IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0330

Filed July 24, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF H.P., L.P., and L.P.,

Minor Children,

T.P., Mother,

Appellant,

L.P., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Donna 

Bothwell, Judge.

A father and mother together appeal the juvenile court order terminating 

their parental rights. AFFIRMED.

J. Joseph Narmi of Narmi Law, Council Bluffs, for appellants mother and 

father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Hynden-Jeanes, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Eric Checketts of Checketts Law, PLC, Glenwood, attorney and guardian 

ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
2

TABOR, Presiding Judge.

This termination-of-parental-rights appeal involves three children: four-yearold L.W.P., three-year-old H.M.P., and one-year-old L.T.M.P. Taylor is the mother 

of all three children. Larry is the father of the youngest child.1 In their petition on 

appeal, Taylor and Larry raise five claims.

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(1) The juvenile court abused its 

discretion by denying their motions to continue the termination hearings. (2) The 

court erred in denying their request for a different judge. (3) The State failed to 

prove a ground for termination. (4) Termination was not in the children’s best 

interests. (5) Exceptions preclude the need for termination. Finding no merit in 

those five claims, we affirm the termination order.3

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

This family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and 

Human Services in November 2021 when police arrested Taylor for possession of 

methamphetamine and child endangerment. The two older children were 

adjudicated as children in need of assistance (CINA) in January 2022 after being 

1 Matthew is the father of the two older children. The juvenile court terminated his 

parental rights, but he does not appeal. In November 2023, Taylor and Larry had 

a fourth child who is not the subject of this appeal.

2 Taylor and Larry retained the same attorney who filed a joint petition on appeal

for the two parents. Because parents cannot raise issues on behalf of the other 

parent on appeal, we read each argument as though raised solely on behalf of the 

mother and/or father. See In re D.G., 704 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). 

3 We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re M.D., 921 

N.W.2d 229, 232 (Iowa 2018). While we are not bound by the juvenile court’s 

factual findings, we accord them weight, especially in assessing witness credibility. 

Id. Despite that de novo standard, we review the court’s denial of the parents’ 

motions to continue for an abuse of discretion. Id. Likewise, we will not reverse 

the court’s recusal decision absent an abuse of discretion. In re S.D., 671 N.W.2d 

522, 528 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003). We also review any constitutional claims de novo. 

In re N.N.E., 752 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2008).
3

removed from parental custody in early December 2021. They have been living 

with relatives since their removal from Taylor’s custody.4

During the next few months, Taylor began outpatient drug treatment while 

waiting for an inpatient placement. But the department reported that her 

participation in treatment and drug-testing was inconsistent. As for inpatient 

treatment, Taylor reported scheduling four different start dates but never entered 

the programs. She was equally inconsistent in her attendance at supervised visits 

with L.W.P. and H.M.P. But when she did show, she was attentive to their needs. 

L.T.M.P. was born prematurely in November 2022. At birth, his urine tested 

positive for amphetamines, and his umbilical cord blood tested positive for 

methamphetamine and marijuana. With infant L.T.M.P. in her custody, Taylor was

admitted to Iowa Family Works (IFW) in Council Bluffs to receive inpatient 

substance-use treatment. During her stay at IFW, Taylor had supervised visits 

with the two older children, progressing from once to twice per week, as well as a 

six-hour visit on the weekend. 

Meanwhile, Larry told the department that he was pursuing inpatient 

substance treatment as well. But he was discharged from the program after only 

two days. And he also missed drug testing appointments. His stalled progress 

undermined Taylor’s treatment goals too. She received an unsuccessful discharge 

from her IFW inpatient program in April 2023 after being dishonest about her 

whereabouts while in treatment and allowing Larry access to the children. That 

4 The children were placed back with their mother briefly in April 2023 when she 

was in residential treatment.
4

spring, Taylor had mixed results on drug testing. Her hair follicle test was negative, 

but her sweat patch screen was positive for methamphetamine. 

