J-S21017-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

KASHONDA D. POWELL 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 2030 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 12, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0003402-2018 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and MURRAY, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 10, 2024

Appellant Kashonda Powell appeals from the order dismissing her 

second Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition as untimely. Appellant 

argues that the PCRA court erred in dismissing her first and second PCRA 

petitions. We affirm. 

The PCRA court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history 

of this matter as follows: 

On May 18, 2018[,] following a “fender bender” near the Sunoco 

located at the intersection of 22d Street and Edgmont Ave., [in] 

Delaware County. [A]ppellant[,] using a blunt object[,] smashed 

the driver window of [the victim’s] car. . . . As [the victim] began 

to drive away, Appellant shot her in the face. As a result, 

Appellant immediately was arrested and charged with several 

violations of the Crimes Code, including attempted murder, 

aggravated assault, and related crimes. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 
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On June 16, 2018[,] following [a] preliminary hearing, the charges 

were held for court. On July 2, 2019[,] Appellant entered an open 

guilty plea to criminal attempt murder of the first degree, 

aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, and 

possessing an instrument of crime;[2] during the guilty plea 

hearing, this court and plea counsel conducted on the record a full 

colloquy to confirm Appellant understood the decision to enter the 

plea; as a result of the colloquy this court determined Appellant’s 

plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 

PCRA Ct. Op. 10/5/23, at 1-2. 

On September 25, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of eighty-four to 180 months’ incarceration, followed by five 

years’ probation. Appellant did not file timely post-sentence motions nor a 

direct appeal. Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final 

thirty days later on October 25, 2019. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (stating 

that “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review[]”); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing that a notice of appeal shall be filed 

within thirty days after entry of the order from which the appeal is taken). 

On September 18, 2020, Appellant filed a timely and counseled first 

PCRA petition. Ultimately, after the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice 

of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing, the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s first PCRA petition on August 9, 2022. Appellant did not file an 

appeal. 

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2

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), 2705, and 907(a), respectively. 
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 On April 11, 2023, Appellant filed a motion to reinstate appellate rights, 

which the PCRA court properly treated as an untimely second PCRA petition. 

See PCRA Ct. Op., 10/5/23, at 4-6; see also Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 

736 A.2d 564, 568 n.3 (Pa. 1999) (stating that the proper vehicle for seeking 

the reinstatement of appellate rights is the PCRA). On July 12, 2023, the 

PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s second PCRA petition as untimely. See

PCRA Ct. Op., 10/5/23, at 8. 

Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal. Both the PCRA 

court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P 1925. 

On Appeal, Appellant raises the following issues: 

1. Did the [PCRA] court err[] in dismissing the Appellant’s PCRA 

petition where Appellant alleged that the guilty plea which she 

entered into on July 2, 2019, was not knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent? 

2. Did the [PCRA] court err[] in denying the Appellant’s [first] 

PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing? 

3. Did the [PCRA] court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s 

motion to reinstate appeal? 

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (some formatting altered). 

In reviewing an order denying a PCRA petition, our standard of review 

is well settled: 

Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is limited 

to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported 

by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. The 

PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the 

record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo

standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions. 
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Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted and formatting altered). Moreover, 

[t]he timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. 

[T]he PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not 

be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of the 

petition. In other words, Pennsylvania law makes clear no court 

has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition. The PCRA 

requires a petition, including a second or subsequent petition, to 

be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment 

becomes final. A judgment of sentence is final at the conclusion 

of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review. 

Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(formatting altered); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), (3). 

It is well settled that “no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA 

petition.” Ballance, 203 A.3d at 1031. Courts may consider a PCRA petition 

filed more than one year after a judgment of sentence becomes final only if 

the petitioner pleads and proves one of the following three statutory 

exceptions: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petitioner asserting one of these exceptions 

must file a petition within one year of the date the claim could have first been 

presented. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).3 It is the petitioner’s “burden to 

allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.” 

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1094 (Pa. 2010) (citations 

omitted and some formatting altered). 

 Following our review of the record, we conclude that the PCRA court 

correctly treated Appellant’s April 11, 2023 motion to reinstate her appeal 

rights as an untimely second PCRA petition. See PCRA Ct. Op., 10/5/23, at 

4-6; Lantzy, 736 A.2d at 568 n.3 (Pa. 1999) (stating that the proper vehicle 

for seeking the reinstatement of appellate rights is the PCRA); 

Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 397 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(explaining that a petition seeking the restoration of PCRA appellate rights 

nunc pro tunc must be treated as a subsequent PCRA petition). 

As noted previously, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on 

October 25, 2019. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Therefore, 

under the PCRA, Appellant had one year, or until October 25, 2020, to file a 

timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant’s April 11, 

2023 PCRA petition was therefore facially untimely. 

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3

 On October 24, 2018, the General Assembly amended Section 9545(b)(2) 

and extended the time for filing a petition from sixty days to one year from 

the date the claim could have been presented. See 2018 Pa.Legis.Serv.Act 

2018-146 (S.B. 915), effective December 24, 2018. The amendment applies 

only to claims arising one year before the effective date of this section, 

December 24, 2017, or thereafter. 
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Additionally, it is well settled that “[a]ll requests for reinstatement of 

appellate rights, including PCRA appellate rights, must meet the timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA.” Fairiror, 809 A.2d at 397; see also Lantzy, 736 

A.2d at 570. A court may consider a facially untimely PCRA petition only if 

the petitioner pleads and proves one of the exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Here, Appellant did not raise any of the exceptions in 

her PCRA petition. Therefore, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s 

second PCRA petition was untimely, and that, therefore, the PCRA court did 

not have jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s second PCRA petition. See PCRA 

Ct. Op., 10/5/23, at 8; see also Ballance, 203 A.3d at 1031. For these 

reasons, we affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s untimely second PCRA 

petition. 

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

 

Date: 9/10/2024