebanon pays 

dividends tor U.S. national security, whether it's through our strong, 

successful partnership with the Lebanese Armed Forces or investments in 

Lebanon's economic and development needs to counter threats to stability from the 

impact of the Syrian conflict and from violent extremist organizations such as 

Hizballal1. In TLmisia, the United States is maintaining our strong partnership with 

a govemment that has bolstered democratic institutions while implementing 
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-6-

economic refonns. Our assistance, with support from Coalition partners, has also 

helped enable the return of nearly 1.9 million displaced persons to their homes in 

lraq. 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, the President's FY 2018 

request supports our highest national security priorities in the region and promotes 

investments to further our regional interests. I want to thank this S ubcmmnittee for 

your strong and continued support for the State Department and USAID and look 

forward to answering your questions. 
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Statement of Maria Longi 

Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for the Middle East 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

House Foreign Affairs Conunittee 

Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee 

"America's Interests in the Middle Fast and North Africa: 

The President's FY 2018 Budget Request" 

July 13, 2017 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and Members of the 

Subconm1ittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the President's Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2018 budget request for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 

And thank you for your leadership on this subcommittee as we face complex and 

evolving humanitarian and development challenges in the region. US AID supports 

U.S. national security interests, promotes American prosperity, and advances 

American leadership by helping our partners recover from conflict, foster stability, 

and promote inclusive governance and economic growth. 

With this request, we will continue to work with our international partners and 

those in the region to prioritize mutually identified areas of need that advance U.S. 

national security goals. 

As Acting Assistant Secretary Jones noted, the crises in the region have a direct 

impact on U.S. national security and economic prosperity. The programs that 

USAID implements, with your continuing oversight and support, enhance regional 

security, resilience, and prosperity- benefits that are directly connected with 

American national security and prosperity. 

While the news headlines only focus on the multiple crises, conflicts, and threats in 

the region, we cannot lose sight of the longer-term U.S. goals that can only be 

achieved with democratic, inclusive governance and economic opportunity. 

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In the last two months, T have visited USATD projects and met with partners in the 

West Bank, Jordan, and Iraq- and made virtual visits to projects inside Syria. I can 

tell you from tlrst-hand experience that in addition to supporting U.S. national 

security priorities, our friends and allies in the region greatly appreciate our help as 

they struggle to maintain stability in the face of increasing pressures. We are 

furthering our interests and improving the lives of many. 

Supporting U.S. National Security Objectives 

The President's 2018 budget request for the Middle East and North Africa is driven 

largely by the national security priorities to defeat ISIS, support Israeli-Palestinian 

peace building, strengthen key partnerships, and advance stability. 

For USAID, this means focusing resources in Iraq and Syria, where the campaign 

to deteat ISIS is intensifYing. Immediate stabilization resources will continue to be 

crucial to ensure success and consolidate Coalition military gains in order to 

prevent malign actors from filling the void. Our work in these countries is closely 

synced with U.S. military, diplomatic, and international coalition partners. 

For example, in Iraq, USAlD's contribution to a multilateral stabilization program 

helps people displaced by or liberated from ISIS return to their homes once they 

are ready, in places like Tikrit, Ramadi, and, more recently, Mosul. Our activities 

help Iraqis resume normal lives by restoring services such as water, electricity, 

sewage, health, and education. With your support, USAID has already contributed 

$115 million to the UNDP's stabilization fund and recently announced its intention 

to contribute another $150 million. Our contribution has leveraged $412 million in 

other donor funding. The President's request for FY 2018 includes additional ftmds 

to support stabilization and recovery in areas liberated from ISIS. 

In Syria, our assistance will continue to support targeted stabilization activities, 

such as the rehabilitation of essential services, provision oftechnical engineering 

support, and enabling the restoration of livelihoods to support commtmities in need 

in areas liberated from ISIS. Our assistance acts as a bulwark against extremism in 

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other areas of the countty, including those held by the moderate opposition in 

southern Syria. 

Additionally, the U.S., as a founding donor, continues to play a leadership role in 

the Syria Recovery Tmst Fund (SRTF), a successful multi-donor partnership. U.S. 

contributions presently account for 21 percent of total SRTF contributions of 

nearly $200 million, and we have leveraged donor funding from a dozen other 

countries to benefit more than two million Syrians to date. The SRTF, in 

partnership with local actors, recently completed renovation of two operating 

rooms, two obstetrics rooms, adult and pediatric TCUs, and provided incubators, an 

oxygen generation system, and six months' worth of essential medications to a 

hospital in Aleppo Governorate that can now treat an average of 1,000 patients 

each month. 

USAID continues to spend the f'tmds appropriated in the 2017 Security Assistance 

Appropriations Act to support D-ISIS efforts, and we expect this funding, in 

addition to what we are requesting in FY 2018, to provide sufficient support over 

the next year for our efforts in other D-ISIS focus areas, such as Libya and Yemen. 

In Libya, the U.S. Government is a founding member and contributor to the 

Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL), a multi-donor fund. Our contribution is 

roughly one eighth of SFL's total international donor contributions of 

approximately $32.4 million, with additional donor pledges pending. USAIDprovided SFL funds will enable continuation of efforts to stabilize transitional 

areas to the countty, including Sirte. U.S. efforts helped the Government of 

National Accord (GNA) and its aligned forces expellSlS from Sirte, and the 

international commtmity must now help the Libyans ensure ISIS never finds safehaven there again. 

Mitigating the Human Impact of Ongoing Conflicts 

Conflict affects every cotmtry in the region- either directly or as neighbors to 

conflict. We are working to mitigate the human impact of these conflicts, and keep 

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allies in the region from sliding further away from important development and 

economic goals. 

17 million people in Yemen need food aid in what is the largest food security 

emergency in the world, and despite challenges presented by ongoing conflict and 

limited access, USAID's assistance is critical to advancing the emergency 

humanitarian and early recovery response. We will continue our support for 

livelihoods at the community level, education for children displaced by the 

conflict, interventions to respond to and prevent health emergencies, and 

stabilization efforts, including helping monitor the flow of key goods needed for 

humanitarian response. 

We are continuing robust support to Jordan as it deals with instability around its 

borders and high refugee levels. In FY 2018, we will continue to focus on 

improving Jordan's water sector and its growing supply and demand gap. Jordan 

has one of the lowest levels of water availability per capita in the world, and with 

the Syrian refugee population and the rapid growth in the .Jordanian population, 

meeting water demand has never been so crucial. USAID has already helped build 

many of Jordan's critical water supply facilities networks and eight wastewater 

treatment facilities, serving the entire population. USAlD's investment in water is 

essential to the health, economic development, and peace and security of Jordan 

and the region. 

USAID has worked with Jordan to coordinate assistance that benetlts Syrian 

refugees and the Jordanian communities that host them. USATD projects focus on 

alleviating pressures on .Jordanian host communities through support to basic 

service delivery, including health, education, and clean water. USAID supports 

The Jordan Compact, a detailed agreement between the Govemment of Jordan 

(GO.J) and the intemational community, which promotes economic development, 

education, and other opportunities to benetlt both Jordanians and recent Syrian 

refugees. 

Our investment will continue in Tunisia and Lebanon, where significant internal 

challenges are compounded by instability in neighboring countries. Lebanon 

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currently hosts the largest number of refugees per capita in the world and refugees 

represent a quarter of Lebanon's population, which exacerbates tensions and 

strains Lebanon's economy, already overburdened by the impact of the 

neighboring Syrian conflict. USAID is therefore focused on providing assistance to 

Lebanese cmmmmities hosting Syrian refugees through development assistance. 

These ongoing programs improve service delivery, expand economic 

opportunities, and increase access to basic and higher education across all areas of 

Lebanon. Our continued support to Lebanon's governance and economic 

prosperity is critical to support Lebanon against the kind of extremism gripping 

other parts of the MENA region and as part of our efforts to strengthen the 

Lebanese government against Hizballah's influence. 