Despite that, in June 2023, Taylor and the children advanced to semisupervised visits. But in July 2023, Taylor had two positive drug screens. Because 

of those tests, L.T.M.P. was removed from her custody. According to the 

department case worker, Taylor never completed inpatient substance-use or 

mental-health treatment.5

In August 2023, the State petitioned for termination of Taylor’s parental 

rights to H.M.P. and L.W.P. under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (e), 

(h), and (l) (2023). Three months later, the State petitioned to terminate the rights 

of both Taylor and Larry to their son L.T.M.P. on the same grounds. The court set 

both petitions for hearing on two dates in December. After considering the 

evidence, the court granted the State’s petitions in February 2024.6 The parents 

appeal together.

II. Analysis

We generally analyze termination cases in three steps. In re D.W., 791 

N.W.2d 703, 706–07 (Iowa 2010). First, we decide whether the State proved any

ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1). Id. at 706. Second, 

we apply the best-interests framework in section 232.116(2). Id. at 706–07. Third, 

if that framework supports the State’s petition, we check whether any factors in 

5 When Taylor gave birth to her fourth child in November 2023, he tested negative 

for drugs.

6 The court did not terminate Taylor’s parental rights to her oldest child, L.W.P., 

under paragraph (h) because he turned four years old shortly after the State filed 

its termination petition and the State did not move to amend to cite paragraph (f). 
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section 232.116(3) should preclude termination. Id. at 707. The parents raise two 

preliminary questions before challenging the three steps. They claim that the 

juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to continue the termination hearing 

and in denying their motion for a different judge. We consider all five claims in 

turn.

A. Motions to Continue

Parents’ counsel contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

denying their two motions to continue the termination proceedings. The court set 

the termination hearing for December 15 and December 22. The parents’ retained 

counsel did not enter his appearance until December 8. And he could not access

the CINA files through EDMS until December 13. So he asked the court for more 

time to prepare. The State resisted, noting that L.W.P. and H.M.P had been out 

of their mother’s custody for over two years. And L.T.M.P. had been out of parental 

care for “the majority of his young life.” The guardian ad litem (GAL) did not resist, 

noting that he had “sympathy for an attorney having two days with access to a 

record to prepare for a termination.”

The juvenile court recalled making it “incredibly clear” that “the parents 

choosing to fire the court-appointed counsel they had a week before the

termination would not be a ground for a continuance.” The court added:

I also sympathize with an attorney not getting access, at no time on 

the—I think your appearance was filed on December 8—at no time 

on the 9th, 10th, 11th, or 12th was it brought to the Court or the 

clerk’s attention that the attorney didn’t have access knowing that 

this Court was not going to be inclined to continue it.
6

In their petition on appeal, counsel claims the court’s ruling “in essence [tied] both 

hands behind [his] back, which violates the due process of the Mother and 

Father.”7 

A juvenile court should not grant a motion to continue unless the party 

seeking more time can show good cause. Iowa R. Juv. P. 8.5. We will only reverse 

a juvenile court’s denial of a continuance if the court abused its discretion. In re 

A.H., 950 N.W.2d 27, 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). “A court abuses its discretion when 

the decision is grounded on reasons that are clearly untenable or unreasonable.” 

Id. (cleaned up). When the grounds raised are non-constitutional, we only reverse 

if the moving party can show prejudice. In re R.B., 832 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 2013). We see no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s disinclination to 

find good cause to delay the start of the termination hearing. As the State notes 

on appeal: “both parents had competent court appointed attorneys throughout the 

pendency of the CINA and [termination] cases. They made the choice to hire 

private counsel on the eve of the termination hearing knowing time is of the 

essence in [termination] matters.” In ruling on the motion to continue, the court 

was also free to weigh the need to prevent undue delays in permanency. In re 

C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). The court properly exercised 

its discretion in denying the parents’ first motion to continue.

