Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 188 / Wednesday, September 29, 2004 / Notices 58225

18 In these instances, complainants reported valve 

stem leakage, vibration, bulges, and irregular wear.

19Based on these and other operational and 

maintenance issues identified in dual rear wheel 

tire applications during the course of this review, 

NHTSA plans to conduct outreach activities to the 

EMS and RV communities in an effort to improve 

vehicle/tire loading and tire pressure maintenance 

conditions.

one third of the EMS services contacted 

by ODI did not experience a tire failure 

while driving.18

6.0 Discussion 

In determining whether to open a 

defect investigation into a product, ODI 

typically considers a number of factors, 

dependent upon the alleged defect and 

component at issue. The decision 

whether to re-open an investigation into 

Firestone Steeltex tires was based on 

consideration of a number of matters 

identified during the course of the 

technical review. These considerations 

were discussed at length above and 

include such items as the number and 

trend of owner complaints, claims and 

adjustment data, the number and 

severity of injury claims, and evidence 

of a possible source and mode of failure.

Standing alone, no one factual 

consideration was dispositive. For 

example, the fact that the adjustment or 

property damage claims rates for 

Steeltex tires may have been comparable 

to or lower than competitor tires, was 

but one factor. Other information was 

considered as well, such as the number 

and severity of injury incidents 

associated with the tires, and the variety 

of failure conditions observed during 

ODI’s tire examinations. 

As noted in the denial of DP02–011, 

the subject Steeltex tires represent an 

immense and diverse population of tires 

that are used in the harshest LTR tire 

applications. The data continue to show 

that the rate of Steeltex tire failures is 

similar to that of other tires in similar 

uses. 

The petitioners’ data and VOQs show 

that Class C RVs, representing a 

relatively small segment of vehicles that 

use Steeltex tires, account for the largest 

share of recent failures, but a very small 

share of the crash numbers. Class C RVs 

are an especially severe LTR tire 

application because, by design, they 

operate very close to the tires’ rated 

capacities, are subject to tire pressure 

maintenance concerns, and accumulate 

mileage at a lower rate than most other 

vehicles equipped with LTR tires. 

Additionally, the independent tire 

failure expert ODI retained to examine 

an assortment of failed Steeltex tires 

was unable to find evidence of any 

specific type or mode of failure in the 

tires. His examination concluded that 

the tires demonstrated evidence of a 

wide variety of failure modes, all of 

which were consistent with the failure 

modes typically seen in tires of 

comparable size and type, regardless of 

manufacturer. 

With regard to ambulance 

applications in particular, tire 

examinations and interviews conducted 

by ODI, and surveys conducted by 

Firestone have uncovered evidence of 

significant tire maintenance concerns 

(many of which also apply to RVs). ODI 

examined 21 ambulance tires and found 

many of the same conditions observed 

at Marengo, including flex failures and 

unrepaired road hazards. The dual rear 

wheel arrangement on many 

ambulances often renders the inner 

valve stem inaccessible, making it 

difficult to assure that proper pressures 

are maintained. Up to a third of the 

vehicles surveyed by Firestone 

evidenced substantial underinflation of 

their tires. This is especially significant 

because, like RVs, ambulances operate 

very close to the maximum carrying 

capacity of their tires most of the time.19

7.0 Conclusions 

Based on ODI’s analysis of 

information submitted in support of the 

petitions, additional complaint and 

claims information gathered since the 

DP02–011 denial, and its examination of 

failed Steeltex tires, it is unlikely that 

NHTSA would issue an order for the 

notification and remedy of a safetyrelated defect in the subject tires at the 

conclusion of the investigations 

requested by the petitioners. Therefore, 

in view of the need to allocate and 

prioritize NHTSA’s limited resources to 

best accomplish the agency’s safety 

mission, ODI is denying the petitions to 

reopen the Steeltex investigation. ODI 

will continue to monitor the 

performance of these tires for any signs 

of an emerging defect trend.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30120(e); delegations 

of authority at CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

Issued on: September 24, 2004. 

Kenneth N. Weinstein, 

Associate Administrator for Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 04–21786 Filed 9–28–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs 

Administration 

Pipeline Safety: Hazards Associated 

With De-Watering of Pipelines

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs 

Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory 

bulletin. 