In Tunisia, USATD is helping private enterprises address the critical issue of 

unemployment and underemployment, particularly among young people. Through 

one program alone we have helped create more than 15,000 jobs, assisted 300 

enterprises, and leveraged $2 million in teclmical assistance to encourage over $35 

million in direct investment. A separate project, a partnership with Hewlett 

Packard, UNIDO, and the Government ofltaly, helped more than 160 start-ups 

create more than 1 ,200 new, long-term jobs. With FY20 17 funds, we will provide 

the final tranche of capital to the Ttmisian American Enterprise Ftmd, which 

invests in Tunisia's private sector growth. 

Fostering Economic Development and Reform 

USATD's work to foster inclusive development and economic opportunity play an 

important role in building stable societies that can be good neighbors and enhance 

regional and global economic opportunities, including for American businesses. 

Stable, prosperous societies are critical to the broader network of global security. 

The President's FY 2018 request will support key development programs that 

bolster stability and support the U.S. government goal of achieving lasting peace 

between Israelis and Palestinians. For example, support will include developing the 

water and electricity sectors; improving health outcomes through teclmical 

assistance to the Palestinian health sector; enhancing the education sector through 

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in-service teacher development training; promoting better govemance and access 

to critical services such as local courts; expanding existing transportation 

networks; and addressing basic humanitarian needs in Gaza. USAID does not 

directly provide funding assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA), and US AID 

has a rigorous monitoring and vetting program for our assistance in the West Bank 

and Gaza. 

USAID's economic assistance in Egypt aims to continue a long-standing 

partnership. As Egypt undertakes critical economic refom1S, the request will 

support private sector-led job creation, workforce development, and better health 

and education outcomes. FY 2018 resources will also expand support for targeted 

mle-of-law programs, such as those that combat gender-based violence. 

Effectiveness and Accountability 

Before concluding, I would like to say a few words about how US AID evaluates 

the effectiveness of our foreign assistance programs in promoting and protecting 

U.S. interests in the region. 

USAID places the highest priority on ensuring that taxpayer funds are used wisely, 

etiectively, and for their intended purpose. USAID has a zero tolerance policy for 

fraud and we carry out extensive measures to ensure our funding is not diverted to 

terrorist financing. USAID uses regular meetings with implementing partners, 

quarterly reports, data quality checks, verification through third-party monitors, 

and geo-tagged photographs, videos, and other technology to ensure that taxpayer 

dollars are spent efficiently and effectively. 

To build on our monitoring data, USAID conm1issions extemal, third party 

evaluators to assess activities and answer questions that may not be readily 

verifiable from monitoring data. In the MENA region in 2016 alone US AID 

completed 11 extemal evaluations and is managing three ongoing impact 

evaluations, which continue to inform the design of more effective activities. 

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We also use these tools to improve the effectiveness of our programs. Countrylevel indicators help illustrate the major challenges facing a country- such as in 

Egypt, where the otlicialtmemployment rate is over 12 percent and a quarter of the 

over 90 million population lives in poverty. This drives our focus to employment 

and income generating activities. In the past year, we have helped thousands of 

technical school and university students find intemships and jobs- and helped 237 

entrepreneurs launch their businesses. 

In Morocco, the youth unemployment rate is almost 40 percent, and Morocco 

underperfonns on education indicators. As a result, USATD's Morocco 

programming focuses on improving education outcomes and strengthening links to 

the private sector. 

USA !D's effectiveness is reflected in the people and communities we help. 

USAID is working to support youth in the cities along Morocco's coast at the 

northem point of Africa and just a few miles by boat from Spain. Working with the 

private sector, we provide vocational training and life skills, and help marginalized 

youth contribute to their conununities. Some of these youth are at risk of 

radicalization. When two teen boys told a USATD-supported youth association 

they were considering fighting in Syria as a way out of their marginalized 

community, an association worker steered them instead toward jobs at a 

construction company. 

Statistics also demonstrate the etiectiveness of our programs. USAID's third-party 

evaluation shows that since the start of the activity in 2014, nearly 22,000 

marginalized youth have increased confidence, professional skills, schooling, and 

are more engaged in their commtmities. Nearly three-quarters (72 percent) of youth 

surveyed indicated that the quality oflife in their neighborhood had improved 

since the project began. Indeed, the evaluation confirmed that taxpayer funds are 

having an impact. 

USAID uses evaluations to identifY what works, so host cmmtries can sustain those 

etiorts. For example, also in Morocco, US AID developed a new reading 

curriculum, complete with guidebooks and coaching tools for teachers, which we 

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have implemented in 90 schools for 10,000 primaty school children. The 

Moroccan Ministry of Education decided to stop the roll out of its own revised 

curriculum and to nationalize the USAID-funded curriculum, since our 

assessments showed clear improvements in the children's reading and teacher 

pertormance. 

Regionally, USATD uses findings from assessments and evaluations to adjust, 

scale, and replicate pilot programs; for example, we are integrating results from 

regional pilot activities in Countering Violent Extremism and research on the role 

of women in violent extremism into project design in Tunisia and a cross-leaming 

effort within USAlD and the State Department to develop a more nuanced 

understanding of the role women play globally in violent extremism. 

Conclusion 

With your support, and with the President's FY 2018 request, US AID will 

continue to play a key role in demonstrating American leadership and advancing 

American interests. 

Thank you for having this hearing to draw attention to these issues, and I will be 

happy to take any questions you may have. 

8 
22

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And with that, we will begin the question 

and answer period with Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thanks very much, Madam Chair. 

And the first question would be, this past weekend at the G-20 

Summit, a ceasefire was announced for portions of southern Syria 

to be overseen by the United States and Russia. However, the 

ceasefire only covers a small portion, as we know, of Syria, and 

many details remain somewhat unclear. 

Would you be so kind as to outline the terms of the ceasefire and 

how we expect it to be enforced? And does the ceasefire prevent 

Iran or Hezbollah from establishing a presence in the ceasefire 

areas? 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you, Congressman. 

First, Madam Chairman, thank you for your kind words. And 

thank you for your friendship and your support through these 

many years. And your announcement also will be, has been a loss 

for the House. So, thank you very much. 

Congressman, in regards to the ceasefire that was announced 

last week, this represents an agreement between the United 

States, Jordan, and Russia to establish a ceasefire in the southwestern quadrant of Syria. And the idea is, of course, initially to 

establish a ceasefire, but, ultimately, to create conditions in that 

area where people could start to return to their homes, where we 

would be able to deliver humanitarian assistance, and we would be 

able to create stability. 

Certainly an essential element of that is to have no forces threatening the line of demarcation, whether they be Syrian Regime 

forces, or Iranian forces, or Hezbollah forces. So that is certainly 

part of the expectation. 

That said, some of the details are still to be worked out. And we 

are still working through the mechanics of this. Since the ceasefire 

was announced last Thursday we have seen now several days of 

genuine stability and peace in that vicinity. 

And just right before I got here I got a report from Michael 

Ratney, our Deputy Assistant Secretary, who participated in that 

negotiation. And he said that reports today from the area around 

Daraa and this area where the ceasefire has been declared that the 

ceasefire is holding effectively. 

So this is good news for us. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

In the past, Iran and North Korea have cooperated, as we know, 

in missile development. What is the current state that we believe 

of ballistic missile cooperation between Iran and North Korea? 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you again, Congressman. 

So, the Iranian development of ballistic missiles we believe is a 

significant threat to stability in the Middle East. This is in complete violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. We know 

that the Iranians are providing ballistic missiles and ballistic missile technology to the Houthis, which is adding to the conflict in 

Yemen. 

And there are other instance, too, where the Iranians are providing the ballistic missile technology to Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations in the region. 