Parents’ counsel filed a second motion to continue on the second day of the 

termination hearing. That motion asked for a continuance because Taylor was 

7 The parents also complain the termination petition on the fourth child was filed a 

month before the hearing date but, because that child is not a part of this 

proceeding and the parents do not develop the significance of that petition to the 

requested continuance, we will not address the issue further. 
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“putting on a drug screen patch” that day and, in her view, “[t]he outcome of this 

patch would be beneficial to all parties involved.” The motion also asserted that 

no party would be prejudiced because the department was still involved with the 

family after the birth of Taylor’s fourth child. The State again resisted and the GAL 

took no position. The court denied the motion, but offered to keep the record open 

so that counsel could submit the drug-patch results and any new substance-use 

evaluation for his client.8 

In their petition on appeal, the parents reiterate that no party would have 

been prejudiced by granting their motion to continue. The State responds that 

Taylor should not have waited until the eve of termination to take positive steps to 

address her addiction. See In re K.A., 516 N.W.2d 35, 37 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994)

(examining “a parent’s past performance in determining whether a continuance of 

a termination proceeding[] should be granted”). 

On this record, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of the 

second motion to continue. We agree with the State’s view that the motion 

amounts to “no more than a general desire to have more time to do things [the 

parents] should have been doing throughout the entire case.”

B. Different Judge

At the start of the termination hearing, the parents’ counsel asked the 

juvenile court judge to recuse herself because she had presided over the CINA 

proceedings. Counsel reasoned that it was “unfair” for the parents “to sit before 

8 Taylor’s sweat testing was negative for controlled substances in the January 

2024 report. And her new substance-use evaluation found that she was “in the 

action stage of change and at a low risk for relapse.” 
8

the same judge” in both matters. The court denied the motion, noting that our 

supreme court has found “that it is actually more beneficial that it’s one family, one 

judge.” We review that denial for an abuse of discretion. In re S.D., 671 N.W.2d 

522, 528 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003). And we find none. In rejecting a similar claim more 

than a decade ago, our court noted “any knowledge gained from having presided 

in the earlier termination proceeding did not require disqualification.” In re Q.A.S.,

No. 13-1182, 2013 WL 5229746, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2013) (interpreting 

Iowa Code section 602.1606(a) on judicial disqualification).

C. Ground for Termination

The parents allege that the State failed to offer clear and convincing 

evidence of the three grounds for termination in its petitions. On appeal, they cite 

paragraphs (e), (h), and (l) in the issue heading but do not provide a discrete 

argument contesting each ground in the body of their petition. Rather, as the State 

notes, the parents’ argument is “nothing more than a litany of services they claim 

to have satisfactorily completed over the course of the court’s involvement.”

Where, as here, the court terminates on more than one ground, we may 

affirm on any alternative supported by the record. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 

774 (Iowa 2012). We focus on paragraph (l). It authorizes termination when (1) the 

children have been adjudicated CINA under section 232.96 and custody has been 

transferred under section 232.102; (2) the parents have a severe substance-use 

disorder as described by either (a) “the most current edition of the diagnostic and 

statistical manual prepared by the American Psychiatric Association,” and the 

parents present a danger to themselves or others as shown by prior acts or (b) 

“the disorder is evidenced by continued and repeated use through the case, the 
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[parents’] refusal to obtain a substance use disorder evaluation or treatment after 

being given the opportunity to do so,” and the parents present a danger to 

themselves or others as shown by prior acts; and (3) there is clear and convincing 

evidence that the parents’ prognoses indicates that the children will be unable to 

be returned to their custody within a reasonable time considering the children’s

age and need for a permanent home. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(l). 

Both Taylor and Larry struggle with diagnoses of severe methamphetamine 

use disorder. The juvenile court chronicled the mother’s history of drug use:

Taylor has continued to test positive throughout the underlying CINA 

actions. She tested positive for methamphetamine during her 

pregnancy with [L.T.M.P.] thereby exposing him to the drug and 

causing him to test positive at birth. While briefly back in her care in 

July 2023, [L.T.M.P.] again tested positive for methamphetamine at 

4,843pg/mg. She continued to test positive for methamphetamine 

during her most recent pregnancy as well. Her drug use is a danger 

to her children. She has maintained no prolonged period of sobriety 

that would ensure she is no longer a danger to others due to her drug 

use. [The department case worker] correctly noted that Taylor is only 

now starting to address the drug concerns that started the underlying 

CINA actions.

