In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3948

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ABDULLAH SHABAZZ, also known as DANIEL CLINCY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 98 CR 127--J.P. Stadtmueller, Chief Judge.

Argued September 29, 2000--Decided October 6, 2000/*

 Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

 PER CURIAM. Abdullah Shabazz seeks review of the

sentence of supervised release imposed after he

was found to have violated his parole. Because

Mr. Shabazz already has completed that portion of

the supervised release period that was to be

served in a community corrections facility, we

cannot address the legality of such a condition

on his supervised release. For the reasons set

forth in this opinion, however, we hold that the

district court should not have imposed a threeyear term of supervised release. We therefore

remand this case with directions that the court

set the term within the one-year maximum

permitted by statute. 

I

BACKGROUND

 Abdullah Shabazz entered a plea of guilty to

misprision of felony on July 30, 1999. The

district court imposed a sentence of five years

of probation commencing July 30, 1999. It also

imposed a one-year period of supervised release

as well as a restitution obligation. 

 On October 6, 1999, Mr. Shabazz’s probation

officer filed a Petition to Revoke Probation on

the ground that Mr. Shabazz had not complied with

the conditions of probation. Consequently, Mr.

Shabazz was arrested on November 4, 1999, and

appeared with counsel before the district court
the following day. At that hearing, Mr. Shabazz

waived his right to a revocation hearing and

stipulated to the accuracy of five of the six

violations set forth in the Petition to Revoke

Probation and the Revocation Hearing Report. The

district court denied defense counsel’s request

to modify the probation pursuant to U.S.S.G. sec.

7B1.3(a)(2). The court then revoked Mr. Shabazz’s

probation and sentenced him to six months in

prison and three years of supervised release. As

a condition of this sentence of supervised

release, Mr. Shabazz was ordered to spend 161

days in a community corrections facility. Neither

Mr. Shabazz nor his counsel objected to the

district court’s imposition of the 161 days in a

community corrections facility as a condition of

Mr. Shabazz’s supervised release, nor did they

object to the three-year period of supervised

release. 

 Mr. Shabazz then filed a timely notice of appeal

on November 12, 1999. Appellate counsel filed a

no-merit brief and motion to withdraw. This court

denied counsel’s motion to withdraw and ordered

him to file a brief addressing the issue of

whether the district court was authorized by

statute to require that the defendant reside at a

community corrections facility as a condition of

his supervised release. After the filing of the

new briefs, counsel filed a motion asking that

the court take notice that the sentence of

supervised release for a period of three years

was in excess of the statutory maximum of one

year permitted by 18 U.S.C. sec. 3583(b)(3). The

Government filed a reply that noted its agreement

with the defendant on this latter point. We

directed that the motion and the Government’s

reply be treated as supplemental briefs. 

II

DISCUSSION

1.

 Mr. Shabazz has argued to this court that the

district court erred in imposing, as a condition

of supervised release, that he serve the first

161 days of his period of supervised release in a

community corrections facility. Mr. Shabazz

contends that this condition is not permitted by

the terms of 18 U.S.C. sec. 3583(d). At oral

argument, however, counsel informed us that Mr.

Shabazz already had completed that period of his

supervised release that was to be served in a

community corrections facility. Moreover, counsel

was aware of no collateral consequences that

still might burden Mr. Shabazz because of the

imposition of that condition. Nor is it likely

that Mr. Shabazz will find himself in this

situation again and that the matter necessarily

would evade review. See Weinstein v. Bradford,
423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). With respect to Mr.

Shabazz’s present sentence, there is no

possibility of such repetition. It is a matter of

pure speculation as to whether Mr. Shabazz will

ever again find himself under such a sentence and

in circumstances in which review will not be

possible. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395,

403 (1975). Under these circumstances, Mr.

Shabazz’s argument is moot and cannot be

addressed by this court.

2.

 The parties are in agreement that the district

court erred in sentencing Mr. Shabazz to a period

of supervised release of three years. Although

this matter was not raised before the district

court, we can address it as a matter of plain

error. See United States v. Hall, 212 F.3d 1016,

1022 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that challenges

raised for the first time on appeal are waived

and, therefore, reviewed only for plain error);

see also United States v. Bauer, 129 F.3d 962,

964 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that under the plain

error standard, this court will only reverse a

district court if the error at issue is "palpably

wrong" and likely would have resulted in a

different sentence) (internal quotations

omitted).

 We agree with the assessment of the parties.

Misprision of felony is punishable by a term of

imprisonment not to exceed three years. See 18

U.S.C. sec. 4. A person found guilty of an

offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of

not more than three years is guilty of a Class E

felony. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3581(b)(5). The term

of supervised release for a Class E felony is not

more than one year. See 18 U.S.C. sec.

3583(b)(3). Accordingly, we must vacate the

sentence imposed by the district court and remand

the case to the district court with the direction

that it impose a sentence of supervised release

that does not exceed the statutory maximum of one

year. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3583(b)(3).

 At oral argument, counsel represented to the

court that Mr. Shabazz soon will have fulfilled

the maximum period of supervised release

allowable under the statute. We therefore trust

that the district court will attend to this

matter as soon as its other obligations permit

and make the adjustment required by this opinion.

Conclusion

 The sentence imposed by the district court is

vacated, and the case is remanded. The district

court is directed to correct the sentence of
supervised release so that it does not exceed the

statutory maximum of one year. The mandate of

this court shall issue immediately.

IT IS SO ORDERED

/* This opinion was released initially in typescript

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