23

I am sorry, I am not prepared to speak to you about the nexus 

between North Korea and Iran. But, clearly, Iran is an evil, is an 

evil partner in this arrangement. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

And finally, let me turn to ISIS. Obviously Mosul has just fallen, 

although there are I guess a few things still to wrap up here and 

there. But overall it looks like the Iraqi forces, you know, with our 

assistance and others, have won out there. And I would assume 

that Raqqa will be soon. 

And the question is what—I assume the administration is planning on what happens with those who either go back to their country or go elsewhere. It will continue the terror in other parts of the 

world. What is the planning going on there, to the extent that you 

can tell us in an open forum? 

Ambassador JONES. Well, thanks for the question again, because 

it is very timely. 

Today, at the State Department, we are hosting a meeting of political directors from all the coalition members. And a key focus of 

this discussion has been, what are we going to do about the foreign 

fighters who are going to be now leaving the field in Iraq and 

Syria? 

There is a great deal of concern, as you would expect, in Southeast Asia. I had the Deputy Prime Minister—sorry, the Deputy 

Foreign Minister of Australia in my office yesterday talking about 

this very topic: How can we cooperate to make sure that we are 

sharing information and identifying these foreign fighters as they 

cross borders and present threats to other regions? 

So this is something that is very much under our attention. We 

are working closely with DoD partners. We are, of course, focusing 

on terrorist finance aspects through the Department of Treasury. 

This is a whole of government approach. 

And, again, this is something that was highlighted during the 

President’s summit in Riyadh back in May. The GCC countries 

and, indeed, all of the Muslim countries who attended the broader 

summit pledged to support efforts to counter terrorism financing, 

to counter terroristic and extremist messaging, and also to counter 

the flow of foreign fighters across borders. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

There has been a lot of attention on Capitol Hill paid to the socalled Palestinian martyr payments. And we all abhor this practice 

of incentivizing and rewarding terrorism. Certainly does nothing to 

advance the prospects for peace that we all desire. 

I have raised this issue directly with Palestinian Authority leaders on multiple occasions. It has been on the agenda for President 

Trump and his advisors in their meetings with President Abbas 

and other Palestinian officials. 

Yesterday the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the Taylor Force Act. The legislation in its current form 

would bar aid from all West Bank and Gaza programs until a certification could be made that these payments have ceased. Now is 

clearly the time for action. There is momentum in Congress and in 

24

the administration, and many of our allies around the world have 

joined in decrying these payments. 

The witnesses at yesterday’s hearing offered a number of suggestions for revisions to the legislation that would ensure that we 

maintain Israel’s security, such as withholding PA debt payments 

or setting aside the money as incentive for the PA to retrieve it 

once changes to the practice are made. 

Does the department have a view on these potential pass-forwards so that the United States Congress can move ahead with the 

Taylor Force Act and finally move on legislation aimed at stopping 

these payments to terrorists? 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you, Congressman. And also thank 

you for your kind words. And I appreciated your visits to my, to 

my various Embassies and very much appreciate your friendship. 

Of course the administration shares Congress’ commitment to 

ending the programs that incentivize acts of terrorism. President 

Trump has discussed this issue directly with President Abbas, emphasizing the need to make significant progress on this issue. And, 

in fact, we have seen some progress. 

For the first time in the 52 years of the Palestinian’s Prisoner 

Payment Program, the Palestinian Authority cut funding to 277 

Hamas-affiliated former prisoners last month. Now that’s not sufficient. None of us think that’s sufficient, but it is a step forward. 

We know they have to do more. 

It is not clear that the Taylor Force Act, as currently drafted, 

would help accomplish the objectives that are needed. But we—but 

I agree with you that the hearing yesterday was very constructive, 

some interesting ideas proposed. The administration has not yet 

taken a position on those proposals. 

Mr. DEUTCH. All right. I appreciate that. I urge the administration to look closely at some of those proposals to see if there is a 

way to move forward on this quickly. 

Small investments in programs like the Middle East Regional 

Cooperation Program, which started over 35 years ago, which 

helped foster cooperation between Israel and their Arab neighbors, 

can go a long way. This particular program has never received 

more than $5 million. And it brings together researchers from 

across the region. 

Why, at a time when the White House seems to be pushing a regional approach to peace, would we zero out a program like this? 

Ms. LONGI. Thank you for your question. And thank you for all 

of your support for and words for USAID, and for development of 

humanitarian assistance. We appreciate hearing that. 

The Middle East Regional Cooperation Program was zeroed out. 

I will say they do some wonderful programs and there are a significant number of grants in their pipeline. So, as a practical matter, 

that program can continue for a little while. 

But we do have several other cooperation programs in the Middle 

East with the Israelis and Palestinians we implement between civil 

society groups, between educators, between businesses. So, while 

this is one of the programs where we do have a cooperation between the different players, we do have others that support that 

objective. 

25

Mr. DEUTCH. I know that we do. I would also point out it is a 

decision to make a small cut to a program that will effectively be 

eliminated, a program that contributes to peace. And I would urge 

you to reconsider that. 

I am deeply concerned—I wanted to follow up on Mr. Chabot’s 

point—I am deeply concerned that the administration has been 

willing to let Russia lead in Syria. And Russia has shown no willingness to divorce itself from Assad, from Iran, or from Hezbollah. 

You had spoken about the current ceasefire. But I would like to 

just look ahead and ask whether the United States would ever 

agree to a political solution that allows a sustained Iranian or 

Hezbollah military presence in Syria? 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you, Congressman. 

We are very troubled by the Iranian military presence, by the 

Hezbollah presence in Syria. This is a significant risk and poses a 

terrible threat to stability, not only in Syria but to the entire region. So we are very troubled by that. 

Our engagement with Russia is aimed at reducing the levels of 

violence inside of Syria today. And so far if this ceasefire in southwestern Syria holds, that would be a step forward in terms of the 

reduction in violence and just trying to improve people’s lives at a 

very basic level. 

In parallel, the Russians have established a process called the 

Astana Process in which they are working with the Iranians and 

the Turks. And they have also in that forum proposed three other 

de-escalation areas to reduce the, to reduce the levels of violence. 

And, indeed, since they proposed those areas we have seen a reduction in violence in those areas. 

So, we will work with the Russians if they continue to be able 

to help us reduce the levels of violence in these areas. Hopefully, 

as we reduce areas of violence we can create greater levels of stability, we can provide more humanitarian assistance. And then the 

idea is to move toward a political process. And we hope that that 

political process will remove Bashar al-Assad. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, I understand. Let me just be clear though. 

And I understand the step-by-step approach. But my question was 

about a political solution, about a long-term plan. 

And I would suggest to you, respectfully, that the idea that there 

can be stability in Syria with a permanent presence of Iran and 

Hezbollah is not a serious one. And that is what I am suggesting. 

Ambassador JONES. And I am sorry, I should have, I should have 

said that I agree with you. We agree. We agree on this point. There 

cannot be stability in Syria as long as Iran and Hezbollah maintain 

this current military presence. That is our position as well. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate it, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you both. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Thank you. 

Mr. Cook of California. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

My questions are about there is a whole laundry list of countries 

here that we could address, but let me start off with there are two 

I want to talk about: Bahrain and the huge cut in a country where, 

obviously, our military, the fleet is stationed right there. Anyone 

who has ever gone there they know how important that is. 

26

And then you have the situation with a government that is primarily Sunni with the majority of the population Shia. And I am 

afraid that is on the at least my watch list for future problems 

from Iran and what have you. And could you comment on that situation? 

And, of course, to see that cut there it like, wait a minute, does 

anybody know what is going on? And whether you share my angst 

in that regard. 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you, Congressman. 

We, we certainly agree that Bahrain is an important security 

partner for the United States. It is the base of the 6th Fleet. It is 

an important partner in the coalition against ISIS. It is playing a 

role in the Saudi-led coalition on Yemen. We have important security interests and investments in Bahrain. 

Bahrain also faces tremendous security challenges. I was there 

recently in March and I met with the Minister of Interior. He told 

me that in the last year he had lost 50 police officers to Iraniansponsored terrorism in Bahrain. So, we need to stand by Bahrain. 