The court provided a similar summary for the father:

Larry repeatedly used methamphetamine throughout the life of the 

case, testing positive all the way through the first day of the 

termination hearing. If considering no shows as positive tests, Larry 

has had 24 positive drug tests since January 2023. He left inpatient 

treatment . . . after three days. He obtained a substance abuse 

evaluation in May of 2023 and was recommended to complete 

extended outpatient treatment. However, Larry quit outpatient

treatment after one individual appointment and two group sessions. 

While being around Larry during her pregnancy with [L.T.M.P.], 

Taylor and [L.T.M.P.] tested positive for methamphetamine. Again 

in July 2023 when Taylor was allowing Larry to be around [L.T.M.P.] 

without prior approval from [the department], [L.T.M.P.] tested 

positive for methamphetamine at an alarming amount. Larry’s drug 

use is a danger to [L.T.M.P.].
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Like the juvenile court, we find this record includes clear and convincing 

evidence that the prognoses of both parents strongly suggest that the children

could not be safely returned to their custody within a reasonable time considering 

their young ages and need for a permanent home. While it is encouraging that 

Taylor is now making strides against her addiction, her progress is too tenuous to 

risk reunification. Termination was proper under paragraph (l). 

D. Best Interests of the Children

The parents next argue that termination of their parental rights is not in the 

children’s best interests. Taylor and Larry stress that they both have “a very strong 

bond with their children” and are attentive to their needs during visits. They also 

hypothesize that these three children “may never know” their youngest sibling if 

we affirm the termination-of-parental-rights order.

In assessing the children’s best interests, we consider their safety; the best 

placement for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth; and their physical, 

mental, and emotional condition and needs. See id. § 232.116(2). We also weigh 

their integration into a foster family. See id. § 232.116(2)(b). Like the juvenile 

court, we have concerns about the children’s safety if returned to the parents’ 

custody. The court observed: “No parent has fully followed through with the 

recommendations nor maintained sobriety.” Given that lack of follow-through, the 

parents are not the best placement for ensuring the children’s long-term 

development. 

As for their sibling connections, the parents’ concern for severing the 

children’s ties with their youngest brother is too speculative to overcome the 

benefits of achieving permanency for L.W.P., H.M.P., and L.T.M.P. See In re J.E., 
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723 N.W.2d 793, 800 (Iowa 2006) (noting preference to keep siblings together is 

not absolute).

E. Permissive Factors 

In their final claim, the parents contend the juvenile court should have 

avoided termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3), paragraphs (a) and (c). 

Under paragraph (a) a court need not terminate if the children are in the legal 

custody of a relative. Under paragraph (c), the court need not terminate if there is 

clear and convincing evidence that ending the legal relationship would be 

detrimental to the children because of their close relationship with the parents. Our 

supreme court has interpreted section 232.116(3) to place the burden on the 

parents to show that these permissive factors apply. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 

467, 476 (Iowa 2018).

Taylor contends that L.W.P. and H.M.P are in the “custody” of their aunt and 

that she and the aunt have “worked together” in the children’s best interests. But 

relative placement is different from relative custody. Because the children have

been in the legal custody of the department, section 232.116(3)(a) does not apply. 

See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014).

Both Taylor and Larry argue that termination of their rights will be 

“absolutely devastating” to the children because of their very strong bond with their 

parents. The record supports Taylor’s assertion that she has loving relationship 

with the children. The case worker testified: “She interacts well with them. The 

kids always come to her to seek security, and if they are hurt, go to her. They play 

well together. She’s always very caring to them and provides food for them.” The 

worker was less sure of Larry’s connection with his son. In the words of the case 
12

worker: “It’s hard to bond with a child when there is not continual parenting, and 

[they haven’t] been able to . . . because of drug usage.” 

But assuming that both parents have a healthy bond with their children, it is 

not enough to trigger the exception to termination under paragraph (c). The 

parents “failed to provide the clear and convincing evidence necessary to show 

that, on balance, that bond makes termination more detrimental than not.” See In 

re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 315 (Iowa 2021). As the juvenile court found, the 

parents’ substance-use disorders prevented them from offering a safe and healthy 

environment for their children. 

AFFIRMED.