SUMMARY: On June 21, 2004, the 

Research and Special Programs 

Administration’s Office of Pipeline 

Safety (RSPA/OPS) issued Advisory 

Bulletin ADB–04–01 to owners and 

operators of gas and hazardous liquid 

pipelines to consider the hazards 

associated with pipeline de-watering 

operations. This advisory bulletin was 

originally issued jointly with the 

Department of Labor’s Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA) as Safety and Health 

Information Bulletin SHIB 06–21–2004. 

Operators are strongly encouraged to 

follow the recommended work practices 

and guidelines to reduce the potential 

for unexpected separation of temporary 

de-watering pipes.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Richard Huriaux, (202) 366–4565; or by 

e-mail, richard.huriaux@rspa.dot.gov.

This document can be viewed at the 

OPS home page at http://ops.dot.gov.

The original advisory bulletin issued by 

OSHA can be viewed at http://

www.osha.gov. General information 

about the RSPA/OPS programs may be 

obtained by accessing RSPA’s home 

page at http://rspa.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The OSHA Allentown and WilkesBarre Area Offices recently investigated 

two fatalities that occurred in 

conjunction with de-watering processes 

associated with newly constructed gas 

pipelines. In both cases, the temporary 

de-watering piping violently separated 

from its couplings, striking and fatally 

injuring employees. In one instance, the 

separated section of pipe was thrown 45 

feet from where it had been attached to 

the temporary de-watering valve. OSHA 

determined that a major contributing 

factor to both of the accidents was 

temporary de-watering pipelines that 

were not adequately secured to prevent 

the piping from moving or separating. In 

one case, the failure occurred at a pipe 

coupler that was not being used within 

the safe tolerances established by the 

manufacturer. 

After a pipeline is laid, a hydrostatic 

test is conducted to ensure its integrity. 

Hydrostatic testing may also be 

conducted during the service life of the 

pipeline to evaluate its operational 

integrity. The hydrostatic test consists of 

pumping water into the pipeline, 

pressuring up the line to specified test 

pressures, and holding that pressure for 

a discrete period of time in accordance 

with applicable regulations and 

guidelines, including regulations 

58226 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 188 / Wednesday, September 29, 2004 / Notices 

promulgated by RSPA/OPS. After 

completion of the hydrostatic test, the 

pressure is relieved and the water is 

removed from the pipeline during dewatering procedures. 

The de-watering process involves 

connecting a temporary de-watering line 

to the main pipeline with mechanical 

couplers and adequately securing the 

temporary de-watering line to prevent 

displacement. A de-watering pig is then 

forced through the main pipeline using 

several hundred pounds pressure of 

compressed air. As the pig is forced 

through the pipeline with air pressure, 

the water remaining in the line from 

hydrostatic testing is pushed out of the 

main pipeline through the temporary 

de-watering line. 

During the de-watering process, 

significant and sudden variations in 

pressure often occur within the main 

pipeline and temporary de-watering 

line. These variations can be caused by 

changes in pig velocity as it passes 

through bends in the pipeline or 

changes in pig and water velocity due 

to changes in pipeline elevation. 

Compressed air escaping around the pig, 

which can combine with air already 

present in the main pipeline at high 

spots in the pipe, can also create a 

source for stored energy within the main 

pipeline. These sudden pressure 

changes produce surges that are 

transferred from the main pipeline to 

the temporary de-watering line. This 

can result in movement of the 

temporary de-watering line, as the 

pressures can easily exceed the working 

pressures and bending capabilities of 

the temporary de-watering line 

couplers. The movement of the dewatering line can result in violent 

failure of the temporary piping system, 

particularly when the temporary piping 

is not properly anchored. This situation 

can be exacerbated when the temporary 

pipeline suddenly changes direction, 

when couplers or pipe sections have 

worn beyond the specified tolerances 

established by the manufacturer of the 

de-watering piping system, or when the 

entire de-watering manifold is 

inadequately designed for the stresses 

that can be imposed while de-watering.

RSPA/OPS recognizes the existence of 

hazards associated with testing 

pipelines and requires operators to 

protect their employees and the public 

during hydrostatic testing. Section 

192.515(a) states that ‘‘* * * each 

operator shall insure that every 

reasonable precaution is taken to protect 

its employees and the general public 

during the testing.’’ In addition, 

§ 195.402(c) requires each pipeline 

operator to prepare and follow 

procedures for safety during 

maintenance and normal operation. 