Again, we will have this regional—sorry—this global foreign military financing fund where we will have the flexibility to support 

our partners as needed going forward. The Pentagon will also have 

funds, counter-ISIS funds through which they can support programs in Bahrain. 

And, also, to a great degree Bahrain can support its own security. And it also receives significant support from its Gulf partners. 

So I am confident that there will be no gaps in our approach to 

Bahrain. 

We are concerned about human rights in Bahrain. But this administration has de-linked the conversation on human rights to our 

security support. We are still talking about human rights. We are 

very concerned about the arrest of dissidents and the lack of due 

process, but we have de-linked that from the important security 

support that you mentioned. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. The other country I wanted to talk about 

was Tunisia. You know, I look at the figures for Libya and I understand that. But Tunisia, you know, where the Arab Spring and everything like that, where it all started, and that was a year, 2 

years ago. And saw the remnants where they shot up the museum 

and things like that. 

More telling, at least from an economic standpoint, and all the 

beach resorts and the cruise ships that are now in Croatia, or what 

have you, and the whole economy is, is just basically hurting. And 

it is very, very worried about that country. 

In this, my thoughts on this were reinforced. I was just in Italy 

a few months ago, and the Italians are very worried about the 

human trafficking coming from sub-Saharan Africa, through Libya, 

through Tunisian, some of those countries that are, you know, 

landing every night there. 

And that is going to be basically the same question: Do you share 

my same anxiety about that country where in many ways that was 

our hope for the future for the Arab region? 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you, Congressman. 

As you say, Tunisia is an important partner for the United 

States. Prime Minister Chahed was here this week. He met with 

27

the Vice President. He met with Secretary of Defense, Secretary of 

Treasury. The Tunisians have been doing a terrific job. They are 

building democratic institutions. They are defeating ISIS. They 

definitely merit our support. 

I think this budget reflects significant support for Tunisia. We 

straight lined our economic support funds with the exception of just 

$20 million. That reflects the fact that we have paid up the Enterprise Fund commitment in Tunisia. And the Enterprise Fund is 

succeeding in Tunisia. 

We also, thanks to the support of Congress, were able to provide $40 million in supplemental FY 2017 funds in counter-ISIS funds 

to Tunisia. Thirty million of that is FMF. So that is money that 

will be going into the system relatively soon. 

As the chairman mentioned, although we have not—this budget 

does not provide for FMF in FY 2018, Tunisia will be a higher priority recipient under the global FMF fund, $200 million FMF fund. 

I think all of us recognize the principles that you have outlined, 

that we need to stand with Tunisia. 

Let me just say very quickly, too, Tunisia will also continue to 

qualify for DoD 333 funds, also DoD CTEF funds. And, also, Tunisia is now the beneficiary of a MCC, Millennium Challenge Corporation, compact agreement which will bring a significant U.S. investment, multi-hundred million dollar investment in infrastructure into Tunisia. 

So, I think we can say we are standing by the Tunisians. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cook. 

And before I recognize Mr. Cicilline, we are going to be cutting 

the time for Q&A to 4 minutes because we want to give as many 

members the opportunity to ask questions before the votes are 

called. 

Mr. Cicilline is recognized. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to our witnesses, and not only for your service but for the service of the men 

and women you represent. And I regret that we are living in a time 

where there is such an absence of leadership in important positions 

in both your agencies. 

But I want to just quickly move to my questions. First is, ISIS 

control over Syrian land has drastically reduced over the past year, 

particularly of course in the northern part of the country. How does 

the budget that is being presented today support the humanitarian 

aid which will be necessary to promote stability in these areas? 

And what can we do, and what does the budget support to ensure 

that these areas are not taken advantage of by new and different 

extremist groups going forward? 

Ms. LONGI. Thank you for your question. 

I can start on the humanitarian and development support that 

we provide through this budget, primarily in Iraq and Syria, which 

is where the issues are most prominent right now. I think the request on the humanitarian account will continue to support the 

needs that we are seeing in both Iraq and Syria. Just this week, we announced another $190 million for the humanitarian crisis in Syria. So, we will continue to support that 

issue. 

28

In Syria, the U.S. Government has already provided over $6 billion since the Syria crisis began on the humanitarian front. And as 

with Iraq, we have requested sufficient funds, we believe, to continue to support those needs. 

For the request on the stabilization front, we are anticipating 

that those needs will be great. The estimates that we are hearing 

from Mosul just this week with the coalition in town are upwards 

of $1 billion. We just announced the contribution of $150 million 

to the UNDP stabilization fund there. And so we are working very 

hard to encourage other, other coalition partners to contribute as 

well. And, hopefully, we will be successful on that front because 

they are already seeing returnees because of some of the stabilization efforts that they have made. 

In Syria for the stabilization effort, we have requested funding 

in our budget for that. The landscape is unknown for a lot of that 

now. But I think our goal, and what we are discussing with our coalition partners, is focusing on stabilization once areas are liberated. And so, we are all working to tee up partners to do that work 

and funding. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

As Iran and North Korea are enhancing their abilities to disrupt 

military communications and navigation in order to degrade information networks, does the Fiscal Year 2018 budget propose enough 

spending to fight this global threat of electronic warfare by two of 

our most serious adversaries? 

Ms. LONGI. Could you repeat that? 

Mr. CICILLINE. Sure. They are, both North Korea and Iran are 

enhancing their capabilities to disrupt military communications 

and navigation in order to degrade information networks. And does 

the Fiscal Year 2018 budget propose enough spending to fight the 

looming global threat that these adversaries present through electronic warfare? 

Ambassador JONES. So, I apologize, Congressman. I am not well 

prepared on what we are doing on electronic warfare. Those activities wouldn’t come out of the NEA budget. But I can assure you 

that this is a topic of frequent discussion in the inter-agency, and 

both the Pentagon, our intelligence services, and others are looking 

at these issues and are preparing approaches. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

And my final question. According to Freedom House, freedom in 

the world has been in decline over the last decade. The President’s 

request for democracy rights and governance is down to $1.5 billion, a reduction in more than $700 million, and 30 percent compared to the $2.3 billion appropriated by Congress in Fiscal Years 

2016 and 2017. 

And my question is how does the President’s request, that dramatic reduction, reflect our country’s commitment to democracy, 

human rights, and good governance at a time when the threat of 

instability, violent extremism, and tolerance, and authoritarianism 

seem to threaten more and more people around the world? It seems 

as if we are retreating from that work by this very substantial reduction in this budget proposal. And I would like to hear your response to that, please. 

29

Ms. LONGI. Thank you. I can say from USAID’s perspective that 

democracy and human rights is no less of an emphasis for us as 

we go forward. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I understand. But can you do the work that is 

necessary with a 30 percent reduction? 

Ms. LONGI. In the Middle East region, we have not requested a 

30 percent reduction so, hopefully, we are confident that the funds 

that are there will allow us to do what we are able to do in these 

countries. As you acknowledged, that space is getting tighter and 

it makes it more difficult, which makes it tough to kind of up our 

game on the diplomacy and the conversation part with the countries, but I think assistance-wise we have sufficient funds to do 

that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. And we regret that votes have just 

been called. We have 11 votes. But I think that we will be able to 

get in Mr. Kinzinger and Ms. Frankel’s question, and I—questions, 

and I would ask the members to submit the other ones, their questions in writing. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. And, again, thank you 

all for being here. 

I was actually watching a cable news show yesterday, and that 

is not one I usually watch, and there was a respected scholar Max 

Boot on it. And in that exchange with this cable news host, this 

cable news host was talking about basically how wonderful it would 

be to work with the Russians in the Middle East and how, you 

know, the Iranians actually aren’t really all that bad, and said 

that, you know, there was no terrorist attack by the Iranians 

against Americans in the United States. Although Mr. Boot reminded him that there are about 900 dead Americans from Iraq as 

a result of Iranian involvement and influence. 

And I say all that to say there is this kind of like really kind of 

sick narrative out there that we no longer need to fight for values, 

and human rights, and beliefs, and freedom, which is very counter 

to President Reagan, that, you know, I became a Republican because of. And now it is this idea that we lean again on strongmen, 

and that dictators can keep order in the Middle East, and that 

somehow repressing human desires is possible, even in the age of 

technology when people can communicate and come together. 

I think, you know, when you make the case on Syria for instance, 

people often point to Libya as a disastrous result. And there is 

huge challenges in Libya. I would argue that it was our leaving 

Libya afterwards that has been a big problem. But if I compare 

Libya to Syria, there is no comparison in terms of which is the bigger tragedy. In Syria there was no intervention; Libya there was 

intervention. Much different of a situation. 

I say all that to ask this: Instead of relying on other countries 

and encouraging them to use military hard power to oppress humans, and bomb hospitals, and kill 500,000 Syrians in this case, 

as I mentioned in my opening statement, it is about winning over 

the next generation. We are engaged in a war that is going to take 

as long or longer than the Cold War. The Cold War was won not 

because we had a great military—we did—but it was won because 

30

multiple generations began to reject the philosophy of communism 

and desire more. That is what is going to have to happen in this 

fight. 

So I guess the question for both of you is, when we talk about 

the next generational war on terror, we talk about the budget request, we talk about giving people hope and opportunity, not all 

just us, but working and leveraging our allies and partners in the 

region together, do we have sufficient enough resources and strategy to engage in that understanding that this is a long-term fight, 

when ISIS’ flag falls there is still going to be this ideology and see 

this through to the end? 

I will start with you, Ambassador. 

Ambassador JONES. Well, thank you, Congressman. 

And I think if we look at what happened in May, the Riyadh 

Summit where the President met first with the Saudis and then 

with the GCC and then with the broader Islamic community, and 

in all of those sessions they mutually agreed to fight extremism, to 

counter extremism, to defeat terrorism, and also to stand up 

against the malign Iranian influence that is destabilizing the region, that has caused so many deaths and destruction in Syria. 

So I think that the Riyadh Summit was an historic event. And 

I think it is important to look at what came out of those meetings. 

And that has created a platform for this administration to move 

forward. 

In the GCC, although there has been this falling out with Qatar, 

we still have a document that creates a platform for both counterterrorism and counter-extremism cooperation, but also security cooperation throughout the region, blunting the malign influence of 

Iran, and working together to build those economies. 

As you know, one of the deliverables from the President’s visit 

to Riyadh was the establishment of the ETIDAL Center for 

Counter-Extremism in Riyadh. The director of the center is here 

this week; he has been meeting with U.S. Government officials all 

week. He is taking back new ideas. And this is not just about stopping negative messages in the cybersphere, this is about addressing 

the core issues that you have raised in your question. 

So I think it is exactly where we are. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ambassador JONES. Sorry. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excellent question. Thank you for the answer. 

Ms. Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Let me start by saying that the ignorance of the State Department budget is appalling and frightening. We are withdrawing 

from the world at a time when our leadership is needed more than 

ever. And buddying up with Vladimir Putin is not a substitute for 

a well thought out plan for peace and security. 

I am not going to ask you any questions because you are here 

to defend what I think is the indefensible. And I think you two are 

just very fine public servants. And I don’t want to do that. 

31

So I am going to yield to Mr., the rest of my time to Mr. Schneider who wants to take a shot at asking you a question. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I appreciate the moments. And I appreciate your service to our country and you being here to discuss. 

Two things. One, what was spoken about earlier with the 

ceasefire negotiated in southwestern Syria and the idea of the presence of Iran, Iranian troops, Hezbollah troops there, are you aware, 

this ceasefire I assume includes Daraa where this started. And I 

don’t know how we can have a process that is going to lead to 

peace by having the same people who have oppressed an entire nation because 15 young children spoke out against the government, 

and yet there it is. It includes the area to the west of Daraa along 

the Damascus-Amman Highway, which not only borders Jordan 

but borders Israel. And the idea of Iranian troops, the possibility 

of them ever being there is of grave concern. 

So I guess that is a statement more than a question. 

My question is budgets reflect our values, they reflect our goals, 

they ultimately, in theory, should reflect our strategy. It seems to 

me that this budget is a budget developed first with numbers, and 

then we will see if the strategy follows. 

So to each of you, given the draconian cuts, I will argue indefensible, unwise, misguided cuts of this budget, what impacts is that 

going to have on A) the ability to achieve our goals; are we changing our goals, and B) the strategy that follows to achieve those 

goals? 

Ms. LONGI. Yes, thank you. 

I think that the budget for the Middle East is reflective and supportive of our goals. I am not going to speak to the military piece 

of it. But on the development and stabilization piece, I do think 

that we have asked for sufficient resources to support what our 

goals are. And those include defeating ISIS and stabilizing the regions afterwards, as well as the longer-term development goals in 

the countries such as Jordan and Egypt, in countries where there 

is more stability and the ability to do that. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And if I may, I am sorry to interject, but because of time. 

Defeating ISIS is critical. We have to defeat ISIS. It is a milestone, it is not the endpost. The endpost is a region that is stable, 

a region that is not a threat to the countries around it, and to the 

United States. 

Ms. LONGI. And I will just add on that in our strategic planning 

and thinking about the assistance, how we spend the assistance in 

these countries, we do look longer-term to the development impacts. And so, we are not just doing the immediate stabilization 

work, we are looking at primary education, and jobs creation, and 

things that do have a longer-term impact. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I guess, Ambassador Jones, put you on the spot. 

And I with you great happiness in your retirement. We will miss 

you. 

But as you look back on your career, the budget being proposed 

is it going to make your successors, and those who come, the men 

and women who put their lives on the line day in and day out 

working on behalf of our nation as diplomats in development, is 

their job going to be easier or is it going to be more difficult? 

32

Ambassador JONES. Thank you for your kind words. 

So speaking for NEA, speaking for the Middle East Bureau, we, 

we are looking at an 11 percent cut here. I think we have been able 

to digest these cuts. Clearly, I think there is concern about the zeroing out of some of the foreign military financing accounts. We 

will look at how to address that through the $200 million FMF 

Global Fund. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, 

Brad. 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I know that your wife, Barbara, is itching to 

have you leave as well. 

Ambassador JONES. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But we have 2 minutes left to vote. And with 

that, the subcommittee is adjourned. 

Thank you for your testimony. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 2:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(33)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

34

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee ou Middle East aud North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtiueu (R-FL), Chairman 

July 6, 2017 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

A±Iairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2167 of 

the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

bttp ·/ /wiMWF oreiunAffai rs. house. gov ): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESS: 

Thursday, July 13,2017 

1:00 p.m. 

America's Interests in the Middle East and North Africa and the 

President's FY20 18 Budget Request 

The Honorable Stuart Jones 

Acting Assistant Secretary- Bureau of Near Eastern A±Iairs 

US Department of State 

MariaLongi 

Acting Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for the Middle East 

US AID 

By Direction of the Chairman 
35

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26225m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ______ t!_w_u_id_d_!e_E_-a_st_a_,_d_N,_or_tl_r ,if;.;._ri_ca ______ HEARING 

Day _ __:cT:.:..:It.:..:u:_:rsccd~ay,__Date, ___ c_0.:..:7!cc'l.:..:3!-='1_7 ___ Room ___ 2=cl"'6"7---

Starting Time 1:20 p.m. Ending Time 2:13p.m. 