Advisory Bulletin (ADB–04–01) 

To: Owners and operators of gas and 

hazardous liquid pipeline systems. 

Subject: Hazards associated with dewatering of pipelines. 

Purpose: To advise owners and 

operators of gas and hazardous liquid 

pipelines to consider hazards associated 

with pipeline de-watering operations 

and to follow recommended work 

practices and guidelines to reduce the 

potential for unexpected separation of 

temporary de-watering pipes. 

Advisory: Each operator of a gas or 

hazardous liquid pipeline should take 

recommended precautions against the 

unexpected separation of temporary dewatering pipes during de-watering 

procedures. This advisory bulletin was 

originally issued jointly with the 

Department of Labor’s Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA) as Safety and Health 

Information Bulletin SHIB 06–21–2004. 

The original advisory bulletin issued by 

OSHA can be viewed at http://

www.osha.gov, or the RSPA/OPS Web 

site at http://www.ops.gov.

The following guidelines will help 

reduce the risk of injury to employees 

involved in de-watering activities: 

• Study the piping system. During the 

initial planning stage of a de-watering 

operation, an engineering analysis of the 

existing and temporary piping system 

should be performed to identify the 

pressure associated with fluids and 

other forces that could adversely affect 

the integrity of the pipeline or the 

stability of the drainage and its 

components. The operator should 

design the de-watering system and 

develop installation techniques based 

on the expected forces of the particular 

project. Alternatively, designs and 

techniques could be developed for a 

‘‘worst case’’ scenario that could be 

applied to all de-watering projects. 

• Anchor the de-watering lines. It is 

accepted industry practice to adequately 

anchor or secure de-watering piping to 

prevent movement and separation of the 

piping. Operators should establish 

effective anchoring systems based on 

expected forces and ensure that the 

systems are used during de-watering 

projects. 

• Ensure condition of couplings and 

parts. All couplings and parts of the dewatering system need to be properly 

selected for their application. The 

associated piping which the couplings 

connect is a significant variable in the 

entire mechanical piping system. The 

couplings are manufactured in a 

controlled environment, and variations 

in the quality of the couplings should be 

limited. Operators should ensure that 

couplings are within manufacturer’s 

tolerances and free of damage that may 

result in connection failure. A chain is 

only as strong as its weakest link—in 

de-watering piping systems, the weakest 

link frequently is the temporary dewatering pipe connections. 

• Provide adequate employee 

training. This training should instruct 

employees on de-watering installation 

designs and techniques, including 

proper coupling and anchoring 

methods. Operators should ensure that 

employees understand the potential 

hazards of improperly installed dewatering systems, provide employees a 

means of determining whether the pipe 

groove meets manufacturer’s tolerances, 

and the procedures they should 

implement to protect themselves and 

others working around them. 

• Proper procedures. Operators 

should ensure that proper installation 

and de-watering procedures are 

followed on the job site. 

Operators may refer to recommended 

practices provided by national 

consensus standards organizations, such 

as American Petroleum Institute (API) 

Recommended Practice for 

Occupational Safety for Oil and Gas 

Well Drilling and Servicing Operations 

(API RP 54–1999, Section 12.4.3); 

American National Standards Institute 

(ANSI) Power Piping (ANSI B31.1–1973, 

Section 121.2); and U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE) Safety and Health 

Requirements Manual (EM 285–1–1, 

1996 Section 20).

Issued in Washington, DC, on September 

23, 2004. 

Stacey L. Gerard, 

Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.

[FR Doc. 04–21829 Filed 9–28–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Surface Transportation Board 

[STB Docket No. AB–6 (Sub–No. 425X)] 

The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe 

Railway Company—Abandonment 

Exemption—in Chase, Morris, Marion 

and Dickinson Counties, KS 

The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe 

Railway Company (BNSF) has filed a 

notice of exemption under 49 CFR part 

1152 subpart F—Exempt 

Abandonments, to abandon a 25.57-mile 

line of railroad between BNSF milepost 

0.00 near Neva and milepost 25.45 near 

Lost Springs, in Chase, Morris, Marion 

and Dickinson Counties, KS. The line