Recesses!:,~~~-~ L_to __ ) L_to __ ) L_to __ ) ( __ to __ ) L_to __ ) L_to __ ) 

Presiding Membcr(s) 

Cludrnum Ros-lelltinen, 

Check llfl of the .fOllowing tlwt apply: 

Open Session 0 Executive ~sed) Session D Televised 0 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Record£!!{ taped) 0 

Stenographic Record LLJ 

America's Interests in the Middle East tmd North Aji·ica and the President's FY2018 Budget Request 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

GOP- Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Reps. Chabot, Cook, DeSantis, Kinzinger, Zeldin, Donovan, Mast, Fitzpatrick 

Dem- Ranking Member Deutch, Reps. Cicilline, Frankel, Schneider, Suozzi 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an* if they are not members afjirll committee) 

HKARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [2J NoD 

(If "no", please list he low and include iille, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (Lis! any statements submitted fbr the record) 

Mr. Connolly's Statement for the Record 

Questions for the record for Acting As,,istunt Administrator Longifi'om Clwirman Ros-Lehtinen 

Questions for the record for Ambassador .Tones ji'om Chairman Ros-Lehtinen 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 2:13p.m. 
36


26225c-1.eps

Statement for the Record 

Submitted by Mr. Connolly ofVirginiu 

The United States has many interests in the Middle East and North Africa, including the free flow 

of commerce, human rights, territorial integrity, democratic governance, counterterrorism, and 

broader regional stability. Protecting these interests requires significant financial investment, 

diplomatic capacity, and strategic messaging. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has failed 

on all three accounts. 

President Trump's FY 2018 international affairs budget represents a unilateral retreat from U.S. 

global leadership, and the Middle East and North Africa region is no exception. The President's 

budget requests an II percent cut to non-humanitarian bilateral aid for Near East and North African 

countries. When it comes to humanitarian assistance, the picture is even more dire. Since 20 II, the 

United States has provided more than $8.9 billion to alleviate humanitarian crises stemming from 

ongoing contlicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere in the Middle East. These funds provide 

food, safe drinking water, emergency and transitional shelter, relief items, livelihood assistance, and 

critical health interventions. In 2017, the global appeal for humanitarian aid was higher than ever; 

yet President Trump has proposed cutting global humanitarian assistance by 44 percent. 

I am thankful to the witnesses for appearing before us today, and I have no doubt that you are both 

highly qualitied civil servants. Nonetheless, each of you is here in an acting capacity because 

President Trump has declined to invest in the human resources necessary to carry out the State 

Department's and U.S. Agency for International Development's missions. At State, only two out of 

twenty-two assistant secretary vacancies have a nominee, and neither would cover Near Eastern 

Affairs or African Affairs. At USAID, no one has even been nominated to fill the ten deputy and 

assistant administrator positions. President Trump has failed to nominate ambassadors for at least 

five key countries in the Middle East and North Africa region, and his incoherent foreign policies 

drove the charge d'affaires in Doha to resign. 

This lack of tinancial and human resources is matched only by the absence of a Trump 

Administration strategy to address the region's ongoing conflicts and challenges. While President 

Trump has been outspoken on his commitment to defeat ISIS, his strategy remains opaque. He has 

twice pledged to hold a press conference on the fight against lSlS, but that has yet to occur. 

Following the Syrian regime's unspeakable sarin gas attack in April 2017, the United States 

conducted airstrikes targeting Syrian war planes and infrastructure at al-Shayrat airtield. The United 

States has a vested interest in enforcing global norms against chemical weapons and alleviating 

humanitarian concerns. However, fifty-nine Tomahawk cruise missiles are not a substitute for a 

strategy going forward. Further, the United States has continued to engage the Syrian regime 

militarily on a number of occasions since then without consulting Congress to obtain the necessary 
37

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26225c-2.eps

authorities. Kneejerk kinetic responses without an overarching strategy endanger American lives 

and diminish US global leadership. 

Last month, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt cut off diplomatic and 

economic relations with Qatar, citing Doha's close ties with Iran and support for terrorism. Rather 

than brokering a deal with our varied GCC partners, President Trump exacerbated the situation by 

choosing sides. Trump has stoked regional rivalries and inflamed conflict in an already volatile part 

of the world. Criticism of Qatar is valid. They should be doing more to combat terrorism. However, 

uninformed missives that do not take into account the location and well-being of 11,000 US. 

service members are reckless and disturbing. 

The hard truth is that when the United States does not act as a forceful advocate for our principles 

and our interests abroad, we leave a vacuum. When US. leadership retreats, adversaries who do not 

share our interests and values fill that vacuum and endanger U.S. security. Last month, this 

Subcommittee held a hearing on Russia's strategic objectives in the Middle East. We heard how 

Russia has carried out a dramatic expansion of its military, diplomatic, and economic footprint in 

the region. Putin's aims in that part of the world compete with and threaten US. interests. I look 

forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the President's budget can protect U.S. interests in 

the Middle East and North Africa when it decimates our diplomatic, development, and humanitarian 

accounts. 

2 
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Question: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Acting Assistant Secretary Stuart Jones by 

Congressman Ros-Lehtinen 

House Foreign Affairs Committee, 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

July 13, 2017 

The Administration has not requested FMF grants to a number of smaller NEA countries, such as 

Tunisia, Morocco, Bahrain, and others. It has also requested a proposed $200 million for a FMF 

global fund. What is the rationale behind ending these grants and creating a global fund? 

Obviously, these countries will now be in competition with countries from other regions. How 

will FMF grants from the global fund be prioritized and decided" 

Answer: 

Focusing our efforts will allow us to advance our most important policy goals. We will 

continue to engage diplomatically with allies and partners to advance U.S. national interests and 

shared policy priorities. As we work to streamline efforts to ensure efficiency and effectiveness 

of U.S. taxpayer dollars, we acknowledge that we have to prioritize and make some tough 

choices. The Department is shifting its approach to the funding and provision of military 

assistance globally. The Department's budget request includes $200.7 million in global Foreign 

Military Financing (FMF) resources, which could support targeted FMF grants or loans to 

partners such as Tunisia, Morocco, Bahrain, and others. Shifting some foreign military financing 

from grants to loans will better leverage U.S. taxpayer dollars and still allow qualifying partners 

to purchase more American-made weaponry. 

The Administration's request gives the United States a range of tools to build the capacity 

of foreign militaries, including FMF grants, FMF loans, and Department of Defense (DoD) 

assistance programs. We are working closely with the DoD to optimize our security sector 

assistance for priority countries, particularly given DoD's expanded authority to build partner 

capacity through Section 333 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

Question: 

Is the Defense Department expected to fund the continuation of previously FMF-funded 

counterterrorism aid in countries that no longer receive State Department FMF grants" What 

implications might that have for the future balance of departmental roles in the provision of 

security assistance, and is this part of an intentional policy decision to remove State from the 

FMS process, and as a result, this Committee of its oversight responsibilities on foreign military 

sales" 

Answer: 

The Administration's request gives the United States a range of tools to build the capacity 

of foreign militaries, including FMF grants, FMF loans, and Department of Defense (DoD) 

assistance programs. We are working closely with the DoD to optimize our security sector 
39


26225e-2.eps

assistance for priority countries, particularly given DoD's expanded authority to build partner 

capacity through Section 333 of the National Defense Authorization Act. The Department 

remains committed to exercising its statutory role in overseeing the Foreign Military Sales 

process, as mandated by the Arms Export Control Act. 

Question: 

Have there been any discussions about a return to cash flow financing for Egypt, or will that 

policy remain the same going forward" 

Answer: 

Egypt is a strategic partner of the United States and the Administration is committed to 

strengthening our relationship. Since entering office, President Trump has made it a priority to 

deepen U.S. engagement with Egypt. 

Previous use of cash flow financing (CFF) did not allow the United States to respond to 

the immediate and critical needs of the Egyptian Anned Forces when Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF) for the year had already been expended. 

The Administration is taking a comprehensive look at how the United States can best 

support Egypt's efforts, including through training, advice, and assistance options to ensure that 

Egypt receives the support it needs to address the threats it faces. 

Question: 

The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq intends to hold an advisory referendum on 

independence in September 2017, after which KRG officials may seek to open negotiations with 

Iraqi authorities about confederation or independence. How does the Administration intend to 

manage related sensitivities regarding the provision of US assistance to the KRG and other 

subnational entities in Iraq" Should Congress place additional related conditions or reporting 

requirements on US. assistance to Iraq? 

Answer: 

The U.S. government does not support a referendum on Kurdish independence at this 

time, and we have conveyed this view to Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) officials at 

senior levels. We have asked them to postpone the referendum and instead engage with Baghdad 

in a process of dialogue on their future relationship. 

While the planned referendum is non-binding and would not lead to an immediate change 

in the status of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), it could have negative consequences on 

Baghdad-Erbil cooperation that is critical to defeating ISIS in Iraq. The referendum also has the 

potential to sow instability, especially as the KRG plans to include disputed areas in the poll. It 

may also undermine moderates like Prime Minister Abadi in 2018 elections. 

The international community is nearly unanimous in its opposition to the referendum's 

proposed timing. The United Kingdom, Gennany, Turkey, the EU, Turkey, and dozens of others 

have spoken out against it. Furthermore, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq 

(UN AMI) has stated explicitly that it will not support the vote, weakening the legitimacy and 

credibility of the vote. 
40


26225e-3.eps

ln our conversations with the KRG, we have asked that they postpone the referendum at 

least until after ISIS is defeated, and preferably after 2018 elections and government formation. 

We have encouraged the Government of Iraq and the KRG to agree to a high-level, sustained 

dialogue on unresolved issues, including the disputed territories, energy cooperation, and 

revenue sharing, and we have offered to act as a facilitator of those discussions. Such a dialogue 

could also include the possibility of a referendum at some point in the future. Both sides agreed 

to begin these meetings in the coming weeks. However, the KRG has not yet agreed to postpone 

the referendum. 

We fully inform the Government oflraq and receive the concurrence of the Prime 

Minister's office for all U.S. assistance to sub-national entities, including the KRG. A unilateral 

Kurdish referendum may also reduce Prime Minister Abadi 's willingness to sign off on such 

assistance. Although we believe it is premature to condition U.S. assistance to the KRG, we 

will continue to evaluate all options. 

Question: 

Do you think it's wise to be eliminating FMF funding for Tunisia at this time? Would you 

support Tunisia receiving assistance out of the global FMF fund in order to make up the 

difference in any cuts to Tunisia-specific FMF? 

Answer: 

Tunisia is an important partner, and the United States is fully committed to its success. 

The Administration will continue to engage diplomatically with allies and partners to advance 

U.S. national interests and shared policy priorities. As we work to streamline efforts to ensure 

efficiency and efTectiveness of U.S. taxpayer dollars, we have to prioritize and make some tough 

choices. Focusing our efforts will allow us to advance our most important policy goals. 

The Department's budget request ret1ects a change in approach to the funding and 

provision of military assistance globally. The request includes $200.7 million in global Foreign 

Military Financing (FMF) resources, which could support targeted FMF grants or loans to 

partners such as Tunisia. Shifting some foreign military financing from grants to loans will 

better leverage U.S. taxpayer dollars and still allow qualifying partners to purchase more 

American-made weaponry. We will examine all of the resources available to continue 

supporting Tunisia's security and stability, including not only FMF, but also INCLE, NADR, 

and lMET funds at the State Department and assistance administered through the Department of 

Defense. Finally, we are working closely with the Department of Defense to optimize our 

security sector assistance for priority countries, particularly given DoD's expanded authority to 

build partner capacity through Section 333 of the National Defense Authorization Act. 

Question: 

Lebanon received a significant cut in the President's budget request for FY 2018 over previous 

years, including the elimination ofFMF assistance. The request includes $22 million for health, 

$26 million for education, and $23 million in private sector competitiveness. How is this 

assistance given- is it directly to Lebanese ministries? What programs are covered under 

private sector competitiveness, and what groups do we work with to implement those programs? 
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Answer: 

The President's FY 2018 budget request of $103.8 million for assistance to Lebanon 

includes $85 million in Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) funding. Of this 

total, we are requesting $23 million in FY 2018 ESDF to support private sector competitiveness 

programs intended to leverage private investments that will encourage new businesses and 

economic productivity. These programs support microenterprises and microfinance institutions 

to improve livelihoods in rural areas, increase the availability of equity capital, and expand 

services to improve business skills of micro-entrepreneurs. These programs build off successful 

programs that advance stability in Lebanon, a key U.S. regional interest, by providing economic 

opportunity in historically underserved areas. 

Currently, U.S. economic and development assistance is not provided directly to the 

Lebanese government, but rather, through NGOs and international organizations. The State 

Department and USAID work assiduously to prevent the use of U.S. government funds, directly 

or indirectly, to benefit individuals or entities associated with terrorist groups. 

While the FY 2018 budget request does not include specific bilateral Foreign Military 

Financing (FMF) for Lebanon, the Administration is committed to combatting the threats posed 

by terrorist organizations in Lebanon, such as TSTS and al Qa'ida-affiliated groups. As such, the 

FY 2018 budget request was developed to provide flexibility to respond with any combination of 

these programs. 

We view the Lebanese Armed Forces as a critical partner in combatting terrorism and 

contributing to regional stability. We will continue to work closely with the Department of 

Defense to ensure the United States government can address the most urgent needs of the 

Lebanese Armed Forces. 
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Questions for the Record Submitted to 

Acting Assistant Administrator Maria Longi 

by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

Subcommittee Hearing on Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request on Middle East and North Africa 

July 13, 2017 

Question 

The current request has an additional $300 million primarily for post-conflict stabilization in 

areas liberated from ISIS in Iraq, while much of the $191.5 million in bilateral aid request for 

Syria is for supporting recovery and stabilization activities and removing explosive hazards in 

areas liberated from ISIS. What exactly does stabilization efforts look like? How are your 

departments thinking about stabilizing these areas liberated from lSJS? 

Answer 

Stabilizing liberated areas is a top priority for the Government oflraq and the U.S.-led 

Coalition. 1t is not enough to militarily defeat ISIS in a city, we must help set the conditions for 

the safe and voluntary return of displaced families to their homes and support reconciliation 

efforts to ensure that any defeat is lasting and sustainable. 

Coalition partners assist the Government oflraq's stabilization efforts through the United 

Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS). This 

mechanism allows donors to work directly with local communities to identify and address the 

most immediate needs such as running water, electricity, and security in order for Internally 

Displaced Persons (TDPs) to return home and rebuild their communities. 

The UNDP stabilization model is agile and can be used to quickly to assess the needs of 

liberated areas, identify the requirements for restoring essential services, and generate economic 

activity. Effective stabilization prepares the field for future political processes. 

We regularly assess performance and make adjustments to our approach based on 

conditions on the ground. We are greatly encouraged by the results achieved through the current 

lJNDP-managed stabilization program, which has helped facilitate the return of over two million 

Iraqi lDPs since the conflict began in 2014. ln July 2017, we announced our intent to provide an 

additional $150 million for the FFS program. This brings our commitment to stabilization 

programming in Iraq to more than $265 million over the past two years. 

Coalition donors and lJNDP put a premium on Iraqi ownership, which is essential for 

sustainable results. The current model is also conducive to Prime Minister Abadi's political 

reconciliation strategy, which is grounded in the concept of empowering locals in Sunni and 

minority areas with the resources and authority necessary to manage their own affairs and 

limiting the role of the central government. lJNDP has excellent relationships with local and 

provincial actors across Iraq, and leverages its assistance to ensure they play a key role in the 

rehabilitation of their communities. 

The Administration's FY 2018 request of $191.5 million for assistance to Syria will allow us to 

provide stabilization assistance to newly liberated areas. This level does not include 

humanitarian needs which are requested in separate accounts. ln newly liberated areas, USAlD 

and the Department of State will focus on the provision of humanitarian and demining assistance 

and the restoration of essential services with the goal of enabling people to return home and 

preventing the resurgence of ISIS. Recognizing the immense scale of needs in these areas, we 

are engaged in intensive dialogue with our Coalition partners to encourage them to step up and 

share the burden of post-liberation stabilization in Syria. 
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Question 

We provide a lot of assistance into Syria through Turkey or Jordan. We are hearing concerns 

about closing space in Turkey, limiting the ability to provide cross-border assistance into Syria. 

What can you tell us about this? 

Answer 

The Department of State and US AID continue to monitor the situation in Turkey and 

work with our Turkish partners and other partners in the region to ensure the delivery of critical 

cross border assistance into northern Syria. State and USAID rely on a robust and diverse 

platform to move assistance into Syria and seek to procure assistance inside Syria when 

possible. 

Question 

In the FY201 8 request, the budget would eliminate the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and 

Democracy Assistance (DA) accounts, as well as two other accounts, and replace them with a 

new Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) account. Can you explain the rationale 

behind this shift, and how the ESDF account is expected to be managed? How will the 

determination be made in tenns of the balance between economic support or development 

assistance? 

Answer 

In an effort to streamline accounts and ensure the most effective use of taxpayer dollars, 

the FY 2018 budget incorporates funding and programs previously requested under the 

Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA) accounts within a new 

account: the Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF). The FY 2018 request includes 

$4.9 billion for the ESDF account. 

This streamlining of accounts does not mean we are eliminating development programs. 

USAID will continue to do development work supported by this new ESDF account, as well as 

the Global Health Programs accounts. USATD's programming is aligned with the 

Administration's foreign policy priorities. 

As a core pillar of American leadership and power, global development works in tandem, 

with defense and diplomacy to advance U.S. national security interests; assert U.S. leadership 

and influence; foster economic opportunities for the American people; and ensure efficiency, 

effectiveness and accountability to the U.S. taxpayer. 

As part of the FY 2018 budget, USAID and the Department of State will: 

Support assistance programs to help defeat ISIS by promoting stability, addressing the 

root causes of violent extremism, and responding to humanitarian effects of the crisis in 

Iraq and Syria. 

Question 

In previous years, there has been a rather significant backlog ofESF assistance for Egypt, yet the 

previous administration continued to request additional money. This year's budget request for 

ESDF represents a significant scale back from previous years, and in fact, is the lowest amount 

of economic assistance for Egypt since the late I 970s. Ts this a result of wanting to clear out the 
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pipeline, or does this represent a significant policy shift to gradually reduce, and perhaps 

eliminate, economic assistance to Egypt? What is the exact number left in the Egypt pipeline? 

Answer 

ln recent years USAlD has worked to reduce the Economic Support Fund pipeline that 

grew following the 2013 political upheaval. U.S. economic assistance in Egypt aims to build on a 

long-standing partnership and works closely with the Egyptian government to implement 

programs across a number of sectors. As Egypt undertakes critical economic reforms, Economic 

Support Funds will support private sector-ledjob creation, workforce development, and better 

health and education outcomes. ln addition, FY 2018 funding will expand support for targeted 

rule-of-law programs, such as combating gender-based violence. 

Question 

Tn certain countries, particularly Yemen, Libya and Egypt, we have no presence or we are seeing 

a closing of the space to operate, particularly in Egypt with the new NGO law. How do State and 

USATD plan to use our bilateral assistance to these countries when we are so limited and the 

space is so restrictive" 

Answer 

The United States cooperates with countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa 

in many areas, including economic development and stabilization. We also regularly raise our 

human rights concerns with many countries in the region and will continue to do so at senior 

levels. Allowing space for civil society to operate without restrictions will make for a stronger 

and more prosperous region. 

Egypt remains a key partner and U.S. assistance to Egypt underpins our partnership and 

promotes key U.S. interests in a volatile region. We have seen some progress over the last few 

months: the release of Aya Hijazy, increased military cooperation, and important wins for U.S. 

businesses. However, Secretary Tillerson expressed extreme disappointment in response to 

President Sisi signing the NGO law. From the time parliament proposed this legislation until 

President Sisi approved it, we clearly and repeatedly communicated our concerns at the highest 

levels and urged the Government of Egypt to revise it. We have stressed that a strategic 

relationship must be mutually beneficial and require trust and credibility by both countries. 

We are closely monitoring the implementing regulations for this law and are examining 

the implications for the implementation of U.S assistance programs. We will continue to press 

the Egyptians to enable U.S. assistance programs and civil society the necessary freedom to 

operate. 

The FY 2018 $23 million Economic Support and Development Fund request for Libya, 

together with the FY 2017 Security Assistance Appropriations Act funding, should enable 

USA!D to meet its assistance objectives in Libya related to stabilization, governance, community 

resilience, economic growth and political processes. USAID partners continue to operate to 

meet these objectives across Libya's population centers despite our non-presence Mission status. 

If the security environment improves, assuming policy concurrence with the Department of 

State, USATD's mechanisms in Libya are flexible enough to expand in geographic scope, 

particularly in the East. While USAID notes the potential dosing space for civil society in the 

East, and we continue to monitor practices and policies that impinge upon civil society, overall, 

\Ve would not determine Libya to be a closing space at present. U SAID is a tmsted partner at the 
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municipal level and recentlv has been gaining traction with national ministries and the 

legislature. USAID also works actively with civil society groups across Libya. 

As non-presence countly, L'SAlD oversees its programs in Libya with a combination of 

coordination and oversight mechanisms and reports, including detailed written descriptions, 

photos, videos, tracking of social media and news outlets. and other evidence to verify that USG 

funding is being used t',_-,r its intended purpose. In addition to existing implementation safeguards, 

USAID is currently launching a third-party monitoring and evaluation platfonn that will enable 

USAID to carry out objective monitoring activities in country. The platform builds on lessons 

learned from monitoring approaches developed and implemented in other non-permissive 

assistance environments, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. USAID and the Department of 

State work together to detennine technical and geographic scope or assistance programs in 

advance to avoid duplication, while implementers meet in-person and communicate regularly to 

plan operations and learn best practices for operating in Libya. 

While many ofUSAID's bilateral programs in Yemen were put on hold after the closure 

of the Embassy in 2014, USA!D is able to continue support to several critical activities in Yemen 

through the United Nations ('ON). US AID launched a few pilot early recovery assistance 

activities last year that are helping prevent the collapse of key social service institutions and 

helping households cope with the effects of the conflict These high-impact activities are 

implemented through UN agencies to provide maternal and child health services, and education 

and livelihood activities with key Yemeni institutions that will be critical to Yemen's postconflict recovety. USA![) also continues to mobilize a robust humanitarian response to the crisis 

in Yemen despite the complex and insecure operating environment. Since FY 2016, the U.S. has 

provided nearly $795 million in humanitarian assistance to help the Yemeni people. Working 

through UN agencies that are already actively providing humanitarian assistance on the ground 

allows us to take advantage of their extensive networks and expertise, minimize risk, and most 

effectively coordinate with the ongoing humanitarian response. \\·'e are also exploring the 

possibility of increasing and diversitying our assistance to allow us to quickly seize on 

improvements in the operating environment to implement activities that restore services, enhance 

economic opportunities, improve local governance, and support any future transition process. 

Question 

As the US continues Operation Inherent Resolve in Syria and Iraq, the needs of liberated areas 

are enormous, with many Iraqi areas receiving insufficient assistance to help rebuild war-torn 

towns and resettle displaced populations. Is the FY18 request for Iraq and Syria sufficient to 

meet these challenges? 

Answer 

The FY 2018 request for $300 million in Economic Support and Development Fund 

(ESDF) assistance for Iraq and $150 million in ESDF assistance for Syria, along with additional 

resources appropriated through the FY 2017 Security Assistance Appropriations Act is sufficient 

to meet the challenges associated with newly liberated spaces. US AID will leverage and build 

on current programming in Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, USAID is working with our D-ISIS 

Coalition partners and others to leverage partner resources and share the cost burden of 

liberation.